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Multiplicatorul bazei monetare este influenat de:
raportul numerar depozite valoarea acestui raport este determinat de
comportamentul agenilor economici, de gradul de bancarizare a economiei,
de decizia de economisire a agenilor economici;
rata rezervei minime obligatorii - decizia regulatorului sistemului bancar,
adic decizia Bancii Centrale
raportul exces de rezerv depozite determinat de decizia managerilor
bncilor comerciale. Coeficientul e este influenat de costul de oportunitate al
deinerii de sume care NU aduc venit bncii (banca central nu pltete
dobnd pentru sumele inute n contul curent de bncile comerciale, ci
pltete o dobnd mic doar pentru deinerile de rezerv minim obligatorie),
ceea ce nseamn c intre e i rata dobnzii de pe pia exist o relaie invers.
De asemenea, e este influenat i de ieirile poteniale de depozite (ex.
retragerile de depozite)
Multiplicatorul creditului
Cum influeneaz creterea resurselor de finanare ale unei bnci potenialul de
creditare dintr-o economie? (creterea resurselor de finanare nseamn atragerea unui
nou depozit sau existena de exces de rezerva la Banca Central).
S lum cazul unui depozit iniial D.
Banca A
este obligat s pstreze D r la Banca Central sub form de rezerv
minim obligatorie
restul depozitului atras D r D poate fi folosit pentru a acorda credite
Presupunem c ntreaga suma este acordat sub form de credit (ce ar putea mpiedica
banca s fac acest lucru?).
o parte din credit
D r n ) 1 (
este pstrat de beneficiarul creditului sub
form de numerar
restul creditului
D r n D r n D r ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
se rentoarce
n sistemul bancar n conturi curente sau depozite deoarece beneficiarul
creditului folosete restul creditului pentru a face pli prin sistemul bancar.
Presupunem c toate plile sunt realizate de Banca A ctre banca B
9
Banca B
este obligat s pstreze
D r n r ) 1 ( ) 1 (
la Banca Central sub form
de rezerv minim obligatorie
restul depozitului atras
D r n D r n r D r n
2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( poate fi
folosit pentru a acorda credite
Din nou presupunem c ntreaga sum este acordat sub form de credit.
o parte din credit
D r n n
2
) 1 ( ) 1 (
este pstrat de beneficiarul
creditului sub form de numerar
restul creditului
D r n D r n n D r n
2 2 2 2
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( se
rentoarce n sistemul bancar n conturi curente sau depozite deoarece
beneficiarul creditului folosete restul creditului pentru a face pli prin
sistemul bancar. Presupunem c toate plile sunt realizate de Banca B ctre
banca C.
acest proces se poate continua la infinit. S determinm potenialul de creditare
generat n economie de noul depozit D.
Potenialul de creditare=
D
r n r n
D r n D r n D r
+
+ + +
1
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
?
3 2 2
=9,63855 mld
Raport=1,32165
15. Considernd un depozit iniial n lei de 2 mld lei i un depozit iniial n euro de
0,10 mil euro la un curs euro leu de 40000 lei, potenialul de creditare din economie n
cele monede este egal, considernd un coeficient de fug egal cu 0 att pentru euro ct
i pentru lei. Banca central decide s ncurajeze creditarea n lei i modific rata
rezervei minime obligatorii la lei (r
lei
) cu 5 puncte procentuale pstrnd rata rezervei
minime obligatorii n valut (r
euro
) neschimbat, diferena dintre potenialul de
creditare n lei i potenialul de creditare n valut (exprimat n lei) fiind de 20 mld lei.
Se cere rata rezervei minime obligatorii n valut i rata rezervei minime obligatorii
n lei dup modificare.
14
Rezolvare
Banca Central ncurajeaz creditarea n lei scznd rata dobnzii obligatorii cu 5
puncte procentuale, deci rl1=rl0-0,05.
Faptul c diferena dintre cele dou poteniale de creditare este de 20 mld se scrie
astfel:
20
4
05 , 0
2
20
0 1
v l v
v
l
l
r r r
Di
r
Di
(*)
tim c iniial potenialul de creditare n valut i n lei este egal ceea ce nseamn:
0 0
0
2
l l
l
v
v
v
v
l
l
r r
Di
Di
r
r
Di
r
Di
de aici rezult c relaia (*) se poate scrie:
20
2
4
05 , 0
2
0 0
l l
r r
prin prelucrare obinem:
0 005 , 0 05 , 0
0
2
0
l l
r r
ecuaia de gradul II are 2 soluii: r1=-0,05 i r2=0,1. desigur, rata rezervei minime
obligatorii nu poate fii negativ ceea ce nseamn c soluia corect este
2 , 0 05 , 0 1 , 0
1 0
v l l
r si r r
16. la nivelul Uniunii Europene se cunoate valoarea urmtorilor indicatori:
depozite cu o maturitate de pana la 2 ani
repo
numerar n circulaie
economiile populaiei
depozite overnight
uniti ale fondurilor mutuale de pia monetar
depozite cu o maturitate de 2 ani
titluri de stat
titluri de credit cu o maturitate de pana la 6 ani
titluri de credit cu o maturitate de pana la 2 ani
depozite cu preaviz de pana la 3 luni
determinai valoarea agregatului monetar M2
17. ce se intmpl cu PIB-ul nominal, dac oferta de moned crete cu 20%, iar viteza
rotaie a banilor scade cu 30% ?
R. scade cu 16%
18. O banc central previzioneaz pentru anul urmtor o cretere economic de
3,4%, o inflaie de 1,5% i decide ca prin politica sa monetar s genereze o cretere a
masei monetare de 3%.
a) Stabilii dac aceste valori sunt consistente cu teoria cantitativ a banilor.
b) considernd c banca central intete agregatele monetare i ii pstreaz decizia
de a genera o cretere a masei monetare de doar 3%, iar obiectivul de politic
monetar este de a obine o inflaie de 1,5% determinai sacrificiul de cretere
economic ar trebui s accepte banca central, n condiiile respectrii teoriei
cantitative a banilor.
15
R. a) Nu. Viteza de rotaie nu poate s rmn constant, ea trebuie s creasc cu
1,89%
b) in aceste condiii, creterea economic poate s fie de doar 1,1478%, deci
sacrificiul de cretere economic este de 1,922 puncte procentuale.
19. La sfritul anului 2004, banca central a unei ri trebuie s stabileasc creterea
int a masei monetare. Politica monetar a bncii centrale se bazeaz pe urmtoarea
evoluie a creterii masei monetare:
1 | | 1
7 , 0 120
+
+
t t t t
m m
(*)
se tie de asemenea c, n anul 2004 inflaia a fost de 7%, creterea economic real
de 5%, viteza de rotaie a rmas constant fa de 2003, iar masa monetar la sfritul
anului 2003 era egal cu 2000 um. S se determine:
a) creterea int a masei monetar pentru anul 2005
b) valoarea previzionat a masei monetare pentru sfritul anului 2005
c) care este creterea masei monetare pe termen lung? (atunci cnd t ) conteaz
valoarea masei monetare din 2003 pentru determinarea acestei valori?
Rezolvare
a) scriem ecuaia de schimb pentru anul 2003 i 2004 i le mprim. Obinem:
2003
2004
2003
2004
2003
2004
2003
2004
Y
Y
P
P
v
v
M
M
se tie c
2003
2004
v
v
=1, deoarece viteza de rotaie nu se modific
2003
2004
P
P
=1+rata inflaiei=1,07
2003
2004
Y
Y
=1+creterea economic real=1,05
din cele de mai sus rezult c
2003
2004
M
M
=1,1235
247 2247
2003 | 2004 2004
m M
um
din (*) avem c
9 , 292 7 , 0 120
2004 | 2005 2003 | 2004 2004 | 2005
+ m m m
um
b)
um m M M 2540
2004 | 2005 2004 2005
+
c) notnd t t
m
| 1 +
+
n t
n
x
, ceea ce nseamn c pe termen lung modificarea
masei monetare este egal cu 400 i nu depinde de valoarea masei monetare din 2003.
16
Modelul Cagan sau cum afecteaza nivelul actual si
viitor al masei monetare nivelul preturilor
Ipoteze: venitul produs in economie, viteza de rotatie a banilor, rata reala sunt
constante.
Consideram urmatoarea functie a cererii de moneda reala:
) (
1 t t t t
p Ep p m
+
, ) 1 (
0
unde: cererea reala =
t
t
P
M
,
t
m
= ln M
t
, t
p
= ln P
t
, t t
p Ep
+1 = inflatia anticipata
in perioada (t, t+1).
Parametrul
procente.
Relatia ) 1 (
0
se mai poate scrie:
1
1 1
1
+
+
+
+
t t t
Ep m p
,
_
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ + + + +
....
1 ) 1 ( 1
1
1 1
1
2
2
1 2 2 1 1 t t t t t t t
Ep Em m p Ep Em Ep
+ +
,
_
+
+ +
,
_
,
_
+
+
+
+
+
t t t t t
Ep Em Em m p
1
... ...
1 1 1
1
2
2
1 ) 2 (
0
Notam x =
0 ) 1 , 0 (
1
+
Relatia ) 2 (
0
arata ca nivelul preturilor e o medie ponderata a cantitatilor de moneda
prezente si viitoare. Se observa importanta parametrului
in determinarea preturilor.
Cu cat
+ 1
e mai mic, deci ponderile aferente cantitatilor
viitoare de moneda scad mai abrupt si influenteaza mai putin nivelul actual al
preturilor. In cazul in care
, deci
+
t
t t
M
M M
1
) 3 (
0
Sa se determine nivelul preturilor la momentul t conform modelului lui Cagan. Sa se
interpreteze rezultatul obtinut.
) 3 (
0
este echivalent cu
+
+ +
s m m m m
t s t t t 1
17
Inlocuind in ) 2 (
0
obtinem pt
s
,
( ) ( )
,
_
+
+ +
,
_
+ +
,
_
+
+ +
+
+
+
t t t t t
Ep m m m p
1
... ... 2
1 1 1
1
2
+ + +
+
+ + + +
+
...) 3 2 (
1
1
...) 1 (
1
1
3 2 2
x x x x x m
t
+ + +
+
+
...) 3 2 1 (
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
x x x
x
x
m
t
+ + +
+
+
, 3 2
...) (
1
1
x x x x m
t
1
]
1
,
_
+
+ + + +
+
+
x
x
x x m x x x x m
t t
1
1
1
1
...) (
1
1
, 3 2
+
t t
m p
Interpretare: Cunoscand ritmul constant de crestere a masei monetare, nivelul
preturilor depinde doar de masa monetara de la momentul actual. Mai mult, daca
masa monetara creste cu un punct procentual, nivelul preturilor creste cu un punct
procentual (dupa cum reiese si din teoria cantitativa a banilor). Daca ritmul de crestere
a masei monetare creste, nivelul preturilor creste.
nu influenteaza nivelul
preturilor daca
=0. Din ) 1 (
0
se observa ca rata anticipata a inflatiei este egala
chiar cu ritmul de crestere a masei monetare.
Lectur obligatorie
Follow the money
Aug 6th 1998
From The Economist print edition
Remember monetarism? It may be coming back into fashion
IN THE heyday of monetarism in the early 1980s, economists and traders
pounced eagerly on every new money-supply statistic. Most central banks then
set formal monetary targets, and so every wiggle in the data was scrutinised for
clues to the next move in interest rates. Since then, monetarismthe notion that
faster money-supply growth automatically causes higher inflationhas fallen out
of favour. As the link between money and inflation appeared to crack, most
central banks long ago abandoned monetary targets.
Now, however, money may be regaining its importance. The Federal Reserve has
started to pay more attention to the rapid growth in Americas money supply. And
next month the European Central Bank (ECB) is expected to announce it will
adopt a target for money-supply growth when Europes single currency, the euro,
is launched next January.
Among the big economies, only Germanys Bundesbank currently sets a formal
target under which the central bank tries to control the money supply. Most other
countries pursue inflation targets (where interest rates are set to bring forecast
inflation within a target range), as in Britain and Sweden, or an exchange-rate
target, as used by members of Europes exchange-rate mechanism. Americas
18
Federal Reserve has no explicit target for monetary growth, inflation or the dollar,
but instead scrutinises a broader range of indicators to keep inflation down.
The money supply is useful as a policy target only if the relationship between
money and nominal GDPand hence inflationis stable and predictable. The way
the money supply affects prices and output depends on how fast it circulates
through the economy. Annoyingly, its speedwhich economists call the velocity
of circulationcan suddenly change, as has happened in most economies over
the past decade or so as a result of financial innovation and deregulation. For
instance, after behaving in a fairly predictable way during the 1980s, the velocity
of Americas broad money supply increased sharply in the early 1990s, sending
such monetary measures out of fashion as compasses by which to steer policy.
Now, though, there is evidence that velocity has stabilised. Alan Greenspan
recently noted that a more predictable relationship may once again be developing
between money, economic output and inflation. Some members of the Feds
Open Market Committee are also focusing more on money. At its May meeting,
William Poole, president of the St Louis Fed, and Jerry Jordan, president of the
Cleveland Fed, both dissented from the committees decision to leave interest
rates unchanged. They argued that rapid money growth signalled the need to
raise rates to prevent a pick-up in inflation.
Americas M2 measure of money (largely
cash, cheque accounts, savings deposits,
and small time deposits) has risen by
7.3% over the past year, its fastest
annual rate for a decade. This used to be
the Feds favourite measure, but some
economists prefer a broader measure:
M3 (which also includes large time
deposits and institutional money-market
mutual funds) rose by 10% over the
same period (see chart). The recent spurt
in both measures of money suggests that
the American economy remains strong,
probably too strong.
Tying their hands in knots
The Fed would be foolish to ignore rapid money growth completely (and, being far
from foolish, it is not). But few economists would recommend that it adopt a rigid
money target. In September, the ECB must decide on the shape of its own
monetary policy. As a new central bank, it needs to set some sort of nominal
anchor to help build anti-inflationary credibility. It is considering two options: a
monetary target or an inflation target. The Bundesbank has been pushing hard
for a German-style money-supply target, supplemented, perhaps, by some sort of
long-term inflation yardstick.
Several economic studies suggest that while the link between money and inflation
has proved fickle in individual countries, pan-European measures of money are
much more stable and a good indicator of growth and inflation in the region as a
whole. One reason is that, in closely integrated economies, firms and individuals
tend to switch between currencies in response to interest-rate differences, an
19
option that will shortly disappear for European countries that adopt the single
currency.
Still, what was true in the past may not hold in the future. The shift from national
currencies to the euro represents a huge structural change. Combined with the
liberalisation of financial markets, this may cause big changes in the behaviour of
firms and individuals, and hence the previous relationship between money and
inflation is likely to break down. In the early years the euro money supply is
therefore likely to be unstable.
The Bundesbank has set an annual monetary target since 1974 and its inflation
record is unmatched, so it is understandable that it is keen for the ECB to follow
suit. But in almost half of the 24 years the Bundesbank has missed its target,
often because of distortions in the money numbers. Indeed, on several occasions
the Bundesbank cut interest rates even though money growth was above target.
In practice, therefore, the Bundesbank does not actually pursue a pure monetary
target. Because of its long track record of delivering low inflation, occasional
overshoots have not undermined the German central banks credibility. The
European Central Bank, however, starts without this advantage. Establishing such
credibility will prove hard if it sets a monetary target and then is promptly forced
by unforeseen events to overshoot it. This is why the ECB would be better
advised to adopt an explicit inflation target, along the lines of those used in
Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden. The Bank could then be judged by its
results.
The money supply can often be a useful early-warning signal. A wise central
banker, like a wise driver, should regularly check the speedometer. But a driver
who stares solely at the speedometer is likely to have a nasty crash. Likewise,
central bankers need to monitor a large range of economic and financial
indicators if they want to be sure of achieving their ultimate goal of low inflation.
20