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45


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,
(H en inger, 2001; Bartov, Gul Tsu,i 2000), ( Becker
, 1998; F rancis, M aydew Sparks; 1999), Jones
( Subram anyam, 1996; Bartov, Gul Tsu,i 2000)
, Jones, ( 2000)
( 2002)
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2004), Jones, ( 2003)
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+ B7* ComS izei + B8* AdjROAi + B9* Leverag ei + B10* AGE i + B11* Yea r00i + B12 * Yea r01i + Ei

, B0 , B1 ~ B12, Ei :
1.
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, (
) , ( F ranc is, M aydew Sparks;
1999),
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, TA i i, TA i = NI i CFO i, N Ii i,
CFO i i; Ai i; NDA i
iNDAi ( 1)
NDA i = A1 + A2 ( $ RE Vi /Ai ) + A3 (P PE i /Ai )

( 1)

: $REVi i, PP E i i
, Ai i , A1, A2, A3 A1, A2,
A3 ( 2),
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( 2)

: a 1, a 2, a 3 A1, A2, A3 OLS ; GAi i, GAi = OIi

CFO i , OI i i ; Ei ; ( 1)
2.
T enuCeni TenuCenSqi,

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47

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ComS izei i, AdjROAi i, Lever2
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chow, S loan Sweeney, 1995; Defond Park, 1997; Becker, 1998; M yers, Myers Omer, 2003;
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2667

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2667

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2001: 2000) 2001 ,

, ,

49

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2667

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Pearson,

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nuCen 0110, | DA | TenuCen;

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1, U ;

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, 0157, ,
, U
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6, , ; 6,
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ly
, 

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Leverage | DA | , / DA 0 DA , DA
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,

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[ - 010014*

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( 6 - 41879 ) + 01006*

( 1- 41 879) 2] -

[ - 01 0014*

( 6 - 41 879 ) 2 ] =

( 6- 41879) + 01 006*

( 6 - 41 879) 2 ] = - 01015, 10 , , 1500,

, 1500 , 6 7 5,
10 , 50 60

51


DA

DA

Leverag e

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, , VIF , 3,
, :
, (Regression w ith Robust Standa rd E rrors) 4
; U ,
; ,
DA InGrow thAd jROA Leverage 2% W in sorize
W in sorize, ,

, 2000 2002,
J ones,
,
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, ( 6 ) ,
, ,
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52

,
, ,
,

, , .

2000. . , 1

2002. 12. 13. .

1998. 3.

, .

2003. : . :

, .
.

19~ 20. ) ) ) .

2000. A . : , 2

2003. . ,

, , . 2005. : . ,
2003. 1.

, .

11.

) ) ) 5 2 6

.
, .

2002. . ,

Bar tov E. , Gul F. A.

and Tsui J. S. 2000, Discretionary2a ccrua lsM odels a nd Audit Qua lif ica tions. The Accounting R eview

76 ( Janua ry): 27~ 58.

Becker C. L. , D efongd M. L. , J iamba lvo J. , a nd Subram anyam K. R.

1998. The Effect of Aud it Qua lity on E arningsM an2

agem ent. Contem pora ry Accounting R esearch ( Spr ing ): 1~ 24.

Chen K.

and H. Yuan. 2004. E arningsMa nagem ent and Cap ita l Resource Alloca tion: Evidence from China s' Accounting Ba sed

Regu la tion on R igh ts Issues. The Accounting R eview ( July): 645~ 665.
D echow, P. M. , R. G. SLoa n, and A. P . Sweeney. 1995. Detecting E arningsM anagemen t. The Accounting R eview 70:
193~ 225.
D eF ond, M. and C. P a rk.

1997. Smooth ing Income in Anticipa tion of F uture Earnings.

Jou rna l of Accoun ting and Econom ics

23 ( July ): 115~ 139.

F rancis J. R. , Maydew E. L. and Spa rksH. C.

1999. The Role of B ig 6 Auditors in the Cred ible R eporting of Accrua ls. Au2

diting: A Journa l of Practice and Theory18 ( F a ll): 17~ 34.

Geiger M. A. a nd Raghunandan K.

2002. Auditor T enure and Audit Repor ting F a ilures, Aud iting: A Journa l of P ractice and

Theory (M a r. ): 67~ 78.

Genera l Accounting Office ( GAO ) 2003. P ublic Accounting F irm s: R equired Study on the P oten tia l Effects of Ma nda tory Aud it
F irm Rota tion, http:
H ening er W. G.

/ /www1gao1gov.
2001. The Associa tion between Aud itor Litiga tion and Abnorma l Accrua ls. The A ccounting R eview 76 ( Ja nuar2

y): 111~ 126.

Ma nsi S. A. , M axwell W. F. a nd M iller D. P.

2004. D oesAud itor Qua lity a nd Tenure Ma tter to Investors? Evidence from the

Bond Ma rket. J ourna l of Accounting R esearch ( F orthcom ing ).

Ma utz R. K. and Sha raf H. A.

1961. The P h ilosophy of Auditing. Am er ican Accounting Associa tionM onograph N o. 6. Sa ra 2

sota, F L: Am erican Accounting Associa tion.

Myers J. N. , M yer s L. A. , a nd Om er T. C.

2003. Exploring the Term of the Aud itor2C lient Rela tionship a nd the Qua lity of

Earnings: A Ca se for M anda tory Auditor R ota tion? The A ccounting R eview 78: 779~ 799.
Subram anyam K. R. 1996. The P ricing of D iscretiona ry Accrua ls, Journa l of Accounting and Econom ics 22: 249~ 282.

53

English Ab stracts ofM a in Paper s

Setting up Q ua litative Character istics System of A ccoun ting Inform at ion in Ch in a
P rogram Group
Based on domestic and interna tiona l resea rch results on qua lita tive charac teristics of accounting informa tion from 1979 to 2004,
th is paper puts forward our coun tryps inform ation qua lity charac teristic system of financia l accounting and m anagem ent accounting, re2
ferring to the system atic fram e of accoun ting in form ation qua lity characters put forward by FASB ( SFAC N012),

in connection w ith

outstanding prob lems existing in the history of our coun try. The resu lt of th is study has offered the reference for se tting up Ch inese ac2
counting informa tion qua lity characteristic system.

R esearch on the recogn itions of the environm enta l assets

Xu J ia lin & Wang Changrui
The environm ental asse t is an important accounting elem ent in the environm enta l accounting,

the recogn itions of the environm ental

assets are the basis for the research of the m easurem ent, the record and the report. In this pape r,

a new view is deve loped that the

environmenta l asse ts are m ade of be ing capita lized environm enta l cost because ofm eeting the recogn ition cr iter ia of the assets on the ba2
s is of the research of the environm enta l assets and the environm enta l cost accord ing to the recogn ition cr iter ia of the accounting, and
the re la ted issues are discussed.

E qu ity m ethod or cost m ethod ? ) ) ) A case from Shenzhen Cap ita l G roup Co. L td
Chen Wei et a l
The paper analyzes the argum ent on how to se lect the accounting m ethod in the case of Shenzhen Cap ita lGroup Co. Ltdp s inves2
ting on W e icha i Power Co. Ltd.

It points out the econom ic essences instead of a ce rtain investm ent percen tage should be regarded as

the standard of judging the ma teria l influence and selecting the costm ethod or equ ity m ethod. Based on th is,

the paper furthe r discus2

ses the reform on accoun ting system of venture capita l en terpr ises in Ch ina.

R ota tion of Sign ing Aud itors: N a tura l S tate and M anda tory
R uleps In itia l E ffect in Ch inese Secur ities M a rk et
Li Shuang & Wu X i
Th is pape r exam ines the natural sta te of rotation of s igning auditors in Chinese securitiesm arket and the in itia l effect of the m anda2
tory rotation ru le enacted in late 2003. Evidence on the natu ra l sta te shows that the long engagem ent re lationsh ip between an account2
ing firm and a listed c lient was usua lly m a inta ined in the nam e of very few ind ividua l sign ing auditors m ostly w ith a consecutively2sig2
ning pattern. After the enact of mandatory rotation rule,

the comp liance rate increased from about 50% in 2003 annua l aud it up to a2

bout 80% in 2004 annua l aud it. Based on a pre lim inary compar ison between aud it resu lts before and after the m andatory rotation,

ver2

y lim ited effect of the m andatory rule is expected on substantially enhanc ing the accounting firm disc los ing financ ia l reporting prob lem s
of listed com pan ies.

A ud itor tenure and A udit Q ua lity: Em p ir ica l E vidence from th e Ch inese Secur itiesM a rket
Chen X inyuan& X ia Lijun
This paper,

using the data of those listed firm s that rece ived clean audit op inions dur ing 2000 to 2002 in the Ch inese Securities

M arke t, and m easur ing audit quality by the discretionary accrua ls calculated by the Cross- sectiona l JonesM ode,l investigates the re2
lationship between auditor tenure and aud it quality. W e find tha t, a fter controlling the influence of other va riab les,
between auditor tenure and the absolute va lue of d iscretionary acc ruals is / U0 shape,

.i e. ,

the re la tionsh ip

the re la tionsh ip be tw een aud itor tenu re

and aud it quality is inve rse / U0 shape. Further analysis indica tes that, when aud itor tenure is less than 6 years,

the increase of ten2

93

ure has positive e ffects on aud it quality, but when aud itor tenure is m ore than 6 yea rs,

it has negative effects on aud it qua lity.

A ccoun ting E lem ents: A R eform Suggestion Ba sed on the V iew of R esources
Li Yuju & Zhang Q iusheng
Th is pape r uses the resource theory to analyze and study accounting e lem en ts in the fram ework of financ ia l accounting concepts in
Ch ina. The financia l reports couldnpt reveal the present situation and rea l va lue of a firm, while business accounting is m a inly based
on asse t2accoun ting in practice, wh ich lim ited by the trad itional framework of financia l accounting concepts. To im prove the reality of
the accounting reports, we be lieve that business accounting shou ld be set up on a firmps resou rces, and resources are d ivided in to as2
sets and C apab ilities in th is paper. As a conc lusion,
bilities,

liab ilities,

equities, revenues, gains,

the accounting e lem en ts in china m ight be added and ad justed in to assets,

capa2

expenses and losses.

E ffectiveness of In terna l Con trolM echan ism for Subsid ia ry Com pany
and its CFO: on P r in cip a l2Agen t P erspective
Su J ing
Parent com pany usually appoints CFO to its hold ing subsidiaries to m on itor the ir financ ia l resu lts. This m echanism focus on the
a rrangement of layers of the h iera rchy structure to a lleviate princ ipa l agent problem s. W e deve lop a two layers m ode,l wh ich compr ises
a parent com pany ( ie. P r inciple),

top m anagem ent and CFO of subsid iary ( ie.

tw o layers of agents),

to illustrate the effectiveness

of the interna l controlm echanism of the hierarchy structure w ith in a group ente rprise.

Construction of En terpr isesp In terna l Con trol E va lua tion System

) ) ) a Ca se based on th e p ra ctices of / A 0 P rovin ce P ow er C om pany
Da i Yan
Abstract:
m enta tion.

Inte rna l con trol evalua tion is an im portant m ethod tha t can im prove interna l control regu lations and ensure va lid im ple2

By now,

the dom estic prac tices of interna l con trol eva luation a re m ore lim ited w ith in the scope of auditing practices and

have not developed into an independent m anagem ent too.l Th is article w ill focus on the procedure and m ethod of the construction of
enterpr isesp inte rnal con trol eva luation system,

based on the research of a typ ica l case.

R esearch on P r ed ict in g Takeover Ta rgets

Cui Xuegang & J ing X in
Based on Chinese cap ital m arket and institutions,

th is study emp ir ica lly investigates the listed com panies in Ch ina and bu ilds a

forecast mode l using Log it m ethod. The resu lts for the future forecast ( the yea r of 2002 and 2003) ind icate that the percentage of cor2
rect for 2002 is 7517% and 641 4% for 2003. On the whole, for the future data, the com prehensive percentage of correc t is 701 1% ,
the com prehensive sensitivity is 571 8% and the comprehensive spec ific ity is 7013% .

The effec t of prediction is very sa tisfying.

There fore this forecast model is helpfu l for investors and othe r re lated parties to m ake re levant dec isions.

Th e Survey About Th eory O f T he O p tim a l Shar eholder S tructure D esign

A nd P ow er Ba lanceW ith Shareholder Structure
Wa ng Qibo
The study about theory of the optim a l shareholder structure design leads to the theory of the power balance with sha reholder struc2
ture. P ower ba lance with several big shareholders m ay solve the two princ ip le2agency prob lem. Our study has findings below. F ist,
power ba lance w ith severa l big shareholders is the comm on shareholder structure in US and Europe.

Second,

shareholder structure is one of the ba lanced solution of shareholder struc ture and the best of that. Third,
holder struc ture can help to lim it the private profit of b ig shareholders.

94

the power balance w ith

the power ba lance with share2