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ATP 3.3.2.1(B)

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction
JUNE 2009

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ORGANISATION TREATY ATLANTIC NORTH (NSA) AGENCY NATOSTANDARDIZATION OF NATOLETTER PROMULGATION


19 June200 9

(B) and Procedures Techniques (ATP)-3.3.2.1 - Tactics, 1. AlliedTacticalPublication publication. The UNCLASSIFIED is and Air lnterdiction a NATO/PfP for CloseAir Support Agreernent publication recordedin Standardization is of agreement nationsto use this (STANAG) 7144. (A), ATP-3.3.2.1 whichshall (B) on 2. ATP-3.3.2.1 is effective receipt. lt supersedes of procedures the destruction documents. for with the local in be destroyed accordance

o JuanA. al, ESP( N) Vice Agency Director, TO Standardization

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THIS PAGE IS RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) RECORD OF RESERVATIONS NATION FRA RESERVATIONS


France will apply the tactics, techniques and procedures described in this document, with the following reservations in order to ensure its interoperability in allied operations. However, in a national context as well as for specific missions ou capabilities, it reserves the right to establish procedures or to implement specific structures which will be defined in national documents. In accordance with paragraphe 0002, the tactics, techniques and procedures described in this document will not prevent the development of appropriate structures for land forces dedicated to the integration of supports in aid of the joint chief ; these structures will host air support teams TACP (ALO) and TACP (FAC), and will have their own functionning and procedures which will adhere to the procedures used in the air support chain. In particular, the tactical use of FACs is the responsibility of the joint chief. Definition of FAC Airborne FAC(A): France will apply the definition of FAC(A) given in paragraph 0107.a. The third sentence of paragraph 0203 He may either be experienced operational aircrew or other service personnel trained to perform FAC duties is not self-explanatory enough and can get things mixed up with the FAC(A) who is defined as an aircrew member in paragraph 0107.a. To avoid any contradiction with the definition of FAC(A), France considers that the subject he in this sentence must refer to the main subject of the paragraph, i.e. an FAC", and not to a "FAC(A)".

USA

1. 2.

The USA recommends ratification with reservation on STANAG 7144 AO (Ed 3)(RD 1). The USA agrees with the principles of ATP-3.3.2.1(B) and the requirements of STANAG 7144 and states the following reservations.

The TTP contained in this publication does not supplant or change any found in US Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). USA does not use the term In Hot to preclude confusion with Cleared Hot. US will use In with magnetic direction In heading 270. USA does not read line titles when passing the CAS 9-line brief. Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) should be defined in the pub since it is a joint, multi-service and multi-nationally accepted term.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction

References:
a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) AAP-15, NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications AArtyP-5, NATO Field Artillery Tactical Doctrine AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-3, Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations AJP-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations AJP-3.3.1, Counter Air AJP-3.3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air Interdiction and Close Air Support AJP-3.3.5, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control AJP-3.6, Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine APP-7, Joint Brevity Words Publication ATP-3.3.5.1, Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures ATP-49, Use of Helicopters in Land Operations (Volumes I and II) STANAG 3733, Laser Pulse Repetition Frequencies (PRF),Pulse Energies And Effective Designation Range Of Laser Systems For Target Designation And Weapon Guidance STANAG 3797, Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers and Laser Operators in Support of Forward Air Controllers

p.

Preface:
0001. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.3.2.1 (B) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction is based on general doctrine and fundamental considerations contained in the Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3.2 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction. 0002. The aim of this document is to introduce principal Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to be used during Close Air Support (CAS) and Air Interdiction (AI). Nothing in this publication is intended in any way to restrict the development of tactics or additional procedures and techniques by national armed forces or NATO Commands. The requirement is that all air components that may be tasked to support surface forces of another nation or command, and all Forward Air Controllers (FACs), who may be required to direct aircraft of another nation or command, are able to do so through the application of the standard procedures outlined herein. This document should also serve as a reference for training in national armed forces. 0003. CAS and AI are conducted to deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory by neutralising, delaying or destroying his surface forces. 0004. AI is air activity conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemys military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise - xi NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) achieve objectives. AI is conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. 0005. CAS is air activity against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Such action requires the involvement of a qualified FAC 1 (ground or airborne). All individuals authorised to direct action of Fixed-Wing (FW) aircraft and Attack Helicopters (AHs) 2 from a forward position must be trained and qualified in accordance with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 3797, Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers and Laser Operators in Support of Forward Air Controllers. 0006. Standard operating procedures and high standards of training are essential for the safe conduct of AI and CAS. To facilitate joint and combined operations, standard procedures are described in this document.

The term Forward Air Controller is taken in this document to include the USA terms Terminal Attack Controller or Joint Terminal Attack Controller. 2 AH refers to both terms Attack Helicopters and Armed Helicopters throughout this publication.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction CONTENTS Page Cover Title NSA Letter of Promulgation National Letter of promulgation References Preface Contents Record of Reservations Record of Changes Chapter 1 Section I Section II Section III Section IV Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Operations Introduction to Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Operations Types of Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Coordination Measures Fratricide Prevention, Collateral Damage Minimization and Risk Assessment Close Air Support Preparation and Coordination Functions of Close Air Support control elements Forward Air Controller Duties and Rules of Engagement Close Air Support Mission Considerations, Planning and Requesting Forward Air Control Mission Preparation Other Close Air Support Requirements Pre-planned Close Air Support Requests Immediate Close Air Support Requests Close Air Support Execution Forward Air Controller to Command Post Coordination Airspace Deconfliction Methods Initial Aircraft Check-In Close Air Support Briefing Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control Target Identification and Position Marking Battle Damage Assessment Digital Close Air Support - xiii NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED 3-1 3-3 3 - 13 3 - 15 3 - 18 3 - 22 3 - 29 3 - 31 2-1 2-2 2-5 2 - 18 2 - 23 2 - 14 2 - 16 1-1 1-2 1-5 1-8

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Chapter 2 Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Figure 2-1 Figure 2-2 CHAPTER 3 Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII Section VIII

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Figure 3-1 Figure 3-2 Figure 3-3 Figure 3-4 Figure 3-5 Figure 3-6 Figure 3-7 Figure 3-8 Figure 3-9 Figure 3-10 CHAPTER 4

Fire Support Coordination Measures Offset Direction Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Lateral Separation Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Altitude Separation Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Altitude and Lateral Separation Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Time Separation Standard Laser Brevity Terms Night Infrared Close Air Support Brevity Terms Standard Marking Brevity Terms Digital Close Air Support Brevity Terms Close Air Support Tactics, Weapons and Sensor Considerations Close Air Support Procedures Close Air Support Aircraft Tactics Night, Limited Visibility, and Adverse Weather Considerations Urban Close Air Support Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Tactics Airborne Forward Air Controller Methods and Procedures Precision Guided Munitions Electro-Optical Sensor Operations Coordinated Attack Types Fixed-Wing Close Air Support Attack Phase Example Typical Bomber CAS Orbit Typical Bomber FAC Attack Communications AC-130 Gunship Call for FIRE Movement Techniques Example of Rotary-Wing Close Air Support Tactics Urban Grid Objective Area Reference Grid Building Reference Grid Target Reference Points Wheel Orbit Figure 8 Orbit Racetrack Orbit Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Overhead Holding Pattern Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Side Holding Pattern Forward Air Controller (Airborne) "Figure 8" Pattern Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Low Level Holding Pattern

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Section I Section II Section III Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII Section VIII Figure 4-1 Figure 4-2 Figure 4-3 Figure 4-4 Figure 4-5 Figure 4-6 Figure 4-7 Figure 4-8 Figure 4-9 Figure 4-10 Figure 4-11 Figure 4-12 Figure 4-13 Figure 4-14 Figure 4-15 Figure 4-16 Figure 4-17 Figure 4-18

4-1 4-3 4 - 21 4 - 26 4 - 32 4 - 37 4 - 45 4 - 58 4-7 4-9 4 - 10 4 - 12 4 - 14 4 - 20 4 - 20 4 - 30 4 - 30 4 - 31 4 - 31 4 - 34 4 - 35 4 - 36 4 - 39 4 - 40 4 - 41 4 - 42

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED (B) ArP-3.3.2.1 Page and Advantages Figure 4-19 Airborneand GroundDesignators Disadvantages Figure4-20 Example SafetyZoneand OptimalAttackZones of Exclusion Zone Designator Figure 4-21 HELLFIRE ErrorCategories Figure4-22 TargetLocation Figure 4-23 Full MotionVideo BrevityTerms 5 CHAPTER Air Interdiction SectionI Sectionll lll Section SectionlV 5-1 Figure Figure5-2 Figure5-3 Figure 54 Annex A PartA Part B Part C Annex B PartA Part B Part C Part D Annex C Annex D Annex E PartA Part B Part C Annex F Typesof Air Interdiction Planning Requesting Considerations Air Interdiction and ArmedReconnaissance SurfaceKill Box Procedures SurfaceKill Box LifeCycle TypicalSurfaceKill Box Utilisation BlueSurfaceKill Box PurpleSurfaceKill Box Gheck-inBriefinq/CAS briefinq Agencyto Format(Briefing Situation UpdateBriefing Aircraft) Check-inBriefing CloseAir SupportBriefingFormat Sequenceof Events (Example) Briefing 9-LineCloseAir Support mission HighLevelCloseAir Support Low LevelCloseAir Supportmission (Example) LaserCommunications Infliqht Report Risk-estimateDistances GeneralPlanninqfor GloseAir Support IntenUMission Objectives GroundCommandeis PrepareCloseAir Support9-LineBriefing n Considerations Urlcan/Mountai Air Support RequestMessaqe(Example) B-1 B-1 5-1 5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-7 5-8 A-1 4-49 4-49 4-53 4-56 4-63

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Page Lexicon Acronyms and Abbreviations Terms and Definitions List of effective Pages Back Cover Lexicon - 1 Lexicon - 3 LEP - 1

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

CHAPTER 1 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AIR INTERDICTION OPERATIONS


Section I. Introduction to Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Operations
0101. Close Air Support and Air Interdiction Operations. CAS and AI are air operations conducted to deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory by neutralising, delaying or destroying his surface forces. CAS and AI operations are carried out by land and sea based aircraft in support of land or amphibious forces using procedures described in this ATP. CAS and AI must be closely coordinated with the supported commander. They must be integrated with the supporting commanders organic air operations to achieve unity of effort and avoid fratricide. CAS and AI contribute to the shaping of the battlespace for the joint force. They also enable a commander to take advantage of both friendly strengths and enemy weaknesses whilst preserving his own freedom of action through the exploitation of air powers utility for asymmetric warfare. a. CAS and AI missions may be flown under an overall posture of offence or defence and are to be coordinated with the surface scheme of manoeuvre for maximum effectiveness. These activities can either be accomplished in direct or indirect support of surface activities, or can be carried out without friendly surface forces in the area. How CAS and AI are conducted is dependent on overall campaign strategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict; such factors including but not limited to available assets, enemy disposition, phase of the operation, whether surface combat is also occurring, our degree of control of the air and the need to support, or be supported by, surface forces. Although CAS and AI may not be restricted by battlefield or geographical boundaries, they may be restricted by political boundaries separating two or more nations. CAS and AI coordinated by military control centres may still require aircraft diplomatic clearances to cross host nation sovereign territories before entering the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Political agreements/arrangements for aircraft diplomatic clearances with all affected host nations must be established in accordance with international law, treaties, and/or customs and practice before CAS and AI missions can be executed. The remainder of this ATP concentrates on CAS and AI planning and execution within the land environment.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) 0102. Close Air Support. CAS is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (AAP-6). The mission must always be supported by a qualified FAC and is flown in direct support of ground forces, in offensive and defensive operations, to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix or delay enemy forces where they are in close proximity to friendly forces. The two key parts of the CAS definition are close proximity and detailed integration. The term close does not imply a specific distance; rather it is situational. To succeed, detailed integration is required between each air mission and the fire and movement of surface forces to maximize mission effectiveness and minimize the risk of fratricide and collateral damage. Control of CAS is performed by a qualified FAC in support of surface forces. a. Close Proximity refers to the distance within which some form of terminal attack control is required for targeting direction and fratricide prevention. Detailed Integration refers to the level of coordination required to generate the desired effects without overly restricting CAS attacks, surface firepower or the ground scheme of manoeuvre. It is also necessary to protect aircraft from the effects of friendly surface fire.

b.

0103. Air Interdiction. AI operations are conducted to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemys military potential before enemy forces can effectively engage friendly forces. Typical targets for AI are lines of communications, supply centres, Command and Control (C2) nodes, or fielded forces. All AI occurring within a given JOA is coordinated through established planning, targeting and operational execution processes. Fires from AI occurring within a Joint Force Land Component Commands (JFLCC) Area of Operations (AOO) are normally required to be de-conflicted with that JFLCC. AI has the flexibility to operate either in support of surface activities or as the main effort against the enemy ground force. In some cases AI can provide the sole effort against the enemy ground forces, for example, when a joint operation has no friendly land component involved in combat activities. a. AI is traditionally conducted against targets that have been coordinated and prioritized at the Joint Force Commander (JFC) level and subsequently been tasked in the Air Tasking Order (ATO). This normally allows for good weapon to target matching and ample planning time for the aircrew. AI can also be tasked to shape the battlefield in front of advancing ground forces and on a non-linear battlefield. In the latter case, the procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) have been proven quite effective during recent operations. SCAR utilizes combat aircraft to detect targets for AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of surface fighting. SCAR missions are normally part of the C2 interface to coordinate multiple flights, detect and interdict targets, neutralize enemy Air Defences (ADs), and provide Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). 1-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) SCAR aircrew perform a similar function for AI missions that Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) (FACs(A)) provide for CAS aircraft. Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of an FAC(A), SCAR aircrew who are not explicitly qualified as FAC(A) do not have the authority to control CAS.

Section II. Types of Close Air Support and Air Interdiction


0104. CAS and AI missions generated to fill preplanned requests are designated as either scheduled or on-call. Scheduled missions result from pre-planned requests during the normal ATO cycle and allow for detailed coordination between the tactical air and ground units involved. On-call missions result from pre-planned requests during the normal ATO cycle and provide either airborne or ground alert missions to cover periods of expected enemy action, respond to immediate requests, or attack dynamic targets. Scheduled AI missions use detailed intelligence to attack known or anticipated targets in an operational area to generate effects that achieve JFC objectives. Scheduled CAS missions are normally dedicated to a specific ground unit or activity. Air planners attach a G or X prefix to the ATO mission identifier to designate either ground or airborne alert, respectively. a. Ground Alert CAS (GCAS) is a mission placed on ground alert status to provide responsive air support to ground forces that encounter substantial enemy resistance. CAS assets located close to the supported ground forces normally provide faster response times. GCAS missions may be changed to Airborne Alert CAS (XCAS) as the situation dictates. Airborne Alert CAS (XCAS) is a mission on airborne alert status in the vicinity of ground forces that expect to encounter enemy resistance. XCAS sorties typically remain in established holding patterns to provide responsive air support while awaiting tasking from any ground unit that needs CAS. If no tasking evolves during the vulnerability period, XCAS missions may swing to an AI role if other appropriate targets exist. Ground Alert AI is a mission placed on ground alert to provide responsive AI throughout the JOA in response to emerging targets. Airborne Alert AI is a mission that pursues a designated area versus a particular target. Tasked Missions may fly airborne alert or search particular areas to strike at targets of opportunity.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) 0105. Some CAS and AI missions may not clearly fall under their traditional definitions, but are still examples of airpower used against enemy surface forces or supporting infrastructure. The generic term attack may be used in such cases. Other labels such as strategic attack describe a scheduled mission which can be dynamically re-tasked to provide CAS or attack higher priority targets if requisites such as aircrew qualifications, weapons load and weapons fusing are compatible. Commanders and planners should carefully consider the resultant balance between effectiveness and efficiency caused by keeping a portion of air assets in reserve when apportioning ground-based and air alert missions. 0106. Immediate requests usually result from situations that develop after the suspense for pre-planned requests in a particular ATO cycle. Dynamic targeting provides a responsive use of on-call or dynamically re-tasked offensive air missions to exploit enemy vulnerability that may be of limited duration. However, dynamic targeting may lead to an overall reduction in the probability of success because of reduced time for mission preparation and target study. 0107. Derivative Missions Associated with AI and/or CAS. Derivative mission-types are frequently tasked to complement and support CAS and AI operations. The following discussion briefly describes the most common missions that are associated with, and facilitate the effective accomplishment of CAS or AI. a. Forward Air Controller (Airborne). FAC(A) missions provide terminal attack control for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Because of the risk of fratricide, FAC(A)s are specially trained aircrew qualified to provide delivery clearance to CAS aircraft. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of friendly ground forces. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance. SCAR missions use aircraft to detect targets for dedicated AI missions in a specified geographic zone. The area may be defined by a box or grid where worthwhile potential targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have relocated because of ground fighting. Terminal attack control and clearance of fires is important to the effective employment of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) during CAS. There is an increased chance of fratricide, mid-air collision, and confusion if procedures are not clearly defined. These risks are further increased with the proliferation of armed UAVs. Individual conflicts will necessitate clear and precise procedures for armed UAVs, details of which should be contained within special instructions (SPINS).

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) i. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on an Air Support Request (ASR) Tasking in Communication with an FAC who is in Communication with the Ground Force Commander. In this case, follow standard CAS procedures. The local ground commander clears and gives approval for fires in the target area, and the FAC provides final attack control. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Tasking that is not in Communication with Ground Forces. In this case, the UAV operator should receive approval to terminate the ISR tasking temporarily. Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) UAV responsibilities should transition from the senior intelligence duty officer to the senior offensive duty officer. Overall C2 should transition from the CAOC to the Air Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC). The UAV operator should contact the AOCC to ensure the appropriate ground commander is contacted through appropriate command channels. If the local ground commander has an available FAC, the AOCC should provide a C2 and data link frequency for the UAV operator to facilitate clearance of fires.

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Section III. Coordination Measures


0108. Various boundaries and coordination measures are used for airspace control and fire support coordination when planning and executing AI and CAS. The measures help to integrate air and ground manoeuvre, ensure de-confliction, avoid fratricide, and identify which parts of the battlespace require specialized control procedures. The JFC may define lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOO for the various surface components. The following discussion centres on linear boundaries and coordination measures that play a significant role in AI and CAS activities. 0109. Forward Boundary. The Forward Boundary (FB) defines a components outer AOO and is the farthest limit of an organization's responsibility. The organization is responsible for deep operations to that limit. Within the JOA, the next higher headquarters is responsible for coordinating deep operations beyond the FB. In offensive operations, the FB may move from phase line to phase line, depending on the battlefield situation. 0110. Forward Line of Own Troops. The Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces during operations at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The zone between the FLOT and the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) is typically the area over which friendly ground forces intend to manoeuvre in the near future and may also be the area within which ground force organic fires are employed. This zone is the area where air operations are normally executed through the AOCC.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) 0111. Fire Support Coordination Measures. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) are necessary to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. FSCMs are divided into two categories: permissive and restrictive. Permissive FSCMs facilitate attacks and include Coordinated Fire Lines (CFLs), Free Fire Areas, and FSCL(s). Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces and include No-Fire Areas (NFAs), Restricted Fire Areas, Restricted Fire Lines (RFLs), and Airspace Coordination Areas (ACAs). When operating in the JFLCC AOO, airpower must operate within the confines of all JFLCC FSCMs. In order to reduce the risk of fratricide and still take advantage of airpowers inherent flexibility and versatility, FSCMs must be clearly defined, easily controlled, and not overly restrictive. For detailed information on FSCMs, see ATP-3.3.5.1 and AArtyP-5. 0112. Historically, linear operations have used linear FSCMs such as the FSCL. However, as operations move towards being non-linear, dispersed component AOO necessitate the need for nonlinear FSCMs such as Surface Kill Boxes (SKBs). Advancements in data link technology and digital information have increased the potential for combat forces to effectively coordinate and conduct nonlinear operations. Non-linear operations require airmen to continually evaluate the capabilities of the controlling AOCC to ensure adequate resources (manning, radios, frequencies, computer support, etc.) are available to meet the C2 needs of aircraft operating in ever-increasing dispersed JFLCC AOO in the JOA. During SKB activities, the CAOC maintains C2 of aircraft outside the JFLCCs AOO while the AOCC typically maintains responsibility for aircraft inside the JFLCCs AOO. The following section describes the most significant and controversial FSCM that pertains to CAS and AI - the FSCL. 0113. Fire Support Coordination Line. The FSCL is a permissive FSCM established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL does not divide an AOO by defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for CAS. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL (or outside an enclosed FSCL) must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide and must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of the line. This coordination is achieved through the targeting process and the component liaison elements. Short of the FSCL (or within an enclosed FSCL) all air-to surface and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the surface force commander responsible for the AOO, who will specify the procedures required. The word control under these circumstances denotes aircraft control procedures; it does not imply that the surface force commander has Operational Control or Tactical Control of the aircraft. The purpose, establishing authority, employment, and placement of the FSCL must be understood to effectively execute CAS and AI within a surface AOO. 0114. An FSCL ensures the coordination of fire which is not under the surface commanders control but may affect his current tactical situation. The land component commander typically sets the FSCL after coordinating with all affected component commanders. All attacks short of the FSCL must be coordinated with the establishing component, primarily to ensure proper integration and prevent fratricide. Because of this, the FSCL is often used as the forward limit of the airspace controlled by the AOCC. This 1-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) mandates the various AOCC and other Air Command and Control System (ACCS) components have the required connectivity to monitor not only air activity out to the FSCL, but also be able to monitor friendly and enemy ground positions, surface-to-air threats, and all other key aspects of Situational Awareness (SA). When the land component attacks targets beyond the FSCL, it is required to coordinate with the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), usually through the CAOC, to ensure de-confliction and to prevent multiple assets from attacking the same target. 0115. The optimum placement of the FSCL varies with specific battlefield circumstances, but typically it should be placed where the preponderance of effects on the battlefield shifts from the ground component to the air component. In this way, the FSCL placement maximizes the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each component will suffer only a small reduction in efficiency. To place the FSCL so deep or shallow that one component is given complete freedom to operate usually results in the other components being so restricted that overall joint effectiveness suffers. The proper location for the FSCL may also shift from one phase of the war to the next, depending on the scale and scope of each components contribution during that phase. FSCL placement must also take into account the ground scheme of manoeuvre and should be based on anticipated, not current, ground force positions at the time the FSCL will be active. History has shown that placing the FSCL too deep is detrimental to overall joint force effectiveness and may even provide the enemy a sanctuary from effective air attack. 0116. The preponderance of kinetic effects shifts from land to airpower near the maximum range of organic field artillery. Therefore, under all but the most rapid ground manoeuvres, the FSCL is normally placed near the maximum range of tube artillery, because air and space power provides the most expeditious attack of surface targets beyond that point. To facilitate a rapidly moving battlefield, a common practice is to establish on-call FSCL in advance that can be activated as the ground force moves. Establishing the FSCL along an easily identifiable terrain feature is beneficial. Modern digitization, along with advanced navigation equipment such as Global Positioning System (GPS), can complement this technique. Using obvious terrain features for FSCL can prevent errors from happening in the heat and confusion of battle. The FSCL should be easy to define on a map and easily recognised from the ground and the air. 0117. Although normally thought of as a JFLCC responsibility, FSCL placement should be part of the joint targeting coordination board process. This ensures all components are able to integrate and maximize effects in support of JFC objectives. Joint doctrine does not define a depth or range for placing the FSCL in relation to the FLOT or forward edge of the battle area. This permits the JFLCC to tailor FSCL placement according to specific battle conditions that optimize joint operations. The JFLCC may employ the FSCL to achieve different desired effects. 0118. In conflicts characterized by nonlinear operations, ground forces occupy pockets that may have large distances of open terrain between them (often occupied by the enemy). Under such circumstances, the classic linear concepts such as the FSCL may need adjustment. One option is to create an alternate FSCM based on a common reference system (such as a standardized box, circle, or other easily employed shape) to 1-7 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) accomplish the same task that the FSCL performs for the linear battlespace. Although it is highly effective in nonlinear war, the common reference system is also very useful in linear operations. 0119. Surface Kill Box. An SKB is a three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks. It combines traditional aspects of both an Airspace Control Means (ACM) and FSCM, used to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface attack of targets, which could also be augmented by or integrated with surface-to-surface indirect fires. When established, the primary purpose is to allow air assets to conduct air interdiction against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander and without terminal attack control. SKB procedures are detailed in Section V of Chapter 6.

Section IV. Fratricide Prevention, Collateral Damage Minimization and Risk Assessment
0120. Fratricide is the employment of weapons by friendly forces that results in the unintentional death, injury, or damage to friendly personnel, equipment, or facilities. Air operations in close proximity to friendly forces require particular emphasis on the avoidance of fratricide. CAS requires detailed planning, coordination, and training for effective and safe execution. Execution of CAS relies on the disciplined following of standardized procedures. Though occasionally the result of malfunctioning weapons, fratricide has often been the result of confusion on and over the battlefield. Causes include misidentification of targets, target location errors, target or friendly locations incorrectly transmitted or received, and loss of SA by terminal controllers, CAS aircrew, or ACCS agencies. Items such as detailed mission planning, standardized procedures for friendly force tracking and supporting immediate air requests, realistic training/mission rehearsal, use of friendly tagging or tracking devices, effective coordination between staff elements on all levels, and sound clearance of fires procedures can significantly reduce the likelihood of fratricide. 0121. Fratricide Avoidance is crucial for the effective employment of CAS. Commanders, components, and units should conduct joint training and rehearsals on a regular basis that routinely exercise CAS scenarios to develop the skill sets and familiarity required for success. 0122. Minimization of Collateral Damage. In selecting a means or method of attack, due diligence should be applied in order to minimise, and ideally avoid, any loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. 0123. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is a critical factor in preventing fratricide and collateral damage. As the battlefield situation changes, commanders and their staff should make continuous tactical risk assessments. Risk assessments involve the processing of available information to ascertain a level of acceptable risk to friendly forces or noncombatants. Based on the current risk assessment, the supported commander will weigh the benefits and liabilities of authorizing specific weapons types or a particular type of 1-8 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) terminal attack control. Considerations during risk assessment should include, but not be limited to, the following: capabilities of units involved, information flow, uncertainty, communications reliability, battle tracking, targeting information, weather, and ordnance effects. 0124. Risk-Estimate Distance. Risk-estimate distances allow commanders to estimate the danger to friendly troops from a CAS attack. The distances are defined by the Probability of Incapacitation (PI) to ground troops. Weapon size, distance and relative azimuth of impact to ground troops affect PI. Moreover, different surroundings such as target elevation, terrain, buildings, trees, etc., can significantly reduce or increase PI. Ordnance delivery inside 0.1 percent PI distances will be considered Danger Close. The supported commander must accept responsibility for the risk to friendly forces when targets are inside danger close range. Risk acceptance is confirmed when the supported commander passes his initials to the attacking CAS aircraft through the FAC, signifying that he accepts the risk inherent in danger close deliveries. When ordnance is a factor in the safety of friendly troops, the aircrafts axis of attack should normally be parallel to the friendly forces axis or orientation. This will preclude long and/or short deliveries from being a factor to friendly forces. 0125. Proximity. Proximity of friendly troops is also a key factor during risk assessment. FAC and aircrew must use additional caution when conducting CAS when friendly troops are within one kilometre of enemy targets. The FAC should regard friendly forces within one kilometre (km) as a Troops in Contact (TIC) situation and thus advise the supported commander. However, friendly forces outside one km may still be subject to weapons effects. Although a TIC situation does not necessarily dictate a specific type of control, CAS participants must carefully weigh the types of terminal attack control, aircraft delivery parameter restrictions, and the choice of munitions against the risk of fratricide. Provision and read-back of the location of nearest friendly forces (Line 8 in the CAS Brief) is mandatory irrespective of distance.

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CHAPTER 2 - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PREPARATION AND COORDINATION


Section I Functions of Close Air Support Control Elements
0201. This section deals with the functions, duties and responsibilities of those personnel involved with the tactical control and coordination of CAS operations. 0202. Tactical Air Control Party. The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) is the principal air liaison element aligned with land force manoeuvre units from battalion through corps. The primary mission of corps through brigade-level TACP is to advise their respective ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air power and assist the ground commander in planning, requesting, and coordinating CAS (Commonly known as TACP Air Liaison Officer (ALO)). Below this level the TACPs primary task is to support the FAC during terminal attack control of CAS in support of ground forces Commonly known as TACP(FAC). Only FAC are authorized to perform terminal attack control. 0203. An FAC is a qualified individual who, from a forward position on the ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support of land forces (AAP-6). An FAC operating from an airborne platform is known as an FAC(A). He may be either experienced operational aircrew or other service personnel trained to perform FAC duties. The intention is not to restrict the selection of individuals, but rather to ensure that any person employed as an FAC is capable of adequately and safely controlling aircraft engaged in CAS. An FAC may be employed outside of a TACP. 0204. CAS in Extremis. Units that have a reasonable expectation to conduct terminal attack control need to have qualified FAC available. In emergency situations it might be required to call for CAS support when no FAC is available. This is considered a nonstandard procedure and should be treated as an emergency. In these instances, qualified FAC, FAC(A) and/or CAS aircrew should assist these personnel/units to the greatest extent possible in order to bring fires to bear. Due to the complexity of CAS, the ground commander must consider the increased risk of fratricide and collateral damage when using personnel who are not qualified FAC and accept the results of the attacks which may not be as effective as desired. The requester must notify/alert their command element when an FAC or FAC(A) is unavailable. If the ground commander accepts the risk, he forwards the request to the CAS controlling agency. This information will alert the CAS controlling agency (AOCC (L) or CAOC) that aircrew will be supporting non-FAC qualified personnel. 0205. Additional Functions. In many instances an FAC may be the only individual capable of providing a land force formation or unit with specialist advice on air matters and may be required in certain circumstances to perform functions and duties additional to those described below. The FAC should be able to integrate and be familiar with procedures and systems such as artillery, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), mortars, and ISR. 2-1 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Section II Forward Air Controller Duties and Rules of Engagement


0206. Duties of a Forward Air Controller. The duties outlined in the following paragraphs are those directly connected with the actual control of a CAS mission. They are of a general nature only and must be adapted as necessary to satisfy the existing ROE, SPINS and prevailing circumstances. a. Targeting. At the tactical level, targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising individual targets and matching appropriate responses to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. The FAC facilitates delivery of ordnance onto targets approved by the manoeuvre force commander. While conducting CAS, this may equate to the FAC selecting a particular target in a target array. When targeting, the FAC must consider items such as target type, mission, enemy air defences, terrain and weather, available armament, response time, long time of flight/fall of weapons, and time for fusing. Other considerations include controller-to-target aspect, aircraft-to-target aspect, weapon-to-target aspect, designation or mark type, proximity of friendly forces, proximity of non-combatants, and other fires. Additionally, controllers and aircrew must expeditiously obtain and pass BDA information. Commanders, controllers, and aircrew use BDA to determine if objectives have been met, or whether re-attack is necessary. The FAC assists the aircrew to acquire and/or attack the target by: i. Providing a precise target location to aircrew which includes target coordinates and elevation. Passing a detailed target description that will give the aircrew a mental picture of the target, and the immediate target area, before the attack is started. Marking the target or a suitable reference point when possible by physical or electronic means. Directing the aircrew onto the target in order to position it for weapon release.

ii.

iii.

iv.

b.

Fratricide Risk: To minimize the risk of fratricide the location of friendly forces in close proximity to the target must be determined by the FAC and passed to the aircrew as a cardinal direction together with distance in metres from the target. If these forces bracket the target, the position of all potentially affected units must be passed (e.g. W 1.5 km and next nearest SE 2 km). The aircrew shall read back the position of friendly forces. When planning the attack pattern to be used, the FAC should select an axis of attack, which will ensure, as far as is practicable, that inadvertently released weapons will not result in fratricide. If aircraft are observed on an incorrect attack path or attacking friendly forces, the FAC must direct an abort. The 2-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) FAC should also consider implications of the use of lasers. Procedures for this are covered in Chapter 5, Section VII. c. Risk Management. The CAS aircraft and aircrew are at risk during their CAS mission from friendly and enemy forces. To minimize the risk the FAC is responsible for: (1) Coordinating the attack with the appropriate land force commander including notification to AD assets of details of CAS in the area. Informing the CAS aircrew of any relevant obstructions or terrain features that might constitute a hazard on the approach to or in the target area. Briefing the CAS aircrew on the airspace de-confliction measures as appropriate. Informing the CAS aircrew of known enemy air defences in the target area. Informing the CAS aircrew of other known aircraft in the target area. Providing current or estimated weather in the target area. Clearing the mission for the attack and, if necessary, each aircraft on each weapon delivery pass. Suggesting or, if necessary, assigning the best egress route. Providing calls to the CAS aircrew for evasive manoeuvres when observing active engagements by enemy AD.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5) (6) (7)

(8) (9)

d.

Integration. Although CAS is conducted at the tactical level, CAS integration starts at the operational level during the air apportionment process. Whether conducting offensive or defensive activities, commanders plan CAS at key points throughout the depth of the battlefield. The JFC prioritises CAS to support his concept of operations. Commensurate with other mission requirements, the JFACC postures aviation assets to optimise support to the requesting units. The Joint Coordination Order, Air Operations Directive, ATO, Airspace Control Order (ACO), and SPINS provide the framework for integrating CAS into the commanders concept of operations. The FAC then integrates CAS with the scheme of manoeuvre and fire support plan of friendly troops. He will, if necessary, also arrange for target marking and for suppressive fires onto enemy air defences within his operational area.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) e. Weapons. In order to achieve the commanders intent for CAS, planners, FACs, and aircrew must tailor the weapons, and fuse settings. For example, airburst weapons are effective against area targets such as troops and vehicles in the open, but not against hardened targets, and are not advisable for targets where friendly troops or non-combatants may be affected by the immediate strike. In urban environment weapons and fuse settings need to be selected very carefully to achieve the desired effects on the ground. Munitions that dud - Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) - may affect the mobility of certain units. In all cases, the FAC and the supported commander need to know the type of ordnance expended, and its possible impact. The FAC and aircrew must ensure that weapons are delivered in accordance with the land commanders plan and current ROE. Additionally, FAC need to know the time of flight/fall for munitions used. If the situation dictates, the FAC may deny the use of a specific weapon.

f. Show of Force. A Show of Force (SHOF) seeks to achieve an effect on the ground through non-kinetic means. Through witnessing a display of potential military capability, the recipient (target) of a SHOF may be deterred from their present course of action. A SHOF should clearly demonstrate the intent and capability to employ kinetic effects if necessary. Generally, a SHOF should be conducted with clear potential to escalate to the use of kinetic means if necessary in order to produce the desired end-state. The FAC employs the same procedures for a SHOF as he would for any kinetic event. The nature and conduct of the SHOF is at the discretion of the FAC and aircrew, in accordance with JOA and national restrictions and tactics. g. Damage Assessment. Whenever possible, the FAC provides attack flights with the BDA of their attack as they egress. The FAC gives BDA for the flight, not for individual aircraft in the flight. The FAC should not assume the target is completely destroyed since the enemy may employ deception. FAC must use their judgement and be precise (if you do not see it, do not report it) in reporting BDA. BDA must be passed to intelligence and controlling agencies as soon as possible. If conditions preclude briefing complete BDA, at a minimum pass SUCCESSFUL or UNSUCCESSFUL to the aircraft and the controlling agency. Develop and maintain a log of all BDA. The log should contain the following elements: mission number, call sign, target coordinates, Time on Target (TOT), known results (vehicles/structures destroyed, unexploded ordnance), and whether or not the mission was successful.

0207. Rules of Engagement. a. FAC and CAS aircrew must operate in accordance with current ROE. These ROE may address, amongst other things, target designation, target identification, type of control, weapons delivery, or circumstances under which attack clearance may be given. 2-4 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) b. FAC and CAS aircrew are to be aware that ROE pertaining to target identification and attack clearance may leave little margin for final corrections or weapons release. This may significantly affect mission success.

Section III Close Air Support Mission Considerations, Planning and Requesting
0208. Close Air Support Planning Considerations. This section addresses basic planning considerations associated with the joint mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support and/or time available. CAS is coordinated with other manoeuvre, combat support, and joint forces to support the combined arms team. CAS provides firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, neutralise, disrupt, suppress, fix, or delay enemy forces as an element of joint fire support. Commanders use CAS to gain and employ required capabilities not organic to the force or to augment organic surface fires. They should plan for the employment of CAS throughout the depth of their assigned battlespace. 0209. Mission. CAS in offensive and defensive activities. a. Offensive Activities. The TACP (ALO) should provide advice to the relevant targeteers to ensure that CAS is used appropriately. CAS supports offensive activities with scheduled or on-call missions. Commanders employ CAS depending on the type of offensive activity being conducted: attack, raid, exploitation, pursuit, feint, demonstration, reconnaissance in force, ambush, breakout of encircled forces. (1) Attack. Commanders plan for and use CAS to support attacks against enemy forces. CAS can destroy critical enemy units or capabilities before the enemy can concentrate or establish a defence. CAS can also help fix the enemy in space or time to support the movement and assault of ground forces. CAS may add to the concentration of firepower, and the effects against the enemy. CAS can help to isolate enemy forces on the battlefield and force the enemy to defend in a direction from which he is unprepared to fight. CAS should be incorporated into the detailed planning and coordination involved in a deliberate attack. Raid. A raid is an activity, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

(2)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (3) Exploitation. Exploitation is an offensive activity that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganise the enemy and erode his cohesion. In exploitation, CAS is used to sever escape routes, destroy fleeing forces, and strike unprotected enemy targets that present themselves as enemy cohesion deteriorates. Pursuit. In the pursuit, the commander attempts to annihilate the fleeing enemy force as the enemy becomes demoralised and cohesion and control disintegrate. Because the objective of the pursuit is destruction of the enemy, CAS can keep direct pressure on the enemy to prevent them from reorganising or reconstituting. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract the action of an enemy force by seeking combat with it. Demonstration. The purpose of a demonstration is to distract an enemys attention without seeking contact. Both feint and demonstration may contribute to fixing an enemy. Reconnaissance in force. The purpose of reconnaissance in force is to induce an enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or possibly the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. Ambush. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the enemy while denying him an opportunity to counter-attack, principally through surprise. Breakout of encircled forces. In a breakout, an encircled force takes offensive action to link up with a main force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the enemy, and there is considerable advantage in attempting to break out at the earliest opportunity.

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

b.

Defensive activities. In defensive activities, commanders employ CAS to cause the enemy to deploy prematurely, or slow or stop the enemys attack. CAS can be distributed to support specific forces in the security, main battle, or rear areas depending on the type of defence (mobile or area). Commanders may use CAS to: (1) Defence. The purpose of defence may be to defeat an enemy force or to prevent him from achieving his objectives or to hold ground. Forms of defensive activities are mobile defence or area defence. (a) Mobile Defence. The purpose of a mobile defence consists in combining in the depth retrograde screening actions, delaying activities, blocking actions and armoured counterattacks in order to: 2-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) i. Weaken the opponent by inflicting losses on him while preserving as much as possible the engaged friendly forces, Slow-down and often canalize its advance, thus Win time and prepare for a new offensive with the engagement of reserved forces.

ii. iii.

(b)

Area Defence. The purpose of an area defence consists in combining a fixed element that denies the enemy freedom of manoeuvre, and a moving element to counterattack the enemy. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission and the relative capabilities of the attacker and defender.

(2)

Delay. Delaying activities are those in which a force being pressed by an enemy trades time for space, reducing its opponents momentum and inflicting damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay may be conducted to slow an enemys advance, reduce his fighting power, gather information about enemy intentions, or protect friendly deployments. Delaying activities also allow the commander to shape the battlefield, and to create the conditions for a counter attack.

0210. Enemy. CAS planners must account for the enemys disposition, composition, order of battle, capabilities, and likely courses of action. The considerations include: a. What are the Enemy's Offensive/Defensive Capabilities? Valuable targets are usually defended by Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA), Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), or automatic weapons. Use of standoff weapons and varying initial point location will enhance aircraft survivability by reducing exposure and altering attack direction. However, camouflage and decoys may be used to degrade or negate visual or electronic target detection and tracking. This may prevent the use of certain munitions or tactics. What is the Enemy's Capability to Conduct Command and Control Warfare (Communications, Navigational Aids, Targeting, etc.)? From this information, CAS planners anticipate the enemys ability to affect the mission and the potential influence enemy actions may have on flight tactics. As the threat level increases, pre-briefing of aircrew and detailed mission planning become critical. The potential for the threat situation to change during the course of the mission makes communications and close coordination between the aircrew, control agencies, and the supported ground force crucial. In-flight updates on enemy activity and disposition along the flight route and in the target area may require aircrew to alter their 2-7 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) original plan and tactics. If the enemy is successful at disrupting communications, alternatives are planned to ensure mission accomplishment. Secure-voice equipment and frequency-agile radios can overcome some effects of enemy interference. c. What are the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Requirements? If the enemy AD threat is significant, air support may be limited until the threat is reduced. SEAD support may be required against air defences both in and outside urban areas, with hidden SEAD targets more difficult to find and anticipate. An aggressive, proactive SEAD effort may be necessary during the early stages of activities.

0211. Terrain and Weather Effects. a. Terrain and Weather. Terrain can affect communications and visual Line of Sight (LOS) for identifying the target and/or aircraft. SA enhancing systems (e.g. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and data link type systems) and Inertial Navigation System (INS)/GPS-guided weapons improve the ability to execute CAS in certain tactical situations despite weather limitations. Nevertheless, favourable visibility normally improves CAS effectiveness. Weather, ceiling and visibility may affect the decision to employ low, medium, or high altitude tactics. These conditions will also affect the FACs ability to see both the target and the CAS asset. Weather conditions may also determine the attack profile of the aircraft. If enemy vehicles are moving, exhaust smoke, dust trails, and movement can indicate their location. Thick haze or smoke has a greater effect on low-level attacks than on steep-dive attacks because horizontal visibility is usually lower than oblique visibility. Reduced visibility and cloud layers restrict laser and Electro-Optical (EO) guided ordnance. Target acquisition is usually easier when the sun is behind the aircraft. Datum. CAS planners, FAC, and aircrew must ensure that both controller and weapon delivery platform use the same coordinate datum. The default datum is World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84). Datum planes should be verified prior to deployment/mission as part of the deployment/mission checklist and coordinated or confirmed with the controlling agency and/or higher echelons. The use of a different datum will result in erroneous target data and could increase the risk of fratricide. Wind. When calculating directions or flying times for attack patterns, FAC will not include any corrections for wind. If an FAC considers the wind velocity such that it will substantially affect the attack pattern he should advise the aircrew accordingly. Wind can greatly affect the development and appearance of marking smokes. FAC must take this into consideration when determining where and when to place smoke taking particular care to avoid obscuring the target. 2-8 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

c.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) d. Target Masking. A target screened by valleys or other natural cover may be difficult to see on low-level attacks. An increase in altitude may be necessary to find the target. Thermal Significance. Many variables can affect a targets vulnerability to detection and attack by thermal systems. Recent weather conditions, time of day (thermal crossover), target composition and background should all be considered. Contrast and Brightness. A major factor in target detection is the contrast of the target against its background. Camouflaged targets against a background of similar colour may be impossible to detect. All targets, regardless of contrast differences, are more difficult to locate under poor light conditions. Mountainous Environment. Mountain terrain may force the enemy to concentrate his forces along roads, valleys, reverse slopes, and deep defiles, where CAS is very effective. However, the terrain also restricts the attack direction of the CAS strikes and may limit communications. CAS planners must assume the enemy will concentrate air defences along the most likely routes CAS aircraft will fly. CAS planners must thoroughly identify AD systems and target them to enhance the survivability of CAS assets. Desert Environment. CAS aircraft may be more vulnerable in the desert because of the lack of covered approaches, and both friendly and enemy units are often widely dispersed. In most cases the desert environment will allow weapons to be employed at longer ranges and will provide increased weapons effects due to lack of obstructions. Greater communication ranges may be possible due to increased LOS ranges. In general if good contrast exists between the target and the background, target detection will be possible at extended ranges. Deserts that have vegetation will reduce target detection capabilities from standoff ranges. Camouflage and decoys have proven to be effective countermeasures in the desert environment and will also delay target acquisition. Jungle/Forested Environment. In jungle terrain, most contact with the enemy is at extremely close range. If the friendly force has a substantial advantage in fire support, the adversary will most likely try to close with the friendly force and maintain that close contact. Thus, the friendly force commander might not be able to use his fire support advantage without increasing the risk of inflicting friendly casualties. Therefore, knowledge of the type of munitions best suited for jungle/forested terrain and how to employ them is vital.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (1) Target acquisition. Due to limited LOS ranges, both vertical and horizontal, target acquisition will be difficult for both the attacking aircraft and the FAC. Target marking techniques and attack profiles may have to be altered to engage targets. Smoke has limited effectiveness in forested terrain. However, white Phosphorous (WP) is normally effective as a marking round. Munition effects. Ordnance and fusing may have to be tailored to penetrate dense forest or jungle canopies. Because combat in these environments is usually of such close nature, the delivery of the munitions must be closely controlled to avoid fratricide. Dense jungle will tend to absorb weapons effects due to numerous trees and heavy undergrowth. This can reduce the effectiveness of weapons. Observation/Terminal Attack Control. The dense vegetation of most jungles makes observation beyond 25 to 50 metres very difficult. The jungle also makes navigation, self-location, target location, and friendly unit location very difficult. Communications. Communications may be severely degraded due to LOS problems. Where possible use FAC(A), Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, AWACS or other systems as relay stations.

(2)

(3)

(4)

j.

Urban CAS Environment. CAS planners must be aware of the special considerations regarding urban terrain and the close quarter nature of urban combat. These include, but are not limited to: (1) Target Acquisition: (a) (b) Increased need for marking and designating CAS targets. The ability of FW and Rotary-Wing (RW) aircraft to provide fire support may be limited by the structural make-up of the urban location. Tall buildings make it difficult for pilots to identify targets and may require specific attack headings to achieve LOS with the target. Detailed grid maps or photos derived in planning will aid in target description and location. Roads and buildings may be numbered to speed the target acquisition process from the air. Prior planning is required to ensure all units, both on the ground and in the air, have the correct charts or imagery.

(c)

(d)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (2) Munitions Effects. Whenever ordnance is delivered, the unexpected consequences of collateral damage in the form of fratricide and damage or destruction of unintended targets should be a consideration. Detailed planning of weapons and delivery tactics will minimise the risk to friendly forces, non-combatants and adjacent buildings/structures. Additionally, the heights of buildings along the munitions path from delivery point to impact may prohibit the use of the optimum delivery profile. The urban canyons encountered in urban combat may shield some targets from effective attack. The available attack vectors may result in weapons employments that have both, an increased fratricide and an increased collateral damage potential. Observation/Terminal Attack Control. Consider the use of FAC(A). Observers may be placed on upper floors of buildings to improve visibility.

(3)

k.

Limited Visibility/Adverse Weather. The execution of limited visibility or night CAS is one of the most difficult missions on the battlefield. Limited visibility may occur due to fog, smoke or dust on the battlefield but occurs most frequently due to activities extending into hours of darkness. Units can take advantage of their night vision and navigational superiority to gain tactical and psychological advantages over the enemy. (1) Advantages: The most important advantage of night and adverse weather CAS is the limitation it imposes on enemy optically-directed AAA and optical/Infrared (IR) guided SAM. Selectively placed airborne and ground illumination may further degrade enemy night vision capabilities while preserving or enhancing those of friendly forces. As an example, overt airborne illumination flares, selectively placed at a distance well behind and above friendly positions (at the backs of, but not close enough to silhouette), could be employed to gain down enemy Night Vision Devices (NVD), improve low ambient light conditions, and counter enemy IR SAM. Disadvantages: Darkness and weather can impose several limitations on CAS employment. During periods of low illumination and reduced visibility, both CAS aircrew and ground forces may have difficulty in acquiring targets and accurately locating enemy and friendly forces. Accurate target marking plays a vital role in target acquisition. Low ceilings may require CAS aircraft to operate in the low to very low altitude environment. Consideration must be given to target marking, SEAD and fires de-confliction. CAS aircraft operating in the low to very low environment will also have reduced target acquisition times.

(2)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (3) Friendly Force Location and Combat Identification. The challenges of identifying friendly and enemy locations, identifying targets, and maintaining SA becomes acute in the night or adverse weather CAS environment. The entire training, equipping, planning, tasking, and execution process must recognise these challenges. Visual Employment. Visual employment is a viable option for conducting night CAS. Night Vision Goggles (NVG) can be used to aid in target acquisition. With detailed prior planning and coordination, target area illumination and target marking can provide effective conditions for CAS. Specific visual employment considerations include: (a) Illumination. Coordination and approval for illumination must occur prior to CAS aircraft entering the target area. Artificial illumination may be used to enhance target acquisition. The target may be illuminated or marked by the FAC, artillery/mortars, direct fire weapons or by CAS/airborne FAC aircraft delivering parachute flares in conjunction with an attack. Marking. (IR) Laser marks are extremely effective for target marking and should be used to the maximum extent possible commensurate with CAS aircraft capabilities. WP rockets, mortars, or artillery rounds are excellent night and low visibility marking rounds and may be used in conjunction with airborne delivered illumination.

(4)

(b)

(5)

System-Aided Employment. System-aided target acquisition and weapons delivery methods are relied on more heavily during night and adverse weather. In terrain with poor contrast or sparse terrain features, target acquisition for CAS aircraft flying above 10,000 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) will mostly depend on the use of system aids for target acquisition and identification (ID). While these systemaided employment options can be used independently, combining the systems increases the probability of mission success. These systems include laser, EO/IR, radar, radar beacon, INS and GPS. The Commanders and FAC have to weigh the risk of fratricide and take into account the current ROE. (a) Laser. Night procedures for target designation by laser are the same as those used during daytime activities. However, adverse weather may limit the use of lasers. Cloud cover and precipitation as well as battlefield conditions (smoke, dust, or other obscurants) can seriously degrade laser effectiveness.

2 - 12 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (b) EO/IR systems. Cloud cover, humidity, precipitation and thermal crossover, battlefield conditions (smoke, dust, haze and other obscurants) may degrade Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) and Low Light Level Television (TV) effectiveness. Radar. Although not preferred, radar deliveries are an option in certain instances. During severe weather, non-availability of other weapon platforms, the type of weapon on board, or a failure of the target designator (Laser), may make this type of weapon delivery the only option available. INS/GPS. Weapons can be delivered at night or through the weather at specific coordinates by properly equipped aircraft. These weapons are extremely accurate and can be very effective if loaded with accurate coordinates. Target location error (distance between the actual target position and the coordinates provided) is the single largest factor in determining miss distance. The FAC must verify the accuracy of the coordinates provided to the weapon and ensure the JFCs ROE support the use of INS/GPS-aided munitions.

(c)

(d)

l.

Revetted Targets. Targets in revetted positions may only be visible from the air. FAC may have trouble designating these types of targets. FAC should select an attack heading that is in the direction of the revetment opening. This will increase the probability of a successful attack.

0212. Forces (Close Air Support Assets) Available. CAS planners must consider C2, ISR, and CAS aircraft assets available. a. Command and Control Assets. A detailed, flexible, and redundant C2 plan is essential. Airborne C2 support systems may alleviate some of the challenges in C2. Each of these platforms has inherent capabilities and limitations. Consider each of the available C2 assets and what role they can play to support the mission. (1) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land). The AOCC (L) functions as the primary control agency for the execution of CAS. It coordinates and directs CAS for land forces and facilitates CAS, AI, SEAD, air mobility, and ISR missions within its assigned area of responsibility. The AOCC serves as the net control station for immediate air support request nets, and monitors aircraft check-in/check-out within its area of responsibility.

2 - 13 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (2) Airborne/ground based C2 Assets. Planners should consider integrating other airborne/ground based C2 assets to enhance the plan. The specific roles and functions of each asset must be known so that a determination can be made as to whether these assets are critical and warrant specific requests to higher Headquarters (HQ). TACP (ALO) is usually located at Division and Brigade level and is a team that functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air power. The TACP (ALO) plans and coordinates CAS in accordance with the ground commanders guidance and intent.

(3)

b.

Tactical Air Control Parties (Forward Air Controller). TACP (FAC) provide direct interaction with supported ground combat forces. They normally are staffed with FACs to conduct control and liaison functions, LOs and other support personnel. (1) Forward Air Controllers. FACs have the primary responsibility of terminal attack control. It is important to consider FAC capabilities and limitations as well as subordinate or adjacent unit FAC. This consideration should include personnel (levels of training and qualification) as well as equipment serviceability and availability. Laser Operators. LOs may aid the FAC by acquiring or lasing targets. If the FAC plans to use a laser operator, then he must be able to communicate and coordinate with the operator during target marking or terminal guidance illumination.

(2)

c.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets. Use all sources of ISR. Assets that may be used include UAV and Air-Ground Surveillance feeds, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sources, scout reconnaissance troop reports, FAC observations, and intelligence reports and video or remote viewing capability (for example, Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER)). There are also many human sources of CAS targeting information available on the battlefield. These elements are specifically tailored for ISR roles and normally report through established intelligence channels. CAS Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities. CAS planners should select those combinations of munitions and aircraft offering the required accuracy, firepower, NTISR capability and flexibility. To achieve the desired level of destruction, neutralisation, or suppression of CAS targets, the weapons load, arming and fuse settings must be tailored for the desired results. Generalpurpose munitions are very effective against troops and stationary vehicles. However, hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets may require specialized weapons, such as laser-guided, EO, or IR munitions, or aircraft with special equipment or capabilities. The growing NTISR capability of targeting pods able to link with ground control stations or FACs with remote video-receiver 2 - 14 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

d.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED (B) ATP-3.3.2.1 provides and findingcapability.Whilethe enhanced situational awareness CAS aircraftwill carry,the requesting the CAOCdetermines actualordnance his information outlining desiredresults, sufficient commander shouldprovide tactical restrictionsor limitations,etc. This any external or self-initiated intentwhile simultaneously allows CAS to best supportthe commander's givingas muchflexibility possible.Groundcommanders shouldbe aware as that immediate CAS requestsmight have to be filled by aircraftloadedwith munitions. less-than-optimal 0213. Time Considerations. a. Time Availablefor Planning. Time is the criticalelementin coordinating arms effectof groundand fires to achievethe combined eventsand massing to must estimatethe amountof time necessary plan the air forces. Planners mission,effect the coordination, and execute the mission to support the ground commander. Inadequateplanningtime will result in reduced risk effectiveness increased to aircrewand groundtroopsalike. and JOA will haveestablished Air Tasking Order PlanningGycle. The specific "cutoff'timesfor pre-planned requests. Planning ATO cycle and Requesting CAS requirementsthat do not meet the establishedcut off times are divisionof submitted a changeto the ATO throughthe currentoperations as per JOA Standing Operating the CAOC or as an immediate request (SOP). Procedures of Synchronisation. Synchronisation CAS with the schemeof manoeuvre and fires is critical. Whenever possible, use GPS time to synchronise actions.

b.

c.

CAS, 0214. Requesting Close Air Support. There are various methodsof requesting intelligence the on depending how fluid the situationis and how much pre-mission on target is available. Unlikeother forms of air attack,with CAS it is very rare to know the precisetargetpriorto takeoff. lt is important notethe difference betweenCAS missions to drivinga CAS requestmay changeright up to the time and CAS requests.The conditions while the CAS flight lead checksin with the FAC due to the fluid natureof the battlefield, may or may not affectthe actual executiontiming of CAS missions. The such changes ground component may have a pre-identified of CAS targets, but the battlefield list situationoften delays the decisionas to which target's destructionor disruptionis the highestpriority.

2-15 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 2-1 - Pre-planned Close Air Support Requests. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0215. Pre-planned Requests. Pre-planned requests for CAS mean the aircraft flying the missions are scheduled for a particular time or time period, which normally coincides with the anticipated time when CAS will be needed most by the ground component. Preplanned requests for CAS will result in one of two types of mission: scheduled or on-call. Those CAS requirements foreseen early enough to be included in the ATO are submitted as pre-planned requests. As soon as the requirements for CAS are identified during the planning process, CAS planners submit a pre-planned request for CAS prior to the request cut off time, as dictated by the Air Planning Cycle. CAS planners prepare pre-planned requests by using air request format. Submission procedures (i.e. numbering system, time frame for inclusion in the ATO) for pre-planned requests are JOA-specific, and detailed guidance should be found in respective SOPs. However, the normal routing of air request formats is via each superior Fire Support Element (FSE) eventually arriving with the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) at the CAOC for inclusion in the ATO.

2 - 16 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) a. Scheduled CAS (listed as CAS on the ATO) is the preferred method of employment because it puts the CAS assets over the area of the battlefield where they are needed most, at a specific time on target, and where a need for CAS has been established in advance. Scheduled missions will normally have a specific contact point, at a specific time, to expect handoff to an FAC or FAC(A). Scheduled CAS missions are the most likely to have good intelligence on the expected type of target, resulting in a better munitions target match. Although joint doctrine states that a specific target must be identified when requesting scheduled CAS, the reality of fluid battlefield environments makes identifying a CAS target days in advance very difficult. On-call CAS involves putting the aircraft on ground-based or airborne alert (often listed as GCAS or XCAS in the ATO) during a pre-planned time period when the need for CAS is likely, but not guaranteed. This is a less efficient use of CAS resources, as the assets involved may or may not actually employ against the enemy unless a backup target is provided or there is a plan to move excess CAS sorties to AI within the ground commanders AOO. Therefore, commanders or planners should consider tasking XCAS flights with a back-up mission in case they do not use their ordnance for CAS.

b.

0216. Push CAS is a form of pre-planned XCAS that provides massed on-call CAS when needed. When a significant number of CAS assets are available and the tactical situation dictates, a continuous flow system providing a constant stream of CAS missions to the contact points may be employed. Push CAS represents a proactive method of distributing CAS that differs from a request-driven or pull method. While similar in concept to other pre-planned CAS missions, push CAS differs because it is planned and often flown before the actual request for CAS is made by the supported ground component. Push CAS missions are scheduled to arrive at a specified contact point at a specified time, normally in a continuous flow, to provide constant CAS assets available to support the ground unit(s) identified as the main weight of effort. The term push refers to the fact that CAS missions are pushed forward to the AOCC, FAC(A), or FAC before the formal CAS request is made; those assets not needed for CAS should be pushed to pre-planned backup targets so the sorties are not wasted. Push CAS works best in an environment where many CAS targets are available, so the assets involved will likely have a lucrative target to attack. Although push CAS significantly cuts response times, the number of sorties required is often high and the advantages gained must be weighed against the other potential uses for these assets (such as interdicting known targets). Therefore, planners should regularly assess how much push CAS to use based on such factors as available assets, existing targets, and the ground scheme of manoeuvre. 0217. Precedence. Each pre-planned request is assigned a precedence, which orders the requests in descending order of importance.

2 - 17 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) 0218. Amount of Detail. The amount of detail the requester is able to include in the request is critical. If possible, the requesting unit should identify the target, TOT, and other mission data (e.g. effects, FSCM). This information will provide more effective coordination and a higher likelihood that the aircraft will have the proper weapons load for the assigned target. 0219. Timeliness. A high level of detail is not always available prior to the ATO distribution. In these cases, pre-planned requests can still identify an anticipated requirement for CAS to be available during a period of time, with the exact time and place to be coordinated as the battle develops. The requesting commander should provide a time frame, probable target type, and place where the need for CAS is most likely. Ideally, pre-planned requests should be submitted prior to the appropriate ATO planning cycle. Updates to the original request (using the request number) should be processed through the surface forces chain of command as required by the developing situation. 0220. Submission. CAS planners at each echelon consolidate their requests and submit them to the next higher echelon. There, the commander and the staff consolidates all requests and accepts or refuses them using an accept/refuse message. Refused requests should be sent back to the requesting unit with an explanation. Accepted requests are reprioritised and assigned a new precedence in accordance with the ground commanders desires. 0221. Coordination. Accepted and prioritised requests are forwarded to the CAOC for inclusion into the ATO planning cycle.

2 - 18 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 2-2 - Immediate Close Air Support Requests. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0222. Immediate Requests for Close Air Support. Immediate requests for CAS usually result from unanticipated or unplanned needs on the battlefield, often of an emergency nature, that require diverting or rescheduling aircraft from other missions. Immediate requests may also result from less emergent circumstances, where there simply wasnt sufficient time to plan the mission in time for the ATO cycle. While this demonstrates that not all immediate requests result in hasty mission planning, immediate requests tend to result in missions that are likely to be less well planned or executed due to their nature and will have an increased risk of fratricide. Immediate requests can be filled with ground or airborne alert CAS, if available, or by diverting aircraft from pre-planned CAS (or even AI) missions that are of lower priority. The need for immediate CAS can be reduced by apportioning the correct amount of air and space power to support the ground scheme of manoeuvre, based on the overall priorities of the JFC. 0223. When immediate requests result in CAS requirements that exceed the CAS apportionment, the JFACC may be unable to fill lower priority requests due to higher priority missions or request additional CAS apportionment from the JFC. The decision on whether or not to increase CAS apportionment will be based primarily on the gravity of the 2 - 19 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) ground situation and the contribution to joint strategy being made by the available CAScapable assets committed elsewhere. There are several factors to consider before diverting AI and CAS assets for immediate CAS requests. First, the aircrew must be CAS qualified as extensive knowledge and familiarity with specialized CAS procedures are required to ensure target destruction and fratricide avoidance. Second, the aircrew should have suitable mission materials such as required maps, code words, and communications gear. Finally, CAS aircraft should have appropriate ordnance; fusing and weapons effects are critical factors when attacking targets in close proximity to friendly forces, and especially so in urban environments or where avoiding collateral damage is at a premium. 0224. Immediate Requests Procedures. If CAS is unavailable, the senior ground echelon AOCC/TACP (ALO) may advise the J3/G3/S3 to divert pre-planned CAS missions or forward additional requests to the CAOC. During the execution phase of the ATO, the CAOC staff may need to redirect missions to cover immediate requests for CAS. a. Submission. Immediate requests are forwarded to the appropriate tasking authority (CAOC or AOCC, if delegated) by the quickest means available. Requests are broadcast directly from the FAC to the AOCC by means of the Tactical Air Request Net (TARN), using the air support request format or CAS briefing. The Fire Support Coordinator (FSC)/TACP (ALO) at each intermediate HQ monitors the flow of requests. Based on the commanders intent, and after considering whether organic assets are available to fulfil the request, they accept or refuse the request. Silence by intermediate HQ implies consent to the request. Refusal will be explained with the transmission of the Accept/Refuse message. Priority. CAS request priority is annotated on the air request format.

b.

Section IV - Forward Air Control Mission Preparation


0225. Introduction. a. Preparation consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct activities including, but not limited to, rehearsals, precombat/communication checks, and movement. Once the plan is formulated and approved by the commander, it should be rehearsed. This includes primary and redundant connectivity and control methodology. Observers must be identified and their communications capabilities verified. Consideration must be given to the methods of tactical movement throughout the battlefield. The overall FAC employment plan should be feasible, executable, and tactically sound. Preparation by the air liaison, fire support, and manoeuvre staff is critical to the synchronised execution of joint fires.

b.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) c. Coordination between echelons and preparation that precedes execution are just as important as plan development. Staff preparation includes assembling and continuously updating estimates, with the goal of providing accurate situational updates for commanders. Whether incorporated into a formal process or not, the staffs preparatory activities such as intelligence preparation, targeting, fire plan refinement, etc. continue throughout preparation and execution. Preparation requires staff, unit, and individual actions. It includes Concept of Operations (CONOPS) briefs, reviewing activities orders, mission rehearsals, equipment and communications checks, SOP reviews, load plan verification, and troops readiness preparation.

d.

0226. Rehearsals. Rehearsals help staffs, units, and individuals prepare for activities. CAS is one of the most overlooked aspects of manoeuvre and fire support rehearsals. It provides attendees the opportunity to visualise the battle, ensure total comprehension of the plan, promote responsiveness, and identify areas of potential confusion, friction or conflict that may have been overlooked. This visual impression helps orient individuals to both the environment and other units during the execution of the operation. Moreover, the repetition of combat tasks during the rehearsal leaves a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. The extent of the rehearsal is limited by imagination, the tactical situation, time, and resources available. There are many types of rehearsals including: full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map, map, and radio rehearsals. 0227. Pre-Combat Preparations. a. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections allow personnel to prepare for a mission and provide the leader/supervisor an opportunity to ensure the operational readiness of personnel, equipment and vehicles. The following pre-combat checklists are a guide to help personnel to prepare for pre-combat inspections. Pre-combat checks can be broken down into the following areas: (1) Mission Essential Knowledge: Ensure personnel in each subordinate element understand the mission, CONOPS, SOP, ROE, scheme of manoeuvre, and fires. Mission Essential Equipment: Ensure all required equipment is operating and accounted for. The FAC must plan for redundant communication and marking tools. The minimum equipment an FAC should have includes: (a) Target location and designation capabilities: i. GPS quality target coordination generation (GPS) 2 - 21 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

(2)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) ii. iii. iv. v. Laser ranging (LRF) IR pointing (IR pointer) Night vision (NVD) Basic location devices (maps, compass, binoculars, common objective graphics) Illumination and marking devices (grenade launcher with illumination and WP smoke rounds)

vi.

(b)

Coordination system capabilities: i. Line-of-sight secure and encrypted communications (multi-band radio) Beyond-line-of-sight secure and encrypted communications (SATCOM radio)

ii.

(c)

Friendly marking capabilities: i. Visual (mirror, pyrotechnics - smoke/illumination, chemlights, panel) Thermal IR (IR strobe, IR chemlights)

ii. iii. (3)

Highly desired equipment for an FAC includes: (a) Target location and designation capabilities: i. ii. (b) Laser designation (LTD) Laser spot observation (LST, spotting scope)

Coordination system capabilities: Ability to receive, generate and transmit plans, requests data for control (secure data link)

(c)

Friendly marking capabilities: Radar (radar beacon) 2 - 22 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (4) Desired equipment for an FAC includes: (a) Coordination system capabilities: i. Ability to receive, forward and display friendly force situational awareness (Friendly Force Tracker, Blue Force Tracker) Ability to transmit/receive Full Motion Video (FMV)

ii.

A JFC will likely develop a minimum required equipment list for FACs operating in his JOA. (5) Mission Essential Coordination: (a) Ensure distribution of graphics and/or overlays depicting: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. Scheme of manoeuvre FSCM Position of endangered civilians/civilian objects Airspace Control Means Named Area of Interest, Target Area of Interest (TAI) Decision Points, Tactical and Technical triggers Aircraft Contact Points (CPs) and Initial Points (IPs) Holding Areas (HAs), Battle Positions (BPs) and/or Landing Zones Countermobility/obstacle plan Target List, target overlays and schedules of fire with: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) Priority of fires Priority targets SEAD targets Preparatory fires Final Protective Fires Groups and series Target blocks

ix. x.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (b) Identify: i. Friendly Day/Night marking procedures. available and correctly displayed/checked: (i) (ii) (iii) IR marker lights/pointers Strobe lights (visual and/or IR) Air panels. ((1)) Thermal panels. ((2)) Chemical lights. Pyrotechnics. ((1)) Smoke. ((2)) Star clusters. Radar beacons and codes. Tagging/tracking devices. Equipment

(iv)

(v) (vi) ii.

Target Marking Procedures: (i) (ii) Allocation of laser codes. Allocation of fire support assets (mark mission).

0228. Communications. a. During the preparation phase, and often in conjunction with the pre-combat inspections, communication links are checked and verified. This ensures that primary and backup voice and digital systems are checked, cryptographic keys are current, time is synchronized and code words, brevity codes, passwords and call signs are available and current. Ensure systems are fully operational and connectivity is established to include air network addressing schemes for digital communications to include air network addressing schemes for Tactical Data Link (for example: AFAPD, MTS, VMF, Link 16). Additionally, any extra measures such as day/night friendly marking procedures and visual or sound signals are practiced. The TARN will be established by the JFACC. Check and verify: (1) Command Nets: (a) Company/Squadron/Battery. i. ii. iii. Battalion. Brigade. Division Command. 2 - 24 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (2) Fire Support Nets: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (3) Conduct of Fire (COF). Mortar COF. Fire Support Coordination nets. NSFS Ground Spot. NSFS Air Spot. Shore fire control party.

Air Nets: (a) (b) (c) Air Request Nets. Tactical Air Direction. TACP Nets.

(4)

Cryptographic keys/callsigns/codewords/prowords/passwords/brevity words: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Crypto verified and loaded. Time synchronized. Copies or excerpts of call signs available. Codewords and brevity words for current plan reviewed. Prowords posted or noted for communicators.

0229. Movement and Positioning. a. Movement. The TACP (ALO) ensures FAC movement is in accordance with the manoeuvre units observation plan. Most FAC activities require movement to forward assembly areas, observation posts, or BP during the preparation phase of an operation. The manoeuvre unit operation order will normally specify formations and techniques of movement. This allows the commander to position his elements where they will optimise the units battlespace and facilitate execution of his scheme of manoeuvre.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) b. Positioning. The TACP (ALO) recommends initial observation positions of FAC to the commander. The TACP (ALO) and the commander must consider three aspects in the FAC positioning decision: security, observation, and communications: (1) Security. A FAC cannot provide his own security. He must be positioned where he can optimise his observation capability yet maintain his survivability and communications capability. The manoeuvre unit commander must consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time when selecting a position. Observation. The selection of an observation position is critical to the ability of the FAC to effectively control CAS. The position must permit observation of targets. Landmarks and prominent terrain features should be avoided, as the enemy can probably target them. Communications. FACs primary means of communication are the tactical radios. The FAC must be positioned to allow communications with the commander, higher HQ (ALO), and the CAS aircraft.

(2)

(3)

c.

Reconnaissance. If time and the tactical situation permit, take advantage of the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance of the future battlefield. Confirm when observation positions offer visibility of engagement areas, enemy avenues of approach, and dead space. Verify communications connectivity.

0230. Coordinates. Users may require target position data in latitude and longitude or by map references using MGRS. Considerations for these formats are as follows: a. Latitude and Longitude are given in degrees, minutes and tenths of a minute or degrees, minutes and seconds. Map references are normally given in MGRS or Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid. The perceived accuracy of a position given by the FAC to the aircrew is reflected in the number of digits he uses, e.g. Lat/Long minutes are given to centi-seconds or thousands of a minute of arc. UTM (MGRS) positions will be given in 6 digits for an estimated position from the map and 8 or 10 digits for a GPS/laser confirmed position. In case of an accurate GPS/Laser acquired position accuracy to within centi-seconds should be used when possible. FAC and aircrew should be aware of miss distances generated by the use of coordinates with a different geodetic datum (e.g. grid references of the same location passed using European Datum 1950 and the default, WGS 84, may have as much as 200m difference in the apparent geographical position). Therefore either the same map editions should be used, or information on the respective datum has to be exchanged. The FAC should be provided with a means to convert positions based on different geodetic datum for the specific AOO. 2 - 26 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Section IV Other Close Air Support Requirements


0231. Synchronisation. a. Simultaneous Employment. One of the most difficult functions performed by a Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC)/FSE is synchronizing CAS with surface fires. The intent is to coordinate the timing of air support, supporting arms, and manoeuvre to achieve the mass of a combined-arms attack. The goal is to accomplish this without suspending the use of any of the supporting arms or affecting the scheme of manoeuvre. An additional goal is to offer a reasonable measure of protection to aircraft from the effects of friendly surface fires. Coordination: A common example of a coordinated attack is a Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) activity involving a variety of weapons and support systems, primarily AH, CAS aircraft, artillery and NSFS. For detailed Information about JAAT refer to ATP-49. Timing: A common time reference is essential to accomplish the high degree of coordination necessary for effective CAS. All participants (aircrew, FAC, C2 agency, FSCC/FSE, and artillery) must use the same timing method. Refer to the two methods, Time on Target (TOT) and Time to Target (TTT), described below: (1) Time on Target 3 . TOT is a time at which the aircraft are to have bombs on target 4 and around which supporting surface fires can be coordinated. TOT requires minimum communication and is usually easier to employ than TTT. All participants, air and ground, must understand the time standard in use (Zulu or local), and the FAC must ensure all clocks are synchronized by providing a time check. GPS time, if available, is normally used to establish a TOT. Strict adherence to timing by participants is required for aircraft safety. Aircrew can update the clock on check-in with air control/fire support coordination agencies. Figure 3-6 illustrates time separation using a TOT. Time to Target. TTT establishes a precise number of minutes and seconds that elapse between an established time hack and bombs on target. This is an accurate method of time control and is easy to implement when few participants are involved. The time hack must be of sufficient duration for the FSC/FSO to synchronize indirect fires. Additionally, the FAC must consider time required for the aircraft to execute the attack. After the CAS brief, specify the TTT and give the

b.

c.

(2)

3 4

TOT for CAS in the ASR or ATO means, Time at CP. This statement does not reflect the current definition of TOT for air operations per AAP-6, but must be applied for safety reasons.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) time hack (e.g. TIME TO TARGET 5+00, READY, READY, HACK). The FAC normally provides the hack. Aircrew will acknowledge receipt of the time check.

0232. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. SEAD may be accomplished by surface and air delivered weapons. To minimize exposure of friendly aircraft to enemy air defences, FAC should first notify aircrew and then evaluate the option to route the aircraft away from known or suspected anti-air threats. a. Objectives. 'The primary objective of SEAD is to neutralise, temporarily degrade or destroy enemy air defences in order to permit friendly aircraft to complete their task. Coordination. Surface delivered SEAD involves planning and coordination by the FSCC/FSE and at the manoeuvre units down to the company level. Airborne-delivered SEAD and EW must be coordinated and de-conflicted in order to provide necessary support during the time CAS is being conducted. For these reasons, SEAD is another critical timing factor associated with CAS. Effective SEAD also depends on accurate intelligence on the position and type of enemy weapons. The FSC/FSO, working with the FAC and Forward Observer (FO), must coordinate surface-delivered SEAD with target marking to minimize confusion.

b.

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CHAPTER 3 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT EXECUTION


0301. Close Air Support Execution. CAS execution begins with a target nomination from the supported commander and involves two processes that are continuous and overlapping in nature: FAC/command post coordination, and CAS target engagement. This Chapter discusses the concepts and considerations required for the detailed integration of CAS with the supported unit.

Section I - Forward Air Controller to Command Post Coordination


0302. Forward Air Controller to Command Post Coordination. a. Coordination. It is critical for FAC and command post 5 elements to coordinate their efforts prior to each CAS engagement. Key issues such as battle tracking, target nomination, airspace de-confliction and coordination, synchronisation, weapons release authority, tactical risk assessment, types of terminal attack control, and which FAC provides terminal attack control must be clearly understood. Only through effective coordination can the TACP (FAC) successfully achieve the supported commanders objectives for CAS. Situational awareness. As an element of SA, battle tracking is the process of building and maintaining an overall picture of the battlespace that is accurate, timely, and relevant. Effective battle tracking is fundamental to CAS/fire support integration and increases the probability of CAS attack success by ensuring its application at the proper time and place. The level of detail required, and scope of the picture will depend on the mission and information requirements of the respective commanders. At the tactical level, the simplest form of battle tracking is the mental and graphic picture built and maintained by using maps, observations, and battle updates from higher HQ. At higher levels, battle tracking is more complex and takes advantage of digital information systems using multiple sources to generate a coherent picture of the battlespace. By maintaining up-to-date information on FSCMs, friendly and enemy positions and actions, uncertainty is reduced. Effective battle tracking will aid in maintaining an understanding of friendly and enemy progress, reduce redundant targeting, and the possibility of fratricide. Effective methods of battle tracking include maintaining up-to-date maps, imagery and status boards, and utilizing computerized tracking and display methods. It is imperative that FAC personnel remain part of the information flow (e.g. battle drills, spot reports, targeting, etc.). Additionally, the FAC and command post elements must both operate with the most current information:

b.

Supported surface commander HQ

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (1) FSCMs/ACMs (as applicable): IPs, CPs, BPs, ingress/egress routes, ACMs, ACAs, NFAs, and restricted operating zones, CFLs, RFLs, FSCLs, etc. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-1 - Fire Support Coordination Measures. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(a) Friendly Unit Information. Unit boundaries, phase lines, friendly locations, laser activities and reconnaissance locations, objectives, engagement areas, and obstacles. (b) Artillery. Current and planned artillery locations, and GunTarget Lines (GTLs). Enemy locations. (including surface-to-air threats). Targeting. Pre-planned target locations, CAS target triggers, air requests, observation plan, and fire support plan.

(c) (d)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) NOTE: In accordance with AJP 3.9, FAC and command post elements must be aware of established restricted and prohibited targets. In addition to prioritized and authorized targets, the Joint Target List contains the Restricted Target List, consisting of targets that are temporarily or permanently restricted from the NATOs own attack decision making process, and the No-Strike Target List, which contains targets protected by international law. FAC and command post elements must make every effort to avoid engagement of targets on or in close proximity to restricted or prohibited targets and other predominantly civilian objects until such time as enemy action results in a loss of target protection and these objects become lawful targets in accordance with ROE and international law. (2) (3) Fragmentary Orders, reconnaissance reports, and ATO updates. Weather impacts at take off location(s), along ingress and egress routes, and at target/engagement areas. Civilian/civilian objects. Current position of civilian personnel and objects to be taken into consideration as far as possible before an engagement.

(4)

0303. Close Air Support Target Nomination. A nomination occurs when the commander or his representative tells an FAC to engage a target with CAS. Commanders nominate CAS targets based on previously planned target sets, or from reconnaissance reports received during execution. The nomination process can occur before or after aircraft arrive at the CP.

Section II - Airspace De-confliction Methods


0304. Airspace De-confliction. Direct and indirect fires may interfere with aircraft operations. FAC and fire support personnel must de-conflict airspace to provide a reasonably safe operating space for aircraft to manoeuvre and attack targets. Deconfliction must also accommodate other airspace users to include UAV, Medical Evacuation, C2, ISR, and transport aircraft as listed in the ATO. Common CAS ACMs include:

a.

A Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ) is established in order to reserve airspace for specific, often singular activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users is safeguarded (e.g., refuelling orbits, terminal approach holding areas, landing/drop zones, etc.). Usage of a pre-planned ROZ must be defined in the Remarks section in the ACO. ROZs may also be established within an execution cycle for a particular operation (for 3-3 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) example a TIC). A ROZ will be established by the CAOC and control within a ROZ may be delegated to an FAC for CAS operations. b. A High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ) is airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the Airspace Control Authority, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and/or varied weapons or airspace users. HIDACZ are usually used for de-confliction and are short-term measures, activated to support the achievement of a particular objective. Procedures for the activation of HIDACZ are published in the Airspace Control Plan (ACP). Pre-planned HIDACZ will be published and activated in the ACO. Airspace Coordination within the HIDACZ will be delegated to the commander of the surface force being supported by air operations within the zone. The Commander to whom local airspace coordination is delegated will coordinate aircraft movement within the HIDACZ in accordance with the broad policies and procedures established in the main ACP. FAC must be familiar with these procedures and the established HIDACZ. CAS aircraft may require specific de-confliction and coordination using time, space, and altitude. FAC and fire support personnel should select the separation techniques that require the least coordination without adversely affecting the ability to safely complete the mission. To be successful, all participants must be well versed in ACA terminology and have knowledge of all applicable ACA in use. ACA are normally established inside a HIDACZ. De-confliction may be accomplished with a formal ACA or, more frequently, with informal methods. Formal ACAs are promulgated in the ACO; it may also be included in the ATO or the SPINS. (1) Formal Airspace Coordination Area Terminology (a) ACA established but not activated. The ACA size and location have been defined and designated, usually by code name, but no clearance has been given for aircraft to enter the airspace. Fires through the ACA are allowed without coordination. ACA activated. ACA is activated at this time. Aircraft are cleared to operate in the defined airspace. A time limit may be established. Fires through the ACA are prohibited. Coordination. Once a target has been nominated, the FAC and command post elements must coordinate the CAS attack with affected ground elements. Cross-boundary clearance of fires, friendly AAA, and CAS aircraft ingress/egress routing must be de-conflicted and coordinated. Cross-Boundary Clearance of Fires. Boundaries are the basic manoeuvre control measure used by commanders to designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is tactically 3-4 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

c.

(b)

(c)

(d)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ArP-3.3.2.1(B) responsible. They are restrictive in that no fire support weaponsmay deliverfires or fires effects across a boundary unlessthose fires are coordinated with the affectedunit. The FSC/Fire SupportOfficer(FSO) must conductclearanceof fire proceduresdirectly with the cross boundarycommand post postHQ. elements, the common or command (e) FriendlyAir DefenceArea. To avoidfratricide, commandpost "friendly air on station" to elements should announce subordinate units. FAC and air defenceartillerypersonnel must coordinate CP/IPusage,targetlocation, type and number of aircraft, altitude, timeson station.The SPINSand ACO and procedures shouldincludespecialconidorsand associated for aircraftto returnfrom CAS target areas. ProceduralControl Measures. Proceduralcontrol measures providetargetorientation aircrew,alignaircraftfor the attack to or egress,provideseparation from other supporting fires, and provideseparation from enemyAD assets. Procedural control measures include lP selection, offset direction, and attack heading. i. lP Selection.The FAC selectsthe lP basedon enemy capabilities, targetorientation, friendly location, weather, aircraft capabilities and fire support coordination requirements. shouldbe identifiable lP visually and with radarand normally from 5 to 15 Nautical Miles located (NM)from the target. OffsetDirection.The offsetdirection tells the aircrewon which side of the lP-to-target line they can manoeuvre for the attack (see Figure 3-2). FAC use an offset direction to ease fire support coordination,align the aircraftfor the attack or egress,or keep aircrew away from knownthreats. An offsetdirectionaids fire support coordination restrictingaircrewfrom using airspace by line on the side of the lP-to-target wherethere mightbe a conflictwith a GTL. The offsetdirectionregulates the attack quadrant without assigning a specific attack heading.

(f)

ii.

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Plot an IP and a Target and connect them with a straight line. Specify the offset direction as either right or left. If told to offset right, as in the example above, proceed on or to the right of this line while inbound the target. Aircraft shall not fly to the left of this line. An offset restriction applies from the time the aircraft leaves the IP until ordnance release or begin of egress.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-2 - Offset Direction. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(g) Attack Heading. FACs assign attack headings for several reasons: to increase ground troop safety, aid in aircraft acquisition, aid aircrew in target acquisition by the FAC, meet laser safety cone attack restrictions and facilitate fire support coordination. Controllers may employ attack cones that allow aircrew to manoeuvre on either side of the attack heading. This gives aircrew more flexibility in prosecuting the target while maintaining the required degree of restriction on the aircraft heading. Attack cones might be particularly useful when the attack aircraft are using coordinate dependant weapons, since it is possible for the weapon final attack heading to significantly differ from the aircraft heading. Aircrew and FACs must understand that the attack cones may differ between the aircraft and the weapon. FACs must weigh the advantages of issuing an attack heading with the disadvantages of restricting aircraft tactics. Final attack 3-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) headings will be issued when mandatory. Aircrew will adhere to them. (2) Informal ACA. Informal ACAs can be established using separation plans and may be established by any supported commander. An informal ACA is an expedient measure designed to provide immediate, yet temporary control and de-confliction. As such, informal ACAs are normally short-lived and not as widely disseminated as formal ACAs. Aircraft and surface fires may be separated by distance (lateral, altitude, and combination of lateral and altitude) or by time. Although relatively easy to set up and de-conflict with CAS, informal ACAs can be more difficult for the FSCC/FSE to coordinate. FSCC/FSE must ensure restrictions to indirect fires or aircraft are limited to those required to successfully execute the attack and are coordinated with all affected agencies. When FSC/FSO set up informal ACAs, they use one of the following de-confliction methods:

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-3 - Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Lateral Separation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) Lateral Separation. Lateral separation allows coordinated attacks against two adjacent targets. The ACA should be big enough to allow aircraft to operate over the target yet small enough to minimize restrictions on supporting fire. Divide the target area into two or more engagement zones. While the separation measure may be described by a grid line or latitude/longitude reference, terrain features have the added advantages of simplicity and constant visual reference. This is an appropriate technique when aircrew and firing units engage separate targets and aircraft will not cross GTL. FAC must know the GTL so they can prevent aircraft from flying through trajectories. For example: Stay west of the grid line 62 or Remain west of the river.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-4 - Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Altitude Separation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(2) Altitude Separation. This technique permits indirect fires to continue when the aircraft must cross the GTL. Clearance from the indirect fire trajectory and fragmentation pattern is provided by stay above or stay below altitude restrictions. When calculating the safe separation for an aircraft to stay above the Maximum Ordinate (MAXORD), the FAC and FSC/FSO use tabular firing tables and apply a margin of safety above the MAXORD. Convert this number to Mean Seal Level (MSL) before passing it to the aircraft (for example: Remain above 5.000 feet MSL.).

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-5 - Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Altitude and Lateral Separation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(3) Altitude and Lateral Separation. This is an appropriate technique when aircraft and firing units engage targets along the GTL or aircraft must cross the GTL. This requires aircraft to remain above or below indirect fire trajectories. To calculate safe separation from indirect fires, determine the point where the aircraft will cross the GTL, determine the ordinate at the selected point and add or subtract the margin of safety (for example: Stay west of 62 east and remain below 5.000 feet MSL, or: Stay above 5.000 feet MSL west of 62 east).

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-6 - Artillery-Close Air Support Aircraft Time Separation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(4) Time Separation. Time separation requires the most detailed coordination and may be required when aircrew must fly near indirect fire trajectories or ordnance effects. The timing of surface fires must be coordinated with aircraft routing. This technique is appropriate when aircrew and firing units engage the same or nearby targets, when indirect fire is providing SEAD in coordination with the aircraft attack, or when the target is being marked by indirect fire. When de-conflicting sorties, consider weapons fragmentation envelope and the likelihood of secondary explosions. All timing for surface fires will be based on the specific aircraft event time (TOT/Time to Target (TTT)).

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Section III Initial Aircraft Check-In


0305. Aircraft on the Air Tasking Order. If the aircraft are on the ATO, they may simply state AS FRAGGED, which would eliminate the need to pass anything other than the mission number and abort code (controllers may request full fighter check-in briefing see Appendix A, Part B, page A-2). At check-in, the aircrew establishes the abort code for terminating the attack. This eliminates unnecessary heads-down time in the target area. Authentication and abort procedures are identified in the SPINS. FAC should have a list of current standard conventional loads available and confirm actual ordnance loads at aircraft check-in. 0306. Situation Update. After CAS aircrew checks in, the FAC will provide a current situation update (see Annex A). This update should include: a. Target - General enemy situation Threat activity Friendly situation Friendly positions Artillery activity Clearance authority Ordnance requested Restrictions/Remarks Localized SEAD efforts (suppression/EW) Hazards (Weather/terrain/obstructions) Target: Weapons effects on target can vary depending on how the target is orientated. Armoured vehicles are more vulnerable from the back or top than the front. Fortified positions should be attacked along their most vulnerable axis. Threat: Determining the enemy's disposition, composition, order of battle, capabilities and likely courses of action helps ensure aircraft survivability and aids in target planning. Knowing where the threat is could significantly influence aircraft ingress and egress tactics. Friendly situation: The own situation needs to be analysed to enhance own aircraft survivability and aid in target planning. Knowing where friendly forces are located and their disposition will significantly influence aircraft ingress and egress tactics. Friendly positions: The closer friendly forces are to the intended target, the more deliberate the FAC needs to be. As a general rule, avoid having aircraft release weapons in the direction of friendly forces. Long bombs, skipping bombs, precision weapons going dumb or bullets going long increase the chance of fratricide. 3 - 12 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

c.

d.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) e. Artillery: If artillery is being utilized at the same time as aircraft, within the same general area it is essential to ensure de-confliction. Clearance: The authority and responsibility for expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander. The supported commander will delegate weapons release clearance authority to his terminal controllers to facilitate CAS attacks. Controller will announce what type control (1,2 or 3) will be used. Clearance should be given as soon as possible in the delivery sequence after the terminal controller is convinced the attacking aircraft sees the target and will not release on friendly positions. This allows the aircrew to concentrate on the weapons solution and improves delivery accuracy, further reducing the possibility of fratricide. Ordnance: Selection of the number and type of munitions to achieve the desired effects, takes into consideration the protection of target, location of target, nature of target, target size and shape, and the commander's guidance. Whenever the FAC considers the capabilities and limitations of a weapon against a target, he must consider the entire weapon system. This includes not just the weapon that is released, but also the system that is releasing it. How accurate are the aircraft systems? Can the aircraft be positioned to release on the target given your restrictions? What is the fragmentation pattern of the weapon and is it appropriate for the target? In most cases the aircrew are better suited to weaponeer the target based on the weapons they are carrying. Restrictions: Used to safeguard friendly forces and CAS aircraft. These restrictions will be given by the FAC and may be a geographic reference, cardinal direction or altitude restriction. For example "remain west of X" or "remain above/or below altitude X". Localized Suppression of Enemy Air Defence: Localized SEAD is planned to destroy or disrupt air defence threats within a specific geographical area during a specific time period, normally for the benefit of a specific package of friendly aircraft. Localized suppression operations are normally confined to geographical areas associated with specified ground targets or friendly transit routes. These operations contribute to local air superiority and facilitating joint operations in the area. The objective of localized suppression is to protect friendly aircraft as they fly their specific missions. EW provides close-in-jamming and standoff jamming of radar, data links, and voice communications signals, enemy indirect threat radars such as warning, acquisition, and Ground Controlled Interception (GCI) systems or threat radars for SAM and AAA systems.

f.

g.

h.

i.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) j. Hazards: Weather plays a significant role in CAS operations. It influences both enemy and friendly capabilities to locate, identify, and accurately attack CAS targets. Weather can also influence the effectiveness of laser designators, Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM), NVD, and thermal imaging systems. Planners at every level require an understanding of the effects that weather can have on CAS aircraft navigation, sensors, and weapons systems. Weather may also limit the operations of one type of platform without affecting another. RW aircraft operate effectively under low ceilings that might render FW CAS ineffective, while FW can operate above blowing surface dust that might keep helicopters grounded. A terrain survey is used to determine the best routes to and from the target area. Where the terrain permits and when the threat dictates, flight routes should maximize the use of terrain masking to increase survivability against air defence systems. When practical, flight routes, holding areas, IP, release points, and BP should use terrain features that are easily recognizable, day or night. Broad area satellite imagery and air mission planning and rehearsal systems can assist in selecting optimum flight parameters, and recognise obstructions to flight, like towers, cables, terrain and other aircraft flight routes.

Section IV - Close Air Support Briefing


0307. Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control. The FAC will use a standardised briefing to pass information rapidly. The CAS briefing (see Annex A) is the standard for use with FW and RW aircraft. The CAS briefing form helps aircrew in determining if they have the information required to perform the mission. The brief is used for all threat conditions and does not dictate the CAS aircrafts tactics. The mission brief follows the sequence (1-9) of the CAS Briefing Form. Line titles must be passed to prevent confusion due to missed or clipped radio transmissions. When applicable, remarks should include those items listed at Annex B. Lines 4, 6, 8, Mandatory Attack Heading (under Remarks), Laser Code and Laser to target line as well as any restriction are mandatory read-back items (verbally or digitally) for all types of control. Additionally, the FAC may need confirmation that the aircraft has correctly received other critical items of the brief. In those situations, the FAC will specify the additional items to be confirmed.

a.

Line 1 - IP/BP. The IP is the starting point for the run-in to the target. For RW aircraft, the BP is where attacks on the target are commenced. Line 2 - Heading. The bearing is given in degrees magnetic (unless requested differently by aircrew/system operators) from the IP to the target or from the centre of the BP to the target. FAC give an offset (offset left/right) if a restriction exists. The offset is the side of the IP-to-target line on which aircrew can manoeuvre for the attack.

b.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) c. Line 3 - Distance. The distance is given from the IP/BP to the target. For FW aircraft, the distance is given in NM and should be accurate to a tenth of a NM. For AHs, the distance is given in metres from the centre of the BP and is accurate to the nearest 5 metres. The unit of length must be specified. Line 4 - Target Elevation. The target elevation is given in feet above MSL. Line 5 - Target Description. The target description should be specific enough for the aircrew to recognize the target. The target should be described accurately and concisely. Line 6 - Target Location. The FAC can give the target location in several ways (e.g. grid coordinates, latitude and longitude, relative to a navigational aid, or visual description from a conspicuous reference point). Because of the multiple coordinate systems available for use, the datum that will be used must always be specified in the air request. If using grid coordinates, FAC must include the 100,000- metre grid identification. For an area target, give the location of the targets centre or location of the greatest concentration. For a linear target, give the location of intended end impact point, orientation, and the distance to each end in the remarks section of the 9-line brief if required. Line 7 - Type Mark. The type of target indication the FAC will use (smoke, laser, or IR) and the Laser Code the FAC will use. Laser to Target Line (LTL) (in degrees magnetic, unless requested differently by aircrew/system operators). Line 8 - Location of Friendly Forces. The distance of friendly forces from the target is given in metres and cardinal heading from the target (north, south, east, or west). If the friendly position is marked, identify the type of mark.

d. e.

f.

g.

h.

CAUTION Friendly positions should not be defined by anything other than bearing and range from the target. i. Line 9 - Egress. These are the instructions the aircrew use to exit the target area. Egress instructions can be given as a cardinal direction or by using control points. Remarks. The following information should be included if applicable: (1) (2) (3) Mandatory Attack heading. Mandatory final attack heading. Threats. Threat and location and type of suppression (if any). Weather. Significant weather. 3 - 15 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

j.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) Hazards. Hazards to aviation. Ordnance delivery. Any active GTL. ACA. Restrictions. Additional target information. Night vision capability. TLE Category. Danger close (if applicable with commanders initials). Other time considerations. Attack clearance. (if issued by different entity) give callsign and radio frequency/channel.

k.

Time to Target. TTT is the time in minutes and seconds, after the time HACK statement is delivered, when ordnance is expected to hit the target. The time HACK statement indicates the moment when all participants start the timing countdown. Time on Target. TOT is the synchronized clock time when ordnance is expected to hit the target. TOT is the timing standard for CAS missions. There is no time HACK statement when using TOT.

l.

0308. Mission Brief Accuracy. Ideally, the controlling agency (e.g., AOCC), briefs the aircrew before contact with the FAC. The brief must be accurate, concise and executed quickly. Map datum must be considered when determining target grid coordinates. The mission brief should not change once an aircrew leaves the IP/BP inbound to the target. 0309. Target Descriptions. If a target mark is unavailable, the FAC will use an enhanced target description to guide the pilot to a target or a talk-on to enable the pilot to visually verify the target. a. Enhanced Target Description (Low Altitude Attack Terminology). Enhanced target descriptions are designed to provide a more detailed description of the target in line 5, facilitating target acquisition and aiding in target verification. The FAC will describe what the aircrew will see as they approach the target area. The FAC will usually provide a reference (a clearly 3 - 16 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) identifiable feature) or a mark that the pilot should see near the target. The enhanced target description is typically used when the pilot can not observe the target area as it is being described. When the pilot enters the target area, he will only have a few seconds to try and acquire the target. For this reason, the enhanced target description is not as detailed as the target talkon. The location of the target from the mark or the reference may be passed as a Cardinal, Distance and Object or Clock Code Distance and Object. When a final attack heading has not been given or multiple aircraft are to attack from different directions a cardinal would be used. When the final attack heading is known, a clock code would be more applicable. b. Target Talk-On (medium altitude attack terminology). The talk-on method is used to get the attacking aircrafts eyes-on the correct target. Even with technological advances, the traditional talk-on remains a valuable tool for target verification. There may be times when a talk-on is superseded by circumstances (e.g. communications jamming), and other tactics will be required. Just as in any other form of communications, the precise form will vary with the tactical circumstances, but certain critical items will be found in any successful talk-on. Before beginning a talk-on, confirm that flight lead is prepared to observe the area or copy the talk-on brief.

0310. Target Description Techniques. The preferred method for talk-on or enhanced target descriptions is big-to-small and known-to-unknown. Establish a common unit of measure for estimating distances (e.g., the length of an airfield from east to west being one unit of measure). The FAC can then tell the pilot FROM THE WEST END OF THE AIRFIELD, GO SOUTH for TWO UNITS OF MEASURE, AND LOOK FOR LARGE LSHAPED BUILDING. This tells the pilot where to start, which direction to look, how far to look, and what to look for (using FIDO: Form a point, In a direction, for a Distance, to an Object). Using units of measure such as kilometres or miles does not work well and should be avoided. Start with a large, easily recognizable feature or a known point and then work to smaller or unknown points. It is best to start with the largest, most easily recognizable geographical feature as the starting point. If you need the aircrew to confirm they are looking at the correct point, have them describe it to you. The aircrew confirms they see a specific reference point or location by transmitting CONTACT. Once they call CONTACT on a point or location, it becomes the new reference point for further talk-on. 0311. Reactive Talk-On. Reactive talk-on techniques can be used in urban and convoy escort scenarios. A reactive talk-on can also be given from a weapon impact or a common known reference point in the target area. In all cases line 8 (location of friendly forces) and applicable remarks must be given.

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Section V - Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control Procedures


0312. Close Air Support Terminal Attack Control. a. Recent technological advances in aircraft and FAC capabilities, weapons systems and munitions have provided the FAC additional tools to maximize effects of fires while decreasing the risk of fratricide when employing air power in close proximity to friendly forces. GPS-equipped aircraft and munitions, laser range finders/designators and digital system capabilities are technologies that can be exploited in the CAS mission area. When delivering Inertial Aided Munition (IAM), attack aircraft will confirm that the briefed target location and elevation have been accepted by the selected munition. When using aircraft system targeting, aircrew will confirm the coordinate/s are loaded into the waypoint, offset, or target points. Aircrew will verify correct data is selected prior to the IN HOT call. Use of real time sensor data, available from a variety of modern aerial platforms, is expanding in its utility to FAC and commanders. Careful consideration must be used with the application of FMV, and it is recommended that attack platforms are made aware of any FMV use in the attack briefing process. Detailed planning and preparation by both the FAC and the aircrew are required to identify the situations and locations suitable to standoff weapons attacks, and to address flight profile and de-confliction (aircraft/weaponry/terrain) considerations. Weapon time of flight will be a factor relative to movement of enemy targets and friendly forces when employing standoff weapons incapable of receiving targeting updates throughout the duration of flight. Digital or data link systems capable of displaying aircraft track, sensor point of interest, etc., significantly enhance SA that better enable the FAC to authorise weapons release when the FAC is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft. Since both FW and RW CAS aircraft are ever changing, standardized tactics provide a baseline for further refinement and improvement. Aircrew will ultimately decide aircraft tactics but must ensure that tactics used fall within any constraints issued by the FAC. The following terminal attack control procedures exploit advances in technology:

b.

c.

d.

e.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0313. Types of Control. There are three types of terminal attack control (Type 1, 2 and 3). Each type follows a set of procedures with associated risk. The commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the FAC based on recommendations from his staff and associated risks identified in the tactical risk assessment. The intent is to offer the lowest level supported commander, within the constraints established during risk assessment, the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the mission. The three types of control are not ordnance specific. a. Type 1. This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the FAC is required to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. In order to minimize fratricide the FAC needs to consider attacking aircraft nose position and geometry. The FAC will clear each individual attack against each target (CLEARED HOT). Type 2. This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the commander requires the FAC to control each individual attack. The commander will accept the associated risk levels for the different control techniques below and decide which ones to approve under the following parameters: (1) There is no requirement for the FAC to visually acquire the target or attacking aircraft at weapon release. The attacking aircrew may not be able to see the target/mark at weapon release. The FAC may have either: (a) line of sight to the target and eyes on target throughout the control, or to rely on a third party observer (for example, a scout or SOF) for fighter guidance or target coordinates/marking, or to rely on an airborne sensor with real-time targeting information (for example, FMV from a UAV) for target coordinates/marking. However, the FAC should have good overall target area SA prior to using FMV as a single source sensor. If SA is inadequate, a Type 3 control must be effected.

b.

(2)

(3)

(b)

(c)

(4)

The FAC must pass timely and accurate targeting data to the attacking aircraft. The FAC will clear each individual attack against each target (CLEARED HOT).

(5)

3 - 19 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (6) The FAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by observers. Examples of when type 2 controls may be used are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, high altitude and standoff weapons employment, or where the target moves out of sight from the FAC, but visible for third party observer or airborne sensor. The FAC will declare to the aircraft whether or not he is VISUAL and indicate the source of his target acquisition.

c.

Type 3. This type of terminal attack control is conducted when the FAC requires the ability to provide clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to specific attack restrictions. (1) (2) Like Type 1 and 2, only an FAC can provide Type 3 control. During Type 3 control, FAC provide attacking aircraft targeting restrictions (e.g., time, geographic boundaries, final attack heading, specific target set, etc.) and then grant a blanket weapons release clearance (CLEARED TO ENGAGE). Type 3 control does not require the FAC to visually acquire the aircraft or the target; however, all targeting data must be coordinated through the supported commanders battle staff. The FAC will monitor radio transmissions and other available digital information to maintain control of the engagement. The FAC maintains abort authority. Observers may be utilized to provide targeting data and the target mark during Type 3 Control. Type 3 is a CAS terminal attack control procedure and should not be confused with SCAR procedures. As with Type 2 the FAC will declare whether he is visual with the aircraft or the target, or neither.

(3)

(4)

(5)

0314. Timely and Accurate Target Data. Because there is no requirement for the FAC to visually acquire the target or attack aircraft in type 2 and type 3 control, FAC may be required to coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information from an observer. The FAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by other observers or targeting sensors. The FAC must consider the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when relying on any form of remote targeting. 0315. Briefing and Control Procedures. FAC will transmit the type of control in use upon aircraft check-in. Type 1 is the default method of control. It is not unusual to have two types of control in effect at one time. For example, an FAC may control helicopters working type 2 control from an attack position outside the FACs field of view while simultaneously controlling medium or low altitude FW attacks under type 1 or 3 control. 3 - 20 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) The FAC maintains the flexibility to change the type of terminal attack control at any time within guidelines established by the supported commander. Senior commanders may provide restrictions that will prevent subordinate commanders from choosing certain terminal attack control types based on the risk assessment. However, the intent is for senior commanders to provide guidance that allows the lowest level commander to make the decision based on the situation. The following procedures will be used when executing Type 1, 2 or 3 terminal attack control: (all transmissions can be either verbal or digital). a. Type 1: (1) (2) FAC will visually acquire the target FAC will send a CAS briefing to attack aircraft (verbally or digitally). Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory readback items in accordance with the CAS briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the FAC, either by voice or digitally. Aircraft will provide a LEAVING IP call if applicable. FAC will mark/designate target (as practicable). Attack aircraft will provide the FAC IN HOT call indicating manoeuvring for weapons firing solution. Attack aircraft will visually acquire target or mark. FAC will visually acquire the attacking aircraft. In case that aircraft acquisition by the FAC is not achieved, attack aircraft will be forced to modify their attack profile or repeat their attack to aid acquisition. FAC will ensure attack will not affect friendly troops by visual acquisition and analysis of attack aircraft geometry/nose position to determine weapon impact point. FAC will provide a CLEARED HOT or ABORT.

(3) (4) (5)

(6) (7)

(8)

(9) b.

Type 2: (1) FAC or an observer will see the target (an observer may be a scout, UAV, SOF, or other Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance asset with real time targeting information). The FAC will declare whether he is visual with the aircraft or the target, or neither. FAC will send a CAS briefing to attack aircraft (verbally or digitally).

(2)

3 - 21 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) Note Attack aircraft verifies target location by using all appropriate means: map plot, target designation displayed on digital map set, head-up display symbology, FLIR, radar, etc. (3) Attack aircraft will verify target coordinates correlate with expected target area. Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory readback items in accordance with the CAS briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the FAC, either by voice or digitally. Aircraft will provide a LEAVING IP call if applicable. Attack aircraft will provide the FAC with an IN HOT call indicating manoeuvring for a targeting solution. Aircrew employing standoff precision munitions should make this call at the appropriate time to allow clearance before entering the release window. FAC will provide a CLEARED HOT or ABORT. Note The FAC maintains abort authority in all cases. c. Type 3: (1) FAC acquires the target or acquires targeting data from a scout, combat observation and lasing team, Fire Support Team (FIST), UAV, SOF, or other assets with accurate real-time targeting information. The FAC will declare whether he is visual with the aircraft or the target, or neither. FAC will send a CAS briefing to attack aircraft (verbally or digitally). Briefing must include area for attacks, restrictions/limitations, and attack time window. Attack aircraft will verify target location correlates with expected target area.

(4)

(5) (6)

(6)

(2)

(3)

Note When delivering IAM, attack aircraft will confirm that the briefed target location and elevation have been accepted by the selected munitions. When using aircraft system targeting, aircrew will confirm the coordinates loaded into the waypoint, offset, or target points. Aircrew will verify correct data is selected prior to the IN HOT call. 3 - 22 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (4) Attack aircraft will confirm mandatory readback items in accordance with the CAS briefing as well as any restrictions imposed by the FAC, either by voice or digitally. Once satisfied the attacking aircraft have SA of the target area, the FAC will provide attack aircraft CLEARED TO ENGAGE (verbally or digitally). Aircraft will provide a LEAVING IP call (verbally or digitally) if requested. Prior to initial weapons release, the attack aircraft will provide COMMENCING ENGAGEMENT to the FAC (verbally or digitally). FAC will continue to monitor the engagement by all means available (visual, voice, digital, etc.). No other communications are required unless directed by the FAC. Attack aircraft will provide ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE to the FAC (verbally or digitally). Note The FAC maintains abort authority in all cases.

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Section VI - Target Identification and Position Marking


0316. General. a. Attack aircrew must locate and identify targets quickly and accurately. This process will be complicated by the dynamics of the battlefield due to manoeuvre warfare, target camouflage, the distraction by enemy fire and difficult flight manoeuvres. The FAC is the key to accurate target identification and should apply all of his skill and available resources towards assisting attack aircrew with this task. There are several ways in which this can be accomplished. Innovative tactics and techniques can be used to improve the effectiveness of methods used for target identification. Equally important is ensuring that the chances of having a CAS mission attacking friendly troops or other non-combatants are prevented. This may be achieved, where tactically acceptable, by specifically indicating positions of friendly forces or non-combatants or, more tactically, by giving aircrew sufficient cues to enable them to identify positively the safe limits for engagement.

b.

3 - 23 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) c. Developments in target marking, such as laser, greatly assist FAC and aircrew in this procedure. However, there will undoubtedly be circumstances when the basic methods outlined in this Chapter will still be applicable. FAC should use a combination of marking methods whenever practicable to assist in orienting the CAS aircrew to the target.

d.

0317. Target Marking. Targets should be marked for CAS aircraft whenever possible. Target marking should be planned in order to permit sufficient time prior to weapons employment for target acquisition by the CAS aircrew. The target mark can be provided by laser, direct or indirect fire weapons (heavy machine gun tracer, mortars, artillery, or naval gunfire), an airborne platform or beacons. Methods of target marking include: a. Laser Devices. The FAC may use a variety of lasers to mark the target or a reference point near the target for suitably equipped aircraft or to designate the desired impact point for Laser Guided Munitions. Detailed procedures for target marking and designation by laser are at Section VI. Laser Spot Tracker (LST) or Laser Spot Locater (LSL). For aircraft equipped with the appropriate sensors, designating or marking targets by laser is very effective (LST equipped aircraft can locate and track the reflected laser energy whereas LSL equipped aircraft may not be able to track). If using lasers (ground or airborne) to mark the target, its use must be selective and timely as lengthy laser emissions may compromise friendly positions. The CAS aircrew could also confuse the laser with the intended target if not conforming to a recognized attack arc. When employing lasers to designate or mark, include LASER, along with the 4-digit laser code in the marks portion of the CAS briefing. FAC should also provide the lasertarget-line in degrees magnetic (unless the aircrew have requested true information) from the applicable laser operator to the target and state "MAGNETIC" or "TRUE". For laser activities, the aircrew are to provide the ten seconds call prior to laser activation and the call laser on to actually switch on the laser.

b.

STANDARD LASER BREVITY TERMS


CALL TEN SECONDS LASER ON SPOT NEGATIVE LASER SHIFT MEANING Prepare to start LASER designation in 10 seconds. Designate the target with LASER energy. Aircraft has acquired LASER energy. Aircraft has not acquired the LASER.

Call to shift LASER energy from the offset position next to the target onto the target. TERMINATE Cease LASER designation. 3 - 24 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-7 - Standard Laser Brevity Terms 6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------c. IR pointers. At night, it is also possible to mark the target with an IR pointer. FAC may use IR-pointers and other IR devices for aircrew that are using NVD. Unlike laser designators, IR devices cannot be used to guide munitions. IR pointers must be used with caution as they may expose the FAC to adversaries who are also equipped with compatible NVD. Another option for marking with an IR device is for an aircraft equipped with an IR device to mark the target and have the FAC either confirm the mark or adjust the aircraft mark until it is on the correct target. The length of illumination with IR marks is a compromise between the time required by the aircrew to identify the mark and the risk of exposure to any adversary. As a guide, illumination should be initiated 20 to 30 seconds prior to the CAS TOT/TTT, or when requested by the aircrew. FAC must, when applicable, also provide the pointer-target-line if a mandatory attack heading is not given.

NIGHT INFRARED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BREVITY TERMS CALL MEANING FAC marks the target with an IR pointer. Can be initiated by FAC or SPARKLE aircrew. Proper aircrew response is CONTACT or NO JOY. Call made by exception for the FAC to jiggle the IR beam on the target. This aids in distinguishing the friendly position from the SNAKE target, verifies that the aircrew are looking at the proper IR pointer and can aid in the acquisition of the IR energy. Proper aircrew response is Contact, STEADY, or No Joy. FAC uses pulse mode available on some IR pointers. Can be initiated by FAC or aircrew. May be used by FAC to emphasize that PULSE an enemy position is being illuminated by flashing IR energy, which is often used to identify friendly positions. Proper aircrew response is CONTACT, STEADY, or NO JOY. STEADY FAC steadies the beam after a SNAKE or PULSE call. This can aid in verifying that the aircrew is looking at the proper IR pointer. STOP FAC stops the beam. This can aid in verifying that the aircrew is looking at the proper IR pointer, especially if followed with another SPARKLE call. ROPE Call made by exception if the FAC is to illuminate the aircraft with an IR pointer. Can be initiated by either FAC or aircrew. If requested by the FAC, it must be approved by the aircrew prior to illumination. Proper aircrew response is VISUAL or BLIND. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-8 - Night Infrared Close Air Support Brevity Terms 7 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6 7

For a full list of NATO brevity terms see APP-7 For a full list of NATO brevity terms see APP-7

3 - 25 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) d. Marking by Fires. (1) Marking by indirect fire. Artillery, NSFS, or mortar fires are an effective means of enabling pilots to visually acquire the target. Indirect fire marking rounds are most effective when delivered within 100 metres of the CAS target, but those within 300 metres of the CAS target are generally considered effective enough for use during a control. Before choosing to mark by these means, the FAC should consider: (a) The danger of exposing these supporting arms to the enemys indirect fire acquisition systems. The coordination between supporting arms required for this mission. Marking rounds should be delivered as close to CAS targets as possible and care must be taken to consider environmental factors (e.g. that the target is not obscured by the smoke or features such as the local geography, buildings, etc. do not affect the dispersion of any smoke). The timing of the marker round can be critical. The lead time should give minimal warning to the adversary whilst ensuring that the marking round is in position early enough and remains visible long enough for the controller to provide final control instructions and for the pilot of the attacking aircraft to acquire the target. When the required positioning of the marker round is not achieved, the controller must be prepared with a backup marking technique or verbal instructions for the CAS aircrew. If the situation requires precise marks, observers or spotters can adjust marking rounds to ensure that accurate marks are delivered to meet the CAS schedule. Caution must be applied when using certain types of smoke on a crowded battlefield that their characteristics cannot be confused with similar phenomena.

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(2)

Marking by direct fire. Direct fire weapons may also be used to mark targets. While this method may provide more accuracy and timeliness than indirect fire marks, its use may be limited by range and the visibility of the burst from the air and on the battlefield. Systems used in the direct fire role may be ground (e.g. tanks or tracer fire) or air platforms. Aircraft can mark with some or all of the following: 3 - 26 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (1) (2) (3) (4) WP or High Explosive (HE) rockets. Laser. IR pointer. AC-130 gunships, directed by an FAC, can mark a target with 105 millimetre (mm) HE and 40mm HE incendiary.

e.

Radar Beacon Marking. Whilst not a means of marking the target specifically, radar beacons may be used to provide a reference point from which aircrew may be able to positively locate the target. Friendly Forces. Using friendly positions as a guide to the target is the least desirable method of providing a reference. Marking of friendly positions can be confusing and should be used cautiously and only when no other method is available.

f.

0318. Aircraft System Aided Acquisition. a. IR and EO systems. The FAC will have to bear in mind that the operator using IR and/or EO systems normally will not be able to see/distinguish any colours on his display. Laser. Procedures for target identification and designation by laser are the same for night CAS as those used during daytime activities (see Chapter 4, Section VII). Radar. Radar deliveries can be an option for certain aircraft under certain conditions. In order to perform radar-directed bombing, the target or offset aim points must be radar significant. Global Positioning System. The advent of GPS use by both the CAS aircraft and the FAC can increase the accuracy of CAS deliveries both during day and night. In many aircraft, accurate GPS coordinates supplied by the FAC will allow other aircraft sensors (such as a FLIR or radar) to be slewed into the desired target area. This can facilitate rapid target acquisition and identification. Inertial Aided Munitions. IAM can be delivered at night or through the weather at a set of coordinates by aircraft. The effectiveness of an IAM depends upon the tactical situation (type of target, desired weapons effects, target movement, etc.) and the accuracy, or Target Location Error (TLE), of the target coordinates. IAM are discussed more fully in Chapter 5, Section VII.

b.

c.

d.

e.

3 - 27 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) f. When an aircrew uses system aided acquisition (e.g. a Targeting Pod (TGP)) the FAC may choose to give an additional target description in the remarks to clarify what the aircrew must look for. The sequence will be the same up until the moment that the FAC would normally start his talk-on. Instead of stating call when ready for the talk-on the FAC will state when ready tell me what you see. The FAC can expect that the aircrew will give a description working from small to big, first describing what he sees closest to the crosshair. When the aircraft is equipped with an IR-pointer device, the FAC may request a SPARKLE by the aircrew. The FAC can adjust the SPARKLE location of the laser beam by directing the aircrew to move the pointer, followed by a cardinal direction and if applicable a distance (eg. move SPARKLE east STEADY). First Run Attack. An aircraft equipped with a TGP can be tasked by the FAC to perform a First Run Attack (FRA) in the medium level altitude band. Reasons for performing a FRA at medium altitude could be to keep the element of surprise or due to the presence of a specific threat in the target area when the aircrew is not able to perform an attack at lower altitude. At the CP the aircrew will receive the AO-update (in which the FAC will state that he wants the aircrew to hold at the CP and perform a FRA), CAS-brief and remarks. In the remarks, the FAC will give additional target information like he would also do when performing a FRA at low altitude. After leaving CP the aircrew will try to identify the target while moving inbound the target area. Clearance will be given by the FAC after the call TALLY target by the aircrew.

g.

0319. Marking Friendly Positions. It is sometimes necessary to mark friendly forces' front-line positions for positive discrimination between own troops and those of the enemy, by visual, mechanical or electronic means. Marking systems must always be used in a secure and verified manner to minimise the effects of enemy countermeasures. a. Coloured Smoke. Where feasible, coloured smoke is an excellent means of marking. If the target is very close to friendly positions, it will be better to maintain a continuous emission of smoke during the attack. This minimises the possibility of error during weapon deliveries. In order to prevent effective use of decoy smoke, marking smoke should be laid as late as possible, shortly before the attack aircraft enter visual range of the target. The mission leader should then confirm colour and position of the smoke to the FAC. Smoke colour should not be discussed over the radio prior to this point. NOTE No-Drop smoke colour will be issued in SPINS/ATO

3 - 28 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) b. Signal Mirror. This device provides a highly directional system for daytime, sunlight conditions. It is very effective and has the advantage of being covert. However, attacking aircrew may mistakenly identify light flashes from a signal mirror as ground fire. FAC must use caution to ensure that no confusion exists. IR Devices and Beacons. At night, own and friendly positions may be marked by a variety of IR devices. With the emergence of advanced radar sensors or beacons it is possible to protect land vehicles and the individual soldier from air-to-ground friendly fire. IR beacons emit covertly in the verynear IR with a relatively narrow dispersion angle, and can only be seen through night-vision goggles at ranges adequate for air-to-ground engagement. Being re-programmable by the soldier in the field, the devices are somewhat less susceptible to exploitation by the enemy. Panels and Tape. Combat Identification panels can be used to mark own position and friendly forces. For best results they should be oriented to provide maximum visibility for the attack aircrew. In some circumstances it may not be practicable to use this method due to topography, the likelihood of enemy air attack or slant range at which aircrew employ weapons. Gated Laser Intensifier for Narrow Television (GLINT) (GLO)-Tape is used when working with the AC-130 and designed for marking vehicles and positions. When illuminated with visible light, it exhibits no reflective characteristics. When illuminated with IR light, the tape appears to glow brightly. The reflection is only seen by those with NVG. Other Means. Signal lamps and other lighting equipment may also be employed. In all cases the aim should be to produce an effective signal that is also covert.

c.

d.

e.

STANDARD MARKING BREVITY TERMS


MEANING The FAC has the attack aircraft in sight, or the attack aircraft has positively identified the FACs or friendly ground position. BLIND Informative call indicating that an aircraft has lost visual contact with friendly ground position (opposite of VISUAL). CONTACT Acknowledges the sighting of a specific reference point. TALLY The enemy position/target is in sight. NO JOY Aircrew does not have visual contact with the target/BANDIT/BOGEY/landmark (opposite of TALLY). ---------------------------------------------------------8 Figure 3-9 - Standard Marking Brevity Terms -----------------------------------------------------------------8

CALL VISUAL

---------------------------------------------

For a full list of NATO brevity terms see APP-7

3 - 29 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0320. Weapon Release Authority. The authority and responsibility for expenditure of any ordnance on the battlefield rests with the supported commander. The supported commander will delegate weapons release clearance authority to his FAC to facilitate CAS attacks. Weapons release authority grants FAC the authority to provide to attacking aircraft: a. CLEARED HOT- Term used by an FAC during Types 1 and 2 control, granting weapons release clearance to an aircraft attacking a specific target. CLEARED TO ENGAGE- Term used by an FAC during Type 3 control, granting a blanket weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the prescribed restrictions set by the FAC. CONTINUE DRY- Term used by an FAC during Types 1 and 2 control, granting an overflight for simulated release, used during training and for Show of Force.

b.

c.

0321. Tactical Risk Assessment. As the battlefield situation changes, the supported commander and staff make continuous tactical risk assessments. This involves the processing of available information to ascertain a level of acceptable risk of fratricide or collateral damage. Based on the current risk assessment, the supported commander will weigh the benefits and liabilities of authorizing a particular type of terminal attack control. Information to consider when assessing risk includes but is not limited to: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Confidence and training of the unit and staff. Timeliness of information. Absence of information. Information flow and communications. Confidence in battle tracking. Friendly force locations. Non-combatant locations. Enemy locations. Confidence in targeting information in respect to source and accuracy (human intelligence, SIGINT, satellite, visual, etc.). Stationary or moving targets. 3 - 30 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

j.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ArP-3.3.2.1(B)
k. l. m. n. o. Abilityto markthe target. for Ordnance available attack. Ownand enemycapabilities/limitations. Attackrestrictions. Proximityoffriendlytroops/non-combatants.

0322. Risk-EstimateDistance. a. CAS Troops in Contact. FAC and aircrewmust be carefulwhenconducting when friendlytroops are within 1 km of targets. The FAC should regard friendlytroops within 1 km as a TIC situationand so advisethe supported commanderor accept an increasedPl. Refer to Annex D, Risk Estimate Distances. However,friendlytroops outside 1 km may still be subject to weapons effects. FAC and aircrew must carefullyweigh the choice of munitionsand delivery profile against the risk of fratricide. Risk-estimate to allowthe supported commander estimatethe dangerto friendly distances troopsfrom the CAS aftack. They are describedin terms of 10 percentPl trees, surroundings such as terrain,buildings, and 0.1 percentPl. Different Pl. reduce increase or etc.,can significantly will insidethe 0.1 percentPl distance be delivery DangerClose. Ordnance considered "danger close". The supported commander must accept responsibility the risk to friendlyforces when targetsare inside the 0.1 for percent Pl distance. Risk acceptanceis confirmedwhen the supported passeshis initialsto the attacking CAS aircraftthroughthe FAC, commander inside 0.1 the delivery in that he accepts riskinherent ordnance the signifying percent Pl distance. Risk-estimate distances allow the supported commander estimatethe dangerto friendlytroopsfrom the CAS attack. to When ordnanceis a factor in the safetyof friendlytroops,the aircraft'saxis force'saxis of orientation.This will to of attackshouldbe parallel the friendty preclude from beinga factorto friendlytroops. longand/orshortdeliveries

b.

SectionVII - Battle DamageAssessment


0323. Battle DamageAssessment. a. Introduction. BDA is used to updatethe enemy order of battle. Accurate if BDA is criticalfor determining a target should be re-attacked. In a highBDA may be difficultto judge. BDA must be based on threat environment, not objectivity, guesswork. There is no simple answer as to who is in the BDA. Aircraftand FAC have differentcapabilities best positionto determine 3-31 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) based on experience, weather, terrain, weapons employment techniques, and enemy actions when assessing BDA. BDA is crucial in determining mission effectiveness, enemy disposition, and re-attack requirements. BDA will be difficult to ascertain in a high threat environment, but the difficulty can be reduced by the integration of intelligence preparation of the battlefield early in the deliberate planning process. This assists in developing an appropriate mix of ISR assets that maximizes collection and exploitation potential. Determination of who reports or collects BDA within a given scenario is based upon the objective, capabilities, experience, weather, terrain, employment techniques, and enemy actions. The BDA should be sent using BDA message format. At a minimum this information should include: (1) (2) (3) (4) Size - number and type of equipment/personnel observed. Activity - Movement direction, stationary, dug in. Location - Where was the target you attacked or observed. Time - At what time did you attack the target or when did you observe the target. Your actions - Munitions expended, observed damage (e.g. number of tanks destroyed), mission number, and mission accomplished.

(5)

b.

FAC Responsibilities. Whenever possible, the FAC provides attack flights with the BDA of their attack as they egress. The FAC gives BDA for the flight, not for individual aircraft in the flight. The FAC should not assume the target is completely destroyed since the enemy may employ deception. FAC personnel must use their judgment and be precise (if you do not see it, do not report it) in reporting BDA. BDA must be passed to intelligence and controlling agencies as soon as possible. If conditions preclude briefing complete BDA, at a minimum pass SUCCESSFUL or UNSUCCESSFUL to the aircraft and the controlling agency. Additionally, the FAC should provide all available BDA information to the appropriate C2 agency. Develop and maintain a log of all BDA. The log should contain the following elements: mission number, call sign, target coordinates, TOT, specific results (e.g. number of enemy killed by air, vehicles/structures destroyed, unexploded ordnance), and whether the mission was successful. Aircrew Responsibilities. Use the In-flight Report (INFLTREP) (Annex C) to report CAS mission results. The INFLTREP can be used to report other tactical information of such importance and urgency that, if the aircrew were to wait for a normal post-flight debriefing, the information might no longer be useful. This might include the presence of SAM, AAA, radar warning receiver indications, or numbers of remaining targets. Send the INFLTREP directly to any C2 agency, the supported unit, or via any available relay. Message 3 - 32 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

c.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) recipients may add additional information and forward via another INFLTREP. INFLTREP information is incorporated in all-source intelligence reports. Use the standard Mission Report format to report mission results after return to base.

Section VIII Digital Close Air Support


0324. Digital Close Air Support Transmissions. Digital CAS systems are great aides to reduce voice communications, save valuable time and reduce typing errors. The type of information exchanged between FAC and mission remains the same, the difference being that a number of data from the FAC brief is generated automatically and inserted in the briefing format avoiding manual calculations. Digital CAS Systems are made up of specific hardware and software systems that give the FAC situational awareness and enhance target-locating ability. This hardware may include Laser Range Finder (LRF)/Laser Target Designators (LTDs) coupled with computer/GPS that can utilize target location to build CAS briefs and digitally transmit them to the aircraft. These systems greatly aide CAS employment during night time and poor weather conditions. a. As aircrew transit to the AOO they contact the FAC by digital means (makes best use of extended range over UHF with digital messaging). If digital contact is established, voice calls are not required until the mandatory read back calls are made. Digital CAS Equipment terminal settings. Digital CAS Equipment address for aircraft and FAC will be defined in the SPINS.

b.

Digital CAS BREVITY TERMS


CALL CALL READY FOR DATA READY FOR DATA DATA IN 5 DATA RECEIVED DATA HOLLOW READ BACK MEANING Aircrew or FAC is to check setup and make sure his station is ready to receive data burst. Aircrew or FAC is ready to receive data (CAS Brief, Check in Brief, Mark Point, Free Text Message). Data transmission will be sent in 5 seconds. Data successfully received. Data transmission NOT received, data must be sent again.

FAC to aircrew call. Aircrew is to read back mandatory lines from CAS Brief (Target Elevation, Target Location, Friendly Position and, if applicable, Mandatory Attack Heading). Read back of target coordinates should only take place after the coordinates have been entered into the aircraft system. READ BACK FAC to aircrew call. Aircrew has done a correct read back of the CAS CORRECT briefing. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 3-10 - Digital Close Air Support Brevity Terms. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 - 33 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

3 - 34 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

CHAPTER 4 - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TACTICS, WEAPONS AND SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS


SECTION I. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROCEDURES
0401. General. This section will provide standard procedures for CAS target engagement. While JOA or specific commands may have unique requirements, FAC, CAS aircrew, and fire support personnel should be familiar with the standard formats used in passing key information between CAS participants. One way to ensure this is to follow standardized procedures. This begins with CAS aircraft check-in procedures, providing situation updates, and includes following standard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) during terminal attack control. There may be instances where ground-based FAC and FAC(A) combine their efforts in support of a manoeuvre force. In these instances, it is critical that FAC and FAC(A) actions are complementary. 0402. Ground Forward Air Controller to Airborne Forward Air Controller Coordination. The responsibilities of the ground FAC and the FAC(A) must be determined prior to the attack. These responsibilities may include coordination with manoeuvre elements, attack aircraft briefing, target marking, airspace de-confliction, SEAD execution, and who provides final attack clearance. 0403. Close Air Support Aircraft Check-in. Aircraft check-in procedures are essential for establishing the required flow of information between the CAS aircrew and control agencies. Controlling agencies should update all CAS assets on the current situation en route to the AOO. Consequently, it is important for the FAC to brief the latest situation to the controlling agency allowing CAS aircraft to arrive with the most current information available. For CAS check-in format see Annex A. 0404. Clearance to Drop/Fire. Once the clearance requirements for a particular type of control are met, it is important to pass clearance in a timely manner to give aircrew time to prosecute the attack before release parameters have expired. A wide variety of ordnance is available and suitable for CAS missions. Mixed weapons loads on aircraft or between flight members will require the flight lead and the FAC to coordinate different delivery patterns. When employing standoff munitions or delivery methods, the FAC must provide a timely clearance appropriate for the weapon being delivered. For example, high-altitude level attacks can result in weapon releases at more than 4 NM from the target. 0405. Re-attacks. Re-attacks allow CAS aircraft to quickly reposition to attack the same target, and while manoeuvring, maintain compliance with any restrictions in force. A re-attack may be requested if additional weapons effects are required on the target. In a low/very low altitude environment, aircraft may be unable to make multiple passes due to enemy defences. The FAC issues clearance for immediate re-attack and must be aware of any threats to the aircraft. As was required in the initial attack, clearance to drop/fire on a re-attack must be issued by the FAC before 4-1 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) ordnance release. Corrections and new restrictions can be given to the aircrew during manoeuvring. If ordnance adjustments are required, they must be given in a timely manner. Corrections are given in cardinal direction or in clock code and distance in metres from the previous bomb impact point. In the following example a correction is being given to the second attacking aircraft in the flight based on lead aircrafts impacts (e.g. Razor 02, from leads hits, north 100). 0406. Abort Procedures. The FAC should direct CAS aircrew to abort if they are not aligned with the correct target, and must abort them if it appears that friendly troops may be endangered, or for the safety of the CAS aircrew. The CAS abort procedure uses the challenge-reply method to authenticate the abort command. During the CAS check-in briefing, the flight lead gives the FAC a challenge code for use with his flight only. The FAC refers to his authentication document, finds the reply, and notes but does not transmit it. The reply letter becomes that flights abort code and the CAS attack is aborted by simply transmitting, ABORT (Abort Code), ABORT (Abort Code), ABORT (Abort Code). 0407. Brevity. A brevity code is a single word or phrase that does not provide security but shortens the message rather than concealing its content. Using brevity eases coordination and improves understanding in tactical communications since brevity codes have only one meaning. In periods of communications jamming, brevity is required to get the message across since transmissions must be minimized. CAS players should always use brevity for clearer and more concise communications. See APP 7 for detailed brevity list.

Section II. Close Air Support Aircraft Tactics


0408. Introduction. This section identifies some basic TTP used by aircrew to conduct CAS. Standardized procedures and tactics provide a baseline for further refinement and improvement. It specifies basic FW and RW CAS aircraft tactics. Tactics are ever changing and must be adapted to the specific situation. FAC must be familiar with these as well as advanced CAS tactics. Aircrew will ultimately decide aircraft tactics but must ensure the tactics used fall within any constraints issued by the FAC. 0409. Fixed-Wing Tactics. a. Medium/High Altitude Tactics. Medium/High altitude tactics are are employed when slant range and altitude can be used to negate the adverse effects of the local threat systems. Minimum Heights will vary with the type of threat and weather and are theatre specific. For visual deliveries, the local weather conditions must include sufficient visibility and ceilings for the desired/required weapons deliveries to be employed. Terrain must also be considered when selecting employment altitudes. More time may be available for target 4-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(1)

Advantages of medium/high altitude tactics include: (a) All flight members can continuously observe the target area, marks, and hits from other aircraft. Lower fuel consumption and increased time on station. Reduced navigation difficulties. Improved formation control. Improved mutual support. Allows considerable manoeuvre airspace and allows aircrew to concentrate on mission tasks instead of terrain avoidance tasks. Communications between aircrew and control agencies are less affected by terrain. Reduces exposure to AAA and man-portable IR SAM. The ability to roll-in from any axis requested by the FAC. Easier timing of TOT. Simpler battlespace management for FAC.

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(g)

(h) (i) (j) (k) (2)

Disadvantages of medium/high altitude tactics include: (a) Enemy acquisition systems can detect the attack force at long range, allowing the enemy to prepare its air defences. Requires local air superiority.

(b)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (c) May require high weather ceilings and good visibility when using laser guided or other weapons requiring visual target acquisition by the aircrew (may not be a limiting factor when the ground commander authorizes use of GPS-guided weapons).

(d) Makes it difficult for the FAC to visually acquire the aircraft. (e) Visual target acquisition can be more difficult from higher altitudes and slant ranges.

(3)

Ingress. The higher altitude of the aircraft often makes receiving situation updates from extended ranges feasible. This enables the aircrew to build SA prior to entering the immediate target area. FAC may route CAS aircraft to the target area via IP, geographic references, dead reckoning (time, distance, and heading) or a combination of these techniques. FAC should use caution to not send friendly aircraft into uncoordinated adjacent unit airspace or known areas of concentrated enemy air defence. Multiple attack flights can be de-conflicted using vertical and horizontal separation. CAS Aircraft Observation and Holding Patterns. When possible, CAS aircraft should be given enough airspace to hold in an area of relatively low AAA and MANPAD activity that provides a good position to observe the target area. FAC should not restrict attack aircraft to specific observation or holding patterns but should specify the observation or holding area that will best accomplish the mission. Considerations for observation or holding area and altitude selection include: artillery GTL, adjacent unit activities, weather conditions such as sun position and clouds, terrain and threat locations and activity, and other attack aircraft either on station or inbound. Typical holding patterns include the following: (a) Racetrack. An oval holding pattern with straight legs of at least 10 NM in length and hard, 180 degree turns on each end. Figure Eight. The same as the racetrack pattern except the turns at each end of the pattern are made toward the target area and are 230 degrees of turn instead of 180 degrees.

(4)

(b)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (c) Wheel. Circle around the designated target. Ideal for non-linear battle fields with pockets of enemy activity.

(5)

Attack. Types of Delivery: (a) Dive Deliveries. Used for both free fall and forward firing ordnance, dive deliveries typically use dive angles of 20 to 60 degrees. Most modern fighter aircraft delivery systems incorporate some type of Constant Computing Impact Point (CCIP) display. CCIP allows the aircrew to accurately deliver ordnance without having to fly predictable wings level passes. Dive Toss. These deliveries provide increased standoff by using aircraft systems to compute release points similar to loft deliveries. The target is designated in the weapon systems computer by the aircrew at an extended slant range with the aircraft in a dive. The weapon is then released as the aircrafts dive angle is decreased. Level Deliveries. This type of delivery can be used with free fall munitions and may also be used off-axis with PGM.

(b)

(c)

b.

Low Altitude Tactics. Low altitude tactics are employed when threat system capabilities, weapons requirements, and/or weather conditions preclude aircraft employing medium/high altitude tactics. (1) Advantages of low altitude tactics include: (a) Decreases enemy acquisition systems ability to detect the attack force at long range, decreasing the enemys time available to prepare air defences.

(b) May be used when local air superiority has not been achieved. (c) (d) May be used with low weather ceilings and poor visibility. Degraded enemy GCI radar coverage, denying intercept information to enemy fighters and forcing enemy aircraft to rely on visual or onboard acquisition systems. Improves accuracy of unguided weapons delivery due to shorter slant ranges at low altitude.

(e)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (f) (g) Increased psychological effect on the enemy. Decrease weapon TOF dynamic/moving targets. for use against highly

(2)

Disadvantages of low altitude tactics include: (a) Navigation is demanding and requires a high level of aircrew skill (Navigation is easier for aircraft equipped with INS or GPS). Terrain avoidance tasks and formation control become primary tasks, decreasing time to concentrate on mission tasks. Probable late target acquisition by the aircrew due to high angular velocity. Probable late acquisition of the attacking aircraft by the FAC causes reduced time for corrective inputs. The observation of the target area, the marks, and hits from other aircraft are limited to the final portion of the runin. Higher fuel consumption and decreased time on station. Terrain may reduce communications effectiveness between aircrew and control agencies, such as the FAC due to LOS limitations. Attack timing and geometry more critical than in higher altitude tactics. Exposes aircraft and aircrew to small arms, MANPADS and AAA. More difficult battlespace management for FAC.

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f) (g)

(h)

(i)

(j) (3)

Ingress. Aircrew and mission planners may employ support aircraft and other countermeasures to degrade threat system effectiveness. Aircrew, FAC, and air controllers select routes that avoid known threat weapon envelopes. Routes should include course changes to confuse and deceive the enemy concerning the intended target area. Helicopter aircrew using terrain flight techniques must remain close to the terrain. This 4-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) becomes critical when FW aircrew traverse vertically-developed terrain. Formations are used to complicate enemy radar resolution and improve lookout capability against enemy fighters. Aircrew plot, brief, and study the ingress routes to gain the maximum advantage from terrain masking. Entry should be delayed into a heavily defended target area until the aircrew has a clear understanding of the mission. The expected threat intensity and sophistication influence the selection of ingress tactics. FAC and aircrew tailor communications and control requirements to counter the threat. Normally, control of CAS flights is handed over to the FAC at the CP. In a limited communications environment, scheduled missions may be the primary method used to limit the required communications. Proper planning increases the chances for mission success even if there is little or very difficult radio communications after the flight becomes airborne. (4) Attack. During low altitude attacks, many of the same considerations apply as in high/medium altitude attacks. However, aircrew will have less time to acquire the target and position their aircraft for a successful attack. When planning ordnance and attack profiles, consider the requirement for fragmentation pattern avoidance in the low altitude environment. The final run-in from the IP to the target is the most crucial phase of the CAS mission. Aircrew tasks intensify as the aircrew must follow a precise timing and attack profile. The terrain dictates the type of formation flown by the attack element. A level delivery attack is the most common method for FW CAS attack aircraft to engage targets in the low altitude environment. Types of Delivery: (a) Level. Deliver ordnance with a wings level pass over the target. Loft. To execute a loft delivery, the aircrew proceeds inbound to the target from the IP. At a calculated point, the aircrew starts a loft manoeuvre pull up. Once released, the weapon continues an upward trajectory while the aircrew egresses the target area. The weapon reaches the apex of its trajectory then follows a ballistic or guided flight path to impact. Pop-up. To execute a pop-up delivery, the aircrew proceeds to the target from the IP at low altitude. As the aircrew nears the target, they pop-up to the desired altitude and execute a dive delivery. 4-7 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(b)

(c)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(5)

Coordinated Attacks. The FAC must approve use of coordinated attacks. Coordinated attacks include multiple aircraft using timing splits over the target, multiple sections using a combination of timing and heading splits, or multiple flights using dissimilar aircraft in coordinated laser designator/bomber attacks. Coordinating flights for attacking the same target/target area can add firepower to the attack and help to split target defences. A tactical lead is identified by the FAC for coordinated attacks. The tactical lead is usually the flight lead with the highest SA of the target area. He will coordinate all attacks with the FAC. While the tactical lead directs de-confliction between flights, the FAC is still responsible for air action in the target area. While the FAC and aircrew must conduct the attack using a common frequency, the aircrew can use a separate frequency to conduct inter-flight coordination (e.g. ordnance de-confliction, timing between flight members). Type of Attack. The type of attack is principally based solely on the avenue to the target, and does not apply to the target itself. Example: Combined/Sequential/Visual means the avenue to the target is shared airspace; timing on target is sequential, with the trailing flight taking visual spacing on the lead flights last attacker. Sectored/Sequential/1 Minute means the avenue to the target is sectored (using an acknowledged sector), and timing on target is sequential with the trailing flight taking one minute spacing from the lead flights TOT. Simultaneous Visual or Hack
(Visual spacing or time hack separation)

(6)

Type of Attack COMBINED


Same avenue of attack

Sequential Visual or Hack


(Visual spacing or time hack separation)

Random NOT NORMALLY USED Free Flow*

SECTORED
Acknowledged sector

Visual or Hack
(Visual spacing or time hack separation)

Visual or Hack
(Visual spacing or time hack separation)

*Must ensure strafe fan/bomb and missile frag de-confliction

------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-1 - Coordinated Attack Types. -------------------------------------------------------------(7) The following procedural guidelines are considered standard: (a) (b) Aircraft egressing from the target have the right-of-way. The FAC must approve re-attacks after coordination with the ground force commander. 4-8 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(c)

If an aircraft enters another flights sector, the aircrew will immediately notify the other flight, the FAC, and de-conflict or exit that sector. FAC and aircrew must coordinate munitions that may enter the other flights sector before the attack.

(d)

(8)

Attack Heading. An attack heading is the assigned magnetic compass heading that an aircrew flies during the ordnance delivery phase of the attack. FAC assign attack headings for several reasons: to increase ground troop safety, aid in target acquisition, and help fire support coordination. Attack headings, especially during visual attacks, may reduce the flexibility and survivability of aircraft. Immediate Re-attacks. The aircrews goal is to complete a successful attack on the first pass. Once acquired in the target area, an aircraft that remains for re-attacks may be more vulnerable to enemy fire. A re-attack can help assure the desired result, aid visual orientation for the aircrew, and increase responsiveness to the supported commander. FAC authorise reattacks. If a re-attack is necessary and possible, the FAC may give the aircrew a pull off direction and may assign different attack headings. The FAC may provide additional target marks for the re-attack and can describe the target location using the last mark, last hit, terrain features, or friendly positions. The reattack may engage other targets within a specific target area. Egress. While operating in a low environment, the need for a rapid egress may delay the ability to rendezvous and regain mutual support. Egress instructions and rendezvous should avoid conflict with ingress routes and IP of other flights. Egress instructions may be as detailed as ingress instructions. Egress fire support coordination and de-confliction requirements are the same as those used during ingress. Upon attack completion, aircrew follow the egress instructions and either execute a reattack, return to a CP for further tasking, or return to base. Combination low and high altitude. Aircrew can combine low and medium altitude tactics to gain the advantages of both while reducing the disadvantages of each. The en route portion of the flight is normally beyond the range of enemy AD weapons and flown at a medium or high altitude. The attack force descends to low altitude to avoid detection by certain enemy SAM threats and/or gain surprise. 4-9 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(9)

(10)

(11)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

FIXED-WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ATTACK PHASE EXAMPLE Target

Contact Point (CP)

Initial Point (IP)

Turn Point Pull-up (TP) Point

Key Key Actions in a Fixed-Wing Close Air Support (CAS) Attack Key Actions in a Fixed-Wing Close Air Support (CAS) Attack To Perform a CAS attack, the following actions must take place: To Perform a CAS attack, the following actions must take place: 1. The attack aircrew receives the CAS brief. 1. The attack aircrew receives the CAS brief. 2. The aircrew calculates the following, based on aircraft type, run-in airspeed, 2. The aircrewand delivery the following, based on aircraft type, run-in airspeed, ordnance, calculates manoeuvre: ordnance, and delivery manoeuvre: a. Time to leave the CP to cross the IP at the proper time. a. Time to leave the CP to cross the IP at the proper time. b. Distance and time from IP to Turn Point (TP). b. Distance and time from IP to Turn Point (TP). c. Degrees to turn at TP and direction of offset, if not directed by the FAC. c. Degrees to turn at TP and direction of offset, if not directed by the FAC. d. Distance/time to pull-up point (from TP or IP, whichever preferred). d. Distance/time to pull-up point (from TP or IP, whichever preferred). e. Pull-up angle (as applicable). e. Pull-up angle (as applicable). f. Apex/roll-in altitude (as applicable). f. Apex/roll-in altitude (as applicable). g. Release altitude (based on threat, friendly fires, and ordnance) g. Release altitude (based on threat, friendly fires, and ordnance) 3. FAC provides: 3. FAC provides: a. Verbal description of the target and references a. Mark on target 30-45 seconds before TOT/TTT. b. Mark on target 30-45 seconds (or as requested by the aircraft) before b. Final directions/corrections, given concisely in cardinal direction and TOT/TTT. distance from the mark, to the aircrew to find the target. c. Final directions/corrections, given concisely in cardinal direction or clock c. Clearance distance from the mark, to the aircrew to find the target. code and to deliver ordnance. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-2 - Fixed-Wing Close Air Support Attack Phase Example. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

0410. Close Air Support by Bombers (B-1, B-52) a. En Route. Typical bomber en route times can extend upwards of 12 hours before arriving in the JOA. Depending on communications equipment this could be the last threat and situation updated received. Satellite communication may not be available for the ground party, so do not depend on it. Make every attempt to use secure communications. Pre-attack Phase. (1) Station time. Normally you can expect 3 hours of station time; however, this could be extended upwards to 8 hours or more depending on air refuelling capability in the area and transit time. Data link. Both the B-1 & B-52 have Combat Track II as a data link. If the FAC has data link capability with the CAOC they can relay information to the en route bomber. Orbit. B-1 altitude block is normally 22-30,000 feet and B-52 3539,000 feet. Even though bombers need to look at the target with radar or targeting pod, distance is normally 2040 NM from target area. The FAC should not unnecessarily restrict the orbit location as precision guided weapons may not have to be released on a traditional track to the target. Orbit locations should be selected based on proximity to threats and friendly locations. Bombers may also have the capability to neutralize threats while en route to the CAS orbit.

b.

(2)

(3)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-3 - Typical Bomber CAS Orbit. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(a) Because of weapon release/launch altitudes, the bomber will have a greater stand off range from the target than fighter aircraft. Typically, the launch range for IAM can extend 7-9 NM from the target. Bombers can give a splash time prior to release. This time may vary by +/- 10 seconds depending on the weapon type and programmed impact parameters. Communication problems are possible due to terrain and distance from the target. Expect Type 2 or 3 controls. The mission lead or mission commander in the bomber formation will de-conflict aircraft and weapons flight paths. He will also assign targets to a particular bomber if multiple targets are being attacked simultaneously. Direct (LOS) Communications. Bombers cannot attack a target with visual cues only, but crew or formation can accept map talk-ons and multiple 9-Lines. The preferred coordinate format is DD-MM.MMMM. MGRS can be used but additional time from 9-line receipt to read back will be necessary for coordinate conversion.

(b)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) c. Attack Phase. (1) Target. Bombers traditionally employ weapons on given coordinates. With this method there is no verification of the actual target. Inertial Aided Munition (IAM) is the preferred allweather weapon of choice. Laser Guided Weapons (LGWs) and general purpose weapons are secondary choices and Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) are last. The B-52 can obtain its own coordinates when equipped with targeting pod. A sensor point of interest is normally required to cue the targeting pod onto the desired target. In this case, if identification of the target is desired/required, the target will have to be EO/IR significant. B1s can self generate coordinates. Talk-on. Bombers can self generate target coordinates and elevation depending on how radar or EO/IR significant the target is. FAC cuing is crucial for either bomber to locate typical CAS targets. Urban CAS. Because bombers bomb on coordinates or must acquire the target with radar it is difficult for the aircrew to determine which building is being targeted in this environment. Careful attention must be paid to the correct coordinates being passed. The talk-on in this environment will be extensive. Target marking. (a) Smoke or flares is of little to no use due to altitude of the aircraft and possible targeting pod obscuration. In some situations bombers can use ordnance for spotting. The FAC would then tell the aircrew move 120 degrees for 15 metres from the last splash. Special beacons may improve aircrew SA, but require significant aircrew practice and extra ground coordination. Crews will never place radar crosshairs or targeting pod on friendly locations while in bomb mode to avoid potential fratricide.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(b)

(c)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (5) Ordnance Employment. (a) Consider passing multiple 9-Lines to a single bomber or formation per pass. The bomber has the ability to attack several Desired Mean Points of Impact (DMPI) on a single pass using IAM. Each DMPI could be attacked with different ordnance on a single pass. The bomber can employ a wide range of weapons per pass in large numbers if desired or they can make many passes employing smaller amounts per pass. Bomber crews are trained to weaponeer targets real-time with tabbed data. The FAC should pass the desired effect, target area size and true axis or cardinal direction (if applicable) in the 9-Line remarks. Pass target centroid DMPI coordinates for area targets and the crew will build a weapon pattern around this point.

(b)

(6)

Attack Communications. Bomber - FAC radio calls will differ from those made by fighter type aircraft. See Table 4-4 for an example with associated time line.

Communication or Activity

Time per 9-Line FAC send 9-Line 1 min Bomber crew programs weapons 1 min Crew reads back applicable 9-Line items from weapon program 1 min page (minimum: mandatory readback items) Crew manoeuvres to release point Bomber leaving IP, time to 2-6 min * release is__ FAC ensures area clear and calls Cleared hot < 1 min * Crew calls Weapons away, impact time is___ < 1 min * * Same action and time for multiple 9-Lines ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-4 - Typical Bomber FAC Attack Communications. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(7) (8) Limited manoeuvrability. B-1s 3G and B-52s 1.8G. Threats in target area. The bomber crew will typically ask for a detailed threat analysis from the FAC, any other players in the package and the CAOC before pushing from the orbit to the target. Limited to level delivery.

(9)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) d. Post attack Phase. (1) Long re-attack times. Typical are 5 20 minutes depending on threat and weapons employed. Limited BDA capability with targeting pod.

(2)

0411. Close Air Support by AC-130. a. The AC-130 gunship is a uniquely capable CAS platform. Its extended loiter time, precision fire control systems and low-yield munitions offer the ground commander specific capabilities and limitations. The AC130 usually uses a 5-Line format for executing call-for-fire missions. However, the crew can execute CAS missions utilizing the 9-Line brief. The AC-130 can execute CAS missions that support offensive, counteroffensive, and defensive ground operations with pre-planned or immediate attacks. AC-130 Call for Fire Form. AC-130 aircrew use the AC-130 Call for Fire. In addition to the standard briefing items, the following items are mandatory for AC-130s: a detailed threat description, marking of friendly locations, identifiable ground features, and the ground commanders willingness to accept danger close. Because the AC130 is capable of extended loiter, the AC-130 crew can work a series of targets with a single ground party. In these cases, the CAS briefing format can be abbreviated but must include: magnetic bearing and range to the target in metres from the friendly position to the target; and a brief description of the target. Attack Phase. (1) Capabilities. The AC-130 provides accurate fire support to ground units for extended periods of time during the hours of darkness. It uses multiple sensors to maintain SA on ground scheme of manoeuvre. Both variants have through the weather engagement capability. The AC-130 crew employs a friendly-centric approach to CAS. Normally, the first consideration in the attack phase is to identify the friendly position. Various aids may be used by friendly ground forces to expedite acquisition (e.g., strobe lights, flares, GLINT tape). In addition, there are several electronic beacons that may be used to assist in locating friendly forces.

b.

c.

(2)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (3) Considerations for Close-in Fires. Due to the accuracy of the gunship fire control system, ordnance can be delivered extremely close to friendly positions. In these situations, cover is effective at minimizing the risk to ground forces due to the combination of accuracy and low-yield munitions. Parameters for Attacking the Target. The type of target, its value, the proximity of friendly forces, and the damage already inflicted will determine the gun selection, type of ammunition, and the number of rounds required to successfully attack the target. Ground controllers should not dictate munitions selection to the AC-130, but rather provide effects-based targeting requests.

(4)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

FIRE Mission, Over." 2. FriendlyLocation/Mark:

(AC13O CIS)

(Ob*rver Ctg

(&tfie, bacon, /R Sfrobe, etcJ

(mgneticbeaing&nnge tmetrcslffiE ja Tar99tDescription/Mark'.Marked by_,

'tr-) e Over.,

(Thrsab,Oange na,etc.) AS REQUIRED 1. Clearance: Transmission the fire missionis clearanceto fire of (unlessDangerClose).ForAC-130,DangerCloseis tOdm with the 105mm,75m with the 40mm, 100mwith ire eOmm, anJ OSm wittr the.2Smm.For closerfire, the observermustacceptresponsibility ' for increased risk.State '.GlearedOangerCtose; [witn commande/sinitials)on line 5. This cblrance may be preplanned. 2aAt my cog.tmand: positivecontrolof a gunsnip,strate ,.At For _, my Command" on line 5. The gunshipwill call .;Readyio Fire. o . . lf signfficant missdistiance wrongtarget,adjust or round. impactby givingrange(metres)and cardinal direction(north,south,east,west) Marking/confirming targetscan also be accomplished usingcovertillumination (Bum) or with the laserpointer(Sparkle). ,,f,lOVE Io move Bum or Sparkle,say, BURN/SPARKLE 300M VtEST" or..ROLL BURN/SPARKLE IOOII EAST". or sparkteis over target,say ..FREEZE 9l-99 _9yl BURN/SPARKLE.. you say',STOp (tf

1. Do not ask the gunshipto identifycolors 2. Do not reference clock positions. 3. Do not pass run-inheadings/nofire headings(giveno.fireareas and friendlytroop positions only) 4. Do not correct lefVriohtor

Figure4-5 - AC-130GunshipCail for F|RE.

0412.GloseAir Supportby Rotary-Wing.


a' Method of Control. Traditionally units are supportingmanoeuvre AH commanders a subordinate as manoeuvreunit. They reJeivemission type ordersand executethese ordersas a unit. when AHs are tasked to work with other units withouthavingbeen in an in-depthplanning processwith that unit the methodof controlis shifting. fne nH can not operate as a manoeuvreunit anymore. In that case the preferred methodof controiling aircraftis by usingthe cAS procedures.lino the FAC is availablethe procedurefor contro-lling aircraftwill be the the closecombatattackprocedures described the ATp4g. as i;

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) b. Launch and Departure Procedures. The appropriate controlling agency issues launch orders through the proper C2 or fire support agency. AH can be launched and moved to HAs, forward assembly areas, forward arming and refuelling points, or directly into an attack or support by fire position depending on mission or current situation. Medium Altitude Tactics. Medium level tactics are normally flown above 1000 feet AGL. These tactics are employed when the air defence threat permits. (1) Advantages of medium level tactics include: (a) All flight members can continuously observe the target area, marks, and hits from other aircraft. Lower fuel consumption and increased time on station. Reduced navigation difficulties. Improved formation control. Improved mutual support. Allows considerable manoeuvre airspace and allows aircrew to concentrate on mission tasks instead of terrain avoidance tasks. Communications between aircrew and control agencies are less affected by terrain. The ability to roll-in from any axis requested by the FAC. Easier timing of TOT.

c.

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

(g)

(h) (i) (2)

Disadvantages of medium level tactics include: (a) Enemy acquisition systems can detect the attack force at long range, allowing the enemy to prepare its air defences. Requires local air superiority. May require high weather ceilings and good visibility when using laser guided or other weapons requiring visual target acquisition by the aircrew.

(b) (c)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (3) Ingress. The higher altitude of the aircraft often makes receiving situation updates from extended ranges feasible. This enables the aircrew to build SA prior to entering the immediate target area. FAC may route CAS aircraft to the target area via IP, Holding Areas (HA), geographic references, dead reckoning (time, distance, and heading) or a combination of these techniques. FAC should use caution to not send friendly aircraft into uncoordinated adjacent unit airspace or known areas of concentrated enemy air defence. Multiple attack flights can be deconflicted using vertical and horizontal separation. Helicopter Observation and Holding Patterns. When possible, CAS aircraft should be given enough airspace to hold in an area of relatively low AAA and MANPAD activity that provides a good position to observe the target area. FAC should not restrict attack aircraft to specific observation or holding patterns but should specify the observation or holding area that will best accomplish the mission. Considerations for observation or holding area and altitude selection include: artillery GTL, adjacent unit activities, weather conditions such as sun position and clouds, terrain and threat locations and activity, and other attack aircraft either on station or inbound. Typical holding patterns include the following: (a) Racetrack. An oval holding pattern with straight legs and 180 degree turns on each end. Figure Eight. The same as the racetrack pattern except the turns at each end of the pattern are made toward the target area and are 230 degrees of turn instead of 180 degrees. Wheel. Circle around the designated target. Ideal for non-linear battle fields with pockets of enemy activity.

(4)

(b)

(c)

(5)

Attack. Types of Delivery. (a) Running Fire. Running fire is performed when the aircraft is in level, forward flight. Forward flight may add stability to the aircraft and improve the accuracy of unguided ordnance. While performing running fire, aircrew can use direct and indirect fire techniques. Aircrew deliver direct fire when they have an unobstructed view of the target. Aircrew deliver indirect fire when they cannot see the target.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (b) Diving Fire. Diving fire is delivered while the aircraft is at altitude and in descending forward flight. If delivering unguided ordnance, diving fire may produce the most accurate results. Use diving fire if the aircrew can remain above or outside the threat envelope.

d.

Low Altitude Tactics. (1) En route. Ideally, en route tactics (route and altitude selection, terrain flight profile, and formations) allow AH aircrew to avoid concentrated enemy air defences and prevent early enemy acquisition of the attack force. If en route tactics are successful, they can delay or hamper enemy AD coordination and increase aircrew survival and mission success. Navigation. En route navigation tactics depend on the threat, need for and availability of support aircraft, friendly AD requirements, weather, and fuel. As aircrew approach the target area or probable point of enemy contact, they fly lower and with increased caution to move undetected by the enemy. Aircrew use terrain flight to deny/degrade the enemys ability to detect or locate the flight visually, optically, or electronically. When flying tactical profiles, aircrew may manoeuvre laterally within a corridor or manoeuvre area compatible with the ground scheme of manoeuvre and assigned route structures. Within the corridor, aircrew can use a weaving or unpredictable path to avoid detection by the enemy. En route terrain flight profiles fall into three categories: low level, contour, and Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE). (a) Low Level. Conduct low-level flight at a constant altitude and airspeed. Low-level flight reduces or avoids enemy detection or observation. Aircrew use low-level flight to reach a control point in a low threat environment. Contour. Contour flight conforms to the contour of the earth or vegetation to conceal aircraft from enemy observation or detection. Aircrew use contour flight until reaching a higher threat area. Nap-of-the-Earth. NOE flight is as close to the earths surface as vegetation and obstacles permit while following the earths contours. Terrain and vegetation provide cover and concealment from enemy observation and detection. NOE flight uses varying airspeed and altitude based on

(2)

(b)

(c)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) the terrain, weather, ambient light, and enemy situation. NOE flight should be used in high threat environments. (3) Ingress Tactics. Ingress tactics apply from arrival at the release point or HA until the target attack phase begins at the BP. (a) Attack Helicopter Control Points. In addition to normal CAS control points, AH aircrew can use special AH control points. RW CAS can be performed with or without HA or BP. FAC and aircrew select HA and BP that are tactically sound, support the scheme of manoeuvre, and are coordinated with other supporting arms. Holding Areas. HA may be established throughout the battlefield to be used by helicopters awaiting targets or missions. These HA serve as informal ACA while they are in use. HA provide the AH aircrew an area in which to loiter. HA may be established during planning, referred to by name or number, and activated/established during operations. Battle Positions. BP are manoeuvring areas containing firing points for AH. Like HA, BP serve as informal ACA while in use. Planning considerations and methods of establishment for BP are the same as those involved in the use of HA.

(b)

(c)

(4)

Techniques of Movement. Due to proximity to the threat, aircrew use terrain flight to move during ingress to the BP. If aircrew are close to friendly artillery and mortars, they use terrain flight in conjunction with ACM to de-conflict with artillery and mortar trajectories. Particularly when conducting terrain flight, helicopter movement must be coordinated with the applicable FSCC/FSE. Aircrew use three techniques of movement: travelling, travelling overwatch, and bounding overwatch (see Figure 4-6). (a) Travelling. Travelling is a technique that aircrew use when enemy contact is remote. The flight moves at a constant speed using low-level or contour terrain flight. Movement should be as constant as the terrain allows. Travelling allows rapid movement in relatively secure areas. Travelling Overwatch. Travelling overwatch is a technique that aircrew use when enemy contact is possible. The flight moves using contour or NOE terrain flight. While 4 - 21 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(b)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) caution is justified, speed is desirable. The flight consists of two major elements: the main element and the overwatch element. The overwatch element may contain multiple sub-elements. The main element maintains continuous forward movement. The overwatch elements move to provide visual and weapons coverage of the main element. The overwatch elements provide weapons coverage of terrain from which the enemy might fire on the main element. (c) Bounding Overwatch. Bounding overwatch is a technique that aircrew use when enemy contact is imminent. The flight moves using NOE terrain flight. Movement is deliberate and speed is not essential. The flight consists of two elements. One element moves or bounds while the other element takes up an overwatch position. The overwatch element covers the bounding elements from covered, concealed positions that offer observation and fields of fire.

(5)

Communications and Control. An AHs inherent flexibility allows a variety of communication and control procedures. Terrain flight techniques of movement may restrict the FACs ability to communicate with low flying aircraft. Typically, communications may not be desirable during the ingress phase. To preserve operations security, aircrew can land to receive face-to-face mission briefs and mission-essential information from the supported commander or FAC before leaving the HA. An airborne relay may be used to maintain communications. Attack Phase (Within the BP). The attack phase is the most important phase of the AH mission. The attack must produce the necessary result in a timely manner. Figure 4-7 illustrates an example of RW tactics during CAS attacks. (a) Control. Once the aircrew reaches the BP, the FAC or mission commander issues final instructions to the flight. Aircrew select individual firing positions (FP) and remain masked while awaiting the TOT/TTT or the order to attack. Attack Tactics. Specific techniques used to attack a target are the choice of the air mission commander. Choose attack tactics considering the threat, target size and vulnerability, weather, terrain, accuracy requirements, weapons effectiveness, and fragmentation patterns.

(6)

(b)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (c) Hovering Fire. Hovering fire is performed when the aircraft is stationary or has little forward motion. Aircrew perform hovering fire after unmasking from a defilade position. To prevent being targeted by enemy weapons, aircrew maintain the hovering fire position only for short periods, and deliver indirect hovering fire from FP hidden from the enemy by terrain features. After delivering hovering fire, aircrew re-mask behind terrain. If terrain permits, aircrew should move to an alternate FP. Hovering fire may reduce the accuracy of unguided ordnance (rockets, cannon, or 20/30 mm gun fire) because the aircraft can be less stable in a hover. Precision-guided weapons are the most effective ordnance fired from a hover. i. Running Fire. For description see 0412.c.v.(1) on page 4-15. Diving Fire. page 4-15. For description see 0412.c.v.(2) on

ii.

(7)

Reconnaissance/Attack Team. Reconnaissance/attack teams provide the joint force with a highly mobile, powerful, combinedarms capability. They consist of two or more helicopters combining the scout and attack roles. This capability allows the scout/attack team to quickly and effectively react to a rapidly changing battlefield. Commanders can use the scout/attack team separately, as a reinforcing asset, or reinforced with other assets. Team Elements: (a) Scout Element. The scout element contains one or more helicopters. Multiple helicopters are preferred, to provide mutual support within the scout element. The air mission commander is normally a member of the scout element. He is responsible for mission planning and execution. The air mission commanders duties include: i. Providing liaison and coordination between the team and the supported unit to receive the current situation and mission brief. Providing reconnaissance of the HA and BP if time and threat permit. Briefing the attack element.

ii.

iii.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) iv. Planning and designation. coordinating target marking/

v.

Providing security for the attack element from ground and air threats. Controlling the missions supporting arms.

vi. (b)

Attack Element. The attack element contains a minimum of two AHs. It is subordinate to the mission commander. The attack element leaders duties include: i. Assuming all the duties of the mission commander if required. Attacking specified ordnance. targets with the proper

ii.

iii. (8)

Providing a rapid reaction base of fire.

Disengagement and Egress. Following the attack, the flight disengages and egresses from the BP. Egress instructions may be as detailed as ingress instructions. Egress fire support coordination and de-confliction requirements are the same as those used during ingress. Upon mission completion, the flight can: proceed to an alternate BP, return to the HA for further tasking, return to the forward arming and refuelling point for refuelling/rearming, return to the forward operating base/ship. MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

Low level or contour Contour or Nap-of-theTravelling Overwatch Possible Earth Bounding Overwatch Imminent Nap-of-the-Earth ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-6 - Movement Techniques. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Techniques of Movement Travelling

Likelihood of Contact Remote

Terrain Flight Profile

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

EXAMPLE OF ROTARY-WING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TACTICS Target FP = Firing Position Holding Area
FP FP FP FP FP FP FP FP FP FP

Heading/Distance

Ingress Route

FP

Release Point Battle Position ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-7 - Example of Rotary-Wing Close Air Support Tactics. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0413. Close Air Support by Armed Unmanned Aerial vehicles. Clearance of fires and CAS final control for armed UAVs need to be clearly established before combat activities begin. The following guidelines are based on proven combat activities that were applied successfully with UAVs. Armed UAV procedures should follow the same procedures as other CAS airframes in most cases, but there are situations that require additional consideration. The ASR process typically begins when a ground commander requests CAS from the AOCC through a TARN. The ASR process often works in reverse when an ISR-tasked UAV (e.g., Predator) locates hostile forces in an area that requires detailed integration with or is in close proximity to ground forces. In this case, the UAV operator usually informs the ground commander (through the AOCC) that a recently discovered target may require CAS as opposed to the ground commander making the request. There are two basic cases that an armed UAV could require clearance for fires and final control. These cases all assume that targets identified by a UAV meet Rules of Engagement (ROE) requirements.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

Section III. Night, Limited Visibility and Adverse Weather Considerations


0414. Introduction. Fundamental CAS procedures do not go away at night. However, limited visibility and adverse weather CAS demands a higher level of proficiency that can only come about through dedicated realistic CAS training. FAC and aircrew must routinely train together during these conditions. In addition to training, limited visibility CAS relies heavily on systems and sensors due to pilots limited ability to visually ascertain friendly positions and targets. Aircraft and FAC can perform night CAS using artificial illumination or with NVD. Specific attack and delivery techniques vary depending on the amount of illumination, the specific capability of the CAS aircraft, and equipment available to the FAC. For these reasons, limited visibility activities require additional coordination and equipment. There are three general categories of limited visibility employment: visual, systemaided, and NVD. a. Visual Employment. During night visual employment, FAC and aircrew must contend with lower ambient light conditions, and use battlefield fires, or artificial illumination to successfully attack targets. Threat permitting, the FACs requirement to see the CAS aircraft may require use of aircraft lights or flares. If this is not tactically feasible or proves insufficient to determine aircraft attack geometry/nose position, Type II control may be required if approved by the supported ground commander. Visual employment mission planning considerations: (1) Weather and Reduced Visibility. Target weather can affect illumination. If the weather is clear and a bright moon is available, additional artificial illumination may not be necessary. Smoke, haze, and precipitation in the target area may cause reduced visibility and force the aircraft to manoeuvre closer to the threat in order to maintain visual contact with the target. Flying closer to the threat presents an obvious problem. On the other hand, flares employed under an overcast sky will highlight the aircraft for enemy defences. Heavy haze will cause a milk bowl effect that severely limits slant-range visibility and may cause spatial disorientation. Avoid allowing such conditions to drive the aircraft into flying a more predictable flight path close to a threat. Illumination flares can increase the effects of smoke and haze and further reduce the visibility. Low Ceilings. Low ceilings may force the aircraft to maintain lower altitudes. Flares dropped below low ceilings may not produce the desired results. Low ceilings will further complicate de-confliction between aircraft holding at control points.

(2)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (3) Terrain. Knowledge of the terrain is a crucial aspect of any night CAS mission. FAC must be thoroughly familiar with the general terrain as well as the highest terrain and obstructions in the immediate target area. Non-Illuminated. The capability to attack targets without artificial illumination depends on several variables: (a) distinguish the need to attack a general target versus a specific DMPI within the target. total ambient and cultural lighting in the target area. contrast between targets and their background. lit versus unlit targets. minimum acceptable slant range to the target due to threats, and JOA restrictions.

(4)

(b) (c) (d) (e)

(5)

Artificial Illumination. Flare employment is essential for lowillumination night activities without NVD. If at all possible, do not illuminate friendly positions. Any illumination introduced into the battle area must be coordinated with the ground commander prior to flare release. Marks. Rockets and shells are widely used marking devices. The detonation will give an obvious flash with afterglow. The bloom will cast a visible shadow with good moon-like illumination. Flares, explosive ordnance, burning targets, enemy muzzle flashes, tracers, and various marking rounds can be employed to provide target identification.

(6)

b.

Visual Employment Mission Execution. Friendly positions, winds, and the threat will determine the position and direction of the weapons delivery pattern. Prior to allowing aircraft to illuminate or mark a target at night, coordinate with the commander so that precautions are made to preserve own troop night vision or prevent enemy observation of own troop locations.

0415. System-Aided Employment. Aircraft systems (radar, laser, FLIR, IR, and TV) are relied upon more at night and in adverse weather because of degraded visual target acquisition range and recognition cues. Aircrew and FAC should incorporate redundant methods (e.g. radar, laser, and FLIR) into an attack, along with a target mark to find and attack a target. Night laser employment techniques are

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) the same as in the daytime. Avoid the temptation to rely solely on one information source. For more information see Section VIII. 0416. Night Vision Devices Employment. NVD are an additional sensor for aircrew to use together with other systems to find and attack targets. Manoeuvre forces and aircrew must ensure there is no confusion between conventional and NVD terms. FAC must be equipped with IR marking devices to fully integrate with supported manoeuvre forces and exploit the potential of NVD. a. NVD Mission Preparation. (1) Weather. Target area weather can affect illumination. An overcast sky can decrease effective illumination but may also highlight an attacking aircraft to the threat, especially nightvision-capable threats. Smoke, haze, and precipitation will degrade NVD capabilities, however, NVD still increase the pilots awareness of the battlefield. Artificial Illumination. Artificial illumination (log-illumination) devices can be used effectively at night with NVD. They provide a very accurate reference for target area identification and can establish run-in lines. When used, the devices need to be funnelled skyward in order not to illuminate the surrounding terrain. Due to the halo effect of such a flare, it is best to place it away from the actual target to prevent it from reducing NVD effectiveness. Marks. IR-marking devices provide the perfect complement to NVD and allow the pilot to identify both friendly and enemy positions. As a result, the combination of NVD and IR marking devices allows safe, accurate employment in close proximity to friendly ground forces. Particular care must be taken to ensure that friendly location is not confused with target location. Artillery. Artillery marking round effects are enhanced with NVD. The high explosive/marking round is obvious upon detonation and will be visible for 1 to 2 minutes. Burning embers may be seen up to 10 minutes after impact. Artillery flares that provide bright visible light are not normally used for NVD activities because they are not covert. The smoke round provides smoke and burning embers that can be seen for several miles. Rockets. They produce a brilliant flash lasting 1 to 5 seconds. The radiated heat from the rocket usually can be seen for 1 to 5 minutes after impact, depending on the terrain.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (6) IR Marking Devices. There are numerous IR pointers in use by ground units. These pointers vary in intensity and are all visible with NVD but not with the naked eye.

b.

NVD Mission Execution (1) Aircraft Ordnance. In general, all free-fall munitions will cause an initial flash and may cause fires that are useful as marks. Depending on terrain, these weapons will heat up the ground in the impact area that will be visible even in the absence of fire. This is usable as a mark for a short period of time and can also be used for adjustments. Ground Unit IR Marking Devices. There are several ground marking devices available for use. Effective range of these devices will vary depending on their power and the amount of illumination that is present. Depending on environmental conditions, the entire IR beam or just a flashlight-type spot around the target may be seen. High illumination levels will decrease the effectiveness of IR marks but will not negate them completely. When working with IR pointers, try to minimize the target designation time. This will minimize the chance of friendly positions being compromised, especially if the enemy is night vision capable. There is also a variant available that can be carried by aircrew and used to mark ground targets from the air. Airborne IR Marking Devices. Airborne marking devices include targeting pods and hand held devices. Effective range will vary depending on their power and the amount of illumination and environmental conditions present but usually these devices function extremely well in good conditions from medium altitude. They may be set to flash or maintain a steady beam. Highillumination levels will decrease the effectiveness of IR marks but will not negate them completely. These devices may be used to increase FAC and aircrew SA by marking the target prior to ingress and may be used as a primary or secondary mark. Aircraft equipped with these devices must coordinate with the FAC prior to their use. IR Pointer Terminology. When working with IR pointers, use brevity words. Pilots and FAC must be familiar with these to avoid confusion.

(2)

(3)

(4)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) c. Friendly Marking. Ground forces can illuminate their position with IR devices or other friendly tagging devices. IR lights should be placed where aircrew overhead can visually acquire and maintain sight of friendly positions. During low luminance level scenarios, the entire IR beam will be seen with NVD. The shape of the IR beam can be used to identify the FACs and targets position. The IR beam will appear narrow or pencil-like at the FACs position, while the beam will be mushroomed at the target. IR pointers can also be used to direct the NVD-equipped aircrew to the FACs position, either by walking the beam out to the aircraft (if the aircraft has an NVD external lights package) or by wiggling the IR pointer to designate to the aircrew the FACs position (the non-moving end of the pointer). Again, it is necessary for the FAC to ensure that the aircraft uses system aids to ensure that friendly troops are not confused with enemy locations due to disorientation. Planning an attack axis (pre-planned or as directed by the FAC) with only a small offset from the controllers pointer-to-target line can also help the aircrew confirm the controllers position. (1) IR Marking Devices: (a) IR position markers. There are numerous IR position markers used by ground forces. These devices can be flashing, programmable, or steady. They vary in intensity and all are visible with NVD, but not with the naked eye. Flashing devices are easier to visually acquire. When possible, identification of marking devices should be verbally confirmed with the aircrew to avoid misidentification with other ground lighting. As with IR pointers, the higher the ambient illumination, the more difficult it will be to acquire these devices. IR Pointers. Used alone or in conjunction with other IR marking devices, IR pointers are very effective for identifying both friendly and enemy positions. Depending on environmental conditions, pilots (and enemy personnel) may see the entire beam or just the flickering of the IR pointer source on the ground. By having the ground party rope the aircrafts position or a general direction from them, their position is easily identified, assuming the aircraft is close enough and there are not too many light sources in the area. For example, if the aircraft is egressing from the south and calls ROPE SOUTH, the ground party should then point their IR pointer south and move it in a circular motion. Enemy NVD capabilities should be considered before using IR pointers.

(b)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (c) GLINT Tape. Ground forces with GLINT tape may be seen by low-light level television, depending on the amount of environmental or artificial illumination in the area. Identification of friendly forces by this manner should be verified by other means to avoid misidentification. Do not use more than a 1/2-inch square for an individual or four 1-inch squares per vehicle.

(2)

Clearance Parametres. Aircrew conducting night/limited visibility CAS must be in positive communication with ground forces. When LTD and LST are employed, ground forces could hear SPOT, meaning the aircraft has acquired the laser energy. SPOT does not constitute clearance to release ordnance. When IR pointers are employed, ground forces must further hear VISUAL (meaning the FACs position is positively identified) and TALLY (meaning the aircraft has positive target identification). Always ensure aircraft are using target coordinates and systems aids such as INS steering to prevent confusion of friendly and target locations. This is in conjunction with standard laser safety cones. CAS Briefing Form. When using IR target pointer/illuminators, indicate the target mark type in line 7 of the CAS Briefing Form with IR or IR pointer. Additionally, include the pointer-totarget line also in line 7 of the CAS briefing form (see Annex A). Friendly Tagging Devices. Units equipped with tagging devices can use their capability to relay latest position to C2 nodes equipped to receive and display data. If airborne CAS forces are equipped to receive and/or display this information, they can use it to help confirm or update friendly locations.

(3)

(4)

Section IV. Urban Close Air Support


0417. Introduction. Urban operations can be planned and conducted across the range of military missions. They may be conducted on or against objectives in a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and the presence of non-combatants are dominant features. The compressed battlespace in the urban environment creates unique considerations for planning and conducting CAS activities. These include activities in urban canyons, de-confliction in confined airspace, restrictive ROE, difficulty in threat analysis, the presence of non-combatants, the potential for collateral damage and the increased risk of fratricide.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0418. Size of Urban Areas. Population is the most common method of classifying the size of urban areas. The following categories apply: a. b. c. d. Strip Areas (linear development along roadways, railways, etc.). Villages (population less than 3,000). Towns and Small Cities (population 3,000 to 100,000). Large Cities (population greater than 100,000).

0419. Threats. Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a variety of weapon systems. The urban environment also affects the employment of antiaircraft weapons, including AAA, MANPADS, and SAM systems. Light to medium AAA may be employed from ground sites, from the tops of buildings or weapons mounted on civilian vehicles. The terrain may limit suppression options and the cluttered environment with lights, fires and smoke will make threat and target acquisition difficult. 0420. Infrared Signatures. IR signatures are affected by the proximity of other buildings and structures. When using FLIR, aircrew must pay particular attention in this environment. Urban temperatures are generally higher than rural areas and can be 5-10 degrees Celsius higher than the surrounding environment. Thermal heating also adversely affects thermal sights. 0421. Command and Control. Urban terrain presents severe problems in maintaining communications due to manmade structures that inhibit LOS and absorb or reflect transmitted signals. While these problems will force a higher degree of decentralization, the combat force should make every attempt to minimize them. The use of aircraft as re-broadcast facilities and rooftop communicators can minimize ground based LOS communication limitations. A detailed, flexible and redundant C2 plan is essential. 0422. Forward Air Controller Considerations. In addition to normal FAC equipment recommended items for urban CAS activities include: a. b. c. d. IR strobe light. Chemlights. Pyrotechnics (smoke/illumination). Access to a grenade launcher with illumination and smoke rounds.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) The FAC must plan for redundant communications and marking tools. A single tool will not work in all urban environments. An FAC will only be able to utilize a laser designator when in a stationary position and preferably from an elevated position. 0423. Proficiency. Considerable training in an urban environment is required for both FAC and aircrew proficiency and a very high FAC proficiency in more normal CAS procedures is critical if the FAC is to step into an urban environment with no previous urban training. For successful Urban CAS there are a number of specific considerations: a. Aircraft on call should hold over an unpopulated area, one cleared by friendly forces or other safe area whilst the aircrew build their SA of the target and of friendly locations. The FAC must provide extra details in the CAS remarks section of the brief working from big to small features. Additionally, the aircrew must ensure that the FAC is kept aware of what they can, or cannot, see. If a ground FAC cannot see the target, terminal attack control hand-off to an airborne FAC, if available should be considered. The FAC may not be in a position to observe all buildings containing friendly forces due to intervening buildings and battlefield confusion. During urban CAS it is likely that the FAC will be marking and engaging targets within 100 metres of his own position - within Danger Close parameters. The FAC must select the appropriate ordnance to limit the potential of fratricide. The tactical situation will be changing rapidly even if only from building to building and the CAS aircraft may need to be utilised to confirm and report targets. Aircrew may need to be cleared (Type 2/Type 3-control), once targets that are positively identified as enemy but not seen by the FAC, are to be engaged. Aircraft on call but not immediately required for CAS should be encouraged where possible and tactically sound to overfly the units position and reconnoitre adjacent threat avenues leading into the FACs location.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0424. Navigation. Navigation in urban areas is usually more difficult than over natural terrain. Maps fail to show the vertical development of urban terrain and rapid movement from position to position can often create confusion between aerial and ground observers as to friendly and enemy locations. Familiarity with the characteristics of urban terrain will allow aircrew to discern key features of this environment. Aircrew and ground controllers should perform detailed mission planning to maximize the effectiveness of all available assets. A running dialogue should be emphasized after the brief is given. 0425. Air-to-Ground Coordination. An urban grid system labelling structures and prominent features (see Figures 4-8, 4-9, 4-10 and 4-11) should be prepared. The FAC should select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers, road junctions, buildings, bridges, etc. For instance: a. Basic Urban Grid. Figure 4-8 demonstrates a basic urban grid where areas and buildings have been lettered and numbered clockwise around the area or block starting from the most north-western area or building. Referring to block letter and number will provide a quick cueing process. City streets, alleys and other easily recognizable topographic features can delineate the boundaries of the blocks. CAS planners need to ensure that all players are using the most current and accurate maps, imagery, etc. that are being used for reference. Objective Area Grid. Where troops are intending to operate in a specific area (Figure 4-9), the basic principle of numbering those areas of specific interest is amended to reflect area A as the primary area and then lettering the additional areas clockwise from the most northwest corner. Numbering follows the previous example but only those buildings most likely to be involved in action are numbered. Building Reference Grid. Although of more interest to troops on the ground for identifying specific activity in buildings during close quarter battle, the ability to identify specific parts of a building may be of use when calling in direct fire from supporting helicopters. At Figure 4-10, the target building is divided into lettered columns using obvious divisions of the building and then numbered floors. Because of LOS problems it is best to use the unconventional procedure of numbering from the top floor down. This will assist identification when aircraft are used as they do not have to first see the ground floor in order to identify which is floor #1. FAC would ensure that the correct building and relevant elevation is being observed by supporting Air and simply call for fire into the desired area using the building grid.

b.

c.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) d. Target Reference Point (TRP). TRP (Figure 4-11) may also be used. Buildings or distinctive urban structures in and around the objective area might be labelled TRP#1, TRP#2, etc. TRP should be committed to memory by the FAC (and if possible aircrew) to expedite passing or interpreting a call for fire. If fire is being received, pass a TRP number, heading, approximate distance and description of where and what type of fire is being received.

0426. Reactive Talk-On. If time and communication capabilities exist, the minimum items on the normal CAS brief should be used. However, the uncertainty of urban warfare means it is possible to receive fire from a position that cannot be covered by one of the sectoring methods discussed. Immediate reactive calls should be directive and descriptive, Razor 11, request immediate engagement, mortar position, 320 degrees, 100 metres from Globe water-tower. Whatever briefing format is used, it must ensure critical information is passed between concerned participants. Whether using the traditional or an abbreviated briefing format, describing the target location as it relates to surrounding structures is essential. Plain language descriptions will greatly assist the CAS aircrew in locating the target. In all cases however, a common reference point for both the FAC and aircrew must be established prior to talk on. Items that provide variation in colour or contrast will allow for faster target acquisition, but the FAC must remember that what he observes on the side of a feature might not correspond to that which the aircrew will see from altitude. 0427. Urban Grid System. If the supported unit uses one system and CAS aircrew have their own, it will make fire support impossible. The use of common photoreconnaissance data for the preparation of any grid systems is critical. The preparation of suitable, common-datum, maps and sketches will be critical when considering action within urban areas. Once engaged in urban operations, considerable effort will be required to ensure that maps and sketches are regularly updated and distributed to all relevant users. All maps, sketches and photographs require date and update references to ensure that all players have a means by which they can confirm that they are using matching data. a. Whatever type of grid system is chosen, it should be standardized so all units have the correct information to include the following: C2 HQ, FSCC, reconnaissance and surveillance teams, intelligence section, and all assets, including artillery, mortars, and both RW and FW aircraft. Development and implementation of an urban grid system will only be effective if all players utilize it.

b.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) c. The use of TRP or an urban grid requires some degree of communication. If aircrew are operating without any of the above preplanned control measures, then disciplined voice communications (cadence, clarity, brevity) will be critical. Even when using control measure graphics, FAC should select the biggest and brightest structure nearby for initial orientation between themselves and the aircrew. The time to pass a brief and then pass talk-on type remarks will decrease as the level of pre-mission planning increases. Whereas it may take 5-10 minutes for a detailed talk-on using only a 1:12,500 city map, it may only take 2-3 minutes given a photograph or line-art urban grid.

0428. Ground Unit Control Measures. Establishing objectives and phase lines assists in understanding the ground scheme of manoeuvre and is one method to integrate air and ground activities. All types of maps and charts; from joint operations graphic charts or aerial photos to tourist maps may be utilised in the urban environment. 0429. Weapons Selection. The requirements for urban CAS weapons must focus on rapid employment, minimum collateral damage, the ability to employ them in proximity to ground forces and high precision. The target group in urban tactical activities may include troops in the open, armoured vehicles and enemy forces using the urban terrain (buildings) as firing positions or strong points. A minimum collateral damage capability is essential to protect non-combatants, preserve whatever local and international support might exist, and to reduce the cost of rebuilding the urban area upon conflict termination. CAS weapons should minimize building damage (which further inhibits own force activities) and be deliverable in very close proximity to friendly forces. To achieve the desired level of destruction, neutralization, or suppression of enemy CAS targets, it is necessary to tailor the weapons load, fusing option, to the required results. For example, general purpose bombs would be effective against troops and vehicles in the open and forward firing EO/IR weapons may be effective against individual vehicles in the open, whereas hardened, mobile, or pinpoint targets may require specialized weapons such as laser guided, EO, IR munitions, or aircraft with special equipment or capabilities. In all cases, the requesting commander needs to know the type of ordnance to be expended. To provide effective CAS, the weapons delivery platform must have adequate sensors to deliver weapons with the required high degree of accuracy.

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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-8 - Urban Grid. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-9 - Objective Area Reference Grid. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-10 - Building Reference Grid. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-11 - Target Reference Points -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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SectionV. UnmannedAerial VehicleTactics.


0430. UAV are uniquelycapableCAS supportand CAS platforms. Most UAV offer for elements. targeting groundmanoeuvre extendedloitertime and supportprecision provideprecision fires againstkey targets. Armed UAV can also planning 0431. UAV Tactics/integration. This section identifiescapabilities, conduct CAS operations. and tactics used by UAV to supportand considerations vary betweendifferentplatformsand need to be knownfor proper UAV capabilities to employment. Most new UAV have the capability be, or alreadyare, armed and provide extremelyaccuratefires with Laser and GPS guided weapons. The can currentremotevideo terminalsused by groundforces allow the FMV to be viewed may include: by directlyfrom the UAV real-time groundforces. UAV Payloads a. b. limitedutilityat nightwith illuminated/ EO permitscolouridentification; lightedtargets. and allows FLIRallowsfor day or nightworkingin the far lR spectrum (NOTE: Thermal crossover, for visibilitythrough dust and smoke clouds, and thermal blooming in the target area will degrade performance FLIR). of as Near-lRpassivenightopticsworksthe samespectrum NVGs. LTD allowsfor markingby laser spot trackersor terminalguidanceof for laser-guided ordnance; desirable UAV to have the abilityto change LTD PRFcodesin flight. lR Pointer permits nighftime marking of targets for NVD-capable platforms personnel. or SAR providesdetailedpicturesof radar significantobjects and geofeaturesregardless weather. of of tracking/cueing sensors Movingtarget indicator allowsfor automatic onto movingtargets. conventional nuclearand enhanced radiological, Chemical, biological, weaponsdetection. weapons. Laserand GPS-guided

c. d.

e. f. g. h. i.

0432. Planning Considerations: UAV, either FW or RW, operateusing the same rules as manned aircraft,to include airlcornelaser procedures. There are some when utilizing UAV. that uniqueconsiderations needto be addressed

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) a. b. c. Detailed plan for no radio. Lost Link procedures and UAV contingency routes. Control at the lowest tactical level or at the command level best suited to exploit the UAV FMV, sensors, imagery, communications and weapons payload capabilities. Difficult to re-task a UAV in flight over large distances due to low transit airspeeds. UAV flown above the coordination altitude require de-confliction for operations and airspace. A UAV must adhere to the Hellfire designator exclusion zone when designating for RW CAS. Due to the shallow look angles of helicopters, UAV ideally should be looking approximately on the same bearing, and as low as tactically possible, to assist with target area orientations for verbal talk-on of RW assets. When being supported by armed UAV, the required attack profiles or orbits the UAV needs to launch weapons have to be planned for to include timing and de-confliction with other aircraft in the area. A UAV with radio relay payloads in the UHF and VHF frequency range can act as a low-flying, surrogate satellite. This capability allows ground forces to communicate, in an urban environment or mountainous terrain, over long distances using standard man-portable radios. Weather is a major consideration for UAV flight operations, particularly the launch and recovery. UAV that fly low and have a large visual signature or a loud engine noise will alert enemy forces, or may give away friendly positions. UAV can and are equipped with class-3 and 4 lasers. Planners must ensure planning occurs for nominal ocular hazard distance if working with ground forces or piloted aircraft as manned aircraft may fly through the laser unexpectedly. Additionally, ground forces may be illuminated with reflected laser energy or may be looking up at the UAV. Proper coordination and tactics will minimize this risk.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

l.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) m. UAVs are limited in their ability to react to surface to air threats. Consideration must be given to the threat environment to allow for survivability of the asset.

0433. Tactics: a. The standard CAS briefing format is used by UAV and UAV flight crews, however the standard CP and IP matrix used by current high performance manned strike/fighter aircraft are usually too far away to be of use to an armed UAV. The UAV will generally orbit over the target area for weapons delivery, using the following tactics

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-12 - Wheel Orbit. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------b. Figure 4-12 depicts the profile used when there is no restriction or required final attack headings and terrain features or urban development do not mask the target. Orbit size is approximately 12 kilometres in radius around and above the target. The orbit allows the UAV to roll in on time line, command or when ready. If the UAV is awaiting clearance to fire the UAV weapons payload operator will update the run-in heading and pass to the controlling authority as required. If terrain or urban development is masking the target during portions of the orbit the UAV pilot may off-set to minimize masking.

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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-13 - Figure 8 Orbit. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------c. The Figure 8 Orbit depicted in Figure 4-13 above and the race track orbit depicted in Figure 4-14 (next page) may be used when restrictions to final attack headings are required for airspace de-confliction purposes. These restrictions include: friendly positions, collateral damage concerns, terrain/urban development, or if cluttered or congested airspace precludes UAV operations.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-14 - Racetrack Orbit -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Section VI - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Methods and Procedures


0434. General. The use of an FAC(A) is a proven, effective means to provide air support to surface forces. The FAC(A) may be equipped with any type of aircraft. Helicopters are very useful and have the advantage of being capable of landing almost anywhere. Light observer aircraft are effective in moderate or low threat environments. In more hostile environments, fighter aircraft may sometimes be used. The functions, however, are basically as outlined here, regardless of the type of aircraft. The options available for the employment of an FAC(A) are endless and run the spectrum from operating as the FAC's over-the-horizon-targeting system to operating nearly autonomously. 0435. Provide Over-the-Horizon-Targeting. In many cases, the FAC(A), by virtue of his increased surveillance of the battlefield, can locate targets invisible to the FAC. Once located, the decision to engage will be made by the FSC and a mission coordinated. This coordination will usually be done by the FAC and the FAC(A) will be "read-in" by monitoring the frequency. The FAC(A) may be given the authority to adjust fires or direct CAS. The FAC may retain "cleared hot" or "abort" authority for the CAS aircraft should he desire too. 0436. Provision of Target Marking or Suppressive Fires. Even if the FAC can get eyes on the intended target, he may require the aid of the FAC(A) if other assets are not available to mark the target or provide SEAD. The FAC(A) will monitor the CAS briefing and conduct other coordination on the TACP frequency. Obviously, the most important point of coordination is to ensure that the FAC and FAC(A) are looking at the same target. At the appropriate time the FAC(A) will move in to provide the required fires, i.e. WP mark, LASER Spot, or other ordnance. The FAC will likely retain control authority for the CAS aircraft. 0437. Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Generated Mission. In the most extreme case, the supported unit will not have the capability to coordinate and control CAS, or other fire support means, in support of its mission. If a unit does not rate an FAC team, has suffered casualties, or is helicopter borne, the FAC(A) may be required to "do it all". In this situation, the FAC(A) will locate suitable targets which impact on the unit's mission, coordinate required fires, and control those fires to support the manoeuvre of the supported unit. 0438. Regardless of the degree of autonomy exercised by the FAC(A) in accomplishing his mission, it is important to understand that his authority is specified by the supported unit. And regardless of where on the spectrum of FAC(A) missions he may be for a particular mission, the FAC(A) must always coordinate all fires with the supported unit.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0439. Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Tactics. There are advantages in placing the FAC above the battlefield. However, survivability is an important consideration in FAC(A) employment. The threat can partially be reduced through tactics and by maintaining distance from enemy sources of fire. When operating in forward areas, the FAC(A) must coordinate his movement with ground-based fire support activities to avoid conflictions. Accurate navigation is imperative for the FAC(A). 0440. Control Positions. a. The fixed wing FAC(A) must coordinate his movements with the attacking aircraft. He should position himself so that he is over friendly territory and has full vision of both the target and the attack aircraft. Enemy defences may force the FAC(A) to stand off at a safe distance or pass control to an available ground FAC. An FAC(A) may indicate his control position to the attacking aircraft if operationally desirable. Figures 4-15 to 4-17 reflect basic FAC(A) holding patterns for operating near the target; Figure 4-18 indicates suitable control areas for FAC(A) operating at low level and well back (2000 metres or more) from the target. The helicopter FAC(A) will normally operate at the forward edge of friendly forces but aiming to maintain 5-7 km from the target using onboard sensors and stabilised optics for detailed observation of the target. He will operate at low level and be able to make maximum use of terrain to mask his position. He has an advantage in that he will normally be located behind direct fire weapon positions but underneath the trajectory of indirect fire weapons. He will also be on the battlefield control radio net and may also be able to control indirect fires.

b.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-15 - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Overhead Holding Pattern. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-16 - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Side Holding Pattern. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-17 - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) "Figure 8" Pattern. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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NOTE To ensure de-confliction, the fixed wing FAC(A) should keep 500 metres clear of the attack track. This is not critical for helicopters. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-18 - Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Low Level Holding Pattern. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0441. Factors. It is essential to establish the best possible control position. Therefore, after a ground FAC or TACP (ALO) has briefed the FAC(A) on the ground situation he will identify the target position on his map and then by careful study he will select what he considers to be the best control position. He then goes to this position and confirms the choice. To enable him to do this, the following factors must be considered: a. b. c. The best attack course and associated IP (if required). The target indication methods available. The tactical situation and tactical flying limitations in the forward battle area. Dead ground (see paragraph 0444).

d.

0442. Target Indication Methods. The FAC(A) may use the target indication methods described in Section II. In addition, laser or other marking means may be used from an aircraft to mark or designate ground targets. This may be achieved from the FAC(A)'s own aircraft or another aircraft specifically tasked for this purpose. In either case, the FAC(A) may play a part in the coordination of the manoeuvres of the attack and marking aircraft. The following three paragraphs describe variations of the reference-point method suitable for use by FAC(A). 0443. Single-Smoke Method. Ideally, the FAC(A) should be able to mark a target. However, if this is not possible owing to limitations of enemy fire and own operating position, he might be able to mark either a good line feature or small natural reference point some distance from the target. Once the attack aircrew has identified the feature, the FAC can give simple verbal directions from it to the target. 0444. Tactical Flying Limitations in the Forward Battle Area. The position of friendly forces has an overriding influence on the choice of an attack course and therefore the control position. The FAC(A) must position himself to give the troops on the ground, the attack aircrew and himself the best chance of success and survival. Close liaison with the troops being supported is essential. In addition, battlefield conditions may limit the FAC(A)'s freedom of reconnaissance and choice of control position. 0445. Dead Ground. If the FAC(A) is to operate at low level over friendly territory it is ideal to have the control position in an area of dead ground so that reconnaissance, planning and control can be done with minimum waste of time and maximum ease of movement. The position should give the clearest view of the planned attack pattern of the attack aircraft.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0446. Resolution of Factors. Through map study and careful consideration of the aforementioned factors, the FAC(A) determines the optimum control point. To give guidance, Figure 4-18 shows the areas around an angle-off attack pattern, which are suitable for controlling and which are applicable to any size of pattern. The control position is then verified by a short airborne reconnaissance and a nearby navigation point selected so that subsequently the control position may be found quickly and easily. The orientation point can be any local feature easy to be seen. 0447. Sequence of Events. The sequence of events in planning and controlling an attack by an FAC(A) operating at low level some distance from the target is as follows: 0448. Receipt of Target Location and TOT. a. From map choose likely attack pattern and control position. control position. Go to

b.

If the attack course and control position are suitable, then identify target and own troops on the ground and select an orientation point. If the above is not suitable, choose a new control position and a new orientation point. Match IP to attack course. Make notes for a detailed target description. Plan the attack. Brief the attack aircrew, clear the attack with the TACP, alert mortars or guns for smoke, and then clear the aircraft for attack. If marking, do so at the required time. Call for laid smoke, allowing for time of flight, burning time etc. Control the attack. Report results.

c.

d. e. f. g.

h. i. j. k.

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Section VII Precision Guided Munitions


0449. Laser, Inertial Navigation System, Global Positioning System Guided, and Digital Systems. Technology can assist in effective CAS. Laser and IAMbased systems can aid in target acquisition and weapons guidance. Additionally, digital information systems can expedite the transfer of critical targeting and C2 information between ground units, FAC, and CAS aircraft. Consideration must be given to the additional time and effort required to coordinate and execute PGM attacks over simple point-and-shoot weapons in a dynamic CAS environment. 0450. Laser-Guided Systems. Laser-guided systems provide the joint force with the ability to locate and engage high priority targets with an increased first-round hit probability. The accuracy inherent in laser-guided systems requires fewer weapons to neutralize or destroy a target. These systems effectively engage a wider range of targets, including moving targets. They provide additional capabilities, but also have distinct limitations. When enemy equipment includes laser alarms and/or countermeasures, target illumination may still provide a superior mark on surface features (like rocks) near the target with good security. Laser operations supplement other CAS procedures and are not substitutes for other planning and execution procedures and techniques. In any laser-designating situation, strive for simplicity and use all available resources to help ensure first-pass success. Including a laser code and a laser-to-target line in the CAS briefing to the aircrew will enhance mission accomplishment. This paragraph provides CAS-specific TTP and background information on laser-guided system employment. a. Basic Considerations. There are five basic considerations for using LSTs or LGWs: (1) LOS must exist between the designator and the target and between the target and the LST/LGW. Pulse repetition frequency codes of the laser designator and the LST/LGW must be set on the same PRF code. The direction of attack must allow the LST/LGW to sense enough reflected laser energy from the target for the seeker to acquire and lock-on the target. The laser designator must designate the target at the correct time, and for the correct length of time. If the length of time is insufficient, the seeker head could break lock and the flight pattern of the LGW becomes unpredictable.

(2)

(3)

(4)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (5) The delivery system must release the LGW within the specific delivery envelope to ensure the weapon can physically reach the target. There is an increased hazard to friendly forces when aircrew release weapons behind friendly lines.

b.

Environmental Factors can affect laser designators and seeker head performance. Tactics and techniques must consider low clouds and fog, smoke, haze, snow and rain, solar saturation, and other visually limiting phenomena.

c.

Beam Divergence and Target Size. If a designator has a beam spread or divergence of 1 milliradian, its spot would have a diametre of approximately one metre at a distance of 1,000 metres in front of the designator. If this spot was aimed at a three-metre by three-metre box 3,000 metres away, the laser spot would be as wide and tall as the box or larger if the angle of incidence is not perpendicular. The laser spot size is a function of beam divergence, the distance from the laser designator to the target and the angle of incidence between the surface lased and the laser beam. after the target. At longer slant ranges the laser spot could be larger than the target thus causing the LGW to hit the spot but still miss the point target. Target Reflection. Most surfaces have a mixture of mirror-like and scattered reflections. Laser energy reflects in an arc, but is strongest at the angle where it would reflect if the surface were a mirror. If the laser designator is perpendicular to a surface the reflection can be seen from all angles on the designated side, but can be detected best near the laser designator to target line. When the surface is at an angle to the laser designator, the angle of strongest reflection is also predictable. Glass, water and highly polished surfaces are poor surfaces to designate because they reflect laser energy in only one direction. This requires the seeker to be in this small region and looking toward the reflected energy to achieve target acquisition. Battlefield dynamics will rarely provide the opportunity to perfectly align laser designation/reflectivity in the direction of approaching aircraft or munitions. Strict adherence to laser cones or baskets and centre mass target designation will best ensure success. Laser Operations are divided into three primary categories: target ranging, target acquisition, and weapons guidance: (1) Target Ranging. Target ranging systems can provide accurate range, azimuth, and elevation information to identified targets.

d.

e.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (2) Target Acquisition. Target acquisition involves the use of an LST carried by the aircraft and a LTD aimed by a ground team. LST are laser sensors that provide head-up display cueing for aircraft equipped with these systems. While scanning for laser energy, these systems have a limited field of view that depends on range and switch settings. In general, the chances of acquisition are improved when a complete CAS brief (9-line) is used and proper final attack headings are given. Cueing aids, such as target marks, landmarks, and accurate target coordinates can assist the pilot to point the aircraft in the direction of the target. Weapons Guidance. Weapons guidance allows a LGW to home in on reflected laser energy placed on a target by an LTD. This allows precision delivery of weapons as well as some standoff deliveries.

(3)

f.

Laser Hardware. (1) Laser-Guided Weapons. All LGWs home on PRF coded reflected laser energy. Some LGWs require target illumination before launch and during the entire time of flight. Other LGWs require target designation only during the terminal portion of flight. All LGWs require designation until weapon impact. Typical LGWs are: Laser-guided bombs: PAVEWAY II and III. Laser-Guided Missiles: AGM-65E Laser Maverick and AGM-114 HELLFIRE. LGMs generally provide greater standoff launch ranges than LGWs. Greater range provides increased survivability for aircrew operating in a high threat environment. Aircrew and FAC must exercise caution when launching LGMs from behind friendly troops. Laser Maverick Employment considerations include: (a) In the event the laser signal is lost, the weapon will safe itself and overfly the target. The Maverick system allows aircrew to engage targets designated by either air or ground sources with in-flight selectable PRF codes. Delivery aircraft must have unobstructed LOS to the target to achieve Maverick lock-on. The missile must lock-on to the laser source prior to launch. 4 - 54 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(2) (3)

(b)

(c)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(d)

The Maverick and the laser designator must be set to the same PRF code prior to launch. For other than self-designation, the attack heading must be adjusted to optimise the reflected laser energy.

(e)

(4)

Laser Target Designators. Ground laser target designators (GLTD) are employed by ground forces to illuminate targets with laser energy. LGW use this energy to guide to the target. Laser spot trackers use the reflected laser energy as a reference point for lock-on and tracking. The laser energy PRF is adjustable and must match the PRF setting on the weapon or tracker. GLTD ranges vary from 10 metres to 20 km. Airborne LTD are carried on aircraft and provide the same function as the GLTD. Airborne lasers are capable of very long range lasing and are normally employed below 30,000 feet AGL.

(5)

Laser Range Finders/Target Locating Devices. LRF use low power laser pulses to measure range to an object. These systems will not currently provide the accuracy needed for a single IAM weapon to hit a point target. Tactical LRF ranges vary from 10 metres to 20 km. Accuracy is range/equipment dependent and generally varies from 1 to 15 metres at maximum ranges. Target locating devices incorporate a LRF, magnetic or gyroscopic compass, tilt measurement devices, and GPS. These systems measure the range and angles from its position provided by the GPS to mathematically derive a target location. If used correctly, the quality of the target location is generally much better than that of a hand-derived coordinate. The accuracy of the coordinate is dependent on many variables. Errors are induced by inaccurate GPS data, poor azimuth, range and elevation data, system calibration and user skill. These errors are magnified with range and can result in significant TLE. Due to the variables listed previously, TLE will generally vary from 10 metres at 1 km to more than 300 metres at maximum ranges. Laser Spot Trackers. LST are systems that allow visual acquisition of a coded laser designated target. LST must be set to the same code as the coded laser target designator for the user to see the target being lased. In the case of airborne LST, the aircrew acquires the laser designated spot (target) and either employs LGW or executes visual deliveries of non-laser

(6)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) ordnance. The aircrew can select PRF codes for the LST while in flight. g. Laser Procedures. (1) Attack Headings. FAC provide aircrew with an attack heading. The attack heading must allow aircrew to acquire the reflected laser energy. Due to the possibility of false target indications, attack headings should avoid the target-to-laser designator safety zone, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise. The safety zone is a 20 degree cone whose apex is at the target and extends 10 degrees either side of the target-to-designator line. The optimal attack zone is a 120 degree cone whose apex is at the target and extends 60 degrees either side of the target-tolaser designator line. To give the laser trackers/weapons a better chance of acquiring the reflected laser spot, a smaller 90 degree cone (+/-45 degrees) is preferred (see Figure 4-20). ADVANTAGES
Increased stand-off Larger target area footprint

TYPE/DESIGNATORS
Airborne

DISADVANTAGES

Larger laser spot size Increased susceptibility to podium effect 1. Trail Position Increased probability of success Axis restrictive (spot detection) Increased platform predictability Increased stand-off 2. Overhead Wheel Decreased platform predictability Decreased effectiveness in target Good stand-off areas with varying vertical Position developments (podium effect) 3. Offset or Opposing Decreased platform predictability Axis restrictive Excellent stand-off Wheel Position Increased susceptibility to podium effect Coordination intensive Ground Smaller laser spot size Axis restrictive Decreased targeting ambiguity Increased designator exposure Rapid BDA Coordination intensive

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-19 - Airborne and Ground Designators Advantages and Disadvantages. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-20 - Example of Safety Zone and Optimal Attack Zones. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(2) Attack Angles. Aircrew release or launch LGWs so the reflected laser energy will be within the seeker field of view at the appropriate time. The maximum allowable attack angle (laser-totarget/seeker-to-target) depends upon the characteristics of the weapon system employed. If the angle is too large, the seeker will not receive enough reflected energy to sense the laser spot. Coordination with FAC. Laser-guided systems improve the delivery accuracy of unguided ordnance. If the attack aircraft has an LST, the FAC can designate the target for aircrew identification. Aircrew can use the LST as an aid to visually locate the target Once the aircrew locates the target, they can conduct an accurate attack using unguided ordnance. Aircraft equipped with laser designators can also be talked onto the target by the FAC, then designate the target and deliver the weapon using their own spot or in some cases confirm the correct target with an airborne IR marker.

(3)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (4) Employment of LGWs in conjunction with coded LTD is either autonomous or assisted. Autonomous LGW employment uses the CAS aircrafts on-board LTD for terminal weapons guidance. Most aircraft capable of delivering LGWs can provide on-board autonomous self-designation. Assisted LGW employment uses an off-board LTD for terminal weapons guidance. This is typically accomplished by a ground team operating a designator (such as a ground/vehicle LTD) or by another aircraft (known as buddy lasing). There are some aircraft that have no on-board LTD, but can carry and deliver LGWs. These require assisted LGW employment. Coded LTDs are ground and airborne systems that have two specific purposes. First, they provide terminal weapons guidance for LGWs. Second, they designate targets for coded LSTs. Coded LTDs emit laser energy with a PRF and require input of specific laser codes for operation. Codes are assigned to LGWs and directly relate to the PRF that harmonizes the designator and seeker interface. Coded LTDs used for terminal weapons guidance must be set to the same code as the laser-guided weapon. Certain LGWs, such as LGWs, are coded prior to takeoff and cannot be changed once the aircraft is airborne. However, most LTDs, with few exceptions, can change codes while airborne. The FAC will have to coordinate efforts to ensure both the aircraft and designator are on the same code. Coordination for the LTDs to match the LGWs code is conducted through the ATO, C2 controlling agency, or FAC CAS briefing. Sometimes, a designator will serve the dual purpose of target designation for a coded laser acquisition/spot tracker and terminal weapons guidance for LGWs. In these cases, the designator, spot tracker, and the weapon must have the same code. By STANAG 3733, targets may be designated using any code from 1111 to 8788. The first digit of this code indicates the use of any specialist systems. The remaining three digits of the code correspond to the PRF in use. At present some laser-equipped aircraft are limited in the number of codes available. Laser coding ensures that the system detects only the target designated by a specific LTD and disregards differently coded emissions within its field of view. Coding also complicates the enemy's countermeasures problem. When briefing LST-equipped aircraft, include the fourdigit laser code and laser-to-target line in accordance with the CAS briefing format. If aircraft check in with a different code, then it is the FACs responsibility to make appropriate corrections. Even if the aircraft is capable of self-designation, the FAC should have a backup ground designator ready if it is available. 4 - 58 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(5)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (6) Laser Designation Time. The aircrew may request a longer laser-on time based on munitions characteristics. If communications are unreliable, the FAC should begin designating 20 seconds before TOT or with 20 seconds remaining on TTT (unless the aircrew is using loft delivery). Laser designation time with LGW delivered from a loft profile will vary depending on the weapon being delivered. Refer to appropriate tactics manuals for loft laser designation time rules of thumb. While reducing laser operating time is important in a laser countermeasure environment or when using batteryoperated designators, designation time must be long enough to guarantee mission success.

h.

HELLFIRE Laser-Guided Systems Employment and Characteristics. (1) General. The HELLFIRE is an air-to-surface LGM system designed to destroy armoured and reinforced hard targets. It is guided by ground or airborne laser designators to rapidly engage multiple targets. Laser characteristics. The HELLFIRE system uses PRF codes in the range of 1111 to 1488 to achieve the highest probability of hit. It allows the aircrew to conduct multiple, rapid launches using one or two designation codes simultaneously. The aircrew can assign missiles to search for two codes simultaneously. The missile PRF code can be set or changed from the cockpit. If launching subsequent missiles (all set on the same PRF code) the FAC/designator shifts the laser designator to the next target prior to missile impact. If using two designators (each set to a different PRF code) the missile launch interval can be as low as two seconds. The use and coordination of multiple designators present a complex problem for the aircrew and the FAC/designator. Employment considerations. The employment considerations for the HELLFIRE missile follow the same mission analysis used for other platforms or forces. The following METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available - time available)-format will cover all the requirements: (a) Mission. What is required and is the HELLFIRE the best ordnance for the target? Enemy. What is the target, how many targets are there, are they moving, and are they close together or spread out? 4 - 59 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(2)

(3)

(b)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(c)

Terrain and weather. Are there hills, mountains, or buildings in the battle area? What is the ceiling and visibility in the area? Will wind, turbulence, or other atmospheric effects affect targeting? Troops. Where are the friendly troops, are designators available, where are the designators, and where are the helicopters? Time. How much time is available for the engagement?

(d)

(e) (4)

Coordination considerations: Aircrew and designators consider the following factors when coordinating HELLFIRE engagements. (a) Communications between aircrew, manoeuvre commander, designator, and FAC, if required. Number of missiles required, and location of targets. Designator codes for the missiles. Separation angle between launch aircraft and designator must be less than 60 degrees, using the target as the corner of the angle. Range from launch aircraft and target(s) must be within minimum and maximum missile range for the conditions. Safety considerations including the designator outside a 30 degree angle from the firing aircraft to the target using the aircraft as the corner of the angle, and troops or civilians in the surface danger zone. Obstacle clearance requirements including terrain and cloud height.

(b) (c) (d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(5)

Target designator options. Autonomous and remote are two basic options for designating the missiles target. (a) Autonomous. The launching aircraft designates its own target. This may be the easiest form of designation to set up, but requires the aircrew to identify the correct target.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (b) Remote. The target is designated by an aircraft other than the launching aircraft, or by a remote ground based designator. This requires the designator to properly identify and lase the target because the aircrew may not see the target during this option. Remote designation allows the launching aircraft to fire from a masked position, and with longer standoff than is possible with autonomous designation.

(6)

Launch modes. The two basic types of launch modes are Lock On Before Launch (LOBL) and Lock On After Launch (LOAL). Both launch modes can be used with either autonomous or remote designation options. (a) LOBL is when the missile seeker locks onto properly coded laser energy prior to the missile launch. The missile seeker must have direct LOS with the designated target for this launch mode to work properly. LOBL gives a higher probability of hit when the aircraft is close to the target. It is also used to confirm the aircraft is within missile launch constraints, that the missile sees the correct laser code and target, and when the threat or environment does not require delayed designation. LOAL is when the missile seeker locks onto the coded laser energy after the missile is launched and is in flight. This method allows the aircrew to launch the missile without LOS to the target. This reduces the exposure of launch aircraft, helps defeat laser countermeasures by delaying the designation, and extends the missile range when using a remote designator. LOAL has three different trajectories that can be used based on required obstacle clearance requirements and cloud ceiling limitations. They are LOAL-Direct (lowest trajectory), LOAL-LO (low trajectory), and LOAL-HI (highest trajectory).

(b)

(7)

Attacks on Multiple Targets. Multiple missiles attacking multiple high-threat targets reduce the aircrews exposure. Rapid fire reduces laser operating time when engaging multiple targets. During rapid fire, the aircrew uses a minimum of 8 seconds between missiles. Use longer intervals based on experience, terrain, target array, and battlefield obscuration. During multiple missile launches, the FAC/designator must be sure that subsequent missiles can receive reflected laser energy without interruption. Dust and smoke from initial missile detonations can 4 - 61 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) block or interrupt reception of laser energy by follow-on missiles. The FAC/designator should consider wind speed and direction when selecting multiple targets. Multiple missile launches require close coordination and timing.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-21 - HELLFIRE Designator Exclusion Zone. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0451. Inertial Aided Munitions. IAM can be delivered at night or through the weather at a set of coordinates by aircraft. The effectiveness of an IAM depends upon the tactical situation (type of target, desired weapons effects, target movement, etc.) and the accuracy, or TLE, of the target coordinates. In addition, CAS planners, FAC, and aircrew must ensure that the WGS-84 coordinate datum plane is used by both controller and weapon delivery platform when employing IAM. Datum planes should be verified prior to deployment/mission as part of deployment/mission checklist and coordinated or confirmed with the AOCC and/or higher echelons. Significant errors can result if different data or excessive TLE are used. These errors increase the risk of fratricide as the distance to friendly troops decreases to within the TLE. a. Advantages: (1) Accuracy. These weapons can be accurate if precise target location data is known. Accuracy is also unaffected (assuming GPS-aided guidance) by launch range. 4 - 62 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(2)

Standoff. These weapons can provide standoff capability at very long distances. Aircraft and aircrew can thereby effectively avoid any threat point defence weapons systems by employing these weapons. However, if stand-off is not required, aircrews can minimize release ranges to mitigate airspace de-confliction issues. All weather capability. IAM will normally offer an all weather capability because they do not require designators for guidance. IAM do not require the aircrew to see the target, as do unguided munitions, or to maintain a clear LOS to the target as do laserguided munitions. Wind Effects. Depending on type, IAMs may be adversely affected by strong winds encountered after release. Multiple target capability. Depending on platform and weapon variety, the weapons allow one aircraft to strike multiple stationary targets in one pass.

(3)

(4)

(5)

b.

Limitations: (1) Moving Targets. These weapons have no inherent capability against moving targets. IAM fly to pre-programmed coordinates. If the target moves between the time it is located, targeted, and the weapon impacts, the weapon will miss. Location Error. These weapons are only as accurate as the target location information provided in both the horizontal and vertical plane. If accurate coordinates and elevations are not available, the commander must be advised to the effects this will have on accuracy and subsequent reduction in effectiveness (All CAS participants must ensure they are using the same charts and same reference system. WGS-84 is the assumed standard unless stated otherwise in the SPINS). Human Errors. Since inserting the target coordinates into the IAM currently requires numerous interfaces, extreme attention to detail must be applied to those steps. Errors committed by the human interface will greatly affect the accuracy of the IAM employment.

(2)

(3)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (4) Malfunctions. The footprint for IAM in the event of a malfunction, such as loss of guidance or control fin hard-over, is very large and, in some cases, increases indefinably the probability of fratricide. When able, precision-guided munitions should be employed parallel to the FLOT. Depending on type, these weapons may be affected by strong winds encountered after release.

(5)

c.

Target Location Error. (1) TLE is defined as the difference between a set of target coordinates generated and the actual location of the target. In order to facilitate the communication of targeting accuracy, TLE is characterized in six categories. The first row presents the categories of TLE which range from best (CAT 1) to worst (CAT 6) and are used to classify the coordinate accuracy of any coordinate generating system. TLE is expressed primarily in terms of circular and vertical errors, or infrequently, as spherical error. (a) Circular Error (CE) is the error of the coordinates in the horizontal ground plane (i.e. circular). Vertical Error (VE) is the error of the coordinates in the vertical plane (i.e. elevation). Spherical Error (SE) is the error of the coordinates in 3D spherical space (i.e. the combined error of CE & VE).

(b)

(c)

(2)

These errors are expressed as CE90, VE90, and SE90 distances, which means that there is a 90 percent chance that the actual target will be within these circular and vertical distances. For example, a CE 90 of 20 feet means that there is a 90 percent chance that the horizontal coordinates are within 20 feet of the actual target. This is a very small potential target location error. A CE90 of 1000 feet is a very big potential location error. Factors that affect overall IAM weapon accuracy include but are not limited to TLE, type of IAM delivered, the accuracy of GPS, weapon guidance kit reliability, the method of the delivery, and the airframe dropping the IAM. TLE deals only with the target location error and usually is the greatest source of error for an IAM delivery. Aircrew should apply the known TLE in order to calculate on overall IAM delivery CE 90. Assuming that the weapon guides and functions normally, the weapon delivery CE 90 is the distance within which the IAM has a 90percent 4 - 64 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) chance of hitting, based on aircrew calculations with their particular airframe and known TLE. IAM that are delivered with a ninety degree impact angle can essentially mitigate any VE (elevation); therefore, when the target is primarily horizontal, CE is the primary targeting error. If a specific target is defined more vertically than horizontally (i.e. cave entrance on a slope or vertical face of a structure), the VE becomes a critical factor and must be incorporated. TARGET LOCATION ERROR CATEGORIES CAT 6 >1001 feet CAT 1 CAT 2 CAT 3 >305m 0-20 feet 21-50 feet 51-100 feet Or Large 0-6 m 715 m 16-30 m Elliptical Error ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 4-22 - Target Location Error Categories. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------d. TTP. IAM may be employed via two methods: Bomb on Coordinate (BOC) or visually (also known as relative targeting). CAT 4 101-300 feet 31-91 m CAT 5 301-1000 feet 92-305 m (1) Bomb on Coordinate. In this mode, IAM guide to a designated impact angle and azimuth over the coordinates entered into the munition via the aircraft system. Therefore, great care must be taken to ensure that the most accurate target location (i.e. lowest TLE) is obtained and correctly input into the weapon/system. The tactical situation (type of target, desired weapons effects, closest friendly forces, etc.), determines the acceptable TLE. If executing an IAM via BOC, each aircraft delivering an IAM is required to read back the target coordinates and elevation from the weapon/system to the FAC/FAC(A). When using aircraft system targeting, aircrew will confirm the coordinates loaded into the waypoint, offset, or target points. Aircrew will verify correct data is selected prior to the IN HOT call. Aircraft altitude and speed can yield significant standoff ranges (in excess of 10 NM.). Therefore, it is necessary to de-conflict high altitude/long range release profiles from other systems operating below the release altitudes. Significant issues exist when using weapons that transit over or around friendly forces using pre-programmed flight paths and impact points. Once released, these weapons may not be redirected.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) (2) Visual. Some aircraft can deliver IAM via a visual mode. This delivery mode is advantageous in dynamic situations where accurate (low TLE) coordinates cannot be obtained. Although not as accurate as BOC with low TLE, these weapons are at least as accurate as unguided weapons when employed visually. Therefore, all normal methods of de-confliction and release restrictions apply. If an IAM is delivered visually (i.e. not on coordinates) the coordinates do not have to be read back from the weapons system.

e.

Target Types and Target Location Error. Due to the nature of CAS, targets are likely to be difficult to see on targeting pods when operating from height. Because of the inherent inaccuracy of the FAC target locating equipment, TLE is also likely to be significant - particularly at night- and so the employment of GPS weapons must be carefully considered. If time allows, aircraft sensors can be used to determine the accuracy of the target coordinates. This should enable aircrew to gain confidence if the sensor is slaved to the coordinates and the target is visible. To minimise height error, weapons should be programmed to impact the target at the steepest impact angle possible. FAC Clearance. The FAC is responsible for clearing each aircraft into the attack. When utilizing a GPS weapon, aircraft will be delivering from an altitude where it is highly unlikely that the FAC will be able to visually acquire the releasing aircraft. As the FAC is responsible for confirming that weapons are delivered onto the correct target he will normally stipulate a mandatory attack track or arc to minimise effect of a misguided weapon. The aircrew must ensure that they are on, or within the mandated attack parameters, before requesting weapon release. Correction of TLE. A possible method of correcting for TLE is by applying corrections from the observed impact point of a single weapon to subsequent weapon releases. This correction can only originate from the FAC and must be via a newly calculated position based on an error correction. FAC should ensure that they possess the necessary template or figures for applying appropriate lat/long corrections from the observed fall of shot. These tables must be corrected for the latitude in which the engagement takes place.

f.

g.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

Section VIII Electro-Optical Sensor Operations


0452. Introduction. This section details the characteristics and use of EO sensors in support of CAS activities. When controlling EO sensor-equipped aircraft, some changes to the current procedures used for the traditional high method of FAC control are necessary. Because the aircraft sensor locks on to the given target grid, the FAC only needs to concentrate on references within the area seen by the sensor. Employing these procedures, the FAC can bypass the traditional visual control method of describing the general target area then 'walking' the aircrew's eyes from references to the target. In doing so, the FAC and aircrew make better use of advantages offered by EO sensors and ultimately speed-up the CAS process. 0453. Briefing Procedures. a. The FAC should prepare and pass the full CAS brief for the initial control. For subsequent controls the FAC only needs to pass location (Latitude/Longitude), height, target type and location of friendly forces if appropriate to the weapon delivery profile. It is normally helpful if a Line of Attack (LOA), either nominated by the FAC after considering ground manoeuvre/friendly forces restrictions, wind direction and battle effects obscuration or requested by the aircrew for weapon employment reasons, is established. The laser code the aircraft requires for target marking and that for target designation (if different) should be established and the Abort Code confirmed.

b.

0454. Procedures. a. The EO sensor of the designating aircraft will usually be locked on to the given target coordinates by approximately 15 NM run-in on the agreed LOA. The aircrew advises the FAC when their sensor is locked onto the target area and commence a description of features that are discernible on their EO display. The FAC will be advised when passing the 15 NM to run point at which time he illuminates the target with his ground designator. The FAC also commences description of the target which, because some sensor displays do not have the ability to display cardinal directions, should be in terms of Long, Short, Left and Right in relation to the LOA as seen by the aircrew on their sensor display screen.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) b. Aircrew should keep the FAC aware of which EO sensor they are using since different sensors may require alternative talk-on procedures. Aircrew should also confirm, through the use of question and answer technique that they are seeing the same objects described by the FAC. Aircrew must advise the FAC of any sensor problems or if they are reverting to visual (or non-EO assisted) mode. If the aircrew are confident the target has been located but have been unable to acquire the specific DMPI on the first pass a break away is initiated and a second attack run may be considered. The FAC recommences target description once the aircraft is re-established on the LOA. If the target has still not been acquired after a subsequent run and threat level permits, it may be possible to establish a pattern over, or close to, the target area. The FAC must be advised of any time when the aircrew wishes to continue to receive target description but are NOT established on a notified LOA. The FAC then changes the format of target description to one with reference to cardinal directions rather than LOA of the aircraft as per the first option. Under certain circumstances a suitably distinctive line feature may be nominated as a false cardinal direction. Generally, there are two options when employing EO sensors. One is for the aircraft to establish a circular or figure eight holding pattern over safe territory and start the attack run on the given LOA only after target acquisition. The second option, often used by aircraft equipped with LST devices, is to establish a first run attack profile and acquire the target during the run-in. The target acquisition methods are identical; therefore only the talk-on during the run-in will be addressed in the next paragraphs. The FAC should restrict his target description to those areas that are commensurate with the sensor's field of view. A suitable template laid over the map may be useful in this process.

c.

d.

e.

0455. Laser Target Designator Operation. a. If available, with ROE and tactical situation permitting, and on request of the aircrew, the FAC should use his LTD to designate the target as the attacking aircraft reaches approximately the 15 NM position. This may assist aircrew in LST equipped aircraft to acquire the target. Where airborne lasing is to be used and the laser frequency is the same as that on the ground laser, the ground laser must be switched off prior to weapon release. The FAC must then be prepared to designate the target, on instruction from the aircraft, in the event of problems with the airborne designation. Where the two codes are 4 - 68 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

b.

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) different, the FAC should confirm that the target designation code is inserted prior to weapon release. 0456. Use of Helmet Mounted Sights. When available, helmet-mounted sights may be used to slave the on board sensor to the target described by the FAC or on to opportunity targets seen by the aircrew. By reading back the coordinates and height of the target as seen by the sensor, aircrew and FAC may confirm that they are looking at the same target. FAC must be aware that most aircraft systems default to the WGS 84 datum. Consequently the FAC may be required to make a compensating adjustment from WGS 84 to the datum of the maps that are being used. 0457. Full Motion Video Operations. FMV is growing in its utility for CAS operations. However FMV provides a soda straw view of the target area through the aircrafts electro-optical/infra-red sensors. Both aircrew and FACs still need to conduct adequate target study and mission preparation prior to the talk-on. FMV equipment normally comprises a receive-only terminal that provides the capability to receive real-time sensor-data (in the form of streaming video data) from suitably equipped airborne platforms. Correctly used, FMV can reduce the risk of fratricide and reduce the engagement cycle time. However, to realise this capability, aircrew and ground forces must operate as a cohesive team. The requirement of the aircrew to understand the ground scheme of manoeuvre is essential to success. Technical details and information on the functionality of specific FMV equipment and associated controls can be found in operators manuals. a. Planning. Not all aircraft are equipped with suitable sensors to downlink to an FMV receiving terminal; therefore, if FMV is required to support an operation, this must be highlighted when bidding for air support using the appropriate air request form, annotating details within the remarks section. The following should be considered when requesting support: (1) Specify the required and potential elapsed time-on-task as this could influence which sensor platform is allocated. Identify whether the task is purely Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) or will require autonomous air-to-ground platform capability. If the task is ISTAR only, this may increase the number of platform types that could support the operation. Highlight the need for surprise or covert manoeuvring if it is considered that platform signature may affect the operation. Receiver location relative to the target should be sent to enable aircrew to ensure that a sensor-to-receiver link is maintained. 4 - 69 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(2)

(3)

(4)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(5)

FACs should assess the local operating environment as the range at which sensor data can be received is dependent upon the aircraft aspect, output power of its datalink, the FMV antenna type and the guarantee of LOS between the aircraft and receiver terminal.

b.

Execution. (1) Control Types. FMV can be used to assist in all 3 types of CAS terminal attack control. Under Type 1 control, the FAC will be visual with both target and aircraft, FMV will be used to verify target details and expedite the engagement cycle. However, if FMV is the primary means of identifying and engaging a target, then as a minimum, this should be treated as a Type 2 control. Coordination Procedure. Use of FMV follows traditional CAS medium-level FIDO talk on procedures (From a point, In a direction, for a Distance, to an Object) but the following points should be considered by FAC when utilising an FMV terminal: (a) Using wide Field of View (FOV) initially, refining down to narrow FOV (big to small) enables better situational awareness. The ZOOM command can be used in all FOVs. Due to video lag, FACs need to wait for the aircrew to call SET and the FMV stream prior to additional slew commands. F The starting point for the talk-on should normally be the centre of the crosshairs or a known point in the vicinity of the target (STAKE). All adjustments are done by moving the crosshairs. I As both the FAC and pilot are looking at the same picture, movement is achieved by using up, down, left, right or clock codes. D Unit of measure can be the width of the screen; therefore distance is given as , , or full screen, a prominent feature or the horizontal length of the crosshairs (yardstick). O The object is a short description of what you are looking for or the target. 4 - 70 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(2)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(g)

Possible techniques are: i. Technique 1: Battleship The FAC employs a series of left, right, and up, down commands coupled with a unit of measure. Example, slew left 2 up 1. Technique 2: Clock/Unit The FMV video is viewed with the top of the screen representing 12 oclock. A unit of measure needs to be established with the aircrew prior to proceeding. The recommended unit of measure is from the centre of the crosshair to the outer edge of a horizontal leg. The FAC then directs the aircrew to move the cursors using the clock position and a unit of measure. Example: Slew 3 oclock for 2 units. When the aircrew is complete with the movement, it will call SET. Another technique is to direct the aircrew to a specific identifiable feature in the video. Example: The white hot, inverted L shaped object at 10 oclock for 2 units is the target. Technique 3: Roadway This method can be useful in cultural and urban developments as Lines of Communications (LOC) are prevalent. It incorporates the basic principles from the clock/unit method. Simply put, the aircrew uses the sensor to follow the roads that lead to the target. The FAC directs the aircrew using the clock method to follow the LOC until they get to a specific object or point, usually either a road intersection or a building. Direct the aircrew to call contact at each intersection or point. Continue to direct the search utilizing the clock method and LOCs until the aircrew comes to the target area. Then transition to clock/unit and pass a final description of the target.

ii.

iii.

c.

Situational Awareness. Experience has shown that FMV users have a tendency to become fixated by the TV picture and can potentially lose their overall SA.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) CAUTION The FAC must understand that FMV is an extra tool to enhance CAS operations; whilst it is extremely beneficial, FMV use does not over-ride the need to prosecute an attack using standard CAS procedures.

d.

If FMV fails, the FAC should then transition to having the aircrew describe what they see through the sensor. This should confirm to the FAC that the sensor is positioned on the DMPI or at least in the general target area. From there the FAC can utilize a traditional talk-on to guide the aircrew on to the correct DMPI. If the sensor fails, the FAC should be prepared to conduct a visual only talk-on. Target Confirmation. The FAC should use IR and TV sensors to identify a target as each sensor yields different information to the observer. Invariably, the target will be positively identified in narrow FOV but operators/FACs should request that, prior to final clearance, the FOV is temporarily changed to give greater coverage of the target area and allow overall situational awareness to be maintained. Forward Firing Weapons. Some platform sensors park in order to protect from being damaged whenever a forward firing weapon is used. While it is possible for the aircrew to un-park the sensor head during such attacks, it is not recommended and the FAC should only request this when necessary. FMV Terminology. The following standard terminology should be adopted in order to reduce misunderstanding between the FAC and the aircrew:

e.

f.

g.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

TERMS VIDEOBREVITY FULL MOTION


CALL HANDSHAKE HOLLOW EXPECT HOLLOW MEANING to Usable downlink FMV freezes or to Unusable downlink FMV. FMVscreen not this by is not updating, is indicated the picture rotatinq slantranqeis not chanqinq or Informative from the aircrewto the FMV call will that a condition likelyexist operator FMV reception momentarily limits that (manoeuvres, terrain, etc.) to from the FMVoperator ask the aircrew Request polarity. to switchthe FLIR to Request from the FMVoperator ask the aircrew to switchto CCD ffV) modeor FLIR(lR) mode. wide FOV or narrowFOV. Switchbetween Usethe zoomfeatureto examinetargetdetail. to Directive from FMVoperator the aircrewto call pod a qivendirection and distance. slewthe Informative from the aircrewto FMV operator call pod the no indicating longer slewing targeting and waitinqfor furtherupdates. Informative from FACto the aircrewthat target call to be no longertrackedby the targeting appears ood. lnformative callfrom FACto the aircrewthat FLIR imaqeappearsto be out of focus. lengthis from the centreof the The suggested leg. to crosshairs the outeredge of a horizontal The (i.e be screensizecan although utilized SLEWright this for methods defining Traditional % screen). mav also be used The nominated startingpointfor a talk on which is nearthe tarqet. to the FAC requests piloUoperator removetargeting to symbology allowthe FACto see a betterpicture of the tarqetarea.

SWITCHPOLARITY SWITCH SENSOR SWITCHFIELDOF VIEW

zooMflN/ouT)
& SLEW(LEFT-RTGHTD|ST/ UP-DOWN DIST) & SET CHECKCAPTURE CHECKFOCUS UNITOF MEASURE/YARDSTICK

STAKE
DECLUTTER

Figure 4-23- Full Motion Video Brevity Terms.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

CHAPTER 5 AIR INTERDICTION


Section I - Types of Air Interdiction
0501. Depending upon the amount of target information available, AI may fall into one of three general categories: pre-planned, airborne alert/on-call or armed reconnaissance. Attacks are best pre-planned to allow for proper weapon to target matching, target area tactics, threat avoidance, weather study and consideration of all the other variables that maximise the possibility of target destruction with minimal losses. Attacking mobile or short notice targets may provide a more flexible response on the battlefield, but the chances of each specific attack being successful are reduced and higher friendly losses are possible. Emerging technology such as real time data link and digital imagery in the cockpit may reduce but not eliminate this factor. a. Pre-Planned AI is the normal method of operation and is used to attack specific fixed or mobile targets where detailed intelligence information is available to support planning. Airborne Alert/On Call AI is used for those circumstances where a lucrative target has been identified and assets located against it, but complete premission targeting data is not available. These on-call missions rely on real or near real-time targeting guidance from other sources, which can be an inefficient use of assets unless you have an overwhelming number of assets or an insufficient number of lucrative pre-planned AI targets available. Time sensitive targets can include AI targets as identified on the JFC approved Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) Matrix developed by the joint coordination board as part of the joint prioritised target list. Armed Reconnaissance (AR) is a form of AI planned against a specific area rather than a specific target, where lucrative targets are known or suspected to exist, or where mobile enemy surface units have moved as a result of ground fighting. The area may be defined as a box or grid, or may be a line feature such as a road, rail line or river. In cases where a specific area for attack cannot be pre-determined, missions may be flown in airborne alert or on call status.

b.

c.

Section II - Air Interdiction Planning and Requesting Considerations


0502. Well defended or difficult to attack targets carry a high risk of friendly losses. Communications assets, route infrastructure, key capabilities and logistics may offer benefits for a lower expenditure of resources. However, many targets are mobile, and this could result in difficulties in target location and weaponeering, as well as a risk of collateral damage. Some AI targets, such as bridges, may only be tactically relevant for very short periods. All these factors create problems in selecting and engaging AI targets.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0503. Dynamic Targets may be attacked by AI capable forces under a dynamic targeting process when they have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the deliberate targeting cycle. A surface force commander may request attacks on these targets not addressed in the ATO. Although not identified on a TST matrix, valid/approved dynamic targets can be engaged using the Find/Fix/Track/Target/ Engage/Assess process used for TST. Requests should flow from the requesting surface force commander to the JFACC via the CAOC. If feasible, the JFACC will re-task other mission-assigned aircraft or task available aircraft to attack the target. The targeting process is much less flexible due to the detailed planning required to execute such missions successfully; consequently the rescheduling of missions for these unplanned AI requests may not always be possible. 0504. Ground Assisted Air Interdiction. SOF elements can search for, identify, and precisely report the location of targets using systems like GPS, laser designators, etc. or combinations of the above. Prior planning and coordination with SOF is required; SOF will provide target information in accordance with the CAS briefing format or via digital means. Prior exchange of vital information such as authentication and abort code must be made on a tactical frequency. The abort code will only be used where SOF identify a need to prevent the attack. Importantly, the target briefing does not constitute clearance to attack; this responsibility rests with the aircrew who will ensure that the law of armed conflict, SPINS and ROE are complied with. 0505. Collateral Damage and Fratricide are undesirable aspects of warfare. Causes include, but are not limited to, misidentification of targets, target location errors, weapons technical failures, and loss of SA during planning or execution. It is critical for all commanders to ensure that adequate procedures are in place to avoid fratricide or collateral damage.

Section III - Armed Reconnaissance


0506. Employment of Armed Reconnaissance. AR can either be tasked as a Line search or an area search against enemy troop massing or high value enemy assets. A subtype of AR is SCAR were the designated area is explored by ground or airborne assets that coordinate entrance to that area by air assets, guide (other) missions by providing expected or confirmed target locations within the area, and provide BDA. 0507. Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance. a. SCAR missions are normally part of the ACCS tasked to coordinate multiple flights, detect and interdict targets, neutralize enemy AD, and provide BDA. SCAR platforms may discover an enemy target and provide a target mark (laser, rocket, talk-on, etc.) for AR missions or accurately locate targets for AI missions.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) b. Typical tasks include cycling multiple attacking flights through the target area and providing prioritized targeting guidance to maximize the effect of each sortie. Although fast-jet aircraft often accomplish SCAR missions, other platforms, such as UAVs can perform SCAR tasks such as locating, verifying and cross-cueing other assets to positively identify moving targets; procedurally controlling and sequencing aircraft and passing target updates. Aerial platforms can also find, fix and track potential targets for subsequent AI missions. UAV may also be able to engage targets on their own, buddylase for manned aircraft and provide BDA for the same mission. Optimally, the de-confliction and sequencing of aircraft is best performed by an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or a ground-based Control and Reporting Centre. Even though some SCAR responsibilities are similar to that of an FAC(A), SCAR aircrew DO NOT have the authority to provide terminal attack control. FAC(A) undergo specialized training to effectively coordinate and integrate air-ground forces to conduct terminal attack control safely during CAS - a SCAR aircrew does not have these specialized qualifications. The bottom line is that an FAC(A) can conduct SCAR but a SCAR aircrew cannot conduct FAC(A) duties. SCAR can also be as simple as the coordination between one aircraft exiting a grid box and passing enemy target locations inside that grid box to another AR aircraft. SCAR aircraft provide the JFC with an extended view of the battlespace. They may be tasked specifically and the aircraft configured with the capability to designate targets for destruction by other aircraft. SCAR aircraft should not be confused with FAC(A) aircraft. FAC(A) aircraft are a direct extension of a surface FAC. SCAR aircraft do not require detailed integration with surface forces for the delivery of munitions. Because detailed integration is not required with surface forces and SCAR platforms do not normally operate close to friendly surface forces, there are no special qualifications required for an aircraft to be tasked as a SCAR platform.

c.

d.

Section IV - Surface Kill Box Procedures


0508. Purpose. When established, the primary purpose of an SKB is to allow air assets to conduct interdiction against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander and without terminal attack control. An SKB will normally be established for AI missions. However, this does not restrict CAS missions inside of established SKBs if all CAS requirements are met. When used to integrate air-to-surface and surface-to-surface indirect fires, the SKB will have appropriate restrictions. The goal is to reduce the coordination requirements whilst maintaining maximum flexibility and preventing fratricide.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0509. Establishment. An SKB is established and adjusted by component commanders in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. SKB boundaries normally are defined using an area reference system (e.g. common grid reference system), but could follow well defined terrain features or may be located by grid coordinates or by a radius from a centre point. Altitude limits are defined as for ACM using AGL, above mean sea level or flight level as appropriate. Changes in the status of established kill boxes, as with other FSCM and/or ACM, must be coordinated as far in advance as possible. The two types of SKB and the terminology used during the life cycle of an SKB are defined below: a. Blue surface kill box. A blue SKB permits air-to-surface fires without further coordination with the establishing headquarters. Purple surface kill box. Same as above, plus a purple SKB permits the integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires with air-to-surface fires without further coordination with the establishing headquarters.

b.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 5-1 Surface Kill Box Life Cycle. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) 0510. Surface Kill Box Terminology. a. Established. Term used to describe an SKB that is in effect, either planned through joint targeting or immediate during execution. Information about the time it becomes established, the duration, and other attributes will be published and disseminated using appropriate C2 systems from the establishing headquarters. Open. Term used to describe a portion or portions of an SKB that are open to fires without further coordination or de-confliction. An established SKB is inherently open, until closed or cancelled. Active. An established SKB that has aircraft flying in the space defined by the box or effects of air or other joint fires within its boundaries. Cold. An established SKB that is not active. All portions of it are open to fires unless identified as closed. Closed. Term used to describe a portion or portions of an established SKB in which fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination. Cancelled. The SKB is no longer in effect.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

0511. Employment. Use of SKB is not mandatory, but, if used, must support the commanders objectives and CONOPS. C2 updates on SKB (e.g., altitude restrictions, frequency use, established control measures within) will be accomplished via appropriate C2 systems. The minimum and maximum altitudes may be disseminated in the SPINS or in the establishment order of the coordinating measure. a. Linear battlespace. SKB can augment use of traditional FSCM, such as FSCL and CFL. They can help the commander focus the effort of air and indirect fire assets. Non-linear battlespace. When traditional FSCM are not useful or are less applicable, the SKB can be another method of identifying areas to focus air and indirect fire assets.

b.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 5-2 Typical Surface Kill Box Utilisation. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0512. General Considerations. It is important to note that an SKB is a FSCM and is not a reference system. SKB boundaries are normally defined using an area reference system that provides the construct (a two-dimensional system) while a kill box (a threedimensional system) is the application. The decision to use a kill box requires careful consideration by the JFC or the establishing commander. If used, its size, location, and timing are based on estimates of the situation and CONOPS. Disposition of enemy forces, friendly forces, anticipated rates of movement, concept and tempo of the operation, surface-to-surface indirect weapon capabilities, and other factors must also be considered by the commander. a. Planning. SKBs can be applied to different portions of the battlespace, including rear areas, to facilitate expeditious target engagement. Also, an SKB may be an applicable tool where traditional coordination measures (e.g., FSCL) do not exist or have not been established. SKBs can be used in conjunction with existing FSCM. An SKB can be planned in a TAI where a commander might expect the requirement for a specified time period. Friendly de-confliction is the responsibility of the establishing headquarters. Surface-to-air fires responsiveness could be reduced due to additional coordination requirements and the range and trajectory of surface-to-surface indirect fires could also be inhibited. Special considerations may be required for certain stand-off weapons, such as tomahawk land attack missiles or conventional air-launched cruise missiles, with respect to flight path deconfliction. 5-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B) b. Immediate establishment. An immediate SKB is developed and established during the execution phase of an operation. Immediate SKBs are established by the current operations sections within each command and disseminated via appropriate means (voice and digital) to ensure visibility across the joint force. If the establishing commander needs to establish an SKB that he cannot promulgate himself, he uses his liaison elements such as a Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) or goes through the AOCC to inform the CAOC that an SKB was established and the time it will be open. On-order. An on-order SKB is planned without a specific time for it to be established. The establishment may be triggered by an event(s). This SKB may have restrictions listed, but more likely, specific coordination for it will occur with the notification to change its status to established.

c.

0513. Surface Kill Box Operation. There should be no friendly ground forces within or manoeuvring into established SKBs. If circumstances require otherwise (e.g., long-range reconnaissance patrols, SOF teams, etc.), then NFAs must be established to cover those forces, or the SKB, or a portion thereof, must be closed. The JFC must maintain awareness of locations of friendly ground forces and the status of SKBs within the JOA and maintain timely management of SKBs to prevent fratricide. Integration of air-tosurface fires and surface-to-surface indirect fires within a box may still require application of restrictions: altitude, time or lateral separation. The establishing commander will determine which of these is appropriate for the mission and ensure dissemination through the appropriate C2 nodes. While SKBs are permissive FSCMs, with respect to the delivery of air-to-surface weapons, they can also be restrictive in nature. However, an SKB may take priority over permissive FSCMs. For example, an FSCL that crosses an established SKB does not automatically close it. In addition, surface-to-surface direct fires are not restricted by the establishment of an SKB. The first FAC(A), SCAR, mission commander, or flight lead on station is responsible for airborne de-confliction and coordination, if required. 0514. Blue Surface Kill Box. The primary purpose of a blue SKB is to permit air-tosurface fires without further coordination or de-confliction. The airspace included by a blue SKB extends from the surface up to the limit established by the Airspace Control Authority. Ordnance may be delivered from outside the airspace defined by the SKB to include stand-off surface-to-surface indirect and air-to-surface weapons. However, if the SKB is active, air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories) delivered by aircraft not assigned to it will need to be coordinated. All aircraft not assigned to an active blue SKB are restricted from flying through it unless coordinated with the SKB coordinator. Effects and trajectories of surface-to-surface indirect fires are not allowed to pass through it: Land and Maritime force commanders must coordinate with the JFACC to deliver surface-to-surface indirect fires into or through an established blue SKB.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 5-3 Blue Surface Kill Box. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0515. Purple Surface Kill Box. The primary purpose of a purple SKB is to reduce the coordination requirements for air-to-surface fires, while still allowing surface component commanders to employ surface-to-surface indirect fires. A purple SKB permits the integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires with air-to-surface fires into it without further coordination. Air-to-surface and surface-to-surface indirect fires can be de-conflicted by altitude, lateral, or time separation. The establishing headquarters will coordinate with the air component to define the appropriate de-confliction technique for operations within the purple SKB. All aircraft not assigned to an active purple SKB are restricted from flying through it unless coordinated. Also air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories) delivered by aircraft not assigned to the SKB must not violate it unless coordinated. Ground units subordinate to the establishing commander are required to obtain clearance from the JFACC for any surface-to-surface indirect fires when their trajectories will violate the altitude, lateral, or time restrictions. Ground units from other components must coordinate fires with the establishing commander as well.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 5-4 Purple Surface Kill Box. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------0516. Coordinating Activities Within Active Surface Kill Boxes. SKB coordination is required when multiple flights or formations are operating within or providing air-to-surface fires within the same kill box. This coordination may be as simple as de-conflicting two flights or as complex as performing SCAR. At a minimum, this coordination must deconflict flight paths and weapons deliveries. Unless previously coordinated, the first flight to enter a given SKB will be responsible for providing the required coordination. As the complexity of the SKB environment begins to exceed platform capability or the crews training or comfort level that flight should seek to pass the responsibility for providing coordination to a more qualified flight. FAC(A) or SCAR-trained flights are ideally suited and prepared to provide all of the capabilities described above. If no FAC(A), SCAR-, or mission commander is available, the most qualified flight lead will conduct SKB coordination, but will only be responsible for flight de-confliction. The functions associated with SKB coordination should not be confused with those of the FAC(A). FAC(A) are a direct extension of a TACP and specifically facilitate the conduct of CAS. Flights providing SKB coordination will not normally provide terminal attack control within that box. However, rapidly changing circumstances could require FAC(A) to provide terminal attack control for CAS missions. In this case, the SKB or portions thereof will be closed and CAS procedures will be used.

5-9 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1(B)

5 - 10 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX A Part A - SITUATION UPDATE BRIEFING FORMAT (Briefing Agency to Aircraft)


"Situation Update _________ " (Identifier) TARGET -General Enemy Situation (SALT, Target Composition eg. concrete, metal, etc,) *Target location (UTM or LAT-LONG), target elevation (ft) (mandatory readback items) and target description THREAT ACTIVITY -S/A threats observed FRIENDLY SITUATION/POSITIONS -Disposition/posture, locations *"No friendlies within distance or nearest friendly location (mandatory readback) ARTILLERY ACTIVITY -GTL, Max Ord, etc CLEARANCE AUTHORITY -Who will have final control ORDNANCE REQUESTED RESTRICTIONS/REMARKS -FAC Capabilities, etc *Include advisory or mandatory attack headings (mandatory readback) LOCALIZED SEAD EFFORTS -Suppression/EW HAZARDS -WX/Terrain/Obstructions NOTE: - Situation Update Brief is normally given when a flight checks in with the dedicated briefing agency. Higher echelons may assign an alphanumeric identifier to facilitate subsequent check-ins at lower echelons. - Situation Update Brief may be passed to supporting airborne/ground agencies to speed information flow. - This briefing should be broad in scope and will not to be used as a substitute for a 9-line CAS Briefing * If specific target information is available when brief is given, provide this additional information

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Part B - CHECK-IN BRIEFING


ASR No: from FAC/ALO ATO MISSION No: POSITION and ALTITUDE: TIME ON STATION: Mission Number/Identification No & TYPE OF A/C: ORDNANCE/SENSOR/TLE CATEGORY: Capabilities (FAC(A), Type of LDP, NVG, Laser Pointers, Link-16, VMF, SADL)

ABORT CODE:

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Part C - CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BRIEFING FORMAT


NOTE: FAC should transmi t portion s of line titles that are underli ned. Units of measur e are standar d unless otherwi se specifie d.

FAC: ___<Mission C/S>_____, this is _ _<FAC C/S>_ _ _ "This will be a Type _< 1,2, or 3>_ Control." (TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL TYPE) and for this target I request _____ (type ordnance) 1. IP/BP 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. HEADING DISTANCE TARGET ELEVATION TARGET DESCRIPTION TARGET LOCATION (UTM/MGRS) TARGET LOCATION (LAT-LONG) 7. TYPE MARK
(WP, laser, IR)

mag

true Offset L / R NM AH: ft m m

8. 9.

LOCATION OF FRIENDLIES EGRESS

Laser to Target Line: (actual code) mag Position marked by Code:

true

REMARKS (as appropriate), Please check the content of the Remarks Section! mag MANDATORY ATTACK HEADING THREATS WEATHER HAZARDS ORDNANCE DELIVERY ANY ACTIVE GTL ACA RESTRICTIONS ADDITIONAL TGT INFORMATION NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY TLE CATEGORY DANGER CLOSE ATTACK TIME (TOT/TTT/ASAP) ATTACK CLEARANCE C/S: Commanders Initials TAD: mag

true

true

Lines 4,6,8, mandatory attack headings and restrictions are mandatory read-back items. FAC may request read-back of additional items as required

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX B SEQUENCE OF EVENTS


PART A - 9-LINE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BRIEFING (EXAMPLE)
FAC "Viper 11, this is Blackjack 14, this will be a Type 1 control, advice when ready for CAS briefing." "Blackjack 14, Viper 11, Type 1, ready to copy." "IP PLYMOUTH "Heading 275 offset left" "Distance 9.1" "Elevation 350" "Target is platoon of infantry dug in" "Location CM 367971" "Mark Laser 1111 LTL 340" "Friendlies North East 900, troops in contact" "Egress South to CHEVY" "Advise when ready for remarks." "Ready to copy remarks." "Final attack heading 285-330, report LEAVING IP" "350, CM 367971, NE 900, final attack heading 285-330." "Readback correct, TOT 56:50." "Roger, TOT 56:50." Flight

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

PART B - HIGH/MEDIUM LEVEL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION


Briefing Agency Flight Establishes contact and challenges the BA according to standard authentication procedures. Authenticates with proper reply. Gives Check-in Brief. Gives situation update briefing, type of control and/or other control details. Reads back mandatory items. Confirms proper read back and sends mission to FAC frequency. Switches to FAC frequency, establishes contact and challenges the FAC. FAC Authenticates with proper reply. Gives check-in brief with abort code and situation update briefing identifier. Confirms that flight has correct situation update briefing, repeats abort code and gives 9-Line CAS briefing. Reads back mandatory readback items of the 9-line CAS briefing. Clears the flight into the target area and requests to call: "Ready for Talk-on". Proceeds to target area and calls "Ready for Talk-on". Establishes start point and unit or describes what he can see in target area (sensor related). Starts talk-on (start point, unit, big to small, target). After confirmation calls "TALLY Target" (gives feature for confirmation or describes to FAC what it looks like. Confirms that both are talking about the same target. B-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) If situation so dictates, gives location of friendly forces. Calls "Visual Friendly forces". "Call in with attack heading". IN HOT heading XXX If ROE dictates call "VISUAL", gives clearance for the Attack. CLEARED HOT "OFF HOT/DRY". Pass BDA Receive BDA

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

PART C - LOW LEVEL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION


Briefing Agency Flight Establishes contact and challenges the BA according to standard authentication procedures. Authenticates with proper reply. Gives Check-in Brief. Gives Type of Control, requested ordnance, CAS brief and/or other details. Reads back mandatory items. Confirms proper read back and sends mission to FAC frequency. Switches to FAC frequency, establishes contact and challenges the FAC. FAC Authenticates with proper reply Gives check-in brief with abort code and CAS brief authenticator. Confirms that flight has correct CAS brief, repeats abort code and asks the flight to call ready to receive additional target information. Calls "Ready for additionals". Gives a description of the reference point(s) and target. Calls "Copy all" or gives a read-back of relevant info. Asks for attack profile so FAC will know where to start looking for an early visual. Gives intended attack profile of the mission. Asks the flight to call "Leaving IP". Calls "Leaving IP". Gives information in relation to one or more reference points and works his way towards the target.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Calls "Contact Reference Point" or "Tally Target" as appropriate, gives a call "action" if the attack profile includes an action, for instance a pitch-up. IN HOT Gives the call "Visual" if time permits. Gives final guidance if appropriate. Clears flight for the attack once positive that aircraft vector poses no threat for friendly forces. CLEARED HOT "OFF HOT/DRY". Pass BDA Receive BDA

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

PART D - LASER COMMUNICATIONS (EXAMPLE)


FW CAS aircraft LGW attack from a bunt or roll-in profile. Assumptions: Type I Control. CAS aircraft is tally of the target and can bunt/roll-in visually. The Laser Operator (LO) is using a ground based laser designator for the mark and will guide the LGW to impact. FAC Viper 11, this is Blackjack 14, Type 1 in effect, advise when ready for 9-line CAS briefing. Blackjack 14, Viper 11 ready to copy. IP: PLYMOUTH HEADING: 275 degrees true/magnetic left DISTANCE : 9.1 NM 350 degrees true/magnetic TARGET: Platoon of infantry dug in LOCATION: CM 367971 MARK: Laser 1111, LTL 340 degrees true/magnetic FRIENDLIES: North East 900, troops in contact EGRESS: South to CHEVY Advise when ready for remarks. Ready to copy remarks. Final attack heading 285-330 Report Leaving IP. 350, CM 367971, NE 900, final attack heading 285-330. Readback correct, TOT 50:00. Roger, TOT 12:50:00. Viper 11, Leaving IP. Continue. Viper 11, IN HOT heading 300. Viper 11, Cleared Hot. Attack Aircraft

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Blackjack 14, one away (time of fall) 30 seconds. 10 Seconds. Laser on. Laser on. (After weapon impacts observed) Blackjack 14, TERMINATE. Pass BDA Receive BDA

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX C IN-FLIGHT REPORT


IN-FLIGHT REPORT (INFLTREP)
Aircrew transmits: <addressee> , this is <aircrew C/S> INFLIGHTREP, over.

*** authentication requested here, as required *** Line One Line Two Line Three Line Four Line Five Remarks Call sign Mission Number Location Time-on-Target Results
(Target area weather, significant sightings, essential elements of information) (lat/long, UTM grid, place name)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX D RISK-ESTIMATE DISTANCES (National Example USA)


RISK-ESTIMATE DISTANCES FOR AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED ORDNANCE
Weapon Mk-82 LD contact Mk-82 LD airburst Mk-82 HD contact Mk-82 HD airburst Mk-83 LD contact Mk-83 LD airburst Mk-83 HD contact Mk-83 HD airburst Mk-84 LD contact Mk-84 LD airburst Mk-84 HD contact Mk-84 HD airburst CBU-87, CBU-89 CBU-103/104 (WCMD) CBU-99, 100, Mk20 GBU-12 GBU-51 contact GBU-16 GBU-10/24 GBU-38 contact GBU-38 airburst GBU-38(v)4 contact GBU-32 contact GBU-32 airburst GBU-31 contact GBU-31 airburst GBU-39 contact GBU-39 airburst (7) GBU-39 airburst (14) AGM-130 AGM-154 AGM-158A AGM-65 M151, M229, M2615 Zuni - contact M61A1 GAU-12 GPU-5A, M230A1 GAU-8 (A-10) Description 500-lb bomb 500-lb bomb 500-lb bomb/retarded 500-lb bomb/retarded 1000-lb bomb 1000-lb bomb 1000-lb bomb/ retarded 1000-lb bomb/ retarded 2000-lb bomb 2,000-lb bomb 2,000-lb bomb retarded 2,000-lb bomb retarded CEM or GATOR CEM or GATOR Rockeye 500-lb LGB 500-lb LCDB LGB 1,000-lb LGB 2,000 lb LGB 500-lb JDAM 500-lb JDAM 500-lb LCDB JDAM 1,000-lb JDAM 1,000-lb JDAM 2,000-lb JDAM 2,000-lb JDAM 250-lb SDB 250-lb SDB 250-lb SDB 2,000 lb TV guided JSOW JASSM Maverick (All) 2.75" Rockets med alt 2.75 Rockets low alt 5" Rockets low alt 20 mm Gatling 25 mm Gatling 30 mm Gatling/Chain 30 mm Gatling 0.1 percent PI metres feet 245 804 300 984 230 755 280 919 305 1001 340 1116 265 869 315 315 380 270 355 265 155 230 170 100 195 250 185 230 100 210 275 265 305 135 160 180 220 170 210 95 365 225 290 60 55 40 65 1034 1034 1247 886 1165 869 509 755 558 328 640 820 607 755 328 689 902 869 1001 443 525 591 722 558 689 312 1198 738 951 197 181 131 213 10percent PI metres feet 105 345 135 443 130 427 155 509 120 394 145 478 160 525 175 110 140 165 180 180 90 140 50 35 75 70 55 80 35 75 100 80 105 35 40 55 70 100 55 35 190 115 125 35 30 25 40 574 361 459 541 591 591 295 459 164 115 246 230 180 263 115 246 328 263 345 115 131 181 230 328 181 115 623 377 410 115 98 82 131

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED (B) ATP-3.3.2.1


25mm 30mm Mk 44 40mm 105mm Hellfire Hellfire Hellfire Hellfire 65 100 75 165 110 110 125

AC-130 AGM-114 K AGM.114K2A AGM.114 M AGM-114 N

213 328
246 541 361 361 410 394

35 45

25
65

115 148 82

213
131

120

40 50 40 40

1U
131 131

NOTE from J-Fire Manual12107). This is an USA exampleonly (extracts SPINS national valueswill differ. However, operational Individual to will detailtheriskdistances be used.

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX E GENERAL PLANNING FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT


Part A Ground Commanders Intent/Mission Objectives

E0001. Orientation / Situation. a. Terrain. (1) Map Datum, Common Graphic Reference System/Global Area Reference System. Observation / Fields of Fire. Avenues of Approach. Key Terrain. Obstacles. Cover and Concealment. Predominant Albedos. Urban Environment / Lighting.

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) b.

Weather. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) Ceiling/Visibility. Temperature/Dewpoint. Winds (Surface and at Altitude). Sunrise/Begin Morning Nautical Twilight. Sunset/End Evening Nautical Twilight. Solar elevation/azimuth. Moon Data (Rise/Set, Elevation, Azimuth, Percent Illumination, Lux). Diurnal / Thermal Crossover. Relative/Absolute Humidity.

E-1 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) c. Enemy. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) d. Target type, Size, Activity, and Location. Enemy Strengths and Weaknesses. Courses of Action. Observed TTPs. Enemy Air, Air Defence, and Surface Threat/Type/Location. Target Priorities. Intelligence Collection Plan/Products Request. Plan for Intelligence Updates Before Launch and Enroute.

Friendly. (1) Main Effort. (a) (b) (2) (3) (4) FLOT / Forward Edge of the Battle Area / Operations. SOF.

Higher. Adjacent. Supporting. Assets Available (FAC (ALO)). (a) (b) (c) RW. FW. CAS. i. ii. iii. Fighters. Bombers. UAV.

E-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) (d) EW/SEAD. i. ii. Tanker. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence. ISR.

iii. (e)

Indirect Fires. i. ii. iii. iv. Howitzer. Multiple-Launch Rocket System. Mortar. NSFS.

(5)

Ground observers. Observation/Terminal Attack Control Positions. (a) (b) (c) FACs. FIST/FO. SOF.

E0002. Mission. a. b. c. d. e. Commanders Guidance. Objectives. Success Criteria. Tactical Risk Assessment. Targeting Priorities.

E0003. Execution. a. b. Prepare Situation Update. Command and Control.

E-3 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) E0004. Agencies a. b. c. C2 (Control and Reporting Centre, etc). AOCC. FAC/FAC(A). (1) (2) (3) (4) Nets / Frequencies. Cryptologic Changeover. Digital CAS. Authentication Procedures.

E0005. Friendly Location Marking Procedures. E0006. Target Marking Procedures. a. b. Smoke / WP / HE. Laser. (1) (2) (3) (4) c. Self Lase. Buddy Lase. Ground Based Lase. Laser Code Deconfliction.

IR Pointers.

Part B

Prepare Close Air Support 9-Line Briefing

E0007. Line Remarks Considerations. a. b. c. d. e. f. Target Description. Threats. Artillery. Clearance (Final Control / Abort Code). Desired Ordnance Effects. Restrictions.

E-4 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) g. h. i. j. k. l. Timing / Deconfliction Plan. Airspace Coordination Areas. Weather. SEAD / EW and Location. Laser, Illumination, Night Vision Capability. Danger Close.

E0008. Fire Support Coordination. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. ACM / FSCM, SKB Plans. Artillery/Mortar Position Areas. Gun-Target Line. Minimum / Maximum Ordinate. Attack Plan. Support by Fire and Maneuver Schedule of Fires Worksheet High Payoff Target List. Attack Guidance Matrix. Joint Prioretized Target List Target Marking (Smoke / Laser / Illumination). Suppression of Enemy Air Defences.

E0009. Fixed Wing. a. b. c. d. Type. Ingress / Egress Considerations. Fixed Wing Holding Plan. Altitudes.

E-5 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) e. f. g. Deconfliction Plan. Sensors. Ordnance. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) h. i. Type and Number. Weapon to Target Match. Jettison. Attack Profiles. Level. Loft. Pop-up. Dive.

Communications. Forward Air Controller (Airborne).

E0010. Rotary Wing. a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Type. Ingress / Egress considerations. Rotary Wing Holding Areas. Battle / Firing Positions. Altitudes. Deconfliction Plan. Sensors. Ordnance.

E-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) i. Attack Profiles. (1) (2) (3) j. k. Diving. Running. Hovering.

Communications. Forward Air Controller (Airborne).

E0011. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. a. b. c. d. e. Type. Restricted Operations Zone/ Restricted Operations Area. Sensors. Ordnance. Communications.

E0012. Personnel Recovery / Combat Search and Rescue. a. b. Embedded / On-call. Spider Routes (Combat Search and Rescue Assets).

E0013. Battle Damage Assesment Passage. a. b. Close Air Support Aircrew. Air Operations Coordination Centre.

E0014. Contingencies. E0015. Coordinating Instructions. a. b. c. d. Airspace Coordination Order. Air Tasking Order. Special Instructions. Rules of Engagement.

E-7 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) e. f. g. h. i. j. Named Areas of Interest. Target Area of Interest. Prespun Contact Points / Initial Points. Landing Zones. Unit Boundaries. Coordination Measures. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Fire Support Coordination Lines. Coordinated Fire Lines. Restricted Fire Lines. Restricted Fire Areas. No Fire Areas. Free Fire Areas. Airspace Coordination Areas. Missile Engagement Zone. Fighter Engagement Zone.

Part C

Urban/Mountain Considerations

E0016. Communication Plan. a. Line of Sight Limitations. (1) (2) b. Urban Canyons/Valleys. Optimal Comm Locations.

Alternate communication assets. (1) (2) Airborne (e.g. FAC(A)). Ground (e.g. FAC).

E-8 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) E0017. Targeting/Marking. a. Mission Materials. (1) (2) (3) (4) b. Large Scale Maps with Labels. Gridded Reference Graphic Highlights. Other Standardized Maps. Target Reference Points.

Marking. (1) (2) (3) Cultural Washout. LOS Considerations. Laser Safety.

c. d. e.

Employment/Weaponeering. Fusing (Instantaneous vs. Delayed). Final Attack Plan. (1) (2) LTL/Final Attack Heading/Lase Leg for LOS. Impact Parametres (Angle, Velocity, Azimuth, etc.).

f.

Rules of Engagement Considerations.

E-9 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

ANNEX F AIR SUPPORT REQUEST MESSAGE (EXAMPLE)


AIR SUPPORT REQUEST MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION: NATO PRECEDENCE ACTION: INFO: FROM: TO: DTC: INTERNAL COORDINATION

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS TABULATE SIC NOT FOR TRANSMISSION A 2. A 3 A 1. A2 A3 EXPER/OPER AIR SUPPORT REQUEST MISSION NO CAS AI INT EW ESCORT JAAT HARASS NEUTR DESTROY DEP SUPP CHAFF SLAK

OCA RECCE JAM TEREC

A 4, 5 & 6 TGT DETAIL (PASS INFO IN FOLLOWING ORDER PER TCT)

TCT/LINE NO LOCATION DESCRIPTION/CATEGORY

P R I O R I T Y

A4

A5

A6 CAT: B TOT C POSITION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS


C D1 (INITIAL RADAR) C/S + FREQ O N D2 (FWRD RADAR) C/S + FREQ T R D3 (TACP/ASOC) CP + TAD /FREQ O L D4 (TACP/ALO) CP + TAD/FREQ D D5 TACP/FAC TAD/FREQ E T D6 CP/OP/IP A I D7 MARKERS/SMOKE/PANEL/ L LASER/FREQ/ETC. E. INFLIGHT REPORT F. SQUADRON/WING G. NO. AND TYPE AIRCRAFT H. SCL/SENSOR J. REMARKS E.C: MSN SPT DATA/ REPORTS/AERIAL REFUELING DATA

B. C.
D1. P D2. P D3. CP P D4. CP P

ASAP

NLT NIL
S S S

D7. E. P F. G. H. J. S

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)


COPIES TO: COMM CTR CURRENT OPS ARMY ATTACK RECCE R C V D DTC: Z INITIALS DRAFTER TEL NO.

F-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

LEXICON
Part I - Acronyms and Abbreviations
The Lexicon contains abbreviations relevant to ATP-3.3.2.1(B) and is not meant to be exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15. AAA AAP ACA ACCS ACM ACO ACP AD AGL AH AI AJP ALE ALO AOCC AOCC (L) AOO AR ASFAO ASR ATO ATP AWACS BCE BDA BOC BP C2 C4I CAOC CAS CBU Anti Aircraft Artillery Allied Administrative Publication Airspace Coordination Area Air Command and Control System Airspace Control Means Airspace Control Order Airspace Control Plan Air Defence Above Ground Level Attack Helicopter Air Interdiction Allied Joint Publication Air Liaison Element Air Liaison Officer Air Operations Coordination Centre Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land) Area of Operations Armed Reconnaissance Anti Surface Force Air Operations Air Support Request Air Tasking Order Allied Tactical Publication Airborne Warning and Control System Battlefield Coordination Element Battle Damage Assessment Bomb On Coordinate Battle Position Command and Control Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Combined Air Operations Centre Close Air Support Cluster Bomb Unit Lexicon-1 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) CC CCIP CE CFL CID CIS CONOPS CP CR DMPI DS EO EW FAC FAC(A) FAC-INS FAC-STANEVAL FB FIST FLIR FMV FO FSC FSCC FSCL FSCM FSE FSO FW GCAS GCI GLINT GLTD GPS GTL HA HE HIDACZ Component Command Constant Computing Impact Point Circular Error Coordinated Fire Line Combat Identification Communication and Information Systems Concept of Operations Contact Point Combat Ready Desired Mean Point of Impact Direct Support Electro Optical Electronic Warfare Forward Air Controller Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Forward Air Controller Instructor Forward Air Controller for Standardization and Evaluation Forward Boundary Fire Support Team Forward-Looking Infrared Full Motion Video Forward Observer Fire Support Coordinator Fire Support Coordination Centre Fire Support Coordination Line Fire Support Coordination Measure Fire Support Element Fire Support Officer Fixed Wing Ground alert Close Air Support Ground Controlled Interception Gated Laser Intensifier for Narrow Television Ground Laser Target Designator Global Positioning System Gun-Target Line Holding Area High Explosive High-Density Airspace Control Zone Lexicon-2 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) HQ IAM ID INFLTREP IP IR ISR ISTAR JAAT JDAM JFACC JFC JFLCC JOA km LCR LGM LGW LO LOA LOAL LOBL LOC LOS LRF LSL LST LTD MANPADS MAXORD METL MISREP MGRS NATO NFA Headquarters Inertial Aided Munition Identification In-flight Report Initial Point Infra Red Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Joint Air Attack Team Joint Direct Attack Munition Joint Force Air Component Commander Joint Force Commander Joint Force Land Component Commander Joint Operations Area kilometre Limited Combat Ready Laser Guided Missiles Laser Guided Weapon Laser Operator Line of Attack Lock On After Launch Lock On Before Launch Lines of Communication Line of Sight Laser Range Finder Laser Spot Locater Laser Spot Tracker Laser Target Designator Man-Portable Air Defence Systems Maximum Ordinate Mission Essential Task List Mission Report Military Grid Reference System North Atlantic Treaty Organization No-Fire Area

Lexicon-3 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED NM NOE NSA NSFS NTISR NVD NVG PGM PI POL PRF RFL ROE ROVER RW SA SAM SAR SCAR SE SEAD SIGINT SHOF SKB SOF SOP SPINS STANAG STANEVAL STE SUP-FAC TACEVAL TACEVAL-FAC TACP TGP TAI TARN TI ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Nautical Mile Nap-of-the-Earth NATO Standardization Agency Naval Surface Fire Support Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Night Vision Device Night Vision Goggles Precision Guided Munition Probability of Incapacitation Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Pulse Repetition Frequency Restricted Fire Line Rules of Engagement Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receiver Rotary Wing Situational Awareness Surface-to-Air Missiles Synthetic Aperture Radar Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance Spherical Error Suppression Of Enemy Air Defences Signal Intelligence Show of Force Surface Kill Box Special Operations Force Standing Operating Procedures Special Instructions Standardization Agreement Standardization Evaluation Synthetic Training Equipment Supervisory Forward Air Controller Tactical Evaluation Tactical Evaluation Forward Air Controller Tactical Air Control Party Targeting Pod Target Area of Interest Tactical Air Request Net Thermal Imaging Lexicon-4 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) TIC TLE TOT TRP TST TTP TTT TV UAV UTM UXO VE WGS WP XCAS Troops In Contact Target Location Error Time on Target Target Reference Point Time Sensitive Targeting Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Time to Target Television Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Universal Transverse Mercator Unexploded Ordnance Vertical Error World Geographic System White Phosphorous Airborne alert Close Air Support

Lexicon-5 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

Part II Terms and Definitions


air interdiction Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy an enemys military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces and at such distance from the latter that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and manoeuvre of friendly forces is not required. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6) air liaison officer A tactical air force or naval aviation officer attached to a ground or naval unit or formation as the advisor on tactical air operation matters. (AAP-6) air reconnaissance The collection of information of intelligence interest either by visual observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors. (AAP-6) airspace control The implementation and coordination of the procedures governing airspace planning and organization in order to minimize risk and allow for the efficient and flexible use of airspace (AAP-6). airspace control means Operational means that when established, segregate control, and/or reserve airspace for Allied operations. (AJP-3.3.5) air support All forms of support given by air forces on land or sea. (AAP-6) allocation 1. In nuclear warfare planning, the specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons allocated to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor only. 2. The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or mission. (AAP-6) apportionment The quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort, in relation to the priorities which are to be given to the various air operations in geographic areas for a given period of time (AAP-6). area of operations An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish missions and protect forces. (AAP-6) Lexicon-6 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) Anti Surface Force Air Operations Air operations against enemy land force capabilities to create effects that contribute to the achievement of joint force commander objectives. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) close air support Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (AAP-6) control That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6) direct support 1. The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. 2. In maritime usage, operations related to the protection of a specific force by other units, normally under the tactical control of that force. 3. In land operations, a primary tactical task given to an artillery unit to provide fire requested by a supported unit other than an artillery unit, without specifying the command relationship. (AAP-6) electronic warfare Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)

Lexicon-7 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) fire support coordination line Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commanders current and planned operations. The fire support coordination line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of the fire support coordination line must be conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination line must coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonize joint objectives. Note: in the context of this definition the term "surface targets" applies to those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6) fire support coordination measure A measure employed by land or amphibious manoeuvre commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Commanders position fire support coordination measures consistent with the operational situation and in coordination with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. (This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as new term in AAP-6) forward air controller A qualified individual who, from a forward position on the ground or in the air, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support of land forces. (AAP-6) forward air controller airborne A forward air controller who controls close air support operations from an airborne platform (e.g. helicopter, light aircraft, or fixed-wing fast jet). (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication.) ground liaison officer An officer especially trained in air reconnaissance and/or offensive air support activities. These officers are normally organized into teams under the control of the appropriate ground force commander to provide liaison to air force and navy units engaged in training and combat operations. (AAP-6) inertially aided munitions Inertially aided munitions are weapons that can use GPS and/or INS to guide to a set of coordinates. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication)

Lexicon-8 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) integrated control The control of a CAS mission conducted in training or actual combat environment where the fire (e.g. direct fire, indirect fire or other air assets) and manoeuvre of friendly forces in the battlespace is planned, considered or simulated in the prosecution of the attack. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6) joint air attack team A combination of attack and/or reconnaissance RW aircraft and FW close air support aircraft, operating together to locate and attack high-priority targets and targets of opportunity. Joint air attack team operations are coordinated and conducted to support the ground commanders scheme of manoeuvre. Note: the joint air attack team normally operates as a coordinated effort supported by fire support, air defence artillery, naval surface fire support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare systems, and ground manoeuvre forces. (AAP-6) joint force commander A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint force. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) joint force air component commander A commander, designated by the joint force commander or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the joint force commander on the employment of air forces and assets, planning and coordinating air operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) joint force land component commander A commander, designated by the joint force commander or higher authority, who would be responsible for making recommendations to the joint force commander on the employment of land forces and assets, planning and coordinating land operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the designating commander. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication)

Lexicon-9 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) joint operations area A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-6) liaison That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6) manoeuvre 1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (AAP-6) mission 1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. 2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6) objective A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversarys force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commanders plan and towards which the operation is directed. (AAP-6) operation A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6) operational command The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6)

Lexicon-10 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) operational control The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6) probability of incapacitation The measure of a soldiers inability to perform activities critical to his tactical situation. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) rules of engagement Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6) sortie In air operations, an operational flight by one aircraft. (AAP-6) special operations Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require clandestine, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations. (AAP-6) support The action of a force, or portions thereof, which aids, protects, complements or sustains any other force (AAP-6). supported commander A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6) supporting commander A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6) suppression of enemy air defences That activity which neutralizes, temporarily degrades or destroys enemy air defences by a destructive and/or disruptive means. (AAP-6)

Lexicon-11 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B) tactical air control party A subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft. (AAP-6) tactical air operation The employment of air power in coordination with ground or naval forces to: 1. attain and maintain air superiority; 2. prevent movement of enemy forces into and within the combat zone and to seek out and destroy these forces and their supporting installations; and 3. assist ground or naval forces in achieving their objectives by combined and/or joint operations. (AAP-6) tactical control The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6) targeting The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-6) target list A tabulation of confirmed or suspected targets maintained by any echelon for information and fire support planning purposes. (AAP-6) target location error The difference between the coordinates generated for a target and the actual location of that target. TLE is expressed primarily in terms of circular and vertical errors, or infrequently, as spherical error. (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication) tasking The process of translating the allocation into orders, and passing these orders to the units involved. Each order normally contains sufficient detailed instructions to enable the executing agency to accomplish the mission successfully. (AAP-6) terminal attack control Action taken by an FAC applying the procedures and techniques while the attacking aircraft moves to a weapon release point (real or simulated). (This term and definition is only applicable within the context of this publication)

Lexicon-12 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Lexicon-13 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED ATP-3.3.2.1 (B)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Effective Pages Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original Original

Page Numbers Front Cover i through xiv 1-1 through 1-10 2-1 through 2-24 3-1 through 3-32 4-1 through 4-64 5-1 through 5-8 A-1 and A-2 B-1 through B-8 C-1 and C-2 D-1 and D-2 E-1 through E-6 F-1 and F-2 Lexicon-1 through Lexicon-12 LEP-1 Back Cover

LEP-1 NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

(B) ATP-3.3.2.1

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED