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Chapter 4 Exhibits

from Strategy and the Business Landscape

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

The Pharmaceutical Payoff Matrix


(Millions of Dollars)
CLIENTS (CS) PRICE NO PRICE CHANGE E HAS LARGE PRICE ADVANTAGE E HAS SMALL PRICE ADVANTAGE C NEUTRALIZES ES ADVANTAGE VERY LOW 358/190 418/163

ENTRANTS (ES) PRICE LOW 507/168 507/168 MODERATE 585/129 HIGH 624/116

454/155

511/138

636/126

428/50

504/124

585/129

669/128

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

A Framework for Competitor Analysis


What Drives the Competitor Future Goals
At all levels of management and in multiple dimensions

What the Competitor Is Doing and Can Do Current Strategy


How the business is currently competing

Competitors Response Profile Is the competitor satisfied with its current position? What likely moves or strategy shifts will the competitor make? Where is the competitor vulnerable? What will provoke the greatest and most effective retaliation by the competitor?

Assumptions
Held about itself and the industry

Capabilities
Both strengths and weaknesses

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Source: Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy, (New York: Free Press, 1980), Chapter 3

The Limits to Sustainability


40

30

ROI%

20

10

10

Year
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Source: Pankaj Ghemawat, Commitment (New York: The Free Press, 1991)

The Four Threats to Sustainability


Imitation Substitution

Added Value

Appropriated Value

Slack

Holdup

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Trends and Success in the Programming of New Television Series


Averages Trendy Introductions Nontrendy Introductions Year 1 Ratings 15.3 16.3 Year 3 Ratings 16.4 20.4 Years Broadcast 1.8 2.3 % Surviving 3 Years 21% 27%

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Source: Robert E. Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Competitive Convergence: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime Time Television Programming, Unpublished working paper, Harvard Business School (January 1998)

The Economics of Brokerage Business Models, Early 1996


250

200

Price Cost

Dollars

150

100

50

0
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Online/Deep Discount

Source: Rajiv Lal, E-Trade Securities, Inc. Stanford University Discount Full Service Graduate School of Business Case No. M-286, 1996

Asset-Specificity in the Automobile Industry


U.S./U.S. Measures of Asset-Specificity Distance between manufacturing plants (miles) Capital that is not readily redeployable (%) Man Days of face-to-face contact divided by sales to automaker (index) Suppliers sales to automaker divided by suppliers total sales (%)
* Share of part production

Japan/Japan Division (48%)* 276 31 7.9 94 Arms-length (35%)* 125 13 9.9 19 Partner (38%)* 41 31 10.6 60

Arms-length (42%)* 589 15 7.7 34

Partner (10%)* 413 18 9.0 34

Source: Jeffrey H. Dyer, Does Governance Matter?, Organization Science, Vol. 7, No. 6, Nov-Dec 1996
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Market Value versus Cumulated Strategic Investments at General Motors


100 50 0

Market Value

-50 -100

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

$ Billion

-150

Strategic Investments

0%

-200 -250

-300 -350

10%

-400 1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responding to Threats to Sustainability


Responses to Imitation Building Barriers
Economies of scale and scope Learning/private information Contracts and relationships Network externalities Threats of retaliation Time lags Strategic complexity Upgrading

Responses to Substitution
Not responding Fighting Switching Recombining Straddling Harvesting

Added Value

Appropriated Value

Responses to Slack
Gathering information Monitoring behavior Offering performance incentives Shaping norms Bonding resources Changing governance Mobilizing for change
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Holdup
Contracting Integrating Building bargaining power Bargaining hard Reducing asset-specificity Building relationships Developing trust

Chapter 4 Text Related Slides


from Strategy and the Business Landscape

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Outline
I. Approaches to competitor analysis II.The purposes of competitor analysis III. The process of competitor analysis

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

I. Approaches to Competitor Analysis


x x x

Structural analysis Behavioral analysis Game-Theoretic analysis

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Behavioral Analysis of HSC


x

GOALS
State-ownership Lower Profits Growth Objectives

CAPABILITIES
Tosoh/DSM Technology DSM Size/Deep Pockets Political Access

STRATEGY
Migrating Downstream Legal Skirmishing Likely to Expand into US

ASSUMPTIONS
Different Home Base Chemical Company Parents Thinks NutraSweet Will Accommodate

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Behavioral Profiles

Resources and Capabilities Competitor Profile Current Strategy

Apparent Assumptions

Future Goals

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Source: Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy, (New York: Free Press, 1980), Chapter 3

Competitors Goals
x x x x x

Market share vs. profitability Growth vs. dividend pay-out Technological leadership vs. cost leadership Long run vs. short run performance Non-economic vs. economic goals

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Personality Profiles
x x x x x

Conservative vs. aggressive Risk takers vs. risk adverse Operational focus vs. visionary Analytical vs. emotional Profit-oriented vs. growth
Analyze titles & responsibilities: Chair & CEO Chair, CEO & COO Chair & chief scientist ...

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Diagnosing Competitor Goals and Assumptions


x x x x x x x x

Profiles of key management Organization structure Advisors Public statements Results of recent past History Parent company strategy Position in the portfolio

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Competitor Incentives
x x x x

Look ahead and reason back Recognize linkages across markets Pay attention to uncertainties Narrow uncertainties by projecting profits and implied courses of action

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Pulling It All Together


x x

Is the competitor satisfied with its current position? What likely future moves or strategy shifts, will the competitor make and how dangerous are they? Where is the competitor vulnerable? What will provoke the greatest and most damaging retaliation by the competitor?

x x

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

II. The Purposes of Competitor Analysis


Linking Analysis to Action
x x x x x

Offense Defense Influence Cooption Concession

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Interaction: Reality & Perceptions


Common Perceptual Biases
x

Ascribing inertia to competitors, while assuming you will act Assuming competitors have no options Underestimating the intensity of retaliation

x x

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Classic Good Moves ...


x

x x x x

Hard to match; cost them more than it costs you -builds on strategic asymmetries Have commitment value; costly to reverse, so intentions will be believed Help\improve industry structure Lower costs and\or create value for customers Aim at competitors blind spots Anticipate the competition (it is easier to keep them out than kick them out)

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Classic Bad Moves ...


x x x

x x x

Can be easily copied (when you think its unique) Show a lack of commitment Raise costs without creating value; lower prices without expanding volume Undermine industry structure Ignore a firms capabilities Needlessly provoke or mindlessly hurt competitors

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

A Broader Perspective: Influencing Competitors


x x x x

The right competitors can be good Influence the competitors entry and mobility Influence the competitors incentives Avoid creating desperate competitors

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

III. The Process of Competitor Identification


Whom do I analyze?
x

Common approach:
Companies with similar strategies and competitive positions

Often forgotten:
Companies able to:
change industry structure or evolution leverage related capabilities to enter the industry offer substitute technologies provide complementary assets or products

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Procedural Guidelines
x x x x

A lot of information already in house One time efforts rarely succeed Cost/benefit of data collection Data without analysis = low benefit

More than a planning tool and, a framework for self analysis ...

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Sources of Information on Competitors


Public Advertising What competitors say about themselves Promotional materials Press releases Speeches Want ads OTHERS? What others say about them Books HBS cases! Consultants Unions Trade Manuals Technical papers Licenses Patents Courses ... Customers Partners Subcontractors Suppliers Govt SEC Congressional testimony Lawsuits Courts Regulatory agencies ... Lawsuits Agency reports Investors Annual reports Annual meetings 10K, 10Q... Prospectus

... Analysts reports Industry studies Credit agencies

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Protecting Ones Own Information


x x x

Decide what needs to be protected Recognize the range of overt sources of information Recognize the possibility of covert action
telephone and fax intercepts trash analysis employee subversion/insertion

Protecting information requires protecting people

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Anticipating Competitive and Cooperative Dynamics


x x

The detailed analysis of individual competitors The evolutionary analysis of threats to sustainability

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Predicting Profits
39%

3% Bottom Half
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Top Half

Sustainability Analysis
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1 97 1
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Advantage (% ROI)

1 973

19 75

1 97 7

19 79

Sustainability: Resources and Products

Imitability of the Product/Service Low

High

Imitability of Superior Resources

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Threats to Sustained Advantage


Yes

Continued Appropriability
Yes

No

Hold-up Slack

Continued Scarcity

No

Imitation Substitution

Yes

Competitive Advantage

No

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Threats to Sustainability

Imitation Slack Substitution Hold-Up

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Imitation
x

Imitation increases the supply of what a firm uniquely provides


Profits draw a crowd

Imitation is pervasive and can be deadly


Intel in DRAMs EMI in CAT scanners Apple in user-friendly PCs Netscape in browsers Ben & Jerrys in super-premium ice cream Bridal registries on the Internet

But imitation can be deterred


Continental Lite vs. Southwest Airlines Child World vs. Toys R Us

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Imitation: Duration of Intels Monopolies


386 486 Pentium Pentium Pro MMX (4 Years) (3 Years) (2 Years) (1 Year) (3 Months)

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Barriers to Imitation
x x x x x x x x

Scale or Scope Economies Experience/Learning (Tacit Knowledge) Relationships Reputation Retaliation Response Lags Upgrading/Investments Fit

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Substitution
x

Substitution reduces the demand for what a firm uniquely provides by shifting the demand elsewhere
The better mousetrap Due to changes in technology, customer needs, input prices, etc.

Substitution threats can be subtle and unexpected


Videoconferencing vs. air travel Western Union vs. the telephone Conventional contact lenses vs. disposables

For this reason, substitution is an especially effective way to attack dominant players

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Substitution: Book Retailing


Procurement and Logistics Operations Marketing

B&N Offline Amazon Original B&N Online Amazon Response

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Substitution: Steel

Steel Quality

Sheet steel

lity ua Q

of

Steel Structural el ste ced du pro illm ini m

& rods Other bars

Rebar

1975

1980

1985

1990

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Source: Clayton Christensen and Bret Baird, Continuous Casting Investments at USX Corporation, HBS #5-697-066, April 24, 1997.

Responses to Substitution
x x

Before Scan the landscape broadly for threats Understand underlying customer needs
But be prepared to ignore the needs of current customers

After: Your Options


x

Fight the threat


Incorporate their benefits (e.g., orange juice supplemented with calcium) Incorporate their cost reductions (e.g., private labeled items in supermarkets) Face up to your loss of added value, and reduce price before the substitute gets a foothold

x x

If you cant beat them, join them Take the money and run

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Substitution
x x x x x x

Not responding Fighting Switching Recombining Straddling Harvesting

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Hold-up
x

Hold-up diverts value to customers, suppliers, or complementors who have some bargaining leverage
They have bargaining leverage because they have something you need and cant get elsewhere (added value)

x x

Ex: Who makes all the profits from PCs? Hold-up is especially threatening when parties in a relationship have invested in assets that are specific to that relationship (so its hard to walk away)
An electric plant built at the mouth of a coal mine A railroad spur laid to a particular factory Skills that are tailored to a particular employer

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Hold-Up: Genex and G.D. Searle


x

Codeveloped a process for making one of the two key amino acids used in NutraSweet Genex entered into a long-term contract to supply Searle and built a new bioprocessing facility Searle began to renegotiate price within months, and initiated internal production within one year Genex went bankrupt

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Holdup In The PC Industry


40%

Operating Margin

30%

20%

10%

other components microprocessors

personal computers

software

peripherals services

Share of Industry Revenue


Source: Orit Gadiesh and James L. Gilbert, Profit Pools: A Fresh Look at Strategy, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1998, p.145

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Hold-up
x

Multiple sourcing
But investments in relationship-specific assets are important

x x

Tough negotiation Contractual arrangements


But contractual incompleteness limits this option

Vertical integration

Dont base your competitive advantage on specific assets you cant own (like a particular individual)

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Hold-up
x x x x x x x

Contracting Integrating Building bargaining power Bargaining hard Reducing asset-specificity Building relationships Developing trust

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Slack
x x

Slack, or waste within the firm, dissipates value Slack is hard to identify...
Plush carpets for their own sake are slack But plush carpets to win customers and recruit talent might be wise investments

but slack is thought to be large


10-40% of revenues, typically!?!

Slack tends to be worst under certain conditions


Forgiving competitive environments Settings in which managers must have wide discretion over productive processes

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Slack: The Theory of Free Cash Flow


x

Principal-agent problems between managers and stakeholders Managers have incentives to grow the resources under their control Free cash flow enhances managers ability to
Invest resources in negative-return activities Waste resources

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Slack
x

Monitoring of performance
Benchmarking Time-motion studies Outsiders on Boards

Managerial incentives
On average, top executives get roughly $3.25 for each $1,000 of shareholder value created (Jensen and Murphy)

Commitments to return cash to shareholders


e.g., dividends

Appeals to a higher calling, a sense of mission

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Responses to Slack
x x x x x x x

Gathering information Monitoring behavior Offering performance incentives Shaping norms Bonding resources Changing governance Mobilizing for change

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

A Fifth Threat
x

Nonmarket Pressures
Government NGOs Media

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Sustained Cooperative Advantage


With cooperative or competitive interactions, unlikely to gain more than added value Sustained cooperative advantage: significant added value as partner

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Building Sustainable Advantages


x x

Understand your own uniqueness Scan the environment for


Technological changes Variations in input supply Demand shifts

Invest in opportunities that fit

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Protecting Sustainable Advantages


x x

Sustainability is not forever, nor is it free Investment can reinforce it by


Amplifying advantages Multiplying their bases

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Conclusions
x x

The best defense is a good offense That is, defend your advantage by continually upgrading it
Seek out ways to increase willingness to pay without incurring commensurate supplier opportunity costs Seek out ways to reduce supplier opportunity costs without sacrificing commensurate willingness to pay

x x

Make yourself a moving target But remember that the landscape can shift under your feet

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Countering Threats to Sustainability


x

Sustained superior performance requires


Scarcity Appropriability

Two routes to sustainability


Making lumpy commitments Building organizational or technical capabilities over time

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

A Dynamic Theory of Sustainability


x

A dynamic theory of sustainability requires


a link between what you did yesterday and what you can do well today a link between what you do today and what you can do well tomorrow

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Sustainability and Investment


x

Implications for investment


The status quo cannot be sustained without investment Because of the moving competitive baseline, investment is required just to earn average returns Above-average returns require investments that retard the movement of the competitive baseline

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Chapter 4 Case Related Slides

British Satellite Broadcasting vs. Sky TV

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Structural Analysis of BSB vs. Sky


x x x x x x x x x

High fixed costs/Upfront investment Inelastic supply: films, advertising Fixed demand Network effects/Switching costs Diverse competitors Inconsistent goals High strategic stakes Antagonism/emotion Substitutes: BBC/TV/Cable

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

A Behavioral Profile of News Corporation


x

Resources and Capabilities


Second-largest media conglomerate Cash Twentieth Century Fox library 1/3 of British newspapers Experience with satellite TV

Assumptions
Low cost Old/proven technology Commercial programming Quick to market Ability to skirt loopholes

Strategy
Emphasis on electronic media Satellites targeted Presence in English speaking markets ITV stake Losing bidder on official franchise

Goals
Murdochs nonpecuniary motivation

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Game-Theoretic Analysis of BSB vs. Sky


BSB Fight 699, -190 Exit

Fight SKY Exit

2943, -180

-70, 2089

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Chapter 4 Case Related Slides

De Beers

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

De Beers Exhibit A: Value Appropriation

Quantity Bought carats South Africa Namibia Botswana Soviet Union Other Total 9,154 963 7,769 6,000 3,320 27,206

CSO List

COGS

Contrib.

De Beers contrib. $/carat 38 102 13 12 9 24

De Beers Total contrib. $ million 348 98 101 72 30 649

De Beers Total contrib. % 54% 15% 16/6 11% 5%

$/carats 58 200 53 125 60 77

$ million 531 193 412 750 199 2084

$/carat 20 98 10 113 51 44

$ million 183 94 78 675 169 1199

$/carat 38 102 43 12 9 33

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Exhibit A: Value Appropriation (contd)


Ratio of CSO List to inventory COGS = 1.75 Ratio of CSO List to inventory COGS = 1.42 (w/o Debswana) Average markup in South Africa: 190% Average markup in Namibia: 104% Average markup in Botswana: 430% -- wow!

1982 Inventory is $1.7 billion at COGS or $2.42 billion at CSO List. This amounts to 31 m carats inventory (mostly gems) Actual CSO Sales over next 4 years

Year 1983 1984 1985 1986

CSO Sales $1.6b $1.61b $1.82b $2.56b

Years to clear inventory 1.51 1.5 1.33 0.95

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

De Beers Exhibit B: Supply Forecast 1986


Gems 000 carats Australia Zaire Botswana USSR South Africa Namibia Angola Tanzania Other Total 1986 Total 1982 % Increase Polished Supply Available: Yield: 1982 1986 % Increase
1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Near Gem 000 carats 13,500 5,548 7,924 4,664 3,387 10 245 88 1,507 36,873 15,713 135%

Industrial 000 carats 15,000 12,020 4,661 3,180 3,479 41 123 22 1,202 39,728 11,283 252%

Total 000 carats 30,000 18,493 15,537 10,600 9,155 1014 1,226 220 4,285 90,530 37,332 142%

1,500 925 2,952 2,756 2,289 963 858 110 1,576 13,929 10,336 35%

48%, 4961 6686 35%

17.50 2750 6453 135%

------7711 13139 70%

De Beers Exhibit C: Demand Forecast


Forecast Retail Demand Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 (mill. cts.) 7.9 8.51 8.8 9 9.3 9.6 9.9 Forecast Supply Surplus (mill. cts.) 7.7 9.05 10.4 11.75 13.1 13.1 13.1 Surplus Cumulative Surplus (mill. cts) 0.55 2.15 4.9 8.7 12.2 15.4 Probable Value of Surplus ($/carat) 20 21 22.1 23.2 24.3 25.5 26.8 Additions to Inventory ($ mill.) 12 35 64 92 89 86 Cumulative Additions to Inventory ($ mill.) 12 47 111 203 293 378

(mill. cts.) -0.2 0.55 1.6 2.75 3.8 3.5 3.2

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Exhibit C: Demand Forecast (contd)

Sensitivity Analysis
Probable Value of Surplus in 1982 ($/carat) 30 40 50 60 Cumulative Additions to Inv. by 1988 ($ mill.) 562 745 928 1,111

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

Exhibit C: Demand Forecast (contd)

Actual Retail Demand Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 (mill. cts.) 7.9 8.5 9 9.9 13.2 13 14.5

Actual Supply (mill. cts.) 7.7 9 10 11.5 13.1 13.1 13.1

Surplus

Cumulative Surplus (mill. cts.)

Average Value of Surplus ($/carat)

Additions to Inventory ($ mill.)

Cumulative Additions to Inventory ($ mill.)

(mill. cts.) -0.2 0.5 1 1.6 -0.1 0.1 -1.4

0.5 1.5 3.1 3 3.1 1.7

145 90 -40 -51 456 -300

145 235 195 144 600 300

1999 Pankaj Ghemawat

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