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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.

BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989

Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory since 1958. He was also
a member of the EPWU. Under the CBA between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which
means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in
the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU
claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the
INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that
his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate
Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the
close shop agreement because RA 3350 is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs
legal/contractual rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

HELD: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a
labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a
union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and
employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to join
union. But the RA recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Fucts:
The respondent Murclul A. Edlllon ls u duly llcensed pructlclng uttorney ln the Phlllpplnes. The IBP Bourd of Governors
recommended to the Court the removul of the nume of the respondent from lts Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusul to
puy hls membershlp dues to the IBP slnce the lutters constltutlon notwlthstundlng due notlce.
Edlllon contends thut the provlslon provldlng for the IBP dues constltute un lnvuslon of hls constltutlonul rlghts ln the sense
thut he ls belng compelled, us u pre-condltlon to mulntulnlng hls stutus us u luwyer ln good stundlng, to be u member of the
IBP und to puy the correspondlng dues, und thut us u consequence of thls compelled flnunclul support of the suld
orgunlzutlon to whlch he ls udmlttedly personully untugonlstlc, he ls belng deprlved of the rlghts to llberty und property
guurunteed to hlm by the Constltutlon. Hence, the respondent concludes, the ubove provlslons of the Court Rule und of the
IBP By-Luws ure vold und of no legul force und effect.
Issue:
WON the puyment of IBP dues suffers constltutlonul lnflrmlty? NO
Held:
All leglslutlon dlrectlng the lntegrutlon of the Bur huve been unlformly und unlversully sustulned us u vulld exerclse of the
pollce power over un lmportunt professlon.
The pructlce of luw ls not u vested rlght but u prlvllege, u prlvllege moreover clothed wlth publlc lnterest becuuse u luwyer
owes substuntlul dutles not only to hls cllent, but ulso to hls brethren ln the professlon, to the courts, und to the nutlon, und
tukes purt ln one of the most lmportunt functlons of the Stute the udmlnlstrutlon of |ustlce us un offlcer of the court.
When the respondent Edlllon entered upon the legul professlon, hls pructlce of luw und hls exerclse of the suld professlon,
whlch uffect the soclety ut lurge, were (und ure) sub|ect to the power of the body polltlc to requlre hlm to conform to such
regulutlons us mlght be estubllshed by the proper uuthorltles for the common good, even to the extent of lnterferlng wlth
some of hls llbertles. If he dld not wlsh to submlt hlmself to such reusonuble lnterference und regulutlon, he should not
huve clothed the publlc wlth un lnterest ln hls concerns.
To compel u luwyer to be u member of the Integruted Bur ls not vlolutlve of hls constltutlonul freedom to ussoclute. 6
Bur lntegrutlon does not compel the luwyer to ussoclute wlth unyone. He ls free to uttend or not uttend the meetlngs of hls
Integruted Bur Chupter or vote or refuse to vote ln lts electlons us he chooses. The only compulslon to whlch he ls
sub|ected ls the puyment of unnuul dues. The Supreme Court, ln order to further the Stutes legltlmute lnterest ln elevutlng
the quullty of professlonul legul servlces, muy requlre thut the cost of lmprovlng the professlon ln thls fushlon be shured by
the sub|ects und beneflclurles of the regulutory progrum the luwyers.
Such compulslon ls |ustlfled us un exerclse of the pollce power of the Stute. Why? The rlght to pructlse luw before the
courts of thls country should be und ls u mutter sub|ect to regulutlon und lnqulry. And, lf the power to lmpose the fee us u
regulutory meusure ls recognlze, then u penulty deslgned to enforce lts puyment, whlch penulty muy be uvolded ultogether
by puyment, ls not vold us unreusonuble or urbltrury.

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