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MAGTF Fundamentals
MAGTF Fundamentals
Introduction The Marine Corps is an expeditionary intervention force with the ability to move rapidly on short notice to wherever needed to accomplish whatever is required. The Corps possesses a full range of combat capabilities integrated into a single-service, air-ground combined arms team. These qualities make the Marine Corps unique when compared to other United States (US) military services. The Marine Corps has the ability to project combat power ashore for a wide range of contingencies. Depending on the nature of the threat, we can field a task organized combined arms team, consisting of ground, air, and combat service support elements under a single commander. Ship, aircraft, or a combination of both may deploy these task forces, called Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), as an independent force or as part of a joint task force. This lesson gives you an edge on understanding the components of a MAGTF, the types of MAGTFs, and the locations of each of the major warfighting components of each MAGTF. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic MAGTF Core Competencies MAGTF Capabilities MAGTF Elements Types of MAGTFs Locations of Major Combat Organizations Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objectives MCCS-MAGT-1002 Without aid of resources, identify the location of major Marine units without error. MCCS-MAGT-1003 Without the aid of references, describe Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizations without omission. Page 4 6 7 10 15 15 16 16 16
Importance
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Expeditionary Readiness
Expeditionary readiness defines an institutional mindset that is ready to respond instantaneously to world-wide crises, 365 days a year. To Marines, ready to respond means much more than being ready to go. First it means being ever ready to win our nations first battles. This requires a force that can transition from peacetime to combat operations at a moments notice without critical reserve augmentation and with certain success. Second, it demands a force ready to flourish under conditions of uncertainty. Expeditionary readiness is about being ready to adapt to whatever is out there, improvising and finding unconventional solutions to unconventional problems. As a result, it demands a primary focus on the human dimension rather than the technological dimension of battle. And third, it means being ever ready to defeat the opponent after next requiring a relentless commitment to innovation and change. As specifically demanded by Congress, the nations naval crisis response force must be capable of acting on short notice and without immediate support from Army and Air Force warfighting forces. In other words, such a force in readiness requires an organic, combined arms capability. For over half a century, MAGTFs have trained so that a single commander directs their ground combat, air combat, and combat service support capabilities. Other services practice combined arms operations MAGTF operations embody them.
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Sea-based Operations
Reserve Integration
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MAGTF Capabilities
The Marine Corps task organizes for operations consistent with its statutory tasking to provide forces of combined arms, including aviation by forming MAGTFs. The MAGTF is a balanced air-ground combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander structured to accomplish a specific mission. It is the Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations. It is designed to fight, while having the ability to prevent conflicts and control crises. All MAGTFs are task organized and vary in size and capability according to the assigned mission, threat, and battlespace environment. They are specifically tailored for rapid deployment by air or sea and ideally suited for a forward presence role. A MAGTF provides the naval, joint, or multinational commander with a readily available force capable of operating as The landing force of an amphibious task organization. A land force in sustained operations ashore. A land force or the landward portion of a naval force conducting military operations other than war such as noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or the tactical recovery of an aircraft or aircrew. A forward-deployed force providing a strong deterrence in a crisis area. A force conducting training with allied forces as part of theater engagement plan. MAGTFs provide joint force commanders with the capability to: Move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destinations or intentions. Provide continuous presence in international waters. Provide immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural disaster relief operations. Provide credible combat power in a non-provocative posture, just over the horizon of a potential adversary, for rapid employment as the initial response to a crisis. Support diplomatic processes for peaceful crisis resolution before employing immediately responsive combat forces. Project measured degrees of combat power ashore, day or night, and under adverse weather conditions, if required. Operate independent of established airfields, basing agreements, and overflight rights. Sequentially introduce additional forces into a theater of operations.
Capabilities
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MAGTF Elements
MAGTF Organization As a modular organization, the MAGTF can be tailored to each mission through task organization. This building block approach also makes reorganization a matter of routine. In addition to the Marine Corps units, MAGTFs may have attached forces from other service and nations; e.g., naval construction force, multiple launch rocket system batteries, and armor brigades. A key feature of Marine expeditionary organization is expandability. Crisis response requires the ability to expand the expeditionary force after its introduction in theater without sacrificing the continuity of operational capability. The MAGTFs modular structure lends itself to rapid expansion into a larger force or integration into a joint or multinational force because the MAGTF structure parallels the structure of a multidimensional joint force. Marine forces integrated into a joint or multinational force are normally employed by the joint force commander as a MAGTF. As a task organized force, the MAGTFs size and composition depend on the committed mission. If a MAGTF is deprived of a part of its combat forces, accomplishment of the mission for which it is tailored is jeopardized.
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The MAGTFs combat forces reside within these four elements. Although MAGTFs will differ because of mission forces assigned, a standard procedure exists for organization, planning, and operations. Command Element (CE) The CE is the MAGTF headquarters. As with all other MAGTF elements it is task organized to provide the command and control capabilities necessary for effective planning, execution, and assessment of operations across the warfighting functions. The six warfighting functions are: Command and control. Intelligence. Maneuver. Fires. Logistics. Force protection.
When integrated into a joint force, the CE can exercise command and control within the joint force from the sea or ashore and/or act as a core element around which a joint task force headquarters may be formed. It can also provide interagency coordination for military operations other than war and provide a reach back capability for component commanders.
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Types of MAGTFs
MAGTFs are integrated combined arms forces structured to accomplish specific missions. MAGTFs are generally categorized in four types: Marine expeditionary force. Marine expeditionary brigade. Marine expeditionary unit. Special purpose Marine air-ground task force.
The MEF is the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization. It can conduct and sustain expeditionary operations in any geographic environment. MEFs are the sole standing MAGTFs; e.g., they exist in peacetime as well as wartime. Size and composition can vary greatly depending on the requirements of the mission. A lieutenant general normally commands a MEF. It can be comprised of: A standing command element. A GCE of one or more divisions. An ACE of one or more aircraft wings. A CSSE of one or more Marine logistics groups.
A MEF typically deploys by echelon with 60 days of sustainment. The MEF commander and staff can form the nucleus for a joint task force or functional component headquarters. A MEF nominally consists of a permanent CE as well as a tailored Marine division, Marine aircraft wing, and Marine logistics group. Each MEF deploys a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) on a continuous basis to provide forward presence and crisis response capabilities to the combatant commanders. The three standing MEFs are: I MEF based in southern California and Arizona. II MEF based in North Carolina and South Carolina. III MEF based in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and Hawaii.
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The 4th MEB (AT) provides the unified combatant commanders with a rapidly deployable and sustainable specialized antiterrorism force to deter, detect, and defend against terrorist actions and conduct initial incident response to combat the threat of terrorism worldwide. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) The MEU(SOC) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization. A forward-deployed MEU(SOC) provides an immediate sea-based response to meet forward presence and power projection requirements. A colonel commands a MEU(SOC) which deploys with 15 days of supplies. The MEU(SOC) is normally comprised of A CE that may include additional assets such as command and control, force reconnaissance company, and signals intelligence capabilities from the radio battalion. A GCE comprised of an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, tanks, light armored reconnaissance units, assault amphibian units, and other attachments as required. An ACE comprised of a combat assault transport helicopter squadron reinforced with utility and attack helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and landing fixed wing attack aircraft, air refuelers/transport aircraft, and other detachments as required. A CSSE task organized around a MEU service support group. This element has engineering, supply, transportation, landing support, medical, and maintenance capabilities.
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An SPMAGTF may be of any sizebut normally no larger than a MEUwith narrowly focused capabilities required to accomplish a particular mission. It may be task organized form non-deployed Marine Corps forces or formed on a contingency basis from a deployed MAGTF. Regimental level headquarters often assume the role as a special MAGTF CE and may conduct training in anticipated mission skills prior to establishment. A SPMAGTF may be deployed using commercial shipping or aircraft, strategic airlift, amphibious shipping, or organic Marine aviation. Air Contingency Force (ACF) An important type of SPMAGTF is the air contingency force (ACF). An ACF is an on-call, task organized alert force that is maintained by all three MEFs. Lead echelons of an ACF can deploy within 18 hours of notification. It can be dispatched virtually worldwide to respond to a rapidly developing crisis. The ACF is the MEFs force in readiness. It can deploy independently or in conjunction with amphibious forces, MPFs, or other expeditionary forces. Because it can deploy so rapidly, readiness is paramount. Equipment and supplies intended for use as part of an ACF are identified and, where appropriate, stored and staged for immediate deployment. Personnel continuous focus is on their tactical readiness. The ACF is airlifted to a secure airfield and carries its own initial sustainment.
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ACE
CSSE
III MEF Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan 1st Marine Division HQ, 2nd Marine Division HQ, 3rd Marine Division HQ Camp Pendleton, CA Camp Lejeune, NC Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan rd nd 3 Marine Aircraft Wing 2 Marine Aircraft 1st Marine Aircraft Wing HQ, Marine Corps Air Wing HQ, Marine HQ, Camp Foster, Station, Miramar, CA Corps Air Station Okinawa, Japan Cherry Point, NC 1st Marine Logistics 2nd Marine Logistics 3rd Marine Logistics Group, Camp Group HQ, Camp Group HQ, Camp Pendleton, CA Lejeune, NC Kinser, Okinawa, Japan
Summary
The fundamentals involved with understanding the Marine air-ground task force are invaluable to you as an officer, because it helps you to understand the larger picture of how the Marine Corps fights. The concepts that were presented herein are the basics that you need to understand but are not all inclusive. To continue your study of the fundamentals of the MAGTF and its employment, see the references below.
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References
Reference Number or Author MCDP 1-0 MCO 3120.9A MCRP 5-12D MCWP 4 Reference Title Marine Corps Operations Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) Organization of the Marine Corps Forces Logistics
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As stated clearly in MCDP-1, we are guided by the philosophy of maneuver warfare, which emphasizes rapid, focused effort, tactical and operational flexibility, and decentralized adaptation. Because maneuver warfare focuses on the enemy and its critical vulnerabilities, by expanding our operational possibilities, logistics capabilities allow us to seek out and exploit those vulnerabilities. Maneuver warfare also depends heavily on the use of tempo. Logistics must enable the generation and maintenance of tempo by creating flexible and dynamic support networks to allow us to quickly focus combat power and sustain that combat power throughout the course of operations.
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STRATEGIC
PROCUREMENT MOBILIZATION WAR RESERVES MATERIAL READINESS DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT FACILITIES STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT FORCE REGENERATION FORCE CLOSURE ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY INTRATHEATER LIFT THEATER DISTRIBUTION SUSTAINMENT RECONSTITUTION & REDEPLOYMENT
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL
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The application of CSS affects tactical operations; the goal of CSS is to provide the right equipment, at the right place, at the right time to support operations. Since most of the delivery of resources occurs at the tactical level of war, combat service support has been considered to be essentially the same as tactical logistics. Indeed, Marine units have logistics officers and logistics sections, but the units that perform logistics functions for these units are referred to as the Logistics Combat Element (LCE).
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Health maintenance Casualty treatment Casualty collection Temporary hospitalization and evacuation Postal Information systems Security support Civil affairs support Disbursing Exchange services Legal services Mortuary Affairs Food Services
Services
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Classes of Supply
The classes of supply shown in the chart below provide a means of grouping like items for ease of receipt, storage and distribution. The critical classes of supply at the tactical level are I, III and V since they are the items most important to maintaining the tempo of operations.
Description Subsistence, which includes rations and health and welfare items Minor end items, which includes clothing and individual equipment Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants Construction materials Ammunition: Ground (W) and Aviation (A) Personal demand items Major end items (Tanks, HMMWV, etc) Medical supplies Repair parts Non-military materials (items to support humanitarian ops or augment NGOs)
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Simplicity Flexibility
Economy
Attainability
Sustainability
Survivability
Description Providing the right support at the right time in the right place CSS planning and operations must complement tactical plans and operations to enhance the supported units ability to accomplish its assigned mission The keystone of CSS principles Avoiding complexity Fosters efficiency in planning and execution of CSS operations Ability to adapt CSS structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation Translates into the use of task organizations and varying mission structures to get the job done Providing support at the least cost in terms of resources available and necessary to accomplish the mission At some level and to some degree, resources are always limited Prudent and austere use of available combat service support assets The ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations An operation should not begin until minimum essential levels of support are on hand Ability to maintain support throughout an operation, not just to start an operation The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) commander must focus on long-term objectives and requirements of the supported MAGTF or unit The inherent capacity of the organization and its capabilities to prevail in the face of potential destruction
Methods of Distribution
Push vs. Pull Logistics Support. To provide logistics resources to the forces from the CSS units, the Marine Corps tactical distribution system operates on a set of procedures. Reduced to its simplest form, two types of procedures can be employed to effect distribution.
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Push vs. Pull Active Reactive Resources scheduled Resources requested Logistics anticipates Supported unit anticipates Less efficient More efficient Based on estimated consumption rate Based on actual consumption rate due to planned operational tempo Push vs. Pull Distribution
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Command Element
MEF G-4
CLR (FWD) HQ Co Comm Co MP Co Svc Co Food Svc Co MEU CLB MEU CLB MEU CLB LS/BTO Co
DS CLR HQ Co
GS CLR HQ Co
Dental Bn
Engr Spt Bn
CLB Maint Bn HQ Co CLC (MAW) Trans Co CLC (MAW) Support Co Supply Co GS MT Co HQ Co Sup Bn Medical Bn
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Permanently-Structured Units
In permanently-structured logistics units, control and coordination of functional CSS capabilities are normally centralized to achieve maximum efficiency. The two major permanently-structured logistics organizations within the MEF are the: Marine Logistics Group (MLG) Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG)
Description Is the primary logistics organization in the Operating Forces. Mission is to provide sustained logistics to the MEF. Is organized into three regiments which may have either cross functional or functional battalions. (Refer to MLG organizational chart above.) Is designed to support one Marine Division (MarDiv) and one Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) when: o Deployed as a MAGTF. o Separately deployed . o In garrison.
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Direct Support Combat Logistics Regiment (DS CLR) General Support Combat Logistics Regiment (GS CLR)
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A task-organized LCE is a unit tailored to meet the specific support requirements of a MAGTF. The designation, size, and composition of the MAGTF LCE are functions of the mission, size, and composition of the MAGTF itself.
Description Task-organized from the LCE to support the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Typically formed to support a Regimental Landing Team and its attachments. Draws its personnel and equipment from the MLG. The task organized LCE of the MEU Draws its personnel and equipment from the MLG. A separate task organization of CSS assets Is formed to provide any range or combination of CSS functions to the MAGTF or designated subordinate elements. Task-organized to provide direct support to a MAGTF element or additional CSS to a wing support unit located at a forward operating base (FOB).
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Requesting CSS
As stated earlier, the organizations personnel and equipment will provide the initial CSS. The logistics officer (S-4) is responsible for coordinating support for the organizations requirements. When the organizations requirements exceed the capability of its assets, the logistics officer requests assistance from the LCE. The LCE has an operations cell, the Combat Logistics Operations Center (CLOC) similar to the combat operations center (COC) of a ground combat unit. The CLOC Is the agency that controls and coordinates the day-to-day operations of the CSS organization. Focuses on meeting the needs of the supported units. MLGs, MCLBs, and CLRs operate CLOCs twenty-four hours a day during combat operations. Receives requests for support from elements of the MAGTF. Coordinates the support from units in the LCE.
MCLD 3 5
51
CLD 5
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As a platoon commander, you know how many Marines you have, what equipment you have, and what you are going to undertake (mission and commanders intent). From this knowledge you can derive logistical considerations, plan for your supporting requirements, and keep yourself combat effective for this and subsequent missions. PLAN AHEAD! Sample Problem 1: In desert conditions, Marines require approximately 8 gallons of water per day. If a Marine can only carry 2 gallons on his or her person in addition to the rest of the combat load, you have a shortfall of almost 200 gallons per day per platoon. When/where are you going to need and want resupply of water? What else can you do to solve this problem so as to not slow down or hamper your mission? Sample Problem 2: Your mission is to destroy a dug-in platoon on Hill 110, occupy the terrain, and be prepared to conduct patrolling operations in the vicinity. Before you step off into the attack, you know that you are going to expend a lot of ammunition (more than you can carry) in the attack and are going to need a resupply in order to conduct your follow-on mission. Arrange for that now!
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Summary
Good platoon commanders know that their moral authority to lead is built in part on their ability to take care of their Marines and their basic needs. Hence, platoon commanders need to be thinking ahead and planning for logistics that complement and enable their tactics. Logistics is an integral and inseparable part of war. Our approach to logistics recognizes and accepts war as a complex, uncertain, disorderly, and time-competitive clash of wills and seeks to provide the commander with the physical means to win in this environment. We seek logistics capabilities that extend our operational limits, and that allow us to anticipate requirements while remaining flexible, adaptable, and responsive to the changing conditions in the battle space. Marine logistics capabilities are based upon our warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Our logistics support and enhance the conduct of operations that Are oriented on the enemy. Have a specific focus of effort. Are conducted in accordance with the commanders intent. Help generate and maintain a high tempo of operations.
Marine logistics are expeditionary in nature and naval in character. They are built on core capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are conducted through integrated and flexible planning and the exercise of responsive command and control. People are the foundation of Marine logistics. Marine logistics depends upon the exercise of Leadership. Discipline. Attention to detail. Responsiveness.
by both the units supported by the logistics system, and by the individuals who work within that system. Our doctrine, education, training, organization, procedures, and equipment provide the means for implementing Marine logistics. These components of our logistics capability reflect the unique requirements of maneuver warfare and our expeditionary nature. Together with our personnel, they provide a common basis for the conduct of effective logistical activities across the range of military operations.
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References
Reference Number or Author MCDP 4 MCDP 1-0 MCO 3120.9A MCWP 4-11 MCWP 4-11.4 MCWP 4-12 MCO P4790.2C JP 3-02.1 MCRP 3-31B MCWP 3-31.5 MCWP 3-32 Reference Title Logistics Marine Corps Operations Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) Tactical Level Logistics Maintenance Operations Operational Level Logistics MIMMS Field Procedures Manual Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Landing Force Operations Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Ship to Shore Movement Maritime Preposition Force Operations
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MAGTF MALS MARDIV MAW MCLB MCLD MEF MLG MOS MPF
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Basic Definitions
Accountability An obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation of an officer or other individual for keeping accurate records of property, documents, or funds. The individual having this obligation may or may not have actual possession of the property, documents, or funds. Accountability is concerned primarily with records, while responsibility is concerned primarily with custody, care, and safekeeping. As defined in the Navy regulations, means an officer detailed to duty involving pecuniary responsibility for government property and funds in that individual's custody. The commanding officer of a unit having an organic supply account is considered to be an accountable officer. The obligation of an individual for proper management, custody, care, and safeguarding of property entrusted to that individual's possession or under his/her supervision. An individual appointed by proper authority to exercise custody, care, and safekeeping of property entrusted to that individual's possession or under his/her supervision; may include financial liability for losses occurring because of failure to exercise this obligation. A custody control document which identifies, by serial number, the items in the custody of the responsible officer. (See Appendix A.) The range and depth of items functionally related to and supporting an end item. This equipment assists in the operation of the end item. A publication that lists all components for an end item. One of the six functional areas of logistics. It consists of: All action taken to retain materiel in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes: inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.
Accountable Officer
Responsibility
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Categories of Maintenance
Three levels of maintenance exist within the Marine Corps ground equipment maintenance system: organizational, intermediate, and depot. Within these three levels are five echelons of maintenance. Each level and echelon is authorized to perform certain maintenance functions on certain commodity area items of equipment (e.g., communications, ordnance, motor transport). This capability is normally listed in a units T/O mission statement. Maintenance units are not restricted to performing only one echelon of maintenance. For example, a unit may be authorized to perform first and second echelon maintenance or even third or fourth. To manage maintenance effectively, commanders must understand their maintenance responsibilities and the maintenance responsibilities of those units in support.
Organizational Level Maintenance. The using unit performs organizational maintenance on its assigned equipment. All units within the Marine Division, Marine Logistics Group (MLG), and Marine Aircraft Wing possess the organizational capabilities to maintain their organic equipment. Organizational maintenance focuses on the operator and crew preventive/corrective measures required by technical publications, equipment failure, and service schedules. Organizational maintenance phases normally consist of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies. Organizational maintenance includes first and second echelon maintenance responsibilities. Intermediate Level Maintenance: Intermediate maintenance is the responsibility of and performed by designated maintenance activities in direct support of using organizations. Intermediate maintenance phases normally consist of calibration, repair, or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies; the emergency manufacture of non-available parts; and providing technical assistance to using organizations. Intermediate maintenance includes third and fourth echelon maintenance. Depot Level Maintenance. Depot maintenance is performed on materiel that requires a major overhaul or a complete rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items. This level of maintenance includes the manufacture of parts, modifications, testing, and reclamation, as required. Depot maintenance supports lower categories of maintenance by providing technical assistance and by performing maintenance that exceeds the lower categories level of responsibility. Depot maintenance also provides stocks of serviceable equipment that are not available in lower echelon maintenance activities. Depot maintenance includes the fifth echelon of maintenance.
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Responsible Officer
Responsible Officers (ROs) are assigned by the Battalion/Squadron Commander but assisted and managed by the Supply Officer to ensure all duties and responsibilities are adhered to. The following is a list of the basic duties and responsibilities that are required by each RO. Turnover responsibilities
Basic Duties
Ensure that property is properly maintained (SL-3 complete), safeguarded, and employed. Maintain proper records. Make frequent inspections. Report loss or damage. Report all overages and shortages. Old Responsible Officer: o Have a new CMR printed. o Assemble all receipts and vouchers. o Assemble all components lists (SL-3s). o Assist the new responsible officer. o Rectify all discrepancies with the supply officer. New Responsible Officer: o Obtain a copy of the CMR. o Personally inventory all items by serial number and SL-3 components. o Assemble and verify all receipt and vouchers. o Request an extension if necessary. o Submit discrepancy letter if necessary. o Sign CMR within 15 calendar days. Having subordinate Marine conduct inventory for you Not conducting an inventory at all. Not identifying all account discrepancies during acceptance . Requesting changes to account without proper documentation. Not ensuring SL-3 items are complete.
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Temporary Loan
There may be times when another unit requests to borrow your equipment for a period of time. This is most commonly referred to as a "temp loan." Temporary loans of organic property to an organization within another command are neither desired nor encouraged. However, upon determination by the commanding officer that such a loan is necessary and in the best interest of the Marine Corps, a loan may be authorized. As a general rule, temporary loans of organic property, when authorized by the commanding officer, will be made for 30 days with no more than one additional 30-day extension. However, the time may be extended, at the discretion of the commanding officer, not to exceed one year. Temporary loans should not be used in lieu of authorized allowances. Requirements should be anticipated and changes to formal T/E allowances should be initiated whenever possible. When you receive a request for a temp loan and you are willing to provide the support, you should: Notify your company commander or operations officer of the request. If approval is granted to temp loan the equipment, contact the unit supply officer and arrange for the transaction. When the unit comes to pick up the equipment, the supply officer or a representative should be present to draft the necessary documents, and a joint inventory and inspection of the equipment should be conducted. Upon return of the equipment, again, the supply officer or a representative should be present and a joint inventory and inspection made of the returned property.
The commanding officer who controls the account will establish procedures through the units supply officer to ensure recovery of property issued on temporary loan. The appropriate form for conducting the temporary loan transaction is NAVMC 10359, Equipment Custody Record (ECR) card.
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Personal Effects
From time to time Marines within your command will require their personal belongings to be inventoried and packed for long term storage. The supply officer will coordinate this process and ensure all rules and regulations are adhered to during these cases. The following section explains in detail how and when you will be required to conduct such an inventory. A personal effects inventory is required and will be conducted NOT LATER than 48 hours (72 hours if the timeframe involves a holiday weekend) after receipt of information that a member is in one of the following categories: Death. Missing. Hospitalized. Unauthorized absence. Incarcerated (arrested, serving sentence imposed by military or civil authorities). For any other reason that a member becomes separated from his/her property as outlined in MCO P4050.38B.
The following procedures are required to be followed for the inventory of personal effects and government property: The commanding officer (company, battery, etc.) appoints an inventory board consisting of one or more officers or staff noncommissioned officers to conduct the personal effects inventory. The commander can appoint a sergeant to conduct the inventory of the personal effects of sergeants and below. All personal effects will be assembled and inspected for government property. Inventory boards are authorized to remove and turn over to unit supply officers Marine Corps-owned organizational clothing and equipment from the personal effects and will cite such action on form NAVMC 10154 (Personal Effects Inventory Form). Personal effects are inventoried in accordance with Chapter 9 of MCO P4050.38B, Personal Effects and Baggage Manual. The unit supply officer will have a copy of this order. Upon completion of the inventory, the names, grades, and social security numbers of the individual(s) conducting the inventory will be typed or legibly printed on the form; the original of the inventory will be signed in the designated block by the senior member conducting the inventory. A continuous chain of receipts will be maintained until final disposition of the personal effects has been made. A copy of all inventories will be included in the member's SRB/OQR.
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It is the responsibility of the unit commander to identify a member as being in a status that would require a personal effects inventory. Once identified, it is also the responsibility of the unit commander to conduct the inventory and turn the property over to the unit supply officer in the prescribed timeframes.
Summary
While you may not ever be a Supply Officer, it is likely that you will be assigned as a RO for equipment organic to your unit. Therefore it is imperative that you familiarize yourself with the roles and regulations of this position to ensure you are keeping within the standards of all Marine Corps Orders and other regulations.
References
Reference Number or Author MCO P4400.150E MCO P4790.2C MCWP 4-11 MCWP 4-11.4 UM 4400-124 Reference Title Consumer-Level Supply Policy Manual MIMMS Field Procedures Manual Tactical Level Logistics Maintenance Operations FMF SASSY Using Unit Procedures
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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YOU WERE ISSUED A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM MANUAL (MCO P1610.7F) BRIEFLY REVIEW IT AND KEEP IT FOR REFERENCE. READ/REVIEW THIS STUDENT HANDOUT THOROUGHLY BEFORE EACH FITREP CLASS.
Importance
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Fitness Report Score and Reporting Senior Profile Performance Anchored Rating Scales The Competition Example Profile Example Profile List Relative Value Reviewing Officer Comparative Assessment Report Comments Promotion Endorsement Continuum Example Section I Comments: Top Performer Example Section I Comments: Middle of the Pack Example Section I Comments: Weak Performer Additional Resources Check Fitness Report Status Request OMPF with Reporting Profiles Example Fitness Report Discussion Group Case Study / Assignment Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objectives
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MCCS-LDR-2103. Given Marines while serving as a supervisor, conduct performance evaluation to complete accurate, uninflated, timely and complete fitness reports in order to provide fair and accurate information for selection boards. Enabling Learning Objectives MCCS-LDR-2103a. With the aid of reference, describe reporting senior (RS) responsibilities without omission. MCCS-LDR-2103b. With the aid of reference, describe reviewing officer (RO) responsibilities without omission. MCCS-LDR-2103c. With the aid of reference, identify fitness report (FITREP) reporting occasions without omission. MCCS-LDR-2103d. Given Marines while serving as a supervisor, write a FITREP to record performance evaluation.
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The Fitness Report The Fitness Report is one persons evaluation of one Marine at one rank in one billet. The design of the report is such that it facilitates the documentation of essential and critical information in a simple and direct manner. It is a simple communication between reporting officials and selection boards, essentially a Letter of Recommendation. A FITREP is NOT a disciplinary tool, a lever to exert influence or a counseling tool. Rather, it is the culmination of the counseling process. Fitness Report writing requires a blend of science and art. The science of a Fitness Report is largely dictated by Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1610.7e the Performance Evaluation System (PES). The art begins with the FITREP classes and discussions here at TBS. A sharp focus in these classes will provide a solid foundation that will be continuously honed in the fleet through instruction, mentorship, and practice.
The Key Players **All cooperate to insure timely and accurate reporting** Marine Reported On (MRO) Reporting Senior (RS) Any officer or enlisted member sergeant through major general who is the subject of the performance evaluation. Generally the first officer (commissioned or warrant) or civilian GS-9 or above in the MROs chain of command. In rare cases, the RS can be an equal ranking officer. Generally the first (commissioned) officer or GS-10 in the RSs chain of command Required for all adverse reports. Normally the RS of the RO, although certain exceptions may apply. (see par 5005 of the PES)
Chapter 2 of the PES delineates the specific responsibilities of the reporting chain.
The Audience The audience for a Fitness Report is NOT the MRO; it is the selection board. Officers and Senior enlisted members across the Marine Corps are regularly detailed to sit on various selection boards convened in and around Quantico. The primary information they rely upon to select Marines for promotion, command, and special programs comes from FITREP scores and comments that you generate. In essence, Fitness Reports are letters of recommendation.
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Fitness Report Score and Reporting Senior Profile Performance Anchored Rating Scales (PARS) PARS are 14 professional attributes located on pages 2-4 of the report which can be evaluated on a range from A to G. These scales correspond to number values 1 to 7 which are averaged to produce a numerical score for the report. ___________________________________________________ The reporting profile is a list of all Fitness Report scores an RS has recorded for a particular rank. Profiles are constantly updated and maintained by HQMC as part of a RSs Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). Referencing this updated list allows an RS to insure current reports are accurately ranked against historical reports of the same grade. For this reason, profiles are similar in nature to your squad rankings. You dont just recreate the rankings each time; you evaluate the recent performance of your peers and use the previous list to update those rankings. (See Appendix G of the PES) ___________________________________________________ When you write a report, you are not simply comparing the MRO to recent reports; you are comparing the MRO to every report you have submitted for Marines of the same rank. That means you are comparing them to Marines who have long since moved past that rank or even active duty. FITREPS are a comparison of past and present performances, not people. ___________________________________________________
The Competition
Example Profile:
4.35
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Relative Value (RV) Grading the Grader RV is the FITREP systems way of compensating for grading differences between Reporting Seniors. Like weighted points in a GPA, RV insures that all FITREPs are fair and consistent no matter how tough or easy the individual grader is. Example Relative Value Chart:
4.07
4.13
4.14
4.21
4.35
90
80
100
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Reviewing Officer Comparative Assessment Item 3 of Section K of the FITREP on page 5 where the RO ranks the MRO on an 8Block vertical scale commonly referred to as the Christmas Tree. The RO compares the MRO to all Marines (past and present) of the grade whose professional abilities are known to the RO. (See par 4014 and Appendix G of the PES)
Report Comments Complimenting the score and ranking of the report, the comments provided on Page 5 by the RS and RO serve to summarize the MROs performance during the reporting period. Among other relevant information, comments should reflect: a) Demonstrated proficiency in execution of assigned duties b) Demonstrated leadership ability c) Endorsement for promotion and increased responsibility Comments are designed to clarify the score or rank of the report. For that matter, the flavor of the comments should match the score. *Note* Any adverse comment renders the entire report adverse. Forgettable performance must be matched by forgettable commentsnot negative comments. This is part of the Art of FITREP writing that you will learn with time and experience. Example Promotion Endorsement Continuum: Recommended for promotion ahead of contemporaries/peers Best Performer Ever: **Note: Per par 4003.7d, pg 4-12 of the PES, Accelerated Promotion recommendation requires justification using (Accelerated Promotion) Addendum page do not mark any block in SECT A, Item 7.** _____________________________________________________ An absolute must for promotion Top Performer: My Highest recommendation for promotion _____________________________________________________ Highly recommended for promotion Middle of the Pack: Promote at first opportunity Strongly recommended for promotion ___________________________________________________________ Recommended for promotion Weak Performer: Promote with peers Promote Nothing (saying nothingsays a lot)
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WILLIAMS
ROY
xxxxx6789
TR
20090105
20090704
I. DIRECTED AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS -Sergeant Williams is an immensely talented and effective NCO who operates at a level beyond the grasp of his peers. Hand selected to assume a SNCO billet; he completely outperformed two seasoned Staff Sergeants. An absolute technical expert whose professional skill rivals that of an officer. He directs the various administrative and training requirements of his unit without fault. Demonstrates impeccable moral character and a matchless ability among his peers to lead and inspire Marines and Sailors. The Corps could not find a finer ambassador for recruiting duty. Highly recommended for any officer commissioning program. An absolute must for promotion. DIRECTED COMMENT: SECT. A, ITEM 6a: MRO was the subject of a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal on 20090704.
PROFICIENCY:MOS
skillsandabilitytoexecute assignedduties
LEADERSHIP:How
welldoesMROlead,mentor Marines&Sailors
PROMOTION:How
stronglydoyoufeelMRO shouldbepromoted
WILLIAMS
ROY
xxxxx6789
TR
20090105
20090704
I. DIRECTED AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS -Sergeant Williams is a talented NCO whose performance during the period was outstanding. Filling a SNCO billet, he quickly mastered his responsibilities and guided his section to superior results. A superb technician with impressive MOS and professional skills, he directed the various administrative and training requirements of his unit with impressive precision. A mature and dedicated leader who provides a guiding a steadying influence on his Marines and Sailors. Sergeant Williams is highly recommended for promotion and billets of increased responsibility. DIRECTED COMMENT: SECT. A, ITEM 6a: Corps Achievement Medal on 20090704 MRO was the subject of a Navy and Marine
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WILLIAMS
ROY
xxxxx6789
TR
20090105
20090704
I. DIRECTED AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS -Sergeant Williams is an effective NCO who operates at a level expected of a Marine with his rank and experience. Demonstrates the leadership and technical skills required to accomplish assigned billet responsibilities. Directs the various administrative and training requirements of his unit with limited guidance. Promote.
Remember that any adverse comment renders the entire report adverse. Documenting weak performance often takes more time and creative writing skill. Note the unenthusiastic promotion endorsement for the weak performer. Thats a clear signal to any selection board that this Marine is not competitive with his/her peer group.
https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/portal/page?_pageid=278, 1937147&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
- Click Check Fitness Report Status under Online Applications Request OMPF with Reporting Lists & Profile:
https://www.manpower.usmc.mil/portal/page?_pageid=278, 1963381&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
Click How to request your OMPF
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Timothy C. Neder
-Concur with RS assessment; MRO is one of the best Non-Commissioned Officers I have observed in 10 years of combined service Surpasses his peers in every measurable category Excellent candidate for MECEP or other officer program Sergeant Williams has my highest recommendation for promotion and billets of increased responsibility
2009 07 04
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Introduction
It is 1 April 2011 and you have been the platoon commander of 2d Plt, Golf Co, 2d BN, 8th Marines since 1 Feb 2010. During that time you have conducted numerous field exercises, including battalion training deployments to both 29 Palms for a Mojave Viper and to Bridgeport, CA for cold weather training. As your company starts a week long operational pause to verify REDs and SGLI information and get caught up on medical and dental readiness, you find out that one of your sergeants, Sgt Bobby Rivera, has just received PCS orders to Quantico with a report date NLT 7 May. He has decided to request 3 weeks of leave in conjunction and will officially leave your plt in 2 weeks on 15 April 2011. Sgt Rivera, an 0311, is one of your squad leaders. He was promoted to Sgt on 1 Feb 2010, your first day in G/2/8. During your turnover with the previous platoon commander, he explained that Sgt Rivera was a great leader, but only average at PT. Since youve been plt cmdr, youve seen Sgt Rivera consistently go out of his way to train his fire team leaders in everything from OSMEAC, to land nav, to uniform regulations. While hes not the most technically or tactically proficient Sgt in your plt or in the company, he always works to better himself and takes learning his profession very seriously. Last fall, he volunteered to attend Sgts Course and graduated in the top 20% of his class (received a Not Observed report dated 2 Sept 2010 15 Oct 2010). He also qualified expert with rifle and pistol prior to going to Sergeants Course and received a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal on 1 March 2011. Sgt Riveras PT performance leaves slightly more to be desired. His last PFT score was a 227 (run Jan of 2011) and he typically hovers around 12 pull ups and a 24 minute 3 mile run time. You rarely see him in the gym or out running on his own. He is 68 tall and weighs 186, but his body fat percentage is still within regulations at 18%. The last four of Sgt Riveras SSN are 4616. Your company commanders name is Capt Chris G. Carter and his last four are 2895. Your unit MCC is V28 and your RUC is 28582.
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This is your RS profile list for Sergeants. Fill in the 5 boxes below and then use that information to fill out Sgt Riveras Sections A and I. Use the letter boxes to assign him a numeric score for this FitRep, depending on where you want to place him.
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Be prepared to discuss the following questions: 1. How many days do you have to do Sgt Riveras FitRep? By what date should you have given it to him, if possible? 2. What was the occasion for his last FitRep? 3. What is the occasion for this FitRep and why? 4. Including the FitRep you give him, how many will Sgt Rivera have by the time he leaves Golf 2/8? 5. Why isnt Sgt Riveras rifle or pistol score recorded on this FitRep?
6. Why do you have 5 reports where the from time is 1 Feb 10?
8. Does it matter what letter grades you assigned Sgt Rivera? Why or why not?
9. Who are some people you could send this report to for a Command Review?
10. This FitRep was filled out in pen. What would you use to fill out a real FitRep and where would you find it?
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Term or Acronym PES FITREP MRO RS RO PARS RV Definition or Identification Performance Evaluation System Fitness Report Marine Reported On Reporting Senior Reviewing Officer Performance Anchored Rating Scale Relative Value
Notes
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Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Personnel Records
Personnel Records
Introduction A great deal of your time as a platoon commander and Marine officer will be spent on administrative mattershow you take care of your Marines. Your administrative skills directly impact your professional reputation and the importance of administrative proficiency should not be discounted. This student handout is designed to familiarize you with some of the administrative matters encountered by a company grade officer. In this lesson, you will learn some of the basic skills that will help you as a Marine and, more importantly, as a leader of Marines. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Marine Corps Administrators Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) Platoon Commanders Notebook Service Record Book/Officer Qualification Record (SRB/OQR) Record Audit Books Administrative Remarks Leave and Earning Statements (LES) Marine On-Line (MOL) myPay Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Lesson Purpose Page 3 5 7 10 12 18 22 26 30 33 33 34
Importance
In This Lesson
Upon completion of this lesson, you should be able to: Given the requirement, review personnel records for accuracy, per MCO 1070.14, MCO P1050.3H, and MCO P1070.12K. Given the requirement, describe elements of service record books and officer qualification records, without omission Given the requirement, identify documents that should be included in a Marine's occupational military personnel file (OMPF) without omission. Given the requirement, describe elements of a leave and earnings statement (LES), without omission.
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Due to the diversity of commands throughout the Marine Corps, the duties and tasks of the PersO may overlap those of the Adjutant.
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Due to the diversity of commands throughout the Marine Corps, the duties and tasks of the Adjutant may overlap those of the PersO.
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Completeness and accuracy is the individual Marine's responsibility. A Marine may (and should) obtain a copy of their OMPF by Submitting a written request to MMSB. Requesting in person at Building 2008, Quantico, Virginia.
The OMPF contains material organized into five sections: Service Folder Service folder. Commendatory/derogatory folder. Performance folder. Field folder SRB/OQR. Health folder.
The service folder section of the OMPF contains Contract information. Discharge documents. Reserve documents. Orders to active duty. General administrative and service documents.
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Performance Folder
The performance folder section of the OMPF contains Fitness reports. Standard addendum pages for all sergeants and above. Memoranda from CMC (MMSB) as necessary to record historical or administrative information.
Documents in the service record book/officer qualification record (SRB/OQR) are filed in the Service Folder upon separation. The field folder SRB/OQR section of the OMPF contains Documents from previous SRB/OQRs for a Marine who has periods of broken service. A partial listing of documents and standard pages suitable for inclusion in the OMPF.
Health Folder
The health folder section of the OMPF is not maintained unless a Marine has broken service ending prior to 1994 or is presently on temporary disability retired list (TDRL). Health and dental records are sent to the Department of Veterans Affairs upon discharge. Marines are not authorized to remove, enter, or alter anything in their health or dental record.
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Contents
Format
Three-Ring Binder or Folder (Take to Field) Who has access & contributes to it? (Your discretion) o Platoon Sergeant o Platoon Guide o Squad Leader Platoon Sergeant & Squad Leader Notebook (Your discretion)
RUC: 30370 UIC: V36
Mentee Name: Cpl P. T. Moore Mentor Name: 2ndLt I. M. Hard Unit Address: 3d Bn, 6th Mar Administrative Questionnaire: Are there any known current medical problems that may Yes / No interfere with your ability to perform your job? Are there any known current problems that hinder your ability to Yes / No perform physical training? Are there any current existing family problems that you are Yes / No seeking assistance with or receiving counseling? Are there any current known Yes / No financial problems that you are having? Are you currently married? Do you Yes / No have children? Is your spouse a service member? Yes / No
Notes:
Notes:
Notes:
Notes:
Notes:
Notes:
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Unit Mission: -Close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver or repel the enemys attack by fire and close combat. -As assigned by Sqd Ldr, Plt Sgt or Plt Cmdr Marines critical role in support of the units mission: -Effectively lead Fire Team -BPT act as Sqd Ldr in his absence -Be fully proficient in all weapon systems in Infantry Squad, to include radio and call for fire Identified Strengths: 1. Problem Solving 2. Time Management 3. Organizational Skills 4. Prioritizing Identified Weaknesses: 1. Memory of Names and details not associated with a process 2. Can be argumentative 3. Task completion (95% solution guy) 4. Currently PT Professional Goals Short-Term 1. Prepare Marines for deployment 2. Assignment as Squad Leader 3. MCI Personal Goals Short-Term 1. Buy Motorcycle 2. Read more 3. PT more Long-Term 1. Settle down, start family 2. Take college courses Long-Term 1. Sqd Leaders Course 2. Promotion to Sergeant 3. B-Billet to Drill Field
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Training Exercises / Tactical Operations 19 Aug 09 Exemplary performance of Cpl Binotz during Patrolling Exercise. Acted as Squad Leader in absence of Sgt Smith. Demonstrated strong planning and execution of security patrols, to include actions on enemy contact. Effectively maintained accountability of squad and equipment Personal Life / Purchases 21 Aug 09 Purchased Harley Davidson Motorcycle with loan from Navy Fed with $250 monthly payment. Will attend motorcycle safety course next week. Briefed and fully understands base regulations. Daily Observations 25 Aug 09 Observed Cpl Binotz conducting PCC/PCI of his Marines prior to live fire attack. Very detailed and proficient. Formal Performance Counseling 1 Sep 09 Counseled on his 4.5/4.4 Pro/Cons and what he needs to do to improve, specifically: improve PFT and technical knowledge of call for fire. Informal Counseling / EMI (Extra Military Instruction Cmdr Only) 1 Oct 09 Showed up late for PT, unshaven with smell of alcohol on his breath. Counseled by Plt Sgt. Assigned EMI: will stand uniform inspection tomorrow morning by Plt Sgt Formal Disciplinary Issues 15 Oct 09 Forwarded to BN level NJP for DUI in Jacksonville, NC. BAC: 1.3 Court Date: 15 Nov.
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The SRB/OQR is divided into two sides: Standard pages on the right side. Documents on the left side. The SRB/OQR is used for three primary purposes: To record significant events, duties, and other pertinent information for historical purposes. To assist local or immediate commanders in making decisions concerning assignments, promotions, and eligibility for attending formal schools or overseas duty. To protect the privacy of individual Marines by consolidating information and limiting access to this information to personnel in the chain of command.
Purpose
Accessibility
The commanding officer exercises physical control over the SRB/OQRs and is responsible for their care and maintenance as well as safeguarding them to prevent tampering or unauthorized access. Marines can have unlimited access to their records in the presence of a custodian. Other personnel working in an official capacity may also be granted access.
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The standard side of the SRB/OQR is the right hand side of the folder. A standard page may Consist of more than one page. Be identified often by its NAVMC form number rather than its title or actual position in the sequence.
Format for entries require specific guidelines: All entries should be typewritten, stamped, or neatly printed. Erasures, strikeovers, and correction fluids/tape are not permitted. Corrections are made by drawing a single line through the invalid entry and placing the correct entry nearby. Use only standard abbreviations as published in the IRAM. Enter dates in the YYMMDD format. Only a commanding officer or designated officer may sign/authenticate an entry.
The document side of the SRB/OQR is on the left hand side of the folder and contains Superseded standard pages. Official letters. Certificates. Various other documents of permanent value.
Because there is no mandatory sequence for filing documents on the left-hand side of the SRB/OQR, the local command determines the order in which they will be placed.
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---------------------------**PERSONAL INFORMATION**---------------------------DATE OF BIRTH: 19741111 HOME OF RECORD: 103 22 2180 LA ST TAMMANY CITIZENSHIP: CA US COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: ETHNIC CODE: Y NONE CIVILIAN ED LEVEL: 12 12TH GRADE RACE CODE: N BLACK CERT: L HS DIPL MAJOR: 00 NO MAJOR SUBJECPOPULATION GROUP: BLACK BLOOD TYPE: 2 A POS SEX: M RELIGION: 62 ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HOME PHONE: 7036305202 WORK PHONE: 0000000000 STREET ADDRESS: BURKE HALL RM 236 CITY ADDRESS: QUANTICO STATE: VA ZIP-CODE: 221340000 ADDRESS VALIDATION: R RECORD BOOK ----------------------------**PERSONAL INFORMATION**---------------------------GOOD CONDUCT MEDAL DATE: 19980303 ARMED FORCES RESERVE MEDAL DATE: 00000000 SMCR MEDAL DATE: 00000000 DUTY PREF1: ---------------------------**RECORD INFORMATION**-----------------------------RECORD STATUS: 0 ACTIVE STATUS RESERVE RECORD STATUS: DISPUTED DATE: 00000000 DISPUTED DATA: LAST SCREENING: 00000000 REASON: SCREENING RESULT: ---------------------------**DEPENDENTS INFORMATION**-------------------------MARITAL STATUS: S SINGLE TOTAL NUMBER DEPENDENTS: 00 DEPN CERT CODE: NONE BAS/COMRATS: C COMRATS DEPN GEO-LOC CODE: DATE DEPN LOC BEGAN: 00000000 SERVICE SPOUSE SSN: CUSTODY STATUS CODE: SERVICE SPOUSE CODE: SPL POWER OF ATTORNEY: 00000000 SERVICE SPOUSE DATE: 00000000
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UNIT/ORGANIZATION
PRIMARY DUTY
REMARKS
2BN RTBN, RTR MCRD, PISC 29905 RUC 32092 MCC 016
970318 JD FOR REC TRNG 970613 TR TO CG CAMLEJ NC MCC JA4 970827 JD TEMINS FMCT CL#39-97 970912 TR TO MCSSS CAMLEJ NM MCC K78 FOR TEMINS
3DSUPBN 3DFSSG MARFORPAC UNIT 38410 FPO AP RUC 29010 MCC 1C2
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Administrative Remarks
Field commands past practices of indiscriminately recording minor infractions, local command data, and command requirements prompted the decision to limit entries to an absolute minimum. Review of entry requirements is a continuing and evolving process. Restrictions Limit administrative remarks to matters Forming an essential and permanent part of a Marines military history. Not recorded elsewhere in the SRB/OQR or MCTFS. That will be useful to future commanders.
Authorized entries under this rule must meet two tests: the information Contained in the entry is of permanent value to the Marines career. Is or cannot be documented anywhere else in the SRB, medical records, or the Marines MCTFS record.
Participation in certain operations, excluding routine training exercises and/or operations not specifically identified as combat operations but as having a potential for escalating into combat operations and/or humanitarian relief efforts (i.e., California Loma Prieta Earthquake Relief, etc.), are considered to be significant events in a Marines military career. Page 11 Entries Do not make entries on page 11 Which concern administrative discharge or competency review proceedings if they do not, upon final review, result in discharge or reduction. As a local training record.
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I was advised that within five working days after acknowledgement of this entry, a written rebuttal can be submitted, and this rebuttal will be filed on the document side of the SRB. I choose (to) (not to) make a rebuttal. _________________ (Signature of Marine) ______________________ (Signature of CO)
NOTE: If the Marine refuses to acknowledge (sign) an adverse/derogatory entry, add the statement, Marine refuses to acknowledge this entry at the bottom of the entry. By refusing to acknowledge the entry, the Marine forfeits the opportunity to make a rebuttal statement. Make a counter-entry immediately following the counseling entry to verify the Marine was made aware of the adverse/derogatory entry. The verification counter-entry may be signed by direction of the commanding officer.
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(Date). Counseled this date concerning deficiencies: (list deficiencies, provide specific recommendation for corrective action, and assistance available).* I am advised that failure to take corrective action may result in administration separation or limitation on further service. I was advised that within five working days after acknowledgment of this entry, a written rebuttal can be submitted, and this rebuttal will be filed on the document side of the SRB. I choose (to) (not to) make a rebuttal. (Signature of Marine) Common Authorized Entries Some common authorized entries are In Hands of Civil Authorities (IHCA)/In Hands of Foreign Authorities (IHFA). Record of Issue of Wet-Type Divers Dress, Campaign Service Hat, Suitcase, and Trunks. Not Recommended/Recommended But Not Eligible for Reenlistment. Privates through Corporals Not Recommended for Promotion Due to Restrictions Listed in MCO P1400.32. Eligible but Not Recommended for Promotion.
20 Basic Officer Course
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NOTES: The Marines signature acknowledges that counseling has occurred, not that the Marine concurs with the content of the entry. The actual commanding officer/unit commander must physically sign the 6105 entry. The date entered is the day the commanding officer actually counsels the individual Marine. The commander enters the date at the time of counseling using a date stamp or by pen. Forward a photocopy of the completed page 11 entry and written rebuttal statement (if any) to CMC (MMSB-20) within 30 days. If the Marine annotates his or her desire not to make a statement, no further action is required.
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Marines are allowed to maintain 60 days of accrued leave. Any accrued leave over 60 days will be taken away on the first of October (the start of the new fiscal year) each year. The commanding officer may approve advanced leave after the Marine has used more leave than earned as long as the Marine will be able to earn enough to cover the deficiency before reaching his or her end of current contract (ECC). The maximum leave accrual is the total number of days of leave a Marine can accumulate before reaching his ECC. The day of departure is a day of duty if departure is after 1200. Leave begins at 1200 and includes weekends and holidays. The day of return is a day of duty if the Marine returns before 1200. Marines may elect to sell back up to 60 days of accrued leave during their careers; Marines may sell back leave when they reenlist, separate, or retire. A sample LES starts on the next page.
Advanced Leave
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13 DATE
AMO UNT
14 DATE
AMOU NT
15 START DATE
16 AMOUNT
17 BALANC E
1201 1
E 19 LV BF 44.5
24 MAX ACCRU AL .0
25 LOST
26 SOLD/A S OF
.0
G 33 STATE TAX
STATE CODE CA EXEMPTIONS M03 WAGES THIS PRD $4,355.70 WAGES YTD $4,355.70 STATE TAX YTD $.00
EXEMPTIONS M03 WAGES THIS PRD $4,355.70 WAGES YTD $4,355.70 STATE TAX YTD $463.98
AVIATION PAY INFORMATION 32 31 30 29 OP FLY GATE INFO AVIATO ACCUM OP FLY TIME OP R 0000 BASE FLY BASE DATE TIME DATE 0000 00000000 YRS 000000 .0 MO 00 H RIGHTS OF MARINES INDEBTED TO THE GOVERNMENT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO: 35 FICA (SOCIAL SECURITY --INSPECT AND COPY RECORDS TAX) PERTAINING TO DEBT --QUESTION VALIDITY OF A DEBT AND SSEC WAGES THIS PRD SUBMIT REFUTING $4,355.70 EVIDENCE SSEC WAGES YTD --NEGOTIATE A REPAYMENT SCHEDULE $4,355.70 --REQUEST A WAIVER OF DEBT SSEC TAX YTD $270.05 MORE INFORMATION ABOT YOUR RIGHTS MEDICARE WAGES THIS PRD CAN BE OBTAINED FROM YOUR CO VIA $4,355.70 YOUR CHAIN OF COMMAND MEDICARE WAGES YTD $4,355.70 MEDICARE TAX YTD $63.16 28 OFFICE R BASE DATE 0000000 0
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$1200 .00 M RESERVE DRILL INFORMATION N RESERVE RETIREMEN INFORMATION 48 PAY GRO UP 49 CRA DATE 00000000
52 REG
53 REG FYTD
54 REG ANNY TD
55 ADD
56 ADD FYTD
57 ADD ANNY TD
58 BF ANNY TD
51 DS SN 610 5
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MARINE FED CREDIT UNION 800 UCCI DENTAL START 20010101 AMOUNT 19.08
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Website Address
Personal Information
The Personal Information tab on MOL contains documents on Personal Reports o Awards; o BIR. o BTR. o Career Status Bonus (CSB). o Education. o Operational Cultural Information. o Pay and Leave Summary. o Pers Tempo. o PSMC. o Record of Emergency Data (RED). o Rank/Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). o Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Personal Updates o Contact Information (home address, phone number, email address). o Foreign Travel. o Gas Mask and Helmet. o Race/Ethnic, Religion, Self-professed Language Skills.
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The Unit Leader tab on MOL contains documents on Unit Management Status Report (USMR). Commanders Messaging (Cmdrs Msg). Leave Management (Leave Mgmt). Proficiency/Conduct (Pro/Con). Promotion Recommendation (Prom Rec). Special Liberty. Permissive Temporary Additional Duty (PTAD). BIC Assignment Roster. Views Reports.
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myPay
Description myPay Puts customers (individual service members) in control of their pay account information. Uses strong encryption and secure socket layer (SSL) technology to safeguard personal information. Offers convenient, global access around the clock. Saves the Defense Department money by reducing costs associated with LESs and customer support.
Website Address
Capabilities
myPay enables service members to View, print, and save LESs. View and print tax statements. Change federal and state tax withholdings. Update bank account and electronic fund transfer information. Make address changes. View and print travel vouchers. Control TSP enrollment (military only).
A sample log in screen for myPay is on page 31, and a sample menu screen for myPay is on page 32.
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myPay (Continued)
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myPay (Continued)
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Summary
A great deal of your time as a platoon commander and Marine officer will be spent on administrative mattershow you take care of your Marines. Knowing where to find information and how to record, update, and correct information on your Marines is critical. You should be skilled in using personnel records to take care or your Marines.
References
Reference Number or Author MCO P1050.3H MCO P1070.12K MCO P1900.16 Reference Title Regulations for Leave, Liberty, and Administrative Absence Marine Corps Individual Records Administration Manual (Short Title: IRAM) Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual
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Notes
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Notes
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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To maintain the actual strength in each grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) and occupational field (OccFld) at the maximum readiness for commitment to combat. To ensure that all eligible Marines receive full and equitable opportunity to compete for promotion. To ensure that only the best and fully qualified Marines are promoted.
Designation of Authority
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) has delegated authority To promote to the ranks of private first class through sergeant to those commanders o Major and above o With special court-martial authority o Generally, battalion commanders and squadron commanders To commanders of specific units, such as Fleet AntiTerrorism Security Teams (FAST) and Marine security guard companies and detachments at formal schools and administrative detachments special promotion authority (to field grade officers only).
Commanders Responsibilities
Commanders occupy a position of paramount importance in the enlisted promotion system. The commander must ensure Strict compliance with the policies and regulations contained in the reference. That all enlisted Marines who are to be promoted to the next higher grade meet the Marine Corps standards of professionalism, personal performance, and leadership.
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The decision to promote to the grades of PFC through Sgt rests solely with those commanders with promotion authority. A Marine will not be promoted if, in the opinion of the commander, the Marine is not capable of performing satisfactorily in the higher grade, even though all other requirements have been met. Staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) promotions effected by the CMC, require the certification of the commander. By this certification, the commander attests that the Marine's advancement is in the best interest of the Marine Corps.
Promotion System
The promotion system provides a process whereby Marines within each grade and MOS and OccFld compete among themselves for promotion to the next grade. The basic goal of the system is to advance the best-qualified Marines to higher grades so MOS/OccFld vacancies in the enlisted structure will be continuously occupied by Marines who are fully qualified to perform the duties and to assume the responsibilities of the next higher grade. Details are announced in a Marine Corps Bulletin in the 1400 series.
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TIG Requirements
TIG requirements are Marine Corps developed measures of promotion eligibility. The TIG requirements may be reduced 6 months for SNCOs, if the needs of the Marine Corps dictate and as directed by the CMC. The TIS requirements are based upon completed years of service as determined by the Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date (AFADBD) in the o Regular component. o Active Reserve category of the reserve component. Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD) in the two categories of the reserve component.
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For promotion to the ranks of PFC through Sgt, there are no CMC-directed Professional Military Education requirements. LCplS and above who are denied further service beyond their current expiration of active service are not eligible for promotion consideration.
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12 months
Special court-martial
6 months
Summary court-martial
Note: Marines will not be promoted when in a probationary status as a result of sentence by a court-martial.
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As a result of a competency review board (CRB), Marines will not be promoted within 12 months of an administrative reduction to Sgt or higher grade. 6 months of a punitive or administrative reduction to LCpl or Cpl. 3 months of a punitive or administrative reduction to Pvt or PFC. While in a suspended administrative reduction. Commanders may partially waive this restriction to 3 months after the CRB for exceptionally well-qualified Marines grades PFC to Pvt.
Other Restrictions
Other restrictions or cases where Marines will not be provided are listed below. Within 18 months of the date confirmed distribution, use, or possession of illegal drugs took place. For purposes of this paragraph, the 18-month period begins On the date positive confirmation is received from the DOD-certified testing laboratory in the case of urinalysis detection.
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Regular Promotion
The number one requirement for promotion is the commanders recommendation. A Marine may meet minimum time in grade and time in service requirements, other promotion provisions, and have no promotion restrictions; however, that Marine will not be promoted unless in the opinion of the commander that Marine is fully qualified for promotion. Marines in the grades of PFC and LCpl are required to exercise an ever-increasing degree of Maturity Leadership Professionalism
No Marine shall be promoted to PFC or LCpl who has not demonstrated these traits and the desire to assume positions of higher responsibility.
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Marines will be promoted to PFC if They have served for 6 months on active duty in the grade of Pvt. TIG is computed from the 1st day of the month of entry on active duty. Their service has been satisfactory (as determined by the commanding officer) Marines will be promoted to LCPL if they have 8 months TIG from the PFC date of rank 9 months TIS from the AFADBD
Lance Corporal
Are otherwise qualified for promotion, as determined by the commander. Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) The MCTFS The Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) will automatically identify the eligible personnel to Eliminate the requirement for commanders to manually determine the eligibility of Pvts and PFCs by TIG and TIS. Reduce the number of late promotions because of administrative oversight. A select grade of E2 or E3 will post to the unit's Diary Feedback Report (DFR) the month prior to the promotion month for all Pvts who meet the TIG requirement. PFCs who meet TIG and TIS requirements. The select grade will not post if the commander reports a NOT REC (not recommended for promotion) entry on the unit diary by the 15th of the month prior to the effective date of promotion as well as a page 11 entry made in the SRB.
Marines in the grades of Cpl and Sgt are also required to exercise an ever-increasing degree of Maturity. Leadership. Professionalism.
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Promotion to Corporal
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Promotion to Sergeant
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Composite scores for each regular promotion quarter are computed approximately 5-10 days after the MCTFS CS DATA ELEMENTS CUTOFF. Composite Score A mathematical calculation of certain data elements reported on the unit diary. Used as a measuring factor for Marine Corps wide comparison of Marines within a given grade and MOS/OccFld (computed quarterly).
Composite score elements will be reported by unit diary entry for regular and reserve Marines by the cutoff date shown in the promotion plan (paragraph 22). The unit will be informed via the DFR of the quarterly automated composite score for each eligible Marine assigned to the unit approximately 30 days prior to the promotion month. If a composite score is not computed because of missing or invalid information, the Marine will receive a "0000" score on the DFR. The DFR will give the reason why a composite score was not computed. Composite scores generated by this system are only as accurate as the information resident in the MCTFS. Commands must enter accurate and complete information in a timely manner. Units will report missing/corrected elements on the diary and manually compute the score. If the manually computed composite score meets the cutting score announced, request remedial consideration. Once a regular Marine's composite score is computed, that composite score is applied for each month of the promotion quarter and is reflected on the units DFR for three months unless the Marine is selected and the promotion is effected.
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Cutting Score
The CMC announces a score for each MOS/OccFld, to which individual composite scores are compared to control the number of promotions to the grades of Cpl and Sgt.
How Established. After receiving composite scores on all Marines eligible for promotion through unit diary entries, the CMC decides the lowest composite score acceptable for promotion based on the number of vacancies by MOS throughout the Marine Corps that would yield the desired number or less of the new rank.
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The cutting score would be 1456 which yields 800 infantry (03) Cpls for promotion to Sgt. A lower score would yield too many. How Used. Once the CMC establishes cutting scores (one for each occupational field), they are published monthly to the Marine Corps via ALMARS (All Marine messages); then, commanders with promotion authority are authorized to promote those they still feel are qualified.
If a NOT REC entry is made into the MCTFS by the 15th of the month prior to the promotion month, then that Marines composite score will not be used to determine the cutting score. This is a critical requirement for commanding officers, which ensures only those fully qualified and recommended are considered for promotion.
Remedial Promotion
Remedial consideration is afforded to the grades of PFC through Sgt for administrative errors that delayed or prevented a Marine from being promoted. The command submits all requests for remedial consideration to the CMC (MMPR-2) for approval. Due diligence requires that requests for remedial consideration must be submitted within 1 year from the date of error or injustice. The CMC (MMPR -2) may, in the interest of fairness and under unusual circumstances, grant remedial consideration for requests that fall outside the 1-year limit. Pvt through LCpl. Commanders of Pvts and PFCs who meet the TIG/TIS requirement but did not receive a select grade in the MCTFS for the appropriate month may input the promotion on the unit diary without reference to the CMC (MMPR-2).
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Remedial promotion requests should be kept to a minimum. They indicate inadequate administrative procedures, supervision, and leadership. Leaders must ensure the timely, accurate reporting of all MCTFS data on their Marines and practice sound promotion desktop procedures.
Promotion Boards
The two types of promotion boards are the Headquarters Marine Corps SNCO Selection Board. Local enlisted screening boards.
The purpose of these boards is to evaluate the qualifications of those Marines eligible for promotion. Commanders having promotional authority may convene local enlisted screening boards to determine qualifications of eligible enlisted Marines for promotion to the grades up to sergeant. Local enlisted screening boards are normally associated with a units meritorious promotion programs. HQMC will convene selection boards each calendar year to examine the qualifications of Marines for SNCO ranks. Marine Corps Bulletin 5420 provides guidance concerning the composition and schedule of regularly convened selection boards. The board membership will consist of both officers and senior SNCOs, and voting and nonvoting members (recorders). The CMC will review and approve board membership prior to assignment.
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As an officer, you write fitness reports on sergeants and above; they are your promotion recommendations. Chapter 3 of MCO P1400.32C provides detailed guidance concerning SNCO promotion provisions. The accelerated promotion program is designed to provide selection opportunity to Sgts and SSgts who do not meet the DOR or AFADBD cutoff required for consideration in the below zone. Marines recommended for accelerated promotion will be considered in the below zone with the Marines in their MOS/OccFld who met the established TIG and TIS cutoff for promotion consideration. Accelerated promotion is a form of meritorious promotion and is established to advance deserving Marines based on exceptional, noteworthy, and commendatory performance of duty over a sustained period. The performance should be of the degree that clearly merits promotion over other qualified, senior Marines being considered in the promotion zone and above zone by the selection board. Authority to frock enlisted Marines to SNCO ranks is delegated to Marine commanding generals.
Meritorious Promotion
Meritorious promotions are intended to promote Marines whose performance is superior to that of their peers, or to promote Marines for specific actions/superior achievement. The CMC will promote, by means other than the regular promotion system, exceptionally well-qualified Marines in recognition of outstanding leadership and performance, per the provisions outlined below.
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Reduction
Just as we promote those Marines who serve well and will be able to contribute to the Marine Corps by their promotion to the next higher grade, Marines who are not living up to what is expected of them in the grade in which they are serving may merit a reduction, either punitive or administrative, depending on the circumstances. The two types of reduction are Punitive Nonpunitive
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Reduction (Continued)
Punitive Enlisted Marines above the grade of private may be reduced as punishment due to a court-martial or nonjudicial punishment. Chapter 7 of the reference provides detailed guidance concerning punitive reductions. Commanders with nonjudicial punishment authority may reduce Marines from the same grades to which they are authorized to promote. That is to say, the battalion commander may reduce a sergeant or below at office hours. The company commander may not reduce a man at office hours because he does not have the authority to promote. A punitive reduction results in loss of time in grade. That is to say, if a Marine is reduced from corporal to lance corporal, his new date of rank as a lance corporal would be the date of reduction. Nonpunitive The Commandant may reduce enlisted Marines to any grade necessary in order to reduce the total number of Marines by grade. This nonpunitive reduction may occur, for example, during a period of massive strength reductions such as at the end of World War II. Chapter 6 of the reference provides detailed guidance concerning punitive reductions. A Marine may also be reduced for any action(s) or omission(s) in technical or professional performance that indicate the Marine is not capable of satisfactory performance in the grade and MOS currently held. A CRB is a formal administrative body convened to consider the suitability and ability of a Marine to continue to serve in the grade currently held. In the case of Marines of the grade of PFC and LCpl, the CRB may consist of only the Marines commanding officer. The Marine officer is authorized to administratively reduce a Marine who a CRB determined to be incompetent.
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Reduction (Continued)
Reduction Authority The reduction authority for SSgts and above is Marine officers exercising general court-martial convening authority. Sgts and below is the commander, as defined in the reference. The reduction authority and the convening authority may be the same individual. Chapter 6 of the reference provides detailed guidance concerning nonpunitive reductions.
Promotion Ceremony
Commanders as defined by the reference are responsible for conducting or ensuring appropriate promotion ceremonies are conducted for their enlisted Marines. Commanders may delegate responsibility for conducting the promotion ceremony to any Commissioned officer of the U. S. Armed Forces (to include reserve officers and retired officers). Government civilian employees in grades of GS-11 and above. Senior enlisted personnel, under unusual circumstances. Delegation of responsibility for the conduct of the ceremony does not absolve commanders of their responsibility.
Promotion Plan
The promotion plan below identifies the eligibility requirements for regular promotion to Cpl and Sgt for the next 5 calendar years (CY) beginning with 2001, and will replace the annual promotion plan MARADMIN. A MARADMIN will be published only if it becomes necessary to update and/or provide additional information. The columns below are described as QTR - the CY promotion quarter. LCPL DOR - the date of rank required for LCpls to be eligible for promotion to Cpl during the quarter. LCPL AFADBD - the Armed Forces Active Duty Base Date required for regular LCpls to be eligible for promotion to Cpl during the quarter.
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Eligibility requirements for regular promotions to Cpl and Sgt are in the table below.
QTR Jan, Feb Mar 2001 Apr, May, Jun 2001 Jul, Aug, Sep 2001 Oct, Nov, Dec 2001 Jan, Feb Mar 2002 Apr, May Jun 2002 Jul, Aug, Sep 2002 Oct, Nov, Dec 2002 Jan, Feb, Mar 2003 Apr, May, Jun 2003 Jul, Aug, Sep 2003 Oct, Nov, Dec 2003 LCPL DOR 2 Jul 00 2 Oct 00 2 Jan 01 2 Apr 01 LCPL AFADBD 2 Mar 00 2 Jun 00 2 Sep 00 2 Dec 00 CPL DOR 2 Mar 00 2 Jun 00 2 Sep 00 2 Dec 00 CPL AFADBD 2 Mar 99 2 Jun 99 2 Sep 99 2 Dec 99 TIG/TIS 31 Mar 01 30 Jun 01 30 Sep 01 31 Dec 01 MCTFS CUTOFF 20 Nov 00 20 Feb 01 20 May 01 20 Apr 01
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Category EX SS MM 65 = 250 64 = 248 63 = 247 62 = 246 61 = 245 60 = 244 59 = 242 58 = 241 57 = 240 56 = 239 55 = 238 54 = 236 53 = 235
Sustainment Course 40 35 25
Conversion for Scores
Entry Level Course 220 210 190 26 = 192 25 = 190 24 = 183 23 = 176 22 = 169 21 = 162 20 = 155 19 = 148 18 = 141 17 = 134 16 = 127 15 = 120 14 = 113 13 = 106 12 = 99 11 = 92 10 = 85 9 = 78 8 = 71 7 = 64 6 = 57 5 = 50 4 = 43 3 = 36 2 = 29 1 = 22
52 = 234 51 = 233 50 = 232 49 = 230 48 = 229 47 = 228 46 = 227 45 = 226 44 = 224 43 = 223 42 = 222 41 = 221 40 = 220
39 = 218 38 = 216 37 = 214 36 = 212 35 = 210 34 = 208 33 = 206 32 = 204 31 = 202 30 = 200 29 = 198 28 = 196 27 = 194
Conversion Table (Rifle Marksmanship Score to Rating) Score Rating 240-250 5.0 235-239 4.9 230-234 4.8 225-229 4.7 220-224 4.6 215-219 4.4 210-214 4.2 205-209 3.8 200-204 3.6 195-199 3.4 190-194 3.0 000-189 0.0
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Course MCI Course or other Military Service Correspondence CLEP Test (Each portion) College Course (Semester or Quarter) Vocational School Course (Semester)
Line 12: Command Recruiting Bonus Points. Enter 20 bonus points for each individual referred while in the current grade. Bonus points are to be awarded when the individual referred enlists. A maximum of 100 bonus points may be awarded. Line 13: Composite Score: Add values under the "Score" column for lines 5-12. Total is a Marine's Composite Score.
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Rifle Marksmanship Score PFT Subtotal (line 1 + line 2) GMP Score (line 3 divided by 2) GMP Score (from line 4) Average Duty Proficiency Average Conduct TIG (months) TIS (months) DI/Recruitment/MSG Bonus Self-Education Bonus a. MCI/Extension School b. College/CLEP/ Vocational ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
= = = = = = = = = = =
x 1.5 x1 x 20
Line12. Line13.
Summary
As a leader of Marines, you are responsible for ensuring that your Marines, who are found to be qualified in accordance with Marine Corps policy, are promoted in a timely manner. By so doing, you are not only ensuring that your Marines are rewarded fairly for their efforts but also that the future enlisted leadership of our Corps meets the same high standards as in the past.
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References
Reference Number or Author MCO P1070.12K MCO P1400.32C MCO P1610.7E NAVMC 2794 Reference Title Marine Corps Individual Records Administrative Manual (IRAM) Marine Corps Promotion Manual, Vol 2, Enlisted Promotions Performance Evaluation System (PES) How to Write a Fitness Report
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Cutting Score
DFR DI DOD
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IRR
In Zone (IZ)
Date the CMC assigns to a Marine upon Advancement to the next grade Accession into the Marine Corps Used to determine Seniority in grade Eligibility for promotion to the next higher grade Not selected for promotion to the next higher grade Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Reserve component Marine who is a member of the SMCR and pre-assigned to a mobilization billet on a regular component table of organization requiring continuous training during peacetime. Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve component Marines who are not in the SMCR or Active Reserve. Consists of Marines who have completed their active duty or SMCR obligation and have time remaining on their MSO. have completed their MSO and serve in the IRR by choice. Are in the Delayed Entry Program. IRR Marines are assigned to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, Kansas City, Missouri Sgts or SNCOs who Have not previously failed selection for the grade to which competing Satisfy the MOS/OccFld; DOR; and AFADBD/PEBD (If applicable) requirements established for this zone. Referred to as promotion zone. Marine Admin Marine Corps Total Force System Requirement that ensures Marines have acquired a minimum amount of experience in grade prior to being considered for advancement to the next higher grade Possessing the minimum TIG does not mean that the individual will automatically be promoted. Marines in the grades of Pvt through Sgt must be otherwise qualified, and SNCOs must meet at least the below zone cutoff to normally be considered for promotion Minimum time a Marine must be in the service in order to be eligible for promotion to a particular grade Military occupational specialty Military Service Obligation Noncommissioned Officer Nonjudicial punishment Occupational field
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Once Passed
PCS PEBD
Sgts or SNCOs Considered for promotion in the promotion zone Not selected (failed selection) Permanent change of stations Pay Entry Base Date. An established date at the beginning of a Marine's career Adjusted for time lost/broken time Determines certain pay entitlements and when a Marine is entitled to increased basic pay For members of the reserve component (Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)), used to determine TIS for promotion eligibility among Marines within the same grade, OccFld and DOR For LCpls and Cpls in the Marine Corps Reserve, used to calculate TIS when computing their composite scores Physical Fitness Test Reenlistment Code CMC will convene boards consisting of board members who must be at least one grade senior to the Marines being considered for promotion Commissioned officers (CWO through Col) Senior enlisted members (SgtMaj through MSgt) Select those Marines best and fully qualified for promotion to all SNCO grades Will be convened annually at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Number assigned to a SNCO selected for promotion Illustrates the Marines relative standing or seniority in comparison to other Marines selected To the same pay grade By a specific board Based on the precedence criteria established in the reference Maximum amount of time a Marine may remain in the Marine Corps for a given grade Established by Enlisted Career Force Controls Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Reserve component Marine who Performs training and/or duty consisting of a minimum of 28 drills and 2 weeks annual training per year. Are assigned to A specific command within Marine Forces Reserve. An IMA Detachment. Staff noncommissioned officer Time in grade Time in service
Seniority Number
Service Limit
SMCR
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Twice Passed
UCMJ UDP
Sgts or SNCOs, considered twice for promotion, once in the o Promotion zone o Above zone o Not selected (failed selection) Uniform Code of Military Justice Unit deployment program
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Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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In This Lesson
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Learning Objectives
Terminal Learning Objectives MCCS-LDR-2205f. Given materials and references, produce award recommendations to recognize Marines. Enabling Learning Objectives MCCS-LDR-1009. Without the aid of reference, define the classification of Marine Corps Awards without omission.
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AwardRecommendation Process
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Award Elements
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Summary
During this lesson we discussed the importance of company-grade officers being fluent in the Marine Corps awards process. We introduced the various categories of Marine Corps awards: unit awards, military/personal decorations, and campaign/service awards. We also discussed other methods of recognition including the Certificate of Commendation, Meritorious Mast, and Letter of Appreciation. Furthermore, the student was introduced to the Marine Corps award submission process. Each lieutenant, upon reaching his/her duty station, should establish an Awards Processing System account. This will provide the lieutenant the ability to process and track awards for his/her Marines.
References
Reference Number or Author SECNAVINST 1650.1H SECNAVINST 5216.5D MCO 5215.1J MCO 1650.19J MCRP 6-11B Reference Title Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual Naval Correspondence Manual Marine Corps Directives Management System Marine Corps Awards Discussion Guide for Marine Corps Values
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Marine Corps Training Philosophy Training Principles Commanders Responsibilities Systems Approach to Training & Education (SATE) How to Use Training Standards in Units Develop Training Plans Training Schedule Example of Commanders Training Philosophy and Guidance Letter Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 4 5 8 9 13 14 17 19 26 27 28 30
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Training Principles
All Marines must understand and apply these principles at every level of training. These principles provide sound and proven direction and are flexible enough to accommodate the demands of local conditions and the judgment of commanders and other trainers. The principles of Marine Corps training are discussed in the following subparagaphs. These principles are not inclusive, nor do they guarantee success. They are guides that commanders can use to assess unit training programs. Train as You Fight o The battle is the ultimate test of training. To train as you will fight is the fundamental principle upon which all Marine Corps training is based. Therefore, all peacetime training must reflect battlefield requirements. All leaders are considered trainers and coaches, and they must ensure that individual Marines and units receive realistic training that simulates wartime conditions. Marines training should prepare them to perform their tasks and meet operational standards during the complex, stressful, and lethal situations they will encounter in war. If units and elements are to function together during combat, they should train together during peacetime exercises. The Marine Corps philosophy is to train well in peace so that it can fight well in war. Make Commanders Responsible for Training o Commanders at all levels are responsible for the training and performance of their Marines and units. They do more than manage training. The commanders personal presence and involvement demonstrate to all that training is the number one priority. Senior commanders personally train each direct, subordinate commander. The ability to delegate authority to an individual who is trained to accept responsibility is vital to the Marine Corps operational concept. Therefore, training the chain of command is an inherent part of the Marine Corps training philosophy. It is an integral part in developing subordinate commanders into effective leaders. This provides subordinate leaders both implementing and supervisory responsibilities and also the opportunity to train other subordinate leaders. This delegation of authority fosters initiative throughout the chain of command and is vital to the teacher-trainer role. Use Standards-Based Training o Training standards are published as Marine Corps Common Skills (MCCS) for each military occupational specialty (MOS) and as mission performance standards (MPSs) for each unit. All training must conform to these standards. Standards-based training is the use of common procedures and uniform operational methods to create a common perspective within the Marine Corps. This method of training is further reflected in Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
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Commanders Responsibilities
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. General Douglas MacArthur Commanders at all levels are responsible for all of their units training needs. To meet specific training needs, commanders develop overall unit training programs based on the best combination of available resources, materials, guidance, and time. Commanders must Provide clear commanders intent/guidance throughout the process. Identify training objectives clearly. Plan training events and activities. Arrange for support. Ensure that the resources needed to conduct training are available. Ensure that training is conducted. Supervise and evaluate individual and unit proficiency. Supervise and evaluate training sessions, instructional quality, and UTM procedures. Mission-essential tasks are not prioritized, they are all equally essential. But, the training of the skills necessary to achieve proficiency in the performance of missionessential tasks is prioritized.
During Phase I we discussed the Systems Approach to Training process and how it applies to training Marines. We will now revisit this topic with a more in depth look at how it all ties in to developing training plans.
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Assessment
Commanders Guidance
Training Plans
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compete for precious training time. Because of the necessity to support other requirements, not all units can be assigned prime time for training at the same time.
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Training Schedules
Training Schedules o Training schedule formats may vary among organizations, but they should Specify when training starts and where it takes place. Allocate the correct amount of time for scheduled training and also additional training as required to correct anticipated deficiencies. Specify individual, leader, and collective tasks to be trained. Provide concurrent training topics that will efficiently use available training time. Specify who conducts the training and who evaluates the results. Provide administrative information concerning uniform, weapons, equipment, references, and safety precautions. The Training Schedule. Type of Training Schedule Long-range training plan/training exercise and employment plan (TEEP) Description Not required below regiment level Is a long-range training plan o Lists all the major exercises and deployments in which units will take part o Chronologically lists the event and the unit that will be involved Includes a chronological listing of Major training events Exercises Deployments Serves as the master training schedule Should contain all the training needed to o Prepare for events on the mid-range plan o Support the unit's training program Include all the exact details about the training Are what you as lieutenants must be familiar with Represents the fully coordinated training events that will take place Answers these questions: o What o Who o Where o How
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Whenever possible, we must train in an environment that simulates the stress, fatigue, and confusion of combat. Commanders must provide a mechanism for feedback, from the lowest level possible, in order to improve training. b. When ashore, the training environment will be fast-paced, physicallydemanding, and reflect continuous combat-like operations. Delete administrative and bivouac situations during exercisesgo to the field, get tactical, and stay tactical. We should employ force-on-force training when possible, but this needs to be controlled to prevent a cowboy mentality. Force-on-force training should create decision-making
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our most likely operating arena as urban, low to no light, restrictive ROE, and peacekeeping/peacemaking missions. Therefore, our live-fire should be oriented to this environment. 4. Orientation. In todays world of reduced budgets and competing priorities, we must make every round and training dollar count. As such, every round must be scored and recorded, and every exercise must be a learning evolution. I want each training event constructively de-briefed during training (when possible) and at the completion of training. This is best done with all hands in an open forum that is honest, objective, and
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strength, decrease the fat around the waist line, and strive for greater load bearing endurance in all weather conditions. Try hard to be hard, then stay hard. 6. Maintenance. Maintenance is a priority. We will accomplish maintenance through a combination of daily/weekly preventive maintenance and periodic 1- to 2-week maintenance standdown periods. Maintenance standdowns will be scheduled at the battalion level and will encompass all units. During these periods, all training will stop and a 100% effort will focus on detailed maintenance of weapons, vehicles, equipment,
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the past in order to determine what I would want to emmulate/avoid on battlefields in the future. All PMEs and TDGs will conclude with a review of lessons learned. During deployment, we will continue to do two PMEs per month and a commanders TDG every two weeks. Once back at Camp Lejeune, we will endeavor to do a SNCO/officer PME quarterly and a commanders TDG monthly. These PMEs and TDGs should then be used at the company level for your junior leaders. 9. Schools. Upon our return to CONUS, I want this battalion to aggressively pursue opportunities provided by the schools (PME & MOS). In my opinion, there is no one who is too valuable that they cannot go to school. There are many NCOs and SNCOs who need their PME equivalent in order to be competitive for promotion and reenlistment. In
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13. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical. I still want 12 hours of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training each month. Onboard ship, I specifically task every Marine to conduct at least one, masked, three-hour drill doing their normal work-related functions (i.e., typing, maintenance of weapons/vehicles, assemble/disassemble of weapons, fast roping, shooting, etc.). We must become more comfortable and confident in performing our duties while masked. 14. Individual Equipment. The following individual equipment items are required items for all hands: wrist watch wrist compass red lens flashlight whistle
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close air support (CAS) (RW & FW) Platoon live fire and maneuver 10-mile forced march TRAP exercise Dragon shoot Fix broken vehicles (3) Italian PHIBLEX Platoon sustainment training Cold weather sustainment training Minimize live fire training (4) NOBLE SHIRLEY XVI Primary focus is live fire and combined-arms training Platoon and company live fire Platoon and company live fire and maneuver
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Final BLT run/formation Chop R Btry, light armored reconnaissance (LAR), assault amphibious vehicle (AAV), combat engineer battalion (CEB) back to parent commands Personnel shifts Continue set-up and fix-up of new battalion area Battalion change of command Rifle/pistol range details Regiment guard ACB SNCO/officer staff ride to Fredericksburg
Summary
Successful combat units train as they intend to fight, and fight as they are trained. To be successful, the training must be well thought-out, prepared, and executed. The systems approach to training, when properly used, will ensure success. This will, in turn, maintain the Marine Corps as the finest military force in the world today.
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References
Reference Number or Author MCRP 3-0B MCRP 3-0A MCO 1553 Series MCO 1510.97 MCO 3501 MCDP 1 MCRP 6-11B MCWP 3-11.1 MCWP 3-11.2 MCWP 6-11 MCRP 3-11.1A Reference Title How to Conduct Training Unit Training Management Guide ITS for Basic Officer 9901 Lieutenant and Warrant Officer MCCRES standards WarFighting Discussion Guide for Marine Corps Values Marine Rifle Company/Platoon Marine Rifle Squad Leading Marines Commanders Tactical Handbook
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AAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . after-action review AAV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . assault amphibious vehicle ACB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air contingency battalion ACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .aviation combat element AWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Amphibious Warfare School BLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion landing team BST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle skills test C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Command and control CAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air support CATF . . . . . . . . . commander, amphibious task force CAX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combined-arms exercise CEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat engineer battalion CEOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .communications-electronic operating instructions CIFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close-in fire support CONUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . continental United States CSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support CSSE . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support element CWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat water survival EMCON. . . . . . . . electromagnetic emission control EXSCHED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .exercise scheduling FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .forward observer FRAGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fragmentary order FSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordinator FSCC . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center FSCEX. . . . . . . . . fire support coordination exercise FSMAO . . . . . . . . . . . . field supply and maintenance analysis office FST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field skills training FTX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field training exercise GCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element HF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .high frequency HQMC . . . . . . . . . Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
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H&S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . headquarters and service IOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Infantry Officers Course ITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .individual training standard ITSS . . . . . . . Individual Training Standards System JOPES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JULLS. . . . . Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System LAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . light armored reconnaissance MAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine air-ground task force MARFORLANT. . . . . . . . . . Marine Forces Atlantic MARFORPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Forces Pacific MARFORRES . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Forces Reserve MATMEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maintenance Training Management and Evaluation Program MCCRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Combat Readiness Exercise MCCRES . . . . . . . Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System
MCI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Institute MCLLS . . . Marine Corps Lessons Learned System MCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps Order MCTEEP . . . . . . . Marine Corps Training, Exercise, and Employment Plan MDSS . . . . . . MAGTF Deployment Support System MEDEVAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . medical evacuation MET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission-essential task METL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission essential task list MOPP . . . . . . . . mission-oriented protective posture MOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialty MOUT . . . . military operations on urbanized terrain MPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mission performance standard NBC . . . . . . . . . . . . nuclear, biological, and chemical NCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . noncommissioned officer NEO . . . . . . . . . .noncombatant evacuation operation NSFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . naval surface fire support OPFOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . opposing forces PFT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . physical fitness test PHIBLEX. . . . . . . . . . . amphibious landing exercise PME . . . . . . . . . . . . . professional military education PPO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . plans, policies, and operations ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement SACC. . . . . . . . supporting arms coordination center SATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . systems approach to training & education SAW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . squad automatic weapon SLAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sabot, light armor piercing SMAW. . . . . . . . . . shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon SNCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . staff noncommissioned officer SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedure SORTS . . . . Status of Resources andTraining System
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TACLOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical-logistical group TAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . training allowance pool TDG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical decision game TEEC . . . . . . . .tactical exercise evaluator controller T/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . table of organization T&R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . training and readiness TRANSLANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . transatlantic TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel UHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ultrahigh frequency UJTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Joint Task List UNTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Universal Naval Task List USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Army USMC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Marine Corps UTM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unit training management VHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .very high frequency
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Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
B4Q5299
Cultural Awareness
Cultural Awareness
Introduction Whether you realize or not, military operations are ultimately about people. Regardless of whether you are referring to the Tsunami relief in Indonesia, the Cuban missile crisis of the 1960s, or current engagements throughout the world, it is human beings that shape the world we live in and subsequently the world we fight in. Because people are central to military operations, culture is also an important aspect of military operations. To help establish a basis for understanding operational culture, it is important that you know what operational culture is and why military operations are influenced by cultural considerations. Importance The information provided here will help you to understand a foreign culture by breaking it into smaller interlinked parts, which will ultimately help you to better understand and successfully navigate the human terrain of the foreign area in which you are operating.
In This Lesson This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Cultural Factors Cultural Factors: Communication Cultural Factors: Religion Cultural Factors: Social Networks Cultural Factors: Geography Cultural Factors: Clothing Cultural Factors: Residential Patterns Cultural Factors: Diet Cultural Factors: Identity References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Lesson Purpose Page 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 8
The purpose of this lesson is to familiarize students with the operational importance and application of cultural awareness.
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Cultural Awareness
Cultural Factors
Cultural factors are interlinked subsections of a culture that help you to understand the culture by breaking it into smaller easier to categorize portions. The eight cultural factors are communication, religion, social networks, geography, clothing, residential patterns, diet, and identity.
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Cultural Awareness
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Cultural Awareness
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Cultural Awareness
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Cultural Awareness
Summary
Understanding the culture of the people within your AO can be a force multiplier and greatly to your success in operations. The eight factors previously discussed will give you a good starting point for your individual analysis of the human terrain of your AO.
References
Reference Number or Reference Title Author www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl USMC Center For Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) Website
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Cultural Awareness
Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
B4Q5319
Public Affairs
Public Affairs
Introduction This class will cover the mission of Marine Corps Public Affairs, the structure of the Public Affairs MOS, information that pertains to working with civilian media organizations, and instruction on information operations. A Marines actions at the tactical level of warfare can have major effects at the operational and strategic levels. A Marine Officer must understand the importance of his/her decisions when the civilian media is able to report on these actions in a short amount of time and be able to articulate this relevance to their junior Marines. We will discuss the mission and common duties of Marine Corps Public Affairs, cover information regarding working with civilian media, and touch on information operations and non-kinetic fires. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Mission of Marine Corps Public Affairs (PA) Duties and Functions of Marine Corps PA Media Awareness Information Operations Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Annex A: Expeditionary Public Affairs Annex B: Public Affairs Structure Lesson Purpose Page 3 4 6 10 11 11 12 12 13 22
Importance
In This Lesson
At the completion of this lesson, you should be able to understand the mission of Marine Corps Public Affairs and your role as an officer to assist Public Affairs in conveying information, dealing with the media and recognizing how you or your Marines actions may impact the opinion of the American public.
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Public Affairs
B4Q5319
Public Affairs
External Relations
External relations (sometimes called news media relations) provide an indirect method of communication with the public through the news media. Dealing directly with the media requires the highest level of professional competence and sophistication. Such relations require the following: Accurate and timely dissemination of information The public information responsibility is focused primarily on the accurate and timely dissemination of information to local area and national news media about the people, actions, and activities of the Marine Corps. This function involves daily contact with representatives of the civilian print and electronic news media. Credibility Requests for information in response to news media queries must be responded to quickly, accurately, and candidly. Although the Marine Corps cannot dictate which stories will receive coverage in the civilian news media, efforts to tell the story from a Marine Corps perspective must be pursued.
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Public Affairs
Community Relations
Well-conducted community relations enhance readiness by fostering hometown support. A good-neighbor policy is established through involvement with the communities and extends support to families of deployed Marines. It also helps reinforce the idea that the Marine Corps is a meaningful and rewarding career choice for Americas youth. Close, positive relations with neighboring communities inspire patriotism, and that patriotism translates into recruitment and retention opportunities. Every reasonable effort will be made to develop and maintain sound community activities. During deployments and operations, community relations efforts take many forms and can be organized by units, chaplains, public affairs personnel, or concerned individuals. From a unit venturing out in town to paint an orphanage in Pattaya, Thailand, to visits to schools and community centers by Marines and sailors throughout the world, the best picture we paint of the Marine Corps is through community involvement. Navy chaplains function as a tremendous organizational resource during these events. Civil affairs, when deployed, will coordinate community interaction in an operation and or exercise. Although public affairs will release information to the news media, CA will be responsible for the direct release of information to the local population. Civil affairs and public affairs will need to coordinate actions within the information operations cell to ensure that common themes and messages are maintained.
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Public Affairs
Media Awareness
The commander of a unit is not always the best person with whom the news media should talk. For example, the best spokesperson about a light armored vehicle or a tank is the Marine who drives one. The news media is not the message. The news media is the messenger. Marines are the message. When appropriate, commanders should encourage their Marines to talk to the news media, especially when reporters ask questions about a Marines job or mission. To ensure that Marines understand the role of the news media, commanders should include realistic news media training in all exercises, at every level possible. Each operational situation will require a deliberate public affairs assessment to identify specific information to be released. The following categories of information are usually releasable, although individual situations may require modifications. Releasable Information Arrival of U.S. units in the commanders area of responsibility (AOR) once officially announced by the DOD or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the OASD for Public Affairs. (Information could include mode of travel [e.g., sea or air], date of departure, and home station or port.) Equipment figures and approximate friendly force strength. Prisoner of war and friendly casualty figures by Service; approximate figures of enemy personnel detained during each action or operation. Information (nonsensitive, unclassified) regarding U.S. air, ground, sea, space, and special operations (past and present); in general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended.
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Public Affairs
Non-Releasable Information In more general terms, information in the following categories of information should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of host nation and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence method and sources. Although these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the news media, they may also be used as ground rules for news media coverage. The following list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation. Any information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapons systems and tactics including, but not limited to, enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures. Specific information for identification of missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway. Special operations forces unique methods, equipment, or tactics that, if disclosed, would cause serious harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission. Specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, onhand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units for U.S. or allied units; general terms should be used to describe units, equipment and/or supplies. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.
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Public Affairs
Interview Tips The following are tips you and your Marines should follow during an interview with the media: Relax; be yourself. Do not speculate or comment on matters beyond your cognizance or responsibility. Stay in your lane!!! Avoid military or technical jargon. Remember, your audience is the civilian public. Talk on the record or not at all. Anything you say can be quoted. Tell the truth, even if it is painful. You will maintain credibility by doing so. Explain as much as you can if you cannot discuss something (i.e., it is under investigation or classified). If additional information is requested, make an effort to get back to the reporter. Never say no comment. Tell the reporter if you do not know the answer to a question. Offer to get back to the reporter later with the answer, if possible. Answer directly and give the bottom line upfrontyou can amplify later. Correct the record. If a reporter makes an error or has wrong information, make the correction during the interview. Listen carefully to the reporter; ask for repetition or clarification, if necessary. Maintain eye contact; make sure the reporter knows you are interested and paying attention. Be expressive and try to be interesting. Be humorous, if appropriate. Humor can be one of the best forms of communication.
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Public Affairs
The Commander and the News Media Although the military often accuses the news media of not reporting in context, the military has been guilty of not giving the media the context they need. Marine leaders are the obvious experts on the missions and capabilities of naval forces. The American people have come to expect access to the person in charge the one making the decisions, not a spokesperson. The news media, particularly television, provide that public access to Marine leaders. Commanders must seek every opportunity to use the news media to reach a greater audience to explain their mission, its importance, and the risks involved. The commander who chooses not to speak cedes the information battlefield to critics and analysts who are uninformed about the true situation on the ground, how the mission relates to the situation, and the capabilities of the Marine units involved.
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Public Affairs
IO Defined
Information operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of military operations. A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies. Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is effectively translated into superior decisions. IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. To apply IO across the range of military operations, joint force commanders (JFC) integrate their military actions, forces, and capabilities throughout the domains (air, land, sea, and space) of the operating environment in order to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on adversary leaders, forces (regular or irregular), information, information systems, and other audiences; while protecting and defending the JFCs own forces actions, information, and information systems. The commander assesses the nature of the mission and develops the intent for IO in all phases of an operation or campaign. If news is out, its out. The global information environment makes information accessible to larger audiences and makes it easier to disseminate. As the value of information increases, the ability to limit or restrict its flow decreases. Leaders must recognize this; consider the impact that information availability will have on missions; and prepare to address issues openly, honestly, and in a timely manner. Waiting for others to shape the battlefield is inconsistent with our warfighting doctrine by addressing questions as rapidly as possible, we can retain our credibility and initiative.
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Public Affairs
IO (Continued)
Capabilities Supporting IO Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes. There are three military functions specified as capabilities related to IO: Public affairs (PA) Civil Military Operations (CMO) Defense support to public diplomacy
These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly, must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.
Summary
In this lesson, weve covered the mission of PA, duties and functions of PA, media awareness, and information operations. It is important that you as a provisional rifle platoon commander familiarize yourself with the numerous PA assets available to you, and utilize those assets to tell the story to the public. It is also imperative that you educate your Marines so that they understand how their actions impact the opinion of the American public, and ensure they understand how to deal with the media, should the opportunity present itself.
References
Reference Number or Author MCWP 3-33.3 DODD 5122.5 JP 3-61 JP 3-13 SECNAVINST 5720.44A Reference Title Marine Corps Public Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations Information Operations Public Affairs Policy and Regulations
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Public Affairs
Notes
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Public Affairs
Annex A
Conducting Expeditionary Public Affairs During Operation Iraqi Freedom By Capt. Joe Plenzler USMC Left unsung, the noblest deed will die. - Maj. Gen. Jim Mattis, USMC The 1st Marine Division attacked across the line of departure from Kuwait into Iraq at 1730Z on March 20, 2003 to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Division accomplished this mission by utterly destroying resisting Iraqi forces and capturing the capital city of Baghdad. More than 80 national and international media embedded within tactical units witnessed the campaign and saturated the worlds airwaves and newspapers with reports of the Divisions exploits and experiences in combat. The Divisions success in the media was predicated on five essential elements: 1) The initiative and aggressiveness of junior Marines and Officers who embraced the media, shared their courage with the world, and proved to the Iraqi people that there is no better friend, no worse enemy than a U.S. Marine. 2) Building realistic expectations of the media (using We Were Soldiers Once and Youngs LTC Hal Moore and reporter Joe Galloway as an example) and ensuring every Marine and Sailor had a clear understanding of the Commanding Generals mission and intent. 3) Early engaging and maintaining contact with the international and national media upon arrival in theater. 4) Conducting a thorough, efficient and humanistic Receiving, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) designed to impress and build the confidence of the embedded journalists adopted into the Divisions ranks. 5) Capitalizing on key critical events by exploiting tactical successes in the media. Public Affairs Officers, Marines and commands with embedded journalists can best influence the course of the information war at the tactical level by setting the conditions for individual and unit success in the media prior to combat, and by providing reinforcing fires on key communications objectives and tactical victories during the fight. PREPARATION FOR COMBAT BUILDING EXPECTATIONS There are no finer Marine Corps spokespersons than our junior Officers and enlisted Marines. The PA team decided early in the planning phase that the Divisions story would be primarily told where the rubber meets the road. As part of the Divisions preparations for combat, early in August 2002, the 1st Marine Division Commanding
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
General charged his PA section with supervising the development of a PreDeployment Brief to be given to his 20,000 Marines and Sailors a task normally under the purview of the G-3 Operations Section in most commands yet clearly falling into the public affairs mission of internal information. The PreDeployment Brief was designed to image each Marine and Sailor from Southern California through deployment and subsequent combat operations on foreign shores with the specified intent of crystallizing the Commanding Generals intent and key mission expectations into the minds of the audience. The brief provided an excellent vehicle for the PA section to reach out to the commanders, Marines and sailors of the Division, forewarn of the large numbers of media to accompany units in combat and disarm skepticism about the medias presence. The media would be riding along with the Marines into battle, living, sweating, and in some cases bleeding along side of them. To encourage the junior Marines to tell their story to the media, the PAO correlated engaging the media to the free beer purchased by patriotic civilians for Marines on liberty in their hometowns and increased stature in the eyes of attractive members of the opposite sex due to the representation of Marines in the entertainment media. The brief highlighted the photographing of the flag raising atop Mt. Surabachi by Associated Press photographer Joe Rosenthals as a positive example of cooperation between the two different camps. The CG encouraged the Division, left unsung, the noblest deed will die. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT The statement, you only get one chance to make a good impression is clich but true. From the onset, the Division PA section recognized the criticality of gaining and maintaining contact with the media in Kuwait City. The 400 reporters in country, frustrated by the slow pace of media opportunities at the CFLCC Press Information Center, languished in hotel lobbies as irate editors in New York and London screamed for copy. The PA section recognized this hunger for media opportunities and, pockets bulging with journalists business cards, embarked on a media blitzkrieg hosting more than 400 reporters in 40 days. The PA Marines put together media opportunities on bubble gum and bailing wire often hitch-hiking with the media due to the scarcity of available military and commercial vehicles. In one instance, they led 36 journalists in a 16 media vehicle convoy to visit 1st Tank Battalion out at Udari Range #9 in the middle of a Tooz an Arabian sandstorm navigating by GPS and map alone with visibility at less than 50 feet and 40 - 60 mph winds. The tanks couldnt see their targets on the range, but the story of the tank company training in harsh weather conditions carried the headlines, taught the reporters about the tenacity of our young Marines and also a good lesson of what to expect should they decide to embed with the Division for combat operations.
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
To further develop the relationship between the Division and the media, the PA team organized Professional Military Education sessions for the reporters at the CFLCC weekly meetings. Topics covered Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense (NBCD) familiarization, a gear packing seminar, tips on field living, and Division specific media ground rules. The objective of the PME sessions were to convey to the media one clear point: the 1st Marine Division cares whether they live or die. Concurrently, the PA team began exploring the feasibility of many TV medias request to bring along hard-wired, satellite transmission capable, 4-wheel-drive, diesel, desert colored vehicles and night vision qualified drivers to support their broadcasts while embedded with the Division. The team determined that allowing the media to use their own vehicles would benefit the Division by ameliorating some of the logistical burden on receiving units (a TV crew generally requires ten, 10-cube equivalents of space and lift) and allow the media to broadcast live on the fly in combat (the set up time for transmission without the hard-wired vehicle was two hours). Division PA requested to I MEF to appeal the OASD prohibition on media vehicles in embedded units. Most TV media opted to assign vehicles to their embedded correspondents in the hope that the verdict would be positive and fielded the vehicles on short term embeds with Division units. On all early tests, they performed spectacularly. Unfortunately, the Divisions appeal to allow the vehicles was rejected and subsequently limited the embedded TV medias ability to file their stories. RECEIVING, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION On March 10, 2003, the PA section met with 80 reporters assigned to embed within the Divisions tactical units at the Hilton Hotel in Kuwait City. Marines issued NBC suits, masks and nerve agent antidote kits. Doctors turned correspondents into pincushions with anthrax and smallpox vaccinations. Senior Marine leaders gave briefings on ground rules and the organization and mission of I MEF. The Division PA team worked furiously to address the needs of individual media, answer hundreds of questions and ensure that the media were prepared to embed. During one briefing a reporter skeptically asked, Really, how close are you going to allow me to get to the front lines? The Division PAO replied, I can put you in the back of a LVTP-7 Amphibious Assault Vehicle with 18 pissed-off grunts, drive you within 300 meters of the objective and send you in the assault as the Marines storm the enemys trench lines and drive bayonets into their hearts (of the enemy). The room went silent. The audience could have heard a pin drop. Is he serious? asked one skittish reporter. The Division would later deliver, in scores.
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Annex A (Continued)
Prior to embedding, the PA team spent many hours determining the best spread load of correspondents across the battalions to ensure a balance of print, radio and TV journalists throughout the Divisions battlespace. Every news agency would get their own exclusive and be separated from their competitors. The PA team honored every previous habitual relationship between commanders and reporters without exception going so far as to promise reporters with prior experience with the Division that they would be, picked up at Starbucks in Kuwait City if their official request to embed was not approved. The PA team aggressively lobbied for the additional media and the requests were eventually approved. The PA team made every effort to maximize the social bonding potential of the Marines and media by assigning reporters to units based on the hometown of the commander or home station (in the case of reserve units). PAO considered media embedded within the RCTs and separate BNs almost to be in a direct support relationship and retained a small group of general support reporters from the LA Times, New York Times, National Public Radio and El Correo at the Division Main to exploit key successes in the media by transporting them to key locations on the battlefield. The PA team purposely chose the reporters residing at the main on three key factors: circulation, depth of reporting, and acknowledgement of international contribution to the Coalition (in the case of El Correo the largest circulating newspaper in Spain). The media responded positively to this deliberate and aggressive support with the fair, balanced and mostly positive reporting. Buddies vs. Escorts Definitions: Escort (es-kort): A man or woman whose time is easily purchased for the sum of $500.00. Usually lives in Palm Springs. CA. Buddy (bu-de): A Marine who looks out for a new-join. Assists neophytes in learning the ropes. Ensures the well being of his charges. All too often, words such as handle, escort, and manage are used to describe interactions with the media. This vocabulary insinuates that PAOs can control or manipulate the media, and Marines caught using such foul language in the Division had their collective mouths washed out with proverbial soap. The Commanding General suggested to the unit commanders, Marines and Sailors that the media is an entirely winnable constituency and a new lexicon was established to set the tone. Marines assigned to assist the media were called buddies. Media were not escorted, they were adopted and made members of the Division team. This subtle difference framed the Divisions desired approach to interactions between Marines and the media and resulted in quick assimilation of journalists into the ranks. Journalistic professionalism and the desire to remain unbiased could not stop human nature, and the media quickly
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Annex A (Continued)
bonded amid austerity, danger and hardship with the Marines. This would become evident in the sensitive manner in which embedded media reported on the Divisions casualties and understanding of occasional collateral damage and civilian casualties. (Additionally, The numbers of formerly embedded media attending this years Marine Corps Birthday Balls throughout the Division are too numerous to count.) The media agreed to previously established ground rules and honored them. The deliberate focus on welcoming and caring for the embedded correspondents set the conditions for and resulted in positive reporting of the Divisions combat actions in the national and international press. REINFORCING FIRES Public affairs is a combat multiplier. Properly conducted, media operations can provide reinforcing fires that support operational and strategic objectives by exploiting fleeting opportunities that emerge on the battlefield. MOUSTACHES As the Division prepared for combat in Kuwait, the G-2 Intelligence section learned that Iraqi paramilitary forces possessed US military uniforms and would wear them to infiltrate friendly units and to commit atrocities against the Shia population in an attempt to turn local public opinion against the US forces. It is common knowledge that Iraqi males prize their moustaches and loathe shaving them off. To illustrate the significance of the seriousness of the issue, a common insult in the region is, A curse upon your moustache! In an effort to neutralize the infiltration threat, the Commanding General ordered all Marines in the Division to participate in the 1st Annual Moustache Growing Contest which was promptly reported by the media and presumably collected in the open press by Iraqi intelligence. The desired effect was for the Iraqi infiltration squads to feel reassured in keeping their moustaches. Immediately prior to crossing the line of departure, all Division Marines promptly shaved their moustaches and challenged any moustache-bearing individual in US uniforms. SECURING THE SOUTH RUMALLAH OIL FIELDS AND LIBERATION OF SAFWAN The Division attacked and utterly destroyed the Iraqi 51st Mechanized Infantry Division to secure the South Rumallah Oil Fields and liberated the town of Safwan in a lightning strike during the night from March 20 21. This attack was launched a day early due to intelligence reports indicating that Saddam Husseins forces were preparing to destroy critical oil infrastructure in the hopes of creating an environmental disaster designed to sway international opinion against the Coalition Forces. Following the advance of assault forces, the Division PA team scrambled the Headquarters Battalion embedded media and hurried them to the oilfields and border town.
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
Concurrently, SSgt. John Jamison took John Kifner, a NY Times Correspondent, and photographer Ozier Mohammed aboard a UH-1N helicopter to inspect one of the Gas and Oil Separation and Pumping Stations secured by RCT-5. The simple fact that the sky was not ablaze with burning oil smoke and the Persian Gulf was not slick with crude was a clear and early victory for the Coalition forces. This fact was not lost on the press. The PAO and Deputy G-3, LtCol. Clarke Lethin, drove Mercedes Gallego, El Correo, John Burnett of National Public Radio, and Tony Perry of the LA Times to the small border town of Safwan. On scene the embedded reporters and a host of unilateral media from the Associated Press, and Newsweek to name a few, watched as jubilant Iraqis looted the Baath Party Headquarters and US Marines tore down murals of Saddam Hussein. The interactions of the Marines with the Iraqis reinforced, early on in the campaign, the Presidents message that Coalition forces were liberators, not conquerors. Cecil B. Demille could not have created a better scene for the media on the first day of the war. THE FEDAYEEN AND CHICKEN LITTLE REPORTING The Division battled Fedayeen militants using unconventional terrorist tactics from the Euphrates to the Tigris and beyond. Highly motivated and poorly trained, they routinely fired on Marines from ambulances, behind women and children and the insides of hospitals, schools and mosques. The inflated news of Fedayeen attacks became prominent in the press at a time when the Army had overextended its supply lines, and the Marines were killing the zealots by the scores. This hyperbole of Fedayeen capability in sent visions of Vietnam dancing in journalists heads. The PA team acted quickly to highlight the destruction of Fedayeen and Baath Party loyalists in villages and small towns by transporting HQBNs GS embedded media to RCT-1 to observe combat operations along Hwy. 7. As the Division resumed its attack towards Baghdad, the press quickly realized the Marines had the bastards on the run. The CG conducted a well-timed press conference near the banks of the Diayala River to highlight the Fedayeens cowardice and flagrant violations of the Geneva Convention, Law Of Land Warfare and any code of chivalry. They are as worthless an example of men we have ever fought, Maj. Gen. Jim Mattis said, and it is a pleasure to kill them. His words resounded in the media within hours. The combined effort assisted in taking the wind out of Fedayeen sails.
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
THE SUICIDE SCHOOL The PA team worked the media at the hotel for approximately two hours when at 1530z a 30 year old Iraqi male walked up to a checkpoint manned by 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, pulled a pin on a hand grenade and blew himself in half, injuring four Marines and one sailor. Fifteen minutes after the incident, the Division PAO went live on the air with CNNs Christiana Amanpour to discuss the incident. With the reporter asking pointed questions about the new suicide tactics and the state of security measures, the PAO used the opportunity to highlight that the, Division planned on encountering every dirty trick. Thats what you get when you fight a regime that has systematically raped, tortured and imprisoned its populace for the past 22 years. The interview quickly departed the issue of security and allowed the PAO to highlight the regimes complete disregard for the Law of War and Geneva Convention, and reinforce the CGs earlier remarks about the nefarious character and cowardly acts of fanatical paramilitary fighters. The next day the Division Staff Judge Advocate, Maj. Joe Lore, called to notify the PA team of an emerging, immediately exploitable event. Earlier in the day RCT-7 captured an elementary school in a highly populated area in central Baghdad that the Fedayeen were using as a training facility for suicide bombers and storage for their deadly cargo. The RCTs EOD team diffused several timed explosive booby traps left behind in briefcases and boxes. Had the devices detonated, the resulting explosion would have leveled the neighborhood. Within minutes, the PA team scoured the hotel and rounded up CNN, CBS and NBC camera teams and drove them to the site. Inside of what appeared to be a health science classroom, 60 handsomely fabricated black leather vests laid on the floor in plastic bags. Each vest was filled with explosives, ball bearings and wired with blasting caps. Timed, command activated and menacing mercury switch detonators that were designed to fire when the assailant raised his arms over his head in a surrendering pose hid in boxes nearby. Nearly 250 other less sophisticated suicide devices filled other rooms. The vests and detonators were of Palestinian design and the markings on the boxes read, Made exclusively for the Saddam Fedayeen. The press reported that the discovery of the materials conclusively linked the regime to international terrorism. THE PALESTINE HOTEL Returning to the Palestine Hotel, the PA team exploited the days success in the media. Concurrently, the Division established a Civil Military Operations Center, led by LtCol. Pete Zarcone, the Divisions Civil Military Liaison Officer, in the briefing room previously used by Tariq Azziz. The Divisions sectors were relatively secure, yet Baghdad was blacked out. No power. Limited water. Sporadic looting. Immediately the CMOC set about trying to jump start the city back to life.
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
The first priority was the reestablishment of civil order, and to do that, the Marines needed the local police and traffic cops to come back to work. But how do you find the police? More importantly, how do you get them back to work? With all of the mass communication stations knocked off-air by Coalition bombing and the lack of electricity in the city, only one means existed to reach the people of Baghdad radio. The PA team immediately located nearby Iraqis and, with the help of an Iraqi translator, determined that Baghdadis preferred their own radio stations, but had been listening to the British Broadcasting Corporations Arabic World Service station. Coordinating with the CMOC, the PA team and an Iraqi Free Iraqi Forces interpreter went on-the-air to deliver an appeal to get the local police supervisors, electrical power grid technicians, water engineers and other critical infrastructure personnel to come to the hotel to start coordinating with military officials to bring the city back to life. Over three hundred Baghdadis showed up at the front entry control point the next morning. Throughout the week the PA team made the daily rounds of a circuit judge throughout the hotel visiting news agency after agency to highlight the Divisions reestablishment of an interim police force organized by Maj. Mark Stainbrook, the delivery of 15,000 gallons of fuel to critical water treatment and pumping stations, the reestablishment of power to limited parts of the city and many other successes. The PA team set up radio interviews for local Imams to call on the Iraqi people to stop the looting and cooperate with the Coalition forces. In nearly every instance, correspondents would devour the information and broadcast it to the world minutes later. CONCLUSION A QUALIFIED SUCCESS From the initial reporters meeting at the Sheraton Hotel in Kuwait City to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdous Square in downtown Baghdad - poignantly bookending the campaign, the 1st Marine Division conducted maneuver public affairs. Every Marine in the Division knew the mission and the CGs intent and proved to the world that the US Marines are the most trusted military force in the world. Despite fog and friction, units adopted their assigned reporters like brothers and sisters and proceeded to gain and hold the moral high ground in the press. The centralized planning, RSOI and decentralized execution of the CGs media plan served to bring the contributions and sacrifices of 18 year old Marines and Sailors into the worlds living rooms daily. Embedding media into the Divisions tactical units was a qualified success. It significantly countered any Iraqi propaganda attempts by having a third party witness reporting our combat operations to the world. Embedding also helped mitigate negative news pure unbiased reporting was altered by the unavoidable human tendency for Marines and reporters to bond while living together for extended periods of time amid austerity, danger and hardship. I caveat the success of the embed process with the words of George Orwell,
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Public Affairs
Annex A (Continued)
"In general, one is only right when either wish or fear coincides with reality - we are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps against the solid reality, usually on a battlefield." One must remember that the media serves as a bridge to the American and international public. They focus and amplify. Although the Division experienced success with the embed construct in this conflict, a new risk-benefit analysis must be conducted prior to embedding media in some permutation of this paradigm during future conflicts. The Division only hopes that the Iraqi people will wisely spend this gift of newly found liberation and freedom paid for by the blood of the young men and women of the United States of America and United Kingdom.
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Public Affairs
Annex B
PA Organization
HQMC DIVPA CE MCRC MARFORCOM MARFORCOM MARFORPAC MCRD PI/ERR 1ST MCD DIVPA COMRE L DIVPA PLANS MC News MEUs 22nd, 24th, 26th 2d MARDIV MARSOC MARFORPAC MISC MARFOR/JOINT VCJCS
II MEF
I MEF
III MEF
DIVPA MEDIA
MARCENT
POW/MIA DEF
MARFORRES
2d MLG 1 MLG 2d MAW 3d MAW MCI East/ MCB Lej MCAS CHRY PT MCAS NEW RV MCAS BFT MCB 29 Palms MCB Butler
st
PACOM
MCB QUANTICO
MCD
CENTCOM
USF Japan
JFCOM/ JPASE Naval Media Cntr Defense Info School AFN Iwakuni
MARCOR SYSCM
CBIR F
AFN Yokota
AFN Okinawa
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In this lesson
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As you can see from this list, over the last six decades, urban operations have been an extremely important aspect of Marine Corps operational readiness. Our ability to conduct operations in any urban environment is a key ingredient to our being considered Americas Force in Readiness. We must examine the lessons learned from our past and understand how those lessons help us plan for and execute urban operations. Why Study URBAN OPERATIONS? The worlds population is becoming more urbanized. Projections show 85% of the worlds population living in urban areas by the year 2025. Today 75% of politically significant urban areas are within 150 miles of a coastline, and 87% are within 300 miles of the coastline. Our ship to shore capability allows us to reach most urban areas. Many of our current and future enemies cannot match our advantages in firepower, so they will use civilian populations for protection. Urban areas have the highest population concentration and therefore provide the best cover to our adversaries. When conceptualizing urban operations, commanders must understand two important terms: urban area and urban environment. The first is a subset of the second. An urban area is a topographical complex where man-made construction or high population density is the dominant feature. Focusing on urban areas means concentrating on the physical aspects of the area and their effects on weapons, equipment, line-of-sight, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. The urban environment includes the physical aspects of the urban area as well as the complex and dynamic interaction and relationships between its key componentsthe terrain (natural and man-made), the society, and the supporting infrastructure.
Urban Operations and the Spectrum of Conflict. The phrase 3-Block War was coined by Gen Charles C. Krulak to describe the various missions or situations that Marines may face when conducting operations in urban areas. The three blocks describe different environments, each with their own challenges that Marines will encounter, sometimes on the same day, in the same part of a city. The three blocks are described as follows:
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Block One
Humanitarian Ops. Host Nation Control. Stable Environment. Restrictive ROE. Counter-Insurgency Ops. Limited Host Nation Control. Unstable Environment. Increased Force Protection. High intensity conflict. No Host Nation Control. Violent and chaotic environment
Block Two
Block Three
Understanding the 3 Blocks and how they flow together helps Marine leaders to prepare to accomplish their mission in the varied environments of populated areas. The same patrol can encounter all three blocks in a small area during one patrol.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD
Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on a map by the surrounding countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban area of operations is many times that of a similarly sized portion of undeveloped natural terrain. A multi-storied building may take up the same surface area as a small field, but each story or floor contains approximately an equal area as the ground upon which it sits. In effect, a ten-story building can have eleven times more defensible area than bare groundten floors and the roof. It is the sheer volume and density created by this urban geometry that makes Urban Operations resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.
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TYPES
Urban battle space includes The urban battlespace is divided into four basic levels: building, street, subterranean, and air. Operations can be conducted from above ground, on ground level, inside buildings, or below the ground. Most operations will include fighting on all levels simultaneously. (1) Building Level. Buildings provide cover and concealment; limit or increase fields of observation and fire; and canalize, restrict, or block movement of forces, especially mechanized forces. They provide optimum perches for snipers and antiair weapons. Buildings also provide antitank weapons optimum positioning to allow engagement from above, exploiting an inherent weakness found in most armored vehicles. (2) Street Level. While streets provide the means for rapid advance or withdawal, forces moving along streets are often canalized by buildings and have little space for off-road maneuver. Because they are more difficult to bypass, obstacles on streets in urbanized areas are usually more effective than those on roads in open terrain. (3) Subterranean Level. Subterranean systems are easily overlooked but can be important to the outcome of operations. These areas may be substantial and include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems (Figure 1-1 on page 1-4). The city of Los Angeles alone has more than 200 miles of storm sewers located under the city streets. Both attacker and defender can use subterranean avenues to maneuver to the rear or the flanks of an enemy. These avenues also facilitate the conduct of ambushes, counterattacks, and infiltrations. (4) Air Level. The air provides another avenue of approach in urbanized areas. Aviation assets can be used for high speed insertion or extraction of troops, supplies, and equipment. While aviation assets are not affected by obstacles on the streets, they are affected by light towers, signs, power lines, and other aerial obstructions. They are also vulnerable to the man-portable surface-to-air missile threat, crew served weapons, and small arms fire.
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move and as weather and environmental conditions change. They can react to changes within their battle space with the timely movement of assault, support, and security elements in the offense and repositioning of squads in the defense. Other factors that impact battle space include CASEVAC and resupply procedures. Procedures for handling EPW and noncombatants. Rules of engagement. Battlefield obscuration. Communications.
Movementofvehicles,thatis,howthebattlespacewillaffectmovementandtarget engagement.
Urban Zones and Street Patterns The urban area is analyzed using the zones and street patterns. Urban areas will contain varying degrees of physical infrastructure. This infrastructure will at a minimum include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings, hospitals, schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities. The infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be highly complex and sophisticated. For example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets; in another city it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large highways, subways, and other modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a city would be the transportation hub for the region in which it is located. In addition to the physical infrastructure of power plants, transportation networks, and the like, cities also have a service infrastructure: police, fire, and other government services; food and water availability and distribution; medical services; fuel and electricity; the news media and information flow; and others. This sort of infrastructure may be quite sophisticated and an integral part of the citys life, it may be virtually nonexistent, or it may exist in a state of ineffectiveness. Urban Zones: (1) City Core. The city core is the heart of the urban areathe downtown or central business district. It is relatively small and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the urban areas shops, offices, and public institutions. It normally contains the highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean areas. In most cities, the core has undergone more recent development than the core periphery. As a result, the two regions are often quite different. Typical city cores of today are made up of buildings that vary greatly in height.
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(2) Commercial Ribbon. Commercial ribbons are composed of rows of stores, shops, and restaurants that are built along both sides of major streets through built-up areas. Typically, such streets are 25 meters wide or more. The buildings in the outer areas are uniformly two to three stories tallabout one story taller than the dwellings on the streets behind them.
(3) Core Periphery The core periphery is located at the edges of the city core. The core periphery consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings. The building heights are fairly uniformtwo or three stories in small towns, five to ten stories in large cities. Dense random and close orderly block are two common construction patterns that can be found within the city core and core periphery zones.
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(a) Dense Random Construction .This construction is a typical old inner city pattern with narrow winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner. Buildings are closely located and frequently close to the edge of a roadway.
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(b) Close Orderly Block Construction. Wider streets generally form rectangular patterns in this area. Buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block courtyards are common.
(4) Dispersed Residential Area. This type area is normally contiguous to close-orderly block areas in Europe. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.
(5) High-Rise Area Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns, this area consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings.
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Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often contiguous to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with close-orderly block areas.
(6) Industrial-Transportation Area. Industrial-transportation areas are generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be located within dense, random construction or close-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. Highrise areas providing worker housing is normally located adjacent to these areas throughout the Orient. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical because these facilities, especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military movement.
(7) Permanent or Fixed Fortifications. These include any of several different types and may be considered isolated forts, such as the Hue Citadel and the German fortifications that surrounded Metz, or as part of a fortified line (Siegfried and Maginot
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Lines). While most of these fortifications are found in Western Europe, many can be found in the Balkans, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Those in the United States are mostly of the coast defense type. Permanent fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of the above. Some of the latest variants are built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and NBC overpressure systems.
(8) Shantytowns. Shantytowns do not necessarily follow any of the above patterns and may be found in many different zones within urban areas. Many underdeveloped countries are composed of small towns and villages and very few large cities. Most of the structures in the small towns and villages may be constructed from materials ranging from cardboard to concrete block. Some countries in arid regions depend on adobe for construction. Even the larger cities can have shantytowns at the edge that consist of cardboard or tin shacks. (a) These less structurally sound buildings have no common floor pattern and are more likely to have only one room. These types of substandard structures present a problem of weapons over-penetration. Weapons fired in one structure may penetrate the walls of one or more buildings. This penetration becomes a hazard for friendly forces as well as noncombatants. In order for buildings not to be structurally damaged or completely destroyed, reduce the explosive charges or do not use them. Fires are also more likely to develop and spread in shantytowns. (b) Depending upon the type of operation, the temporary nature of the structures can mean that mobility can be either more or less restricted than other sections of an urban area. A unit with armored vehicles may easily knock down and traverse structures without affecting mobility at all. However, their destruction may cause unacceptable civilian casualties, in which case mobility becomes more restrictive as the narrow paths often do not accommodate vehicles. Regardless, commanders must carefully consider the effects of their operations in this area, to include vehicles and weapons, as the weak structures afford little protection increasing the risk of fratricide, civilian casualties, and large, rapidly spreading fires.
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b. Street Patterns. Knowledge of street patterns and widths gives commanders and leaders a good idea of whether or not mounted mobility corridors in different zones can permit wheeled or tracked vehicles and facilitate command and control. For example, a rectangular, radial, radial ring, or combined pattern facilitates movement and control better than irregular patterns.
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Enclosed courtyard
The most common buildings in Afghanistan are mud brick construction homes with an exterior courtyard consisting of the same material. Typically the walls of the home are 24 thick and the walls of the courtyard are 12 thick.
EFFECTIVENESS OF WEAPONS AND DEMOLITIONS The characteristics and nature of combat in urban areas affect the employment of weapons and the results they can achieve. Leaders at all levels must consider the following factors in various combinations.
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Surfaces. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic of urban targets. Rarely do rounds impact perpendicular to these flat surfaces; rather, they impact at some angle of obliquity, which reduces the effect of a round and increases the threat of ricochets. Engagement Ranges. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown that only 5 percent of all targets are more than 100 meters away. About 90 percent of all targets are located 50 meters or less from the identifying Marine. Few personnel targets will be visible beyond 50 meters and engagements usually occur at 35 meters or less. Minimum arming ranges and troop safety from backblast or fragmentation effects must be considered. Engagement Times. Engagement times are short. Enemy personnel present only fleeting targets. Enemy-held buildings or structures are normally covered by fire and often cannot be engaged with deliberate, well-aimed shots. Depression and Elevation. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall buildings form deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fires. Some weapon systems, (i.e: MK-19, M203, M2) can fire rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Target engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior marksmanship skills.
Reduced Visibility. Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall buildings, and the lack of light penetrating inner rooms all combine to reduce visibility and to increase a sense of isolation. Added to this is the masking of fires caused by rubble and man-made structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.
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Risks from Friendly Fire. Urban fighting often becomes confused melees with several small units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during planning. Control measures must be continually adjusted to lower the risks. Marines and leaders must maintain a sense of situational awareness and clearly mark their progress IAW unit SOP to avoid fratricide.
Close Combat. Both the shooter and target may be inside or outside buildings and they may both be inside the same or separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in urban areas means the weapons effects, such as muzzle blast and backblast, must be considered as well as the rounds impact on the target.
Attacking Man-made Structures. Usually man-made structures must be attacked before enemy personnel inside are attacked. Weapons and demolitions can be
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chosen for employment based on their effects against masonry and concrete rather than against enemy personnel. Building Types. Buildings in Afghanistan are mud brick construction homes with an exterior courtyard consisting of the same material. Typically the walls of the home are 24 thick and the walls of the courtyard are 12 thick.
Definitions. The following definitions were determined based on the analyses of various studies relating to the size of man-sized holes and experimentation analyses from the MOUT - Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Loop-hole. A loop-hole is a firing aperture (a minimum of 8 inches in diameter) made in a structure. Mouse-hole. A mouse-hole is an opening that is made to the interior or exterior of a structure (walls, floors, ceilings, roofs) to facilitate inter- and intra-building communications and movement. A mouse-hole is usually a minimum of 24 inches high by 30 inches wide in size. Breach Hole. A breach hole is an opening that is made in a structure using mechanical, ballistic, explosive, or thermal means to facilitate the entry of assault elements. A breach hole is normally 50 inches high by 30 inches wide in size. Breaches made through existing apertures, for example doors and windows, normally do not require additional size enhancement. b. Weapon Penetration. The penetration that can be achieved with a 5.56-mm round depends on the range to the target and the type of material the shooter is firing against. Single 5.56-mm rounds are not effective against structural materials (as opposed to partitions) when fired at close rangethe closer the range, the less the penetration.
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(1) 5.56 mm Maximum Penetration. For the 5.56-mm round, maximum penetration occurs at 200 meters. At ranges less then 25 meters, penetration is greatly reduced. At 10 meters, penetration by the M16 round is poor due to the tremendous stress placed on this high-speed round, which causes it to yaw upon striking a target. Stress causes the projectile to break up, and the resulting fragments are often too small to penetrate. (2) Reduced Penetration. Even with reduced penetration at short ranges, interior walls made of thin wood paneling, Sheetrock, or plaster are no protection against 5.56mm ball ammunition rounds. Common office furniture, such as desks and chairs, cannot stop these rounds, but a layer of books 18 to 24 inches thick can. (3) Wood and Cinder Blocks. Wooden frame buildings and single cinder block walls offer little protection from 5.56-mm rounds. When clearing such structures, Marines must ensure friendly casualties do not result from rounds passing through walls, floors, or ceilings. (4) Armor-Piercing Rounds. Armor-piercing rounds are slightly more effective than ball ammunition in penetrating urban targets at all ranges. They are more likely to ricochet than ball ammunition when the target presents a high degree of obliquity. c. Protection. The following common barriers in urban areas stop a 5.56-mm round fired at less than 50 meters: One thickness of well-packed sandbags. A 2-inch concrete wall (nonreinforced). A 55-gallon drum filled with water or sand. A small ammunition can filled with sand. A cinder block filled with sand (block will probably shatter). A brick veneer. A car body (5.56-mm rounds penetrate but may not always exit). Car Body 1 Sand Cinder 2 in. (Both Bag Block Concrete Sides) 55 Gallon Drum (Sand Filled)
d. Wall Penetration. Although most structural materials repel single 5.56-mm rounds, continued and concentrated firing can breach some typical urban structures
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Structure penetration capabilities of the 5.56-mm round against typical urban targets (range 25 to 100 meters). MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS (7.62-MM AND 50 CALIBER ) In the urban environment, the Browning .50 caliber machine gun and the 7.62-mm M240B machine gun provide high-volume, long-range, automatic fires for the suppression or destruction of targets. They provide final protective fire along fixed lines and can be used to penetrate light structuresthe caliber .50 machine gun is most effective in this role. Tracers from both machine guns are likely to start fires. Medium machine guns are less effective against masonry targets than .50 caliber machine guns because of their reduced penetration power. The guns availability and its lighter weight make it well suited to augment heavy machine gun fire. They can be used in areas where the .50 caliber machine guns cannot be positioned, or they can be used as a substitute when heavy machine guns are not available. The M240B machine gun can be employed on its tripod to deliver accurate fire along fixed lines and then can quickly be converted to bipod fire to cover alternate fields of fire. Weapon Penetration. The ability of the 7.62-mm and .50 caliber rounds to penetrate is also affected by the range to the target and type of material fired against. The 7.62-mm round is affected less by close ranges than the 5.56-mm; the .50 caliber rounds penetration is reduced least of all.
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Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against typical urban targets (range 25 meters)
Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban targets (range 35 meters)
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GRENADE LAUNCHERS, 40-MM (M203 AND MK 19) Both the M203 dual-purpose weapon and the MK 19 grenade machine gun fire 40-mm high-explosive (HE) and high-explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) ammunition. Ammunition for these weapons is not interchangeable, but the grenade and fuze assembly hitting the target is identical. Both weapons provide point and area destructive fires as well as suppression. The MK 19 has a much higher rate of fire and a longer range; the M203 is much lighter and more maneuverable. Employment. The main consideration affecting the employment of 40-mm grenades within urban areas is the typically short engagement range. The 40-mm grenade has a minimum arming range of 14 to 28 meters. If the round strikes an object before it is armed, it will not detonate. The means the minimum safe firing range for combat is 31 meters. The 40-mm grenades can be used to suppress the enemy in a building, or inflict casualties by firing through apertures or windows. The MK 19 can use its high rate of fire to concentrate rounds against light structures. This concentrated fire can create extensive damage. Weapon Penetration. The 40-mm HEDP grenade has a small shaped charge that penetrates better than the HE round. It also has a thin wire wrapping that bursts into a dense fragmentation pattern, creating casualties out to 5 meters. Because they explode on contact, 40-mm rounds achieve the same penetration regardless of range.
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Wall Penetration. The M203 cannot reasonably deliver the rounds needed to breach a typical exterior wall. The MK 19 can concentrate its fire and achieve wall penetration. Firing from a tripod, using a locked down traversing and elevating mechanism is best for this role. Brick, cinder block, and concrete can be breached using the MK 19 individual HEDP rounds, which can penetrate 6 to 8 inches of brick. The only material that has proven resistant to concentrated 40-mm fire is dense stone such as that used in some European building construction. No precise data exist as to the number of rounds required to produce loopholes or breach holes with the MK 19; however, the rounds explosive effects are dramatic and should exceed the performance of the .50 caliber machine gun.
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LIGHT AND MEDIUM RECOILLESS WEAPONS Light and medium recoilless weapons are used to attack enemy personnel, field fortifications, and light armored vehicles. They have limited capability against main battle tanks, especially those equipped with reactive armor (except when attacking from the top, flanks, or rear). The light category of recoilless weapons includes the AT4 M136 series; and the shoulder-launched, multipurpose, assault weapon (SMAW). The medium recoilless weapons are the Javelin. Employment. Other than defeating light armored vehicles, the most common task for light recoilless weapons is to neutralize fortified firing positions. Due to the design of the warhead and the narrow blast effect, these weapons are not as effective in this role as heavier weapons such as a tank main gun round. They are lightweight, allowing Marines to carry several AT4 rounds. Light recoilless weapons can be fired from the tops of buildings or from areas with proper ventilation. (1) Light and medium recoilless weapons, with the exception of the SMAW, employ shaped-charge warheads. As a result, the hole they punch into walls is often too small to use as a loophole. The fragmentation and spall these weapons produce are limited. Normally, shaped-charge warheads do not neutralize enemy soldiers behind walls unless they are located directly in line with the point of impact. (2) Sandbagged emplacements present a different problem. These positions may be encountered in urban areas that are adjacent to or contain natural terrain. Because sandbags absorb much of the energy from a shaped-charge, the rounds should be aimed at the center of the firing aperture. Even if the round misses the aperture, the bunker wall area near it is usually easier to penetrate. Weapon Penetration. The most important tasks to be performed against structures are the neutralization of fortified fighting positions, personnel, and weapons behind barriers. Recoilless weapons can be used in this role, but none of them are as effective as heavy direct-fire weapons or standard demolitions. Each recoilless weapon has different penetrating ability against various targets. Penetration does not always mean the destruction of the integrity of a position. Usually, only those enemy soldiers directly in the path of the spall from a High Explosive Anti- Tank (HEAT) round become casualties. Other soldiers inside a fortification could be deafened, dazed, or shocked but eventually return to action. Wall Breaching. Wall breaching is a common combat task in urban areas for which light recoilless weapons can be used. Breaching operations improve mobility by providing access to building interiors without using existing doors or windows. Breaching techniques can also be used to create loopholes for weapons positions or to allow hand grenades to be thrown into defended structures. Breach holes for troop mobility should be about 50 inches high by 30 inches wide. Loopholes should be about 8 inches in diameter. None of the light recoilless weapons organic to an Infantry battalions (with the possible exception of the SMAW) provide a one-shot wall-breaching capability. To breach walls, a number of shots should be planned.
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(1) Of all the common building materials, heavy stone is the most difficult to penetrate. The AT4 usually will not penetrate a heavy European-style stone wall. Surface cratering is usually the only effect. (2) Layered brick walls are also difficult to breach with light recoilless weapons. Some brick walls can be penetrated by multiple firings, especially if they are less than three bricks thick. The AT4 LAW may require 3 to 5 rounds in order to penetrate brick walls. The SMAW produces a hole in brick walls that is often large enough to be a breach hole. (3) Wooden structural walls offer little resistance to light recoilless weapons. Even heavy timbered walls are penetrated and splintered. The AT4 and SMAW have a devastating effect against a wood-frame wall. A single round produces a breach hole as well as significant spall. (4) None of the light recoilless weapons are as effective against structural walls as demolitions or heavier weapons such as a tank main gun. Of all the light recoilless weapons, the SMAW is the most effective
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ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILES Antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) are used mainly to defeat main battle tanks and other armored combat vehicles. They have a moderate capability against bunkers, buildings, and other fortified targets commonly found during combat in urban areas. This category of weapons includes the TOW. Employment. TOWs provide over watch antitank fires during the attack of an urban area and extended range capability for engaging armor during the defense. Within urban areas, they are best employed along major thoroughfares and from the upper stories of buildings to attain long-range fields of fire. Their minimum firing range of 65 meters could limit firing opportunities in the confines of densely urban areas. The optics of the TOW saber system can be utilized for observation of targets up to 5km away. Weapon Penetration. Anti Tank Guide Missiles (ATGMs) can penetrate and destroy heavily armored tanks. They have large warheads employing the shaped-charge principle. Because of their size, these warheads can achieve significant penetration against typical urban targets. Penetration does not mean concurrent destruction of the structural integrity of a position. The shaped-charge warhead produces relatively little spall. Enemy personnel not standing directly behind or near the point of impact of an ATGM may escape injury. (1) TOW 2B. The TOW 2B uses a different method of defeating enemy armor. It flies over the target and fires an explosively formed penetrator down onto the top of an armor vehicle, where the armor is thinner. Because of this design feature, the TOW 2B missile cannot be used to attack nonmetallic structural targets. When using the TOW 2B missile against enemy armor, gunners must avoid firing directly over other friendly vehicles, disabled vehicles, or large metal objects such as water or oil tanks. TOW missiles can defeat triple sandbag walls, double layers of earth filled 55-gallon drums, and 18-inch log walls.
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MORTARS The urban environment greatly restricts low-angle indirect fires because of overhead masking. While all indirect fire weapons are subject to overhead masking, mortars are less affected than field artillery weapons due to the mortars higher trajectory. For lowangle artillery fire, dead space is about five times the height of the building behind which the target sits. For mortar fire, dead space is only about one-half the height of the building. Because of these advantages, mortars are even more important to the infantry during urban combat. Employment. Not only can mortars fire into the deep defilade created by tall buildings, but they can also fire out of it. Mortars emplaced behind buildings are difficult for the enemy to locate accurately and even harder for him to hit with counterfire. Because of their lightweight, even heavy mortars can be hand carried to firing positions that may not be accessible to vehicles. (1) Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the ground-level flooring is solid enough to withstand the recoil. If there is only concrete in the mortar platoons area, mortars can be fired using sandbags as a buffer under the baseplate and curbs as anchors and braces. (This is recommended only when time is not available to prepare better firing area.) Aiming posts can be placed in dirt-filled cans. (2) The 60-mm and 81-mm mortars have limited effect on structural targets. Even with delay fuzes they seldom penetrate more than the upper stories of light buildings. However, their wide area coverage and multi-option fuses make them useful against an enemy force advancing through streets, through other open areas, or over rubble. Effects of Mortar Fire. The multi-option fuze on newer US mortar rounds makes them effective weapons on urban terrain. Delay settings can increase penetration slightly, while proximity bursts can increase the lethal area covered by fragments. Tall buildings can cause proximity fuzed mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely. (1) 60-mm Mortar. The 60-mm mortar round cannot penetrate most rooftops, even with a delay setting. Small explosive rounds are effective, however, in suppressing snipers on rooftops and preventing roofs from being used by enemy observers. The 60mm WP round is not normally a good screening round due to its small area of coverage. In urban combat, however, the tendency of smoke to linger and the small areas to be screened make it more effective. During the battle for Hue in South Vietnam, 60-mm WP rounds were used to create small, short-term, smoke screens to conceal movement across open areas such as parks, plazas, and bridges. Fragments from 60-mm HE rounds landing as close as 10 feet away cannot penetrate a single sandbag layer or a single-layer brick wall. The effect of a 60-mm mortar HE round that achieves a direct hit on a bunker or fighting position is equivalent to 1 or 2 pounds of TNT. Normally, the blast will not collapse a properly constructed bunker but can cause structural damage. The 60-mm mortar will not normally crater a hard-surfaced road. (2) 81-mm Mortar. The 81-mm mortar has much the same effect against urban targets as the 60-mm mortar. It has a slightly greater lethal area and its smoke rounds (WP and RP) are more effective. A direct hit is equivalent to about 2 pounds of TNT.
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The 81-mm round cannot significantly crater a hard-surfaced road. With a delay setting, the 81-mm round can penetrate the roofs of light buildings. (3) 120-mm Mortar. The 120-mm mortar is large enough to have a major effect on common urban targets. It can penetrate deep into a building, causing extensive damage because of its explosive power. A minimum of 18 inches of packed earth or sand is needed to stop the fragments from a 120-mm HE round impacting 10 feet away. The effect of a direct hit from a 120-mm round is equivalent to almost 10 pounds of TNT, which can crush fortifications built with commonly available materials. The 120mm mortar round can create a large but shallow crater in a road surface, but it is not deep or steep-sided enough to block vehicular movement. However, craters could be deep enough to damage or destroy storm drain systems, water and gas pipes, and electrical or phone cables. Geography and Demography Going through our standard METT-TC considerations we naturally evaluate Terrain and Weather using OCOKA-W (Observation and Fields of fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach -- Weather). Due to the presence of people in the urban environment, however, we must be able to evaluate the influence of the local population on both the geographic characteristics of a particular region as well as several cultural or demographic characteristics. As mentioned above, we know OCOKA-W and should be comfortable using it to guide our planning process. In order to facilitate planning for cultural influences we will use the acronym ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events). Understanding how to make a thorough estimate of the situation with regard to these two view points will make you successful in your planning process.
OCOKA-W
Observation and Fields of Fire. Urbanized terrain is characterized by restrictive observation and fields of fire. Buildings, walls, and other manmade structures create vast amounts of dead space. At the same time, tall buildings and other structures can provide perches which enhance line of sight for observation and communication as well as for weapons. Buildings will concentrate fire down streets and alleys. Cover and Concealment. Buildings, walls, sewers, and subways can provide excellent cover and concealment for enemy and friendly forces. The civilian population can also offer cover and concealment to enemy forces. Different types of building composition will stop different munitions. Shadows and darkness inside buildings create changing light conditions that can be exploited for concealment or surprise. Obstacles. Natural or manmade obstacles restrict or deny maneuver within the urban area. Canals, rivers, walls, fences, and rubble should be thoroughly analyzed. Construction sites and commercial operations such as lumberyards, brickyards, steelyards, and railroad maintenance yards are primary sources of obstacle and barrier construction materials. These sites can also supply engineers with materials to strengthen existing obstacles or to set up antitank hedgehogs or crib-type roadblocks.
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Key Terrain. All kinds of structures can be tactically significant terrain. They may be important because of the observation they provide, or the cover that defenders inside enjoy. Other structures are significant because of the services they offer. Examples of key terrain are airports or airfields, power plants, water works, dams, and bridges. Avenues of Approach. Highways, roads, bridges, alleys, building tops, sewers, and subways are just some examples of urban avenues of approach. These can be natural choke points, they may provide cover and concealment, or allow for easy top down attacks. It is critical to understand the advantages and disadvantages of every avenue of approach and how to exploit each one. They are categorized as building level, street level, subterranean level, and air level. Military maps rarely show the subterranean networks in cities, and local maps should be used to cover this gap. Weather. As in any military operation, weather affects equipment, movement, and visibility, but its greatest impact is on the individual Marine. Snow, ice, dust, wind, rain, humidity, and temperature extremes reduce human efficiency. Weather extremes coupled with stress and the physical strain of urban combat can be minimized with effective small-unit leadership. Weather also affects the civilian population, and can be used to find times when the streets will be vacant. APERTURE ANALYSIS During offensive operations, a key function that the leader must perform is an aperture analysis of the buildings that he is responsible for attacking. This analysis enables him to determine the number of apertures (windows, doors, holes due to weapons effects) in the building. It also provides key information that he needs to know about the buildings in order to accomplish his mission, such as apertures to be suppressed and where possible points of entry and exit are. (A similar application can be applied in the defense to determine how the enemy would attack buildings that friendly units are defending.) A techniqu
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e for conducting this analysis is shown below. Aperture analysis (buildings comprising the objective
Completed aperture analysis for an attack QUESTIONS FOR LEADERS Leaders should be able to answer the following questions after they have completed their terrain and weather analyses. Where are the streets, alleys, through-building routes, subterranean passageways, that provide mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and mobility corridors within the companys AO? What are the number, types, and strength of buildings in the AO? What and where is the rubble that helps or hinders movement? Which buildings present fire hazards to assault or support elements?
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Where are the building locations for support-by-fire positions (ability to withstand backblast or overpressure, ability to support vehicle weight)? How many kill zones (parking lots, streets, rooftops, wide boulevards) are in the AO? Which buildings, rooftops, intersections, or other surrounding terrain provides observation and fields of fire? What is the number of apertures for each building in the objective area, building composition, and likely weapons needed to suppress and breach? What are the current conditions of the objective area and the effects of preparatory fires? Where are the counterattack routes? Where are the urban terrain features on which to place control measures? What are the effects on smoke and obscuration? What are the effects of weather on men and equipment (visibility, temperature, precipitation, humidity, survivability, and mobility)? Where are the locations of noncombatants and what is their disposition to friendly and enemy forces (hostile, friendly, neutral)?
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People. Key individuals in any area must be considered as important as key terrain. These peoples support or opposition can affect our mission. Marine leaders will interact with tribal, religious, or political leaders who can influence the population. Events. Each culture maintains key dates that are important to them for different reasons. We have seen how particular dates or calendar events can be connected to a rise in insurgent activity in Iraq. This is not an isolated phenomenon and can be expected in any urban operations environment. The battle of Hue City was a result of the Tet Offensive in 1968 when the North Vietnamese used a holiday as an impetus for their massive assault on South Vietnam. Elections may entice the enemy to attack us or the general population. Weddings and funerals will draw crowds, and may include celebratory gunfire. We must understand what events will take place in our area of operations, and plan for the populations reaction to these events.
5-3-5
The 5/3/5 Rules were conceptualized by Gen Mad Dog Mattis. As the Commanding Officer of 1st MAR DIV during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Gen Mattis issued these principles to his Marines as key focus points to victory over enemy forces as well as a way to win the support of the Iraqi people. They have since become trademarks of how the Marine Corps operates in every clime and place. Pre-combat and post-combat actions Pre-combat checks (PCCs) / pre-combat inspections (PCIs) These are done to ensure physical and mental readiness before every mission. Rehearsals The unit leader prioritizes and supervises. Confirmation briefs covers likely contingencies and probable points of friction. All participants brief. After action reports Thorough and honest assessments of our actions. These, and the rehearsals that follow, are where we improve our TTPs. Debriefs Information gained on the enemy and the population is consolidated and sent to the intelligence section. Habits of Action Guardian Angel Always have Marines in a covert overwatch position focusing only on security. Geometry of Fire Continuously moving Marines and adjusting fields of fire so that Marines can always engage the enemy without endangering other Marines or friendly units. Unity of Command One Marine must always be in charge. This becomes most difficult and most important when one unit moves through anothers AO, or when different units work on the same mission. Habits of Thought
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Sturdy professionalism Always maintaining the discipline that makes us Marines. One example is wearing uniforms properly, never allowing graffiti or do rags. Maintain steadfast attention to detail. Make yourself hard to kill do not set patterns, ruthlessly enforce proper wear of protective equipment. No better friend, no worse enemy operational embodiment of honor, courage, commitment. First, do no harm engage your brain before you engage your weapon. Be professional; be polite; have a plan to kill only the enemy that hides amongst the innocent people we are here to protect positively distinguish between enemy and innocents.
Summary
It is imperative that we understand how to properly plan for urban operations. In order to accomplish this we must develop the ability to consider those geographic characteristics that are unique to the urban environment and also to properly examine the cultural and demographic characteristics of a particular people or region. OCOKA-W and ASCOPE are two extremely valuable acronyms that will help you organize your thoughts and develop a plan in any urban environment. As the global population grows and becomes more urbanized, we as a Corps must maintain our skill at conducting urban operations. A proper understanding of the 3Block War concept will allow us to plan appropriately. 5-3-5 are principles that will help any unit to be successful. The leadership of our Corps has outlined the intent and it is up to us as executors to affect the training and operational success demanded of us.
References
Reference Number or Author MCDP 1 MCDP 1-0 MCWP 3-11.1 MCWP 3-35.3 MCRP 3-11.1B MCRP 3-16C MCWP 3-33.5 MCWP 3-11.3 Reference Title Warfighting Marine Corps Operations Marine Rifle Company/Platoon Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Small Unit Leaders Guide to Weather and Terrain Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander Joint Marine Corps/Army COIN Manual Scouting and Patrolling
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Ricochet
ROE
Notes
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Notes
Urban Operations II - Offensive and Defensive Operations Introduction The purpose of this handout is to help you, the student, gain a working knowledge of conducting offensive and defensive operations in an urban environment. This class is intended to build upon foundations built during the previous class, Introduction to Urban Operations. Importance As the worlds population gravitates towards urban areas, the Marine Corps must maintain proficiency at operating in urbanized areas. As officers we must maintain the ability to plan for and execute both offensive and defensive operations along the entire spectrum of conflict in urban terrain. Recent combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Europe have proven the need for this skill set. Friendly and threat forces will conduct operations in a three-dimensional battle space. Engagements can occur on the surface, above the surface, or below the surface of the urban area. Also, engagements can occur inside and outside of buildings. Multistory buildings will present the additional possibility of different floors within the same structure being controlled by either friendly or threat forces. In this lesson, the student officer will study offensive and defensive planning, considerations, and operations in relation to the urban fight. This lesson covers the following topics:
Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objectives 0300-MOUT-1001 Given an assigned weapon and a route, while wearing a fighting load, perform individual movement in an urban environment in accordance with MCWP 3-35.3. 0300-MOUT-1002 Given a weapons, while wearing a fighting load, perform individual actions while clearing a room to secure the room.
Enabling Learning Objectives 0302-MOUT-1105e Without the aid of reference, describe urban task organization without omission. 0302-MOUT-1105f Without the aid of reference, describe an urban attack using RIGS without omission. MCCS-OFF-2102l Given a mission and commanders intent, develop a mental estimate of the situation using References METT-TC to accomplish the mission. MCCS-OFF-2102m Given a mission with a commanders intent and a mental estimate of the situation integrate the principles of war into tactical planning to accomplish the mission. B4R5379 Urban Operations II Offensive and Defensive Operations
TLO/ELO Offense operations in MOUT Types of offensive operations Task organization Mission SOM RIGS Tactical Control Measures (TCMs) Offensive Fire support Command and Signal Breaching Assault Entries Tasking statements TO rotation plan Defensive operations in MOUT Mission SOM TDOOTS Elements of the Defense Defensive Fire support Command and Signal
2 2 2 3 4 4 4 8 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 15 15 16 16
CLEARING OPERATION Before determining to what extent the urban area must be cleared, the factors of METT-TC must be considered. The ROE influence the TTP platoons and squads select as they move through the urban area and clear individual buildings and rooms. (1) The commander may decide to clear only those parts necessary for the success of his mission if An objective must be seized quickly. Enemy resistance is light or fragmented. The buildings in the area have large open areas between them. In this case, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective, or only those buildings necessary for security. (2) A commander may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that he will be opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly constructed buildings close together. Therefore, one or two units may attack on a narrow front against the enemys weakest sector. They move slowly through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and building to building. The other unit supports the clearing units and is prepared to assume their mission. CONSOLIDATION Consolidation occurs immediately after each action. Consolidation establishes security and allows the unit to prepare for counterattack and to reorganize. It is extremely important in an urban environment that units consolidate and reorganize rapidly after each engagement. The assault force in a cleared building must be quick to consolidate in order to repel enemy counterattacks and to prevent the enemy from infiltrating back into the cleared building. After securing a floor, selected members of the assault force are assigned to cover potential enemy counterattack routes to the building. Reorganization occurs after consolidation. Reorganization actions prepare the unit to continue the mission; many actions occur at the same time. TASK ORGANIZATION a. Assault Element. The purpose of the assault element is to kill, capture, or force the withdrawal of the enemy from an urban objective. The assault element of a company/ platoon/ squad may consist of one or more platoons/ squads or fire team usually reinforced with engineers and other attachments organic to a infantry battalion. Building and room clearing are conducted at the platoon, squad and fire team level. The assault element must be prepared to breach to gain entry into buildings. b. Support Element. The purpose of the support element is to provide any support that may be required by the assault element. The support element at the company/platoon/ squad level normally consists of the companys organic assets (platoons, mortars, and antitank weapons), attachments, and units that are under the control of the company commander. This assistance includes, but is not limited to: -Destroying or suppressing enemy positions with direct-fire weapons -Setting up support by fire locations; shifting fires, cease. c. Security Element. The purpose of the security element is to isolate without intent from the other buildings, and enabling the assault element to make entry into the objective. The security element of a company, platoon or squad may consist of one or more platoons/squads usually not reinforced. Its not uncommon for the security element to split their forces in order to isolate larger sectors of the operating AO.
ASSAULT UNIT
SUPPORT UNIT
SECURITY UNIT
Clearing
Covering
MISSION The Infantry platoon will normally conduct offensive tasks as part of a company mission. However, there may be times that the platoon will be required to perform an independent offensive operation in support of the main effort. The commander must receive, analyze, and understand the mission before beginning planning.
SCHEME OF MANEUVER
RECON, ISOLATION, GAIN A FOOTHOLD, and SEIZE THE OBJECTIVE (RIGS) We break an attack on a fortified position into four distinct phases. As discussed in Urban Operations I, urban terrain allows a defending enemy readily available fortified positions, an attacker must gain detailed knowledge of the complicated terrain and separate the enemy from his sources of support to be successful. Recon The development of any plan requires some reconnaissance. This first phase is imperative, whether doing a map study, using satellite imagery, or getting eyes on the objective, any recon that can be done prior to crossing the line of departure is beneficial. A solid leaders recon of an urban objective looks primarily to confirm or deny assumptions made about the enemy during our commanders estimate. Determining the Enemys size, location and orientation are critical to success during an attack on a fortified position. A detailed eyes on reconnaissance of the terrain and building considerations should also be done taking into account the following: obstacles, effective breach sites, concealed avenues of approach, window/doorways which need to be suppressed, weapons employment and effects considerations, and effective placement of TCMs. Isolation Isolating the objective from enemy forces in adjacent buildings is essential to the success of an attack. During the planning process you must consider the impact adjacent enemy forces can have on your assault unit.
Gain a Foothold Whether a room, or a building, or a city block, the foothold is the point from which you will flow your forces into the objective. Securing that foothold must be done quickly. Hit the enemy where he least expects it. We use the acronym SOSR as a guideline for gaining a foothold. A proficient unit will Supress, Obscure, Secure a local breach site and then reduce whatever obstacle exists. They are numerous means of reducing urban obstacles and breaching which will be discussed in detail during MOUT platform and day 1 of MOUT FEX, however units should understand the concept of employment of HE on a fortified position as a part of SOSR dramatically improves the chances of seizing the objective. Seize the Objective Flow forces through your foothold to systematically seize your objective. A key ingredient to mission accomplishment is the ability to maintain your momentum while in the attack. Dont stop or slow your attack until youve seized your objective.
Listed on the next page is a graphic depiction of a possible SOM using the four phases of an attack on a fortified position.
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C4 M: 1 PLT: NLT 1200 seize Sector A IOT prevent en from interfering with Company Cs clear ofC3 MOUT Town. C5 T: 1st Squad: ME (ASLT), O/O clear A1 IOT allow 1st PLT to seize Sector A. BPT assume the role of Support. 2nd Squad: SE1(SUPT), O/O Support 1st Squad by fire IOT allow 1st Squad to clear A1. BPT assume the role of Security. 3rd Squad: SE2(SEC), O/O Isolate A1 IOT allow 1st Squad to clear AI. BPT assume the role of Assault.
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Eight Steps of Room Clearing These are the detailed steps one uses in order to properly clear an enemy position in a room. These steps fall under the fourth phase of the attack, Seizing the Objective, and are sequential. The searching of the room and dead often occur simultaneously but can vary based on the construction of the room and the placement of the presumed dead within it. Dominate Eliminate Control through Verbiage Search the Dead Search the Room Search the Living Transition Mark Dominate. Rooms can be Dominated in several ways, one effective way is to employ grenades which we will discuss below. Rooms can also be dominated by making entry and moving to a dominate position inside. The ability to shoot targets on the move can also effectively dominate a room, meaning that the Marines achieve and maintain an initial advantage over any enemy located inside. (1) Throwing Grenades. Two techniques are available for using grenades in room clearing. The preferred technique for Marines is to throw a hand grenade into the room so hard that it skips and bounces, making it difficult for the enemy to pick up and throw back. The skip/bounce technique should be used by Marines during training and combat. The least preferred technique is to cook-off a hand grenade by removing the grenades safety pin, releasing the safety lever, counting off two seconds by thousands (one thousand and one, one thousand and two), and then throwing the grenade into the room. Cooking-off the grenade will be used only as appropriate during combat. (2) Nonverbal and Verbal Alerts. To alert all that a grenade will be thrown, a visual showing of the grenade is made to assault element members, and a visual acknowledgment from them is received. A nonverbal alert may ensure that the enemy is surprised when the grenade is thrown. If the situation demands, a voice alert can be used, but the element of surprise may be lost. When or if a voice alert is used, the voice alert is FRAG OUT; to alert Marines to the presence of HE when an enemy grenade has been identified, friendly forces shout, GRENADE. This allows Marines to distinguish between warnings for outgoing and incoming grenades.
Eliminate Marines eliminate threats through rigorously rehearsed room clearing TTPs. Listed below are several effective methods. After the grenade explodes, Shooter Number One steps across the threshold and clears his immediate area. He engages targets from the ready position. Shooter Number Two follows immediately behind Shooter Number One, buttonhooks, and clears his area. Both shooters clear the immediate area and along their respective walls, starting from the nearest respective corner and continuing to the farthest respective corner. Shooters use the pieing technique to systematically clear the room by sector. Both shooters then establish a dominant position in the room one step away from the wall and two steps into the room and clear the room by sector, pieing to the opposite side of the room. Meanwhile, the covering team (two-man team) in position outside the room being cleared provides security.
Cross Method. When employing the cross method, two Marines position themselves on either side of the entryway. Each Marine faces into the room covering the corner of the room opposite his position. On a prearranged signal, each Marine alternately enters the room. Each Marine crosses quickly to the opposite corner while covering the half of the room toward which he is moving. Once in the near corner, he assumes an outboard kneeling position to reduce his silhouette and continues to maintain coverage of his half of the room. He may change the position of his weapon to best cover the room.
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Clearing a Room, Door Closed, Split Positions Before opening a door, Shooter Number Two of the clearing team positions himself opposite Shooter Number One on the other side of the door and away from the wall in a safe position that allows Shooter Number One to shoot the door-opening mechanism. This positioning allows Shooter Number Two to be in position to immediately move to a wall position opposite Shooter Number One. No matter what method is used to open the door, Shooter Number Two should get in a position on the side of the door opposite Shooter Number One.
Control Through Verbiage Fighting from room to room is an incredibly chaotic and stressful experience. The fight is controlled through a universally and rigorously rehearsed common language. At a minimum a two man room clear will announce: Left/Right side Clear, Checking overhead, Overhead Clear, Room all clear. The clearing team will then announce the plan to search, mark and then transition on to another room. Search the Dead/Room/Living Once a room is announced as all clear Marines will conduct a detailed search of any Enemy KIA, EPWs/detainees or non combatants, and finally of the room itself. Any personnel should be rapidly escorted to the EPW collection point and moved of the objective. The search should be rehearsed, thorough and fast enough to maintain speed and tempo inside the objective. Transition/Mark Marines must have a rigorously rehearsed plan to transition the fight from room to room. Once a room has been searched Marines inside prepared to conduct a follow on room clear, they do this by redistributing ammunition, processing any casualties and redeploying into a 2 or 4 man room clearing stack. Before Marines leave they will visually mark the room as clear to friendly forces. Easy means to mark a room include: Spray paint, chalk, chem. Lights, etc. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES (TCMS) Commanders should use detailed control measures to facilitate decentralized execution. Increased difficulties in command, control, and communications from higher headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from subordinate leaders. Understanding of the commanders intent two levels up by all leaders becomes even more important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment. Control of the urban battlefield is difficult. 11
The use of detailed graphic control measures is critical to mission accomplishment and fratricide avoidance in urban terrain. Phase lines can be used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units. Limits of advance should be considered. Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable phase lines or limits of advance. When attacking to seize a foothold, the infantry unit may assign subordinate units the first block of buildings as their first objective. When an objective extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included. The final objective may be buildings or key terrain at the far edge of the built-up area. Key buildings, or groups of buildings, may also be assigned as intermediate objectives. Buildings should be identified by an alpha numbers designator for clarification, specific windows and doorways can also be label to improve situational awareness and improve command and control (example below).
R1 A2 A1 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 A3 A4
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11/18/2009
E B4R5379, G Slide 14
During the seizing phase, bypassing buildings may increase the risk of attack from the rear or flank. It may be necessary for the unit to enter, search, and clear each building in its zone of action. A single building may be an objective for a rifle squad or, if the building is large, for a rifle platoon or company. When the commanders concept of operations is based on speed or when the force is conducting a hasty attack, a unit may be directed to bypass certain positions within its zone. 12
Phase Lines Phase lines are control measures used to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units. Phase lines should be oriented on readily identifiable terrain features such as principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines. Boundaries Unit boundaries are used to define zones of action and are usually set within blocks so that a street is included in the zone. Both sides of a street should be included within the same unit's boundaries. Checkpoints and Contact Points. Checkpoints aid in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact points are used to designate specific points where units make physical contact. Checkpoints and contact points are designated by each unit as appropriate for command and control at street corners, buildings, railway crossings, bridges, or any other easily identifiable feature. Attack Position and Line of Departure (LD). A designated attack position may be occupied by forward units for last-minute preparation and coordination. The attack position is often behind or inside the last large building before crossing the LD. The LD should be located on the near side of an open area running perpendicular to the direction of attack, such as a street or rail line.
FIRE SUPPORT MOUT operations present unique fire support considerations. On urbanized terrain, buildings provide excellent cover and concealment to the enemy while limiting friendly observation and targeting efforts. Targets are generally exposed for brief periods of time and are often in close proximity to friendly forces. Observers will experience difficulty in finding OPs with adequate fields of observation. Terrain masking by tall buildings may restrict the delivery of indirect fires. Collateral damage and rubble effects must be considered during ammunition selection. The importance of effective communications, ROE, control measures, and procedures to prevent fratricide is magnified. 13
In the offense, fire support plans should include fires to isolate the objective area, support the assault, and support the clearing action. Fires are delivered to isolate and fix the enemy and deny him the use of avenues of approach into and out of the built-up area. Most fires are normally planned and executed at the GCE or higher echelons. Fires are employed to rupture the enemys established defenses and screen friendly maneuver, in order to maintain the momentum of the attack. Fire support is also allocated to units involved in clearing operations. Fire support plans should incorporate the employment of aerial observers and UAVs to compensate for restrictions to observation and to assist in the delivery of deep fires. Procedures for designating the forward line of own troops (FLOT), marking targets, shifting fires, and communicating in the urban environment should also be considered. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: Subordinate units require mission-type orders that are restrictive in nature. Commanders should use detailed control measures to facilitate decentralized execution. Increased difficulties in command, control, and communications from higher headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from subordinate leaders. Understanding of the commanders intent two levels up by all leaders becomes even more important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment. Units often fight without continuous communications, since dependable communications are uncertain. Pyrotechnic signals are hard to see because of buildings and smoke. The high noise level of battles within and around buildings degrades voice alerts. Voice communication can also signal the units intention and location to the enemy. Graphic control measures common to other tactical environments are also used in urban combat. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of command, enhance the mission, and thus prevent fratricide. Thorough rehearsals and detailed back briefs also enhance control. It is also important that subordinate leaders clearly understand the commanders intent (two levels up) and the desired mission end state in order to facilitate control. Radio communications in urban areas pose special problems to tactical units. Communications equipment may not function properly because of the massive construction of buildings and the environment. In addition to the physical blockage of line of sight transmissions, there is also the interference from commercial power lines, absorption into structures and the presence of large quantities of metal in structures. Leaders should consider these effects when they allocate time to establish communications. BREACHING Urban combat is by nature a very slow, deliberate affair. Even if the enemy has not prepared the area for a defense, it will take time to secure the city. A well constructed urban defense will slow or stop any attack unless impediments to movement can be quickly removed or bypassed. Breaching is normally conducted by the assault element. However, a separate breaching element may be created and a platoon or squad may be given this mission and task organized accordingly. The purpose of breaching is to provide the assault element with access to an urban objective. Breaching can be accomplished using explosive, ballistic, thermal, or mechanical methods. Ballistic breaching includes using direct fire weapons; mechanical breaching includes the use of crowbars, axes, saws, sledgehammers, or other mechanical entry devices. Thermal breaching is accomplished through the use of a torch to cut metal items such as door hinges. Attached engineers, or a member of the assault element who has had additional training in mechanical, thermal, ballistic, and explosive breaching techniques, may conduct the breach.
ASSAULT ENTRIES Top level entryAn infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods, each with advantages and disadvantages. The top down assault is the ideal method for clearing a structure. The enemys defenses might not be prepared for a top down assault and the squad can rapidly overwhelm the enemy. The squad has more momentum when moving down ladder wells. The roof can be breached in order to drop grenades and explosives on top of the enemy. Residences are sometimes adjoining, like a townhouse, and asymmetrical in construction with rooftops of varying heights. Alleys and walkways are often inaccessible from the main axis of approach, and certainly outside of the reach of tanks, tracks, or uparmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun-trucks. Often the enemys position is not known until entry was gained, so each house required time intensive positioning of forces in order to safely bring supporting heavy fires to bear.
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Realistically, however, assaulting from the top down is not the best option for the infantry squad in every situation. When clearing from the top, once the squad makes entry and contact is made, pulling out of the structure is extremely difficult. This limits the squad leaders option for engaging the enemy. Bottom level entryIn bottom up clearing, the squad leader has more options when contact is made. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines and the clearing is more controlled, whereas the top down technique must always remain in high gear. If casualties occur, they can be pulled out faster and more easily simply because gravity is working for the squad. It is easy for the enemy to hold the second deck and ladder well as the squad moves upward into the enemys defenses In conclusion, there should not be a standard assault method. The squad leader should understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, assess each structure quickly, make a decision on which method to employ, and then take actions that maximize its advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. All unit leaders must understand geometries of fires, surface danger zones for all infantry and tank weapons, and have a thorough understanding of weapons capabilities and limitationsto include enemy weapons/ weapons systems. Vehicle elevated entryMore complicated then bottom level entry due to coordination with vehicles and their security. Marines are able to enter buildings from the second or third level forcing the enemy down and out into the street where the supporting and security forces are located. Assisted Lifted entryAlthough very effective and simple to perform there are many problems with conducting a lifted entry. Assisted lifted entry requires that at least one Marine remains in the street to perform the desired the lift for the other members of their unit. Ladder assisted entryVery similar pros and cons to both the vehicle and assisted lift entry, however more logistical requirements must be coordinated for a basic dismounted patrol. Helicopter-borne entryAlthough the most desired way to conduct a assault entry (top down), this is also the most difficult entry to coordinate and execute. In order to conduct this type of maneuver a helicopter is required to insert troops onto the roof of the building and allow them to clear from top down. TASKING STATEMENTS Due to the complexity of the SOM for attacking a fortified position (RIGS) a simple and logical means of tasking Assault/Support/Security Units is listed below. In the example each unit is assigned as ME/SE, if necessary a Platoon commander can assign multiple tasks and purposes to a single unit. This form of tasking should be tied into a planned rotation of the task organization listed below. Example tasking statements per squad -1st Squad: (SE#2): -Task 1: You are the ASSLT unit. On order Seize A1. -Purpose 1: IOT eliminate all enemy from A1, and set up a SBF on buildings A2-A3 -Task 2: Upon seizing A1 you will rotate to the SUPT unit. On Order Suppress the Enemy on A2-A3. OS shift/OS Cease Fire -Purpose 2: IOT allow 3rd squad to enter A2-A3. -Task 3: Upon 3rd squads seizure of A2-A3 you are the SEC unit, OS Isolate A4. -Purpose 3: IOT prevent enemy interference with 2nd squad Example attachment tasking statements -Assault Squad: SE#3: GS PLT. O/O Breach the door to A1 IOT allow 1st Squad to enter A1. You will travel with the HQ element. BPT conduct follow-on breaches in Sector A. -Machine Gun Squad: SE#4: GS PLT. O/O Isolate A1 IOT prevent en from interfering with 1st Squads seizure of A1. BPT suppress and isolate enemy positions in support of follow-on operations in sector A. -Tgt Precedence: Technical vehicles, Enemy rockets, MG positions, buildings being seized. -Engagement Criteria: As 1st squad exposes themselves to move into A1, MGs will increase rates of fire from their SPF location.
ROTATION PLAN:
Similar to a MTC, having the ability to rotate your Task Organization can facilitate maintaining speed and tempo during operations. All units (Assault/Support/Security) must be prepared to conduct the roles and responsibilities of each other to best support the SOM. There is no rule stating when to rotate, 15
however forward planning for your units to rotate due to casualties or sizes of building is a good idea. -Plan for one to two rotations of the task organization, as the assault unit makes entry into a structure and seizes it, they will then become either the support or security element. Allowing or beginning the rotation plan where the previously assigned Support element becomes the Security element and the previous Security unit moves to seize the next structure as the Assault element. - Have a plan for follow-on rotations (Aslt-Supt-Sec) - Explain the criteria/events that will initiate the rotation -Dont create to many rotations, simpler is sometimes better
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
MISSION The immediate purpose of a defensive operation is to defeat an enemy attack and gain the initiative for offensive operations. The Infantry company, platoon and squad may also conduct the defense to achieve one or more of the following purposes. -Gain time. -Retain key terrain. -Support other operations. -Preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another. -Erode enemy forces at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations. The defense of an urban area should be organized around key terrain features, buildings, and areas that preserve the integrity of the defense and provide the defender ease of movement. The defender must organize and plan his defense considering factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Procedures and principles for planning and organizing the defense of an urban area are the same as for other defensive operations. In developing a defensive plan, the defender considers METT-TC factors with emphasis on fire support, preparation time, work priorities, and control measures. Planning for the defense of an urban area must be detailed and centralized. As in the offense, execution is decentralized as the battle develops, and the enemy forces assault the buildings and rooms. Therefore, it is imperative that all leaders understand the mission end-state and the commanders intent, two levels up. SCHEME OF MANEUVER The platoon leader continues to call for indirect fires as the enemy approaches. The platoon begins to engage the enemy at their weapon systems maximum effective range. They attempt to mass fires and initiate them simultaneously to achieve maximum weapons effects. Indirect fires and obstacles integrated with direct fires should disrupt the enemys formations, channel him toward EAs, prevent or severely limit his ability to observe the location of friendly positions, and destroy him as he attempts to breach tactical and or protective obstacles. The forward observer or platoon leader will be prepared to give terminal guidance to attack aviation if available and committed into his area of operations.
TDOOTS Types of Defense Two types of urban defenses include the linear and perimeter defense, based on the more complex terrain, a perimeter defense is usually employed, however a unit might occupy a linear defense oriented along an AA, MSR or other piece of urban terrain. Linear Defense
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SE2 ME SE1
Perimeter Defense
SE2
SE1
ME
Fighting Positions A critical defensive task in combat in built-up areas is the selection and preparation of fighting positions. 1. Considerations. Leaders should consider the following factors when establishing fighting positions: Protection. Leaders should select buildings that provide protection from direct and indirect fires. Reinforced concrete buildings with three or more floors provide suitable protection, while buildings constructed of wood, paneling, or other light materials require reinforcement to gain sufficient protection. One- to two-story buildings without strongly constructed cellars are vulnerable to indirect fires and require construction of overhead protection for each firing position. 17
Dispersion. Normally, a position should not be established in a single building when it is possible to occupy two or more buildings that permit mutually supporting fires. A position in one building without mutual support is vulnerable to bypass, isolation, and subsequent destruction from any direction. Concealment. The fighting position should be concealed. Buildings that are obvious defensive positions should not be selected. The occupation of exposed buildings may be necessary because of requirements for security and fields of fire. Therefore, reinforcement of the structure must be accomplished to provide suitable protection within the building. Fields of Fire. Positions should be mutually supporting and have interlocking fields of fire in direction of the enemy. Clearing fields of fire may require the destruction of adjacent buildings by using explosives or engineer equipment,. Care should be taken to avoid high lighting the building as a defensive position. Covered Routes. Defensive positions should try to have at least one covered route that permits resupply, MEDEVAC, reinforcement, or withdrawal from the building. The route can be established by one of the following means: through walls to adjacent buildings, through underground systems, through communications trenches Behind protective buildings. Observation. The building should permit observation of enemy avenues of approach and adjacent defensive sectors. Fire Hazard. Avoid selecting positions in buildings that are a fire hazard. If flammable structures must be occupied, the danger of fire can be reduced by wetting the structure, laying an inch of sand on the floors, and providing fire extinguishers and firefighting equipment. Routes of escape should also be prepared in case of fire. Time. The time available to prepare the defense is one of the most critical factor. If enough time is insufficient, buildings that require extensive preparation should not be used. Conversely, buildings located in less desirable areas that require little improvement may be a better choice for a defensive position. Preparation. Preparation of fighting positions depends time, proper selection of the defensive position, and availability of appropriate materials. Selecting Positions. Each weapon should be assigned a primary sector of fire to cover enemy approaches. Alternate positions will cover the same sector of fire as the primary position. These positions are usually located in an adjacent room on the same floor (Figures D-1A, D-1B, and D-1C). Each weapon must be assigned a supplementary position (to engage attacks from other directions) and an FPL. Building Positions. There are many ways to establish a fighting position in a building. (1) Window Position. Marines should kneel or stand on either side of a window. To fire downward from upper floors, tables or similar objects can be placed against the wall to provide additional elevation, but they must be positioned to prevent the weapon from protruding through the window (Figure D-2). Leaders should inspect positions to determine the width of sector that each position can engage.
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DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES ME/SE DOF is determined in an urban defense. The ME can be weighted with additional combat power to include direct/indirect fire weapon systems, anti armor weapon systems, etc. ORIENTATION The goal of the defense is still to place the enemy in a combined arms dilemma, an urban defense uses the terrain to achieve this. Pre-existing urban structures and urban canyons can be used to create an effective MEA. Leaders must understand the impact of terrain on the effects of the defense, taking into account topics discussed in Urban Ops I to include: building composition, weapons effects and employment, FSP and communications. OCCUPATION PLAN The occupation phase of the defense includes moving from one location to the defensive location. A quartering party under company control normally leads this movement to clear the defensive position and prepares it for occupation. The platoon plans, reconnoiters, and then occupies the defensive position. The battalion establishes security forces. The remaining forces prepare the defense. To facilitate maximum time for planning, occupying, and preparing the defense, unit leaders at all levels must understand their duties and responsibilities, including priorities of work. Occupation and preparation of the defense site is conducted concurrently with the development of the engagement area. The platoon occupies defensive positions IAW the company commanders plan and the results of the platoons reconnaissance. To ensure an effective and efficient occupation, the reconnaissance element marks the friendly positions. These tentative positions are then entered on the fire plan sketch. Each squad moves in or is led in by a guide to its marker. Once in position, each squad leader checks his position location. As the platoon occupies its positions, the platoon commander 20
manages the positioning of each squad to ensure they locate in accordance with the scheme of maneuver. If the platoon commander notes discrepancies between actual positioning of the squads and his plan, he makes the corrections. Security is placed out in front of the platoon. The platoon commander must personally walk the fighting positions to ensure that everyone understands their role in the defense and that the following are IAW scheme of maneuver: -Weapons orientation and general sectors of fire. -Crew served weapons positions. -Rifle squads positions in relation to each other. TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES (TCMs) The use of graphic control measures to synchronize actions become even more important to mission accomplishment in an urban environment. Trigger lines can be used to report the enemys location or to control the advance of counterattacking units. Principal streets, rivers, and railroad lines are suitable phase lines, which should be clearly and uniformly marked on the near or far side of the street or open area. Checkpoints aid in reporting locations and controlling movement. Contact points are used to designate specific points where units make physical contact. Target reference points (TRPs) can facilitate fire control. Many of these points can be designated street intersections. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of command.
SECURITY PLAN Urban terrain places new constraints and considerations on an effective security plan. On more complex terrain LP/OPs will be closer to squad battle positions. Security patrols may need to be reinforced to account for numerous danger areas and threats presented by UO. ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE Squad Battle Positions The infantry battalion is normally assigned a sector to defend. However, depending on METT-TC, it may be assigned to defend from a battle position or strongpoint. The battalion will usually assign its companies to either a battle position, a strongpoint, or a sector. These battle positions, strong points, or sectors are placed along avenues of approach to block or restrict the enemys movement. Depending on the type of built-up area, a company may be employed on the forward edge of the flanks of the area. This forces the enemy to deploy early without decisive engagement because it deceives the enemy as to the true location of the main defense. Other companies may then be employed in a series of battle positions and/or strong points in the center of the city or town. In all cases, mutual support between positions is vital. Companies and platoons should have designated alternate and supplementary positions. Once the rifle platoon commander has received his battle position or sector, he then selects the positions for his squads and crew-served weapons. Squad positions within the built-up area may be separated by rooms within buildings or be deployed in different buildings. Squad positions must be mutually supporting and allow for overlapping sectors of fire Main Engagement Area The decisive battle is fought in the main engagement area. However, the commander may deploy units on the forward edges of the engagement area or in battle positions in depth. The defensive scheme should include forces to defend along the flanks. The commander normally employs security forces to the front to provide early warning and to deny the enemy intelligence on the units defensive dispositions. Command Post This is a location that you can best command and control your troops from. This location should have a great view of the selected main engagement area IOT allow the platoon commander or squad leader the opportunity to coordinate fires. This location should be centralized and known by all members of the defense in the case they need to communicate with the CP. As the defense continues to improve and expand the location of the CP may have to be relocated IOT maintain command and control over the entire defense.
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3 ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSE
A2 A1 B1 B2 B3 C1
t en in gem a M nga E rea A
AB 1002
M M M
-5 BBCB
A4 A3 B4 C6 C7 B5
C8
C2 C3
C4 C5
FIRE SUPPORT MOUT operations present unique fire support considerations. On urbanized terrain, buildings provide excellent cover and concealment to the enemy while limiting friendly observation and targeting efforts. Targets are generally exposed for brief periods of time and are often in close proximity to friendly forces. Observers will experience difficulty in finding OPs with adequate fields of observation. Terrain masking by tall buildings may restrict the delivery of indirect fires. Collateral damage and rubble effects must be considered during ammunition selection. The importance of effective communications, ROE, control measures, and procedures to prevent fratricide is magnified. In the defense, fire support plans address fires to disrupt and slow the enemy attack. Fires are delivered at maximum ranges along avenues of approach to separate armor and infantry forces, to canalize the enemy into killing zones, and to deny the enemy use of key facilities in the city, such as communications and transportation facilities. Defensive fires planned at lower echelons support fighting within the builtup area. Defensive fire support plans identify fire support coordination procedures necessary to execute the delivery of fire support.
COMMAND AND SIGNAL In all defensive situations, commanders should position themselves well forward so that they can control the action. In urban terrain, this is even more critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty in communication, and intense fighting. Other key leaders may be placed in positions to report to the commander and to make critical, time-sensitive decisions. Communications Restrictions. Radio communications is initially the primary means of communication for controlling the defense of an urban area and for enforcing security. Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines may degrade radio communication in urban areas. Wire is emplaced and used as the primary means of communications as time permits. However, wire can be compromised if interdicted by the enemy. Messengers can be used as another means of communication. Visual signals may also be used but are often not effective because of the screening effects of buildings and walls. Signals must be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned and attached units. Increased battle noise makes the effective use of sound signals difficult.
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Summary The fundamentals of defensive operations do not change in an urban fight. There are many factors that must be considered when planning for and executing defensive operations in an urban environment, but a proper planning will help the commander ensure that all aspects of the fight are addressed. As in any defensive operation, the devil is in the details. A successful defensive operation requires a commander who is able to conduct a detailed METT-TC, develop a well-thought out centralized plan, and ensure that his or her subordinates are capable of decentralized execution. REFERENCES Reference Number or Author Reference Title MCDP 1 Warfighting MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations MCWP 3-11.1 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon MCWP 3-35.3 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) MCRP 3-11.1B Small Unit Leaders Guide to Weather and Terrain MCRP 3-16C Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander MCWP 3-33.5 Joint Marine Corps/Army COIN Manual MCWP 3-11.3 Scouting and Patrolling TTECG Mojave Viper Urban Warfare Training CD-ROM CQB School Curriculum Materials and Student Handouts B4R5379 Urban Operations II Offensive and Defensive Operations 14 Basic Officer Course
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Term or Acronym Definition or Identification GEOMETRY OF FIRES Active and continuous placement of units, Marines, and sectors of fire to ensure that, in the moment when fires are needed, the ability to fire is not masked by Marines or by innocents. GUARDIAN ANGEL/COVERT OVERWATCH These are the alert Marines placed in ambush, unseen by the enemy, watching over their units. The purpose of these Marines is to occupy a position of advantage over any approaching hostile force or individual. QUICK REACTIONFORCE A unit that is on an alert status and capable of responding throughout an assigned area of operations in order to provide assistance across the spectrum of conflict. HESCO BARRIERS Canvas and wire mesh containers filled with loose dirt designed to provide cover from enemy fire.
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Counterinsurgency Measures
Introduction This lesson will focus on the basics of counterinsurgency (COIN), and will provide the provisional rifle platoon commander with a basic understanding of insurgency, and provide the student with the start point to begin their own study of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight US forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with US forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust US national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. MCWP 3-33.5. While the United States maintains it dominance in conventional dominance, it forces our enemys to look at other methods to attack us. Counterinsurgency is one method that our enemys have at their disposal to mitigate our conventional dominance. In This Lesson This lesson will give you an introduction to insurgency, and provide you with a model to assess an insurgency and subsequently make decisions as a counterinsurgency. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Studying Counterinsurgency Insurgency Counter Insurgency Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 4 5 15 23 24 24 25
Importance
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Counterinsurgency Measures
Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objectives MCCS.29.01 Given a tactical scenario involving a terrorist threat, employ measures to combat terrorism, per MCRP 302D, MCRP 3-02E, MCRP 3-33A, and MCWP 3-33.5. MCCS.29.02 Given a tactical scenario involving enemy insurgents, employ counter-insurgency measures, per MCRP 3-02D, MCRP 3-02E, MCRP 3-33A, and MCWP 333.5. Enabling Learning Objectives MCCS.27.02c Given a tactical scenario in a combat environment, higher's operation order, and with the aid of the Commander's Tactical Handbook, wearing individual field equipment, and a weapon, search vehicles and locations, per MCWP 2-1, MCWP 2-12, FMFRP 12-16, and MCDP 2. MCCS.29.02a. Given a tactical scenario involving enemy insurgents, determine appropriate counter-insurgency measures, per MCRP 3-02D, MCRP 3-02E, MCRP 3-33A, and MCWP 3-33.5. MCCS.29.02b. Given a tactical scenario involving enemy insurgents, discuss counter-insurgency operations, per MCRP 3-02D, MCRP 3-02E, MCRP 3-33A, and MCWP 333.5.
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Studying Counterinsurgency
Why Study COIN? Counterinsurgency is not just thinking mans warfare it is the graduate level of war. Special Forces Officer in Iraq, 2005 With our conventional dominance our enemys will continue to look for new ways to influence U.S. interests, and counterinsurgency is one method they have. Why not only study COIN? This should be obvious to Marine Leaders; if we lose our conventional dominance, then if one looks at the spectrum of conflict, it follows that our enemys could attack us in a conventional manner, and the threat to our nation increases as we move up the spectrum of conflict.
Many of the skill sets that the military will be required to use as counterinsurgents are the basic skills that are required to conduct conventional war (patrolling, raids, etc.)
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency
Terms Insurgency - an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) Insurgent - member of an insurgency. So whats an insurgency? Doctrinally, an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. Insurgencies are typically a part of (and subordinate to) a larger resistance movement that includes other, non-violent aspects, such as political actions and international coordination Guerrilla - The overt military aspect of the insurgency. Terrorist One who uses violence or the threat of violence to create fear; the intent is to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
Terrorism and guerilla warfare are techniques that may or may not be employed in pursuit of an overall insurgent strategy. Guerillas are a subcomponent of an insurgency that works overtly toward the goals of that insurgency. The following Venn diagram establishes links between insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists:
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency (Continued)
Aspects of an Insurgency Insurgency is typically a form of internal war, one that occurs primarily within a state and has at least some elements of civil war. The exception being resistance movements where indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow what they perceive as a foreign or occupation government. Insurgency goals fall between two extremes: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they control. Terrorism, on the other hand, is a technique that may be employed independently or as part of an insurgency (by guerrilla forces or not). The goals of a terrorist are not necessarily specific to governments; they typically focus on broader ideological goals. They may not even focus their attacks on governments, but on societies directly. Analyzing an Insurgency Each Insurgency is unique. In all cases, insurgents aim to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end. (MCWP 3-35 1-24) Understanding specific aspects of the insurgency allows for more appropriate methods to counter. To create that understanding it is critical to identify the following: Root cause(s) of the insurgency o What is their motivator: Power, money, religion, end occupation?
Extent to which the insurgency enjoys internal and external support o Material: finance, equipment, personnel o Tactical: military training and development of TTPs
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency (Continued)
Analyzing an Insurgency (Continued) Basis on which insurgents appeal to the target population o What issues galvanize the population, what factions exist? Insurgents motivation and depth of commitment o If their goal is to redistribute power and wealth will they be likely to engage in a protracted battle and to die for their cause as someone whose motivation is religiously based and fanatical in nature? Likely insurgent weapons and tactics o Where in the continuum does the insurgency fall? Are they utilizing sticks and stones, small arms and explosives, or heavy machine guns and advance explosives? Operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy o Densely populated urban areas vs. open, agrarian small towns? To form a coherent COIN strategy, it is important to understand not only the motivation but also the approach being used to advance the insurgency. Insurgent approaches include, but are not limited to, the following: Conspiratorial o Involves a few key leaders and a militant cadre seizing control of government structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation. o Lenin used this approach in 1917 during the Bolshevik revolution.
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency (Continued)
Analyzing an Insurgency (Continued) Military-focused - Aims to create revolutionary possibilities or to seize power primarily by applying military force. Asserts that an insurrection itself can create the conditions needed to overthrow a government. Urban - Protracted urban terrorism waged by small, independent cells requires little or no popular support. General aims to sow disorder, incite sectarian violence, weaken the government, and intimidate the population. Protracted popular war - Uses popular support and asymmetry to try political will of the state. Identity-focused - Mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Communities often join the insurgent movement as a whole; insurgent leaders often try to mobilize the leadership of other clans to increase the movements strength.
Composite and coalition - Insurgents may use different approaches at different times by applying tactics that take advantage of circumstances. Mobilization Means and Causes The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy. Insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize popular support for their cause. Both try to sustain that struggle while discouraging support for their adversaries. Mobilization Means: Persuasion o In times of turmoil, political, social, security, and economic benefits can often entice people to support one side or the other. Ideology and religion are powerful means of persuasion.
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency (Continued)
Mobilization Means and Causes (Continued) Mobilization Means (Continued): Coercion o Insurgents may use coercive force to provide security for people or to intimidate them and the legitimate security forces into active or passive support. Kidnapping or killing local leaders or their families is a common insurgent tactic to discourage working with the government. Reaction to abuses o Firmness by security forces is often necessary to establish a secure environment; a government that exceeds accepted local norms and abuses its people or is tyrannical generates resistance to its rule. Security force abuses and the social upheaval caused by collateral damage from combat can be major escalating factors for insurgencies. Foreign support o Foreign governments can provide the expertise, international legitimacy, and money needed o start or intensify a conflict. o Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) can wittingly or unwittingly support insurgencies; i.e. legitimizing charitable agencies and/or raising funds overseas that are diverted through corrupt local agencies. Apolitical motivations o Insurgencies attract criminals, mercenaries, and individuals inspired by the romanticized image of the revolutionary or holy warrior. It is important to note that political solutions might not satisfy some of them enough to end their participation.
B4T5499
Counterinsurgency Measures
Insurgency (Continued)
Mobilization Means and Causes (Continued) Mobilization Causes: A cause is a principle or movement militantly defended or supported. Insurgent leaders often seek to adopt attractive and persuasive causes to mobilize support. These causes often stem for the unresolved contradictions existing within any society or culture. These contradictions may be real; however, insurgents may create artificial contradictions created using propaganda and misinformation. Deep-seated, strategic causes vs. temporary and local ones: Insurgents can gain more support by not limiting themselves to a single cause, adding or deleting them as circumstances demand. They attract supporters by appealing to local grievances; then they lure followers into the broader movement.
Successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents use to generate popular support. Elements of Insurgency Insurgencies take many forms; however, most share common attributes. The proportion of each element relative to the larger movement depends on the strategic approach (conspiratorial, military, etc) the insurgency adopts. Movement Leaders provide strategic direction to the insurgency. They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. In some insurgencies, they may hold their position through religious, clan, or tribal authority. Combatants (main, regional, and local forces/militias) do the actual fighting and provide security. They exist only to support the insurgencys broader political agenda and to maintain local control. Political Cadre forms the political core of the insurgency; they are actively engaged in the struggle to accomplish the insurgent goals and implement the guidance and procedures provided by the movement leaders. They are the local face of the insurgency; they assess local grievances and carry out activities to satisfy them.
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Insurgency (Continued)
Elements of Insurgency (Continued) Auxiliaries Active followers who do not participate in combat operations but provide important support services such as running safe houses, storing weapons and supplies, providing passive intelligence collection, and giving early warning or counterinsurgent movements. Mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement, the supporting populace; they may continue in their normal positions in society or lead clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Dynamics of an Insurgency Insurgencies are shaped by several common dynamics which can be used by counterinsurgents to assess their strengths and weaknesses. Leadership - An insurgency is not simply random violence; it is directed and focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish credibility for their movement. Objectives - Effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgents desired end state. Operational objectives are obkectives that insurgents pursue to destroy government legitimacy and progressively establish their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts. Objectives can be psychological or physical. Ideology and Narrative - The movements ideology explains its followers difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional concerns of the populace. Examples of these concerns include religiously based objectives, a desire for justice, ethnic aspirations, and a goal of liberation from foreign occupation. The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organization scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements.
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Insurgency (Continued)
Dynamics of an Insurgency (Continued) Environment and geography (including cultural and demographic factors) affect all participants in a conflict; most noticeably at the tactical level where they influence all tactics, techniques and procedures. Insurgencies in urban environments present different planning considerations from insurgencies in rural environments. External Support and Sanctuaries - External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support network. Sanctuaries traditionally were physical safe havens, such as training bases, but insurgents today can also draw on virtual sanctuaries in the Internal, global financial systems, and in the international media. Phasing and Timing - Insurgencies often pass through common phases of development; however, not all insurgencies experience such phased development, and progression through all phases is not required for success. Moreover, a single insurgent movement may be in different phases in different parts of a country, or may move fluidly forward and back between phases when threatened. Strategic Initiative (Insurgents) vs. Advantage in Resources (State) - At the beginning of a conflict, insurgents typically hold the strategic initiative. They initiate the conflict, choosing the ground and terms on which to engage the state. During the initial stages, these attacks are aimed at showing government vulnerability and at building popular support for their cause. The State usually has a tremendous advantage in resources: military personnel and equipment, police force, and access to funds. This advantage is counterbalanced by the requirement to maintain order, protect the population and critical resources, and provide basic functions (i.e. power, water, infrastructure, sanitation).
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Insurgency (Continued)
Three phases of an Insurgency Mao defined three different Developmental Phases, which we use in our own doctrine. They are:
Phase I: Latent and Incipient Phase II: Guerilla Warfare Phase III: War of Movement
o Latent and Incipient: The insurgency is most vulnerable during the Latent and Incipient stage. The insurgents are gathering strength and will mostly lay low as they can not afford attention from the regime. Any overt acts, violent or otherwise, will be carefully selected for maximum potential for success with minimal or no possibility of reprisal (i.e. sabotage vs. direct offensive action). If the goal of the insurgency is to replace the regime, then the shadow government will begin to be formed in this stage. In any case, the insurgencys own infrastructure is being developed in this stage. o Guerilla Warfare: Characterized by overt political and military action. The insurgency still does not match the regime in strength. As the title suggests, guerrilla attacks will be the norm rapid, carefully focused attacks that allow the insurgent to take advantage of surprise, minimize his own losses, and highlight the regimes inability to provide security and minister to the needs of the people. Eventually (the insurgent hopes) the regime is forced to defend everywhere which means he is strong nowhere and a stalemate ensues. o War of Movement: The insurgency is capable of both ministering to the needs of the people (political side) and waging conventional warfare. The guerrilla forces are still active but they are complemented by conventional formations.
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Insurgency (Continued)
A Systemic Model We can also look at an insurgency as a system. Not surprisingly, this view was advanced by two economists, Leites and Wolfe. As you can see in the following diagram, in a supply-side system there are inputs, conversion mechanisms, and outputs.
OUTPUT
So if we expand on this supply-side model of insurgency, we arrive at Leites and Wolfe systemic model of an insurgency. There are multiple sources of input, both internal and external. These inputs lead to conversion mechanisms, such as training an IED cell, and then the output are the insurgents activities. The key is understanding that the outputs in this case lead to legitimacy for the insurgents, which subsequently lead to more inputs from both their internal and external sources.
EXTERNAL SOURCES
CONVERSION MECHANISMS
(PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR TRNG, LOG, OPS)
OUTPUT
(ACTIVITIES)
LEGITIMACY
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Counterinsurgency
The Rule of Law The endstate of the counterinsurgency campaign plan is the establishment or sustainment of the rule of law, which as defined as (MCWP 3.33-5) A government that derives its powers from the governed Sustainable security institutions Fundamental human rights
One important thing to understand is that this may not be the Rule of Law that westerners think of. One must understand what the culture wants its government to be, not what we think it needs to look like. The true end state of a counterinsurgency campaign plan is to achieve active participation of the populace in the host nations government, and draw them away from the insurgent. Long term objective: acceptance of one sides claim to political power by the people of the state or region. Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the governments legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency Counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Legitimacy The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as legitimate rule primarily with the consent of the governed. In Western liberal tradition, a government that derives its just powers from the people and responds to their desires while looking out for their welfare is accepted as legitimate. Theocratic societies fuse political and religious authority; political figures are accepted as legitimate because the populace views them as implementing the will of God. Medieval monarchies claimed the divine right of kings. Imperial China governed with the mandate of heaven. Iran, since the 1979 revolution, has operated under the rule of the jurists (theocratic judges). It is imperative that commanders determine and understand what the Host Nation (HN) population defines as effective and legitimate governance. The populations expectations will influence all ensuing operations. Indicators of legitimacy: The ability to provide security for the populace; Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace (Western vs. Non-western views); A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes; A culturally acceptable level of corruption; A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Legitimacy (Continued) Indicators of legitimacy (Continued): Governments scoring high in these categories probably have the support of a sufficient majority of the population. Different cultures, however, may see acceptable levels of development, corruption, and participation differently. For some societies, providing security and some basic services may be enough for citizens to grant the government legitimacy. The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring voluntary acceptance of a governments authority and therefore its legitimacy. A governments respect for preexisting and impersonal legal rules can provide the key to gaining it widespread, enduring societal support. Security under the Rule of Law The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace; one that allows for follow-on political and social progress/reforms. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the HN governments legitimacy. Illegitimate actions are those involving the use of power without authority whether committed by government officials, security forces, or counterinsurgents. Such actions include unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture, and punishment without trial. Counterinsurgent aims Understanding the population within the Area of Operations Organization of key groups in society Relationships and tensions among groups Ideologies and narratives that resonate with groups Values of groups, interests, and motivations The societys leadership system
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Unity of Effort Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation; otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. This is true among tactical adjacent units and between different agents on the levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic). Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent operations. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off and isolated from the sources of that recuperative power. This can be done by readdressing the social dynamics under which the insurgents gain support from the populace or by limiting financial and physical support, via legal actions and border security. Manage Information and Expectations Creating and maintaining a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community will limit discontent and build support. Managing expectations involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN operations.
Isolation
Use of appropriate Level of Force Any use of force generates a series of reactions, it is vital for commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely so that it accomplished the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering. Determining the appropriate escalation of force and rules of engagement for the phase of operation allows counterinsurgents to use lesser means of force when such use is likely to achieve the desired effects without endangering themselves.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Tactical Level Imperatives of Counterinsurgency (Continued) Proportion of Effort COIN operations are a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Commanders weight each operation (and use of offensive/defensive/SASO tactics) based on the assessment of the campaigns phase and the situation in their AO. The proportion of effort devoted to offensive, defensive, and stability operations within COIN is changed over time in response to the situation and can vary geographically and by echelon.
There are thousands of possible variations for an insurgency movement, and therefore the response must be just as flexible. There is no practical way to prepare for every type of possible counterinsurgency. However, there are some guidelines that can be followed to guide the development of an effective counterinsurgency campaign. First Guideline - Analysis before action. As discussed at the beginning, a detailed analysis must precede development of a counterinsurgency campaign. This is no different than what you already know about doing an estimate of the situation. Does it make sense to develop a SOM before doing the METT-T? Second Guideline Popular support is as critical for counter-insurgent as for insurgent. Victory in counterinsurgency, therefore, is not achieved through destruction of insurgent forces or infrastructure in a given area. Those are usually easy to replace. Victory is achieved through permanently isolating the insurgent from the population. This isolation is not enforced upon the population, rather it is achieved through and maintained by the population.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Seven Guidelines for COIN (Continued) Third Guideline Gain support through active opposition. A basic tenet of politics is that for any cause, a portion of the population will be actively in favor, a portion will be neutral, and a portion will be actively opposed. The counterinsurgents focus of effort should initially be with that portion actively opposed to the insurgent. Fourth Guideline Popular Support is Conditional. When a mans life (family, livelihood, etc) is at stake, it will take more than propaganda to budge him. David Galula o Political action must be preceded by effective military and/or police action in order to provide security for active opposition. Throughout the campaign, political and military/police action must go hand-in-hand. As popular or necessary as they might be, social, political, and economic reform are ineffective while the insurgent still has control. In those cases, the population benefiting from the reform is punished by the insurgency. The counterinsurgent must demonstrate the ability and will to win by achieving a convincing success as early as possible. The counterinsurgent can not safely enter into negotiation except from a position of strength, or the population will go over to the insurgent. Fifth Guideline - Military and police action is integrated with and in support of political action. Destruction of a portion of the insurgency strength is meaningless unless it has the desired affect on the population. The counterinsurgent must account for the non-kinetic effects of all of their actions. Sixth Guideline - Focused and intense application of effort. Assets can not be uniformly applied. They must be selectively applied following an analysis of insurgent strength by region and selection of an overall strategy.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Seven Guidelines for COIN (Continued) Sixth Guideline (Continued) o In Galula, regions are designated red, pink, white, with red being the areas most under insurgent control. Start on one end or the other. Starting with red is quicker, but more asset-intensive, which may not be possible. Starting with white is another option. This does two things. First, the insurgency is fought with increasing momentum (as white areas are cleared more assets become available for red area). This takes the initiative back from the insurgent. By concentrating forces in selected areas, the insurgent is forced to either accept the challenge and assume a defensive posture or leave the area and become powerless to oppose the counterinsurgents action on the population. Seventh Guideline - Continuous analysis and adaptation of method and effectiveness is measured through the population. The counterinsurgent must continually evaluate his methods and remain flexible throughout the campaign. As with any other scheme of maneuver, it does not make sense to mindlessly drive on with a plan that is not effective. The difference here, though, is that effectiveness is measured through the population. Sometimes the measures of success that we use have little to do with effective counterinsurgency. As Marines we tend to focus on numbers of weapons captured or destroyed, insurgents killed, number of attacks in a certain zone, etc. Sometimes this is the right measure of success but often it is not. A lack of attacks, for example, might just mean that the enemy is preparing or has shifted focus to a different zone temporarily.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Five COIN Strategies We can now use our systemic model and our seven guidelines to create our counterinsurgent campaign plan. If we look our systemic model, we need to create a counter to each step in the process.
The counterinsurgent must include each of these policies in his campaign plan, militaries usually focus on the counter-output (guerilla attacks, IED defeat, ambushes, etc.). You can see how this would only address part of the problem.
The defensive buffer is those things which prevent the insurgency from gaining legitimacy from their outputs, through such things as propaganda or through use of the information operations. The fifth counterinsurgent strategy is referenced to as IDAD, or Internal Defense and Development. From JP 3-07-1, Appendix B: The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID planners must understand the HNs IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it. In some cases one of the objectives of FID may be to assist the HN to formulate appropriate IDAD strategy.
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Counterinsurgency (Continued)
Five COIN Strategies (Continued) Notice that IDAD is primarily for use by a nation to defend itself, ideally preemptively. However, nations assisting in Foreign Internal Defense must understand how to support the host nations IDAD strategy.
According to joint doctrine, that in order for a IDAD strategy to work, the host nation must utilize all the elements of National Power, referred to as DIME: (Diplomatic, Information, Military, & Economic) The following are the Principles of an IDAD Strategy: Unity of effort Maximum use of intelligence Maximum use of PSYOP & CA Minimum use of violence Responsive government
Summary
Political Factors are Primary At the beginning of a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents. Counterinsurgents must consider how operations contribute to strengthening the HN governments legitimacy and achieving U.S. political goals. In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the HN government than under an insurgent regime. COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the populations support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN agencies in a comprehensive approach.
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Summary (Continued)
You should walk away from this class with the following points: Insurgencies are another form of warfare that we will e required to deal with in the future. Insurgencies must be assessed holistically prior to developing a counterinsurgent campaign plan. While no two insurgencies are the same, there are principles the counterinsurgent can follow that will help develop a counterinsurgent plan.
References
Reference Number or Author MCWP 3-33.5 Gaula, David Greenburg, Lawrence Reference Title Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgent operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 The Ugly American The Army and Vietnam Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterisnrgency available at: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/kilcullen_28_articles.pdf
Lederer, William J. and Burdick Krepinevich, Andrew R. Leites, Nathan and Wolf, Charles Killcullen, David
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Notes
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B4T5579
Urban Patrolling
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
Urban Patrolling
Introduction The purpose of this handout is to help you, the student, gain a working knowledge of the application of patrolling operations in the urban environment. This class also provides principles based TTPs for use as a basic reference during execution. Many of the concepts and planning considerations in this class are an extension of materials taught in Patrolling, and Urban Operations I and II. Patrolling in an urban environment varies drastically from patrolling in rural and less inhabited areas due to the increase in complexity and the introduction of a three dimensional threat. The principles taught in your previous patrolling classes are still relevant but must be applied in slightly different ways in order to deal with the change in environment. In this lesson, the student officer will study the application of command and control, mounted and dismounted patrols, urban patrol planning, and principle based TTPs in order to facilitate execution. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Introduction Individual and Unit Actions 3-Block War Planning an Urban Patrol Conducting an Urban Patrol TTPs Information Operations Debriefing an Urban Patrol Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 5 5 6 6 8 9 11 11 11 12 12 13
Importance
In This Lesson
Urban Patrolling
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Urban Patrolling
Learning Objectives
Terminal Learning Objectives 0311-MOUT-2001 Given a squad, an objective within an urban environment, and an order with commanders intent, lead a squad in urban operation to accomplish the commanders intent. 0300-PAT-1008 Given a patrol order, an assigned weapon, and an assignment in a patrol, while wearing a fighting load, perform individual actions in a patrol without compromising the patrol. MCCS-PAT-2103 Given a unit, a mission, commanders intent, with required weapons and equipment, lead immediate action drills to accomplish the mission. 0311-PAT-2002 Given a squad and a mission with commanders intent, lead a squad patrol to accomplish the mission.
MCCS-PAT-2102f Given a baseline of an area observed with or without observation aiding equipment detect anomalies to determine threats. 0311-PAT-2002a Without the aid of reference, identify patrol types without error. 0311-PAT-2002p Without the aid of reference, describe urban patrol force protection measures without omission. 0311-PAT-2002q Given a unit, a mission with commanders intent, lead an urban patrol to accomplish the mission.
Enabling Learning Objectives 0302-MOUT-1105b Without the aid of references, describe the three block war environment without omission. 0302-MOUT-1105c Given a unit, a mission, a commanders intent, analyze civilian considerations using ASCOPE to develop a complete mental estimate of the situation. 0302-MOUT-1105d Given a unit, a mission, a commanders intent, and a mental estimate of the situation, integrate 5-3-5 into execution to accomplish the mission. MCCS-PAT-2103a Without the aid of references, identify types of halts without error. MCCS-PAT-2103b Without the aid of references, describe patrol immediate actions without omission. MCCS-PAT-2103c Without the aid of references, describe patrol actions while crossing danger areas without omission. MCCS-PAT-2102e Given an area to observe with or without observation aiding equipment establish a baseline to detect anomalies in the area observed.
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Urban Patrolling
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Urban Patrolling
Introduction
The concepts behind patrolling remain the same when we move from the treeline to the urban environment. Thorough planning and preparation remain essential to successful patrolling. However, due to the increase in complexity of the terrain, ASCOPE, an increased emphasis on detailed planning in regards to the three dimensional threat, intra-patrol communication and pattern avoidance will facilitate an increase in command and control functionality.
Combat Hunter
Always the hunter, never the hunted. Use memory pegs to remember events for debriefs. Use binoculars to increase situational awareness and see into shadows. Coopers Color Code.
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Urban Patrolling
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Urban Patrolling
Methods of Movement We can categorize patrols by the method of movement. This gives us three types of patrols: dismounted, mounted (motorized or mechanized), and a combination of the two. Each of these has distinct advantages and disadvantages in an urban environment. Dismounted Patrols Pros Increased interaction with the local populace Route flexibility Increased situational awareness Cons
Civil Considerations (ASCOPE) Security patrols in a high intensity conflict will probably just focus on the enemy. However, security patrols in counterinsurgency operations will likely have a primary mission that deals with the population. Whether you are going to talk to a leader, assess a hospital, or protect an election, understanding the civil considerations will help you accomplish your mission. Use ASCOPE to evaluate all the demographic aspects of your patrol.
Increased vulnerability due to limited armor Physical fatigue Slow rate of movement Reduced firepower capabilities
When planning to conduct a dismounted patrol in an urban environment there are three primary formations for movement: Single Column- Unit conducts movement in a column on one side of the road. This increases command and control but limits the ability to mitigate the three dimensional threat. Double Column- Unit conducts movement in two columns with one on each side of the road. Command and control are still relatively good but now there is increased depth and the ability to provide a higher level of security in covering the three dimensional threat. Satellite- A system of urban patrolling developed by the British military based on their experience in Northern Ireland. The HQ element will move normally, but the other elements will move in front of, behind, or parallel to the HQ element. They act similarly to the flanks of other patrols, but they will move in an irregular manner around the HQ element, appearing to enemy observers that they are moving randomly. Satelliting makes it very difficult for the enemy to keep track of the entire patrol. This makes the enemy uncertain if there are already Marines behind their position cutting off the enemys escape route. This keeps the enemy off balance, making them less likely to attack. The downside is that satellite patrolling is difficult to control and communication is difficult.
Mounted Patrols Pros Cons Increased firepower Increased armor Speed Psychological impact More communications assets Fast, organic casevac capability
Restricted by terrain High profile target Decreased situational awareness, especially passengers Decreased interaction with local populace Engine noise makes surprise impossible
Terrain Considerations (OCOKA-W) Your patrol route and the actions you take along the patrol should be tailored to the terrain. Know when your movement is concealed and when you are exposed. Understand the terrain the enemy is most likely to use to observe you. Excellent cover from walls and buildings is readily available. If you know the obstacles in your area, fences, canals, rubble, etc., you can plan to avoid them, or be prepared to treat them as danger areas. Your patrol may need to occupy key terrain, or check key terrain to ensure the enemy is not there. Understand all the different avenues of approach available to you, so that you can move with the best combination of speed and security.
Depending on the level of threat as well as geographic and demographic obstacles patrol formations should be adjusted to facilitate execution. Command and Control Well planned radio communication between every element is essential, because buildings and walls will separate the patrol leader from some elements. Marines may be within 50 meters of each other, but if they are on different blocks, or in different buildings, communication becomes much more difficult. Urban patrolling is radio intensive.
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Force Protection Ensuring all Marines have appropriate personal protective equipment is only the beginning of force protection. Make sure every Marine hard targets by not staying stationary for any period of time. Small unit leaders should use short tactical pauses, or going firm, to reorient themselves and prepare their unit for the next action.
Initial Contact - The initial contact begins when the sniper fires the first shot. The patrol will seek cover and try to locate the shooter. The element or team in contact will attempt to identify the firing position while that element leader determines appropriate cut-off positions and relays them to flanking elements. Flank elements then set up along likely escape routes, preventing the sniper from escaping. The period of contact ends when the gunman is located, or the patrol leader decides to continue on with the patrol without pursuing the sniper. Immediate Follow-Up - Flanking elements maintain their positions and prevent civilians from entering the area. The patrol leader moves to link-up with the element in contact (if not his own), and makes an estimate of the situation. The patrol leader sends a report to higher headquarters, coordinating casevac or quick reaction force assistance if necessary. Subsequent Follow-Up - The aim of the subsequent follow-up is to clear the building. You may be able to do this with just your patrol, or you may need support from other patrols or a quick reaction force. Once you have the necessary combat power you attack the building. Recon and isolation of the objective have already been done, so you can begin gaining a foothold and seizing the objective.
Reaction to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) IEDs are a common ambush tactic employed by terrorists and insurgents in urban environments. The appropriate response to a suspected IED has five steps known as the five Cs CONFIRM: The patrol leader confirms the presence of the suspicious item. This must be done from a safe distance, always assuming that the IED will be detonated at any time. Use binoculars, or other optics to assist in confirming the IED from a safe distance. Report the device to higher and coordinate for support. CLEAR: Every Marine moves to a safe distance away from the IED, at least 300 meters, or a combination of distance and sturdy cover. Look for secondary IEDs and begin the five steps again if any are discovered. Clearing has to happen very quickly for the safety of the Marines. CORDON: The area must be cordoned to prevent unauthorized personnel, friendly or civilian, from exposing themselves to the IED. CHECK: Marines check the area for suspicious personnel. CONTROL: The patrol leader controls the area, allowing only necessary personnel inside the cordon. The patrol provides security for EOD personnel on the scene. Sometimes IEDs are used to initiate an ambush, or used in conjunction with a sniper or secondary IEDs. Always expect and plan for the worst. Reaction to a Complex Ambush Marines' greatest danger during urban patrols is a complex ambush. These can involve IEDs, RPGs, snipers, machinegun fire, and small arms fire. Here we will focus on an ambush that starts with an IED, and is followed by small arms fire.
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Urban Patrolling
Contact Phase Marines in the kill zone must get out as soon as possible. The rest of the patrol seeks cover and concealment. If the patrol can orient on the source of SAF, it should immediately return fire attempting to gain fire superiority. Immediate Follow Up If possible, the Support Element will establish a SBF pos IOT to suppress the enemy. If possible, HE should be employed to break enemy fortified positions prior to assault element making entry to a fortified position. Support Element provides CASEVAC support with an aid and litter team. The Security Element will isolate adjacent buildings and BPT provide CASEVAC support while the assault element closes with and destroys the enemy. Subsequent Follow Up Once enemy threat has been eliminated, Patrol sweeps the kill zone for possible secondary IED's and moves casualties to CCP. Patrol leader calls in 9-line CASEVAC report and coordinates extract of all casualties. QRF support should also be requested as soon as possible. In urban fighting, the streets are typically killing zones while courtyards and buildings provide cover. One of the very first reactions to an ambush in an urban environment should be to get inside a courtyard or building. Marines should begin returning fire from the building. Marines should begin returning fire from the buildings as they prepare to maneuver against the enemy. The urban environment will make the ambush even more disorienting than in the tree line. Marines should expect to have a great deal of difficulty identifying the source of the fire. Be very careful when handling casualties early in the ambush. The initial IED or small arms fire may be used to lure Marines into a daisy chain of IEDs. Be aware of the secondary IED threat and understand the risks involved when moving toward initial casualties. The ambush may be a hit-and-run attack, or it could be a sustained ambush. As the siituation unfolds, the patrol leader must decide how to respond. Information Operations (IO) Countering enemy propaganda and spreading our message is a critical component of counter insurgency. We use IO to gain support, build the legitimacy of the host nation, and to discredit insurgents. Urban patrols are one of the best times to conduct IO, whether posting and handing out flyers, or talking to civilians. Work with the IO officer to get materials and confirm talking points. Debriefing Urban Patrols The patrol debrief is when information about the enemy and civlian population is gathered sent to the intelligence section. Every Marine on patrol is an intelligence collector. It is impossible to know who may have seen something of value until a detailed debrief is conducted. In addition to enemy TTPs, urban patrol debriefs should collect valuable information about the population. How did they react to the Marine patrol? Was their reaction different today than in the past? Changes in behavior can indicate enemy activity, or provide feeback on the effectiveness of Marine operations. Summary Urban patrols share many traits with traditional patrols. However, the complex environment creates specific planning requirements and counters to enemy threats. Knowing the fundamentals behind the TTPs will allow you to tailor TTPs to your environment and your patrol. Understand and plan for how the civilian population will affect a patrol.
References
Reference Number or Author MCDP 1 MCDP 1-0 MCWP 3-11.1 MCWP 3-35.3 MCRP 3-11.1B MCRP 3-16C MCWP 3-33.5 TTECG MCWP 3-11.3 Reference Title Warfighting Marine Corps Operations Marine Rifle Company/Platoon Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Small Unit Leaders Guide to Weather and Terrain Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander Joint Marine Corps/Army COIN Manual Mojave Viper Urban Warfare Training CD-ROM Scouting and Patrolling
GO FIRM
GUARDIAN ANGEL
HARD TARGETING
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson
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Buddy team
Engage driver Elevate weapon & sight in Hand & Arm Signals Horn , Siren, light
Distances between trigger lines are extended as far as the terrain allows the lines must be clearly identified. Buddy team works together to institute steps.
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Note If only 4 Vehicles; eliminate one at conduct vehicle / personnel search and chase and use Block Road and Chase Vehicle IOT pursue
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Vehicle Searches
Overview. Search techniques are divided into three categories. The categories vary according to the intensity of the search. There is no clear boundary between the categories and the extent of the investigation at each stage depends on the suspicion aroused. Categories include: Initial Check. The initial check is the first part of the searching process carried out on all vehicles and used to select vehicles for a more detailed examination. Occupants are asked to step out of the vehicle and are quickly searched. Search personnel may ask the driver to open the trunk and hood. Search personnel at the entrance to barracks and other installations should know the threat from large vehicle mounted bombs. Up to three personnel are required for the search, and the search normally takes about 3 minutes per vehicle. o o o o o o Ensure at least two people conduct the search: One guard (driver and occupants) One searcher (vehicle) Stop the vehicle at the search site. Have all occupants exit the vehicle and move them to one location. Instruct the driver to turn off the engine, and then open the hood, trunk, and all doors. Get phrases from interpreter prior to mission or tape record phrases from an interpreter. Continue the search once the above is complete. Question or search of the driver and occupants is optional. Begin and end the exterior search at the front of the vehicle, moving in a clockwise direction. Visually search of the exterior and top of the vehicle. Visually search of the underside of the vehicle. Search the interior starting at the front compartment, then the right side, then the rear compartment, then the left side, ending at the front. Complete the search. Instruct the driver and occupants to continue.
o o o o o o o o
Primary search. This is a full search of select vehicles. Vehicles may be selected randomly, In Accordance With (IAW) screening guidelines or due to similarities to vehicles associated with previous events (a Be-On-the-Look-Out (BOLO) list). This search usually entails checking the interior, exterior, engine and trunk compartments and mirror checks of the vehicle underside. It should take two to five minutes. Primary search include those of those of the initial search and may add the following o Question or search the driver and occupants. o Check the inside of the front hood. o Check the rear compartment.
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Secondary search. This is a detailed search of a suspect vehicle. A vehicle becomes suspect usually due to screening or discovery of items during a primary search. This thorough search is manpower and time intensive. It may include disassembling panels, checking interiors of wheels, and so on. At the basic level, to conduct a secondary search of a vehicle o Ensure at least four people conduct the search: Two for the driver and occupants. Two more for the vehicle. o Assume that the driver and occupants or the vehicle itself is suspect. o If possible, have the vehicle stop in a safe and secure location. o Instruct the driver to turn off the engine, open the hood, open the trunk, and open all doors. o Obtain the keys from the driver. o Move the driver and occupants to a separate location. o Detain and search driver and occupants while searching the vehicle. o Begin the vehicle search at the front and end at the rear. One searcher searches the right front, right side, and right rear. The other searcher searches the left front, left side, and left rear. o Conduct a visual search of the exterior and top. o Conduct a visual search of the underside of the vehicle. o Without entering, conduct a visual search of the interior of the vehicle. o Ensure the engine is off, and then ensure the hood, trunk, and all doors are open. o Check the inside of the front hood. o Check the interior left and right sides. o Check the rear compartment. o Complete the search. o Return keys to driver. o Instruct driver and occupants to continue.
Search Considerations. Be quick, thorough, and efficient. This will reduce complaints. Children, babies, pets, old people, young women, and infirmed civilians should not deter operations. If necessary, request special or additional assistance. Use common sense. Look for anything unusual, i.e., scratched screw heads, repaired upholstery, new bodywork etc. Low-riding or overloaded vehicles. Nervous driver or passengers. Remembering details of searched vehicles could be useful in future operations. Vehicle Types Vehicles are generally categorized into four types: Automobiles (cars), motorcycles and bicycles, buses, and heavy goods vehicles (trucks). Search considerations for the car are covered above as part of basic vehicle considerations. Search considerations for the three additional vehicles follow:
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Principles. Cordon and search operations are almost always inextricably linked with counterinsurgency operations. Accordingly, the basic principle of searching a populated area is to conduct it with limited inconvenience to the population. Target selection is based on a variety of intelligence developed through local sources or higher level assets. Task organization and levels of force employed are varied to mitigate effects on the populace. This is done based on the threat level of the target. A target where enemy contact or capture is less likely is executed with a lower level of force. This is often referred to as a cordon and knock; the search element knocks on the door of the target and requests permission to search. Cordon and search missions in more hostile areas or targets based on higher quality intelligence are usually executed more like raids; a breach usually mechanical is executed to gain entry into the target.
Principles of Cordon and Search (1) Speed - Cordons should be rapidly established with an immediate transition to a search of the target. Rapid tempo is critical to maintain the initiative and to reduce the enemys ability to react or escape. Speed will limit the enemys capability to react and mitigate organized opposition by the local populace. (2) Surprise - All efforts must be made to deny the enemy the opportunity to react. (3) Isolation - The target area and the target must be physically isolated by establishing a cordon around each site. The cordon serves to prevent escape from the area, repositioning by enemy elements, or reinforcement. (4) Target Identification - Personnel must be properly tasked and trained to identify, capture, and/or exploit targeted enemy personnel and material. (5) Timeliness - It is critical to strike a balance between actionable intelligence, target activities, desired end state, and execution of the cordon and search. Failure to do so allows the enemy to gain the initiative, reposition as he desires, and escape. (6) Accountability - Frequently during a cordon and search several elements are executing decentralized operations. It is critical that all personnel and assets are accounted for and not left behind during the egress.
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(7) Minimization and Mitigation of Collateral Damage - Cordon and search operations are focused on eliminating threats or potential threats. If the operations cause excessive or unnecessary collateral damage, this may create resentment, which emboldens the enemys cause. Actions that cause extensive collateral damage may also constitute violations under both the law of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). (8) Detailed Search - Target areas must be thoroughly and extensively searched to ensure all of the enemys assets are captured. This requires proper coordination, marking, and adherence to unit SOPs. Target areas cannot simply be cleared they must be properly searched. Train elements within your unit to conduct Sensitive Sight Exploitation (SSE). (9) Legitimacy - Cordon and search operations focus on supporting the efforts of a legitimate Host Nation government. The use and integration of properly trained Host Nation Security Forces are a requirement toward this end. Phases of a Cordon and Search. (1) Planning - The planning phase is used to define the sequence of action by each element to synchronize their tasks to ensure mission success. As time available to plan and prepare for a cordon and search mission is generally limited, it is often necessary to conduct planning while reconnaissance and intelligence collection are ongoing. As additional information becomes available, it is integrated and the plan updated as necessary. While many of the tasks required by a cordon and search is part of a unit SOPs, it is necessary that pre-mission rehearsals be conducted to identify any gaps or seams and that all mission elements and teams understand their tasks (i.e. BAMCIS). (2) Reconnaissance - Every target area should be reconnoitered prior to execution using many of the available resources. The reconnaissance plan must not provide the enemy with indicators of an impending cordon and search. For example: A reconnaissance patrol should not be conducted in an area where our forces do not habitually operate since it could compromise execution of the cordon and search. Often reconnaissance is conducted with overhead imagery (UAV/Satellite). (3) Movement to the Objective - The timing, routes, and execution of movement to the objective should consider the factors of METT-TC and whether it should be simultaneous or phased. A route recon should be conducted both during the day and night for planning purposes. (4) Isolation - This is key to successful execution of the search. It consists of an outer cordon and an inner cordon. The objective may be isolated simultaneously or sequentially. Frequently, the search may have to be executed immediately after the cordon is established. The outer cordon isolates the area and the inner cordon isolates the objective. (5) Search - This includes everything from clearing and search of target areas, consolidation and reorganization, and mitigation of negative effects caused by the search. The search should be conducted by trained members of the Assault Force. (6) Withdrawal - During this phase the unit may be the most vulnerable. To mitigate risk, staybehind elements may be left to cover the withdrawal, different routes and timing may be used, or other techniques may be employed such as simultaneous or phased withdrawals to mitigate the enemys ability to attack.
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d. METT-TC Considerations. A commander should use the full range of intelligence from his subordinates and staff and apply all lessons learned about his Area of Operations (AO) to each mission (civilian considerations may change on a daily basis). (1) MISSION - Most cordon and search operations are enemy-oriented and designed to capture or destroy enemy forces, material, or capability to operate covertly. (2) ENEMY - Enemy considerations drive the tactical planning. Commanders should consider the following enemy actions when planning a cordon and search: (a) Enemy resistance in the route or routes into the target area - This includes the emplacement and use of IEDs and booby traps as well as ambushes. Using aviation, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or mounted patrol reconnaissance just ahead of the cordon and search force will assist the commander in finding and using the path of least resistance into the target area. (b) Enemy resistance in the objective area - In an urban area the commander must consider the possibility of enemy outposts in adjacent houses or courtyards, on the roofs of adjacent buildings, in subterranean hide positions, etc. The cordon forces must be aware of these suspected enemy positions. (c) Enemy resistance at the target - During planning the commander must assess the type and level of resistance expected. Intelligence and other information sources will assist in defining the necessary Scheme of Maneuver (SOM) based on the threat. (d) Enemy resistance departing the objective area - Again, this includes emplacement and use of mines, booby traps, and ambushes. Using aviation or UAS reconnaissance assets will assist the commander in a quick egress. Commanders should strongly consider using a separate ingress and egress route or a stay behind force. (3) TERRAIN - Terrain considerations for a cordon and search are similar to those for most other operations in urban terrain. Commanders must consider obstacles, avenues of approach (to include enemy avenues of withdrawal), key terrain, observation/fields of fire, and cover and concealment when evaluating the terrain. (4) TIME - The time available before mission execution determines whether the unit will execute a hasty or deliberate cordon and search. Commanders must also consider the time of day they are conducting these operations, whether they want to conduct them in the early morning hours before people arise and go to work or if in warmer climates they want to conduct them in the middle of a hot afternoon when people are likely to be indoors trying to escape the weather. Plan for the time of day the HVT is most likely to be home. (5) TROOPS AVAILABLE - Commanders must thoroughly evaluate the number of assets available for each cordon and search mission. The composition of each element of the cordon and search will vary from unit to unit, but commanders must ensure they have adequately resourced each element to meet the possible threats and accomplish their task and purpose. Plan for attachments. (6) CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS - Most cordon and search operations will occur in populated areas and civilians must be considered in the planning process. (a) Occupants and Neighboring BuildingsCommanders must consider the various categories of occupants they will find and how to separate them from the search activities. Units
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must be prepared to deal with women, children, ill, and elderly occupants of the target and to provide for their security and safety. The cordon and search elements must be prepared to search buildings immediately neighboring the target site. Neighboring buildings may share walls or fences with the target site and provide either a covered means of escape or additional cache sites for equipment. (b) Neighbor(s)Units must plan to communicate with the people in the surrounding area. Commanders must plan to use a megaphone or tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) team to inform the neighbors of any specific instructions the unit needs the community to follow. (c) Cultural SensitivityMarines must be aware of cultural taboos and ensure that their action or inaction does not incite the non-combatants in the target area. (d) Perception Management (Neighborhood Follow-up)Units may plan to follow-up with the neighborhood after a cordon and search. Either through a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) or civil affairs (CA) team or through conversations with local leaders, the unit may communicate some information about the cordon and search. For instance, if the unit found an insurgent with bomb-making materials, the unit may communicate that to the neighborhood. If a unit fails to communicate that information to them, then the neighborhood may perceive the detention of their neighbor as a sign of American cruelty or unfairness. The benefit of the neighborhood understanding cordon and search operations could be the difference between that neighborhood supporting and harboring insurgents or that neighborhood denying safe haven to future insurgents. It may be necessary to prepare a PRT or CA team to document damage caused during a search and reimburse the occupants on-site.
Task Organization
The elements within the Cordon and Search Force are similar to the methods used in task organizing a patrol or raid force, in that a general organization to conduct major tasks is established. This breaks the unit into sub-elements. Sub-elements can be further broken down into teams to conduct special tasks based on mission requirements. The below figure depicts the task organization of a cordon and search force.
(HQ)
(Outer Cordon)
(Inner Cordon)
(1) Command Element - The command element is the headquarters of the unit conducting the mission. It provides command and control for the operation, coordinating the various assets. (2) Security Element - The security element is responsible for isolating the objective area. The security element prevents possible outside influence affecting the mission of the search/assault and Support force and prevents ingress/egress of enemy and indigenous personnel from the objective area. (a) Outer cordon prevents anyone from entering the objective area and assists the inner cordon in preventing the enemy from escaping from the objective. Possible tasks include: Block - to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach.
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Interdict - to prevent, hinder, or delay the use of an area or route by enemy forces. To seal off an area by any means; to deny use of a route or approach. Isolate - to seal off, both physically and psychologically, an enemy from his sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and to prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.
(3) Support Element - The support element is responsible for isolating the objective. The security element prevents possible outside influence affecting the mission of the search/assault and prevents ingress/egress of enemy and indigenous personnel from the target objective. (b) Inner cordon accomplishes a similar task as the outer cordon but only for a specific area such as a block, building, or portion of a building. An inner cordon is established to isolate the specific objective in which the target is located. An inner cordon prevents enemy movement within the specific area and prevents enemy ingress into and egress from the target objective. Fixto prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period of time. Isolateto seal off, both physically and psychologically, an enemy from his sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and to prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. Blockto deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach. Interdictto prevent, hinder, or delay the use of an area or route by the enemy forces. To seal off an area by any means; to deny use of a route or approach. Suppressto temporarily degrade the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. Contain--To stop, hold or surround enemy forces or to keep the enemy in a given area and prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere. (4) Assault Element - The assault/search elements mission is to clear, search, and assault targets within the specific building or area that the target(s) are located and to capture, kill, or destroy the target. The assault element initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. It is imperative that this element not only understands but can comply with Rules of Engagement (ROE) in a dynamic environment and this issue is addressed upfront during planning and throughout all phases of the cordon and search. The commander of the unit conducting the cordon or the assault/search element leader may break this element down into separate groups to accomplish its assigned tasks. Possible tasks include: Search - to conduct a movement to go over or look through with the intent of finding something. (b) Seize - to clear the target area and obtain control of it. (c) Clear - to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces. (d) Secure - to gain possession of a position or terrain feature with or without force and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. Destroy - to physically render an enemy force combat ineffective. To render a target so damaged it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. Special Teams and Assets. The following special teams and assets should be considered during planning. Team leaders should be included where applicable in the planning phase of the operation to enhance commanders on their capabilities. These functions may be performed by multiple personnel/teams and may include: (1) Host Nation Security Forces
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(2) Field Interview Teams (3) Documentation Teams (4) Demolition Teams (5) Mine Detection Teams (EOD) (6) Tunnel Reconnaissance Teams (7) Fire Support Teams (8) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (9) Aviation assets (10) Tactical HUMINT Teams (11) Tactical PSYOP Teams (12) Civil Affairs (CA) Teams / Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) (13) Interpreters (14) Detainee Teams (15) Military Working Dogs (16) Medical Teams (17) Sniper Teams
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The Outer Cordon The outer cordon isolates the objective area and prevents enemy or civilian influence. As such it requires detailed planning, effective coordination, and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects, lethal and nonlethal, required for mission execution. (1) Some considerations for the outer cordon include: (a) Vehicles for VCPs and/or blocking positions (b) Battlespace geometryfire planning and coordination (c) Overwatch positions (d) Aviation assets to observe target area and inform outer cordon if vehicles or persons leave the target area. Constant communication between the aviation element and the outer cordon will better facilitate the isolation of the target area. (e) An initial detainee collection point for the receipt and temporary holding of detainees. (f) An initial material collection point for consolidation of captured material. (2) Each subordinate outer cordon element (VCP, blocking position) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for outer cordon positions are tracked and wheeled vehicles with weapons systems, crew-served weapons, javelin with the Command Launch Unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman. (3) The leader of the outer cordon element must develop and maintain situational awareness (SA) of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the search elements. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect fires, and facilitate the achievement of the outer cordons task and purpose. Aviation assets, communications systems, and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate SA for the entire element. (5) Methods to consider when establishing outer cordon positions: (a) Hasty VCP. One method of executing the outer cordon is by the employment of hasty VCP, which will allow personnel and/or vehicles to depart or enter the outer cordon at the commanders discretion. VCPs will typically be used in long duration cordon and search operations. Subordinate elements use Class IV materials to construct a VCP to facilitate personnel and vehicle searches IAW the cordon and search commanders intent. This method is used when cleared traffic will be allowed through. Construction of vehicle, personnel, and material holding areas will aid in security and improve overall operations. See the tactical control measures section of this chapter for detailed information. (b) Blocking Position. Another method of executing the outer cordon is the blocking position. Differing from the VCP, the blocking position does not allow for the passage of personnel or vehicular traffic. When planning cordon and search operations consider the ramifications of not allowing any traffic through the outer cordon during the operation. This impact may be minimal during low traffic hours, but may cause a riot if conducted when people are attempting to get to work. (c) Screening Forces. The outer cordon area may be too large to be covered entirely by blocking positions or VCPs. The use of mounted or dismounted patrols, listening posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs), guardian angels and snipers may augment the outer cordon. If employed, ensure that each element knows the routes and positions of the screening forces. The elements can be used to provide observation of fleeing personnel or deter infiltration along secondary routes. Ensure that screening forces have adequate combat power.
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Depicts an outer cordon element arrayed around an objective to block enemy or insurgent forces. The element employs a combination of blocking positions and screening forces.
(7) The outer cordon is NOT an independent operation. Rather it is an integral part of the cordon and search. The outer cordon secures the objective area and in doing so contains the enemy and is the initial barrier to enemy reinforcements. The Inner Cordon (1) The inner cordon isolates the target in order to protect the assault/search element from threat activity such as direct fire, grenades, explosives, or civil disturbances and prevents escape from the objective area. As such it requires detailed planning and effective coordination, as well as meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects, lethal and nonlethal, sought by the commander. (See figure III-2.) Inner cordon tasks include the following: (a) Serves as overwatch/support by fire/security for the assault/search element. (b) Serves as an immediate reserve for civil disturbances and for the assault/search element. (c) May establish multiple inner cordons for multiple targets. (d) Maintains communication with the search element and coordinating fires within the inner cordon element. (f) Uses supporting structures in built up areas. This may require forces to clear and secure surrounding buildings to provide overwatch to the target/building. (2) The unit performing the inner cordon (SBF, overwatch positions) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for inner cordon positions include, but are not limited to, medium or light crew-served weapons and small arms, light antitank weapons (LAWs), and grenades.
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(3) The leader of the unit conducting the inner cordon must develop and maintain situational awareness of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the outer cordon and the assault/search element. Close coordination with the assault/search element is essential. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity, control direct fires, and facilitate the achievement of the inner cordons task and purpose. Aviation assets may be able to assist the inner cordon force in locating and tracking escaping personnel, but typically the inner cordon commander does not control the air assets. The mission command element will direct the air assets and relay information to either the inner or outer cordon as necessary. (4) The inner cordon is typically established by emplacing SBF or overwatch positions where they can best isolate the target area with overlapping sectors of observation and fires. Depending on the size or complexity of the target area, multiple inner cordons may be required.
(5) The inner cordon is also not an independent operation. Rather it is an integral part of the cordon and search. The inner cordon isolates the target area, provides security for the assault/search element and prevents potential enemy forces from escaping.
Assault/Search Element
a. The assault/search elements mission is to assault, clear, and search the target to capture kill or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. The assault/search element initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The element accomplishes its mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant personnel, and by conducting a systematic search of the target. These areas may be searched selectively (only specific rooms/buildings/blocks) or systematically (everything within a given area). Due to the split second decisions that have to be made by small unit leaders, it is imperative that this element not only understands but can comply with rules of engagement (ROE) in a dynamic environment. b. To accomplish its mission the assault/search element has three primary tasks: securing, clearing, and searching the target. The assault/search element may be task organized into four teamsassault, search, security, and supportin order to facilitate accomplishing its mission.
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All of these teams must understand and be prepared to assume the role of the other teams in the search/assault element. The assault/search element teams may conduct the following tasks: (1) Assault Team(s). The assault team/teams are responsible for entering, clearing, and searching buildings in order to capture or destroy enemy forces or equipment. The assault team conducts the initial assault into the target and uses speed and violence of action to move through the target to completely clear and seize the objective. In most circumstances, the target must be cleared of enemy forces, noncombatants, and/or booby traps before the search begins. The assault team can transition into the search team once the target is cleared (i.e., the assault team clears a house from bottom to top, transitions into the search team, and conducts a search from top to bottom). (2) Search Team(s). Once the target is cleared of combatants and secure, the search team will conduct its primary task of searching the target to capture or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. (3) Security Team(s). The security team provides immediate overwatch inside the target to the unit conducting the search. The security team also provides immediate security of detainees and noncombatants.
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and surprise. Commanders must develop primary and alternate routes and be prepared to react to any contingency while traveling to the target (i.e., small arms, IED, vehicle damage/breakdown, etc.). b. Order of March. The Order of March (OOM) will be dictated by the commanders overall plan and scheme of maneuver formed during Course of Action (COA) development. c. Method of Movement. There are two primary methods of movement to the target: single point ingress and multidirectional ingress. (1) Single Point Ingress-- Movement to the target in a column along a single path facilitates easier command and control. All units approach the target and assume their position as a single unit and break off from the main body at predetermined release points. This technique reduces problems with command and control, timing and deconfliction of fires. However, this movement technique produces a much larger signature and is slower to seal off a cordon area. See figure III-4 for an example of a single point ingress to the target. (2) Multidirectional Ingress. Ideally, a cordon and search force moves to the target from multiple directions. Movement to the target through multiple directions provides a lower signature with fewer vehicles collocated during approach. This technique can be more effective by sealing off multiple avenues of egress simultaneously. Drawbacks to this technique include difficulty with command and control, division of forces, and deconfliction of fires. The multidirectional approach will require units to depart from the same assembly area at different times or from multiple assembly areas. See figure III-5 for an example of a multidirectional approach to the target.
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Simultaneous Occupation
c. Sequential Occupation. This occurs when the elements occupy multiple positions in sequence. (See figures III-7, III-8, and III-9.) (1) The outer cordon is established first to isolate the objective. (2) The inner cordon is the next step to further isolate specific target areas and entry points. (3) The support element should be positioned where it can best support the other elements based upon established planning priorities. (4) The assault/search element should move in and begin executing when conditions have been set by the other elements. (5) Advantages (a) Ease of control. (b) Simplicity for planning and execution. (6) Disadvantages (a) Less effective at timely isolation of the objective area and the target. (b) Allows the enemy initial freedom to reposition or hide personnel and materials.
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d. Sequential emplacement of the outer cordon elements, or using one route in, and having outer cordon elements pass through the objective area is another technique. This technique facilitates C2, keeps combat power massed, facilitates CASEVAC, requires less planning, and the need for additional control measures and battle tracking to ensure synchronization. However, the elements approaching the objective from one side may be observed by the enemy and the targeted individual(s) may be able to escape, hide, prepare a counter attack, or emplace an IED.
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Simultaneous Egress
(2) Sequential. A sequential withdrawal from a cordon and search objective area will provide greater security for forces leaving the cordon area.
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Egress Route Selection (1) Single Point. (See figure III-14.) Single point egress provides simplicity in movement from the objective area to a predestinated rally point. However, a single assigned point of egress may not be the simplest route off target for all elements of the cordon and search force as elements may have to move through the cordon site itself to reach the designated egress route. Depending on the terrain surrounding the target area a single point egress may be the only option. Care must be taken to ensure that the route is properly secured to avoid the possibility of enemy attack. (a) Advantage. C2 of all cordon and search force elements will generally be easier with this type of movement, as well as, ability to mass fire power if attacked. (b) Disadvantage. Single point egress canalizes the cordon and search force with the possibility of the egress route being blocked or overrun by insurgents entrapping them. (2) Multidirectional. (See figure III-15.) Multidirectional egress requires greater coordination for each cordon and search element. Accountability of personnel, detainees and equipment is essential. Well established rally points are essential for multidirectional egress. (a) Advantages Flexibility Security Speed (b) Disadvantages Accountability Control
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Summary
This class exposes you to basic TTPs and planning considerations for vehicle checkpoints, vehicle searches, and cordon and search operations. There are many different ways to execute these operations. The threat level and enemy situation should guide the unit leader with respect to levels of violence, aggressiveness and force protection required. The guidelines outlined here are intended more for consideration and application at the platoon level and below.
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References
Reference Number MCDP 1 MCDP 1-0 MCWP 2-6 MCWP 3-11.3 MCWP 3-33A MCWP 3-33.5 MCWP 3.33.8 MCWP 3-35.3 Reference Title Warfighting Marine Corps Operations Counterintelligence Scouting and Patrolling Counterguerilla Operations Counterinsurgency Multi-Service TTP for Conducting Peace Operations Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) Small-Unit Leaders Guide to Counterinsurgency
Notes
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INTERPRETER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Interpreter Considerations
a. Enablers. Enable communication between a provider and a client who do not speak the same language. (1) Enable communication as if no language barrier existed. (2) Culture mediation. (3) Recognize cultural barriers that impede effective communication. Social Values Time Authority (4) Styles of communication. (5) Determine in advance any specialized vocabulary to be used. (6) Maintain a professional relationship with both parties in order to appear unbiased. (7) Strive to remain objective without display of personal emotion. (8) Perform duties as unobtrusively as possible. b. Interpreter's Role. (1) Accurate interpretation of what is said, without embellishments, omissions, or editing. Including vulgar or embarrassing comments. (2) Maintain the tone and style of the speaker. (3) Never correct facts presented by a speaker. (4) Conduct communication in the first person. Note: The interviewer speaks directly to the subject, not through the interpreter. Example: Use the phrase What is your name? NOT Ask him what his name is. c. Modes of Interpreting. (1) Consecutive. Recommended. Speaker completes a phrase or thought followed by the interpreter's re-stating in the target language. (2) Simultaneous. NOT recommended. Interpreter speaks almost contemporaneously with the speaker. (3) Summary. NOT recommended. Interpreter listens to the speech of a speaker then summarizes and condenses the thoughts. Opportunity is great for omission of necessary information. (4) Intervention. An interpreter may at times need to intervene, or interrupt, during an interpreted session. For instance when: They did not hear correctly or completely. They need to clarify a technical term. They were interrupted by other parties. They state the interpretation is not yet complete. d. Tactical Questioning with the interpreter. (1) Place the interpreter behind the LN that you are communicating with in order to read the body language of the LN. Do not let the interpreter and LN look at each other when translating. Ensure the LN maintains eye contact with you the entire time.
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson
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AAVP7A1 RAM/RS troop carrier AAVC7A1 RAM/RS command and control variant AAVR7A1 RAM/RS recovery variant
AAVP7A1 RAM/RS
3 Combat-equipped: 52,120 pounds (EAAK, crew, fuel, OEM, and ammunition) 21 combat-equipped troops (at 285 pounds each) or 10,000 pounds of cargo Land at 25 miles per hour: 200 miles Water at 2,600 rotations per minute: 7 hours Land: 45 miles per hour Water: 8.2 miles per hour 8-foot trench span, 3-foot vertical wall Negotiate 6-foot plunging surf, cargo-loaded and survive 10-foot plunging surf without sustaining mission failure Daylight 1X or 7X power Night 7.1X power (passive vision assembly) Rate of fire (cyclic): 450-550 rounds per minute Muzzle velocity: 3,050 feet per second Maximum effective range: 2,000 yards (1,830 meters) Rate of fire (cyclic): 325-375 rounds per minute Muzzle velocity: 790 feet per second Maximum effective range: 1,640 yards (1,500 meters) Caliber .50: 200 ready rounds, 1,000 rounds stowed in 10 ammunition boxes 40 millimeters: 96 ready rounds, 768 rounds stowed in 16 ammunition boxes Visor kit Litter kit Winterization kit MK 154 linear explosive mine clearance system
Weight
Load capacity Cruising range Maximum speed Obstacle ability Surf ability Gunner's sight M36E2 M2 caliber .50 machine gun MK-19 model 3 40millimeter machine gun Ammunition Special mission kits
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Weight
Load capacity Cruising range Max speed Obstacle ability Surf ability
Same Same 9 combat-equipped troops of battalion staff Same Same Same Same Communication Vehicle System 1 AN/VRC-89D (consists one long-range radio and one short-range radio). 1 AN/PRC-104 radio set for HF communications. 1 AN/VRC-83 radio set for UHF communications. 2 AN/VRC-89D SINCGARS VHF radio sets (each set consists of two long-range) 2 AN/VRC-92D SINCGARS VHF radio sets (each set consists of two long-range) M240G, machine gun, pintle-mounted Ammunition 7.62 millimeters; 1,000 rounds stowed
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Weight
Load capacity Cruising range Max speed Obstacle ability Surf ability Air compressor Welder unit Crane winch Recovery winch Hydraulic crane:
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The AA platoon is organized into four sections of three AAVP7A1s. Each section provides support to a reinforced rifle platoon and each vehicle provides support to a reinforced rifle squad. The AA platoon normally conducts operations attached to or in direct support/general support of an infantry company.
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M1A1 Tank M88A2 heavy recovery vehicle M60A1 Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge (AVLB)
M1A1 Tank
4
Weight
Armament
Sight
Machine Guns
Ammunition
68 tons 273 to 298 mi 42 mph Forward climb of a vertical obstacle: 49 in, Maximum ditch: 108 in Fording depth: Without kit: 48 in Main gun, M256, 120mm laser rangefinder can range on targets 200 to 7,990 meters thermal imaging system can be viewed at 3or10-times magnification. Coaxial machine gun, M240, 7.62mm Loaders machine gun, M240, 7.62mm Maximum effective range: 900 meters (tracer burnout) Commanders machine gun: M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50 Maximum effective range: 1,200 to 1,600 meters (tracer burnout) 120mm (main gun), 40 rounds M240, 7.62mm (coaxial machine gun), 10,000 rounds M240, 7.62mm (loaders machine gun), 1,400 rounds .50 cal (commanders machine gun), 900 rounds
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M1A1 Tank
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Weight
139,000 lb
5 combat-equipped troops
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Extended: 63 ft Folded: 32 ft Weight capacity: one MLC 60 vehicle (waived for M1 series tank during combat operations) Launching time: 2 to 5 minutes using only the two-man AVLB crew 60 ft with prepared abutments 17 ft with unprepared abutments unarmed
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The Tank platoon is organized into two sections of two tanks and typically supports an infantry company or battalion. Units with tank attachments must be aware of the logistical and tactical challenges inherent with armor. A tank unit attached to an infantry battalion or regiment implies that the infantry unit assumes full responsibility for the tank units logistical requirements. As with most supporting relationships, a tank unit is subordinate to the infantry commander to which it is attached.
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Weight
Cruising range Maximum speed Load capacity Obstacle ability
Armament
Ammunition
Forward climb of a vertical obstacle: 49 in, Maximum ditch: 108 in Fording depth: Without kit: 48 in 25 mm M242 chain gun Maximum effective range 2,000m 2-M240 7.62 mm MG coax and pintle-mounted Maximum effective range 900m 260 rounds in AP/HE ready boxes and feeder chutes 1000 rounds stowed
LAV-25
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Crew Weight Cruising range Maximum speed Obstacle ability Armament Ammunition
Crew Weight Cruising range Maximum speed Obstacle ability Armament Ammunition
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Crew Weight Cruising range Maximum speed Obstacle ability Armament Welder unit Crane winch Recovery winch
Crew Weight Cruising range Maximum speed Obstacle ability Armament Load capacity
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LAR Company
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Techniques of movement Similar to movement techniques for ground infantry forces. Consider the likelihood of enemy contact, speed, and terrain in choosing a movement technique. Traveling: The fastest and most easily controlled technique but also the least secure. All elements of the units move continuously and at a constant rate. Interval and dispersion are based on visibility, terrain, and vehicle weapons. Traveling overwatch: More secure than traveling but slower and more difficult to control. The leading element moves continuously, as in traveling, while the overwatch element moves at variable speeds, sometimes pausing to overwatch from a stationary position when the situation permits. The overwatch element keys its movement to the terrain and to its ability to support the leading element by direct fire. Bounding overwatch: The most secure technique but slowest and most difficult to control. Elements move by bounds with one element always in a stationary position to overwatch the movement of the other. Units may move by successive bounds, one element always leading and the other always conducting overwatch and then bounding to join the leading element. Basic formations Similar to formations used on the ground by infantry forces, mechanized units utilize: Wedge Vee Column On line
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Panther: Two elements provide a base of fire and one element maneuvers in an action left or right.
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Support By Fire: Mechanized assets provide a base of fire in order to allow the infantry the ability to maneuver in an action left or right.
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Summary
Mechanized operations are complex operations. By knowing the mechanized platforms the Marine Corps possesses and some techniques to employ those assets, you will have a better understanding of how to capitalize on the strengths and minimize the limitations of mechanized vehicles.
References
Reference Number or Author MCWP 3-11.1 MCWP 3-12 MCWP 3-13 MCWP 3-14 Reference Title Marine Rifle Company/Platoon Marine Corps Tank Employment Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles Employment Of The Light Armored Infantry Battalion
Notes
Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Expeditionary Operations Reasons for Conducting Expeditionary Ops Characteristics of Expeditionary Ops Sequence in Projecting Expeditionary Forces Amphibious Operations Characteristics of Amphibious Operations Types of Amphibious Operations Phases of Amphibious Operations Amphibious Command Relationships Amphibious Operations Planning Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Maritime Pre-Positioning Force Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 14 15 16 19 20 20 20 21
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Expeditionary Operations
An expedition is a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. The defining characteristic of an expeditionary operation is the projection of force into a foreign setting. By definition, an expedition thus involves the deployment of military forces and their requisite support some significant distance from their home bases to the scene of the crisis or conflict. All expeditions involve the projection of power into a foreign setting. However, it is important to recognize that not all power projection constitutes expeditionary operations; power projection is a necessary component but not a sufficient condition by itself to constitute an expeditionary operation. Operations that do not involve actual deployment of forces are not expeditionary operations. Expeditionary forces vary significantly in size and composition. Expeditionary operations may also vary greatly in scope, ranging from full-scale combat to humanitarian missions. The term expeditionary implies a temporary duration with the intention to withdraw from foreign soil after the accomplishment of the specified mission. The term expeditionary also implies austere conditions and support. This does not mean that an expeditionary force is necessarily small or lightly equipped, but that it is no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational necessities; amenities are strictly minimized. Expeditionary bases or airfields, for example, provide less than the full range of support typically associated with permanent stations. Operational considerations such as force protection and intelligence prevail over administrative, quality-of-life, or other considerations. This tendency toward austerity is derived from security considerations, the temporary nature of expeditionary operations, and the imperative to minimize lift and support requirements.
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Assurance that policy objectives pursued by other means have in fact been secured; for example, to ensure compliance with established diplomatic solutions such as the adherence to cease-fire arrangements or an agreement to hold free elections. Seizing or controlling key physical objectives such as airports, ports, resource areas, or political centers in order to ensure their safe use by all groups, to deny their use to an enemy or disruptive element, or to facilitate future actions such as the introduction of follow-on forces. Controlling urban or other restrictive terrain. Establishing a close, physical, and highly visible presence in order to demonstrate political resolve, deter aggressive action, or compel desired behavior. Establishing and maintaining order in an area beset by chaos and disorder. Protecting or rescuing U.S. citizens or other civilians. Separation of warring groups from each other or from the population at large, especially when enemy or disruptive elements are embedded in the population. Providing physical relief and assistance in the event of disaster.
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Amphibious Operations
An amphibious operation is a military expeditionary operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore in hostile or potentially hostile area(s) to accomplish an assigned mission. An amphibious force is defined as an amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF) together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. Amphibious operations apply maneuver principles to expeditionary power projection in joint and multinational operations in order exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness. There are four main purposes for conducting amphibious operations. They are: Prosecute further combat operations ashore. Obtain a site for an advance naval, land or air base. Deny use of an area or facilities to the enemy. Fix enemy forces and attention, providing opportunities for other combat operations.
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Amphibious Raid
Amphibious Demonstration
________________________________________________ Amphibious Withdrawal An amphibious operation involving the extraction of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. ________________________________________________ Not all amphibious operations conducted can be categorized by these four types. Forces may be called upon to conduct non-conventional amphibious operations that may closely parallel one of the four types, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and foreign humanitarian assistance.
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Embarkation
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Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as a command post exercise. Movement The movement phase is the period during which various elements of the amphibious force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-deployed position to the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the various elements of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions in the operational area. The decisive action phase is the period from the arrival of the amphibious force in the operational area, through the accomplishment of the mission and the termination of the amphibious operation.
Action
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An amphibious force is an amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. An ATF is a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The ATF, together with the landing force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. A LF is a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The LF, together with the ATF and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Supported/Supporting Relationship During the initial planning phase of amphibious operations, the CATF, the CLF, and any other designated commanders are coequal. During the planning phase, the CATF and CLF will identify the events and conditions for any shifts of the support relationship and forward them to the establishing authority. The supported commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take full action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. These relationships can change based upon the mission, and can also change based upon when certain criteria is met, such as when the CLF has sufficient combat power ashore to continue operations.
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Unity of Effort
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The force focuses on an operational objective, using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against enemy critical vulnerabilities. OMFTS provides increased operational flexibility through enhanced capabilities for seabased logistics, fires, and command and control. Sea-basing facilitates maneuver warfare by eliminating the requirement for an operational pause as the LF builds combat power ashore and by freeing the MAGTF from the constraints of a traditional beachhead. OMFTS is based on six principles: Focus on the Operational Objective. The operation must be viewed as a continuous event from the port of embarkation to the operational objective ashore. Everything the force does must be focused on achieving the objective of the operation and accomplishing of the mission. Intermediate objectives or establishing lodgments ashore assume less importance in OMFTS as the force is centered on decisive maneuver to seize the force objective. Use the Sea as Maneuver Space. Naval forces use the sea to their advantage, using the sea as an avenue of approach and as a barrier to the threats movement. This allows the force to strike unexpectedly anywhere in the littorals and to use deception to mislead the enemy as to actual point of attack. Generate Overwhelming Tempo and Momentum. The objective of maneuver warfare is to create a tempo greater than that of the enemy. The tempo generated through maneuver from the sea provides the commander freedom of action while limiting the enemys freedom of action. Pit Friendly Strength Against Enemy Weakness. The commander identifies and attacks critical vulnerabilities where the enemy is weak, rather than attacking his center of gravity when it is strong.
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When operating as part of a naval expeditionary force, MEFs will normally focus on conducting operations using OMFTS. The Marine commander, in concert with his Navy counterpart and higher-level direction, will orchestrate the employment of amphibious forces, MPFs, and Marine forces operating from land bases to shape events and create favorable conditions for future combat actions. The amphibious forces will normally execute tactical-level maneuver from the sea to achieve decisive action in battle. For the action to be decisive, the battle must lead to the achievement of the operational objectives. OMFTS should not be viewed as a revolutionary new way of conducting amphibious and MPF operations. The brilliant amphibious operation at Inchon in 1950 is a classic example of OMFTS. It is an evolutionary way of using expeditionary forces assisted by greatly increased enhancements to current capabilities such as sea-basing. These enhancements will be in the form of new doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and technology.
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). STOM is the tactical implementation of OMFTS by the MAGTF to achieve the joint force commanders operational objectives. It is the application of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations at the tactical level of war. STOM treats the sea as maneuver space, using the sea as both a protective barrier and an unrestricted avenue of approach. While the aim of ship-to-shore movement was to secure a beachhead, STOM thrusts Marine Corps forces ashore at multiple points to concentrate at the decisive place and time in sufficient strength to enable success. This creates multiple dilemmas too numerous for the enemy commander to respond to, disrupting his cohesiveness and diminishing his will or capacity to resist. This concept focuses the force on the operational objective, providing increased flexibility to strike the enemys critical vulnerabilities. Sea-basing of some of the fire support and much of the logistics support reduces the footprint of forces ashore while maintaining the tempo of operations. Emerging command and control capabilities will allow commanders to control the maneuver of their units the moment they cross the line of departure at sea, to include changing the axis of advance or points where they cross the beach during the assault.
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Movement of Marine forces and their combat essential equipment must be fully integrated with ongoing tactical operations ashore. The MPF, consisting of the MPS and the fly-in echelon of Navy and Marine forces, can then integrate with the MAGTF commanders scheme of maneuver while delivering combat service support and force sustainment, enabling a rapid force buildup or providing support and sustainment for a prolonged period from offshore. MPFs can tailor support packages to accommodate a variety of missions to include MOOTW of varying scope and complexity.
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Summary
BY PROJECTING COMBAT POWER PRECISELY AT THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS LOCATION AND TIME, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS CAPITALIZE ON THE MARINE CORPS CORE COMPETENCIES AND EXPEDITIONARY MINDSET, AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AND CAPITALIZE ON ENEMY WEAKNESS. By understanding amphibious and expeditionary operations, differences between the two, and how they are related, the student officer will have a better understanding of his/her role in the operating forces.
References
Reference Number or Author JP 3-02 JP 3-02.1 JP 3-02.2 MCDP 1-0 MCDP 3 Reference Title Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Landing Force Operations Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation Marine Corps Operations Expeditionary Operations
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Introduction to Drill
Introduction to Drill
Refer to MCO P5060.20, Drill and Ceremonies Manual, on student CD, and available at: http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications
Learning Objectives
Terminal Learning Objective MCCS-COD-2301. Given a formation of Marines, acting as the detail commander, conduct drill in accordance with the Marine Corps Drill Manual.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Manual of Sword
Manual of Sword
Refer to MCO P5060.20, Chapter 5, Drill and Ceremonies Manual, on student CD, and available at: http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications Learning Objective Enabling Learning Objective MCCS-COD-2301a. Given a formation of Marines, acting as the detail commander, armed with a sword; conduct sword manual in accordance with the Marine Corps Drill Manual.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson
Learning Objective
Enabling Learning Objective MCCS-HIST-2302b. Without the aid of reference describe the customs associated with the Marine Corps Birthday celebration without omission.
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Symbolically, the eldest Marine present passes a piece of cake to the youngest Marine present, just as for years our experienced Marines have nurtured and led young Marines that will fill our ranks and renew our Corps. The youngest Marine present this , who was born . evening is
Summary
Like the Corps itself, the Marine Corps Birthday developed from simple origins to become the polished, professional function that all Marines commemorate on 10 November around the world. The Marine Corps Birthday is a time to celebrate the history of our Corps and it is incumbent upon you as an officer of Marines to uphold this tradition.
References
Reference Number or Author Reference Title Marine Corps Manual Marine Corps Historical Division
Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Joint Operations
Joint Operations
Introduction The Armed Forces of the United States hold in trust for the American people the military power of the Nation and are the ultimate guarantors of its territorial integrity and independence. Challenges and threats may arise from adversaries who are opposed to US values and interests. The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces is to win the Nations wars. The employment of American military power adheres to Constitutional and other legal imperatives, the highest societal values, and the concepts of proportionality, decisiveness, and accountability to the American people. Military commanders at all levels are responsible for infusing in the fighting forces an attitude of willing joint integration of effort that recognizes that all forms of combat power present advantages for exploitation. The importance of this period of instruction is to understand where and how the United States Marine Corps fits into the Unified Command Structure of the Department of Defense. This lesson will introduce you to some of the basic fundamentals of joint operations and expose you to the various unified combatant commands, their missions and responsibilities. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Historical Context Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Staff Unified Combatant Command US Armed Forces Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 4 5 6 7 13 14 15 15 16
Importance
In This Lesson
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Joint Operations
Joint Operations
Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objectives MCCS-JOPS-2304. Given a joint operating environment, explain joint warfare fundamentals to prepare for possible service in a joint task force. MCCS-JOPS-2305. Given a joint operating environment, explain joint campaigning to prepare for possible service in a joint task force. Enabling Learning Objectives MCCS-JOPS-2304a. Without the aid of reference, describe the history of the current joint environment, without omission. MCCS-JOPS-2304b. Without the aid of reference, describe the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without omission. MCCS-JOPS-2304c. Without the aid of reference, describe the role of the Joint Staff, without omission. MCCS-JOPS-2304d. Without the aid of reference, describe the role of the Combatant Commanders, without omission. MCCS-JOPS-2304e. Without the aid of reference, describe the role of the Service Chiefs, without omission.
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Joint Operations
Historical Context
During WWII, each of the Services generally fought as homogeneous entities with minimal cooperation among the Services. The Army was focused in Europe and the SW Pacific, the Navy and Marines primarily operated in the central Pacific, and the Army Air Corps had attained Service-like status while conducting strategic bombing of Germany and Japan. Although there were excellent examples of inter-Service cooperation during WWII, the norm was to give each Service a theater of operations and allow them to prosecute the war as their Service doctrine prescribed. Although this technique provided some advantages including decreasing the amount of coordination required to conduct an operation, it failed to capitalize on the unique capabilities each Service brought to the fight. Despite great military success during WWII, the U.S. military recognized the need to evolve its command structure for future conflicts. After much heated debate within the military and in Congress, the National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law. Important elements of this legislation included: Creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Creation of the Joint Staff Creation of several standing unified (i.e. joint) and specified (mission specific) commands Creation of the U.S. Air Force JCS and Services Secretaries report to single civilian Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Despite the National Security Act of 1947, the post-war era was characterized by Service infighting as each Service developed their own strategies and sought to purchase Service-specific equipment that reflected their vision of the nature of war. Operations during this period were characterized by stove-piped Service-oriented chains of command that stretching from the battlefield to the Service Chiefs in Washington D.C. For example, General Westmorland, the Commanding General of the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) did not have control of the Air Force assets based in Vietnam or the Navy assets sitting just of the coast of Vietnam. Thus, each Service was free to fight the war as they saw fit. This organizational chaos contributed to the failure of the U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Military operations during the 1980s also highlighted the fact that the U.S. military was unprepared to fight effectively as a joint force. Operation EAGLE CLAW (Iran hostage rescue attempt), Marine peacekeeping operations in Beruit, and Operation URGENT FURY (U.S. invasion of Grenada) all highlighted the inability of the Services to cooperate effectively on the battlefield. As a result, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This important legislation established the framework for the way the Department of Defense operates today. Key components: CJCS became the principal military advisor to the President of the United States, the SECDEF, and the National Security Council
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Joint Operations
Forces were assigned to the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) for employment Service Chiefs retained responsibility to train, organize, and equip but do not employ forces
Although the concept of joint force employment continues to evolve, the tenets have been proven successful on the battlefield with Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003 to the present.
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Joint Operations
provide advice to the President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) as requested by that individual. Members are also allowed to make recommendations to Congress, relating to the Department of Defense (DoD), after first informing the SecDef. Naval Service Chiefs: Both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) are members of the JCS but report to the Secretary of the Navy. As with the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the CNO and CMC are responsible for ensuring organization and readiness of their respective branches, yet they have no operational command forces.
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Joint Operations
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Joint Operations
US Pacific Command
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Joint Operations
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Joint Operations
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Joint Operations
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Joint Operations
Headquarters Location: Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska Mission: Provide the nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized DoD effects to combat adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide. Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); space and global strike operations; information operations; integrated missile defense and robust command and control. Functional Responsibility: USSTRATCOM is a global integrator charged with the missions of Space Operations; Information Operations; Integrated Missile Defense; Global Command & Control; Intelligence, surveillance and Reconnaissance; global Strike; and Strategic Deterrence. USSTRATCOM is also the lead Combatant Command for integration and synchronization of DoD-wide efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction.
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Joint Operations
US Armed Forces
United States Army (USA) The United States Army is the largest branch of the U.S. Armed Forces and has primary responsibility for land-based military operations. As of 2004, the Army consisted of 494,295 soldiers on active duty, 342,918 in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and 204,134 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The Army has been very active in recent years since September 11, 2001 in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently the Army is undergoing a period of transformation, which will result in five (5) geographical commands aligned with the five geographical Unified Combatant Commands. The United States Navy is primarily responsible for conducting naval operations. The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. Currently, the Navy has approximately 500,000 sailors on active duty or in the Naval Reserve and operates 282 ships in active service and more than 4,000 aircraft. The 21st century Navy maintains a sizeable presence in the world, deploying in such areas as East Asia, Southern Europe, and the Middle East. Its ability to project forces into the littoral regions of the world, engage in forward areas during peacetime and rapidly respond to regional crises makes it a tremendous asset in American foreign and defense policy. The United States Air Force is the aerospace branch of the United States Armed Forces. The USAF is the largest and most technologically advanced modern air force in the world, with over 4,000 aircraft in service and about 352,000 men and women on active duty. According to the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Air Force, In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to
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Joint Operations
The Marine Corps has the unique ability to rapidly deploy a combined-arms task force to almost anywhere in the world within days. The basic structure for all deployed units is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) that integrates a ground combat component, an air component, and a combat service support component under a common command element. The Marine Corps ability to permanently maintain integrated multi-element task forces under a single command provides a smoother implementation of combined-arms warfare principles.
Summary
This lesson served to introduce you to the Joint World. It is important to understand how the Marine Corps fits into the Unified Command Structure of the DoD because the majority of the operations conducted by the US Armed Forces are joint in nature. This includes every type of mission, ranging from combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
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References
Reference Number or Author MCDP 1-0 Joint Pub 1-0 Joint Pub 3-0 Reference Title Marine Corps Operations Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States Joint Operations
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Mess Night
Mess Night
Introduction It has long been an established custom of the officers and/or noncommissioned officers of a military organization to dine together periodically. A mess night is a formal dinner in mess by all members, or by the officers and noncommissioned officers of a particular post or unit. The mess night is a formal stag dinner where spouses and dates do not attend. The object of a mess night may vary from a wish to foster good comradeship among fellow Marines, to celebrate the anniversary of significant events in a units history, to dineout members being detached, or to honor guests from another unit, service or country. Except for the annual celebration of the Marine Corps Birthday, no social function associated with the smaller of Americas naval services is more enjoyed, admired and imitated than the mess night. The purpose of Marine Corps Mess Night is to recognize and pay homage to the Marines who came before. We will discuss The Basic School Student Company Mess Night procedures as well as the history, traditions, and etiquette associated with a Mess Night. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Mess Night Traditions Mess Night Etiquette Summary References Notes Learning Objectives Terminal Learning Objective MCCS-HIST-2302. Given commander's guidance and references, organize a traditional Marine Corps event in accordance with Marine Corps traditions and commander's guidance. Enabling Learning Objective MCCS-HIST-2302a. Without the aid of reference, describe the customs associated with a Mess Night without omission. Page 3 5 6 6 6
Importance
In This Lesson
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Mess Night
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Mess Night
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Mess Night
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Mess Night
Summary
The Marine Corps Mess Night is a time honored tradition in the United States Marine Corps of dining in with formal mess dress. The purpose of Marine Corps Mess Night is to recognize and pay homage to the Marines who came before.
References
Reference Number or Author MCO P5060.20, Appendix D Reference Title Marine Corps Drill and Ceremonies Manual
Notes
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
To successfully lead Marines, you must first understand who this Marine is, the process that turns civilians into Marines, and finally the issues that will confront you, as a Marine leader, when dealing with your Marines. This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Marine Profile Requirements for Enlistment Enlistment Contracts Recruit Training Officers Role Summary References Glossary of Terms and Acronyms Notes Page 4 4 5 6 11 13 13 13 14
In This Lesson
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Marine Profile
The Research and Planning Department of J. Walter Thompson, U.S.A. Inc., periodically completes surveys for the Enlisted Advertising Section, Headquarters Marine Corps by interviewing several hundred poles at various Marine Corps Recruiting Stations. One of the main objectives is to construct a profile of the person most likely to join the Marine Corps. Major findings from one such survey indicate that the individual most likely to join the Marine Corps is: Between 17 and 18 years of age. Single. 69" in height, 165 pounds. Currently in high school with plans to graduate. Involved in inter-school sports. Living at home with a low to moderate average income of $17,500 annually. The middle child in a large family and the first to join. From a city environment 42 percent of the time and declining. Not a minority (28 percent are from minority backgrounds).
This describes the average Marine. In reality, Marines come from all parts of the American mosaic. Our Corps is as diverse as the nation that sustains us. We are a cross section of economic, social, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. As it has done for our Nation, this diversity has added to the strength of our Corps.
We reinforce the values they hold. We fill those with undamaged characters who are among our societys many empty vessels with the ideals and values they so desperately need and seek. We evaluate each candidate based on the whole person and accept or reject a candidate through an analysis of risk versus potential. Before prospective recruits can become a Marine, they must meet certain basic requirements. The Marine recruiter is primarily responsible for ensuring that each prospective recruit is properly screened and meets the six requirements described in the following table.
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Education Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) General Technical (GT) Score
Is an average of four of the ASVAB sub-tests. o Arithmetic reasoning o Paragraph comprehension o Mathematical knowledge o Word knowledge Is used for quality control and MOS selection. Felony Records Can be waived at Headquarters Marine Corps Appropriate Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, may waive misdemeanors Medical/Physical Must be fit for duty. Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) conduct complete medical physical. Delayed entry program candidates undergo another complete physical exam to ensure qualification. Arrival at recruit depot, undergo another physical screening. Each medical screening includes a urinalysis.
Enlistment Contracts
The two enlistment contracts available to prospective recruits are: Guaranteed contract. Normally, o Discussed with the recruiter. o Are indicated on the recruit's enlistment processing package. o Guarantee promises the recruit follow-on training in an occupational field vice specific military occupational specialty (MOS).
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Recruit Training
Recruit training for male Marines is conducted at: Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA for those Marines enlisting west of the Mississippi River. MCRD Parris Island, SC for those enlisting east of the Mississippi River. MCRD Parris Island, SC for all female recruits.
All subjects taught at both recruit depots are identical, although allowances are made in sequencing due to the geographic differences between the two recruit depots. Training for male and female Marines is identical except for the difference of the physical fitness test (PFT). Male and female recruits are segregated during training so they can focus on their transformation into Marines. Recruit training is divided into twelve weeks of training described in the table below.
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The MCT battalions mission is "to train all Marines in infantry skills essential to operating in combat and to function as a member of a rifle squad or machine-gun team." Marines with an infantry MOS bypass MCT and go straight to infantry school for more in-depth training. MCT is similar to TBS in that it trains all enlisted Marines, regardless of MOS, to be basic riflemen just as TBS trains all lieutenants, regardless of MOS, to be provisional rifle platoon commanders. MCT is conducted in three phases described in the following table.
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Phase II Training
NOTE: During MCT, male and female recruits are segregated by platoons but participate in integrated training.
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Substance abuse. Substance abuse consists of the illegal use of drugs and the problems associated with alcohol abuse. As a leader, you need to be part of the zero tolerance force for illegal drugs that ensures they are not part of our culture. Constantly reinforce this idea with your Marines. For Marines who are old enough to drink, positively influence them to do so responsibly. Do not tolerate immature practices of binge drinking and alcohol abuse. Deployments. Finally, many of the above problems only become worse when the reality of extended separations for training, operations, and deployments are added to the equation. Married Marines suddenly find themselves homesick. Financial requirements change. Liberty patterns are different. Add to this the extra stress when a deployment becomes a real world mission. As a leader, you need to ensure your Marines and their families are fully prepared for deployments and the stresses that go with them.
Summary
References
Reference Number or Author Alpha/numeric order Alpha/numeric order Reference Title Reference Title Reference Title Alphabetical Order Reference Title
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Notes
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Commandants Initial planning Guidance The Evolution of the Amphibious Assault Inchon Battle Study Operation Enduring Freedom/Task Force - 58 References Notes Page 3 4 22 40 50 50
Learning Objectives
Terminal Learning Objective MCCS-OFF-2104. Given Marines, an amphibious ship, landing craft, and a landing plan; conduct amphibious operations to accomplish the mission
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Current wartime deployments dictate an almost singular focus on preparing units for their next rotation in irregular warfare operations. As a result, the skills Marines need for combined-arms maneuver, mountain warfare, amphibious, and jungle operations have deteriorated. Moreover, our major warfighting headquarters have been limited in their ability to exercise the sophisticated skill sets that have enabled Marine Expeditionary Forces to achieve such formidable success in all types of battletrain for any clime and place and fulfill our promise to be "most ready when the Nation is least ready." As our Nations naval force in readiness, the Navy-Marine Corps Team has the unique ability to provide forward-deployed expeditionary combat forces in response to crises. Within the last two years, the Navy-Marine Corps Team has conducted combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, brought relief to hundreds of thousands devastated by the tsunami in southern Asia, and evacuated our citizens in Lebanon in the largest non-combatant evacuation since the fall of Vietnam. No more responsive, no more lethal force provides our Nations leaders with such a powerful range of options. History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions for which our military must be ready. With little warning, our Nation has repeatedly called our Corps front and center in the southern Pacific after Pearl Harbor, in Korea after the communist invasion in 1950, in the sands of Kuwait during DESERT STORM, in the mountains of Afghanistan after 9/11, and in southern Asia in the wake of the catastrophic tsunami of 2004. Each of these strategic surprises demonstrates the broad range of possibilities for which our Corps must be prepared. What we do today will ensure success in the decades to come but only if we plan and prepare with forethought and prudence. Planning and preparedness in the Long War requires a talented, multi-dimensional force that is well trained and educated for employment in all forms of warfare.
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seminal work, Advance Base Seizures in Micronesia. During the 1940s, WWII saw the refinement of amphibious operations and the use of Marine Close Air Support to a near science with the island hopping campaigns in the Western Pacific. Now codified in the 1947 National Security Act, the MAGTF concept would validate in Korea the new vertical envelopment concept in the form of the helicopter. In 1951, VMO-6 launched helicopters from the flight deck of an LST in support of the Inchon landing assault one day after the largest amphibious operation since Iwo Jima.3 On 17 September, just two days later, Marine helicopters carrying Gen Lemuel Shepard and Col Victor Krulak would be the first U.S. aircraft to land at Kimpo airport in support of the 5th Marines effort to liberate Seoul, Korea. Despite the limited distance and capabilities of the equipment at that time, this event is noteworthy for being the genesis of helicopter-based STOM concepts. Some things have remained constant over the years concerning helicopters and the MAGTF. Surprise, speed, mobility, and flexibility are all part of that nature of helicopter operations and consequently integral to the maneuver warfare philosophy. It was this flexible capability of the MAGTF that has placed the MEU units in the forefront of American military response. When CENTCOM was tasked to remove the Taliban regime and destroy the Al-Queda terrorist organization in Afghanistan, it reached for the tried and tested capabilities of the MAGTF. Because of this, the first conventional forces present would be the Marines. What was different about the seizure of Rhino is the operational sustainment that followed the initial assault. This was not just a raid but rather a watershed event in the development of the advance base seizure concept laid down 70 years earlier. Navy and Marine operational reach will no longer be limited to the littorals. Both services have begun to expand the EMW doctrinal concept to over the horizon objectives with existing training and equipment. This will only improve with developing equipment like the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), V-22 Osprey tilt rotor, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), and tactical missile platform SSGN. TF-58 actions were significant in how the role of aviation and logistics in maneuver warfare was viewed in the MAGTF concept. Traditionally, the role of the Ground Combatant Element (GCE) is the primary means in which we seek an advantage through maneuver. The supporting element roles fell to the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) or the Logistics Combat Element (LCE). There were examples of both the aviation and logistical assets being the primary means to seek and engage the enemy. By establishing a FOB in the heart of enemy territory through aviation assets, some of those same aviation assets sought out and destroyed Taliban forces. Finally, when the city of Kandahar fell to coalition forces, the emphasis on the MAGTF again shifted not to the GCEs ability to seek positional advantage but the LCE and their logistical capability to support the coalition forces.
When Task Force 58 (TF-58) launched a 28-plane assault force at sea, over 371.5 nm into the heart of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on 25 Nov 2001, it validated the decades of refinement to training, doctrine, and equipment of the USMC (See MAP 1).2 This expeditionary maneuver was the culmination of years of doctrinal development dating back to the 1930s when U.S. Marine visionary Pete Ellis created his
2 2
United States Marine Corps, Operations, MCDP 1-0, 2001, 3-10. Capt Jay Holtermann, The 15th MEU Seizure of Camp Rhino, Marine Corps Gazette, June 2002, 4.
Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, (New York:Harper & Brothers, 1961), 128.
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II. Creating and planning TF-58. By 24 September, a team of State Department and Department of Defense representatives obtained broad agreements for the use of Pakistani airspace and bases to support OEF.4 As details were identified, liaison officers (LNOs) formed cells and began laying the groundwork for forces to not only use basing rights but also receive Pakistani security and significant POL support. This would be a major undertaking in the most permissive of situations. The growing anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan made it much more risky.
On 19 October, TF Sword (composed of US Army Rangers), conducted a raid on an isolated airfield 60nm SW of Kandahar in conjunction with a Delta Force raid in the city of Kandahar. For the Marines the intelligence gathered and the reconnaissance would prove useful as this would eventually become Camp Rhino. The Rangers were successful if for no other reason than operating with impunity in the heart of Taliban country. However, the difference between a raid and a seizure is immense, as the Marines would later prove. On 27 October members of 1st MEB staff arrived in Bahrain to begin the preparation for a future task force involving the 15th MEU, additional I MEF forces and the 26th MEU. The Commanding Officer of Naval Forces Central Command, Vice Admiral Moore, appointed BGen Mattis, Deputy Commanding General for I MEF, as the commander of Naval Task Force 58 (TF-58), composed of approximately 8,000 Marines and Sailors. The guidance was simple and direct. Keep the TF-58 staff small and effective and begin planning for a series of raids into Afghanistan with TF-58 forces.5 Admiral Moore specifically did not want to form a MEB-sized staff as the TF was going to fall in on existing ARG ships and would not have the space necessary for such a large organization. The size would also match BGen Mattis desire to keep the staff focused, rapid, and autonomous while not duplicating existing MEU capabilities and structure. From 6 to 10 November TF-58 continued to focus on planning, creating an effective staff, and establishing liaison efforts to the growing number of coalition forces in theater.6 BGen Mattis was making direct liaison with TF Sword, under Maj Gen Dailey (USA), and getting critical insight and assistance from the Army Rangers. The MAGTF concept would be critical for the success of any mission. As the situation developed and intelligence became more available, CENTCOM directed TF-58 to plan for a Forward Operating Base seizure. The location was still undecided; it would be either Kandahar or the desert strip TF SWORD used in Operation Rhino. BGen Mattis made the unique decision that the 15th and 26th MEUs would fight as a single MAGTF, but would focus on two separate objectives. The original plan called for the 15th MEU to seize FOB Rhino and allow the 26th MEU to follow through to seize Kandahar.7 As the plan jelled, the real issues of logistical support over hundreds of miles from Navy shipping and the joint integration problem would be the two main areas of focus for the staffs. TF-58 would operate independently of a beachhead and would depend on air and naval-supplied Intermediate Support Bases (ISB). There were no overland routes for re-supply. During the last week of November TF-58 staff defined roles and responsibilities between the two MEUs as the plan began to fix on FOB Rhino. The decision by BGen Mattis not to issue a detailed OPORD and to initiate all FRAGOs from the highest level
On 7 October, security forces from the 15th MEU were placed in Jacobabad in support of USAF CSAR assets (See Map 2). That USAF detachment had joined the USS Peilelu ARG earlier at the end of September while they were in the Arabian Sea. BLT 1/1 provided the ground forces that went ashore unbeknownst to most of the world and more importantly, to most Pakistani citizens. This security force arrived in conjunction with the first military air strikes against the Taliban, along with USAF CSAR that would recover any downed U.S. aircrew safely to Pakistan.
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LtCol Asad Khan, Pakistan-An Enduring Friend, Marine Corps Gazette, June 2002, 34.
TF-58 Unit History, 14. TF-58 Unit History,17. TF-58 Unit History, 27.
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would present several problems.8 Two key problems became apparent; the most significant being a lack of details and the other being that only a few people knew exactly what the plan entailed. Although the MEUs tended to work things out, friction was inevitable, especially in the competition for missions and who would be the supported and the supporting. On 21 November, members of the 26th MEU cross-decked for the first time to finalize planning efforts and receive detailed guidance from the TF-58 staff for a 23 November D-Day. TF-58 proved itself again as a functionary between the adjacent and higher units as the total force swelled to over 8,000 Marines and Sailors. The critical ATO process had been finalized for both ACEs through the Marine LNO at Bahrain.
III. Operations
Three CH-53Es departed the Peleliu at sunset carrying 66 Marines and two Fast Attack Vehicles. The second wave of three CH-53Es subsequently launched from the Peleliu carrying 95 combat loaded Marines. Both flights pushed north separately to the helicopter aerial refueling (HAR) track that stretched for 50nm south to 5nm south of the Afghanistan border. Each flight of three maneuvered as their own element and refueled from a single KC-130 The first wave of three CH-53's (carrying 66 Marines and two Fast Attack Vehicles ) successfully aerial-refueled and joined the pre-launched AH-1W Cobra attack escorts from Shamsi (see MAP 2). The rotary wing escorts were staggered in waves: two AH-1Ws, followed by three UH-1Ns, followed by two AH-1Ws. Successful coordination with the AWACS was critical for airspace deconfliction as well as the operational pause coordinated with TF Sword in the operating area. As the escorts approached the objective area, the P-3 and four AV-8B Harriers were in position to support.
Operation Swift Freedom (the original name for Marine Operations in Afghanistan) called for a package of six CH-53Es, four AH-1Ws, three UH-1Ns, six KC130s (two tanker and four cargo), one Navy P3 AIP (modified for ground force use), four AV-8Bs, one E3 AWAC and C Co from BLT 1/1. On call, in case organic firepower was insufficient until forces built up, were four F/A-18Cs and one AC-130 gunship. The preponderance of assets were from the 15th MEU, except three CH-53s that would come from the 26th MEU and the USS Bataan ARG and four HMH-361 CH-53Es that I MEF sent from CONUS. Potentially, the remaining assets of the MEU s, almost two reinforced BLTs and another 30 plus aircraft, could be utilized if necessary. The one piece of the MAGTF not brought would generate some concern and that was the lack of artillery. BGen Mattis chose not to bring in artillery. He had successfully argued to senior Marine staff that massive on call air support would cover the forces. The decision not to use artillery was one of the first examples of aviation-based fires establishing primacy in the Marine battle space. Any enemy movement towards the objective would be met with air-delivered ordinance the entire time ground forces were in the FOB. Part of the debate of artillery versus airpower is how effective artillery would have really been in that environment and for the follow on raid missions. This was critical in understanding the nature of the mission of putting a FOB in the middle of Taliban-controlled hinterland. The highly mobile Taliban targets became increasingly difficult to locate, visually confirm, and finally engage. With a large TF of Marines creating chaos in the rear area, Taliban forces could present themselves as targets for air-delivered forces. The mission began during daylight hours at 1615L, as the four AH-1W and three UH-1N lifted from the deck of the Peleliu and proceeded to a previously established forward arming and refueling point (FARP) in western Pakistan Shamsi (see map 2). From there the skids would refuel and proceed on timeline to meet the assault force in the objective area at L-Hour vicinity of Rhino.
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The flight proceeded into the objective area with no resistance and the Assault Flight Lead (AFL) contacted the Escort Flight Lead (EFL) to establish the status of the LZ. Reconnaissance and surveillance in the form of a Navy SEAL team had been observing the objective area for some time. Additionally, the AIP P-3 had eyes on the
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objective area, AV-8Bs were overhead, and the flight was communicating with theater command and control. The RW escorts acted as the final screen for the landing of the assault force. The EFL in an AH-1W contacted the SEAL team in the vicinity of Rhino for the call to land and established a Battle Position north of the objective area. (See MAP 3) Despite a wave-off induced by severe brown-out conditions, the first wave of three CH-53Es landed in zone within thirty-seconds of the established L-Hour of 2100L. The assault force of 66 Marines quickly secured the objective area. The flood gates were now open for the buildup of combat power via KC-130s, which flew waves throughout the rest of the night and many nights following. Clausewitzian friction played its role in the assault. The first division of CH-53Es would encounter brownout conditions unlike any they had ever previously experienced before. Fortunately, all that was required for them and the following aircraft was a wave off or another pass at landing to recover safely. More significantly, the second division of CH-53Es with 95 Marines was unable to aerial refuel, and was 45 minutes late into the LZ. This meant that the second wave of CH-53E's would have to Rapid Ground Refuel (RGR) from the first wave of C-130s that were going to refuel the now low fuel attack helicopters. That second section of AH-1Ws would have to land immediately to maintain a strip alert status until replaced by the on-coming three UH-1Ns with more fuel. Although they had planned for this, it meant two enormously risky propositions.9 First, the attack aircraft would only have one Cobra section and one Huey division for strip alert, leaving the force dangerously limited for fire support. Secondly, the RGR evolution would put the second wave of returning CH-53s back at the USS Bataan almost 13 hours after initial launch, a dangerous and exhausting evolution. Shortly after securing the airfield Marine KC-130s began to bring in fuel, supplies, and additional forces. Within five days after the initial insert, the forward operating base (FOB) Camp Rhino could sustain air and ground operations for an entire MEU. C-17's delivered the 30-man detachment of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 from Guam.10 The engineering and construction capabilities of the SEABEEs would be a critical component in developing the FOB into an effective facility. As planned, the TF-58 staff and their spider web of LNOs now focused on sustainment as the MEU staffs worked on the tactical missions.11 This integration of efforts into a single battle space while MARLNOs at the macro level would now have to organize the heavy air lift requirements from the C-17s, and C-130s. Marine aviation may have gotten TF-58 there, but Air Force heavy lift would keep it there by flying in the vehicles. For the Navy and Marines, this was by no means a pure Ship to Objective Maneuver. TF-58 would be heavily dependent on non-organic air support and distant
ISBs. Commodore Jezierski, Deputy CG of TF-58 stated that this was to be the most difficult amphibious landing in 20 years. 12 Within a few days Marine ground and aviation assets were cooperating with almost every special operations Task Force in the theater. Conducting typical MEU tasks such as the QRF, TRAP, escort, and re-supply were never a problem for the MEUs. Eventually the non-traditional missions, such as Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE is intelligence exploitation of possible Weapons of Mass Destruction sites), would come quickly to the Marines. Marines were working harmoniously for the first time with the best Tier 1 forces in the world.13 Challenging SSE operations, conducted by Marines and SF teams, which were covered by joint Navy, USAF, and USMC aviation proved to be successful.14 What made the relationships so beneficial was the aviation and combat service support capabilities unique to the MAGTF and the absolute willingness on the part of every Marine, from BGen Mattis on down to support any agency. By early December, ATGs and SF teams entering Kabul would send the majority of Taliban forces fleeing into Western Pakistan and clear the path for the southern Pashtun ATGs to surround Kandahar.15 Marine and TF-64 LOC interdiction missions to the north of Rhino opened the way to Kandahar and made deeper penetration of Taliban-held territory possible. On Dec 7 2001, TF-58 would aid in the evacuation of 39 casualties from a fratricide incident that would test the medical personnel at Camp Rhino and the ARGs.16 The MAGTF concept does not solely focus on firepower, it includes the tremendous capabilities of the US Navy. That was the case as the best hospitals in a thousand miles performed 36 life saving procedures on the USS Peleliu and 29 on the USS Bataan. By 14 December, on the heals of an integrated ATG attack on Kandahar, TF-58s combined road march and air assault would place Kandahar International airfield in TF58s control. The attack into Kandahar proved much easier than anticipated but still had its share of problems, particularly with vehicles along route 1 (see Map 2). With Taliban forces in total retreat to mountain hideaways along the porous Pakistani border, a new Afghan government now took over. After two decades of civil war, the city of Kandahar was a disaster. It soon became clear that the logistical capabilities of the MAGTF would become the dominant warfighting function. The only capable support element for the growing number of non-government organizations (NGOs) and coalition forces in the now liberated town of Kandahar was the Marines.17
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TF-58 Unit History, 31. TF-58 Unit History, 39. Capt Cris Lohman, TF-58 Archive files Personal Accounts (Washington DC: MCHB, 2001). 15 Dana Priest, Team 555 Shaped a New Way of War, Washington Post, April 3, 2002. 16 TF-58 Unit History, 33. 17 Khan , Pakistan Enduring Friend, 36
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IV. Conclusion Although the word amphibious may be increasingly slipping from the Marine lexicon, replaced with the much more versatile sounding expeditionary, it was still very much a part of the operation. In fact, little in terms of real support and sustainment would have been available without amphibious shipping efforts by the 1st and 8th ARGs onto the beachhead at Pasni, Pakistan. The ARGs were preloading most of the Marines via boat and almost all of the supplies to Pakistani ISBs at Shamsi, Pasni, and Jacobabad(See MAP 2). This super extended beachhead basically allowed limited capabilities of the assault support helicopters to focus on much more critical and time sensitive items and avoid a three hour flight from ARG shipping to the FOB. The total reliance on Host Nation support was crucial in allowing the supply line to stay open. Marine aviation has always been part of the maneuver warfare philosophy and the MAGTF concept. Marine CAS and assault support are so intertwined with the GCE that separate functionality is often very hard to conceptualize or perform. One could offer that Marine aviation would not have shined so brightly had it not been for the polish provided by the myriad of ground support functions. SEABEES, USAF STS, and Marine ground aviation support help sustain over 1350 fixed and rotary wing sorties out of Camp Rhino. Marine KC-130s were the first to land in Rhino, Kandahar, and most of all other Pakistani locations. Based out of Jacobabad, the combined detachments of VMGR 252 and 352 flew more than 1400 sorties over 2500 hours, delivered more than 8400 passengers, 9 million lbs of cargo, and 1 million lbs of fuel.18 TF-58 obviously depended on both naval and joint aviation for logistical support to sustain operations. This dependence came through in the after action reports and comments of those who were there. The overall performance of the MEUs and support staffs from I MEF were highly praised by Marines and others outside of the chain of command. What will impact future training, doctrine, and equipment the most will be the political decisions based on perceived future capabilities of MAGTFs for the various joint force commanders and their missions. Across the board, the unit after actions reflected the difficulty of the environment, particularly the cold, dust, and extreme altitudes. Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere environments from sea, or forward bases, and this was never more true than in Afghanistan.19 The altitude and the dust ended up claiming more victims than enemy fire as was evident by a number of aircraft mishaps. The first item on TF-58 after action very simply states that the MAGTF concept was revalidated.20 This point by itself will be irrelevant unless the MAGTF amphibious concept continues to be utilized in the Joint environment. A combination of classic MAGTF maxims like well-established reconnaissance for every mission, single unified
Command Element, unassuming flexible plans, and a robust fire support plan can be greatly appreciated in the joint arena. Vice Admiral Moore and BGen Mattis stole a page out of Sun Tzus playbook at Camp Rhino. By establishing a sustainable and lethal FOB in the heart of Taliban country so early on in the war, they contributed without a doubt to the rapid downfall of the Taliban. By developing a near STOM operation they appeared at places that the enemy had to hasten and moved swiftly to where he did not expect.
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TF-58 Unit History, 50. United States Marine Corps, Concept Paper Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. A-4 TF-58 MCLLs report, Task Force 58 After Action, USMC Historical Branch,,Washington, 2002.
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References
Reference Number or Author James T. Conway (Gen, USMC) Victor H. Krulak (LtGen, USMC Ret) Robert D. Heinl (Col, USMC Ret) J. M. January (Maj, USMC) Jay M. Holterman (Capt, USMC) Reference Title Commandants 2006 Initial Planning Guidance First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning TF-58 Developing 21st Century Warfighting Concepts The 15th Marine Expeditionary Units Seizure of Camp Rhino
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS THE BASIC SCHOOL MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
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Importance
In This Lesson This lesson covers the following topics: Topic Amphibious Command Ship (LCC) Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD) Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD-4) Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD-17) Dock Landing Ship (LSD) Mechanized Landing Craft (LCM) Landing Craft Utility (LCU) Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) References Notes Lesson Purpose Page 2 4 7 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 22
At the completion of this lesson, you should be able to Given references, amphibious ship(s) and/or landing craft, determine the capabilities and limitations of those ships and/or landing craft to conduct amphibious operational planning.
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The assigned mission of the amphibious command ship (LCC) is to function as the command ship for a joint task force as the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) platform, or for a naval component commander; numbered fleet commander; commander, amphibious task force (CATF); Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19) is distinctive in appearance. The ship can communicate in frequency ranges from high frequency to super high frequency, including two satellite systems for high speed/high volume communication links. The various internal command areas are highly automated to monitor and process information regarding the progress of an amphibious operation. This is the only class of ship designed from its hull up to support the command and control needs of the CATF; commander, landing force (CLF); and tactical air control center (TACC).
Specifications
Power Plant Length overall Beam extreme Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (1) geared steam turbine, (2) boilers, (1) shaft (22,000 shp) 620 ft 180 ft 29 ft 18,646 tons (16,987 metric tons) full load 23 knots Staff: 217 / Crew: 774 Landing Force: 56 Officers / 153 Enlisted 3,015 sqft 2,175 cuft (2) LCPL
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(1) Utility Boat Aircraft (1x Spot) Can accommodate all helicopters. Can carry all helicopters except the CH-53 Sea Stallion
Command and Control Command Information Center (CIC) Flag Plot Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) Ships Signals Exploitation Space Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) Helicopter Coordination Center Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) Armament Phalanx 20mm Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) MK-38 25mm Machine Gun M-2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun Mk-36 Chaff Rocket Super Rapid Booming Off-board Chaff (SRBOC) Launcher
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The primary war-fighting mission of the LHA-1 Tarawa class is to land and sustain United States Marines on any shore during hostilities. The ships serve as the centerpiece of a multi-ship Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). Some 3,000 Sailors and Marines contribute to a forward-deployed ARG composed of approximately 5,000 personnel. The Tarawa class is designed to operate independently or as a unit of a force, as a flagship or individual ship unit in both air and/or surface assaults, these ships are key elements of the amphibious assault forces for the Navy. A capital ship, the Tarawa class can simultaneously fulfill six war-fighting requirements: flagship for embarked amphibious squadron, flag or general officer staff; aircraft carrier, with a 35-aircraft complement (the LHA's full length flight deck can handle ten helicopters simultaneously); amphibious assault launching platform, employing a variety of surface assault craft; hospital ship, equivalent to the nation's finest local hospitals with 17 ICU beds, 4 operating rooms, 300 beds, a 1,00-unit blood bank, full dental facilities, and orthopedics, trauma, general surgery, and x-ray capabilities; command and control (C4I) ship, with the Navy's most sophisticated SHF and EHF satellite communications capability; and assault provisions carrier able to sustain embarked forces with fuel, ammunition and other supplies. The ships have an extensive command, communication and control suite. These electronic systems give the amphibious task force commander nearly unlimited versatility in directing the assault mission. The ships have an extensive mechanical system for vertical and horizontal movement of containerized and palletized supplies from deep cargo holds to assault craft or helicopters. A system of five centerline elevators, conveyor lines and a monorail system move cargo and supplies. Two large elevators, one aft and one portside, move aircraft and equipment from the hangar deck to the flight deck. Wheeled vehicles, trucks, jeeps and tanks can be driven or pulled from any deck level storage position via inclined ramps to either awaiting craft in the well deck or helicopters on the flight deck. There are 5 active Tarawa class LHAs in the fleet..3 in San Diego and 2 in Norfolk
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Specifications
Power Plant Length Beam Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (2) geared steam turbines, (2) boilers, (2) shafts (70,000 shp) 820 ft 106 ft 26 ft Light Displacement: 26,255 tons Full Displacement: 39,925 tons 24 knots (22 knots sustained) Ships Company: 82 officers, 882 enlisted Marine Detachment 1,900 plus 28,700 sqft 156,000 cuft (2) LCU (1) LCAC (4) LCPL (6) AV-8B Harrier attack planes (4) AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter (12) CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters (9) CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters (4) UH-1N Huey helicopters Actual mix depends on mission/43X CH-46 equivalent Command Information Center (CIC) Integrated Tactical Amphibious Warfare Data System Flag Plot Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) Ships Signals Exploitation Space Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) Helicopter Coordination Center Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) 1 AN/SPS-48 radar 1 AN/SPS-49(V)7 radar 1 AN/SPS-64 radar 1 AN/SPS-67 radar AN/SYS-2 Detection/Tracking System 1 MK-23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) MK-91 Fire control System (4) Operating Rooms
Medical
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(17) Post-op/Intensive Care Beds (1) Isolation ward w/ (4) beds (1) Primary Care Ward w/ (48) Beds Ships Doctor Ships Dentist Armament (2) - 21 Cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) (4) - 25mm MK38 Gun Mounts (2) - 20-mm Close In Weapons System Block 1 (5) - .50 Cal Mounts (2) - SLQ-25 NIXIE (6) - Mk 36 Chaff System
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The Wasp-class are the largest amphibious ships in the world. The LHD is an improved follow-on to the five ship Tarawa-class LHAs, sharing the basic hull and engineering plant. The LHD l has an enhanced well deck, enabling it to carry three LCACs (vice one LCAC in the LHAs). The flight deck and elevator scheme is also improved, which allows the ship to carry two more helicopters than its predecessor, the LHA. The LHA can transport one LCAC when the LCAC is placed in the well deck sideways, while the Wasp class amphibious assault (multipurpose) (LHD) ship carries two LCACs which drive in and drive out of the well deck fully loaded. The LHD has 20,000 more cubic feet storage capacity but 5,000 square feet less vehicle storage than an LHA. The LHD has more hangar and deck space than an LHA giving the LHD the capacity to carry three more CH-46 helicopters than the LHA. A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with an LHA as the large deck amphibious ship requires three additional ships to provide the capabilities required of an MEU. When an LHD is the large deck amphibious ship in the MEU, one to two fewer ships are needed to support the MEU. WASP class ships are the first to be specifically designed to accommodate the AV-8B Harrier jump jet and the LCAC hovercraft, along with the full range of Navy and Marine helicopters, conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles to support a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of 2,000 Marines. The ships also carry some of the most sophisticated communications, command and control capabilities afloat, along with state of the art electronic systems and defensive weaponry. WASP-class ships can also provide command and control and aircraft facilities for sea control missions, while operating with an aircraft carrier battle group. They transport and land ashore not only troops, but also the tanks, trucks, jeeps, other vehicles, artillery, ammunition and various supplies necessary to support the amphibious assault mission. Monorail trains, moving at speeds up to 600 feet per minute, transport cargo and supplies from storage and staging areas throughout the ship to a 13,600 square foot well deck which opens to the sea through huge gates in the ship's stern. There, the cargo, troops and vehicles are loaded aboard landing craft for transit to the beach. Air cushion landing craft can "fly" out of the dry well deck; or the well deck can be ballasted down for conventional craft to float out on their way to the assault area. Helicopter flights also transfer troops and equipment to the beach, while the ship's air traffic control capability simultaneously directs close air tactical support provided by embarked jet aircraft and helicopter gunships. There are 7 active Wasp class LHDs in the fleet..2 in San Diego, 4 in Norfolk, and 1 in Sasebo Japan
8 Basic Officer Course
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Specifications
Power Plant Length Beam Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (2) geared steam turbines, (2) boilers, (2) shafts (70,000 shp) 844 ft 107 ft 27 ft Full Displacement 40,532 tons 22 knots Ships Company 104 officers, 1,004 enlisted Marine Detachment: 1,900 plus 24,012 sqft 145,000 cuft (2) LCU Landing Craft, Utility or (3) LCAC Landing Craft, Air Cushion or (6) LCM-8 Landing Craft, Mechanized or (40) AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle [normal] or (61) AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle [stowed] (Actual mix depends upon mission) (6) AV-8B Harrier attack planes (4) AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter (12) CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters or (12) V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor (9) CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters (4) UH-1N Huey helicopters Actual mix depends on mission/43X-CH-46 equivalent Command Information Center (CIC) Integrated Tactical Amphibious Warfare Data System Flag Plot Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) Ships Signals Exploitation Space Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) Helicopter Coordination Center Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) 1 AN/SPS-48 radar 1 AN/SPS-49(V)7 radar 1 AN/SPS-64 radar 1 AN/SPS-67 radar AN/SYS-2 Detection/Tracking System 1 MK-23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) MK-91 Fire control System
9 Basic Officer Course
Aircraft
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Medical
(6) Operating Rooms (18) Post-op/Intensive Care Beds (1) Isolation ward w/ (6) beds (1) Primary Care Ward w/ (36) Beds Ships Doctor Ships Dentist (2) - MK29 launchers for NATO Sea Sparrow (3) - MK15 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts (8) - MK33 .50 cal. machine guns (1) - MK-36 Chaff System AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Bouys AN/SLQ-25 NIXIE Towed Torpedo Countermeasures AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare (EW) system
Armament
10
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The LPD 4 Austin class of ship combines the functions of three different classes of ships; the landing ship (LSD), the tank landing ship (LST), and the attack cargo ship (LKA). The Amphibious Transport, Dock, is used to transport and land Marines, their equipment and supplies by embarked landing craft or amphibious vehicles augmented by helicopters in amphibious assault. The assigned mission of the LPD is to transport and land troops and their essential equipment and supplies in an amphibious assault by means of embarked landing craft or amphibious vehicles augmented by helicopter lift. The LPD is a general purpose amphibious ship with substantial lift capacities for troops, vehicles, landing craft, cargo, and bulk fuel. The LPD is capable of ballasting to permit loading and launching of landing craft and assault amphibious vehicles. Vehicles can move about the various decks by a series of power operated ramps. The well deck can accommodate all types of landing craft currently in the amphibious force inventory. A limited number of helicopters may be transported on the flight deck as the LPD serves as a helicopter platform for landing embarked troops and their supplies. It also serves as a refueling station for helicopters of the landing force. Troops, vehicles, and equipment can be loaded/off-loaded by helicopter and landing craft simultaneously. Although their capabilities are less than those of the new LSD-41 class, the ships of the Austin class, built between 1965-1971, were considered sufficiently modern to have their service lives extended, and the Navy had planned to inaugurate an overhaul program for all 11 of them commencing in early 1988. Their modernization could have extended their service lives to 2005. However, Congress did not authorize funding for the program. Although the predecessor LPD-1 Raleigh class was retired after three decades of service, the ships of this class will remain in service for nearly four decades until they began being replaced by the LPD-17 class beginning in 2003.
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Specifications
Power Plant Length Beam Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (2) boilers, (2) Steam Turbines, (2) shafts (24,000 shp) 570 ft 84 ft 23 ft 16,905 tons 21 knots Ships Company: 24 officers, 396 enlisted Marine Detachment: 68 officers, 717 enlisted 14,000 sqft 51,000 cuft (1) LCU or (1) LCACs
Aircraft (2, w/ 4x (6) CH-46 Equivalents expanded) Landing Spots Command and Control Command Information Center (CIC) Troop Operations & Logistics Center (LFOC) Ships Signals Exploitation Space Flog Plot (Flag configured only) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) Helicopter Coordination Section SPS-40 Air Search Radar SPS-60 Surface Search Radar (1) Operating Rooms (12) Post-op/Intensive Care Beds (1) Phalanx 20mm Close-in Weapons System (CIWS) (2) Mk 38 25mm Machine Gun (2) M2 .50 Cal Machine Guns (1) MK 36 Chaff System
Medical Armament
12
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The SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) Class of amphibious transport dock ships represents the Navy and Marine Corps' future in amphibious warfare, and is one of the cornerstones in the strategic plan known as "Forward...from the sea". The San Antonio class is the first designed, from the keel up, to execute Operational Maneuver from The Sea [OMFTS] and Ship to Objective Maneuver. It is designed to support embarking, transporting, and landing elements of a Marine landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and by a combination of these methods to conduct primary amphibious warfare missions. The LPD 17 integrates with the existing amphibious ship force structure and the Navy's declining shore infrastructure. The LPD 17 class program is the replacement for three classes of amphibious ships that have reached the end of their service life -- the LPD 4, LSD 36, and LST 1179 classes - and one class that has already been retired, the LKA 113. LPD-17 brings to us a ship designed solely to support the mobility triad (LCAC, AAAV, and MV-22). LPD 17 is able to embark, transport, and land elements of the landing force in an assault by helicopters MV-22, landing craft including air cushion (LCAC) and conventional (LCU) landing craft, amphibious vehicles (AAV) and expeditionary fighting vehicles (EFV), and by a combination of these methods. The combat power of this ship is it's embarked Marines and their equipment.
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Specifications
Power Plant Length Beam Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (4) Turbo Marine Diesel Engines, (2) boilers, (2) shafts (70,000 shp) 684 ft 105 ft 23 ft 25,296 tons 22+ knots Ships Company: 32 officers, 365 enlisted Marine Detachment: 77 officers, 535 enlisted 25,000 sqft 35,000 cuft (1) LCU or (2) LCACs or (4) LCM-8 Command Information Center (CIC) Troop Operations & Logistics Center (LFOC) Ships Signals Exploitation Space Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) Helicopter Coordination Section AN/SPQ-14 (V) - Advanced Sensor Distribution System AN/USQ-119E (V) 27 - Global Command and Control System Maritime (GCCS-M) AN/KSQ-1 Amphibious Assault Direction System (2) Operating Rooms (24) Post-op/Intensive Care Beds (2) Dental Operating Rooms (2) - Mk 31 Mod 1 RAM Guided Missile Weapon System (2) - Mk 46 Mod 1 30mm Gun (4) - MK 26 Mod 17 .50 Cal Machine Guns (1) - MK 36 Chaff System AN/SLQ-25 NIXIE Towed Torpedo Countermeasures AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare (EW) system
Aircraft (2) Landing Spots (4) CH-46 Equivalents Command and Control
Medical
Armament
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The LSD 41 is a modified version of the LSD 36 class with design efforts directed to support emerging amphibious warfare concepts. The ships transport and launch loaded amphibious craft and vehicles with their crews and embarked personnel in amphibious assault operations. The ships feature a 440-foot well deck capable of holding four LCACs, a flight deck able to land and launch up to two CH-53E helicopters, the Navys latest diesel propulsion and engineering technology, advanced repair facilities, complete medical and dental facilities, and troop berthing accommodations for up to 627 embarked Marines. Limited docking and repair service are provided for both conventional and air cushion craft. The LSD 41 class ship program replaced the eight aging LSD 28 class ships which reached the end of their service lives during the period 1984-1990. LSD-41 was designed specifically to operate LCAC vessels. It has the largest capacity for these landing craft (four) of any U.S. Navy amphibious platform. The ships use a well deck which is flooded to launch and recover landing craft. LCACs are assault landing craft capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots when carrying a 60-ton payload.
Specifications
Power Plant Length Beam Draft Displacement Speed Crew Vehicle Square Cargo Cube Landing Craft (4) 16-cylinder Diesel Engines, (2) shafts (34,000 shp) 609 ft 84 ft 20 ft 15,165 tons 20+ knots Ships Company: 22 officers, 391 enlisted Marine Detachment: 34 officers, 470 enlisted 11,831sqft 8,970 cuft (2) LCPLs (4) LCACs, or
15 Basic Officer Course
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(3) LCUs, or Aircraft (2) Landing Spots No Organic Aircraft Command and Control Command Information Center (CIC) Helicopter Coordination Section AN/SPS-49 Air Search Radar AN/SPS-67 Surface Search Radar AN/SPS-64 Navigation Radar (1) Operating Rooms (1) Post-op/Intensive Care Bed (5) Primary Care Beds (2) Isolation Ward Beds Ships Doctor Ships Dentist (2) - 25mm MK 38 Machine Guns (2) - 20mm MK 15 Phalanx CIWS mounts (2) - .50 cal. machine guns (2) - Mk 31 Mod 1 RAM Guided Missile Weapon System (2) - Mk 46 Mod 1 30mm Gun (4) - MK 26 Mod 17 .50 Cal Machine Guns MK 36 Chaff System AN/SLQ-25 NIXIE Towed Torpedo Countermeasures AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare (EW) system
Medical
Armament
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The LCM(6) is intended primarily for the transport of cargo and/or personnel from shipto-ship and ship-to-shore. The craft is a 56-foot twin-screw, welded-steel craft with forward cargo well and bow ramp. The design of the boat permits its transportation aboard larger vessels. In 1959, the LCM-3 was replaced with the larger 70 ton LCM-8. LCM-8 are manned by a four man crew, Boatswain mate Petty Officer, Enginerman Petty Officer, and a non-rate fireman and seaman. The LCM-8 is constructed of steel and powered by two 12 V-71 diesel engines. The LCM-8 has twin screws and rudders, which can be controlled from the pilothouse. LCM-8 is built of welded steel; it's bottom, however, is semi-flat.
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Specifications
LCM-6 Propulsion Engine (hp) Length Overall (nominal, hull) Beam (nominal, over guards) Draft (max. full load) Hoisting Weight (max) Displacement (full load, approx.) Cargo Capacity Speed Range Crew Hull Construction 600 shp per engine at 2300 rpm 56 ft. 14 ft. 4 in. 4 ft. 3 in. 69,600 lbs. 69 tons 68,800 lbs. or 80 troops 9 kts (10.3 mph, 16.6 kph) 130 miles at 9 kts 5 persons Steel 105 tons 1- M60 tank or 200 troops 12 kts (13.8 mph, 22.2 kph) 190 miles at 9kts full load 11 persons Steel or Aluminum LCM-8 2- Detroit 12V-71 Diesel engines; twin shafts; 680hp sustained 74 ft 21 ft. 1in 4 ft. 4 in
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LCU 2000
The LCU 2000 moves containers/general/ vehicular cargo. It is used for unit deployment and relocation. It has a bow ramp for Roll-on/Roll-off cargo, and a bow thruster to assist in beaching and beach extraction. The LCU 2000 can carry cargo from deep draft ships to shore ports or areas too shallow for larger ships. The LCU-2000 provides worldwide transport of combat vehicles and sustainment cargo, as well as intratheater movement and can execute cargo operations along coastal MSRs. It is capable of receiving cargo from a ship anchored in the stream and transporting that cargo to shore for discharge over the bow ramp. Because of its shallow draft, the LCU can carry cargo from deep drafted ships to shore ports or areas too shallow for larger ships.
19 Basic Officer Course
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Specifications
LCU-1600 Propulsion Length overall Beam Draft Displacement Deck area Payload Range Crew size (2) Diesels 135 ft 29.5 ft 6 ft. 10 in. 437 tons 1,850 sqft 170 tons of cargo, 3 tanks or 400 troops 1,200 nautical miles 11 LCU-2000 (2) Diesels 174 ft 42 ft 9 ft 575 long tons 2,500 square feet 350 tons (equivalent payload of 8 C-17 loads) 6,500 nautical miles at 10 knots 13
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Error! The Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) Transport weapons systems, equipment, cargo and personnel of the assault elements of the Marine Air/Ground Task Force both from ship to shore and across the beach. The landing craft air cushion (LCAC) is a highspeed, over-the-beach fully amphibious landing craft capable of carrying a 60-75 ton payload. Capable of operating from existing and planned well deck ships, it is used to transport weapons systems, equipment, cargo and personnel from ship to shore and across the beach. The advantages of air-cushion landing craft are numerous. They can carry heavy payloads, such as an M-1 tank, at high speeds. Their payload and speed mean more forces reach the shore in a shorter time, with shorter intervals between trips.
The LCAC is capable of carrying a 60 ton payload (up to 75 tons in an overload condition) at speeds over 40 knots. Fuel capacity is 5000 gallons. The LCAC uses an average of 1000 gallons per hour. Maneuvering considerations include requiring 500 yards or more to stop and 2000 yards or more turning radius. The LCAC, like all "hovercraft," rides on a cushion of air. The air is supplied to the cushion by four centrifugal fans driven by the craft's gas turbine engines. The air is enclosed by a flexible skirt system manufactured of rubberized canvas. No portion of the LCAC hull structure penetrates the water surface; the entire hull rides approximately four feet above the surface. LCAC operates in waters regardless of depth, underwater obstacles, shallows or adverse tides. It can proceed inland on its air cushion, clearing obstacles up to four feet, regardless of terrain or topography), including mud flats, sand dunes, ditches, marshlands, riverbanks, wet snow, or slippery and icy shorelines. Equipment, such as trucks and track vehicles, can disembark via ramps located both forward and aft, there by shortening critical off load time. It is also important to point out the LCAC propulsion system makes it less susceptible to mines than other assault craft or vehicles.
21 Basic Officer Course
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LCAC is a dramatic innovation in modern amphibious warfare technology. It provides the capability to launch amphibious assaults from points over the horizon, thereby decreasing risk to ships and personnel and generating greater uncertainty in the enemy's mind as to the location and timing of an assault, thereby maximizing its prospects of success. The LCAC is accessible to more than 80% of the world's coastlines. It can make an undisclosed, over the horizon (OTH) assault from up to 50 miles offshore. Its high speed complements a joint assault with helicopters, so personnel and equipment can be unloaded beyond the beach in secure landing areas.
Specifications
Power Plant Four Avco-Lycoming gas turbines; 12,280 bhp; two shrouded reversible-pitch propellers; four double-entry fans for lift 88 ft 47 ft 181 tons 1, 809 sqft 40 plus knots with payload 2 - 12.7mm MGs. Gun mounts will support: M-2HB .50 cal machine gun; Mk-19 Mod3 40mm grenade launcher; M-60 machine gun 5 200 miles at 40 kts with payload 300 miles at 35 kts with payload 24 Troops 180 w/PTM 12 HMMWVs per sortie 4 LAVs per sortie 2 AAVs per sortie 1 M1A1 per sortie 4 M923 per sortie 2 M923 5-Ton Trucks,2 M198 Howitzers, and 2 HMMWVs per sortie
LSD 41 Class..............4 LCAC LSD 36 Class..............3 LCAC LPD-4 Class................1 LCAC LPD-17 Class..............1 LCAC LHA Class...................1 LCAC LHD Class...................3 LCAC
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References
Reference Number or Author MCRP 3-31B Reference Title Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book
Notes
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INDEX
ZERO WEEK B000535XW B141116 B0X0256 B130786 B4S5459 B000151 B030096 B130836 B1Z0615B ReviewExam USMC Ed Prog Uniforms ORM ATFP Orientation Stds of Conduct Military Correspondence Ops Terms and Graphics Role of the Chaplain
PHASE 1 B130596 B130736, B130756, B4W6829 B130795 B130876 B130916 B130936 B141036 B141136 B141176 B181936 B181996 B182016 B182036 B182056 B191716 B191956 B1X0856
Military Speaking ETHICS I, II, & III Intro To Obs Theory Warfighting Human Factors Law of War ROE Individual Family Assistance Resp of Int Guard Security of Classified Materials Military Topographic Map I Direction Location Military Topographic Map II Lensatic Compass Communication Equipment Communication Equipment Practical Application Officership
PHASE 2 B151196 B151236 B151256 B283376 B2A2157 B2A2177 B2A2257 B2B2277 B2B2377 B2B2477 B2B2577 B2C2437 B2C2497 B2C2767 B2C2777 B2C2797 B2C3197
Combat Life Saving PREV TRTMT FLD REL INJ Casualty Eval and Evac Night Navigation Intel Enemy Threat Weapons EPW Decision Making Combat Orders Tactical Planning Using Terrain Models PrinciplesFS CALL FOR INDIRECT FIRE-WITHOUT SHIFT FROM KN PT Six Functions of Marine Aviation CAS FSPlanning Helo Capes & Ops
B2D2517 B2E2637 B2E2657 B2E2667 B2E2677 B2E2967 B2F2737 B2F2837 B2H3317 B2H3397 B2H3417 B2I3597 B2X2597
Munitions M203 M249 Day Optics and Observation Theory Night Optics and Observation Theory Combat Profiling Tactical Fundamentals Rifle Squad Tactics PatrolOperations Patrol Order and Overlay AmbushPatrol CBRN OCCFLD MOS
PHASE 3 B3J3638 B3J3718 B3J3778 B3J3838 B3L3998 B3L4038 B3L4118 B3L4258 B3M4078 B3M4178 B3M4238 B3N4478 B3N4638 B3O4818 B3O4858 B3P4878
INTRO TO RIFLE PLT RiflePlatoonInTheAttack Rifle Platoon in the Defense Final RIFLE PLATOON NIGHT ATTACKS FINAL IntroductiontoEngineering EnginOD IED Field Firing exercise IntroCrewServedWeapons M240B HMG MG Employment MovementToContact Mil Law JAGMAN Convoy
PHASE 4 B120636 B2G3217 B2G3237 B3K3738 B3K3958 B3K3978 B3K4058 B3X5178 B4Q5299 B4Q5319 B4R5359 B4T5499 B4T5579 B4T5619 B4U5939 B4V6059 B4W6299
MAGTF CSS MM Government Property B3K4018 FITREPS I, II, & III Personnel Records Enlisted Promotion System Awards Developing Training Plans Cultural Awareness Public Affairs UrbanOps I IntroV1.1 COIN UrbanOps III UrbanOps IV SecOpsInAnUrbanEnv Mechanized Platforms and Employment Amphib Expo Ops Intro to Drill
Manual of Sword USMC Birthday Joint Ops Mess Night The Enlisted Marine AMFEX08 Navy Capabilities and Limitations Urban Ops II