[G.R. No. 135527.

October 19, 2000] Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA OJERIO, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the August 28, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal is DENIED and the challenged Decision dated 26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, is AFFIRMED. No costs. The affirmed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1) Land Registration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondents title to three parcels of land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered: I. In Civil Case No. 4739 1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner]spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos. 2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered the cancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of Title Nos. 296 and 297, which decision has already become final and executory; 3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit. II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 1. Confirming *herein respondents+ title *to+ the land subject of registration and ordering the registration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age, Filipino, married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - share; and Cecilia P. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of legal age, Filipinos, single and residents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - share; and 2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees be issued. SO ORDERED.
The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows: On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents. The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also opposed the application for registration. Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February 1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendantsspouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205Bataan with an area of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares. In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to Branch 2.

Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al. which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous with reality, bolstered the finding that *they had+ never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property. It explained: On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented, concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of the Public Land Laws. On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x x x. Debunking petitioners reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo, the CA ratiocinated as follows: *Herein respondents+ do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 in GR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendantsappellants Manalos and granted the issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses. What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact the subject properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to be public agricultural land. x x x. Hence, this Petition.
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration: I Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld. II Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners titles *to+ the lots. III Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed an act of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent. IV Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the amount of P50,000.00 representing attorneys fees. In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration of respondents title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act, the pertinent portion of which reads: SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. x x x x x x x x x

Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and Arsenio Obdin, who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as required by the Public Land Act. We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain. Unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073 clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo, a suit involving the same parcel of land and instituted by herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held: As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision: x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically became a disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in 1971. (Emphasis supplied.) Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide as follows: SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public benefit. SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they had been occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise: The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed: Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146). We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule that the Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent. Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTs should have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote: SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but for reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit. We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about. Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a title better than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially confirmed. Moreover, respondents invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA must be rejected. In that case, the Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x. Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit. In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. They have not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not petitioners, have a better right thereto.

Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in question. The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property. The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be improper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no personality to recover the property, because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109111 June 28, 2000 CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, MONTSERRAT M. SANTIAGO, NILDA M. IBOLEON, BELINDA MANAHAN AND JOSEFINA M. CAPINPIN, petitioners,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, respondents. PARDO, J.: On appeal1 before the Court is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals declaring respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System ("MWSS") the owner of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in San Mateo, Rizal, and allowing registration of title to the land in its name. The Court of Appeals reversed the "partial decision"3 of the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal. The issue raised is factual, which we do not review.4 However, since the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at different factual conclusions, we depart from the general rule. On July 22, 1980, the MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal an application for registration of title under the torrens system of eleven (11) parcels of land, situated in San Mateo, Rizal.5 Long before World War II, MWSS buried a 42-inch diameter steel aqueduct pipeline under the subject parcels of land. The pipeline drew water from the Wawa Dam in Montalban, Rizal to the Balara Filters in Quezon City. Fifteen (15) kilometers long, it ran through the municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo and Marikina.6 On August 21, 1987, MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal a second amended petition alleging ownership of the subject parcels of land. It alleged that by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest, the National Waterworks and Sewerage System ("NAWASA") and the Metropolitan Water District ("MWD"), it has been in "'open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the said parcels of land," under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. On January 27, 1988, petitioners Nilda Manahan Iboleon, Belinda Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin, as heirs of Modesto Manahan, filed an opposition to the application. They alleged ownership of a portion of the land subject of the application. They presented transfer certificates of title, related papers and documents to support their claim. They stated that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interest ever ceded ownership or possession of the property to any person, and even assuming that MWSS possessed the land, it did not acquire ownership by prescription. On October 24, 1988, petitioner Montserrat M. Santiago as heir of Vicente Manahan, likewise filed an opposition. She claimed ownership of a portion of the land included in the application and presented Original Certificate of Title No. 1153 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. On October 24, 1988, petitioner Carmelino M. Santiago also filed an opposition, alleging ownership of a portion of the land. He presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-39258 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. After due hearings, on November 26, 1990, the trial court decided the case in favor of petitioners. It reasoned: First, the tax declarations presented by MWSS did not prove ownership and merely constituted prima facie evidence of possession. Second, the transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners proved ownership and cannot be attacked collaterally. Third, the pipelines installed by respondent MWSS were buried and hidden under the ground, hence, MWSS' possession was not "open". Further, respondent admittedly discontinued use of the pipelines after 1968, hence, possession was not "continuous". Last, respondents' use and possession of the land was merely tolerated by petitioners and could not ripen into ownership. Thus, the decretal portion of the trial court's partial decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the oppositors Montserrat Santiago, Carmelino Santiago, Nilda Manahan Iboleon, Belinda Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin and against the petitioner, as follows: 1) Ordering the dismissal of the petition insofar as the opposition of the said oppositors are concerned; 2) Declaring the aforesaid oppositors the owners of the strips of land applied for and are located inside the oppositors' properties described in OCT 1153; TCT No. N-39258 and TCT Nos. 178148 and 178149; and 3) Sentencing the petitioner to pay the oppositors the sum of P10,000.00 as and attorney's fee and 4) To pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Given at San Mateo, Rizal this 26th day of November, 1990. (t/s) CIPRIANO D. ROMA Judge 7

On January 21, 1991, respondent MWSS appealed to the Court of Appeals.8 Resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled differently. Reasoning: First, the property covered by the original and transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners merely adjoins and are adjacent to the property claimed by MWSS. 9 Such is shown by the technical descriptions in the certificates of title presented. The parcels of land covered by the certificates of title do not overlap or encroach on the property claimed by MWSS. In fact, the strips of land where the pipes were laid were deliberately excluded in the survey plans of petitioners' property. The survey served as basis for issuance of petitioners' certificates of title. Second, the aqueducts were installed and buried long before World War II, under untitled land, giving rise to the presumption that such land was "public land". Third, petitioners did not present compelling proof that the land under which the pipelines were buried were owned by their predecessors-in-interest. There was no proof that use of the land by MWSS was merely tolerated by petitioners' predecessors. The testimonies presented by petitioners on the matter are hearsay. Last, MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. True, the pipes were "hidden" under the land. However, it is a matter of public knowledge and judicial notice that the pipes existed and were buried there before World War II. The existence of the pipelines was indicated above the ground by "pilapils" constructed by the adjoining landowners themselves, since they planted rice alongside the strips of land. Further, the fact that use of the pipes was discontinued was not relevant since the pipes had remained buried under the land up to the present.1wphi1.nt On July 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the partial decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and in lieu thereof, another partial decision is entered herein declaring applicant MWSS owner of the parcels of land applied for by them in this case and granting and allowing their registration in its name. Costs against oppositor-appellees. SO ORDERED. 10 On February 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, clarified its decision as follows: WHEREFORE, it is hereby clarified herein that the titled property of appellee Carmelino Santiago adjoining a portion of the strips of land applied for registration by appellant MWSS in this case is excluded from the new partial decision rendered by this Court in favor of appellant in LRC Case No. 18-SM in lieu of that of the lower court appealed from in this case. As to the other matters raised in appellees' motion for reconsideration, we find the same without merit and said motion is denied with respect thereto. SO ORDERED. 11 Hence, this appeal. 12 Petitioners raise three issues 13 essentially revolving around the question of whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are correct. The appeal is not meritorious. The findings of the Court of Appeals are supported by substantial evidence and are binding on this Court. 14 Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands. Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of evidence are broken. While the titles presented by petitioners show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in the titles presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and adjoining owners of the land claimed by MWSS for registration. The titles presented are: (1) OCT No. ON-1153 the property is bounded on "the NW., from point 10-1, by the property of Metropolitan Water District, Lot 21, Psu-73270." (2) TCT No. 39258 a portion of Lot C, Psd 68750 is adjacent or adjoining the MWSS property on the southeast side from corner 28 to 29. (3) TCT No. 178148 ". . . Lot 4, Psu-133565, LRC # N-4438 . . . is bounded on the SE by property of the Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot 5, Psu-133565, LRC # N-4438 . . . is bounded on the NE by property of the Metropolitan Water District." (4) TCT No. 178149 "Lot 6, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Case No. 4438 . . . is bounded on the E by the properties of Maria Valero and Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot 7, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Case No. N-4438 . . . is bounded on the NW by property of the Metropolitan Water District, Lot 23, Psu-73270." A torrens certificate of title covers only the land described therein together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing more. 15 The titles presented by petitioners covering as they do land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS' application for registration, do not support their claim, but even defeat it. Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners' predecessors-in-interest being members of the bar and learned in the law merely allowed and tolerated MWD or NAWASA's use of the land, they would have reduced the agreement into writing for use in the registration of their property which at that time was still unregistered. 16 We hold that if petitioners' predecessors were truly the owners of the subject parcels of land, they would have taken steps to have the land properly titled long ago. The land was possessed by MWSS long before World War II. That was over sixty (60) years ago! Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason of negligence or inattention for a long period of time. 17 MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership of the land. True, tax declarations do not prove ownership. However, tax declarations can be strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. 18 Since MWSS possessed the land in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years preceding the application, MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. By placing the pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the land by MWSS, subjecting the land to its will and control. 19 Petitioners cannot argue that MWSS' possession was not "open". The existence of the pipes was indicated above the ground by "pilapils". Even assuming arguendo that the pipes were "hidden" from sight, petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the existence of the pipes. The possession must be public in order to be the basis for prescription. 20 If the owner proves that the possession is clandestine, it will not affect his possession. 21

Petitioners also cannot claim that MWSS abandoned its possession. There is no showing that by discontinuing the use of the pipes, MWSS voluntarily renounced its claim over the land. Petitioners did not prove that the spes recuperendi was gone and the animus revertendi was given up. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, 22 we AFFIRM the same in toto. No costs. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt [G.R. No. 130174. July 14, 2000] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., represented by Rodolfo Perez, respondents. DECISION PARDO, J.: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 07, Batangas City decreeing the registration under the Property Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City in favor of respondent corporation. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: "On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title over three parcels of land, more particularly described as follows: "Lot 9895 Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas; "Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas; "Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas. "Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner. "The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). It also claims that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or encumbrance; that no adverse interests exist with respect to the subject lots; and that there are no military or forest reservation or any pending litigation affecting said subject lots. "Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus alleged that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also declared that the lots are not tenanted nor subject of an agricultural leasehold relationship. "Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances. "On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial Court for the applicants failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to set the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Court on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994. "At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon presented all the necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. Thereafter, upon motion of the application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of special default against the whole world with the exception of the government. The court also issued an order designating and authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to receive evidence. "At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant and Project Controller of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a resident of Tabangao and was a member of the Task Force responsible for negotiating with the numerous landowners and the subsequent acquisition by sale of the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in Tabangao and Libjo, Batangas. He testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of all kinds. "He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor by the previous owners; the spouses Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was acquired by applicant-corporation by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25, 1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr. Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and that Lot 10171 was purchased by applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de Jesus who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2"). "The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax receipts showing full payment of all taxes due. (Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He testified that there is no pending litigation involving the subject properties or any adverse claims filed against the applicants; that they are free from any liens or encumbrances; that there are no tenants or agricultural leasehold contracts involving the subject properties; and that there are no mineral deposits in said lots. "Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell Gas Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract executed on May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M"). "The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas since June 1971. He testified that he has been a resident of Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present and that he knew the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the lots subject of the application. He mentioned that he was the Chairman of the Task Force that was responsible for the negotiations that were done with the previous owners of the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware of the specific dealing regarding the lots subject of the application. He said that he knew the previous owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.

"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership, possession and the status of the lots subject of the application. "In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo Fernandez of the Bureau of Lands and Loida Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest Development. "Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application are not covered by any kind of public land application or patent; that they are not within the reservation area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for any government purposes; and that the entire areas are within the Alienable and Disposable Zone as Classified under Project No. 13, Map No. 718 and certified on March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation Report made by the Bureau of Lands dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b"). "Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest Development. "On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. It held: "From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing applicant-corporation that the latter and its predecessors-ininterest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the parcels of land applied for up to the present, for the requisite period of time, under bona fide claim of ownership, and considering, that no evidence has been presented by the government in support of its Opposition, and even presented the favorable testimonies of Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the Bureau of Lands and Miss Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both CENRO, Batangas City Branch, Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports, the Court is convinced that the applicant-corporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had sufficiently established its rights to the grant of title over the three (3) parcels of land subject of this case." In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the appealed decision. Hence, this appeal. The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for. The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The ruling is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration." Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions of P. D. No. 1529 or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and registration of title. However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, en concepto de dueo, or a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, or since June 12, 1945, or earlier, or since time immemorial. Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of possession by itself and its predecessors in interest for at least thirty (30) years before the filing of the application. Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that in the year 1945, he knew that the land designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596 square meters was owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant corporation on March 31, 1980 and that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155 with an area of 4,031 square meters was owned by Perpetuo Almario way back in 1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the same to applicant corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with the numerous landowners for acquisition of their property by Tabangao Realty, Inc. However, in 1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously could not competently testify on the ownership and possession of the subject land. Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest. "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession." "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property." The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence. Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115508 February 15, 2000 ALEJANDRO AGASEN and FORTUNATA CALONGE-AGASEN, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PETRA BILOG, assisted by her husband FELIPE BILOG, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On April 7, 1980, private respondent Petra Bilog, assisted by her husband Felipe Bilog, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership1 with the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, involving an Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four (8,474) square meter parcel of land registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16109 of the Registry of Deeds of La Union. She alleged that sometime in 1964 or 1965, petitioners took possession and assumed ownership of the said property, appropriating the fruits therefrom. She alleged that despite demands on them to vacate the land, petitioners refused to do so and even filed a case for Annulment of TCT and/or Reconveyance with Damages before the same court, which case was, however, dismissed on February 12, 1980. Thus, in her complaint, private respondent prayed that she be declared the true and absolute owner of the subject land and petitioners be ordered to turn over possession thereof to her. Additionally, private respondent prayed for P300,000.00 as attorney's fees, P2,000.00 as expenses of litigation as well as P60,000.00 representing the value of the land's produce from 1965 to the time of the filing of the case and P4,000.00 annually until the case is terminated. In their Answer,2 petitioners Alejandro Agasen and Fortunata Calonge-Agasen asserted that the subject land used to form part of Lot No. 2192, a forty two thousand three hundred seventy two (42,372) square meter parcel of land owned in common by the five (5) Bilog siblings, private respondent Petra Bilog being one of them. Petitioners claimed that they became the owners of the portion of the subject land which belonged to private respondent as her share therein, by virtue of: (1) the sale in their favor of 1,785 square meters thereof by Leonora Calonge, sister of Fortunata Calonge-Agasen, and (2) the sale in their favor by private respondent of the remaining 6,717.50 square meters on June 24, 1968, by virtue of a notarized Partition with Sale. Petitioners also affirmed that they had been in possession of the subject land since the time of the above-mentioned sale transactions, with a house of strong materials built thereon. By way of counterclaim, petitioners charged private respondent with having fraudulently caused title to the subject land to be issued in her name, following the subdivision of the original land between her and her co-heirs/owners, in violation of their (petitioners') rights over the subject land. Thus, petitioners prayed for the annulment of title in private respondent's name and for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as for the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as litigation expenses and P7,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. On November 19, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 3, rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, dismissing the complaint and declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16109 in the name of private respondent null and void. 3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and private respondent was declared the true and absolute owner of the subject land. 4 Accordingly, petitioners were ordered to turn over the subject land to private respondent. With the denial of petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration on May 20, 1994,5 the instant Petition was filed, anchored upon the following grounds I. THE DECISION (ANNEX A) ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE (EXH. 1) AND THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (EXH. 2) NOT AUTHENTIC AND VALID; II. THE DECISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AND IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND TAX DECLARATION NO. 21460 (EXH. B) AND CERTIFICATION OF TAX PAYMENTS (EXH. C); III. THE DECISION ERRED IN FINDING/HOLDING THAT THE NON-REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE AND THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WITH THE REGISTER OF DEEDS MADE THE PURCHASES THEREUNDER "DENTED" AND DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY VEST TITLE OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO THE BUYERS; IV. THE DECISION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DAILY NOTEBOOK (EXH. 3) CONTAINING THE MEMORANDUM OF INSTALLMENT SALE BY LEONORA CALONGE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FORTUNATA AGASEN (EXH. 3-a TO 3-c) OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND DESCRIBED IN EXH. 2 WAS NOT A VALID OR CREDIBLE DOCUMENT OF TRANSFER; V. THE DECISION GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TCT NO. 16109 (EXH. A) CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BARRED BY THE RULE ON INDEFEASIBILITY OF A TORRENS TITLE AFTER THE LAPSE OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION.6 Although the instant case is a petition for review under Rule 45 which, as a general rule, is limited to reviewing errors of law, findings of fact being conclusive as a matter of general principle, however, considering the conflict between the factual findings of the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals, there is a need to review the factual issues as an exception to the general rule. 7 As correctly stated by the lower court, the crucial question in the instant controversy is whether or not the two (2) documents, relied upon by petitioners as basis for their claim of ownership, are valid. Overthrowing the lower court's finding of validity, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondent's testimonial and documentary evidence "junked'' petitioners' documents (Exhibits "1" and "2"). We disagree. To begin with, it is not denied that the two subject documents are notarized documents and, as such, are considered public documents which enjoy the presumption of validity as to authenticity and due execution.8 One of the documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was identified by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maximo Quero, the administering officer who had notarized it. The legal presumption of validity of petitioners' duly notarized public documents has not been overcome by preponderant evidence by private respondent, upon whom the burden of proof rests, having alleged the contrary. 9 The subject documents were also attached by petitioners to their Answer where they were alleged as part of the counterclaim. As such, private respondent should have specifically denied under oath their genuineness and due execution.10 After all, a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. 11 Having failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the said documents, private respondent is deemed to have admitted the same. And while private respondent denied having signed any document selling the subject parcels of land, the trial court found her signature on the subject documents to be genuine, after a comparison thereof with her own documentary evidence on record (Exh. "B"). Indeed, it has been held that where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses;12 and evidence respecting handwriting may be given by a comparison made by the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered. 13 In the case at bar, the lower court compared private respondent's signatures on the subject documents with that appearing on her own evidence (Exh. "B") and found the same identical.

The following circumstances all indicate the genuineness and due execution of the subject documents: (1) The subject documents were duly notarized public documents; (2) The documents enjoy the legal presumption of validity; (3) Their genuineness and due execution were not specifically denied under oath by private respondent; (4) Private respondent's signature thereon were found genuine by the lower court upon a comparison of her signature thereon with that in her own documentary evidence; (5) The actual identification and positive testimony of petitioner; and (6) The testimony of the lawyer who had notarized one of the subject documents. Private respondent's bare denial of the same cannot, by any measure, overcome the above-mentioned evidence and legal presumptions in petitioners' favor. As for the sale in petitioners' favor by the original vendee thereof, Leonora Calonge, the Court of Appeals accepted private respondent's charges that there was no valid document of transfer and that the notebook with memorandum of sale and record of installment payments, relied upon by petitioners, was worse than the two subject documents. Again, we disagree. The memorandum of sale appearing in Exhibit "3" is sufficient to prove the sale between petitioner Fortunata Calonge Agasen and her late sister, the previous vendee of the land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale from private respondent. After all, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into provided all essential requisites are present.14 The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.15 It was likewise error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the transactions were "dented by the failure to register/annotate the same with the Register of Deeds" and that due to such failure, the documents "did not automatically bind the subject property." First, one of the subject documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, was in fact registered. Second, as elucidated in Fule vs. Court of Appeals16 The Civil Code provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent. From this moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments. Article 1358 of the Civil Code which requires the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument, is only for convenience, and registration of the instrument only adversely affects third parties. Formal requirements are, therefore, for the benefit of third parties. Non-compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of the contract nor the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder. In the light of the foregoing, we reverse the Court of Appeals's ruling that the failure of petitioners to register the Partition with Sale was fatal. The Court of Appeals also found petitioners' claim of ownership to be unsubstantiated, in contrast to that of private respondent who presented tax declarations and certification of tax payments in her favor. As pointed out by petitioners, however, the tax declarations in the name of private respondent for the year 1978 were issued only in 1977, and only after she had secured title to the property in her name. Such a belated declaration has been held to be indicative of an absence of a real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration.17 On the other hand, the real estate tax payments certified as paid by the Municipal Treasurer refers to the entire mother Lot No. 2192 before it was subdivided or partitioned into five (5) equal lots. Private respondent cannot be said to have paid taxes on the subject property during the period when petitioners claimed that the property had already been sold to them. We also note that, far from being unsubstantiated, petitioners' claim of ownership is backed by their long years of possession of the subject parcels of land. There is no dispute that petitioners had occupied the subject land since the sale in their favor, i.e., since 1964 in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale and since 1968 in the case of the Partition with Sale. They have also built a concrete house which has long been standing thereon. Then, too, petitioners have adequately explained why they have not pursued their action for annulment of title against private respondent, which the Court of Appeals viewed as having "further darkened the cloud of suspicion which hovered over the questioned documents." Private respondent herself admits that petitioners were the first to assert their right, by filing an action for annulment of title and/or for reconveyance with damages against private respondent18 which complaint was, however, dismissed without prejudice.19 On the other hand, the complaint of private respondent was filed two months after the dismissal of their complaint, prompting them to merely interpose their cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the lower court. Finally, the Court of Appeals is likewise in error in holding that private respondent's title was "vested with the garment of indefeasibility." The rule on indefeasibility of torrens title i.e., that torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration applies only to original titles and not to subsequent registration. An action for annulment of title and/or reconveyance which was previously filed by petitioners and interposed in their counterclaim is an action open to them to attack private respondent's fraudulently acquired title. Neither may the compulsory counterclaim of petitioners challenging the title of private respondent be brushed aside as merely a collateral attack which would bar a ruling on the validity of the said title.20 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 10309 is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, dismissing Civil Case No. A-713, annulling Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16109 in the name of private respondent and finding petitioners to be the lawful owners of the land covered by the same, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123509 March 14, 2000 LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD JR. in his capacity as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District Land Officer of the Bureau Of Lands, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they have title to the real property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real property, especially banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the share of the other co-owners. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the June 15, 1995 Decision and the January 15, 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 34213.2 In its Decision, the CA ruled: 3 WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof a new one is hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the plaintiffs-appellees['] second amended complaint. Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands as null and void; 2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos to deliver the property subject of this case to the plaintiff; and 3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute owner of the land in controversy. The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, filed on March 14, 1988, 4 by Petitioners Lucio Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia. Robles and Emilio Robles. The facts were narrated by the trial court in this wise: There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters. He occupied the same openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his name for taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration No. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land, declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon.1wphi1.nt Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of said property and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles. In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the, name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh. "19"), father of Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh. "16"). In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968. The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos. In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the property, but was unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos took possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names. 5 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows: The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel of land bounded and more particularly described as follows: A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. Bounded [i]n the north by the property of Venancio Ablay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the property of Veronica Tulak y Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by the property of Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n the west by the property of Dionisio Ablay y Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters, more or less, assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 23219.

As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed Robles, commenced the instant suit with the filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in possession of the land since 1942, the plaintiff alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987 that they came to know of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant Rural Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had already sold the self-same parcel in favor of the Santos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig, rec.). Twice amended to implead Hilario Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent discovery of the issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the defendant spouses, the Director of Land as parties-defendants (pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs' complaint sought the following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their half-brother, constituted on the land, as well as all proceedings taken subsequent thereto, were null and void, to wit: Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a preliminary mandatory injunction be issued forthwith restoring plaintiffs to their possession of said parcel of land; (b) an order be issued annulling said Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in the name of defendants spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos, the deed of sale aforementioned and any tax declaration which have been issued in the name of defendants; and (c) ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and equitable under the premises. (pp. 120-121, orig. rec.) xxx xxx xxx With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the parties-litigants' agreement (p. 203, orig. rec.) the trial court proceeded to try the case on the merits. It thereafter rendered the challenged June 17, 1991 decision upon the following findings and conclusions: The real estate, mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario Robles is not valid because his signature in the mortgage deed was forged. This fact, which remains unrebutted, was admitted by Andrea Robles. Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed allegedly by Hilario Robles in favor of the defendant Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. was not valid, it stands to reason that the foreclosure proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore, the defendant bank did not acquire any right arising out of the foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could not have transferred any right to the spouses Santos. The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will not help the defendant Santos any. There can be no question that the subject [property was held] in the concept of owner by Leon Robles since 1916. Likewise, his successor-in-interest, Silvino Robles, his wife Maria de la Cruz and the plaintiffs occupied the property openly, continuously and exclusively until they were ousted from their possession in 1988 by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that "open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public lands for the period prescribed by law (30 years), creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other action, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Possession of public land . . . which is [of] the character and duration prescribed by the statute is the equivalent of an express grant from the State, considering the dictum of the statute itself[:]; "The . . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." No proof is admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption[,] and confirmation proceedings would be a little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time. Registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988) The land in question has become private land. Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos is not valid because at the time the property subject of this case was already private land, the Bureau of Lands having no jurisdiction to dispose of the same. (pp. 257-259, orig. rec.) Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses and the defendant Rural Bank jointly filed their July 6, 1991 Notice of Appeal (p. 260, orig. rec.) . . . . 6 Ruling of the Court of Appeals In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners no longer had any title to the subject property at the time they instituted the Complaint for quieting of title. The CA ratiocinated as follows: As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to the property at the time of the institution of the instant complaint. (pp. 25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of continuous possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5, 1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is amply evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject realty for taxation purposes not only in the name of Exequiel Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig, rec.) but also in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol. II orig. rec). On the theory that tax declarations can be evincive of the transfer of a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 214), the court a quo clearly erred in simply brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land in litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it cannot, under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to speak of when Exequiel Ballena executed the November 7, 1966 Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.) Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of the land left behind by their common father, Silvino Robles, such title would still be effectively discounted by what could well serve as the latter's acts of repudiation of the coownership, i.e., his possession (p. 22, TSN, November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for taxation purposes in his own name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig. rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for more than twenty (20) years from the time the subject realty was transferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctly maintain that prescription had already set in. While it may be readily conceded that an action to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718; Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Burton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a co-owner or, for that matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-ininterest who occupy the community property other than as co-owner[s] can claim prescription as against the other co-owners (De Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly argue that the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause of action by prescription. Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a quo gravely erred in invalidating the real estate mortgage constituted on the land solely on the basis of Andrea Robles' testimony that her husband's signature thereon was forged (p. 257, orig. rec.),

xxx xxx xxx In according to the foregoing testimony . . . credibility which, while admittedly unrebutted, was altogether uncorroborated, the trial court lost sight of the fact that the assailed deed of real estate mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a public document, the acknowledgment of which is a prima facie evidence of its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the presumption of validity in the absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to overcome such presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA 584). The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it is, moreover, borne in mind that Hilario Robles made the following admissions in his March 8, 1989 answer, viz: 3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendant has no legal basis considering that as the lawful owner of the subject real property, defendant Hilario Robles has the right to mortgage the said real property and could dispose the same in whatever manner he wishe[s] to do. (p. 96, orig. rec.) Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoing admission is binding against Hilario [Robles]. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. They cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through [a] palpable mistake or [unless] no such admission was actually made (Philippine American General Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194). It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees cause any that, aside from complying with the requirements for the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage (Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10", Volume II [)], the appellant Rural Bank had not only relented to the mortgagor's request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II, orig. rec.) but had likewise granted the latter's request for an extension of the redemption period therefor (Exhibits "11" and "12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in discussing the Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for value and in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the mortgagor and the plaintiffs'-appellees cannot now be heard to challenge the validity of the sale of the land after admittedly failing to redeem the same within the extension the appellant, Rural Bank granted (pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990). Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitution and foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage, the plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon . . . Free Patent No. IV-I must necessarily fail. The trial court, therefore, misread, and ignored the evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneous conclusion. Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and jurisprudence, Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio all surnamed Robles filed this Petition for Review. 7 The Assigned Error Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent court: Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that with the transfers of the tax declaration over the parcel of land in question from Silvino Robles to Exequiel Ballena, then to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario Robles, then to Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then finally to Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by themselves and their predecessors in interest have been in open, actual and adverse possession of said parcel of land since 1916 up to their forced removal therefrom in 1988, have lost their title to said property by prescription to their half-brother, Respondent Hilario Robles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses Santos. 8 For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be broken down into three points: first, the nature of the remedy of quieting of title; second, the validity of the real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the free patent granted to the Santos spouses. First Issue: Quieting of Title Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides: Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. 9 It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. 10 Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 11 That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is a valid and efficacious is clear in the present case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. The more important question to be resolved, however, is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property on their continued and open occupation and possession as owners thereof. They allege that they inherited it from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it from his father, Leon. They maintain that after their father's death, they agreed among themselves that Petitioner Lucio Robles would be tending and cultivating it for everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario would be paying the land taxes. Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until 1987, the subject property had been declared in the names of Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., and finally, Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that as co-owners of the subject property, they did agree to the real estate mortgage constituted on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein should not have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions. On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and Ruth Santos trace their claim to the subject property to Exequiel Ballena, who had purportedly sold it to Hilario and Andrea Robles. According to private respondents, the Robles spouses then mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. not as co-owners but as absolute owners

 in order to secure an agricultural loan worth P2,000. Upon their failure to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold to the bank as the highest bidder. Thereafter, private respondents purchased the property from the bank. Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations issued in their names. Also undisputed is the fact that the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the subject property was declared in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes. On September 30, 1965, it was again declared in the same name; on October 28, 1965, in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the name of Hilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name of the Rural Bank of Cardona and, finally, in the name of the Santos spouses. Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed property. First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the petitioners are alleging continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that the subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and in fact declared in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly, inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto. The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is vital to the resolution of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until 1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented, however. Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere coowner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title. Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a coowner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. 12 In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. 14 Neither should his payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners. Second Issue: Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. 15 In the present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute owner of the entire subject property; and that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith. First, the bank was utterly remiss in its duty to establish who the true owners and possessors of the subject property were. It acted with precipitate haste in approving the Robles spouses' loan application, as well as the real estate mortgage covering the disputed parcel of land. 16 Had it been more circumspect and assiduous, it would have discovered that the said property was in fact being occupied by the petitioners, who were tending and cultivating it. Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the Deed of Sale purportedly showing that the ownership of the disputed property had been transferred from Exequiel Ballena to the Robles spouses, or that it had subsequently been declared in the name of Hilario. Because it was dealing with unregistered land, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction between Hilario and his father-in-law Exequiel were suspicious, the bank should have exerted more effort to fully determine the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of Compostela vs. Court Appeals 17 invalidated a real estate mortgage after a finding that the bank had not been in good faith. The Court explained: "The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks." In Tomas v. Tomas, the Court held: . . . Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description. . . . Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding the bank's insistence that it had become the owner of the subject property and had paid the land taxes thereon, the petitioners continued occupying it and harvesting the fruits therefrom. Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his undivided share therein. The said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what legally pertains to the latter Hilario's share in the disputed property. Third Issue: Efficacy of Free Patent Grant Petitioners repeatedly insist that the disputed property belongs to them by private ownership and, as such, it could not have been awarded to the Santos spouses by free patent. They allege that they possessed it in the concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly and continuously as early as 1916 until they were forcibly ousted therefrom in 1988. They likewise contend that they cultivated it and harvested its fruits. Lucio Robles testified: xxx xxx xxx Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land? A Because before my father died, he showed me all the documents. Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of this parcel of land?

A My father, sir. Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land? A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir. Q From whom? A From his father, Leon Robles, sir. Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles acquired this land? A It was inherited from his father, sir. Q What is the nature of this parcel of land? A It's an agricultural land, sir. Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land was planted with what crops? A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who planted those trees, sir. Q When did you plant those trees? A Before the death of my father, sir. Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated this parcel of land? A I took charge of the land after the death of my father, sir. Q Up to when? A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already filed. 20 The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject property is private land. The petitioners do not concede, and the records do not show, that it was ever an alienable land of the public domain. They allege private ownership thereof, as evidenced by their testimonies and the tax declarations issued in the names of their predecessorsin-interest. It must be noted that while their claim was not corroborated by other witnesses, it was not controverted by the other parties, either. Carlos Dolores insisted that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., of which he was the manager, had acquired and possessed the subject property. He did not, however, give any reason why the petitioners had continued occupying it, even as he admitted on the stand that he had visited it twice. 21 In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land, petitioners are "deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 22 The land was "segregated from the public domain." Accordingly, the director of lands had no authority to issue a free patent thereto in favor of another person. Verily, jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering private land is null and void. 23 Worth quoting is the disquisition of the Court in Agne v. Director of Lands, 24 in which it held that a riparian owner presently in possession had a better right over an abandoned river bed than had a registered owner by virtue of a free patent. Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was issued, the President of the Philippines, or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitutes no part of the public domain, and cannot possibly come within the purview of said act 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same is excluded from the provisions of the text thereof. We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of the free patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands. Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee and his successors-in-interest acquired no right or title to said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and indefeasible. Hence we ruled in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al. that if at the time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land. Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain, although it is not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Being null and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner. The Court has previously held that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. xxx xxx xxx

We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of herein petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning. The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have the requisite personality to question the free patent granted them, inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule that actions to nullify free patents should be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General at the behest of the Director of Lands." 25 Private respondents' reliance on this doctrine is misplaced. Indeed, the Court held in Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 26 that only the solicitor general could file an action for the cancellation of a free patent. Ruling that the private respondents, who were applicants for a free patent, were not the proper parties in an action to cancel the transfer certificates covering the parcel of land that was the subject of their application, the Court ratiocinated thus: The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga 27 ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. . . . . Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed for by the private respondents in Peltan would revert the property in question to the public domain, the ultimate beneficiary would be the government, which can be represented by the solicitor general only. Therefore, the real party-in-interest is the government, not the private respondents. This ruling does not, however, apply to the present case. While the private respondents in Peltan recognized that the disputed property was part of the public domain when they applied for free patent, 28 herein petitioners asserted and proved private ownership over the disputed parcel of land by virtue of their open, continued and exclusive possession thereof since 1916. Neither does the present case call for the reversion of the disputed property to the State. By asking for the nullification of the free patent granted to the Santos spouses, the petitioners are claiming the property which, they contend, rightfully belongs to them. Indeed, the same issue was resolved by this Court in Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals. 29 In that case, the trial court dismissed a Complaint seeking the declaration of nullity of an Original Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a free patent, reasoning that the action should have been instituted by the solicitor general. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held: It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit affectum. Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was afforded an opportunity to express its position in these proceedings. But it manifested that it would not file a memorandum, because "this case involves purely private interests." 30 The foregoing considered, we sustain the contention of petitioners that the free patent granted to the Santos spouses is void. It is apparent that they are claiming ownership of the disputed property on the basis of their possession thereof in the concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied, possessed and cultivated it as owners for more than thirty years, 31 only one conclusion can be drawn it has become private land and is therefore beyond the authority of the director of lands. Epilogue We recognize that both the petitioners and the Santos spouses fell victim to the dubious transaction between Spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. However, justice and equity mandate that we declare Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles to have the requisite title essential to their suit for quieting of title. Considering the circumstances peculiar to this complicated problem, the Court finds this conclusion the logical and just solution. The claim that petitioners were guilty of laches in not asserting their rights as owners of the property should be viewed in the light of the fact that they thought their brother was paying the requisite taxes for them, and more important, the fact that they continued cultivating it and harvesting and gaining from its fruits. From another viewpoint, it can even be said that it was the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., which was guilty of laches because, granting that it had acquired the subject property legally, it failed to enforce its rights as owner. It was oblivious to the petitioners' continued occupation, cultivation and possession thereof. Considering that they had possessed the property in good faith for more than ten years, it can even be argued that they thus regained it by acquisitive prescription. In any case, laches is a remedy in equity, and considering the circumstances in this case, the petitioners cannot be held guilty of it. In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the disputed property a contract executed between Spouses Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., on the other is hereby declared null and void insofar as it prejudiced the shares of Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles; it is valid as to Hilario Robles' share therein. Consequently, the sale of the subject property to the Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained to his share only. Likewise declared null and void is Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands covering the subject property. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as modified by the last paragraph of this Decision, the trial court's Decision is REINSTATED. No costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987 FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON, HERMINIA BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE, as Attorney-in-Fact, TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA VICTORIA as Attorney-in-Fact, ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION BARANDA, petitioners, vs. EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. CRUZ, J.: We are faced once again with an all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy: an old woman dying without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling over her properties like the soldiers in Mount Calvary casting lots for the seamless robe of Jesus. The difference in this case is that even before the owner's death, two of the claimants had already taken over her properties by virtue of certain supposed transfers which are in fact that reason for this petition. The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated "Bilihan ng Lupa" and dated January 29 and February 3, 1977, 1 under which Paulina L. Baranda, a widow, sold five parcels of land to her niece, Evangelina Baranda, and a sixth parcel to her other niece, Elisa, also a daughter of Pedro Baranda, Paulina's brother. The sales were made, according to the documents, for the total consideration of P105,000.00 duly acknowledged as received by the transferor from the vendees. 2 What made these transactions suspect was a subsequent complaint filed by Paulina Baranda against her nieces on August 1, 1977, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in which she alleged that she had signed the said deeds of sale without knowing their contents and prayed that Evangelina and Elisa be ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof to her. 3 This complaint was later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated August 2, 1977, 4 under which the defendants, in exchange for such withdrawal, obligated themselves to "execute absolute deeds of sale covering the above-mentioned properties in favor of the First Party," meaning the plaintiff. It was also stipulated in the said agreement thatc. The FIRST PARTY shall keep possession of the aforementioned deeds of sale, as wen as the Transfer Certificate of Title of the above-listed properties, which are in the hands of the SECOND PARTIES; d. That any time that the FIRST PARTY desires to sell, mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the abovementioned properties, the SECOND PARTIES shall execute the proper documents in accordance with the desire and wishes of the FIRST PARTY. As it turned out, only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her; Evangelina never complied with the agreement; and when Paulina died in 1982, the certificate of title over the lots in question were still in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. 5 This was the factual situation when on April 26, 1982, the herein petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the late Paulina Baranda, filed a complaint against Evangelina and Elisa Baranda in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the lots, with damages. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs: * a) declaring the deeds of sale null and void; b) ordering the defendants to execute the necessary instrument to transfer the lots in question to the estate of the late Paulina Baranda; c) ordering defendants to turn over to the estate of Paulina Baranda the sum of P24,000.00 a year from February 1982 until the administrator of said estate takes over the management of said properties, with interest at 12% per annum; and d) sentencing defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for and as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 6 On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, ** the decision of the trial court was reversed and the deeds of sale were held valid and binding, for reasons to be discussed presently. The respondent court, in dismissing the complaint, also required the complainants to pay P50,000.00 for attorney's fees, P30,000.00 for litigation expenses, P20,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The petitioners are now before us to challenge that decision. 7 We address ourselves first to the basic issue, to wit, the validity of the three deeds of sale allegedly signed by Paulina Baranda without knowing their contents. The respondent court, rejecting the findings of the trial court, upheld the questioned deeds, stressing that they were public documents and that their authenticity could further be sustained by the testimony of the private respondents. We disagree. While it is true that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, 8 this rule is nonetheless not absolute but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 9 Such evidence, as the Court sees it, has been sufficiently established in this case. The curious part about the supposed deeds of sale is the consideration allegedly agreed upon, in the amounts of P25,000.00 for lots 4 and 5, P50,000.00 for lots 9, 11 and 6, and P30,000.00 for lot 8 which Evangelina testified as having been actually paid to their aunt on February 3, 1977. Especially intriguing is the source of the said purchase price, in the total amount of P105,000.00, which by the testimony of the private respondents was paid by them in cash to their aunt in the office of Atty. Galos, who notarized the deeds of sale. 10 According to Evangeline, the sum of P100,000.00 was given to her by a "balikbayan" boy friend, and it was from this amount that she paid her share of the purchase price of P75,000.00. 11 According to Elisa, her sister Evangelina lent her P15,000.00 and she raised another P15,000.00 from her grandmother in the province to complete the P30,000.00 due from her for the lot she was buying. 12 At the time of these transactions, neither Evangelina nor Elisa was gainfully employed or had independent sources of income, both being then fresh college graduates aged 25 and 26 years old, respectively. 13 The tale of the mysterious and generous "balikbayan" is something "out of this world," in the language of the trial court, and we are inclined to agree, although not in those words. This Court is itself rather perplexed that the respondent court should have accepted this tissue of lies so readily, considering its obvious falsity. The "balikbayan" is a hazy figure, if we go by his own girl friend's testimony, without even a name at least, let alone other personal circumstances to give him bone and body. All we can glean from the record is that he is an exceedingly trusting and generous person who, presumably out of love for Evangeline, willingly delivered P100,000.00 in cold cash to her and thereafter disappeared completely. (Five years later, Evangelina was still unmarried.) 14 Strangely, this amorphous sweetheart was not even presented at the trial to corroborate his beloved, assuming their love was as strong as ever, or at least to protect his investment. Elsa's explanation of how she got her own P30,000.00 is equally imaginative and was obviously part of the fabric or fabrication woven by her sister to conjure what now appears to be a non-existent fund. As Elisa puts it, half of the P30,000.00 she paid came as a loan from Evangelina's boy friend's P100,000.00 and the other P15,000.00 was given to her by her grandmother. 15 This grandmother was another generous if also improbable figure, if we go by Elisa's testimony this time. According to her, she persuaded her grandmother to sell her lands in La Union, to give her the purchase price of P15,000.00, and to come with her husband to live with her in Manila, 16 not in her own house, significantly, but in the house of Paulina Baranda, with whom she and her sister were themselves living. Elisa did not present any document to prove that her grandmother did sell her properties to raise the P15,000.00, or, indeed, that she had any property at all to sell. There is no evidence of this whatsoever. At any rate, it is hard to believe that this old woman would agree to sell her own properties in La Union, where she was presumably making a living, and with her second husband (who was not even related to Elisa and Evangeline) to live off her granddaughters, who were themselves in a way also living off Paulina Baranda in the latter's house. Paulina Baranda and the grandmother were strangers.

The sisters made another incredible claim, viz., that from the house where they and Paulina Baranda were living together they carried the amount of P105,000.00 in cold cash to the office of Atty. Galos where they delivered it to Paulina Baranda. 17 Apparently, Paulina then brought it back to the same house where it came from in the first place, in a preposterous pantomime that invites laughter, not belief, and would make them out as three silly persons from some inane nursery rhyme. Why the nieces did not pay the money in the house instead of bringing it all the way from the house and back is something that has not been sufficiently explained by the private respondents. They could have shown, for example, that Paulina Baranda intended to bring it somewhere else, say, for deposit in a bank, or for the purchase of some property, such as the ticket to the United States where she was allegedly planning to migrate. 18 There is no evidence of such deposit or purchase, however, no evidence at all of where that money went after it was supposedly received by Paulina Baranda on the date of the alleged transaction. It also simply disappeared like the "balikbayan" who never returned. Paulina Baranda herself denied under oath that she ever sold her lands to Evangelina and Elisa, alleging in her verified complaint that she "never executed any deed" conveying the title to her properties and "was surprised and shocked to learn" later that her transfer certificate of title to her lots had been cancelled and new certificates of title had been issued in favor of the private respondents.19 She withdrew this complaint only after her nieces agreed in writing to reconvey the properties to her "in order to preserve family solidarity and in order to avoid litigation among the parties." 20 The nieces explain away this complaint by saying it was merely simulated, to prevent the U.S. government from discontinuing her pension as a war widow on the ground that she had squandered her property. 21 If that was her only purpose, one might well wonder why it was necessary at all to commence litigation as a mere resale of the properties would have been sufficient and easily effected without the asperity of a civil complaint. Considering that, as the private respondents kept insisting, there was never any misunderstanding between them and their aunt, there would have been no difficulty in their acceding to her request for a resale of the properties to protect her pension. The fact that the complaint had to be filed shows they were unwilling to reconvey the properties after the aunt demanded their return following her discovery of the fake deeds of sale, an unwillingness further manifested when Evangelina refused to comply with this aforesaid agreement and never reconveyed the lots supposedly bought by her. By offering this explanation, the private respondents are in effect asking this Court to condone and approve their attempt to deceive and defraud the government of a sister state. There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is claimed by the private respondents, are not the proper parties to question the validity of the deed of sale. The reason given is that they are not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the challenged transactions. It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived, however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and several nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as petitioners Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda Villarte, children of two deceased brothers and a sister. 22 The above- named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the children of another deceased sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda. The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following: Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional rights. This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate." 23 There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale. Neither can it be argued that the petitioners cannot assail the said contracts on the ground that they were not parties thereto because as heirs of Paulina Baranda they are affected, and adversely at that, by the supposed sales of her properties. As this Court has held A person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. 24 The real party-in-interest in an action for annulment or contract includes a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in the contract if he is PREJUDICED in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties. 25 Moreover, it is expressly and specifically provided in the Civil Code that: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. ... As Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in his concurring opinion in Armentia v. Patriarca, 26 speaking of a similar situation, "what petitioners, however, question is the validity of such transfer or disposition for if it could be established that such disposition was invalid, the property allegedly conveyed never left the patrimony of the transferor,

and upon the latter's death without a testament, such property would pass to the transferor's heirs intestate and be recoverable by them or by the administrator of the transferor's estate should there be any." Assuming then that the petitioners are proper parties to challenge the validity of the private respondents title to the land in question, may it not be argued that the right to do so had nevertheless already prescribed when they filed the complaint in 1982? The Civil Code provides in Article 1391 that an action to annul a contract on the ground of vitiated consent must be filed within four years from the discovery of the vice of consent. In the instant case, however, we are dealing not with a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue influence, violence or intimidation that can justify its nullification, but with a contract that is null and void ab initio. Paulina Baranda declared under oath in her complaint that she signed the deeds of sale without knowing what they were, which means that her consent was not merely marred by the above-stated vices, so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all. We are also satisfied that there was no valid consideration either for the alleged transfers, for reasons already discussed. Lack of consent and consideration made the deeds of sale void altogether 27 and rendered them subject to attack at any time, conformably to the rule in Article 1410 that an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts "does not prescribe." Act No. 496, which was in force at the time the complaint was filed, provided that the action to annul a registration of land under the Torrens system should be filed within one year; otherwise, the same shall be barred forever. 28 This is not an absolute rule, however, as the Torrens system is not supposed to be used as an instrument for wrongdoing or to validate an illegal acquisition of title to the prejudice of the real owner of the property registered. We have consistently ruled that when there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust, should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his wrong doing. (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620). An action to compel reconveyance of property with a Torrens title does not prescribe if the registered owner had obtained registration in bad faith, and the property is still in the latter's name. The reason is that the registration is in the nature of a continuing and subsisting trust. (Caladiao v. Vda. de Blas, L-19063, April 29, 1964). A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds. (Ignacio vs. Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. Provided only that the property has, as in this case, not passed to an innocent third person for value, such an action is permitted. We have held that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers' name is not to set aside the decree after one year from the date thereof. Respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, he may nevertheless bring an ordinary action for reconvevance or for darmages if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 29 It was in conformity with this doctrine, in fact, that the petitioners filed on April 26, 1982, their complaint against the private respondents for annulment of the deeds of sale and for reconveyance of the lands subject thereof which were illegally registered in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. We deal with one final matter that should be cause for serious concern as it has a direct relevance to the faith of our people in the administration of justice in this country. It is noted with disapproval that the respondent court awarded the total indemnity of P120,000.00, including attorney's fees and litigation expenses that were double the amounts claimed and exemplary damages which were not even prayed for by the private respondents. Such improvident generosity is likely to raise eyebrows, if not outright challenge to the motives of some of our courts, and should therefore be scrupulously avoided at all times, in the interest of maintaining popular confidence in the judiciary. We therefore caution against a similar recklessness in the future and call on all members of the bench to take proper heed of this admonition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the trial court is REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents. BIDIN, J.: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question. On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens. On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada. Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25) On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination: In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicantsappellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28) Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed. Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented therein. At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence. As found by the trial court: The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bonafide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26) Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus: The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27) The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues: 17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)

18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15) The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides. As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads: Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied) As amended by PD 1073: Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945. It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that: (The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . . Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . . xxx xxx xxx As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]). The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33). In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis. We disagree. In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed. This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]): . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. . . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra) It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments. In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution). . . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . . . . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . . xxx xxx xxx To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . . xxx xxx xxx

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land. In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother. But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit: Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied) Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads: Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides: Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized. From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved. The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides: Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act. The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96644 June 17, 1994 HEIRS OF JUAN OCLARIT, namely: FRANCISCA VDA. DE OCLARIT, SOFRONIO OCLARIT, BELACIO OCLARIT, RUFINO OCLARIT, JUANA OCLARIT DE MACALOS, assisted by her husband HILARIO MACALOS, FELISA OCLARIT DE LACRE, assisted by her husband, COSME LACRE; HEIRS OF PAULA OCLARIT DE OCANG, namely: PETRA OCANG and ALFREDO OCANG, ANGELA OCLARIT DE OCANG, assisted by her husband, CARLOS OCANG, EPIFANIA OCLARIT DE ALMODOBAL, assisted by her husband, URBANO ALMODOBAL, CRESENCIA OCLARIT DE IVARRETA, assisted by her husband, LUCRESIO IVARRETA, NARCISA OCLARIT DE CAGAS, assisted by her husband, JUAN CAGAS, and JUSTO OCLARIT, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZACARIAS BALASABAS, respondents. BIDIN, J.: Petitioners seek the review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 28, 1990, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, Tagbilaran City, dismissing their complaint for quieting of title with damages and declaring the defendant (private respondent herein) the owner of the parcels of land subjects of controversy. In 1953, the late Juan Oclarit, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, allegedly purchased from Martin Macalos a parcel of unregistered land located in Antipolo, GarciaHernandez, Bohol, with no permanent landmarks or boundaries in consideration of the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos. The deed of sale simply described the property as bounded on the north and east by the property of Herminigildo Baja, on the south by Mariano Gales and on the west by a brook. In 1956, Oclarit bought five more parcels of land located in Antipolo and Ulbujan, also in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, from Dalmacio Gales in consideration of the sum of six hundred (P600.00) pesos. Parcel IV thereof is described as follows: A parcel of an irrigated rice and coconut lands, bounded on the NORTH, by the land of Leon Macalos; EAST, by the land of Mariano Gales; SOUTH, by the land of Pablo Gales, and on the WEST, by the land of Saturnino Gales; containing an area of 9 ares and 28 centares, more or less, without visible landmarks of the boundaries of the same, covered by Tax Declaration No. R-19915 now transferred and declared under the name of the herein VENDEE, JUAN OCLARIT, with the total assessed value of P30.00. In 1975, the heirs of Oclarit filed an action for the quieting of title and damages against respondent Balasabas before the then Court of First Instance of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 3103. The complaint alleged that in January 1969, private respondent entered the properties subject of the action. Failing to work on the area planted to palay, private respondent climbed the coconut trees, replaced the "J.O." markings on the trees with "F.G.", representing Felipa Gales, his mother, and caused to be recorded in the cadastral survey of the land the name of Felipa Gales as claimant against Juan Oclarit. The heirs of Oclarit considered the acts of private respondent as having cast a cloud of doubt over their title to the property and therefore deprived them of the enjoyment of the fruits of the coconut trees. Petitioners further alleged that the late Juan Oclarit, from the time of the acquisition of said properties, had exercised dominion and ownership thereon openly, peacefully, adversely and uninterruptedly. It was also claimed that the deceased planted coconut trees and other crops on the property, enjoyed their produce and paid the realty taxes on the land which was continued by his heirs after his death. In his answer, respondent Balasabas claims to have actually and lawfully possessed the disputed parcels of land "since time immemorial". According to respondent, the first parcel of land was owned by his mother, Felipa Gales, by virtue of inheritance, and declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. D-1120; while the second parcel of land was acquired by him from his own mother as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed on March 20, 1963 and which he declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. D-1006. In addition, respondent likewise alleged possession of the parcels of land openly, peacefully, adversely and continuously without disturbance from any party until he was molested by the heirs of Oclarit. It was contended that Oclarit himself surreptitiously declared these lands for taxation purposes in his own name. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court appointed Teotimo Borja, Deputy Provincial Assessor of Bohol, as commissioner for the purpose of determining whether the lands described in the complaint and covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-13935 and D-13926 overlapped with any of the lands described in the defendants affirmative and special defenses and covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-1006. In 1978, the court-appointed commissioner conducted a relocation survey and an ocular inspection of the properties in controversy in the presence of the heirs of Oclarit, their counsel, respondent Balasabas, a policeman, and adjoining owners Procopio Oclarit, Galicana J. Pagaran, Maxima Macula, Felipe Macula and some disinterested persons. In his report dated May 25, 1979, the commissioner made the following findings and observations: When plaintiffs were asked the extent of their land under the tax declaration No. D-13935, they pointed to the undersigned that figure in Annex A which is embraced from corners 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 back to 1 by a red ball pen broken lines. The area of this is approximately 3,639 square meters (.3639 ha.). The area of the tax declaration No. D-13935 is .0928 ha. This Annex A, which is made an integral part of this report has been traced from the file of the Bureau of Lands Office in Jagna, Bohol. The personnel in that office informed the undersigned that no Lot numbers have as yet been assigned and that the traverse is not yet computed because it will be done by IBM. This land is partly cocal (on the northeastern portion) and partly riceland. There are thirty (30) coconut trees mostly of which are 40 to 50 years old; Defendant Zacarias Balasabas pointed the extent of his claim under the tax declaration No. D-1120 as that area in the cadastral survey. In other words he refer(red) to his claims as that figure in Annex A embraced by corners 1, a, 2, 3, 4, b, c, d, e, 11, 12, f, 13, 14 to 1 and shaded by pencil diagonal lines and which is titled HRS. OF JUAN OCLARIT VS. FELIPA GALES in the cadastral survey. This contains an area of 1,420 square meters (.1420 ha.), more or less. The tax declaration No. D-1120 has an area of .44010 ha.; Plaintiffs and defendants both claimed the same parcel of land on the western portion of Annex A and which is titled FRANCISCA MACALOS VS. ZACARIAS BALASABAS in the cadastral survey as that which is represented by their tax declaration Nos. D-13926 and D-1006, respectively. This parcel which is embraced by corners A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K to A contains an area of 3,098 square meters (.3098 ha.), more or less. The tax declaration No. D-13926 in the name of Juan Oclarit contains an area of .0204 ha. and the tax declaration No. D-1006 of defendant has an area of .8147 ha. There are approximately 200 coconut trees many of which are still non-bearing. The contour of this lot is generally hilly. (Rollo, p. 39) In its decision, the lower court made the following findings: the heirs of Oclarit and Balasabas are laying claim over the same parcels of land; Dalmacio Gales, who sold to Oclarit the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13935, was an uncle of Balasabas mother, Felipa Gales; Martin Macalos, the vendor of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 13926, was the cousin of Balasabas grandmother, Guillerma Gales; the area being claimed by the heirs of Oclarit is, per commissioners report, approximately 3,639 square meters (.3639 ha.) while Tax Declaration No. 13935 shows that it is only 928 square meters (.0928 ha.) and the area of the second parcel per commissioners report is approximately 3,098 square meters (.3098 ha.) while that reflected in Tax Declaration No. 13926 is only 204 square meters (.0204 ha.). From these findings, the lower court expressed its surprise as to the size of the area being claimed by the heirs of Oclarit according to the commissioners report in comparison with the areas shown in Tax Declarations Nos. 13935 and 13926. While recognizing that areas stated in tax declarations are not "approximately exact," the lower court nonetheless considered the discrepancies between the actual areas being claimed and those shown in the tax declarations as "too obvious to be taken with excuse." Moreover, it doubted the credibility of petitioners for their failure to explain why the adjoining owners named in their claim are different from the adjoining owners found by the commissioner. Furthermore, if petitioners were indeed the real owners of the two parcels of land, they would have taken steps for the correction of the smaller areas stated in the tax declarations. Concluding that petitioners were claiming much bigger parcels than what their evidence can support under justifiable circumstances, the trial court thus disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding a preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendant, judgment is hereby rendered: 1 Dismissing the complaint; 2 Declaring the defendant as the owner of the lots covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-1006 with area of .4010 hectare and .8147 hectare, respectively and ordering the plaintiffs to recognize such ownership by the defendant; and 3 Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant attorneys fee of P500.00 and litigation expenses of P400.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. SO ORDERED. On appeal, respondent court ruled that petitioners failed to prove either legal or equitable title to the two parcels of land which are necessary in an action for quieting of title. Petitioners claim of ownership was based principally on tax declarations which, however, are not conclusive evidence of ownership. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial courts declaration that private respondent is the owner of the two parcels of land and such ownership should be recognized by petitioners. It considered such conclusion of the lower court as "bereft of any convincing evidence" because tax receipts, tax declarations and survey plans are not conclusive and indisputable bases of ownership. Accordingly, it disposed of the appeal in the following tenor: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court a quo dismissing the plaintiffs complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. The portions thereof declaring the defendant as the owner of the lots covered by Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-1006, respectively, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant attorneys fee of P=500.00, litigation expenses of P=400.00 and costs of the proceedings are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Without pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40) Their motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied, the heirs of Oclarit instituted the instant petition. Private respondent did not appeal the above disposition. The petition is moored primarily on the following contentions: (a) the filing of Civil Case No. 3103 was the only legal remedy available to petitioners against the "malicious and unwarranted actuations" of private respondent; (b) Oclarits undisturbed claim of ownership of the two parcels of land which he acquired in 1953 and 1956, had spanned more than ten years until private respondent disturbed it in 1969; (c) the two parcels of land mentioned by private respondent in his answer are "foreign and alien" to the two parcels which Oclarit bought from Dalmacio Gales and Martin Macalos and because these vendors had been in possession of the property "from time immemorial", the "waters of prescription have set in"; (d) the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the real worth of Exhibits "N" to "P" otherwise it would have noted that petitioners "clear ownership over said two (2) parcels of land in litigation as the description found therein jibed materially" with the averments in the complaint, and (e) the lower court, in a decision in another case, cited (Ramos v. Court of Appeals 112 SCRA 543) holding that tax receipts are strong evidence of possession as no one in his right mind would pay realty taxes year after year for property not in his actual possession. From the above submissions, it is at once apparent that petitioners assail the factual findings of both courts below. However, there is no basis for considering this case as an exception to the general rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on and are not reviewable by this Court (Oporto v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 878 [1992]). A careful review of the decisions below do not show that both courts overlooked essential facts which, if considered, would have changed the outcome of the case. Moreover, the matter of giving credence to evidence presented is best addressed by the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have appeared before him (Sapu-an v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701 [1992]). In civil cases, the lower court must lean towards a party who successfully presents preponderance of evidence in his favor. It is thus too late in the day for petitioners to claim that the parcels of land which Oclarit had bought are "alien" or different from the parcels which private respondent had allegedly acquired from his mother both by inheritance and by purchase. This is clearly a factual issue which is beyond the ambit of this Courts jurisdiction. It was precisely for the purpose of pointing out with particularity the parcels of land involved that the lower court appointed a commissioner whose findings may be adopted in toto by the trial court (See: Apurillo v. Garciano, 28 SCRA 1054). Had the petitioners been in possession of solid evidence that the parcels of land they are claiming are "alien" or "foreign" to those declared by private respondent as his, they should have questioned the commissioners report which was based on the relocation survey and ocular inspection which were conducted in their presence. Moreover, petitioners claim that their property is different from those of private respondents is indeed antithetical to their filing of the complaint for quieting of title there would not have been any basis for claiming that private respondent cast a cloud of doubt to their title over their two parcels of land. More, the deed of sale wherein Martin Macalos conveyed to Oclarit a parcel of land did not even indicate with particularity the area of the land covered thereby. This explains why they indiscriminately pointed at boundaries which are even beyond what could have been bought by Oclarit. Although it is true that what defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description but the boundaries therein laid down (Vda. de Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 213 SCRA 95 [1992]), in controversial cases as in this case where there appears to be an overlapping of boundaries, the actual size of the property gains importance. Thus, the lower court correctly stressed that it would have done petitioners some good had they correctly specified even in their tax declarations the areas of the land they were claiming. It is well settled that anyone who claims that he has a better right to the property, must prove both ownership and identity of the said property (Beo v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 574 [1991], citing Flores v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 717 [1989]). An area delimited by boundaries properly identifies a parcel of land. With regard to tax declarations as bases for claim of ownership, petitioners capitalize on what was obviously an obiter in (Ramos v. Court of Appeals) (supra) that no one in his right mind would be continuously paying taxes for property that is not in his actual possession. On the contrary, any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove he is in actual possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared for taxation purposes from 1908 to 1945, did not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the claimants actual possession of said property (De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). In the same vein, tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property (Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 [1991]; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214 [1992]). As earlier stated, private respondent did not appeal from the adverse decision of the appellate court. Yet, respondent ventures to implore this Court to nullify and reverse the decretal portion of the decision subject of this petition and to declare him the owner of the lots covered by his Tax Declarations Nos. D-1120 and D-1006. This cannot be legally done. Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. An appellee may only make counter statement of errors to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to adduce arguments which would otherwise modify or reverse the same, for in such case, an appeal must have been seasonably filed (Itogon-Suyoc Mines v. NLRC, 117 SCRA 523 [1982] and cases cited therein). There being no appeal taken by private respondent from the adverse judgment of respondent court, the decision has become final as against him and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. That respondent may have been in possession of the disputed properties since 1965 is of no moment. This Court is not a cadastral court before which respondent can seek confirmation of title. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128531 October 26, 1999 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE L. YUPANGCO, JR., respondents. MENDOZA, J.: The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, the Solicitor General is required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the proceedings void. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The facts are as follows: Private respondent Vicente Yupangco is the owner of a unit in a condominium building in Legaspi Street, Makati City, as evidenced by Certificate of Title No. 7648. Because his aforesaid certificate could not be located, he filed, on January 28, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati, a petition for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost copy, pursuant to 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree). The trial court ordered the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to comment on the petition and thereafter set the case for initial hearing. On February 11, 1994, the Registrar of Deeds of Makati filed a manifestation that she had no objection to the petition. After hearing private respondent's evidence, the trial court rendered, on December 15, 1995, its decision granting the petition, declaring as invalid the missing copy of the certificate of title, and ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati to issue a new owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of private respondent. A copy of this decision was furnished the Solicitor General.1wphi1.nt On February 5, 1996, the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the trial court's decision on the ground that no copy of private respondent's petition or notice thereof had been given to him. His motion was, however, denied. The Office of the Solicitor General then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision 1 dated March 5, 1997, affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Private respondent's petition before the trial court was anchored on 109 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides: Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the facts of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered. Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree. 2 (Emphasis added) Nothing in the law, however, requires that the Office of the Solicitor General be notified and heard in proceedings for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law, involving original registration proceedings, specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those who must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Lands. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, invokes 35(5), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code which provides: Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx (5) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings . . . He contends that, in view of this provision, it was mandatory for the trial court to notify him of private respondent's petition and that its failure to do so rendered the proceedings before it null and void. 3 The contention has no merit. The provision of the Administrative Code relied upon by the Solicitor General is not new. It is simply a codification of 1(e) of P.D. No. 478 (Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General) which similarly provided: Sec. 1. Powers and Functions. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: e. Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings . . . . It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be notified of proceedings for the issuance of the owner's duplicate certificate of title. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the government in land registration and related proceedings. Even so, however, the request for representation should have come from the Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case. Here, there is no dispute that the Registrar of Deeds of Makati was notified of private respondent's petition, but she manifested that her office had no objection thereto. The Solicitor General does not question the propriety of the action and manifestation of the Registrar of Deeds, nor does he give any reason why private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title should be denied. Instead, he claims that the fact that he was given a copy of the decision is an admission that he is entitled to be notified of all incidents relating to the proceedings. This is not correct. Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proceedings for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title, the lack of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. This case should be distinguished from our rulings in cadastral registration cases 4 and original land registration proceedings 5 which cases require that the Solicitor General be notified of decisions and hold as decisive, for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the appeal filed by the government, the date of his receipt of the decisions therein and not that of the Director of Lands or of his other representatives. 6 The issue and the applicable laws in those cases are different.

The important role of the Office of the Solicitor General as the government's law office cannot be overemphasized. Its powers and functions, however, should not be rigidly applied in such a manner that innocuous omissions, as in the case at bar, should be visited with so grave a consequence as the nullification of proceedings. After all, no prejudice to the government has been shown.1wphi1.nt WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 119357. July 5, 2000] LAGUNA ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, JUAN B. AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, ROGELIO AYENDE, LETICIA F. B. BALAT, FELOMINA B. BATINO, ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORESTO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT, GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, EUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO A. GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, ZACARIAS R. HERRERA, FRANCISCO A. JUANGCO, GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, REYNARIO U. LAZO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO MANDANAS, EMILIO M. MANDANAS, GREGORIO M. MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDANAS, TEODORO MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B. MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, AGAPITO MATIENZO, ARMANDO P. AMTIENZO, DANIEL D. MATIENZO, MAXIMO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANTIO T. PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PESQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE, DOPMOSOP F. PETATE, IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, LITO G. REYES, AQUILINO B. SUBOL, CLESTINO G. TOPINO, BONIFACIO G. VILLA, CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD B. VILLA, JACINTA S. ALVARADO, ROSA C. AMANTE, RODOLFO ANGELES, ROGELIO AYENDE, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, SOTERA CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON, LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO JUANGCO, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO LANGUA, ROMEO S. LANGUE, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PESQUIZA, PABLO A. PLATON, LITO G. REYES, REMIGIO M. SILVERIO, JOHN DOES AND MARY DOES, respondents. [G.R. No. 119375. July 5, 2000] CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, JUAN B. AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, ROEGLIO AYENDE, LETICIA P. BALAT, FELOMINA P. BATINO, ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORETO CANUBAS, MAXIMO A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT, GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO GONZALES, GREGORIO A. GON-GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, ZACARIAS R. HERRERA, FRANCISCO A. JUANGCO, GERVASIO A. JUANGCO, REYNARIO U. LAZO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO MANDANAS, EMILIO M. MANDANAS, GREGORIO MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDAMAS, TEODORO MANDAMAS, CONSTANCIO MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, AGAPITO MATIENZO, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO, DANIEL D. MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANTO T. PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PESQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PEATE, DIONISIO F. PETATE, IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, LITO G. REYES, AQUILINO B. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPINO, BONIFACIO G. VILLA, CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD B. VILLA, JACINTA S. ALVARADO ROSA C. AMANTE, RODOLFO ANGELES, ROGELIO AYENDE, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, SOTERA CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON, LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO JUANGCO, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, MRIANITO T. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PESQUIZA, PABLO A. PLATON, LITO G. REYES, REMIGIO M. SILVERIO, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, respondents. DECISION PARDO, J.: These are consolidated cases and are decided jointly. They are the separate appeals of petitioners from the same decision of the Court of Appeals in two original petitions consolidated and jointly decided because they involved the same questions of law and fact. The first petition is an appeal by Laguna Estates Development Corporation from the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing its petition to nullify the order of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) ruling that it has jurisdiction to grant private respondents a right of way over petitioners private roads within its landholdings. The second petition is an appeal by Canlubang Sugar Estate from the same decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing its petition to prohibit the DARAB from conducting further proceedings in the DARAB case including petitioner as one of the parties that DARAB ordered to grant a right of way over private road lots within the property of petitioners and not to impede the free access thereto under penalty of contempt. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: On 12 December 1989, some 234.76 hectares of agricultural land situated in Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna belonging to the Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC, hereafter) was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, public respondent DARAB, under the compulsory acquisition scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and subsequently, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) numbered 00130422, 00130423 and 00130424 with TCT Nos. C-168, C-167 and C-169 334 were issued and award to farmers-beneficiaries, private respondents herein, namely: Rosa T. Amante, et al., Rogelio O. Ayende, et al. and Juan T. Amante, et al., respectively. The compulsory acquisition and distribution of the said 234.76 hectares of land in favor of private respondents were effected by virtue of the Decision dated 19 December 1991 issued by public respondent DARAB in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG0001-00, entitled Juan T. Amante, et al. vs. Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. It appears that the aforesaid agricultural lands in Bgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna are isolated and/or separated from the rest of the municipality of Cabuyao, and the only passage way or access road leading to said private respondents agricultural lands is the privately owned road network situated within the premises of petitioners CSE and LEDC. Subject to reasonable security regulations, the subject road network is open to the public. But after private respondents were awarded the aforesaid agricultural lands under the CARP Law, petitioners CSE and LEDC prohibited and denied private respondents from utilizing the subject road network, thereby preventing the ingress of support services under the CARP Law, provisions for daily subsistence to, and egress of farm produce from, Bgy. Casile where the farmlands awarded to private respondent are located.

On motion by private respondents, an Order dated 25 May 1993 was issued by public respondent (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-0001-00, directing the unhampered entry and construction of support services coming from the national government, and other provisions for the use and benefit of private respondents in Bgy. Casile, and giving private respondents a right of way over the subject road network owned by petitioners. The decretal portion of the said order reads: Order is given to the Philippine National Police (PNP) in coordination with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) for Cabuyao, Laguna, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) for Laguna, and the DAR Regional Office to ensure that support services like farm to market roads and training center for the CARP beneficiaries of Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna coming from the National Government are allowed to be constructed unhampered, agricultural products like pineapple, coconut and papaya fruits, vegetables, corn and palay of said beneficiaries [private respondents] are given free access to the markets and construction materials for their homes and provisions for their daily subsistence are allowed to enter Barangay Casile using the access roads as herein indicated Annex A which forms part of this Order and that lives of the said beneficiaries are protected from harm especially while travelling to and from Barangay Casile. (Underscoring Ours) The implementation of the aforesaid 25 May 1993 order of public respondent, however, was opposed and prevented by petitioners CSE and LEDC claiming that the subject road network belong to petitioners and C. J. Yulo & Sons, Inc. and not to SRRDC, and therefore, is not covered by the said Order. On 22 June 1993, private respondents filed a motion to amend order, praying that petitioners CSE and LEDC, as well as C. J. Yulo & Sons, Inc., be impleaded in the above-mentioned Order dated 25 May 1993 of public respondent so that said order can be properly implemented. On 8 July 1993, public respondent DARAB issued an Order also dated 8 July 1993 requiring petitioners CSE and LEDC to submit their respective comments on private respondents aforesaid motion to amend the 25 May 1993 order of public respondent in DARAB Case JC-R-IV-LAG-0001-00. Attached in said order are copies of public respondent DARABs Order dated 25 May 1993 and private respondents said motion to amend order. Petitioner LEDC responded to public respondents Order dated 8 July 1993 by sending a letter dated 15 July 1993 to public respondent, while petitioner CSE filed its Opposition To Amend Order dated 15 July 1993 to private respondents aforesaid motion to amend order, to while private respondents filed a Consolidated Comment. On 21 September 1993, public respondent DARAB sent a Notice of Hearing and Summons to petitioners CSE and LEDC, directing them to appear for hearing on 1 October 1993 before public respondent DARAB. Petitioner LEDC nor its counsel failed to appear at the aforementioned scheduled hearing, but it filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons and later, an Amended Special Appearance to Quash Summons, for the sole purpose of objecting to its *public respondent DARAB+ jurisdiction and quashing the summons in the aforementioned DARAB Case, allegedly for having been issued unlawfully, arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion. During the hearing, petitioner CSE manifested that public respondent DARAB has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. After hearing the arguments and manifestation of the parties present thereat, public respondent directed private respondents to file their final memorandum, and petitioner CSE, to submit its final reply or comment thereon. Only private respondents complied. On 7 October 1993, petitioner CSE instead filed the present petition for prohibition praying for the issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction commanding public respondent DARAB to desist from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid DARAB Case NO. JC-R-IV-0001-00, and a writ of prohibition commanding said public respondent to permanently desist from conducting further proceedings in said DARAB Case. Said petition was docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 32257 and raffled to the Fifth Division of this Court. On 4 November 1993, petitioner CSE amended its petition by impleading private respondents herein, in compliance with this Courts resolution dated 18 October 1993. In the meanwhile, after evaluating the respective positions of the petitioners and private respondents herein, public respondent DARAB issued its assailed Order dated 23 November 1993 (pp. 119-135, Rollo) in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-0001-00, re-affirming the efficacy of its Order dated 25 May 1993 and directing petitioners not to impede the complete implementation of the 25 May 1993 Order of the same public respondent DARAB, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the efficacy of the Order of this Board dated May 25, 1993, remains valid. Accordingly, the Laguna Estates Development Corporation and the Canlubang Sugar Estate are hereby ordered not to impede, under paid of contempt, the complete implementation of the Order of this Board dated May 25, 1993 and this Order. In reiteration, the Philippine National Police x x x is hereby deputized x x x to implement the Boards Order so that Petitioners *private respondents herein+ are allowed to transport their agricultural products and the National government, NGOs and the Church are allowed to extend life-sustaining support services like credit facilities, construction of training centers, school buildings, farm-to-market roads and even chapels and churches using the so-called M-1 Gate or China Gate and the roads outlined in Annex A of the Order dated May 25, 1993. The board further takes notices of the efforts of the Department of Agrarian Reform to acquire another right of way that is less prejudicial to the respondents herein [petitioners herein], and may upon proper motion disolve (sic) this present order, in the event that such other right of way should materialize in the future. On 26 November 1993, We issued a resolution in CA-G. R. SP No. 32257 directing herein respondents to submit their respective comments on the amended petition of petitioner CSE, and the latter, to file its reply thereto, and thereafter, the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. In the meanwhile, a temporary restraining order was issued directed to public respondent DARAB requiring it to desist from conducting further proceedings in the aforementioned DARAB Case. On even date, petitioner CSE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion For Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, pp. 109-117) to enjoin public respondent DARAB and/or its representatives or persons acting for and its behalf from conducting further proceedings in the aforementioned DARAB case, and from enforcing or implementing the assailed Order dated 23 November 1993 of public respondent DARAB. On 1 December 1993, petitioner LEDC filed its present petition for certiorari and prohibition which seeks to annul the aforesaid Order dated 23 November 1993 of public respondent DARAB, and to prohibit respondents herein or persons acting on their behalf from implementing or enforcing said order. The petition was docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 32709 and was originally raffled to the Sixth Division of this Court. On 7 December 1993, the Sixth Division of this Court issued a resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 32709, directing the herein respondents, including the Director General of the PNP, to file their respective comments on the petition, and in the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued directing all respondents and all persons and entities acting on their behalf to cease and desist from enforcing against petitioner LEDC the Order dated 23 November 1993 of public respondent DARAB in the aforementioned DARAB Case.

As heretofore stated, in a resolution dated 4 February 1994 issued by the Sixth Division of this Court, both petitions were consolidated and assigned to this Courts Fifth Division for decision on the merits. The dispute between the petitioners and private respondents started when the former denied or prohibited the latter to use the subject road network leading to the farmlands of private respondents in Bgy. Casile. This spawned the issuance of public respondent DARABs order dated 25 May 1993 which directed the PNP in coordination with the DAR regional, provincial and municipal offices to ensure the unhampered entry and construction of support services for the benefit of private respondents free access to the subject road network to allow the entry of construction materials, daily subsistence provisions in their farmlands and the exit of their farm produce going to the markets. This was followed by the assailed order dated 23 November 1993 reiterating the efficacy of its earlier 25 May 1993 order and directing petitioners not impede the complete implementation of both orders of public respondent DARAB. On the basis of the foregoing facts, on November 10, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision that denied and/or dismissed both petitions. Hence, the present recourse. The issue raised is whether the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant private respondents who are beneficiaries of an agrarian reform program or tenants of adjoining landholdings a right of way over petitioners network of private roads intended for their exclusive use. We resolve the issue in favor of petitioners. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over such issue. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In Heirs of Herman Rey Santos vs. Court of Appeals, citing Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, we held : For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 32257 & CA-G. R. SP No. 32709 promulgated on November 10, 1994. The Court declares NULL and VOID DARABs order dated November 23, 1993, in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001-00. Respondent DARAB is permanently enjoined from conducting further proceedings in said case. No costs. SO ORDERED.