MIT Sloan School of Management - Licensing Strategies

2008
50 , 2
Lee Davis
2008 by The Regents of

the University of California
cmr@haas.berkeley.edu
Lee Davis
(IP)
20 70 Orbital Corporation
Orbital
ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) Holdings Plc 1990

RISC
ARM
IP 2
2005 6
DRUID Jens Frslev Christensen
Jerome D. DavisMerete L. Drewsen
50 2 2008 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
NTP Inc. IP
Research in Motion Inc. (RIM) RIM
300 2006
NTP 6.125 3
IP
David Teece 1998
4
5
6 IP
Andrew B. Hargadon
7
Ashish AroraAndrea Fosfuri Alfonso Gambardella
8
Joshua Gans Scott Stern
IP
IP
Lee N. Davis
<ld.ino@cbs.dk>
IP
10
11
12 IP
IP
13
14
15
16
17 Teece 1986
18
19
20 AroraFosfuri Gambardella
21 Arora Robert Merges
22
50
2 2008 CMR.BERKELEY.EDU
IP
IP
23 IP
IP
Robert Kearns 20 60
Kearns
Kearns
Kearns
Kearns 20 90
24
25
26
IP
IP 27
28
29
IP
IP
IP
IP Orbital Corporation ARM Holdings

Ltd
Orbital Corporation 1970 orbital
Orbital

1990 Orbital
Orbital
2007 6
Orbital 1520
30
ARM Holdings Ltd. RISC
ARM
ARM ARM
ARM ARM
ARM ARM
10
50
ARM
2001 RISC
77% 2007 1
31
Orbital
Orbital Corporation ARM

ARM ARM
ARM
ARM ARM
ARM ARM Orbital
Orbital
Orbital ARM
Orbital
ARM
Orbital
32
Orbital
Orbital
11
ARM
33
Orbital
Corporation
34 RISC
ARM
ARM Orbital
NTP
NTP
Research in Motion (RIM) NTP
RIM NTP
RIM
Orbital ARM NTP
ARM NTP
RIM NTP
NTP
Genentech 1978 Eli Lilly
Genentech Eli
Lilly 35
12
50
IP
Genentech
Eli Lilly
IP
Oliver Hart
36
IP
IP
IP
IP
IP
37
38 ARM
13
ARM
Peter Smith Ring Andrew Van de Ven
39
Jeffrey Dyer Harbir Singh
40
IP
IP
IP
Orbital Corporation NTP

ARM Holdings Genentech
IP
41
14
50

42
43
44
45
46
47
IP
Robert Kearns
Orbital Corporation
ARM Holdings)
48
Orbital Corporation Genentech
ARM NTP
15
IP
IP
1 IP
Orbital NTP
Genentech ARM
/
Orbital Corporation IP
Amherst Ultra-Scan
Ultra-Scan 1996
49
2 t
2 3-5
t 1
t=1 t=2
(t=3)
t=4
IP IP
/
16
50
1. IP
IP
Orbital Corporation
Robert Kearns
Ultra-Scan
Jerome Lemelson
Mojave Aerospace Ventures

Orbital Corporation Jaguar
Ultra-Scan US Biometrics
Corp
Genentech
NeuroSearch
IP
ARM
Cambridge Display
Technologies
Systemonic
NTP
CombiMatrix and Benitec

Qualcomm
Eolas
MercExchange
17
2.
IP
t=0
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
(t=5)
(t=6)
Jerome Lemelson
Lemelson Mattel Inc. Hot Wheels
1989 Mattel Lemelson 50
/
3 (t=1)
(t=2) (t=2)
(t=3)
(t=4)
18
50
3.
IP
t=0
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
t=7

(t=5)
(t=6)
(t=7)
IP
1
IP
Systemonic 1999
Dresden Gerhard Fettweis Fettweis
(DSP) Systemonic
51
t=5
19
4.
IP
t=0
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
t=7
* IP
Eolas Microsoft Internet

Explorer Eolas
Microsoft 5.2 52
MercExchange eBay
53
/
4 IP (t=1) it (t=2)
t=3
(t=4)
20
50
(t=5)
(t=6)
(t=7)
Mojave Aerospace Ventures (MAV)
Ansari X 2004
MAV Richard Branson Virgin Galactic
54
11992 5 Orbital
Jaguar V6 2005 5 Ultra-Scan
Biometrics Corp. Ultra-Scan
55
3 IP 2003 12
NeuroSearch GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
GSK
NeuroSearch NeuroSearch 820
GSK NeuroSearch
GSK NeuroSearch
2006 11 (t=7)
2000 12 NeuroSearch Grupo

Ferrer (NS 2710) NeuroSearch
Grupo Ferrer
(t=6)56
21
5.
IP
t=0
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
t=7
t=8
/
ARM Holdings
t=1 5 t=2
t=3
(t=4)
(t=5) t=8
22
50
Cambridge Display Technologies (CDT) 1992

CDT
CDT CDT
Philips ElectronicsSeiko-EpsonHoechst DuPont
CDT
57
2005 2 RNA
Benitec, Ltd.
CombiMatrix Group Benitec
CombiMatrix HIV
Benitec CombiMatrix
IP
58
4
1985 Qualcomm
Qualcomm (CDMA)
Qualcomm 2007
130 CDMA 59
Qualcomm CDMA
2005 Qualcomm 2007
Qualcomm
60
23
IP
/
2
NTP
NTP RIM 61
3
4 3
62
24
50
t=1 IP
2007 Qualcomm
CDMA 6,100
Orbital Corporation
Ultra-Scan Genentech
IP Systemonic
IP
IP
Philips 2003 Systemonic 63

IP
Orbital
Corporation IP
Orbital
Orbital IP
25

64
Crucell N.V. Merck & Co. Merck

Crucell Crucell Merck
65 3 4
IP
IP ARM Cambridge Display
Technologies 2
4
Qualcomm
IP
1.
2.
3.
26
See <www.orbeng.com.au>, accessed on October 15, 2007; Andre Morkel and Kelvin Willoughby, Orbital
Engine Corporation, teaching case, 1992. The company changed its name to Orbital Corporation in October
2004.
In addition to RISC chips, ARMs product offering currently includes processors, physical IP, cache and SoC
designs, application-specific standard products (ASSPs), and related software and development tools. Its
technology is used in digital applications ranging from wireless, networking, and consumer entertainment
solutions to imaging, automotive, security, and storage devices. See <www.arm.com>, accessed on October
15, 2007; Eleanor OKeeffe, ARM Holdings Plc., teaching case, INSEAD-EAC, Singapore, 2002.
RIM agreed to pay even though the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, in a preliminary ruling, had found all
five of NTPs patents invalid. Nor did NTP provide e-mail service or compete with RIM.
50
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
See Keith E. Maskus, Reforming U.S. Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right, Council on Foreign
Relations Report, CSR No. 19, November 2006, p. 5.
David J. Teece. Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The New Economy, Markets for Know-How,
and Intangible Assets, California Management Review, 40/3 (Spring 1998): 55-79.
Andrew B. Hargadon, Firms as Knowledge Brokers: Lessons in Pursuing Continuous Innovation,
California Management Review, 40/3 (Spring 1998): 209-227.
See, for example, Ulrich Lichtenthaler, The Drivers of Technology Licensing: An Industry
Comparison, California Management Review, 49/4 (Summer 2007): 67-89; Ashish Arora and Andrea
Fosfuri, Licensing the Market for Technology, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52/2
(October 2003): 277-295; Bernard Guilhon, Raja Attia, and Roland Rizoulieres, Markets for Technology
and Firms Strategies: The Case of the Semiconductor Industry, International Journal of Technology
Management, 27/2-3 (2004): 123-142; Tamara Nanayakkara, Negotiating Technology Licensing
Agreements, International Trade Forum, 4 (2002): 13. A wide variety of license arrangements may be
negotiated. Some licenses are restricted to particular markets, for example. Some contain provisions that
obligate the licensee to share information regarding any improvements made in the licensed technology,
often free of charge.
Hargadon, op. cit.
Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology and Their
Implications for Corporate Strategy, Industrial and Corporate Change, 10/2 (June 2001): 419-451.
Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for Ideas: Commercialization
Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, Research Policy, 32/2 (February 2003): 333-350. It might be
noted that the concept market for ideas is not new; it was used over thirty years ago by Ronald H.
Coase, in The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas,
American Economic Review, 64/2 (1974): 384-391. However, Coase was analyzing the economics of the
First Amendment of the U.S. constitution, not the tradability of ideas among firms.
The term invention factories was coined by Hargadon, op. cit.
See for example Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, op. cit.; Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions
of Capitalism (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985); Oliver Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36/2
(June 1991): 269-296; Kwaku Atuahene-Gima, Inward Technology Licensing as an Alternative to
Internal R&D in New Product Development: A Conceptual Framework, The Journal of Product
Innovation Management, 9/2 (June 1992): 156-167; Toru Yoshikawa, Technology Development and
Acquisition Strategy, International Journal of Technology, 25/6-7 (2003): 666-674.
Lichtenthaler, op. cit.
Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard C. Levin, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter, On the Sources and
Significance of Inter-Industry Differences in Technological Opportunities, Research Policy, 24/2 (March
1995): 185-205.
Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product
Development, Strategic Management Journal, 13/5 (Summer 1992): 111-125.
See, for example, Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004); Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues:
The Uruguay Round Agreement and Its Economic Implications, in Will Martin and L. Alan Winters, ed.
The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, World Bank Discussion Papers, Washington,
D.C., 1995, pp. 381-411.
See, for example, Peter C. Grindley and David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and
Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, California Management Review, 39/2 (Winter
1997): 8-41; Kevin G. Rivette and David Kline, Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden Value of
Patents (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
Farok Contractor, International Technology Licensing: Compensation, Costs, and Negotiation (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1981); Richard Caves, H. Crookel, and J.P. Killing, The Imperfect Market for
Technology Licensing, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 45/3 (1983): 249-267.
David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, Research Policy, 15/6 (1986): 285-305.
John Hagedoorn, Sharing Intellectual Property RightsAn Exploratory Study of Joint Patenting
Amongst Companies, Industrial and Corporate Change, 12/5 (October 2003): 1035-1050;
27
Holger Kollmer and Michael Dowling, Licensing as a Commercialization Strategy for New
Technology-Based Firms, Research Policy, 33/8 (2004): 1141-1151; Klevorick et al., op. cit. Teece
himself, in his 1998 contribution [op. cit.], argues that when firms compete in markets for know-how,
there can be advantages to R&D collaborations (though he emphasizes that idea tradability is still
difficult).
20. See for example, Ashish Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights and the Market
of Know-How, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 4 (1995): 41-79; Jay Pil Choi,
Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19/1-2
(January 2000): 241-267; Bruce A. Larson and Margot Anderson, Technology Transfer, Licensing
Contracts, and Incentives for Further Innovation, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76/3
(August 1994): 547-556; Ines Macho-Stadler, Xavier Martinez-Giralt, and David Perez-Castrillo, The
Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design, Research Policy, 25 (1996): 43-57.
21. Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, op. cit.
22. Ashish Arora and Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries,
Industrial and Corporate Change, 13/3 (2004): 451-475.
23. Gary P. Pisano, The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 35/1 (March 1990): 153-176. This conundrum was first explored by Kenneth
A. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in Universities-National
Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors, Conference No. 13 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1962).
24. Gans and Stern, op. cit. While Kearns is often seen as the victim here, he in fact could have done much
more to position himself more favorably in relation to Ford and the other automakers, saving himself
(and everyone else) the stress of decades of lawsuits. See Jerome Davis and Lee Davis, The Mad Max
Puzzle: Positioning and the Lone Inventor, in Lars Fuglsang, ed., Innovation and the Creative Process
(London: Edward Elgar, 2007).
25. Teece (1998), op. cit.
26. Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D,
Economic Journal, 99/397 (1989): 569-596. Information may also be sticky, to the degree that it is
costly to transfer from one place to another. See Eric Von Hippel, Sticky Information and the Locus of
Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, Management Science, 40/4 (April 1994): 429-439.
27. Klaus Kultti and Thomas Takalo, T. Hold-Ups and Asymmetric Information in a Technology Transfer:
The Micronas Case, Journal of Technology Transfer, 27/3 (June 2002): 233-243.
28. Thursby has analyzed the risk that a licensee might shelve an invention by a university researcher, and
what contractual solutions exist. This logic can readily be extended to IP firms. See Marie Thursby,
Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts, Paper presented to the
Summer Conference of the Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics, Copenhagen, June 27-29,
2005. Available via the DRUID homepage, <www.druid.dk>.
29. See Williamson (1985) and (1991), op. cit.
30. The automakers had to pay 30-40 Australian dollars per engine, as opposed to the industry rate of about 1
Australian dollar. See Morkel and Willoughby, op. cit. For recent developments, see
<www.orbeng.com.au>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
31. OKeeffe, op. cit.; Maija Palmer, Arm Bolstered by Royalty Revenues, Financial Times, April 20,
2006, p. 21; <www.arm.com>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
32. J. Stanley Metcalfe and Michael Gibbons, Technology, Variety, and Organization: A Systematic
Perspective on the Competitive Process, in R.S. Rosenbloom and R.A. Burgelman, Research on
Technological Innovation, Management, and Policy (London: 1989), pp. 153-173; Nathan Rosenberg,
Why Technology Forecasts often Fail, The Futurist, 29/4 (July/August 1995): 16-21.
33. Grindley and Teece, op. cit.; James E. Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with
Private Information, Economics Letters, 82/3 (March 2004): 321-326.
34. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration, Journal of
Law and Economics, 25/2 (October 1982): 321-328. This was demonstrated empirically by Klein et al. in
their analysis of General Motors decision to buy out Fisher Body in the 1920s. Benjamin Klein, Robert
G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21/2 (October 1978): 297-326.
28
50
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
Gans and Stern, op. cit.

Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Williamson, op. cit.
See P.H. Rubin, Managing Business Transactions (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990).
Peter Smith Ring and Andrew Y. Van de Ven, Structuring Cooperative Relationships between
Organizations, Strategic Management Journal, 13/7 (October 1992): 483-498.
Jeffrey H. Dyer and Harbir Singh, The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage, Academy of Management Review, 23/4 (October 1998):
660-679.
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5/1 (Winter 1991): 29-41; Stefano Breschi, Franco Malerba and Luigi
Orsenigo, Technological Regimes and Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation, Economic Journal,
110/463 (April 2000): 388-410; Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging
Rivalry in Technical Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 25/1 (September 1994): 1-24.
Royalty payments are adjusted to reflect the overall contributions of the different parties to the agreement.
See Grindley and Teece, op. cit.
Franco Malerba and Luigi Orsenigo, Innovation and Market Structure in the Dynamics of the
Pharmaceutical Industry and Biotechnology: Towards a History-Friendly Model, Industrial and
Corporate Change, 11/4 (August 2002): 667-703.
Biotech firms may experience difficulties in contracting for access to specific research tools. Some
scholars have expressed concerns that this situation has led to an anti-commons problem. See especially
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is this Market
Failing or Emerging? in Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman, and Harry First, Expanding the
Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 223-249. Other scholars
find only limited evidence of an anti-commons problem in practice, though problems of hold-up may well
exist between particular buyers and sellers. See John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley M. Cohen,
Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation, in W.M. Cohen and S.A. Merrill,
eds., Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Washington, D.C. National Academies Press, 2003).
In Phase I clinical trials, the new drug or treatment is tested on a small group of people (20-80) for the
first time to evaluate its safety, determine the safe dosage, and see what side effects exist. In Phase II, it is
given to a larger group (100-300), and in Phase III, to an even larger group (1,000-3,000) to further
evaluate its safety and effectiveness. See <www.clinicaltrials.gov>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
See especially Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh, Protecting their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working
Paper, Cambridge, MA, 2000; Wesley Cohen, Akira Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson, and John P.
Walsh, R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States,
Research Policy, 31/8-9 (December 2002): 1349-1367.
Malerba and Orsenigo, op. cit.
Grindley and Teece, op. cit.
Fred O. Williams, Amherst, N.Y-Based Ultra-Scan Considers IPO, Knight Ridder Tribune Business
News, October 4, 2002, p. 1; <http://ultra-scan.com>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
Sarah Chapin Columbia and Stacy L. Blasberg, Beware Patent Trolls, Risk Management Magazine,
53/4 (April 2006): 22-27. All in all, Lemelson received 562 U.S. patents on technologies ranging from
automated manufacturing systems to bar code readers, video cameras, and facsimile machines. Beginning
in the 1970s, he brought patent infringement suits against numerous major U.S. corporations including
General Motors, IBM, General Electric, and Zenith, reportedly reaping hundreds of millions of dollars in
royalties and court awards. See also William F. Heinze and Harry Goldstein, Dead Patents Walking,
IEEE Spectrum, 39/5 (May 2002): 52-54.
Katherine Campbell, A Chip Spun off the US Block: Venture Capital: Katharine Campbell Looks at a
German Universitys Pioneering Spin-Off, Financial Times, December 7, 2000, p. 18.
See Patricia S. Abril and Robert Plant, The Patent Holders Dilemma: Buy, Sell, or Troll?
Communications of the ACM, 50/1 (January 2007): 37-44.
Jaffe and Lerner, op. cit.
29
54. MAV also made an agreement with Scaled Composites, which had been central to the development of the craft,
to utilize the technology to build new spaceships to carry passengers into space. One small step for space
tourism . . . , The Economist, December 18, 2004, pp. 141-142, <www.scaled.com>, accessed on October 15,
2007.
55. See <ultra-scan.com>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
56. These details are based on press releases from the companies concerned. For further information, see
<www.neurosearch.com>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
57. Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, op. cit.; <www.cdtltd.co.uk>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
58. CombiMatrix and Benitec Enter Cross-Licensing and Collaboration Agreement, Nanotechwire, February 22,
2005, available at <http://nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=1655>, accessed on October 8, 2007. See also
<www.benitec.com.au/> and <www.combimatrix.com/>.
59. Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, op. cit.; <www.qualcomm.com>, accessed on October 17, 2007.
60. See Nancy Gohring, Qualcomm Files Patent Infringement Suit Against Nokia, IDG News Service,
November 7, 2005, available at <www.infoworld.com/article/05/11/07>, accessed on October 17, 2007; Mark
Halper, Nokia vs. Qualcomm, Fortune, December 25, 2006, pp. 23-24; Nokia Hits Back at Qualcomm in
Patent Row, Computer Business Review, May 25, 2007, available at <www.cbronline.com/article_news>,
accessed on October 17, 1007; Telecoms: Industry Update, Datamonitor, 6/10 (October 2007): 217-218.
61. Arik Hesseldahl, NTP: A Taste of Its Own Medicine, Business Week Online, November 8, 2006, p. 29.
Subsequently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has rejected all five patents that formed the basis of
NTPs case against RIM. NTP is appealing the ruling.
62. See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovators Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press,
1997).
63. Alternately, they may make their own acquisitions. In November 2006, for example, Qualcomm bought
nPhase LLC, which provides machine-to-machine solutions, helping to reinforce Qualcomms position in this
market. <www.qualcomm.com/press/index.html>, accessed on October 15, 2007.
64. There are also indications that patent trolls are facing a more precarious existence. While RIM felt compelled
to settle, another would-be troll, MercExchange, was less successful in its suit against eBay. In 2006, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed a lower courts ruling supporting MercExchange and tightened the standards for
granting injunctions made at the behest of patent trolls. William R. Overend, Patent Injunctions after eBay:
The Bidding is Open on Who Really Benefits, The Corporate Counselor 21/3 (August 2006): 1-2, 7-8.
65. Merck & Co., Inc. and Crucell Sign Cross-Licensing Agreement on Vaccine Production and Technology,
Marketwire, December 27, 2006. Available at <www.genengnews.com/news/bnitem.aspx?name=10841302>,
accessed October 8, 2007.
30
50

University of California F501 Haas School of Business #1900 BerkeleyCA 94720-1900
(510) 642-7159 (510) 642-1318 cmr@haas.berkeley.edu
cmr.Berkeley.edu

MIT Sloan School of Management - Licensing Strategies

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

MIT Sloan School of Management - Licensing Strategies

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2008

2008 by The Regents of

ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) Holdings Plc 1990

David Teece 1998

21 Arora Robert Merges

IP Orbital Corporation ARM Holdings

Orbital Corporation ARM

Peter Smith Ring Andrew Van de Ven

Orbital Corporation NTP

Mojave Aerospace Ventures

CombiMatrix and Benitec

Eolas Microsoft Internet

2000 12 NeuroSearch Grupo

Cambridge Display Technologies (CDT) 1992

Philips 2003 Systemonic 63

Crucell N.V. Merck & Co. Merck

Gans and Stern, op. cit.

You might also like