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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien FELICIANO VS. PASICOLAN 2 SCRA 888 (1961)
This is a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to decide on the merits of a motion filed by the petitioner in which he asks that the Court fix at P10,000.000 the amount of the bail for his liberty pending trial. Heres what happened:

retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong.

And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held: xxx the right to bail only accrues when a person is arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law.' Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping. When he found out that an Information had been filed and that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, he went into hiding. His lawyer, at the instance of his wife, fined a motion asking that the Court fix the amount of the bond at P10K for the petitioners release pending trial, but the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed the motion on the ground that the filing was premature because the petitioner had been arrested. The respondent Judge dismissed the motion on the ground that the petitioner does not have the right to ask for the court to admit him to bail pending his arrest or surrender. The petitioner contends that as, under the Constitution, "all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong," Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of the Philippines, and that the words "all persons" used in said constitutional provision have been interpreted to mean "all persons, without distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense". ISSUE: WON the judge erred in not granting the petition for admission to bail. HELD/RATIO: No. There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, this Court held: xxx According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

MIRANDA VS. TULIAO 486 SCRA 377 (2006)


(I am allowing you to hate me for this digest. Sobrang gulonggulo ako. Ill just attach the original. The issue raised by the petitioners kasi is not about bail, but the court discussed it in such a way that bail got included. They contrasted. Basically, it just says the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused when he/she submits motions, etc even if hes not detained. But the exception is the petition for admission to bail the accused has to be held in detention in such case. Since were in a hurry, I think thats the only thing we need, or so I make myself believe.) Facts: two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, but the venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila which convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court on automatic review where we accused therein was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case

and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio. On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Court: A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3 Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4 Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. . If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien

CORTES VS CATRAL 279 SCRA 1 (1997)


FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for granting bail without hearing. 1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a crime that is supposedly not bailable) without hearing. Catral says:In one of them, the case was frustrated homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of 200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak. In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal Case 08-866 for murder, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge acting on the said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carraos letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused without conducting any hearing. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says: bailbond recommended was 180K. accused filed for reduction and there was no opposition from prosecutor. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto. Catral says: he was acting on the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00. . Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siribans house to get the envelop

ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent judge. HELD/RATIO: YES.

Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. In a crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended the sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal whether a hearing was actually conducted on the application for bail although respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that acting on this recommendation of the provincial prosecutor and taking into account the guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94, the court issued a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused. Subsequently, counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for reduction of bail. The hearing of the motion was conducted on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not having interposed any opposition, and submitting the resolution of the motion to the sound discretion of the court instead. Respondent judge then issued an order granting a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as the evidence was not so strong to warrant the fixation of said amount. The order granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. In another murder case, after conducting a preliminary investigation, the inquest judge issued a warrant of the arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court, the information made no mention of a bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge, acting on said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant on record, issued an order granting bail to the accused in the sum of P200,000.00. Unable to post the said bond, accused through counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. In the course of the hearing of the petition, the public prosecutor manifested that he had no objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge, then guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on record reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused. The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the accused were still at large as he even had to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE VS. MANALLO 400 SCRA 129 (2003)
FACTS: Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nineyear old daughter Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the familys dirty laundry every Saturday at the barangay reservoir. The route to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to their house. In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut gatherer. Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a week. One day, in 1992, Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her clothes and to take a bath. On her way back home, Manallo suddenly appeared from the bushes, grabbed her and raped her. Alex dressed up and warned her not to tell her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened to her. Medico-Legal. Then Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed their respective sworn statements. An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape. No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing thereof. Upon the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at P50,000.00. On the same day, Alex posted a property bond which was immediately approved by the court. Alex was forthwith released from detention. At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992. The prosecution prayed the trial court to cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without due hearing. However, the trial court held in abeyance resolution of the motion until after the prosecutor shall have presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court stated that the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alexs petition for bail and trial on the merits. On June 18, 1992, the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on said date. The trial court issued and order for his arrest. However, Alex could no longer be found at his address. It was only six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was arrested. He denied raping Rosaldiza and claimed that they were lovers. He was found guilty. (short story version.) ISSUE (in the case): WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant not on the basis of the strength of

the prosecutions evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence for the defense HELD/RATIO: NO. Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily show that it convicted appellant of the crime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. LoriaFlorece and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution. The trial court considered appellants flight from the scene of the crime, his having jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of his guilt for the crime charged BAIL-RELATED (copy-paste): The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record its concern and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court in granting bail to appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (please see previous case for the duties of the trial court in resolving a motion or petition for bail) In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet, on the same day that the motion was filed, the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefore stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail without even affording the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the appellant to remain free on his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien LAVIDES VS CA G.R. 129670 February 1, 2000
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner. petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged. nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the aboveentitled case. He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997. The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition. ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid. HELD: CONDITION IS VOID. bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
undermine the accuseds constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 (2003)
(YOU MAY HATE ME FOR THIS, TOO.) Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists. Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson. Accused by Singson. Informations filed. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners coaccused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of crossexamination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail

hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. (Andaming nyang finile. Ang hirap tuloy isummarize) Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the Sandiganbayan. Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail. (I will not include the issues regarding the charging of more than one offense, etc. anymore. Bail na lang tayo) ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. 2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic. 3. No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth. No. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several

4.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution. When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE V SAN DIEGO CAPISTRANO, J.:

In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the information charged the defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed men and craft or fraud. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for each defendant on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar Inocentes very angry because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting bail he used contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited for contempt. Fortunately, after the fiscal had submitted his answer and explanation, the trial judge, in a forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition that the contumacious words be deleted from his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process- YES, HENCE THE QUESTIONED ORDERS ARE NULL AND VOID

prosecution. They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.

We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.

The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien OCAMPO V BERNABE MORAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Eduardo Ocampo to set aside an order issued by the Fourth Division of the People's court denying his application for bail.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Coprs of the Armed Forces of the United States and confined in Muntinglupa Prisons since July 30, 1945, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 6555 he was turned over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and later on filed with the Peoples Court his application for bail under Act No. 682. At the hearing of the application, the special prosecutor stated that petitioner with having pointed out Placido Trinidad as a guerilla to the Japanese and for that reason Placido Trinidad was shot to death. No evidence, however, was presented by the special prosecutor and all that he did at the hearing was to recite the contents of an affidavit which has no referrence to count No. 4, and to state further that he had 27 more affidavits. Petitioner made an objection stating that a mere recital is not a evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which has not been subjected to the test of cross-examination. He testified in his own behalf in denying all the charges preferred against him and stated that said charges are mere intrigues of his political enemy Marcelo Trinidad. Under all these circumstances, the Fourth division of the People's Court composed of Judges Jose Bernabe, Emilio Rilloraza and Angel Gamboa, issued an order dated February 23, 1946, denying the application for bail. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON no proof was presented by the special prosecutor to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, thus, the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail -YES.

We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons (76 Phil., 756), that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. the general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110, section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since

the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362), it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. And this is the prevailing doctrine in the United States. In some states of the American union, the burden of showing that proof is evident or the presumption great, lies on the prosecution while in others on the petitioner, but the rule seems to be uniform to the effect that no matter which side bears the burden of proof, the evidence of guilt should be adduced before the court for a proper determination of its probative force In corpus Juris Secundum the rule is summarized as follows: o Unless the presumption from an indictment for a capital offense is conclusive against accused which has been considered in section 34 b(2) (b)the determination as to whether the proof is evident or the presumption great must, on an original application, be determined from the evidence adduced on the application no matter which side bears the burden of proof. Where accused under a capital indictment bears the burden of proof he should offer the witnesses whose names are endorsed on the indictment, although he is not limited to such witnesses. o The court should hear all material and relevant evidence offered by either party, such as the grand jury minutes, and should consider the evidence as a whole. (8 C.J.S., section 46 [b], p. 94.). Upon the hearing it is proper to require the prisoner to begin the evidence, although it imposes upon him the necessity of producing evidence upon which the state intended to rely for his conviction on the final trial. But the accused will not by this procedure be denied the opportunity of cross-examining the people's witnesses. (Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. To the same effect, Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 So., 711; ex parte Nathan[Fla.]; 50 so., 38." (39 L. R. A., New Series, pp. 752, 774, 775.). The evidence for the state, as well as that for the accused, should be presented (1) by the petitioner in an application for bail. (Ex parte Tully [Fla.], 66 S., 296; Rigdon vs. State, 41 Fla., 308; 26 S., 711; Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind., 87. (2) But the petitioner, by proper procedure, may test the probative force of the testimony for the state in order to fully present his case for the purposes of the hearing. Ex parte Tully, supra; Ex parte Heffren, supra. (6 C.J., p. 984, fn. 50 [a], section 214.).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
Where on a motion to admit to bail after the indictment, the evidence of the witnesses who testified before the grand jury does not make a prima facie case against the accused, he is entitled to bail, and it is an error to refuse bail upon the statement of the district attorney that he has other evidence which he will not disclose for fear of weakening the state's case. (In ex parte Reynald, 37 Texas, 1.) And this is in conformity with the former rulings of this Court. (MARCOS V. CRUZ AND HERRAS CASE) True that in the same case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra, we said that the hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By "summary hearing" we meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court "does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted." (8 C. J. S., 93,94.) The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing. Objection has been made long ago to this method of hearing wherein the regular trial is anticipated though to a limited extent at least. but the objection was dismissed. It appearing in the instant case that on the hearing of the application for bail filed by the petitioner no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong, the Fourth Division of the People's Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the bail applied for.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien SIAZON V JUDGE MAKALINTAL, J.:

At the outset it should be mentioned that the instant petition is formally defective in that the petitioner appears to be the State Prosecutor handling the case below instead of the People of the Philippines, who should properly be represented in this proceeding by the Solicitor General. (BUT FOR SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE, THIS INFIRMITY IS OVERLOOKED. SC PROCEEDS). At the outset, let it be stated that after the arraignment of the accused and before the commencement of the trial, the applications for bail, were heard The Court ruled and ordered a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications for bail. On this same occasion the Court also considered the motion filed by the prosecution to discharge the defendant Angelico Najar. Without any objection on the part of the defense, said motion to discharge was granted and accused Najar was discharged to become state witness pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. As the trial progressed, with the prosecution presenting several witnesses whose testimonies have not established evidence directly linking the accused Escribano and Padilla to the conspiracy alleged in the informations in these cases, the defense on August 2, 1971 filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the order given in open Court ordering a joint hearing of the cases on the merits and of the applications for bail, to which the prosecution also filed its opposition. The Court reconsidered its previous order and ordered that the applications for bail be first heard to which the prosecution gave its assent.

ISSUE: whether or not a proceeding in an application for bail is still summary in nature as it was under the old rule - YES As a general proposition, all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. At the hearing of the application for bail the burden of showing that the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. T he determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, which in the very nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Neither under the old nor under the new Rules is there any specific provision defining what kind of hearing it should be, but in the two cases cited at the footnote hereof it was stated that the hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. "By 'summary hearing,' this Court added, "we mean such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the

outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.' (8 C.J.S. 93, 94.) T The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum at the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purposes of the hearing." We do not see that the addition of the provision Sec. 7, Rule 114 has materially changed the nature of the hearing on a petition for bail to the extent of depriving the Court of its discretion to confine the evidence to the extent necessary for the proper determination of the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The only change that has been introduced is that such evidence shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. The prosecution had had three months since the hearing started until the questioned order was issued and had called 27 witnesses just to lay a sufficient corroborative basis for the testimony of its principal witness, Angelico Najar. The plea that this witness will reveal the names of persons who have some knowledge of circumstances which tend to connect the two accused with thecrimes and who presumably will also be called to testify, and whose willingness to do so may thereby be adversely influenced by such revelation, does not appear to be convincing, since the record of the cases already contains the testimony which Najar gave at the preliminary investigation, aside from his three sworn statements consisting of 16 pages typed singlespace in question and answer form. (TANGGAPIN NA KASI NILA NA INSUFFICIENT NGA DAW) The proviso that any witness may be recalled at the trial for additional examination underscores, if anything, the difference between the hearing for purposes of the petition for bail and the trial on the merits. This is as it should be, because one has for its purpose, from the endpoint of the prosecution, to show that strong evidence of guilt exists while the contemplates proof beyond reasonable doubt. The right of the prosecution to control the quantum of evidence and the order of presentation of the witness while not to be disregarded, must nevertheless be equated with the purpose of the hearing, which is to determine whether the accused falls within the exception to the general rule that he is constitutionally entitled to bail before conviction. To allow the prosecution to conduct the hearing as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits who defeat the purpose of the proceeding. DISPOSITIVE: the petition is dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court is lifted, with instructions to the respondent Court to resume the hearing forthwith for the presentation of Angelico Najar as witness for the prosecution, without prejudice to said Court's allowing, in the exercise of its discretion, the presentation of such other prosecution as it may deem advisable, in the interest of justice.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien MAMOLO V NARISIMA BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 16 May 1994 a criminal complaint for murder was filed against Antonio Balagot and Ariel Acha for the murder of Daniel Mamolo,Jr., son of complainant After Judge Rogelio R. Narisma conducted the requisite preliminary examination he issued the corresponding warrants of arrest against the accused. Respondent Judge recommended no bail since murder is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt was strong. Acha was later arrested while Balagot surrendered to the PC Provincial Command in Cotabato. Subsequently, Balagot through counsel filed a Petition For Admission to Bail and set the same for hearing. At the scheduled hearing defense counsel informed the court that Balagot was ill and asked the court to dispense with the submission of his petition and, instead, to allow Balagot to be treated at the hospital (SPECIAL TREATMENT???). MAMOLO:claims that despite the fact that respondent Judge recommended no bail for both accused he nevertheless allowed Balagot to put a bail of P150,000.00 without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong. MAMOLO: also avers that on several occasions he saw respondent Judge and counsel for accused Balagot together and engaged in a series of private talks at a nearby restaurant. In his Memorandum of 21 July 1995, approved by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez found that respondent Judge disregarded procedural due process in granting bail to the accused. He opined that the prosecutions waiver to present evidence ought to have prompted respondent Judge to ask the prosecution to present its witnesses at another date set for the purpose (of asking) clarificatory questions from which he may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused.. ISSUE: WON JUDGE NARISIMA ACTED INAPPROPRIATELY IN RECOMMENDING THE BAIL FOR BALAGOT?-YES The procedure of conducting a hearing on the application for admission to bail should provide the basis for judges to determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong. In the case at bench, while respondent conducted a hearing on Balagots petition for bail such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition. The deferential attitude of the prosecution cannot excuse respondents disregard of his peremptory duty. It is worthy to note that in the resumption of the hearing in the afternoon of 25 May 1994 the prosecution prefaced its submission with a statement of its serious vehement objection to the petition for bail. Such manifestation ought to have alerted respondent of the next appropriate steps in resolving the petition. In Borinaga v. Tamin we delineated a clear guideline on the exercise of judicial discretion in hearing petitions

for bail -x x x (w)hile the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion by the nature of things may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied of such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground x x x (E)ven where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the states evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail x x The failure of respondent Judge to adhere to a basic, fundamental procedure cannot be lightly overlooked. As correctly perceived by OCA, this omission by respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law since it resulted in depriving the prosecution the time-tested and enduring procedural due process. It is an oft-repeated dictum that a judge should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For the role of judges in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. Indubitably, the industry of a judge in keeping abreast with the law and court rulings will enhance the faith of our people in the administration of justice since litigants will be confidently and invariably assured that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE V. TUPPAL QUISUMBING, J.:
OTHER ISSUES WON the evidence now on record is sufficient to hold appellant Saturnino Tuppal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide- YES The court a quo found the prosecutions evidence credible. It disbelieved appellants bare denials. Eyewitness Florfina Solitos testimony on the hold-up incident was replete with material details. She testified that after being shot in the abdomen, she grappled with appellant for possession of the gun. Meanwhile, coaccused Danilo Tuppal dashed off with her bag and its contents, according to her. She also described the firearm used in shooting her and killing her brother. These details could not have sprung from her imagination, but only from her vivid recollection of the fatal incident implicating the appellant and his brothers as the malefactors. Appellants defense of alibi is untenable.

On appeal is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant Saturnino Tuppal guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Appellants conviction stemmed from four charges filed on August 21, 1992, by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela Appellant remained at large for almost nine (9) years after the filing of the aforesaid cases. It was only on March 5, 1998 that appellant was arrested in Cainta, Rizal and in connection with another case for robbery. Appellant was arraigned. Assisted by counsel, he pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were then consolidated and trial ensued. The prosecutions evidence established that: On the evening of December 22, 1989, the spouses Bonifacio and Florfina Solito and their four-year-old child, Efren, attended the wedding of Florfinas younger sister, Loida Atuan, at Barangay Banguro, Reina Mercedes, Isabela. At about 11:30 P.M., the Solitos accompanied by Bartolo Atuan, Jr., Florfinas 26-yearold brother, left the wedding reception. They had barely traveled some 300 meters away and were in front of the house of Felix Sacang, when they were waylaid by appellant and his four companions, now the co-accused.After Ben Tuppal announced a heist, Danilo Tuppal immediately ran off with Florfinas handbag containing P2,500.00 in cash. Appellant then shot Florfina with a short firearm, hitting her in the abdomen. Bartolo Atuan, Jr., tried to shield Florfina from further harm but Marcelo Tuppal then shot Bartolo, killing him on the spot. Florfina took advantage of the situation and scurried towards a nearby banana plantation. The malefactors gave pursuit and continued to fire at her hitting her further at the buttocks and in the arm. She pretended to be dead and fell to the ground. The ploy worked because she heard accused Pedro Tuppal say, Let us go, she is already dead. In the meantime, upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio Solito and his son Efren scampered towards the house of Felix Sacang. Co-accused Ben Tuppal ran after both father and son. He aimed the gun at them, but the gun jammed and did not fire. In the present cases, appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. CRIMPRO ISSUE: WON the fact that the trial court had held during the bail hearing that the prosecution evidence was weak, it is estopped from rendering a contrary ruling after the trial.- NO Said findings should not be construed as an immutable evaluation of the prosecutions evidence. It is settled that the assessment of the prosecution evidence presented during bail hearings in capital offenses is preliminary and intended only for the purpose of granting or denying applications for the provisional release of the accused.

WON the conspiracy among the accused was established- YES After accused Ben Tuppal announced the hold-up, coaccused Danilo Tuppal took Florfinas handbag containing P2,500.00. Appellant Saturnino Tuppal then shot Florfina with a handgun, hitting her on the left side of her abdomen. Their concerted action shows their unity of purpose to rob the victim, at all cost. These concerted acts of appellant and his co-accused manifestly disclose concurrence of wills, unity of action, joint purpose and common design. Hence, although appellant did not himself shoot Bartolo Atuan, Jr., he is still liable for Bartolos death as principal because the existence of conspiracy makes the act of one the act of all. The charges against appellant and his co-accused, constitute only one special indivisible or composite crime as defined in Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. the prosecution amply established the following elements of robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien DE LA CAMARA V ENAGE FERNANDO, J.:

An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right. (I.E., MASYADONG MAGANDA ANG PONENCIA KO PARA LANG MASAYANG! DI KO NAMAN KASALANAN NA NAKATAKAS SILA EH!- FERNANDO, HAHAHA) Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence. Respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition.

The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Respondent Judge submitted a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail." (HOW TOUCHING. BLEH) ISSUE: WON THE BAIL RECOMMENDED WAS EXCESSIVE AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONYES

Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victims, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision .Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. Villaseor v. Abano: The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake. Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court. Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only is the order complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with the command of reason.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien VILLASENOR v. ABANO

21 SCRA 321 (1967) Sanchez, J; Sept. 29, 1967


FACTS Reynaldo Villasenor was charged with murder of Police Sergeant Madla before the CFI of Marinduque. He was admitted to a P60,000-bail which was reduced to P40,000. He posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty. Before arraignment, Prov. Fiscal amended the information, charging the accused with Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder. Aug. 7 - Judge Abano sua ponte cancelled Villasenors bond and ordered his immediate arrest. Sept. 9 - After hearing on Villasenors motion to reconsider, Judge Abano resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts ups a cash bond of P60,000. Sept. 15 - Villasenor asked the court that the original bond previously given be reinstated. Judge Abano resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years." Villasenor filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction seeking to set aside Judge Abanos orders of Aug. 7, Sept. 9 and Sept. 15 and to reinstate the bail previously approved by Judbe Abano. He charges Judge Abano having acted without any or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed orders. ISSUES: 1. WON the P60k-bond fixed by Judge Abano transgress the constitutional injunction that excessive bail shall not be required. 2. WON the requirement that the property bond be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein collides with Sec. 9, Rule 1141. 3. WON it is beyond the power of Judge Abano to require that properties be offered as bond must be in possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five years. Note: *Since the two orders of Aug. 7 and Sept. 9 was replaced with the order of Sept. 15, they became functus officio (retains no legal authority because his or its duties and functions have been completed) **This is a 1967 case hence the reference to a different ROC. HELD/RATIO 1. NO. The court has the power to grant bail in bailable cases and the discretion to fix the amount thereof. In the instant case, there is no abuse of discretion. Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. The necessary qualifications of sureties to a bail bond shall be as follows: (a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines.
1

Villasenor - he is a mere gov. employee, earning a salary of P210 a month and the sole breadwinner of a family of five. Sec. 12, Rule 114 provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called upon to furnish." We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain amount. This circumstance by itself does not make the amount excessive. Guidelines used by the courts in determining the amount of bail The purpose of bail as provided in the definition under Sec. 1, Rule 114 - the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition of bail as provided under Sec. 2, Rule 114 - defendant shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will, surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or that, in case cause, is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the court to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof. The following principles should be considered in fixing the amount of bail: the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose the good of the public as well as the rights of the accused the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each particular accused Certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) Penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases The principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment." Of importance then is the possible penalty that may be meted Villasenor is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the capital

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18, 1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to recommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty 2. NO. The posture taken by respondent judge does not offend the good sense of justice. Judge Abano - it has been his experience that "it is hard to send notices to people outside the province." He explains that the usual procedure of his clerk of court is to send notices by registered mail accompanied by return cards; that when trial comes, the return cards in many instances have not yet been received in court; that when the parties fail to appear; there is no way of knowing whether the notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond and the arrest of the accused, because he is not sure whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people outside the province is costly, and the court cannot afford to incur much expenses. We read Sec. 9, Rule 114 to mean that the directive that bondsmen be resident householders or freeholders in the Philippines is but a minimum requirement. Reason for this is that bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its courts. It is not intended to tie up the hands of a judge to approve bail so long as it is offered by a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines. For a court has broad powers essential to its judicial function. Judge Abano only wanted to make sure that when the proper time comes for the court to order the sureties to produce the person of defendant, no undue delay will be incurred. If bondsmen reside in far away places, even if within the Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is the insufficiency of the mails as an effective means of communication. And then, there is the problem of complying with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to sureties is not served, no trial can be had. Furthermore, reading of his petition fails of an averment that the requisite exacted that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in Marinduque would cause him prejudice. misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to clarify that order. We do say now that the order of September 15, 1964 is to be understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five years." DISPOSITION we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.

3. NO Judge Abano - he relied on Circular 2, dated January 23, 1964, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, addressed, among others, to Judges of First Instance. That circular recites that it had been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice that in certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious landowners, have been accepted as sureties. The Secretary then suggested that it may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered by certificate of title unless they have been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the person offering them as bond for at least five (5) years. Its purpose is to prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal bail bonds and to protect the interests of the Government. If the bondsman is not the owner, bail fails of its purpose, prejudice to the government sets in. We note that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of properties in general. Failure of specificness on the part of Judge Abana then could have been a case of oversight. To obviate

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE v. ASUNCION

161 SCRA 490 Padilla, J; May 24, 1988


FACTS Rolando Abadina (former colonel of AFP) was charged before the RTC with the offense of Violation of PD 1866 [Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions] The information read that he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in possession and under his custody firearms2, ammunitions and magazines without first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. Upon Abanias motion, Judge Asuncion dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by Executive Order No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation in said information that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime. ISSUES 1. WON judge erred in hooding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222. 2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. EO No. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. We will not give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. Prosecution - nothing is contained in said executive orders which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; that said executive orders merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; and that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under Pres. Decree No. 1866 which was not repealed by said Executive Order Nos. 107 and 222. It may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court had Sterling Assault Rifle, Armalite Rifle, Carbine, Cal 357 Revolver and Cal 45, Pistol
2

ruled that a criminal liability was temporarily LIFTED for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within the period provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surrendering the same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition. People vs. Lopez - It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA NO 4) excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to August 31, 1946, possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used for any purpose other than selfdefense or carried for any purpose other than of surrendering them to the proper authorities. The Government does not dispute this interpretation. Although the law does not categorically state that criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is the only construction compatible with the spirit and purposes of the enactment as revealed by its context. People vs. Feliciano - SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law, and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surrender them. The Court said: Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares: RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on within one year from said date, and punished only (1) the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof on the person except for purpose of surrender. Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or about November 6, 1950. NO. It is necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense Prosecution - these circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. People v. Lopez Under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. People v. Austria - in order that an information charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, under Republic Act No. 482, may be deemed sufficient, it must allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the time he was apprehended by the authorities with said firearm. NO. The information is fatally defective.

2.

3.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
People v. Austria - the presentation of evidence cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law. The Court is not unaware that accuse- Abadilla, rightly or wrongly, is identified with the violent arm of the past regime. To many, he is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of that regime. The Court, however, is not swayed by appellations or approbriums.

DISPOSITION the petition is DENIED. The orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien GARCIA v. CA

266 SCRA 678 Davide, Jr., J; January 27, 1997


FACTS Jose Garcia filed with the QC Pros. Office an Affidavit of Complaint charging his wife, Adela Santos alias Delia Sanots with Bigamy, violation of CA No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. Later, Santos informed Ass. City Pros. Cabanilla that he would limit his action to bigamy. Ass. Pros. Cabanilla filed with the RTC of QC an information charging Adela Santos with Bigamy allegedly committed as follows : the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code. Adela Santos filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground. She contended that by Garcias admission in his testimony in civil case and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service commission, Garcia discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Since the penalty prescribed under Art. 329 of the RPC for the offense of bigamy is prision mayor, which is classified as an afflictive penalty under Art. 25 of the same Code, then said offense should prescribe in 15 years as provided in Art. 92 of the Code. TC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case. The complainant having discovered the first marriage of the accused to one Reynaldo Quiroca in 1974 when he was informed of it by one Eugenia Balingit, the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed in this case on November 15, 1991 Garcia moved for reconsideration arguing that Adelas many trips abroad suspended the running of the prescriptive period. These trips were enumerated in the certification issued by Ass. Commissioner Morals of BID. TC disallowed reconsideration of its order, finding no urgent or justifiable reason to set it aside. The trial court held that trips of are not the kind of absence from the Philippines which will interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. Garcia appealed to CA. He contended that: (a) TC erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription Bigamy was a public offense; the offended party is not the first or second (innocent) spouse but the State whose law was transgressed. Thus, the prescriptive period of Bigamy should commence from the day the State, being the offended party, discovered the offense, which in this case was on Aug. 28, 1991 when he filed his complain before the Pros. Office. He added that the interchanging use in Art. 91 of the RPC of the terms "offended party," "authorities," and "their agents" supports

his view that the State is the offended party in public offenses. People v. Alagao - that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. The information in this case mentioned that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. The factual bases of the motion to quash, viz., the Garcias testimony in Civil Case and his complaint filed with the CSC are not conclusive because the testimony is hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible, while the complaint is vague. The prescriptive period was interrupted several times by the Adela's numerous trips abroad. (b) Counsel for Adela is barred from filing the motion to quash the information Counsel for Adela has already stated that he represent only Delia Garcia and not Adela Santos. Consequently, her counsel could not ask for the quash of the information in favour of Adela Santos alias Delia Santos. The counsel should have sought a dismissal of the case in favour of Delia Garcia alone. CA concluded that Garcia discovered Adelas first marriage in 1974. Since the information was filed in court only on Jan. 8, 1992 or 18 years after the discovery of the offence, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. It further held that the quash of an information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal, for under Art. 89(5) of RPC, the criminal liability of a person is totally extinguished by the prescription of the crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a defese.

ISSUE 1. WON the prescription for Bigamy should have been counted from the time the State discovered its commission. 2. WON a Motion to Quash cannot go beyond what is stated in the information 3. WON the factual bases of the Motion to Quash are not conclusive. 4. WON, assuming the prescriptive period started in 1974, said period was interrupted several times. HELD/RATIO 1. NO. The prescription should have been counted from the time the offended party (first or second innocent spouse) discovered its commission. It is true that Bigamy is a public offense. However, Art. 91 of RPC makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Art. 91 does not define the term offended party. We find its definition in Sec. 12, Rule 110 as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed."

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
It is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Art. 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." The private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party. Garcia even admits that he is the offended party in the criminal case because the information therein describes him as the offended party who suffered damage and prejudice. NO Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in par. (f) and (h) of Sec. 2, and Sec. 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3,4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. Sec. 2, Rule 117 - Form and contents. - The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. As a matter of fact, inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute the offense charged. As a general proposition the court held in People v. De la Rosa that a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in People v. Navarro, additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. NO Garcia cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. Besides, he never denied having given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent. Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint3 filed before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private respondent had been previously married. NO We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case Adela returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the Garcia discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period.

4.

2.

DISPOSTION the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.14324 is AFFIRMED.

3.

These facts were discovered only by the herein complainant in the year 1974 where they separated from each other because of her illicit relations with several men continued use of her alias name "DELIA", without proper authority from the Courts; and committing a series of fraudulent acts; her previous marriage to a certain "Reynaldo Quiroca" is evidenced by a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
3

26

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien LOPEZ v. CITY JUDGE

18 SCRA 616 Dizon, J; Oct. 29, 1966


FACTS Petitioners Angelina Lopez, Aurora Villasor (heirs of Sps. Manuel Mejia and Gloria Lazatin) and Roy Villasor (administrator of the intestate estate of the said Sps.) Petitioners, together with the other heirs of Sps. Mejia, entered into a contract with Trinidad Lazatin for the development and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belong to said intestate estate. Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC for the recission of said contract for alleged gross and wilful violation of its terms. Lazatin and TDC filed with the Fiscals Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation Art. 172 in relation to those of Art. 171, par. 4, of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination, City Fiscal filed an information charging petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they made it appear in the contract mentioned that Aurora Villasor was the guardian of the minor George Mejia and that Angelina Lopez was similarly the guardian of the minor Alexander Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document. Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles reinvestigated the case to give them an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. (Makati and QC) Resolution of this motion to was delayed. The City Court had set the criminal case for arraignment; petitioners secured from said court several postponements of the arraignment. In view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the case, petitioners with the City Court a motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complainants with the conformity of the City Fiscal filed an opposition thereto. City Judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the same year. Petitioners filed the present action for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a private document allegedly done by the parties named in the info even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court 2. WON the motion to quash was improper, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the 3.

information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is proper

HELD/RATIO 1. NO. It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. The City Court of Angeles has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified document, in violation of the last paragraph of Art. 172 of the RPC. The charge against them is that of having falsified a private. US v. Infante - that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Art. 304 of the Penal Code (now par 2, Article 172 of the RPC) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended. The act of falsification the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is not essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. 2. NO. The argument of the respondents refers to the now obsolete demurrer to an information. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required. In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which was submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in connection with the resolution of the motion to quash shows beyond question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. YES

3.

27

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
As a general rule, a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule that upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions however, this is no longer the hard and fast rule. The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.

DISPOSITION judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein.

28

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien UY v. CA

276 SCRA 371 Bellosillo, J; Jan. 28, 1997


FACTS Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of Consolacion Leong. During Rosas employment, she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. A few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. She helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500k were claimed to have given by Consolacion for the business; however because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued.Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Consolacion filed a complaint for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the RTC of Manila. Dec. 10 an Information for and several other informations for violation of BP blg. 22 were filed against Rosa. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly. RTC acquitted Rosa of estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP Blg. 22. CA affirmed the decision Rosa - trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. None of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. The evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila People (1) Even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case. (2)Knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another (3) respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel- it took some 5 years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction. ISSUES

Whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law HELD/RATIO: NO It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are 2 different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to Rosar; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 had been acquired. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing offense however It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. However that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact

29

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. Doctrine of Estoppel not applicable Sec. 3, Rule 117provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8, Rule 113 it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged as provided for in par. b Sec. 3, Rule 117. Rosa timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. Even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Calimlim v. Ramirez Tijam v. Sibonghanoy4is an exception to the general rule In Calimlim v. Ramirez, the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the timehonored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Instant case different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in the present case. As soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court.

DISPOSITION REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filling of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.

It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

30

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE v. NAVARRO

279 SCRA 393 Panganiban, J


FACTS T/Sgt. Sanchez, PC Investigator filed a complaint for qualified theft directly with the RTC of Naga City against minor Carlos Barbosa. PAO, as counsel for Barbosa, filed a Motion to Quash the Complaint on the ground that Sgt. Sanchez is not authorized to file a complaint or information in Court. Judge Manio, Jr., as presiding judge of RTC and the pairing judge of Judge Navarro, issued an order remanding the case for preliminary investigation and assigned the adjudication to Prosecutor Cajot. Before Pros. Cajot could conduct the required preliminary investigation, Sgt. Sanchez filed a motion to withdraw the complaint with the Prosecution Office. Pros. Cajot issued an order and approved by the Prov. Pros., granting the motion to withdraw the complaint and ordering the release of the accused from detention. A copy of said order was furnished the RTC. Judge Navarro ordered the Prov. Pros. and Pros. Cajot to explain why they encroached on the jurisdiction of the court over the case. Pros. Cajot explained asserting the jurisdiction of the prosecutors office in the conduct of preliminary investigation and that when the court ordered the records of case be remanded to the Office of the Prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation, the court divested itself of its control and jurisdiction over the case. Judge Navarro issued an order setting aside the order of Pros. Cajot and ordered Ass. Pros. Llaguno, who was appearing in her sala, to conduct the required preliminary investigation. Pros. Llaguno file a motion for reconsideration taking exception to the order on the ground that any resolution she may issue might run counter with the previous order of her superiors and thus render office policies disorganized, procedures disorderly and chaotic, resulting to the embarrassment of the administration of Justice. Pros. Cajot filed a motion for reconsideration alleging: (a) that he did not issue an order of dismissal but an order granting the motion to withdraw. Therefore, there is no more complaint to speak of before the court; (b) the prosecutor, in conducting the preliminary investigation, has the exclusive power and authority to dismiss the complaint immediately if he finds no grounds to continue with the inquiry, otherwise he files the Information if he finds cause to hold the respondent for trial; (c) the finding/recommendation of the investigating prosecutor is subject to review only by the Prov. Pros and the action of the latter, by the Secretary of Justice; (d) when the Court remanded the case to the Pros. Office for the required preliminary investigation; the Court divested itself of its control and jurisdiction over the case; and (e) the filing of information is within the discretionary authority of the fiscal. Judge Navarro denied both motions for reconsideration and reiterated its previous order to Pros. Llaguno to comply with the order of the court, granting her 15 days to conduct the

preliminary investigation from receipt of the copy of the Order. Prov. Pros. filed a motion to set aside the orders issued by Judge Navarro stating (1) that she has no authority to designate a particular prosecutor to handle the case; (2) that the court will be acting without or with grave abuse of discretion should it insists on Pros. Llaguno to conduct the preliminary investigation; and (3) that the record of said case be forwarded to the Prov. Pros. Office for it conduct the preliminary investigation. A Supplemental Motion to withdraw the case was also filed so that the same may not remain pending with the court while the case is under preliminary investigation. Judge Navarro denied both motions on the grounds that: (1) the case of Abugotal v. Tiro which prohibits the courts from appointing a particular fiscal to conduct the required preliminary investigation, is not in point as the said case refers to reinvestigation while the instant case refers to preliminary investigation; and (2) the court is apprehensive that if the Motion to Amend Orders are granted, there is nothing that will prevent the Prov. Pros. from implementing the orders issued by Pros. Cajot and the latter will just act in conformity with his previous action. Prov. Pros. motion reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed the petition seeking the annulment of the assailed order of Judge Navarro.

ISSUE May a regional trial court judge name or designate a particular assistant prosecutor to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case? HELD/RATIO: NO In setting aside the order of Pros. Cajot which granted the withdrawal of the complaint, and subsequently ordering Pros. Llaguno to conduct the required preliminary investigation, Judge Navarro clearly encroached on an executive function. Preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial, function. As the officer authorized to direct and control the prosecution of all criminal actions, a prosecutor is primarily responsible for ascertaining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. An RTC judge has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that he cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor, particularly over the objections of the latters superiors, to conduct a preliminary investigation. To allow him to do so is to authorize him to meddle in the executive and administrative functions of the provincial or city prosecutor. There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice and his team of prosecutors. Mere suspicion or belief that the said officials will not adequately perform their official duties is no reason for the judges interference in or disregard of such hierarchy. Abugotal v. Tiro - Under Presidential Decree No. 77, the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the

31

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
murder charge filed against private respondents is vested in the petitioner or his assistants. As chief of the office, petitioner has the right to designate as in fact he did the assistant fiscal who conducted the investigation. While it is true that an assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information only in a case in which he himself conducted the preliminary investigation, he may furthermore do so only with the prior authority or approval of the city of provincial fiscal or chief state prosecutor. These provisions of law show in bold relief the degree of control over his assistants that petitioner exercises as chief of the office. Where, however, the interest of justice so requires and the court orders a reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it, the court cannot at the same time choose the fiscal who will conduct the reinvestigation. This is a prerogative vested in the city fiscal as head of office, and certainly beyond the powers of the court to do Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is a part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. It is true that after a case has already been filed in court and the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over it, fiscals as a rule are divested of the power to dismiss a criminal action without the consent of the court. In the case at bench, however, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the complaint filed directly before it by Sgt. Sanchez who was not a prosecutor. Neither was he authorized by the Provincial Prosecutor to file such case directly with the respondent court. We are not persuaded by Judge Navarros contention that Abugotal applies only to reinvestigations, and not to preliminary investigations. This distinction is insubstantial and even tenuous. Both the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective, that is, to determine whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

DISPOSITION the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of Respondent Judge Gloriosa S. Navarro are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

32

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Moran January 27, 1923 Araullo, C.J.
Facts: March 31, 1922 SC affirmed judgment of CFI of Pangasinan convicting the accused herein for violation of the Election Law May 2, 1922 accused filed a special motion, alleging that the crime has prescribed under the provision of Section 715 of Act 3030 (enacted March 9, 1922), thus praying for absolution Issue # 1: Whether or not the prescription provided in section 71 of Act 3030 refers only to that act and not to any other. Held/Ratio: NO. Said act was amendatory to several provisions of the Election law, as such Act 3030 rather than being an integral part of the former election law is in conjunction with the latter the only Election Law in force While it is true that Sec.72 provided that the act shall take effect on the date of its approval (March 9, 1922), the meaning of such expression (effectivity) in connection with prescription is that prescription can be invoked from that date, as was done by the accused, and not that such provision may have a retroactive effect from that same date. Issue #2 (more crimpro relevant): Whether or not such provisions may be applied retroactively in favor of the accused. Held/Ratio: YES. While it is a rule of general application that unless the defense of prescription is pleaded in the trial court, it will be deemed to have been waived and cannot later be raised, yet this rule is not of absolute application in criminal cases, for if the prescription of the crime, as well as of the penalty whereby criminal responsibility is extinguished, may, as is the case here with regard to the former, be provided by statute after the termination of all the proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the appellate court, and when the case has already been submitted for discussion and is awaiting only the final judgment; and if the prescription of the crime is but the extinguishment of the right of the State to prosecute and punish the culprit, it is beyond question that, once the State has lost or waived such right, the accused may, at any stage of the proceeding, ask and move that the same be dismissed and that he be absolved from the complaint. And not only that, the right to prosecute and punish the criminal having been lost by the prescription of the crime expressly provided by the statute, the State itself, the Government through the proper court, is in duty bound to make a pronouncement to that effect.6

Therefore, as on March 9th of this year, 1922, when Act No. 3030 went into effect, providing in its section 71 that offense resulting from the violations thereof shall prescribe one year after their commission, the accused and the AttorneyGeneral had already filed their respective briefs in this court for the prosecution of the appeal taken from the judgment of the court below, and the hearing of the case had already been held, this court itself, without the necessity of any motion of the accused, or of the Attorney-General, should have declared the crime in question to have prescribed, in view of the provision of said section. Consequently, as this court had not up to that time made such pronouncement, the accused are perfectly justified in asking, as they have done in their motion of May 2d of this year, that the offense having prescribed, they be absolved from the complaint. This duty is imperative upon the courts of justice at any moment that the offense appears to have prescribed under the provision of the law. With particular reference to the present case, this conclusion is necessarily reached from the letter as well as the spirit of the provisions of the Penal Code relative to prescription, and from that of section 71 of the aforesaid Act No. 3030, for once the offense or the penalty has prescribed, the State has no right to prosecute the offender, or to punish him, and if he has already been punished, it has no right to continue holding him subject to its action by the imposition of the penalty. The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony or misdemeanor, even if they may be serving sentence, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty. Article 22 of the Penal Code can only be invoked when the provisions of some other penal law than the provisions of the Penal Code are under consideration. In other words, the provisions of article 22 can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. It has no application to the provisions of the Penal Code except in relation with some other law. It is not believed, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting article 7 of the Penal Code intended to provide that article 22 should not be applicable to special laws. o It cannot be maintained that said article 22 of the Penal Code refers only to penalties and is not applicable to appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty, for the length of time fixed by the law for the prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense, as may be seen from Title VI of Book I of the Penal Code, containing, as its heading indicates, "General Provisions Regarding Felonies and Misdemeanors, the Persons Liable and the Penalties," without distinguishing between the penalties and the

Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission. 6 Meaning, there is no need for an allegation by the accused as to the prescription of the crime, the Court may by itself render a
5

decision absolving a defendant because of prescription. (US v. Rama)

33

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
extinguishing of the criminal responsibility dealt with in said Title VI of said Book, which title comes next to Title V, treating of the penalties incurred by those who evade service of sentence and those who, while serving sentence, or after having been convicted by a final judgment not yet served, commit some other crime. And aside from this intimate connection between the prescription of the crime and that of the penalty, a statute declaring the prescription of the crime has no other object and purpose than to prevent or annul the prosecution of the offender and, in the last analysis, the imposition of the penalty. Moreover, if the provisions relative to the prescription of ownership and to the prescription of actions in civil matters are part of the civil law, it cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the prescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof.

SO, IS PRESCRIPTION SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL? With regard to the question whether prescription must be considered as a matter of procedural or formal law, or as a substantive law for the purpose of the retroactivity of laws, we must state, with reference to the present case, that the prescription provided in section 71 of Act No. 3030 is of the nature both of a substantive law, in so far as it gives a person accused of any of the crimes therein referred to, the right not to be prosecuted nor punished after the lapse of the period of one year from the commission of said crimes, within which the criminal action must be commenced, and of a procedural or adjective law in so far as it fixes the time within which such action must necessarily be commenced in order that the prosecution may be legal and the proper penalty may lawfully be imposed. but however said provision may be considered, the same must have a retroactive effect, as will be seen later on.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Salico October 13, 1949 Feria, J.
Facts: CFI of Occidental Negros dismissed the complaint for homicide against defendant on the ground that it was not able to prove that the offense was committed within its territorial jurisdiction7 Issue: Whether this appeal would place the defendant in double jeopardy. Held/Ratio: NO. 1. By the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy Section 9, Rule 1138 basically states that when a defendant when a defendant has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, upon a valid complaint or information by a court of competent jurisdiction and after he has pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. But when the case id dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. Court cited: Ruling Case Law and American Jurisprudence; Carrol v. State; Craig v. US

2.

The appeal by the prosecution in the present case would not place the defendant in double jeopardy. As a necessary corollary of the above conclusion that the defendant not been in jeopardy in the court below, because the case was dismissed upon the defendant's own motion, this appeal by the prosecution would not place the defendant in double jeopardy, since a person who has not been once, cannot be put twice in jeopardy.

Besides, under section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court the prosecution may appeal because the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy, not only when the defendant has not yet been placed in jeopardy in the court below, but also when, although a defendant had already been in former jeopardy, the appeal by the prosecution would no place him in danger again of being convicted by the appellate court by the same offense, because the question for the appellate court to decide is not the guilt or innocence of the defendant. o For example, when after a judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court had become final the court reconsiders its decision and renders another acquitting the defendant, in which the question raised in the appeal is not the guilt or innocence of the appellee, but the jurisdiction of the court to render the second judgment. Or, as in the present case, when the question involved in the appeal is whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution does not show that the place where the offense was committed was within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This court by reversing the appealed decision in such cases cannot convict the appellee, but only remand the case to the lower court for further proceeding. The fact that the lower court has to proceed to the trial of the case against the defendant on the merits and may after the trial either acquit or convict him, would not place the defendant in double jeopardy, because the further proceeding by the court below is not a new trial of a case against the defendant, but a mere continuation of the former trial in order that the lower court may decide the case on the merits or the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

3.

Assuming arguendo that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and would be placed in the double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice for the same offense. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and that appeal would put him in double jeopardy, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that the right of the defendant not to be put twice in jeopardy is deemed waived if not set up in time as a defense or ground for a motion to dismiss. As the defendant has not set up said right or objected on that ground to the appeal by the prosecution, this court can not motu proprio dismiss the appeal, in the same way that if the defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction, waiving his right not to be put twice in jeopardy, the appellate court can not motu proprio dismiss the appeal. The provision of section 2, Rule 118, can not be construed to mean that this Court can not entertain an appeal by the prosecution even if the

As in, literally, they didnt know whether the municipality of Victorias is within Negros Occ. stupid, much? 8 Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. - When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of a defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or information.
7

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
defendant has waived his right to object to the appeal on the ground that it would place him in double jeopardy; because the Congress has no power to make the judgment of the Court of First Instance unappealable by the mere fact that the defendant had already been in jeopardy, inasmuch as section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution provides that the Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal all final decisions and orders of the inferior courts in all cases in which an error or question of law is involved, as in the present case. Besides, section 9, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court provides that "when a defendant shall been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information . . . and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, etc." It does not say that it shall be a bar if the defendant sets up the defense of double jeopardy in the same way that section 2 of Rule 118 does not provide that the prosecution cannot appeal if the defendant set up the defense of double jeopardy; and yet the defendant shall have to set up that defense if prosecuted again for the offense, for otherwise it is deemed waived and the defendant may be prosecuted and convicted for the same offense.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. City Court of Manila Br. VI September 24. 1987 Padilla, J.
Facts: 2 informations were filed against Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan: the first for violation of Section 79, in relation to Section 1110, of RA 3060, the 2nd for violation of Art 201(3) of RPC11 Judge, upon motion of accused to quash information, dismissed the 2nd information on the ground of double jeopardy. Issue: Whether or not the 2 information causes double jeopardy. Peoples contention: The accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings in another case for the same offense. 1 The respondent, on the other hand, argues that conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense. Held/Ratio: NO. It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first

It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any motion picture theater or public place, or by television within the Philippines any motion picture, including trailers, stills, and other pictorial advertisements in connection with motion pictures, not duly passed by the Board; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater, or public place or by television, a label or notice showing the same to have been previously passed by the said Board when the same has not been previously authorized, except motion pictures imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels.
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Any violation of Section seven of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six months but not more than two years, or by a fine of not less than six hundred nor more than two thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. If the offender is an alien he shall be deported immediately. The license to operate the movie theater or television shall also be revoked. Any other kind of violation shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than three hundred pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. In case the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership or association, the liability shall devolve upon the president, manager, administrator, or any office thereof responsible for the violation.
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jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. o the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense. 3 On the other hand, the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing of indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures. o The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. (People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 24). Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472).

Those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other place open to public view, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows;
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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Pineda February 16, 1993 Melo, J.
Facts: Basically: Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she allegedly disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons. Hence she was charged with estafa and falsification of public documents on 2 separate informations She moved to quash the information for falsification on the ground that such was a necessary means to commit estafa, and a separate conviction would constitute double jeopardy. Judge Pineda granted said petition. Issue: Whether or not quashing the information was correct (whether or not there would be double jeopardy) Held/Ratio: NO. 1. Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa, which ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and thus susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash under Section 2 (e), Rule 117 vis-a-vis Section 12, Rule 110 (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it was serious error on the part of the magistrate below to have appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this matter was not specifically raised in the motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 (p. 16, Record). It was only in the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this additional ground after her motion to quash was denied At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private respondent concocted the sinister scheme of falsification in 1971 precisely to facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 such that both crimes emanated from a single criminal impulse. Otherwise, an unfounded verisimilitude of this nature will run afoul with what this Court already observed in People vs. Penas (68 Phil. 533 [1939]; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., p. 574) to the effect that the eleven estafas through falsification which the same accused therein committed between November 24, 1936 and January 3, 1937 including the falsification which he committed on January 8, 1937 were considered distinct offenses, not one complex crime, because they were committed on different dates, not to mention the discrepancy in places where they were accomplished. It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that private respondent is in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under Section 2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash, because this plea is understood to presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been

dismissed or otherwise terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge (People of the Philippines versus Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992; Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended). In the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said that: . . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge.

Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990]) Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book "Remedial Law" enumerates the elements constitutive of first jeopardy, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Court of competent jurisdiction; Valid complaint or information; Arraignment 4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; 853) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Declaro, G.R. No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142; See also People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143; People vs. Gines, G.R. No. 83463, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 481; Que vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 [1989]; Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54; Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 [1991]). (Herrera, Remedial Law, 1992 Ed., Volume 4, p. 417).

Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Herrera continues to submit the idea that: The first jeopardy is said to have validly terminated upon conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case or otherwise terminated without the express consent of defendant (People vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA 150; People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77; People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; Buscayno vs. Military

38

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
Commission, 109 SCRA 273; People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 319; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1987.) (Vide, at page 423). 2. At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite recently in People vs. Asuncion, (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992), the ambiguity stirred by the imprecise observation in People vs. City Court of Manila, a 1983 case, can now be considered modified in that a prior conviction, or acquittal, or termination of the case without the express acquiescence of the accused is still required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Mogol Aguust 24, 1984 Guerrero, J.
Facts: An information for serious physical injuries was filed against accused Edgardo Caballas After arraignment (on which Caballas pled not guilty), prosecution motioned to amend the information from serious PI to frustrated murder Naturally, court denied However, after the submission of evidence by both prosecution and defense, no decision on the merits was rendered, basically because the court thought now that the crime was indeed frustrated murder and not serious PI, to wit: While considering the evidence of this case the court realized that the evidence on the injuries sustained by the accused and the circumstances surrounding the infliction thereof overwhelmingly point to the conclusion that the intention of the assailant was to inflict more than just injuries. Hence, the court is restricted by what it considers a legal obstacle to the validity of whatever judgement it renders, because whether it be one of acquittal or conviction - it shall have so ordered on a case outside its jurisdiction. The evidence is positive and uncontradicted that the person who inflicted the stab wounds on Ernesto Sandoval had evidently not by accident but by design, walked with the victim from a certain point on Real Street up to some 400 meters therefrom which is another spot on a quite unfrequented side street; that it was in that spot where the victim was stabbed four times, two of which hit the victim - one, on the abdominal region and another "penetrating and perforating the posterior abdominal wall cutting the terminal portion of the 10th rib"; that this was at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of December 1971, at which time it must have been dark already; that the victim was alone, and that the attack was sudden and treacherous. It has also been shown that the knife used by the assonant measures about 6 inches in length; that the victim was not able to walk by himself after having been stabbed but that he had to be carried to the hospital and that while there, the victim almost lost consciousness. By the medical certificate issued by a physician of the hospital (Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, Lopez, Quezon) the duration of treatment has been placed at 30 days. The Court believes that the foregoing evidence would support prima facie a complaint for the crime of frustrated murder and, as stated, prevents it from rendering judgment in this case. It cannot even rule that the parties have waived the question of jurisdiction having proceeded with the trial of the case up to its termination as this would be legally erroneous.

The proceedings in the case, however, may not be considered to have been rendered useless because by it more than by a mere preliminary investigation, the court has arrived at a better supported finding that the proper complaint should have been for frustrated murder; that the crime of frustrated murder has been committed and that there is reason to believe that the accused Edgardo Caballas might have been the one who had committed the same. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder. Since the proceedings from the preliminary examination up to the conclusion of the trial hereof has amounted to a compliance with the requirements of a preliminary investigation first and second stage, let the records hereof be forwarded to the Court of First Instance at Calauag, Quezon, under the jurisdiction of which court the case for frustrated murder pertains, through the office of the Provincial Fiscal so that the latter may act on this case and file the corresponding complaint as above-recommended.

So, a new info/complaint for frustrated murder was filed Issue: W/N the new info constitutes double jeopardy Held/Ratio: NO. In the case of Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950), this Court held that: ... the dismissal contemplated in the above-quoted section of the rule (referring to Section 9. Rule 113 of the old Rules of Court, now Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court) is a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice as in the present case. In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not, in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case provisionally, i.e., without prejudice to reinstating it before the order become final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense. (Page 454.) The Jaca ruling was reiterated in People vs. Manlapas et al., L-17993, August 24, 1962, 5 SCRA 883, 887; Republic vs. Agoncillo, et al., L-27257, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579, 587; and People vs. Hon. Surtida, et al., L-24420, January 26, 1972, 43 SCRA 29, 37. Moreover, as stated in the aforementioned case of Republic vs. Agoncillo, et al. (supra, p. 588): ... the authoritative pronouncement in the ... case of People vs. Obsania (L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249), with Justice Castro as ponente, had made clear beyond doubt that

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, it must have the effect of an acquittal Thus: "The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who in the first place, is presumed innocent." There can be no question, as indeed it is quite clear, that in the case at bar, the Order of dismissal issued by the Municipal Court did not actually terminate or put an end to the prosecution against herein private respondent for the felonious act he was alleged to have committed. On the contrary, the dispositive portion of said Order expressly directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the Court of First Instance so that the Office of the Provincial Fiscal could file a complaint for frustrated murder. In any case, the dismissal Order was NOT legal and valid. o We hold and rule that respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case for serious physical injuries "to give way to the filing of a complaint for frustrated murder." For it is the duty of the respondent Judge to render the decision as the evidence presented warrant under the information as filed for serious physical injuries, and not dismiss the case on his Idea or belief that there was evidence of intent to kill the intended victim. The Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction thereby rendering his Order of November 29, 1972 null and void. o Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully terminated, Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical injuries is in order.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien Esmea v. Pogoy February 20, 1981 Aquino, J.
Facts: A grave coercion case was filed agains Esmea, et. al. for having allegedly forced Rev.Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw P5,000 because the priest lost it in a game of cards. Because of many different reasons12, the hearing was reset many times, until the respondent judge (siguro napikon) issued an order setting the trial for the last time on August 16, 1973 However, on said date, priest was allegedly sick, and again motioned to reset the date. Counsel for accused opposed and invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. wenty-seven days later, or on September 12, 1979, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16, 1979 Issue: W/N the revival of the case would place the accused in double jeopardy Held/Ratio: YES. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 240). Previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), previous conviction (autrefois convict) or the dismissal or termination of the case without his consent precludes his subsequent indictment for the same offense as defined in section 9 In the instant case, we hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would

Original date: 10.04.1978 Reason # 1: priest requested reset on 12.13.78 Reason # 2: accused not duly notified Arraigned on 01.23.79 NO TRIAL priest absent BEST REASON OF ALL: FISCAL LOST RECORD OF CASE *applause* -- hearing on 06.19.79 moved again. <kaya ayun, napikon na si judge.>
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not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. o It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional dismissal. o The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299) If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717). The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense (Salcedo vs. Mendoza, L-49375, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 811; Lagunilia vs. Hon. Reyes, etc. and Motas, 111 Phil. 1020 citing People vs. Tacneng, 105 Phil. 1298 and People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016. See Taladua vs. Ochotorena, L-25595, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 528; Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, L28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247; Baesa vs. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437; People vs. Cloribel, 120 Phil. 775; People vs. Abao 97 Phil. 28; People vs. Labatete, 107 Phil. 697)

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Villalon December 21, 1990 Regalado, J.
Facts: Federico de Guzman was charged with estafa through falsification of public documents for allegedly forging the signature of Carrera to make it appear that the former was made the latters attorney-in-fact, and subsequently mortgaging the parcel of land which Carrera owns. De Guzman raised the issue of prescription he claims that the crime has prescribed since more than 10 years has elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Judge Villalon dismissed the complaint on basis of prescription Issue: W/N this appeal by the people would constitute double jeopardy. Held/Ratio: NO. PP v. City Court of Manila As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Irrele on issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law COURT: YES The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estaga bacuase before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of the falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the public, official or commercial document, hence, the falsification of said document is only a necessary meanse to commit the estafa.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People vs. Lagui 171 SCRA 305
Hizon lent money to Sorriano who in turn issued a post dated check to answer for the debt. When they tried to encash the check, the account was already closed. He was charged with a violation under BP 22 and estafa The RTC dismissed the BP 22 charge because the information was fatally defective and convicted him of the estafa charge Upon appeal of the accused, the CA reversed the estafa conviction The people now is appealing the other case (BP 22) saying that the info was not fatally defective.

W/N info was fatally defective? NO 3 Elements of BP 22 1. Issuance of check for account or for value 2. At time of issue, maker does not have sufficient funds or credit 3. Subsequently dishonored. The judge said that the information failed to allege that the accused knew when he issued the check that the then did not have sufficient funds in the bank; the information should have allege that the accused knew that he would not have sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check in full upon its presentment. --Wrong The presence of the 1st and 3rd elements of the offense constitutes prima facie evidene that the second element exists. (Look at Sec 2 of Law.) W/N if it wasnt, can he still be convicted? NO Decision cannot be annulled or set aside because it amounted to a judgment of acquittal. It became final and executory upon its promulgation. The state may not appeal that decision for it would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the offense in violation of his constitutional rights against double jeopardy. Soriano had been arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was tried upon a valid and sufficient information and case was dismissed by trial court (without his consent), he has been placed in jeopardy for the offense charged so re-assesing the evidence against him pursuant to the appeal of the govt would put him in double jeopardy.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien Galvez vs. CA Oct. 24, 1994
Galvez, the incumbent mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan was charged with 3 infos for homicide and 2 infos for frustrated homicide. The prosecution filled a motion to defer arraingment to review the evidence to determine the proper charges as well as change of venue because complainants fear for their safety and to prevent miscarriage of justice. Before their arraignment, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw informations, and subsequently filed informations for murder and illegal possession of firearms. They filed a motion to quash saying the court never acquired jurisdiction, which was denied and judge set arraignment. Assailed resolution.

Which set of informations should Galvez be tried with? The 1 st or 2nd? Corollary issues: 1. Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110; 2. Whether the order granting the withdrawal of the original informations was immediately final and executory; 3. Whether Judge Pornillos was correct in denying the motion to quash and thereby acquired jurisdiction over the new informations considering that (a) the designated public prosecutor allegedly had no authority to file the second set of informations; and (b) the filing thereof constituted forum shopping; and 4. Whether the arraignment proceeding held on January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93 to 4007-M-93 was valid.

Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position. 2. the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It is only an irregularity.Besides, when petitioners were given by Judge Villajuan the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, even assuming the alleged procedural infirmity in his issuance of the order of dismissal, the same was thereby deemed cured. 3. Sec 11 rule 119 governs the trial stage vs sec 10 rule 114 governs procedural governance for prosecution of offenses, from the filing of info to just before the trial. 4. Sec 10 rule 114- The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. Under the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information. Petition dismissed.

1. considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Pilpa 79 SCRA 82
Was charged with frustrated murder and pleaded not guilty The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss because intent to kill was not alleged in the information which initially was not objected to by the accuseds lawyer but subsequently changed his mind. A second information was then filed and a motion to quash from the defense claiming double jeopardy. Judge granted the motion and prosecution now appeals. Petition Granted, assailed order set aside.

Whether the second information would place the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of frustrated murder? NO Under section 9 of Rule 117 the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked in cases of (a) previous acquittal (autrefois acquit), (b) conviction (autrefois convict) of the same offense, or (c) when the case against the accused has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In any of these three cases, in order that there be former kill jeopardy, it is in the first case that (a) there was a valid competent or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (c) and that the had been and had entered his plea. When these conditions or requotes are present, the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,or for carry offense which necessarily includes or is included therein. here is former jeopardy when in the first case there was a valid COMPLAINT of information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and, after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was terminated without his express consent We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent to the dismissal Later, the cases were revived. The accused contended that the revival of the cases would place her in double jeopardy. That contention was rejected because the provisional dismissal did not place the in jeopardy. There was no jeopardy in such dismissal because the words "No objection" conveyed the Idea of full concurrence with the dismissal and was equivalent to saying "I agree."

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
People v. Obsania On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. Petition granted, order set aside.

W/N lewd designs should be alledged in complaint? NO Rape does not require that specific allegation.Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The court then discusses a long history of jurisprudence and somewhat seemingly conflicting rulings that is too long to put in the digest. In the end through the accused can be estopped or can waive double jeopardy. The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel;

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien Ada v. Virola 172 SCRA 336

Ada was initially charged under BP 22 for issuing 3 checks that bounced Before prosecution rested its case, he was also charged with estafa, which Ada tried to object to but was arraigned nevertheless. After prosecution rested its case, he filed a motion to dismiss the later cases saying it was violation is Double jeopardy right.

W/N there is double jeopardy? NO It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. These requisites do not exist in the case at bar. The prohibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. The plea of double jeopardy applies where the offenses in the two informations are the same in law and in fact. It is not necessarily decisive that the two offenses may have material facts in common, or that they are similar, where they are not in fact the same. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision of law requires proof of an additional fact or element while the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. In other words, where two different laws (or articles of the same Code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. The 2 laws are distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses charged.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien People v. Relova 148 SCRA 304
The Police, armed with a search warrant, conducted a search on private respondents properties and found out he was using devices to lower his electric bill. He was charged in violation of ordinance 1 and pleaded not guilty. He filed a motion to dismiss saying the offense has already prescribed which was granted. After 14 days, he was charged now under the RPC 309, theft of electrical power. He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This was granted by the trial court.

offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

Petition denied.

W/N Doulbe Jeopardy bars the RPC information? YES The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. MARIA DEL CARMEN et al. PARAS J.
The defendants were prosecuted in the municipal court of Manila for the crime of malicious mischief. After presentation of evidence for the prosecution, the municipal court dismissed the case on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the removal or destruction of the property in question had been inspired by resentment, rancor, or desires for revenge. Subsequently, the same fiscal who filed the information in the municipal court, filed the following information of coercion in the court of First Instance of Manila against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy? Yes, the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense it seems basic that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Counsel for defendants filed a motion to nullify the second information on the grounds of double jeopardy. Contented for the appellant there is no double jeopardy since the second information charges an offense different from that included in the information filed in the municipal court. The rule against double jeopardy protecting the accused not against the second punishment for the same act but against being tried for the same offense. A brief comparison of the two informations, the act complained of in the case for coercion is the same act which formed the basis of the information for malicious mischief. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense it seems basic that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission, may give rise to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of prosecuting officer to imagine as many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. The case at bar is an occasion for reminding prosecuting officers to be careful and comprehensive in criminal investigations with the view to determining definitely, before filing the necessary information, the offenses in fact and in law committed, in order to avoid situations smacking of persecutions.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien CONRADO MELO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL MORAN, C. J.
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill at the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On December 29, 1949, at 8 a.m., the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day, Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950 and January 4, 1950 and amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused then filed a motion to nullify the amended information claiming double jeopardy. Motion was denied by the respondent court; hence, instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information

The rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct offense. The accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

Issue: Whether or not an accused who pleaded guilty to the offense of frustrated homicide, upon death of the offended party, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy, if the information amended is to charge him with homicide? No, because the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended information. Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and it did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Meaning when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot be charged with the same or identical offense. It is noticed that the protection of the constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Same offense, under the general rule, has always been interpreted to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also the two offenses are identical. There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. On the other hand, the rule of identity does not apply, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was in existent.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO YORAC FERNANDO, J.
A constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense was the basis for a motion to nullify by the accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac. He was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for which he was previously tried and sentenced for slight physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt. The information for frustrated murder was based on the second medical certificate given by the same physician which was much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash in an order of June 21, 1968. The people appealed. The accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod. The accused plead guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer ten days of arresto menor. On April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed information at the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the act upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968. A motion to nullify was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries and having already served the penalty imposed on him for the same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party, he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

or acquitted or the case against him terminated without his express consent, or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or for; any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Although there is the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the existing facts previously constituting a new and distinct offense.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries and had served sentence therefore, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person? No, because there is no supervening fact that had occurred which justifies the application, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. By this, the motion to quash was granted and ordered the dismissal of the case and immediate release of the appellee. For double jeopardy not to exist, there is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. A defendant in a criminal case should therefore, be judged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. The Same offense, means another prosecution for the offense charged after a defendant shall have been convicted

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, v. CITY COURT of MANILA, BRANCH XI and FRANCISCO GAPAY y MALLARES, RELOVA J.
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against respondent Francisco Gapa y Mallares on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private respondent having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy. The case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1972. On the following day, October 18, information was filed against respondent for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. On October 24, 1972, information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against respondent. On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of respondent, issued and order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy.

prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then in existent. Accordingly, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. As stated, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed, and the accused was arraigned two days after, or on October 20, 1972. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed on October 24, 1972, the accused- private respondent was already in jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered? No, the fact remains that the victim Diolito de la Cruz died on October 18 one day after the accident and arrest of the respondent Gapay and that on October 20 the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused. It follows that after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. However, article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury. Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, it must be pointed that, the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first

53

CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien GEORGE MANANTAN, v. THE COURT of APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS QUISIMBING J.
June 1, 1983, thee Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Petitioner was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgement in Criminal Case no. 066, the appellate court found the petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas for a total of 174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Issues: Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability? Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester Doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? Petitioner argues that the trial courts finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis of his acquittal and not reasonable doubt. Hence, upon finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy. Preliminary, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist elements are established. First is a jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. The first jeopardy must have been terminated. Lastly, the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. However, petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. Records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal therefore there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act of omission complained of. This closes the door to civil liability. Second is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused, in this case if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempted from civil liability which may be proved by the preponderance of evidence only.

Hence, petitioners acquittal was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioners negligence. In line with this, the petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. He argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded and concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action. Respondents counter that the trial courts judgement shows the judgement of acquittal did not clearly declare the nonexistence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. They argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt. Inquiry by the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt hence petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the court. The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies. Furthermore, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals made a mistake in awarding damages and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when civil case was instituted with the criminal action. Private respondents argue that under the rules of court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgement. At the time of the filing of information, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, section 1 of the 1964, Rules of Court. As pointed out by the respondents, under the said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. Thus, the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgement. The rules of criminal procedure guarantee that filing fees for the award of damages are first lien on the judgement, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retro act to the institution of the criminal action. Therefore, we find no basis for petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction. The instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien SAMSON V. CA BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases. Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through (falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial. Espiridion Lascao, father of the late Felipe Lascao, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during the last World War, and his widow Rosanna Paras, are Felipe Lascano's only legitimate surviving heirs, They filed their claim papers with the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon in the early part of 1946. On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him at Camp Murphy . They were successful in having the checks of the two claimants. They went to Aristocrat restaurant and Samson went on to watch a movie that night ( I know. Weird.). Just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were with the party which cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. He found Espiridion too weak and too old to get out of the house and saw Rosalina (I think this should be Rosanna) in the school where she was teaching and confirmed that the old mans check was never claimed by them. ISSUE (CRIMPRO): WON Samson can be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence despite the fact that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part- YES

proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to the official duties of appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause damage is not required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents. The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116. Rules of Court). As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.). While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,* G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to appellant. Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document by reckless imprudence, because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien STA. RITA V. CA FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Sta. Rita was charged in the RTC with violating Section 2(a) in relation to Sections 22(d) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. The Information alleged that petitioner, "as President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc. a compulsorily (sic) covered employer under the Social Security Law, as amended, did then and there willfully and unlawfully fail, neglect and refuse and still fails, neglects and refuses to remit to the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its covered employees." Petitioner Sta. Rita moved to dismiss said criminal case The RTC sustained petitioner's motion and dismissed the criminal case filed against him. It ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Social Security System ("SSS") extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended. The People, through the Solicitor General, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the order of dismissal issued by the trial court. Respondent appellate court granted the petition. Thereafter, petitioner filed in this Court a motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The Court granted the motion and gave petitioner until 9 June 1995 to file the petition with warning that no further extension will be given. Despite the warning, the petition was filed only on 13 June 1995 or four (4) days after the due date. Moreover, it failed to comply with requirement no. 2 of Circular No. 1-88, as amended and Circular No. 19-91 of the Court as it did not contain an affidavit of service of copies thereof to respondents. It was only on 14 July 1995, through an ex-parte manifestation, that the affidavit of service was belatedly submitted to this Court. In the Petition for Review, petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof WON THE PETITION MUST FAIL DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL RULES YES It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. 4 These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. 5 Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the Petition and its failure to comply with the aforequoted Circulars of the Court necessitate the denial of the Petition. Besides, even if the Petition had been filed on time and had complied with the Circulars, it would still have to be denied as petitioner has failed to show that respondent appellate court committed any reversible error in rendering the assailed decision.

o o

WON THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER IS SUFFICIENT- YES The Court agrees with the CA that the Information filed against petitioner was sufficient as it clearly stated the designation of the offense by the statute, i.e. violation of the Social Security Law, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, i.e., petitioner's failure to remit his contributions to the SSS. The CA found that there is prima facie evidence to support the allegations in the Information and to warrant the prosecution of petitioner. WON THE QUESTIONED MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT (DOLESSS) IS VALID- YES Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Memorandum of Agreement was approved by the Social Security Commission per the Commission's Resolution No. 437, dated 14 July 1988. Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which reads as follows: Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission. For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in section two hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties: To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act. What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement is not an implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security Commission which, under Section 4 (a) abovequoted, is subject to the approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the participation of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform stipulation in the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of government. The Standard Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign shipowners and Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former express their assent to the inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers. It may be noted that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally expressed their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the coverage of the Social Security Act even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement. It is, finally, worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual employment agreements entered into with the stipulation for such coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS

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Memorandum of Agreement, merely give effect to the constitutional mandate to the State to afford protection to labor whether "local or overseas." (CRIMPRO) WON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST STA. RITA CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDYNO The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal case against petitioner did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected at his own instance. 10 There are only two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 11 Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q92-35426 against petitioner Sta. Rita. (AS IN ITO LANG ANG DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT, ARGH.)

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien ANAMER SALAZAR V. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit). After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged. The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence. TC: rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33. ISSUE: WON SALAZAR SHOULD BE GRANTED THE PROCEDURAL RELIEF IN RULE 33- YES The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the

other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former. Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal. The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. . If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission

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from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., vs. PANFILO M. LACSON. MAY 28, 2002

On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution and not a shootout. On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue. On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision. On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twentysix (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory (TACKLED IN LACSON V. EXEC. SEC.) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, Leonora Amora, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Carmelita Elcamel and Rolando Siplon also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter..

On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other coaccused. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112. On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 as provisional dismissal, and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent ISSUE: whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gangNO (AT LEAST NOT YET) Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent. The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. The issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants at the RTC level. Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to

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entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the refiling of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. DISPOSITIVE: case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE V LACSON APRIL 1, 2003

Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 ISSUE: WON SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689- NO Having invoked Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new

Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should not do. The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory

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Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. WON THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY- NO The new rule is not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the timebar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that:Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. DISPOSITIVE: M.R. GRANTED; RTC DIRECTED TO FORTHWITH PROCEED WITH THE CRIMINAL CASES

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien PEOPLE V. LACSON OCTOBER 7, 2003

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; (b) Motion for Reconsideration; (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration; (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments RESPONDENT asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: APPLICATION OF THE TIME-BAR RULE- PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE?- ONLY PROSPECTIVE. RAAR. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply. The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as

not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. In Cometa v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent." While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will." The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. DISPOSITIVE: respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien CONDRADA V. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Petitioner was charged with rape. When he was arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial hearing, the prosecution moved that the same be postponed due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset on April 29, 1999. On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground that his right to speedy trial was being violated by such postponements. The trial court granted the prosecutions motion and reset the hearing on May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to the complainant and her witnesses be coursed through the National Bureau of Investigation which handled the investigation of the case. During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an order temporarily dismissing the case. On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case No. 10770. Appended to said motion was the affidavit of private complainant that the subpoenae sent to her for the trial of the case did not reach her because in the meantime she had transferred her residence. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on June 25, 1999. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On September 29, 1999, the Court issued a resolution reinstating the said case and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of arrest for petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution insisting that the reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 10770 is still pending before the trial court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, 2000. He claims that Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 is permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his right to speedy trial. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the case was dismissed not because petitioners right to speedy trial has been violated by the postponements of the trial on several instances, but because petitioner through counsel moved that the case be dismissed at least even temporarily to which the public prosecutor interposed no objection. The Solicitor General points out that the prosecution moved for the postponement of the trial several times in good faith and for valid reasons. He likewise argues that the revival of the case does not place the petitioner twice in jeopardy for the same offense because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 was made at petitioners instance. ISSUES:

A.Whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 by the trial court in its Order of June 25, 1999 is permanent in character so as to operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for the crime charged- NO B.Whether or not the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner in double jeopardy.- NO A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the delay in the prosecution of the said case. The trial court apparently denied petitioners motion to have Criminal Case No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of his right to speedy trial when despite said motion made in open court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on May 31, 1999. In subsequently granting petitioners request for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial court expressly stated that the same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary, without prejudice to the revival thereof within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the reinstatement thereof on June 25, 1999 did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present in

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CrimPro (Bail, Motion to Quash) AJ | Amin | Cha | Janz | Julio |Martin | Vien
this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not yet presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained, said dismissal was temporary in nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of dismissal