Certiorari; Period to file. MALLARI, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM G.R. No.

157659 January 25, 2010 BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent GSIS. To secure the performance, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallaris names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations only P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 Nearly three years later (1984), GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. He requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. He persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). GSIS responded to his request. It finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further payments. The petitioner sued GSIS (prelim injunction). The RTC decided in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC. Petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari This Court denied his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. As a result, the CA decision became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. Because of the petitioners request for an extension of time to vacate the properties, GSIS acceded to the request. Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a MR and/or to quash the writ of execution and motion to hold GSIS in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his said motion. To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be re-raffled to another branch of the RTC. The petitioner sought reconsideration but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 on February 11, 2002 denied his motion for reconsideration. By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001 (denied Motion for Contempt), October 21, 1999 (Granted Writ of execution cum writ of possession), and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari in CA Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period HELD: YES. Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution, or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion. It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.

GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Tolentino)

A.M. No. CA-10-49-J; January 28, 2010 CARPIO MORALES, J.: FACTS:

Gonzales (complainant), then a member of Alabang Country Club, Incorporated (ACCI) who was vying for a seat in its Board of Directors, was charged by the Board with having falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members. That drew him to file a complaint before the RTC, Muntinlupa City, for damages against ACCI. Complainant was later disqualified as a candidate and ousted as a member of the ACCI. He thus amended his complaint in the civil case by impleading the members of the Board and he added, as cause of action, the nullification of his disqualification and expulsion. RTC decided in complainants favor, and issued a writ of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI. defendants assailed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via petition for review with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. appellate court issued TRO against the execution of the decision in the civil case, drawing complainant to move for its lifting, alleging that ACCI had already voluntarily executed the decision in the civil case. His motion was denied. When the TRO expired, the Ninth Division of the CA (Barrios, Veloso, and Tolentino as ponente directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction Complainant challenged the appellate courts issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction via petition for certiorari filed before this Court on September 8, 2005.3 complainant filed on September 29, 2005 before the appellate court a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because, by his claim, the issuance of the writ was against the law. By Resolution of April 11, 2007, the Court dismissed complainants petition for certiorari4 "for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned [appellate courts] Resolution is tainted with grave abuse of discretion." More than a year later or on August 20, 2008, complainant filed a letter-complaint before this Court

ISSUE:

W/N the delay in resolving the Motion for Inhibition is PROPER in view of complainants filing (Sept 8, 05) of the Petition for Certiorari. HELD: NO. THERE IS UNDUE DELAY. The rule that a petition for certiorari does not INTERRUPT the course of the principal case UNLESS a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts NOTWITHSTANDING the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend or would render NUGATORY the pending petition before the SC. Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari does not impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court.15 But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification for the delay, since the Court resolved complainants petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007, still, given the nature and history of the cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition only on October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after complainant filed a reiterative motion. WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering an order.

PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 181643; November 17, 2010 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner seeking to annul and set aside Decision of the CA, which reversed Order of RTC, Pasig City directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining respondent DepEd from enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year lease of the school canteen. Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (May-MOA) (2004) with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal (Dr. Blas), for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding program as well as medicines for the school clinic. Thereafter, Pineda renovated the canteen and equipped it with new utensils, tables, chairs, and electric fans. The faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent (Dr. Quiones), questioning the validity of the May-MOA. Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA) superseding the May-MOA. This time, the AugustMOA followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 19987 or the "Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives." Ms. Santos and Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any rule in executing the August-MOA and the lease to Pineda beneficial to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiones wrote the DepEd seeking its decision on the matter. Respondent DepEd, declared the August-MOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of the School. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of DepEd decision DepEd and Ms. Camilo sought the dismissal of Pinedas petition - failed to state a cause of action denied DepEd filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside orders of the RTC. The CA affirmed order of the RTC denying DepEds motion to dismiss but reversed order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

ISSUE:

W/N THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI IS PROPER DESPITE DepEds failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on certiorari. HELD:

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. 16 There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,17 it was written: The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as 1. where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; 2. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower 3. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; 4. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; 5. where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; 6. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.18 (underscoring supplied) As previously discussed, the present case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operation of the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying the relaxation of the settled rule.

MANDAMUS CASE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. LIGOT-TELAN G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993 ROMERO, J.: FACTS:

U.P. Board of Regents issued a Resolution establishing the STFAP (Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program). A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits . Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire and at the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement - University may send a fact-finding team to visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the information Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal in Quezon City. Ms. Cristeta, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Villanueva (head of the office of scholarship) wrote Nadal informing him that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers. He reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees". Because of the discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he willfully withheld and did not declare a car and the income of his mother which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his

studies

SDT rendered a decision exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." SDT decision elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review which affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT; the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension. Nadal filed a MR of the BOR decision; guilty (six members vote) the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. six members. Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. Nadal filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a TRO against President Abueva and the BOR. The lower court ruled that they are temporarily restrained. Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order,

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal. 2. W/N THE RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD RESTRAINED FROM ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS FILED BY NADAL HELD: On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides

more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus. TUASON vs.REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 NARVASA, J.: FACTS:

Petitioner spouses (Tuasons) were retired public school teachers. With funds from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the latter's subdivision in Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Marcos, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious manner: order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government; On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, that their certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy.

ISSUE: W/N THE REMEDY OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS PROPER (IT NOT APPEARING THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS WERE BEING SUED as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.) HELD:

The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10 or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power,

such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings. 14WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION,vs. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY G.R. No. 146197; June 27, 2005 CARPIO, J.: FACTS:

Security Bank as mortgagee and Innovatech as mortgagor entered into a real estate mortgage. Innovatech secured its P25,000,000 loan from Security Bank with a mortgage on fourteen condominium units located at Alabang, Muntinlupa City with Condominium Certificates of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Nebrida (Innovatechs Vp) informed Security Bank that Innovatech sold the fourteen condominium units to Indiana of Mactan, Cebu. Innovatech provided Security Bank with copies of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage 5 it made with Indiana as well as Indianas loan application with Bank of Southeast Asia for P69,000,000. According to Innovatech, part of the proceeds of Indianas loan with the Bank of Southeast Asia would be used to pay the loan with Security Bank. The loan with Security Bank matured without payment from either Innovatech or Indiana. Security Bank filed a petition for notarial foreclosure of the fourteen condominium units . The public auction was held; During the public auction, the condominium units were sold to Security Bank Innovatech filed an action against Security Bank for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale (with TRO) RTC, Muntinlupa City granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Innovatech. RTC Order became the subject of a petition for certiorari filed by Security Bank before the CA which was dismissed for lack of merit. CA set aside its 24 August 1999 Decision and nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. Innovatech filed a motion for reconsideration - denied Innovatech filed a petition before this Court - denied Indiana filed a Complaint-in-Intervention with prayer for the issuance TRO before the trial court Granted Security Bank moved for reconsideration of the Order - denied for lack of merit. Security Bank went to the Court of Appeals for relief - denied due course to Security Banks petition. Security Bank filed a motion for reconsideration denied; Hence, the recourse to this Court.

Issue Whether or not the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records (date of filing of the motion for reconsideration appears in the body of the petition); whether the petition SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENT HELD:

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The Rules clearly provide that non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. If we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing Security Banks petition. The Court of Appeals merely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the parties.17 Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. 18 Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the parties.19 Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, Security Bank correctly asserted that page 13 of its petition states the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days after the receipt of the Order.21 The petition also states the date of receipt of notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court.

Hence, the petition only lacked the date of receipt of the trial courts Order of 1 February 1999 that was the subject of the motion for reconsideration.

The stamped date on the Order of 1 February 1999 annexed to the petition is not clear enough for the Court of Appeals to determine when Security Banks counsel received a copy of the Order. 22 However, upon filing its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Security Bank attached another copy of the Order of 1 February 1999.23 This time, the stamped date of receipt of the Order shows that the Security Banks counsel received the Order on 10 February 1999. When Security Bank furnished the Court of Appeals with the copy of the trial courts Order bearing the stamped date of its receipt, it showed its willingness to rectify its omission. Security Bank, in effect, substantially complied with the Rules. In addition, the trial court would have dismissed the motion for reconsideration outright if Security Bank had filed it late. The trial courts Order of 3 November 1999 does not show that Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration out of time. The rationale for requiring the statement of material dates is to determine the timeliness of filing of the petition. Clearly, Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration with the trial court on time. Security Bank also filed the petition before the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. The Court reiterates that there is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua,25 we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.

TORRES, JR. vs.SPS. AGUINALDO G.R. No. 164268; June 28, 2005 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: FACTS:

ISSUE:

Respondent-spouses Aguinaldo filed before the OCP of Manila, a complaint against petitioner Torres, Jr. for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by TCT were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale5 dated July 21, 1979. Torres - denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale. OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of public document filed MTC Torres moved for reconsideration - denied. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed and ordered the withdrawal of the information. The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied. A Motion to Withdraw Information was filed which the MTC granted It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned. Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was granted - March 22, 2004 Torres motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari

Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. HELD:

NO.Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In Baares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal. In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Baares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does

not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case. Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.30 It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres should not have been considered during the preliminary investigation but should be threshed out only during trial.31 Only the evidence presented by the complainant should be considered in determining probable cause or the lack thereof. We are not persuaded. The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report32 and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner. The court is inclined to grant the motion of the public prosecutor. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

LIBERAL PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 191771; May 6, 2010 BRION, J.: FACTS:

The challenged ruling is a Per Curiam Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 1 dated April 12, 2010 in SPP-10-(DM) granting the application for registration of the Nacionalista PartyNationalist Peoples Coalition (NP-NPC or coalition) and deferring the question of the coalitions dominant minority status to a future resolution. The challenge comes from the Liberal Party (LP) 2 through a petition for certiorari and prohibition3 with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a status quo order. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of political parties. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections."4 LP filed its Opposition5 to the NP-NPCs petition not a duly registered coalition of political parties at the time of filing of their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party; no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for registration as a coalition because the petition should have been first brought before the proper Division; En banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition: the registration of coalitions involves the exercise of its administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the en banc can directly act on it. On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of coalitions. The LP now assails the April 12, 2010 COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, as follows:The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain petitions for registration of political coalitions;The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite the lapse of the deadline for registration;The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite patent and manifest violations of the NPC Constitution and By-Laws; and the respondents argue that the present petition raises mere errors of judgment that are not within the Courts authority to act upon under its certiorari jurisdiction, since the present petition merely assails the en bancs appreciation of facts and evidence.

ISSUE:

a. Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities? W/N petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction HELD: The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright. A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 30 the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, gave a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in relation to errors of law. The Court then said: A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. xxxx "Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below. As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: "When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari." The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. [Emphasis supplied.] The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established, would constitute grave abuse of discretion is the alleged unwarranted action of the en banc in acting on the registration of the NP-NPC when the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure provides that registration is under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error is more than an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal authority and thereby committed a jurisdictional transgression;31 its action, being ultra vires, would be a nullity. Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be the cut-off date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NP-NPC long after this cut-off date had passed without any valid justification or reason for suspending the rule. For the en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant of registration was an act outside mandatory legal parameters and was therefore done when the COMELEC no longer had the authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of grave abuse of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and, accordingly, NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.