Due process Alcuaz vs. PSBA, QC Branch VOL.

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The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment. ISSUE: Whether or not procedures for dismissal were observed?

No. L-76353 , MAY 2, 1988 SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents. FACTS: Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City. The students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. On the exercise of students democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions can be conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements: a) that they be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 pm to 1:00 pm only; b) that the protest action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit; c) that if the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 pm; d) However, before any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days before, or if on the same day, it still be under the first-come-first-served basis in the use of facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to directly participate in the policy-making body of the school. In spite of the abovestated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues and demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrolment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 19861987 which prompted the President of the Student Council to file a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. ISSUE: whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from reenrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as anarchic rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly? HELD: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester, It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the written contracts required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. The petition is hereby DISMISSED

HELD: No. Private respondent did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Requisite of a valid warrant Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 No. L-82585, No. L-82827, No. L-83979 MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents., LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPER, INTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents., LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALENO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDONEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS R GUERRERO, AND JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.

FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. ISSUES: Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause? HELD: No. what Art 3 Sec 2 of the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Petition dismissed.

AGABON vs. NLRC 167 SCRA 393 GR 158693 JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents. November 17, 2004 FACTS: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay.

People v. Mahusay 282 SCRA 80 G.R. No. 91483. November 18, 1997.* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL MAHUSAY y FLORES and CRISTITUTO PASPOS @ TOTO y CATARIG, accused-appellants. FACTS: Six armed men barged into the Bughao residence and introduced themselves as members of the New Peoples Army. After extinguishing the three oil lamps inside the house, they tied the arms and feet of Troadio Bughao, his wife and househelper Esmarlita Paspos, who is the sister of appellant Paspos. The group split in two, ransacked the cabinets, and cleaned out the premises of every valuable item they could carry. Bughaos daughter Maria Luisa (a.k.a. Marilou) was brought upstairs by three men who successively ravished her. The following day, the incident was reported to the police. A police team2 from the Integrated National Police Station of San Isidro, Leyte led by Sgt. Manuel Bughao was promptly dispatched to Sitio Sumakab, Barangay Inangatan, Tabango, Leyte to arrest the suspects. The police were able to recover from them a wall clock, cash amounting to P1,445.00, a ring and two caliber .38 paltik revolvers.During the investigation, appellants allegedly admitted responsibility for the crime charged. Considering, however, that the searching inquiry was done without the assistance of counsel, the trial court correctly disregarded the same. Appellants, on the other hand, invoke alibi as their defense and alleged that they went on a trip to Medellin, Cebu to visit the formers uncle. ISSUE: WON the arrest made againts appellants was an unjustified warrantless arrest? RULING: Yes. Appellants were arrested on the sole basis of Bughaos verbal report. The arresting officers were led to suspect that, indeed, appellants had committed a crime. Thus, the arrest was made in violation of their fundamental right against an unjustified warrantless arrest. Under Section 5(b) of the aforequoted rule, two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the person to be arrested must have just committed an offense, and second, the arresting peace officer or private person must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. People v. Alvario 275 SCRA 529 G.R. Nos. 120437-41. July 16, 1997.* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO ALVARIO, accused-appellant. FACTS: On January 29, 1993, Esterlina Quintero (Ester), a 29-year oldgirl, took her time off as a housekeeper at Pasong Tirad,Makati, to look for another place of employment. Eventually,she found a house in Bel-Air Subdivision where she wasaccepted by Armando Alvario as a cook and a laundress .(Alvario was just a caretaker of the house). Based on Esterstestimony, Alvario would barge into her room in the maidsquarter, point a gun at her and rape her. Also, she testified that Alvario did not allow her to go out of the house and to use the telephone. However, on January 28, she phoned her sister and asked her from her. Subsequently, her sister and 4 Makati police came to the house in Bel-Air. When Alvario and Ester opened the door, she pointed at Alvario and say that heraped her. Then and there, Alvario was arrested. ISSUE: W/N the arrest of Alvario is valid? RULING: No. Th e arrest of Alvario vi olat ed his constitutional r i g h t a g a i n s t w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t s . A s r e q u i r e d b y Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person can be arrest ed even without a wa rrant wh en an offens e h a s i n f a c t b e e n c o m m i t t e d a n d t h e p o l i c e m a n making t he arrest has person al knowled ge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the personal knowledge of t he arresting offic ers was culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvari o as the man wh o raped her at the time of his arrest.

Larranaga v. CA 287 SCRA 581 G.R. No. 130644. March 13, 1998.* THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by his mother, MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS; On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and brother-in-law. Petitioners sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit. Atty. Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the police officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed to meet with them at the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police officers yielded and returned to the CIG headquarters. Petitioner, together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG headquarters aboard their own vehicle. Atty. Armovit questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking in writing that he and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be releas ed and be subject to a preliminary investigation. However p e n d i n g t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u r t f o r t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i , p r o h i b i t i o n and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner. ISSUE: WON the arrest of Petitioner Larraga without a warrant was legal? RULING: No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a private person. To be sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of a warrant. It does not appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense when the police officers tried to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.