1

World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

Smart Power: A Grand Strategy Outline By Nadja Panchenko 1: Introduction According to the data displayed on the GALLUP web site as of January 19, 2011, only forty-four percent of American citizens are ready to call the United States fortyfourth president Barack Obama a strong and decisive leader.1 The majority of Americans claim that their leader does not pay enough attention to US national interests. And yet, in his National Security Strategy, signed in May, 2010, Obama concludes his address to the nation stating that: As a citizen, Senator, and President, I have always believed that Americas greatest asset is its peoplefrom the awe I felt as a child watching a space capsule pulled out of the Pacific, to the strength I drew from workers rebuilding their lives in Illinois, to the respect I have for the generation of Americans who serve our country today (Obama, National Security Strategy). What is President Obama aiming at when emphasizing his unity with common American citizens and demonstrating his support of and compliance with their interests and routines? If the answer is the U.S. national interest, what then triggers his remark That is why I also believe that we must foster even deeper connections among Americans and peoples around the globethat immediately followed the above statement? How do U.S. national interests relate to U.S. connections with other global players? And, finally, turning back to the results of the GALLUP poll cited above, where does the real focus of U.S. foreign politics under the Obama administration lie? I suggest that is should lie in a grand strategy built on smart power. In her essay Leading through Civilian Power, Hillary Clinton observes that [a]lthough traditional diplomacy will always be critical to advancing the United States' agenda, it is not enough. The State Department must expand its engagement to reach and influence wider and more diverse groups using new skills, strategies, and tools (Clinton 3). According to Clinton, such global problems as terrorism, climate change, ruthless violations of human rights, poverty and famine cannot be solved unless a nation is
1

For more details about the poll please refer to http://www.gallup.com/poll/145670/Americans-RoomImprovement-Obama-Leadership.aspx

2
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

willing to accept the responsibility of mobilizing action, and, as she further insists, it is the United States who is to take this responsibility (Clinton 1). Paradoxically enough, this proclamation of commitment sounds perfectly in tune with Obamas seemingly arrogant statement that we [the United States] have a moral responsibility lo lead (Obama, National Security Strategy). However, in his overview of Americas security strategy, the US President cautions that no one nationno matter how powerfulcan meet global challenges alone (National Security Strategy). Yet, unveiling his goals and strategies further, Obama clearly articulates the significance of Americas unmatched military power as well as the countrys strong economy as the means to support and perpetuate American leadership. Simultaneously, he points to the crucial importance of fortifying international institutions and building sound reliable relations with other actors on the global arena. One may regard this paradox as an indicator of either weakness or, on the contrary, shrewdness and smartness of the Obama administration. On the theoretical level, the aforementioned juncture serves as the main argument for Joseph S. Nye Jr., who, in his groundbreaking work Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,2 talks about smart power as a combination of both hard that is military and economicand softbeing culturally and ideologically attractive, promoting international cooperationtypes of power. On a related note, Walter Russell Mead introduces such categories as sharp, sweet, and sticky power and describes them as the corner stones of hegemonic power (Mead 42). It is these three constituents that, according to Mead, condition a countrys leadership in global politics as well as the degree to which its national interests will be realized. Both the authors, reflecting on the challenges that humanity faces in the modern postinformational era, insist on the need to reshape and reconsider the role of U.S. leadership in world politics and establish smart relationships between all the global players. In his fundamental work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, Samuel P. Huntington traces the shifting foci of global power in the historical
2

Joseph Nye coined the term soft power in 1980s , not long before the end of the Cold War. Significantly, Nye worked in close cooperation with Senator Barack Obama during the latters presidential campaign. Moreover, Joseph Nye also got a nomination to become the United States Ambassador in Japan.

3
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

interplay between the East and the West.3 Huntington defines power as the ability of one person or group to change the behavior of another person or group (The Clash of Civilizations 83). Wielding this ability rests on possessing economic, military, institutional, demographic, political, technological, etc. recourses that are crucial to influence the behavior of others. As for the methods by which this influence is exerted, Huntington names inducement, coercion, or exhortation (84). Giving an account of the two possible scenarios for the development of Western civilizationthat is, either further exultant rise or ineluctable declineHuntington observes that the West is increasingly concerned with its internal problems and needs, while economic and military poweralbeit with slower dynamicsis relocating to the East (82). Therefore, following Huntingtons train of thought, to preserve power, a state should see beyond mere internal needs. Its performance on the global stage should be motivated not only by national interests but by the actions of other players as well. The question of the national interest, as related to a states foreign policy, is not a new one, and the United States can by no means be excluded from this discourse.4 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics explains the term as the interest of a state, usually as defined by its government (356). Significantly, W. David Clinton, in his study The Two Faces of National Interest, outlines two quite oppositeyet equally important perceptions of this concept. On the one hand, Clinton argues, the national interest refers to the inward perspective on a state and its political regime, encompassing its societys needs and domestic policies. On the other hand, it represents a states or societys claim in relation to other societies and states (50-257). Clintons subtle discussion of this critical notion proves the inseparability of a countrys foreign politics from its national interests: It is a tight connection in which the latter motivates the former. Thus, it becomes obvious that a states foreign policy strategies reflect its national interests both on the domestic and global levels.

A more detailed review of the worlds civilizations coming to power and deteriorating, as well as possible reasons and outcomes of these phenomena are discussed in Chapters I, II, VI, and V of Huntingtons oeuvre. 4 The discourse on this issue dates back to Alexis de Torquilles Democracy in America and is productively discussed in the works by Peter Trubowitz, Kenneth W. Thompson, Scott Burchill, W. David Clinton, Steven W. Hook.

4
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

2: Joseph S. Nye: Considering soft and hard power Introducing his vision of twenty-first-century global politics, Joseph Nye imparts that if a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead (Nye, Soft Power 6). This consideration, as well as the history of the United States foreign relations, led Nye to deconstruct the notion of power into two constituents namely hard and soft power (Nye 5).5 Such a double-sided approach, according to Nye, stands out as a golden means in the face of those new challenges that the US leadership is going to encounter. Any leadership, however, cannot last without a strong foundation of what Nye calls hard power. To this category Nye refers military and economic power; as its policies and resources, he names coercion, inducement, sanctions, payments, and bribes (8). Connecting hard power to acting unilaterally, Nye concludes, nevertheless, that maintaining this type of power is crucial for a states national security and national interests (145). On the other hand, having power resources does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want (3). In the world of clashing state agendas, the role of military power appears ambiguous (weapons may be too costly to be used). Relying only on hard power is far from enough to preserve ones status quo. Yet more dramatically, even a country with global military reach still remains prone to the attacks by countries with weaker military force. The example of the Bush administration, whose foreign policies, after the tragedy of 9/11, had drawn the United States into the conflicts in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, Nye argues, present a most graphic illustration of abusing hard power in the global context. At the beginning of his discussion of soft power, Nye highlights the significance of context for the successful outcome of any actors strategies. According to Nye, soft power is the ability to shape the contexts and preferences of others (Nye 5). It is the psychological mechanisms of attraction and seduction that weave the narrative of soft power: A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countriesadmiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and opennesswant to follow it (5). Thus, soft power is an appealing power. Its
5

Joseph Nye continues and deepens his discussion of soft power in such publications, as The Powers to Lead (2008), The Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Only Superpower Cant Go It Alone (2003).

5
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

adherents view its authority as morally legitimate and just, they are motivated by the culture and the values it represents; they crave to follow the agenda of its charismatic leader. In contrast to hard power, soft power is characterized by the policies of attraction and agenda-setting. It is cooptive in terms of behavior and advocates for multilateral actions. Finally, soft power promotes international institutions, public diplomacy, and cooperation: It leads to the results other players want. With regard to the United States leadership, Joseph Nye describes this type of power as crucially important for perpetuating democracy, human rights, and open markets (17). In light of the challenges posed by international terrorism and humanitarian crises, speaking with a soft voice means hearing what the others have to say. To preserve its leadership, declares Nye, the US should learn to listen because winning the peace is harder than winning a war (Soft Power Preface xii). 3: Walter Russell Mead: Sharp, sticky, and sweet taste of the American project Unveiling his vision of that role which the United States plays in the contemporary global arena, Walter Russell Mead introduces a model that he calls the American project (Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War 18). He describes this model as the overall impact of American society [] on the rest of the world (18). Just as he then goes on to characterize the American project from the vantage point of U.S. foreign policy, the author applies the notion of grand strategy. With a reference to the German military writer Carl von Clausewitz, Mead infers that grand strategy is about deciding what wars to fight (13). It is this very objective, he argues, thatboth literally and metaphoricallyshould motivate U.S. aims to shape world order. Pushing this idea even further, Mead reminds about the messianic core of American grand strategy: For many generations most Americans seem to have believed that American society was the best possible society and that the rest of the world would be better off if they became more like us. From very early in our history missionaries and others have gone off to help foreigners understand this better (Mead, Power 17). Mead envisions the messianic character of American foreign policy as innate, traditional, and rooted in the nations historical background. American claims to global

6
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

leadership and deciding what wars to fight are therefore rightful and legitimate. According to Walter Russell Mead, the threats posed by weapons of mass distraction on the edge of the twenty-first centurymore than at any other timehave made the need to address and reconsider the American project especially poignant (Mead 18). In terms of power relations, Mead regards the American project through the notions of sharp, sweet, and sticky power (26-42). Not unlike Joseph Nyes notion of hard power, sharp power is concerned with the United States military policy and power as well as national security strategies. One should not forget, however, that Nyes term presents a fusion of both military and economic power. At the same time, when discussing sharp power in contrast to Nye Walter Russell Mead talks about both domestic and international security. On a more subtle level, these distinctions seem productive when addressing such interdependent and interconnected notions as foreign politics and national interest. Speaking about a states economic power, those trade and market relations that tie it up to other states, Mead distinguishes sticky power as yet another key component of the American project. For him, sticky power is not simply a set of economic policies and sanctions designed to influence the behavior of other global actors, but, rather, a system of strategies to lure them onto the path of global economic development and secure their integration andas a resulttheir getting stuck within the global economy. In the framework of American grand strategy, it means thatjust like in a game of ninepins failure or success in the U.S. economy will inevitably draw all other players after it. This binding character of sticky power, as Mead argues, carries out a significant function of preempting and preventing the use of sharp power. In accord with Joseph Nye, Walter Russell Mead accentuates the colossal role that U.S. culture, values, and ideals play in shaping and promoting the American vision of world order. Mead calls this constituent of power sweet power (36). Importantly enough, Meads sweet powerunlike Nyes soft powerdoes not necessarily meet approval and exultation of the global community. According to Mead, the effect of sweet power varies (37). Just as he attests to the sometimes controversial impact of American sweet power, Mead, nevertheless, emphasizes its significance and value in the context of American foreign policy.

7
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

4: Hegemony of smartness? Joseph Nye and Walter Russell Mead regard American power and its place in world politics from slightly different angles. While Nye advocates for more humility and thoughtful public diplomacy, Mead contemplates the bonds and networks of American power that stitch together the global community. At the same time, however, both the scholars warn against relying only on one type of power. According to Joseph Nye, in the twenty-first century, when whose story wins appears to be of utmost significance, U.S. foreign policy should simultaneously encompass soft and hard power, producing what Nye calls smart power (Nye 32). It is through smart power, combined with a more considerate style of public diplomacy, that the United States can preserve its leadership and its key role in procuring international security and global development. It is the lack of smart power that, Nye argues, led to the mistakes of the Bush administration; and it is smart power that should become the main weapon of the current presidential office. With a different approach but to the same effect, Walter Russell Mead calls for the necessity to combine sharp, sticky, and sweet power to sustain U.S. progress internationally. In Meads vision, the United States should retain its hegemonic power. He proclaims that: Sharp, sticky, and sweet power all contribute to hegemonic power and, as they work together, these three different types of power lose their specific identity to come together synergistically and create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts (Mead 42). All the three types of power, Mead unveils, fuse to enhance the ideas of harmonic convergence, capitalism, democracy, and technological progress. This fusion, he argues, is the only way to enduring power. However, just as Mead speaks in favor of the United States hegemony and global leadership and regards them as inseparable from the success of the American project6, he,

In his work, Walter Russell Mead, albeit briefly, also touches upon the notion Pax Americana. However, Mead sees this phenomenon from predominantly American standpoint. A more Europeancentered discussion of the Pax Americana is presented in the collection of articles Pax Americana? Herausgebenen von der Alfred Herrhausen Gesellschaft fr internationalen Dialog (1998).

8
World Report: The Student Journal for International Affairs / September-December 2011 / Nadja Panchenko

more importantly, summarizes that, as of now, there exist no checks on American power. Mead, therefore, purports that the American system faces two dangers. On the one hand, if it accumulates too little power, the system will collapse. Whereas, on the other hand, if the United States uses too much power and applies it too straight-forwardly, the others will unite against it (Mead 63). It is to keep this balance of power via relying on international institutions and global cooperation that the US foreign policy should aim at.