Equal Protection Villegas vs. Hi Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 p2 People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.

P8 Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603 p14 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 p17 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. BangkoSentralngPilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 p53 Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597 p204 Tabrarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 p209

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978 MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents. Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner. Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968. (SGD.) FRAN CISCO ARCA J u d g e
1

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5 On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6 In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void: 1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; 2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and nonuseful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7

On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8 Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9

I THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION. II RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. III RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION. Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled. It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13 The trial court did not commit the errors assigned. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur. Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result. Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that

the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government. The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government. As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011). With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government. The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government. As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When

the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011). With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary. Footnotes 1 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, p. 64. 2 Petition, Rollo, p. 28. 3 Annex "A", of Petition, Rollo, p. 37-38. 4 Section 1. It shall he unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any kind of position or occupation or allowed directly or indirectly to participate in the functions, administration or management in any office, corporation, store, restaurant, factory, business firm, or any other place of employment either as consultant, adviser, clerk, employee, technician, teacher, actor, actress, acrobat, singer or other theatrical performer, laborer, cook, etc., whether temporary, casual, permanent or otherwise and irrespective of the source or origin of his compensation or number of hours spent in said office, store, restaurant, factory, corporation or any other place of employment, or to engage in any kind of business and trade within the City of Manila, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila, and paying the necessary fee therefor to the City the City Treasurer: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons employed in diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries and in technical assistance programs agreed upon by the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of different congregations or religious orders of any religion, sect or denomination, who are not paid either monetarily or in kind shag be exempted from the provisions of this Ordinance. 5 Section 4. Any violation of this Ordinance shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months or by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos (P100.00) but not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That in case of juridical persons, the President, the Vice-President or the person in charge shall be liable. 6 Annex "B", Petition, Rollo, p. 39. 7 Ibid

8 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 75-83. 9 Petition, Rollo, p. 31. 10 People vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, 446. 11 89 Phil. 439, 459-460. 12 80 Phil. 86. 13 Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil, 103.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAYAT, defendant-appellant. Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee. MORAN, J.: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him: That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read: SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding

two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court. The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the nonChristian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity. As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs. Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639

undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.) Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application. Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This

rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubivs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442). Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld. Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons,

the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989). Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees. Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Taada for plaintiffappellant. Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees. BENGZON, J.P., J.: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2 Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar. Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void." Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results. The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the

ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
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Footnotes
1

Resolution No. 30, Series of 1964. Section 1, emphasis supplied.

An action for declaratory judgment was also filed on May 23, 1964 (Civil Case No. 6650) but this and the present case were tried jointly.
4

L-20125, July 20, 1965. L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966. L-12752, Jan. 30, 1965.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government. De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng. No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.: This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorariand of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1 Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the

offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition forcertiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221. On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason that: . . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones

enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial. On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)." On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937. To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction: I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila. (2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer. (3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act. II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that: (1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for probation. (2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition. (3) No right on appeal exists in such cases. (4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same. III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance. IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail. Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted

of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings. Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners. As special defenses, respondents allege: (1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition. (2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court. (3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable. (4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court

nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves. (5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity." (6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court. (7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.
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(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion. (9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ ofcertiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same. (10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration. (11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners. In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation. After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties. To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.) The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner

inmandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action forcertiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said: By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be

subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.) Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White: Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department. Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature. It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable

that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal

and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the

enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.: . . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.) In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said: . . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved. "It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.) Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122). Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley

[1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said: It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. Stateex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional. It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws. The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.) The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that

the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases. It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed. Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found. We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional? Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to

enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty. This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities. One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it. The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act? As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. ". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it? In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex

parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.) In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement: Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . . Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for definite action. If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.) The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:

Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act. We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases. We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime

committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.) Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79). But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns

solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned." We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162;Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.) Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; Stateex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of

a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.) Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said: . . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.) The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)

In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.) The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.) Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.: That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment. In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:

. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373). Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.) We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.) 2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power? Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened

principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.) The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and

wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself. The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.) In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.) For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendiis at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice

Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. "The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) andCruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands." It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.) It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W.,

210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself. The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The

suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said: By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160. The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted. To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become

inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.) True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.) It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing

the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. 3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.) This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.) In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the

affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)
lawph!1.net

Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and

providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself. Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution. Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language: . . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs.

Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.) It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system. Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act: That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits; (b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character; (c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers; (d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere; (e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality; (f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense; (g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and (h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law. The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of

the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is noncompliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional compensation." It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows: There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act. But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation

officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law. That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity. Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers. Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because: (a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines; (b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871), (c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317); (d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environment. Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur. Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.: Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). I. The Case First the facts. On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: xxx xxx xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied] The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2 b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied) c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5 d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7 In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court

should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved.9 Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management." The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.11 II. Issue Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."12 III. Ruling A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be

reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted) Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.18 In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19 That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses. Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23 B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. 1. The concept of relative constitutionality. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.26 Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled: While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied) In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:31 The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances? It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1). But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when,

under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States. xxx xxx xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 2. Applicability of the equal protection clause. In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment. In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court: The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied) Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:

[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) [W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted 3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso. According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon. Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz: 1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); 2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS); 3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC); 4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); 5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); 6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and 7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below: 1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907) Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 90. Personnel. xxx xxx xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied) xxx 2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282) Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied) 3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289) Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]: xxx xxx xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall: xxx xxx xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied) 4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291) Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied) xxx 5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523) Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]: Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied) 6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763) Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)

xxx 7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

xxx

xxx

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read: xxx 3. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied) Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39 The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes. The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny.This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. Theproviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.40 Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the

grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time? In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution. In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not thedeclared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-andfile and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.41 It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies."42 The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages." Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors:46

(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20. Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47 Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL. Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL. It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic]counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental." The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.

Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rankand-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that theraison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within the realm of government entities. It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP. The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups." The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows: First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment xxx xxx xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively

different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment benefits55 (citations omitted) In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rankand-file and the seven other GFIs. Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent. Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-andfile) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar. It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61 The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis. Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in

terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62 In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw. IV. Equal Protection Under International Lens In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the"rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64 A. Equal Protection in the United States In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65 Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required. xxx xxx xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.] From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approachevolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.

The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .] xxx xxx xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection. The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection. [Among the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.] xxx xxx xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66 The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional.Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends must

be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) B. Equal Protection in Europe The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or social origin."67 Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that: . . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention. And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73 C. Equality under International Law The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74 Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American

Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.81 The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination. In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.85 The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR: Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89 Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that: . . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has thepurpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied) Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.92

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93 That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular: a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and

responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted) Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice. Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.97 In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99 Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100 Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.104 V. A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105 But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106 Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence,We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutionaldesideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rankand-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination. IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional. Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Panganiban, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., see dissenting. Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.

CONCURRING OPINION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Does Sec. 15(c), Article II, Republic Act No. 6753,1 which allows the exemption of BSP employees occupying salary grade (SG) 20 and above from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 67582 result in a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection of the law? I submit that it does and said provision should therefore be declared unconstitutional on the ground that the division between BSP employees covered from SG 19 down and from SG 20 up is purely arbitrary. Even given the wide discretion vested in Congress to make classifications, it is nonetheless clear that the lawmaking body abused its discretion in making such classification. It is not disputed that all that is required for a valid classification is that it must be reasonable, i.e., that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; it must be germane to the purpose of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions and it must apply equally to each member of the class.3 In the instant case, the classification was justified on the need of the BSP to compete in the labor market for economists, accountants, lawyers, experts in security, printing, commercial and rural banking, financial intermediation fund management, and other highly technical and professional personnel,4 which it could not do unless personnel occupying top positions are exempted from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law. Under Rep. Act No. 6758, however, professional supervisory positions are covered by SG 9 to SG 33 which includes: (R)esponsible positions of a managerial character involving the exercise of management functions such as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and overseeing within delegated authority the activities of an organization, a unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of professional, technical or scientific knowledge and experience, application of managerial or supervisory skills required to carry out

their basic duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance and control, leadership, as well as line supervision. These positions require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor's degree or higher degree courses. The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33.5 (Underscoring supplied) SG 33 is assigned to the President of the Philippines; SG 32 is for the Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker of the House and Chief Justice of this Court. SG 31 is for senators, associate justices of this Court, chairpersons of the constitutional commissions, department secretaries and other positions of equivalent rank while SG 30 is assigned to the constitutional commissioners and other positions of equivalent rank.6 Economists, accountants, lawyers and other highly technical and professional personnel are covered under SG 9 to 29 as already adverted to. Classification in law is the grouping of persons/objects because they agree with one another in certain particulars and differ from others in those same particulars. In the instant case, however, SG 20 and up do not differ from SG 19 and down in terms of technical and professional expertise needed as the entire range of positions all "require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor's degree or higher courses." Consequently, if BSP needs an exemption from Rep. Act No. 6758 for key positions in order that it may hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20. Under the circumstances, the cut-off point, the great divide, between SG 19 and 20 is entirely arbitrary as it does not have a reasonable or rational foundation. This conclusion finds support in no less than the records of the congressional deliberations, the bicameral conference committee having pegged the cut-off period at SG 20 despite previous discussions in the Senate that the "executive group" is "probably" SG 23 and above.7 Moreover, even assuming that the classification is reasonable, nonetheless, its continued operation will result in hostile discrimination against those occupying grades 19 and below. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Puno, some other government corporations, by law, now exempt all their employees from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 6758. BSP employees occupying SG 19 and below, however, shall remain under Rep. Act No. 6758 considering the rule that the subject classification, to be valid, must not be limited only to conditions existing as of the time the law was passed. Thus, while BSP employees from SG 19 down will continue to be covered under Rep. Act No. 6758, other government employees of the same class and occupying the same positions in government corporations will be exempt. I therefore concur with Justice Puno in that respect and, considering his thorough discussion, I have nothing more to add thereto.

DISSENTING OPINION PANGANIBAN, J.: With all due respect, I dissent. I believe that it would be uncalled for, untimely and imprudent for this Court to void the last proviso of the second paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of Republic Act (RA) 7653. In the first place, the

assailed provision is not unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied, and the theory ofrelative constitutionality finds no application to the case at bar. In the second place, a becoming respect on the part of this Court for Congress as a coequal and coordinate branch of government dictates that Congress should be given ample opportunity to study the situation, weigh its options and exercise its constitutional prerogative to enact whatever legislation it may deem appropriate to address the alleged inequity pointed out by petitioner. For the record, I am not against the exemption from the Salary Standardization Law of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) rank and file employees (with Salary Grade 19 and below). Neither am I against increases in their pay. I simply submit that (1) the factual milieu of this case does not show a denial of equal protection, (2) the theory of relative constitutionality does not come into play, and (3) petitioner should have addressed its plaint, not to this Court, but to Congress in the first instance. I am confident that given sufficient opportunity, the legislature will perform its constitutional duty accordingly. Hence, there is no need or warrant for this Court to intervene in legislative work. Theory of Relative Constitutionality Not Applicable to Extraneous Circumstances The ponencia advocates the application of the theory of relative constitutionality to the present case. The theory says that a statute valid at one time may become unconstitutional at another, because of altered circumstances orchanged conditions that make the practical operation of such a statute arbitrary or confiscatory. Thus, the provisions of that statute, which may be valid as applied to one set of facts but invalid as applied to another, cannot be merely compared with those applicable under the Constitution. From the manner in which it has been utilized in American and Philippine jurisprudence, however, this novel theory finds relevance only when the factual situation covered by an assailed law changes, not when another law is passed pertaining to subjects not directly covered by the former. Thus, the theory applies only when circumstances that were specifically addressed upon the passage of the law change. It does not apply to changes or alterations extraneous to those specifically addressed. To prove my point, allow me then to tackle seriatim the cases relied upon in the ponencia.1 Cited American Cases Not Applicable to and Not in Pari Materia with Present Facts Medill.2 The constitutionality issue in Medill v. State was raised by a bankruptcy trustee in regard to a statute exempting damages that were awarded to the claimants who suffered as a result of an automobile accident.3Specifically, the contested provision exempted from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process issued from any court" (1) general damages and (2) future special damages awarded in rights of action filed for injuries that were caused to the person of a debtor or of a relative.4 The Supreme Court of Minnesota said that the general damages portion of the right of action filed by claimants for personal injuries sustained in fact represented the monetary restoration of the physically and mentally damaged person; hence, claims for such damages could never constitute unreasonable amounts for exemption purposes.5Such claims were thus fully exempt. It added that the legislature had assigned the role of determining the amounts that were reasonable to the state's judicial process.6 While a statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another, the said Court limited its discussion only to the set of facts as presented before it7 and held that the statute was "not unconstitutional."8 Distinguishing the facts of that case from those found in its earlier rulings,9 it concluded that -- by limiting the assets that were available for distribution to creditors10 -- the contested provision therein was a bankruptcy relief for protecting not only human capital,11 but also the debtor's fundamental needs.

Cook.12 The bankruptcy trustee in In re Cook also objected to the same statutory exemption, inter alia, asserted by the debtors in another personal injury claim. The US Bankruptcy Court, following Medill, held that such exemption was "violative of x x x the Minnesota Constitution,"13 as applied to pre-petition special damages,14 but not as applied to general damages.15 The statute did not provide for any limitation on the amount of exemption as to the former type of damages.16 Neither did it set any objective criteria by which the bankruptcy court may limit its size.17 Nashville.18 The plaintiff in Nashville v. Walters questioned the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute imposing upon railroad companies one half of the total cost of grade separation in every instance that the state's Highway Commission issued an order for the elimination of a grade crossing. The plaintiff rested its contention not on the exercise of police power that promoted the safety of travel, but on the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the imposition that deprived it of property without due process of law.19 Reversing the judgment that the Supreme Court of Tennessee had rendered against the plaintiff, the US Supreme Court however did not declare the statute unconstitutional.20 Instead, it remanded the case, because the determination of facts showing arbitrariness and unreasonableness should have been made by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the first place.21 It enumerated the revolutionary changes incident to transportation wrought in the 1930s by the widespread introduction of motor vehicles; the assumption by the federal government of the functions of a road builder; the resulting depletion of rail revenues; the change in the character, construction and use of highways; the change in the occasion for the elimination of grade crossings, and in the purpose and beneficiaries of such elimination; and the change in the relative responsibility of railroads and vehicles moving on the highways.22 In addition, it held that the promotion of public convenience did not justify requiring a railroad company -- any more than others -- to spend money, unless it was shown that the duty to provide such convenience rested upon that company.23 Providing an underpass at one's own expense for private convenience, and not primarily as a safety measure, was a denial of due process.24 Atlantic.25 In Atlantic v. Ivey, the plaintiff filed an action for damages against the railroad company for the killing of a cow on an unfenced right of way of the railway. The defendant pointed out that the original Florida Act of 1889 and its later amendments in the 1940s had required railroad companies to fence their tracks for the protection and safety of the traveling public and their property against livestock roaming at large. Thus, the defendant averred that -- without imposing a similar fencing requirement on the owners of automobiles, trucks and buses that carry passengers upon unfenced public highways of the state where such vehicles operated -- the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions would be violated.26 Reversing the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the application of the contested statutes under then existing conditions was violative of the equal protection clause.27 Citing Nashville, that Court took judicial notice of the fact that there were no motor carriers on public roads when the statutes were originally enacted. It also reasoned that the statutes were enacted in the exercise of the state's police power28 and were intended for the protection of everyone against accidents involving public transportation. Although motor-driven vehicles and railroad carriers were under a similar obligation to protect everyone against accidents to life and property when conducting their respective businesses, the hazard of accidents by reason of cattle straying onto the line of traffic of motor-driven vehicles was greater than that which arose when cattle strayed onto the line of traffic of railroad carriers.29 Yet the burden of expenses and penalties that were rendered in favor of individuals who were neither shippers nor passengers was imposed only on railroad carriers.30 In addition, the railroad carriers would be held liable for attorney's fees and double the value of the animals killed in their railways, without even requiring the plaintiffs who had sued them to prove the negligence of such carriers in operating their equipment.31 Although it was argued that motor-driven vehicles had no authority to fence on state and county highways over which they operated, the legislature could nevertheless authorize and require them to provide similar protection; or, in default thereof, to suffer similar penalties that were incidental to using such public roads for generating profit and serving

the public.32 Louisville.33 The plaintiff in Louisville v. Faulkner also filed an action against defendant-railroad company to recover the value of her mule that had strayed from her premises and got struck and killed by the company's train.34 The judgment of the lower court for the plaintiff was based on the fact that the defendant did not offer any evidence to rebut the prima facie presumption of the latter's negligence under Kentucky statutes.35 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the contested provision unconstitutional and reversed the said judgment.36Citing both Nashville and Atlantic, the appellate court said that because such legislation applied to all similar corporations and was aimed at the safety of all persons on a train and the protection of their property, it was sustained from its inception in 1893; however, under changed conditions, it could no longer be so. The court recognized the fact that, in the 1950s, the inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on public highways created even greater risks, not only to the occupants of such vehicles but also to domestic animals.37 Yet, the operators of these vehicles were not subjected to the same extraordinary legal responsibility of proving that for the killing of those animals on public roads, they were free from negligence, unlike railroad companies that struck and killed such animals on private rights of way.38 Vernon.39 The plaintiff in Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon sought to declare unconstitutional a city zoning ordinance which had limited the business use of its realty, locally known as the "Plaza," only to the parking of automobiles and its incidental services.40 The Court of Appeals of New York ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional.41 That ruling also affirmed the unanimous judgment earlier rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Again citing Nashville, the New York court ruled in the main that, no matter how compelling and acute the community traffic problem might be as to reach a strangulation point, the solution did not lie in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on a landowner in the guise of a regulation issued for a public purpose.42 Although for a long time the plaintiff's land had already been devoted to parking, the ordinance that prohibited any other use for it was not "a reasonable exercise of the police power."43 While the city's common council had the right to pass ordinances respecting the use of property according to wellconsidered and comprehensive plans designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, the exercise of such right was still subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Thus, the zoning ordinance could not preclude the use of property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted.44 Although valid when adopted in 1927, the ordinance was stricken down, because its operation under changed conditions in the 1950s proved confiscatory, especially when the value of the greater part of the land -- to be used, for instance, in the erection of a retail shopping center -- was destroyed.45 Finally, Murphy v. Edmonds.46 An automobile driver and her husband brought action against a tractor-trailer driver and his employer and sought damages for the severe injuries she had sustained in a collision. Raised in issue mainly was the constitutionality of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions.47 Affirming the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals rejecting all challenges to the validity of the law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there was no irrationality, arbitrariness, or violation of equal protection in the legislative classification drawn between (1) the less seriously injured tort claimants whose noneconomic damages were less than the statutory cap; and (2) the more seriously injured tort claimants whose noneconomic damages were greater than, and thus subject to, the statutory cap.48 Although no express equal protection clause could be found in Maryland's Constitution, the due process clause therein nevertheless embodied equal protection to the same extent as that found in the Fourteenth Amendment49 of the federal Constitution.50 Indeed, the right to recover full damages for a noneconomic injury was recognized by common law even before the adoption of the state's Constitution, but the said court declared that there was no vested interest in any rule ordained by common law.51 Concluding that only the traditional "rational basis test" should be used, the appellate court also rejected the

lower court's view of the right to press a claim for pain and suffering as an "important right" requiring a "heightened scrutiny test" of the legislative classification.52 Under the "rational basis test," such legislative classification enjoyed a strong presumption of constitutionality and, not being clearly arbitrary, could not therefore be invalidated.53 Moreover, the law was an economic response to a legislatively perceived crisis concerning not only the availability, but also the cost of liability insurance in the state.54 Putting a statutory cap on noneconomic damages was "reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective,"55 for it led to a greater ease in the calculation of insurance premiums, thus making the market more attractive to insurers. Also, it ultimately reduced the cost of such premiums and made insurance more affordable to individuals and organizations that perform needed medical services.56 From the foregoing discussion, it is immediately evident that not one of the above-cited cases is either applicable to or in pari materia with the present case. Medill not only upheld the constitutionality of the contested provision therein, but also categorically stated that the peculiar facts of the case prompted such declaration. General damages were declared exempt; the law allowing their exemption was constitutional. Cook simply affirmed Medill when the same contested provision was applied to an issue similar to that which was raised in the latter case, but then declared that provision unconstitutional when applied to another issue. Thus, while general damages were also declared exempt, the claims for special damages filed prior to the filing of a petition for relief were not, and the law allowing the latter's exemption was unconstitutional. The court's action was to be expected, because the issue on special damages in Cook was not at all raised inMedill, and there was no precedent on the matter in Minnesota, other than the obiter dictum -- if it can be called one -- in the latter case.57 Had that issue been raised in Medill, a similar conclusion would inevitably have been reached. In fact, that case already stated that while the court "need not decide whether special damages incurred prior to judgment x x x [were] to be exempt in order to decide the question"58 on general damages raised therein, it felt that exempting special damages appeared reasonable and likely to be applied, following an earlier ruling in another case.59 Moreover, the facts of both Medill and Cook are not at all akin to so-called "changed conditions" prompting the declarations of constitutionality in the former and unconstitutionality in the latter. Such "altered circumstances" or "changed conditions" in these two cases refer to the non-exemption of special damages -- a subject matter distinct and separable, although covered by the same assailed statute. In fact, Cook precisely emphasized that "where a statute is not inherently unconstitutional, it may be found constitutional as applied to some separable subject matters, and unconstitutional as applied to others."60 In other words, it was the application of the contested provision therein to an entirely different and separable subject matter -- not the contested provision itself -- that was declared unconstitutional, but the statute itself was not inherently unconstitutional to begin with. Equally important, Nashville skirted the issue on constitutionality. The "changed conditions" referred to in that case, as well as in Atlantic and Louisville, were the revolutionary changes in the mode of transportation that were specifically covered by the statutes respectively imposing additional costs upon railroad companies only, requiring the fencing of their tracks, or solely compelling them to present evidence to rebut the presumption of their negligence. In Vernon, these "changed conditions" were deemed to be the economic changes in the 1950s, through which the normal business use of the land was unduly limited by the zoning ordinance that was intended to address the acute traffic problem in the community. Nashville simply took judicial notice of the change in conditions which, together with the continued imposition of statutory charges and fees, caused deprivation of property without due process of law. Atlantic, Louisville andVernon all relied upon Nashville, but then went further by rendering their respective contested provisions unconstitutional, because -- in the application of such provisions under "changed conditions" -- those similarly situated were no longer treated alike. Finally, Murphy -- obviously misplaced because it made no reference at all to the quoted sentence in the ponencia-- even upheld the validity of its contested provision. There was no trace, either, of any "changed conditions." If at all, the legislative

classification therein was declared constitutional, because it was in fact a valid economic response to a legislatively perceived crisis concerning the availability and cost of liability insurance. In the present case, no "altered circumstances" or "changed conditions" in the application of the assailed provision can be found. It verily pertains to only one subject matter, not separable subject matters as earlier pointed out in both Medill and Cook. Hence, its application remains and will remain consistent. Not inherently unconstitutional to begin with, it cannot now be declared unconstitutional. Moreover, herein petitioner miserably fails to demonstrate -- unlike in Nashville, Atlantic, Louisville, and Vernon -- how those similarly situated have not been treated alike in the application of the assailed provision. Ponencia's Reference to "Changed Conditions" Misplaced From Nashville to Murphy, it can be seen that all the contested statutes were passed in the exercise of police power -- the inherent power of the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.61 The police measure may be struck down when an activity or property that ought to be regulated does not affect the public welfare; or when the means employed are not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the statute's purpose, and they become unduly oppressive upon individuals.62 As Justice Brandeis stresses inNashville, "it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably."63 In the case before us today, the assailed provision can be considered a police measure that regulates the income of BSP employees. Indisputably, the regulation of such income affects the public welfare, because it concerns not only these employees, but also the public in general -- from whose various credits the banks earn their income, the CB generates its revenues, and eventually these employees get their salaries and other emoluments. Additionally, with the passage of RAs 6758 and 7653, the means employed by the State to accomplish its objectives are not unduly oppressive. They are in fact reasonably necessary, not only to attract the best and brightest bank regulatory personnel, but also to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP in accordance with sound principles of management. Nothing, therefore, is arbitrary in the assailed provision; it cannot be stricken down. With due respect, the ponencia's reference to "changed conditions" is totally misplaced. In the above-cited US cases, this phrase never referred to subsequent laws or executive pronouncements, but rather to the facts and circumstances that the law or ordinance specifically addressed upon its passage or adoption. A statute that is declared invalid because of a change in circumstances affecting its validity belongs only to a class of emergency laws.64 Being a manifestation of the State's exercise of its police power, it is valid at the time of its enactment. In contrast thereto, RA 7653 cannot be regarded as an emergency measure that is merely temporary in operation. It is not even a statute limited to the exigency that brought it about. The facts and circumstances it specifically addressed upon its passage have not been shown to have changed at all. Hence, the assailed provision of such a declaratory statute cannot be invalidated. Unlike congested traffic or motor-driven vehicles on public roads, the payment of salaries at differing scales in various GFIs vis--vis in the BSP, is not such a change in conditions as would cause deprivation of property without due process of law. Petitioner's members have not been deprived of their right to income as mandated by law. They have not received less than what they were entitled to ever since RA 7653 was passed eleven years ago. To repeat, the factual situation that the assailed provision specifically addressed upon passage of this law has not changed. The same substantive rights to a competitive and structured human resource development program existing then still exist now. Only the laws external to and not amendatory of this law did. Even if these

new laws were to be considered as "changed conditions," those who have been affected in the BSP (as will be shown later) are not at all similarly situated as those in the GFIs to compel their like treatment in application. In addition, the rulings in all the above-cited American cases -- although entitled to great weight65 -- are merely of persuasive effect in our jurisdiction66 and cannot be stare decisis.67 These are not direct rulings of our Supreme Court68 that form part of the Philippine legal system.69 Granting gratia argumenti that the cited cases are to be considered binding precedents in our jurisdiction,Nashville -- the only one federal in character -- does not even make a categorical declaration on constitutionality. Furthermore, Murphy maintains that "[s]imply because a legal principle is part of the common law x x x does not give it any greater degree of insulation from legislative change."70 Common law, after all, is "a growing and ever-changing system of legal principles and theories x x x."71 Every statute is presumed constitutional.72 This axiom reflects the respect that must be accorded to the wisdom, integrity and patriotism of the legislature that passed it and to the executive who approved it.73 Understandably, therefore, the judiciary should be reluctant to invalidate laws.74 Medill precisely emphasizes that the "court's power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary."75 Although that case continues by saying that unless it is inherently unconstitutional, a law "must stand or fall x x x not upon assumptions" the court may make, the ponencia is still dauntless in relying thereon to support its arguments. Rutter Does Not Even Apply Again with due respect, the ponencia's citation of a local case, Rutter,76 is also inappropriate. In the said case, appellant instituted an action to recover the balance, and interest thereon, of a contract of sale entered into barely four months prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.77 The lower court, however, rendered judgment78 for appellee who set up as defense79 the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342.80 The lower court reasoned further that the obligation sought to be enforced was not yet demandable under that law.81 Reversing the judgment, this Court invalidated82 the moratorium clause,83 not because the law was unconstitutional, but because both its continued operation and enforcement had become unreasonable and oppressive under postwar circumstances of observable reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery of the country's general financial condition.84 The forced vigil suffered by prewar creditors was not only unwittingly extended from eight to twelve years, but was also imposed without providing for the payment of the corresponding interest in the interim.85 Thus, the success of their collection efforts, especially when their credits were unsecured, was extremely remote.86 Moreover, the settlement of claims filed with the United States-Philippine War Damage Commission was not only uncertain but was also practically futile, for it depended entirely on the appropriations to be made by the US Congress. The contested clause in Rutter was definitely a remedial measure passed to accord prewar debtors who suffered the ravages of war an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves within a reasonable time and to pay their prewar debts thereafter, thus preventing them from being victimized in the interim by their prewar creditors. The purpose having been achieved during the eight-year period, there was therefore no more reason for the law. Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases. But it does not become unconstitutional. The altered circumstances or changed conditions in Rutter were specifically the very circumstances that the law addressed at its passage; they were not at all extraneous circumstances like subsequent laws or executive pronouncements. The eight-year moratorium period having lapsed, the debtors' concerns had been adequately addressed. It was now the turn of the creditors to be protected for the pre-war loans they granted. In stark contrast, the contested proviso in the instant case is not a remedial measure. It is not subject to a period within

which a right of action or a remedy is suspended. Since the reason for the law still subsists, the law itself including the challenged proviso must continue in existence and operation. Relative Constitutionality Not Based on Positive Law Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly advocated in the ponencia, therefore, not only goes beyond the parameters of traditional constitutionalism, but also finds no express basis in positive law.87 While it has been asserted that "a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in conditions to which it is applied,"88 the present case has shown no such change in conditions that would warrant the invalidation of theassailed provision if applied under such conditions. Hence, no semblance of constitutional impuissance, other than its conjured possibility, can be seen. In a constitutional order that commands respect for coequal branches of government, speculation by the judiciary becomes incendiary and deserves no respectable place in our judicial chronicles. The ponencia further contends that the principles of international law can operate to render a valid law unconstitutional. The generally accepted definition states that international law is a body of legal rules that apply between sovereign states and such other entities as have been granted international personality.89 Government employees at the BSP with salary grades 19 and below are not such entities vested with international personality; any possible discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles and application of international law would be too far-fetched. The dangerous consequences of the majority's Decision in the present case cannot and should not be ignored. Will there now be an automatic SSL exemption for employees of other GFIs and financial regulatory agencies? Will such exemption not infringe on Congress' prerogative? The ponencia overlooks the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not a GFI, but a regulatory body of GFIs and other financial/banking institutions. Therefore, it should not be compared with them. There is no parity. The Bangko Sentral is more akin to the Insurance Commission, the National Telecommunications Commission, and the Energy Regulatory Commission. Should not more appropriate comparisons be made with such regulatory bodies and their employees? Respect for Coequal Branch The trust reposed in this Court is "not to formulate policy but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution."90 "It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into that broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the political branches to determine the policies to be pursued. This Court should ever be on the alert lest, without design or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial competence."91 Judicial activism should not be allowed to become judicial exuberance. "As was so well put by Justice Malcolm: 'Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.'"92 Since Congress itself did not commit any constitutional violation or gravely abusive conduct when it enacted RA 7653, it should not be summarily blamed for what the ponencia calls "altered circumstances."93 Congress should be given the opportunity to correct the problem, if any. I repeat, I am not against exemption from the SSL of Bangko Sentral employees with salary grades 19 and below. Neither am I against increases in their pay. However, it is Congress, not this Court, that should provide a solution to their predicament, at least in the first instance. The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to enact corrective legislation is a resort, not to this Court, but to the bar of public opinion. The electorate can refuse to return to Congress members who, in their view, have been remiss in the discharge of their constitutional duties.94 Our Constitution presumes that, absent any inference of antipathy, improvident legislative decisions "will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes;"95 and that judicial intervention is unwarranted, no matter how unwisely a political branch may have acted.96

It is only the legislature, not the courts, that "must be appealed to for the change."97 If, however, Congress decides to act, the choice of appropriate measure lies within its discretion. Once determined, the measure chosen cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best solution, or that it is unwise or inefficacious.98 A law that advances a legitimate governmental interest will be sustained, even if it "works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or x x x the rationale for it seems tenuous."99 To compel this Court to make a more decisive but unnecessary action in advance of what Congress will do is a downright derogation of the Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a super-legislature and invests it with a power that to it has never belonged.100 In the words of the great Sir William Blackstone, "there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the Legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the Legislature, or no[t]."101 As Rousseau further puts it, "according to the fundamental compact, only the general will can bind the individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with the general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people."102 Thus, instead of this Court invalidating a sovereign act, Congress should be given the opportunity to enact the appropriate measure to address the so-called "changed conditions." We cannot second-guess the mind of the legislature as the repository of the sovereign will. For all we know, amidst the fiscal crisis and financial morass we are experiencing, Congress may altogether remove the blanket exemption, put a salary cap on the highest echelons,103 lower the salary grade scales subject to SSL exemption, adopt performance-based compensation structures, or even amend or repeal the SSL itself, but within the constitutional mandate that "at the earliest possible time, the Government shall increase the salary scales of x x x officials and employees of the National Government."104 Legislative reforms of whatever nature or scope may be taken one step at a time, addressing phases of problems that seem to the legislative mind most acute.105 Rightly so, our legislators must have "flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial efforts."106 Where there are plausible reasons for their action, the Court's "inquiry is at an end."107 Under the doctrine of separation of powers and the concomitant respect for coequal and coordinate branches of government, the exercise of prudent restraint by this Court would still be best under the present circumstances. Not Grossly Discriminatory There is no question that Congress neither violated the Constitution nor gravely abused its discretion when it enacted "The New Central Bank Act" to establish and organize the BSP in 1993.108 Indeed, RA 7653 is a valid legislative measure. Even the majority concedes that in enacting that law, Congress was well within its legislative powers. However, the ponencia argues that the subsequent enactment of laws granting "blanket exemption" from the coverage of the SSL of all employees in seven GFIs109 has made the contested proviso "grossly discriminatory in its operation"110 and therefore unconstitutional. This conclusion, to my mind, is a non sequitur. The mere possible effect of related or unrelated laws on another law does not ipso facto make the latter unconstitutional. Besides, as already discussed, the theory of relative constitutionality is plainly inapplicable to the present facts. Moreover, the ponencia has assumed without proof that the BSP rank and file employees are factually and actually similarly situated as the rank and filers of Land Bank, SSS, GSIS, etc., and it is clear from the discussion in Mme. Justice Carpio Morales' Dissenting Opinion that that is not really the case. In fact, there exist some substantial differences in scope of work, job responsibilities and so forth that would negate the ponencia's assumption No Indicium of Urgency Other than its bare assertion that the continued implementation of the assailed provision111 would cause "irreparable damage and prejudice"112 to its members, petitioner also fails to show a minimum indicium of such extreme urgency as would impel this Court to second-guess Congress.

Briefly, petitioner contends that (1) the creation of two classes of employees within the BSP based on the salary grade corresponding to their positions113 is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious class legislation;114 and (2) the law itself discriminates against rank and file employees of the BSP vis--vis those of GFIs.115 These contentions are utterly unsubstantiated. They find no support in law for granting the relief prayed for. While it is true that all employees of the BSP are appointed under the authority of the Monetary Board, observe the same set of office rules and regulations, and perform their work in practically the same offices,116 it is equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility for BSP employees with salary grades 19 and below are different from those of other BSP employees with salary grades 20 and above. All those classes of position belonging to the Professional Supervisory Category117 of the Position Classification System118 under RA 6758, for instance, are obviously not subjected to the same levels of difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements as those belonging to the Professional Non-Supervisory Category,119 although to both categories are assigned positions that include salary grades 19 and 20.120 To assert, as petitioner does, that the statutory classification is just an "artifice based on arbitrariness,"121 without more, is nothing more than throwing a few jabs at an imaginary foe. In like manner, petitioner's denunciation of the proviso for allegedly discriminating against its members vis--vis the rank and filers of other GFIs ignores the fact that the BSP and the GFIs cited in the ponencia do not belong to the same category of government institutions, although it may be said that both are, broadly speaking, "involved" in banking and finance.122 While the former performs primarily governmental or regulatory functions, the latter execute purely proprietary ones. Moreover, the extent of damage or prejudice inflicted upon the BSP rank and file employees as a result of the proviso is not shown by any evidence on record. Indeed, neither the petitioner nor the ponencia demonstrate the injuries sustained.123 There is no indication whatsoever of the precise nature and extent of damages caused or to be caused to petitioner's members by the continued implementation of such provision. Surely, with no leg to stand on, the allegation of petitioner that there is great disparity in compensation, allowances or benefits, cannot be considered to be stigmatizing and wounding to the psyche of thousands of its members.124 In fact, BSP employees, in general, also share the same tribulations of workers and employees in other regulatory government offices.125 Not even petitioner's broad and bare claim of "transcendental importance"126 can ipso facto generate alacrity on the part of this Court. In the United States more than sixty years ago, Justice Brandeis delineated the famous canons of avoidance under which their Supreme Court had refrained from passing upon constitutional questions. One such canon is that the Court must "not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it x x x. It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case."127 In addition, the Court must not "pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of."128 Applying to this case the contours of constitutional avoidance Brandeis brilliantly summarized, this Court may choose to ignore the constitutional question presented by petitioner, since there is indeed some other ground upon which this case can be disposed of -- its clear lack of urgency, by reason of which Congress should be allowed to do its primary task of reviewing and possibly amending the law. Taking cognizance of this case and disposing of, or altogether ignoring, the constitutional question leads us to the same inevitable conclusion: the assailed provision should not be declared "unconstitutional, unless it is clearly so."129 Whichever path is chosen by this Court, I am of the firm belief that such provision cannot and should not be declared unconstitutional. Since the authority to declare a legal provision void is of a "delicate and awful nature,"130 the Court should "never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case."131 If ever there is doubt -- and clearly there is, as manifested herein by a sharply divided Court -- "the expressed will of the legislature should be sustained."132

Indeed, this Court is of the unanimous opinion that the assailed provision was at the outset constitutional; however, with recent amendments to related laws,133 the majority now feels that said provision could no longer pass constitutional muster. To nail my colors to the mast, such proclivity to declare it immediately unconstitutional not only imprudently creeps into the legislative sphere, but also sorely clings to the strands of obscurantism. Future changes in both legislation and its executive implementation should certainly not be the benchmark for a preemptive declaration of unconstitutionality, especially when the said provision is not even constitutionally infirm to begin with. Moreover, the congressional enactment into law of pending bills134 on the compensation of BSP employees -- or even those related thereto -- will certainly affect the assailed provision. This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the authority nor the competence to contemplate laws, much less to create or amend them. Given the current status of these pending bills, the arguments raised by petitioner against the assailed provision become all the more tenuous and amorphous. I feel we should leave that provision untouched, and instead just accord proper courtesy to our legislators to determine at the proper time and in the manner they deem best the appropriate content of any modifications to it. Besides, there is an omnipresent presumption of constitutionality in every legislative enactment.135 No confutation of the proviso was ever shown before; none should be considered now. Congress Willing to Perform Duty Far from being remiss in its duty, Congress is in fact presently deliberating upon HB 00123, which precisely seeks to amend RA 7653 by, inter alia, exempting from the SSL136 all positions in the BSP.137 Accordingly, this Court should not preempt Congress, especially when the latter has already shown its willingness and ability to perform its constitutional duty.138 After all, petitioner has not proven any extreme urgency for this Court to shove Congress aside in terms of providing the proper solution. Lawmaking is not a pool this Court should wade into. The Monetary Board has enough leeway to devise its own human resource management system, subject to the standards of professionalism and excellence that are in accordance with sound principles of management.139 This system must also be in close conformity to the principles provided for, as well as with the rates prescribed, under RA 6758. More specifically, there should be "equal pay for substantially equal work" and any differences in pay should be based "upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."140 In determining the basic compensation of all government personnel, due regard should be given by the said Board to the prevailing rates for comparable work in the private sector.141 Furthermore, the reasonableness of such compensation should be in proportion to the national budget142 and to the possible erosion in purchasing power as a result of inflation and other factors.143 It should also abide by the Index of Occupational Services prepared by the Department of Budget and Management in accordance with the Benchmark Position Schedule and other factors prescribed thereunder.144 This Court has not been apprised as to how precisely the human resource management system of the BSP has been misused. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is therefore presumed that the law has been obeyed,145 and that official duty has been regularly performed146 in implementing the said law. Where additional implementing rules would still be necessary to put the assailed provision into continued effect, any "attack on their constitutionality would be premature."147 Surely, it would be wise "not to anticipate the serious constitutional law problems that would arise under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by prudence."148 Attempts "at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."149 A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by purely cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery, especially during rowelling times. No Denial of Equal Protection

Even if the matter of urgency is set aside for the nonce, and the Court exercises its power of judicial review150over acts of the legislature,151 I respectfully submit that the Petition should still be dismissed because the assailed provision's continued operation will not result in a denial of equal protection. Neither the passage of RA 7653 nor its implementation has been "committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."152 Every statute is intended by the legislature to operate "no further than may be necessary to effectuate"153 its specific purpose. In the absence of a clear finding as to its arbitrary, whimsical or capricious application, the assailed provision cannot be struck down as violative of the fundamental law. Moreover, "[u]nder the 'enrolled bill doctrine,'154 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the [s]ecretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed, are conclusive"155 "not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment."156 It is therefore futile to welter in the thought that the original and amended versions of the corresponding bill have no reference to the proviso in question.157 Floor deliberations are either expansive or restrictive. Bills filed cannot be expected to remain static; they transmute in form and substance. Whatever doubts there may be as to the validity of any provision therein must necessarily be resolved in its favor. Brief Background of the Equal Protection Clause Despite the egalitarian commitment in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal," the framers of the original Constitution of the United States omitted any constitutional rule of equal protection. Not until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment thereto was ratified by the legislatures of the several states of the Union,158 did the concept of equal protection have a constitutional basis;159 and not until the modern era did the United States Supreme Court give it enduring constitutional significance. From its inception, therefore, the equal protection clause in "the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment"160 already sought "to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality and to render it impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment."161 Its original understanding was the proscription only of certain discriminatory acts based on race,162 although its proper construction, when called to the attention of the US Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases, first involved exclusive privileges.163 Eventually, other disfavored bases of governmental action were identified. Labeled as morally irrelevant traits, gender, illegitimacyand alienage were included in this list. Today, this clause is "the single most important concept x x x for the protection of individual rights."164 It does not, however, create substantive rights.165 Its guaranty is merely "a pledge of the protection of equal laws."166 Its "promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons."167 As mirrored in our Constitution,168 this clause enjoys the interpretation given by its American framers169 and magistrates. In fact, a century ago, this Court already enunciated that "the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the [US] Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the [US] Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the [US] Constitution, and except those express provisions of the [US] Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their contravention under any circumstances x x x."170 Being one such limitation in favor of personal rights enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection is thus deemed extended to our jurisdiction. Notably, Justice Malcolm himself said that the constitutional law of Spain, then in effect, was "entirely abrogated by the change of sovereignty."171 As a result, it was the constitutional law of the United States that was transposed to our fledgling political and legal system. To be precise, the principal organic acts of the Philippines included President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, to which this Court recognized the United States Constitution as a limitation172 upon the powers of the military governor then in charge of the Philippine Islands.173

In a catena of constitutional cases decided after the change in sovereignty, this Court consistently held that the equal protection clause requires all persons or things similarly situated to "be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects x x x should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."174 Being a constitutional limitation first recognized175 in Rubi176 -- citing Yick Wo177 -- as one "derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"178 this clause prescribes certain requirements for validity: the challenged statute must be applicable to all members of a class, reasonable, and enforced by the regular methods of procedure prescribed, rather than by purely arbitrary means.179 Its reasonableness must meet the requirements enumerated in Vera180 and later summarized in Cayat.181 Three Tests Passed by Assailed Provision I respectfully submit that the assailed provision passes the three-tiered standard of review for equal protection that has been developed by the courts through all these years. The Rational Basis Test Under the first tier or the rational relationship or rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an accepted governmental end.182 In other words, it must be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest."183 To be reasonable, such classification must be (1) based on substantial distinction that makes for real differences; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the same class.184 Murphy states that when a governmental classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, such classification is in most instances reviewed under the standard rational basis test.185 Accordingly, courts will not overturn that classification, unless the varying treatments of different groups are so unrelated to the achievement of any legitimate purpose that the courts can only conclude that the governmental actions are irrational.186 A classification must "be reasonable, not arbitrary, and x x x rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."187 All these conditions are met in the present case. The retention of the best and the brightest officials in an independent central monetary authority188 is a valid governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a corresponding exemption from a salary standardization scheme that is based on graduated salary levels. The legislature in fact enjoys a wide berth in continually classifying whenever it enacts a law,189 provided that no persons similarly situated within a given class are treated differently. To contend otherwise is to be presumptuous about the legislative intent or lack of it. Whether it would have been a better policy to make a more comprehensive classification "is not our province to decide."190 The absence of legislative facts supporting a classification chosen has no significance in the rational basis test.191 In fact, "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data."192 Requiring Congress to justify its efforts may even "lead it to refrain from acting at all."193 In addition, Murphy holds that the statutory classification "enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it."194 Respectfully, therefore, I again differ from the ponencia's contention that the amendments of the charters of the seven GFIs from 1995 to 2004195 have already "unconstitutionalized" the continued implementation of the BSP proviso. Be it remembered that the first six GFIs mentioned by Mr. Justice Puno -- namely the LBP, SSS, SBGFC, GSIS, DBP and HGC -- do not stand in the same class and category as the BSP.196

While the BSP, as mentioned earlier, is a regulatory agency performing governmental functions, the six aforementioned GFIs perform proprietary functions that chiefly compete with private banks and other non-bank financial institutions. Thus, the so-called concept of relative constitutionality again finds no application. Under therational relationship test, there can be no unequal protection of the law between employees of the BSP and those of the GFIs. Further, the equal protection clause "guarantees equality, not identity of rights."197 A law remains valid even if it is limited "in the object to which it is directed."198 "Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement x x x inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact that the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration."199 In fact, as long as "the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern."200 "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."201 On the other hand, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) is also a government regulatory agency almost on the same level of importance as the BSP. However, its charter was only amended very recently -- to be more precise, on July 27, 2004.202 Consequently, it would be most unfair to implicitly accuse Congress of inaction, discrimination and unequal treatment. Comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that our lawmakers be given sufficient time and leeway to address the alleged problem of differing pay scales. "Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function."203 Besides, it is a cardinal rule that courts first ascertain whether construction of a statute is fairly possible by which any constitutional question therein may be avoided.204 To explain further, while the possible changes contemplated by Congress in HB 00123 are similar, if not identical, to those found in the amended charters of the seven other GFIs already mentioned, the governmental objectives as explicitly stated in the explanatory note remain -- to ascertain BSP's effectiveness and to strengthen its supervisory capability in promoting a more stable banking system. This fact merely confirms that the present classification and distinction under the assailed provision still bear a rational relationship to the same legitimate governmental objectives and should, therefore, not be invalidated. The validity of a law is to be determined not by its effects on a particular case or by an incidental result arising therefrom, but by the purpose and efficacy of the law in accomplishing that effect or result.205 This point confirms my earlier position that the enactment of a law is not the same as its operation. Unlike Vera in which the Court invalidated the law on probation because of the unequal effect in the operation of such law,206 the assailed provision in the present case suffers from no such invidious discrimination. It very well achieves its purpose, and it applies equally to all government employees within the BSP. Furthermore, the application of this provision is not made subject to any discretion, uneven appropriation of funds, or time limitation. Consequently, such a law neither denies equal protection nor permits of such denial. The Strict Scrutiny Test Under the second tier or the strict scrutiny test, the Court will require the government to show a compelling or overriding end to justify (1) the limitation on fundamental rights or (2) the implication of suspect classes.207 Where a statutory classification impinges upon a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class, such classification is subjected to strict scrutiny.208 It will be upheld only if it is shown to be "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."209 Therefore, all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a suspect class, like a single racial or ethnic group, are immediately suspect. "That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."210 Pressing public necessity, for instance, may justify the existence of those restrictions, but antagonism toward such suspect classes never can.

To date, no American case -- federal or state -- has yet been decided involving equal pay schemes as applied either to government employees vis--vis private ones, or within the governmental ranks. Salary grade or class of position is not a fundamental right like marriage,211 procreation,212 voting,213speech214 and interstate travel.215 American courts have in fact even refused to declare government employment a fundamental right.216 As to suspect classes, non-exempt government employees (those with salary grades below 20) are not a group "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness, as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."217 They are a group so much unlike race,218 nationality,219 alienage220 or denominational preference221 -- factors that are "seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy x x x."222 Again, with due respect, the ponencia's223 reference to Yick Wo,224 therefore, is unbefitting. Indeed that case held that "[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the [C]onstitution."225 The facts in Yick Wo clearly point out that the questioned ordinances therein -- regulating the use of wooden buildings in the business of keeping and conducting laundries -- operated in hostility to the race and nationality to which plaintiffs belonged, being aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.226 To a board of supervisors was given the arbitrary power to withhold permits to carry on a harmless and useful occupation on which the plaintiffs depended for livelihood.227 In contrast, no such arbitrariness is found in the case at bar. Neither is there any allegation of abuse of discretion in the implementation of a human resource development program. There is also no allegation of hostility shown toward employees receiving salaries below grade 20. In fact, for purposes of equal protection analysis, financial need alone does not identify a suspect class.228 And even if it were to consider government pay to be akin to wealth, it has already been held that "where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."229 After all, a law does not become invalid "because of simple inequality,"230 financial or otherwise. Since employment in the government is not a fundamental right and government employees below salary grade 20 are not a suspect class, the government is not required to present a compelling objective to justify a possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. The assailed provision thus cannot be invalidated via the strict scrutiny gauntlet. "In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."231 The Intensified Means Test Under the third tier or the intensified means test, the Court should accept the legislative end, but should closely scrutinize its relationship to the classification made.232 There exist classifications that are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree of scrutiny than the deferential or traditional rational basis test. These classifications, however, have not been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights; thus, they have not been subjected to the strict scrutiny test. In other words, such classifications must be "substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest."233 Examples of these so-called "quasi-suspect" classifications are those based on gender,234 legitimacy under certain circumstances,235 legal residency with regard to availment of free public education, civil service employment preference for armed forces veterans who are state residents upon entry to military service, and the right to practice for compensation the profession for which certain persons have been qualified and licensed.236

Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive but not a suspect class, and their employment status may be important although not fundamental. Yet, the enactment of the assailed provision is a reasonable means by which the State seeks to advance its interest.237 Since such provision sufficiently serves important governmental interests and is substantially related to the achievement thereof, then, again it stands. "In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'"238 "The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that x x x the fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality."239 A statute, therefore, "is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce."240 Congress does not have to "strike at all evils at the same time."241 Quoting Justice Holmes, a law "aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to which [the law] might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge[,] unless the case is very clear."242 This Court is without power to disturb a legislative judgment, unless "there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched."243 To find fault with a legislative policy "is not to establish the invalidity of the law based upon it."244 Epilogue After that rather lengthy discourse, permit me to summarize. I respectfully submit that the assailed provision is not unconstitutional either on its face or as applied. First, the theory of relative constitutionality is inapplicable to and not in pari materia with the present facts. It pertains only to the circumstances that an assailed law specifically addressed upon its passage, and not to extraneous circumstances. The American cases cited in the ponencia prove my point. The laws therein that have been declared invalid because of "altered circumstances" or "changed conditions" are of the emergency type passed in the exercise of the State's police power, unlike the law involved in the present case. Moreover, our ruling in Rutter does not apply, because the assailed provision in the present case is not a remedial measure subject to a period within which a right of action or a remedy is suspended. Since the reason for the passage of the law still continues, the law itself must continue. Second, this Court should respect Congress as a coequal branch of government. No urgency has been shown as to require the peremptory striking down of the assailed provision, and no injuries have been demonstrated to have been sustained as to require immediate action on the judiciary's part. The legislative classification of BSP employees into exempt and non-exempt, based on the salary grade of their positions, and their further distinction (albeit perhaps not by design) from the employees of various GFIs are nevertheless valid and reasonable in achieving the standards of professionalism and excellence within the BSP -- standards that are in accordance with sound principles of management and the other principles provided for under RA 6758. They are employees not subjected to the same levels of difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements. Besides, the BSP performs primarily governmental or regulatory functions, while the GFIs cited in the ponencia execute purely proprietary ones. Congress is in fact presently deliberating upon possible amendments to the assailed provision. Since there is no question that it validly exercised its power and did not gravely abuse its discretion when it enacted the law, its will must be sustained. Under the doctrine of separation of powers with concomitant respect for coequal and coordinate branches of government, this Court has neither the authority nor the competence to create or amend laws.

Third, the assailed provision passes the three-tiered standard of review for equal protection. It is both a social and an economic measure rationally related to a governmental end that is not prohibited. Since salary grade, class of position, and government employment are not fundamental or constitutional rights, and non-exempt government employees or their financial need are not suspect classes, the government is not at all required to show a compelling state interest to justify the classification made. The provision is also substantially related to the achievement of sufficiently important governmental objectives. A law does not become invalid because of simple inequality, or because it did not strike at all evils at the same time. At bottom, whichever constitutional test is used, the assailed provision is not unconstitutional. Moreover, a thorough scrutiny of the Petition reveals that the issue of equal protection has been raised only in regard to the unconstitutionality of the proviso at its inception,245 and not by reason of the alleged "changed conditions" propounded by the ponencia. With greater reason then that the Petition should be denied. In our jurisdiction, relative constitutionality is a rarely utilized theory having radical consequences; hence, I believe it should not be imposed by the Court unilaterally. Even in the US, it applies only when there is a change in factual circumstances covered by the law, not when there is an enactment of another law pertaining to subjects not directly covered by the assailed law. Whether factual conditions have so changed as to call for a partial or even a total abrogation of the law is a matter that rests primarily within the constitutional prerogative of Congress to determine.246 To justify a judicial nullification, the constitutional breach of a legal provision must be very clear and unequivocal, not doubtful or argumentative.247 In short, this Court can go no further than to inquire whether Congress had the power to enact a law; it cannot delve into the wisdom of policies it adopts or into the adequacy under existing conditions of measures it enacts.248The equal protection clause is not a license for the courts "to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."249 Since relative constitutionality was not discussed by the parties in any of their pleadings,fundamental fairness and evenhandedness still dictate that Congress be heard on this concept before the Court imposes it in a definitive ruling. Just a final observation at this juncture. It seems to me that when RA 7653 was enacted, the real focus of the second paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of the statute was to enable the officers and executives of the BSP to enjoy a wider scope of exemption from the Compensation Classification System than that stated in the last part of Section 9 of the Salary Standardization Law. As can be gleaned from the deliberations on the bill, the mention of BSP employees with salary grade 19 and below seems to have been purely incidental in the process of defining who were part of the executive and officer corps. It appears that the "classification" (if we can call it that) of the rank and filers with salary grade 19 and below, via the challenged proviso, came about not by design. And it was only after the later pieces of legislation were promulgated affecting the charters of the LBP, GSIS, SSS, DBP, etc. that the proviso came to be considered as "discriminatory." In these trying times, I cannot but sympathize with the BSP rank and filers on account of the situation they have found themselves in, and I do not mean to begrudge them the opportunity to receive a higher compensation package than what they are receiving now. However, they are operating on the simplistic assumption that, being rank and file employees employed in a GFI, they are automatically entitled to the same benefits, privileges, increases and the like enjoyed by any other rank and file employee of a GFI, seeing as they are all working for one and the same government anyway. It could also have something to do with the fact that Central Bank employees were quite well paid in the past. They may have overlooked the fact that the different GFIs are regulated by their respective charters, and are mandated to perform different functions (governmental or proprietary). Consequently, their requirements and priorities are likewise different, and differ in importance in the overall scheme of things, thus necessitating some degree of differentiation and calibration in respect of resource allocation, budgets and appropriations, and the like.

The long and short of it is that there can be no such thing as an automatic entitlement to increases in compensation, benefits and so forth, whether we consider the BSP rank and filers similarly situated along with other rank and filers of GFIs, or as being in a class by themselves. This is because the BSP is, strictly speaking, not a GFI but rather, the regulatory agency of GFIs. The foregoing becomes even more starkly clear when mention is again made of the fiscal/budget deficit hobbling the national government, which has, not surprisingly, triggered waves of belt tightening measures throughout every part of the bureaucracy. This particular scenario puts Congress somewhat at odds with itself. On the one hand, it is studying HB 00123 with the end in view of precisely addressing the principal concern of the petitioner. On the other hand, it is also looking into how the various exemptions from the Salary Standardization Law can be rationalized or done away with, in the hope of ultimately reducing the gargantuan deficit. Thankfully, the Court is not the one having to grapple with such a conundrum. It behooves us to give Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional mandate and prerogative, as much elbow room and breathing space as it needs in order to tackle and perhaps vanquish the many headed monster. And while we all watch from the sidelines, we can all console ourselves and one another that after all, whether we find ourselves classified-out as BSP rank and filers, or officers and executives, or employees and members of the judiciary, we are -- all of us -- in the same boat, for we have all chosen to be in "public service," as the term is correctly understood. And what is public service if it does not entail a certain amount of personal sacrifice on the part of each one of us, all for the greater good of our society and country. We each make our respective sacrifices, sharing in the burden today, in the hope of a better tomorrow for our children and loved ones, and our society as a whole. It makes us strong. For this we can be thankful as well. WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. I maintain that the last proviso of the second paragraph of Section 15(c) of Chapter 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is constitutional. Congress should be given adequate opportunity to enact the appropriate legislation that will address the issue raised by petitioner and clear the proviso of any possible or perceived infringement of the equal protection clause. At the very least, Congress and herein respondents should be given notice and opportunity to respond to the possible application of the theory of relative constitutionality before it is, if at all, imposed by this Court.

DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.: I dissent from the majority opinion. First, the majority opinion does not annul a law but enacts a pending bill in Congress into law. The majority opinion invades the legislative domain by enacting into law a bill that the 13th Congress is now considering for approval. The majority opinion does this in the guise of annulling a proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 ("RA 7653"). Second, the majority opinion erroneously classifies the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas ("BSP"), a regulatory agency exercising sovereign functions, in the same category as non-regulatory corporations exercising purely commercial functions like Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"), Social Security System ("SSS"), Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP"), Small Borrowers Guarantee Fund Corporation ("SBGFC"), and Home Guarantee Corporation ("HGC"). Usurpation of Legislative Power

There is a bill now pending in Congress, House Bill No. 123, seeking to exempt the rank-and-file employees of BSP from the Salary Standardization Law ("SSL"). A similar bill was filed in the 12th Congress together with the bill exempting from the SSL all officials and employees of Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation ("PDIC"). The bill exempting PDIC employees from SSL was approved on 27 July 2004 in the dying days of the 12th Congress. However, due to lack of time, the bill exempting BSP rank-and-file employees did not reach third reading. What the majority opinion wants is to preempt Congress by declaring through a judicial decision that BSP rank-and-file employees are now exempt from the SSL. The majority opinion seeks to legislate the exemption from SSL by declaring void the proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653 ("proviso"), which states: A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. (Emphasis supplied) The majority opinion justifies its action by saying that while the proviso was valid when first enacted, it is now invalid because its continued operation is discriminatory against BSP rank-and-file employees. All officials and employees of other government financial institutions ("GFIs") like GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS, SBGFC, HGC and PDIC are now exempt from the SSL. Congress granted the exemptions over the years, for LBP in 1995, SSS in 1997, GSIS in 1997, SBGFC in 1997, DBP in 1998, HGC in 2000, and PDIC in 2004. Among the GFIs granted exemption from SSL, only PDIC is a regulatory agency. PDIC received its SSL exemption only this year - 2004. PDIC is the first regulatory GFI whose rank-and-file employees are exempt from the SSL. Rankand-file employees of BSP, a GFI exercising regulatory functions, cannot at this time claim any unreasonable or oppressive delay in securing legislative exemption from SSL, assuming Congress is disposed to grant an exemption. At this time, this Court cannot say that the continued validity of the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653 is unreasonable and oppressive on BSP rank-and-file employees. This Court cannot say that Congress gravely abused its jurisdiction in not exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL at the same time as PDIC. Congress is now considering BSP's exemption, and this Court cannot imperiously conclude that Congress had more than enough time to act on BSP's exemption. Even if Congress does not act on BSP's exemption for more than one year, it does not follow that this Court should then exempt BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL. As the law now stands, PDIC is the only regulatory GFI whose rankand-file employees are exempt from SSL. All other GFIs exercising regulatory functions are not exempt from the SSL, including BSP whose rank-and file employees are subject to the SSL. The grant of exemption to PDIC is the legislative act that is questionable for being discriminatory against all other selfsustaining government agencies exercising regulatory functions. Such grant to one regulatory agency, without a similar grant to other regulatory agencies whose incomes exceed their expenses, creates a class of exemption that has dubious basis. In short, the singular exemption of PDIC from the SSL discriminates against all other self-sustaining government agencies that exercise regulatory functions. The grant of SSL exemption to GFIs has ramifications on the deepening budget deficit of the government. Under Republic Act No. 76561, all GFIs are required to remit to the National Treasury at least 50% of their annual net earnings. This remittance forms part of the government revenues that fund the annual appropriations act. If the remittances from GFIs decrease, the national revenues funding the annual appropriations act correspondingly decrease. This results in widening even more the budget deficit.

A bigger budget deficit means there are no revenues to fund salary increases of all government employeeswho are paid out of the annual appropriations act. The exemption of GFIs from SSL may delay or even prevent a general increase in the salary of all government employees, including rank-and-file employees in the judiciary. This Court cannot simply ordain an exemption from SSL without considering serious ramifications on fiscal policies of the government. This is a matter better left to the Executive and Legislative Departments. This Court cannot intrude into fiscal policies that are the province of the Executive and Legislative Departments. Indeed, Congress should pass a law rationalizing the exemptions of all government agencies from the SSL. The piecemeal grant of exemptions is creating distortions in the salary structure of government employees similarly situated. Such rationalization, however, is not the function of the Court. Even as a practical matter, this Court does not have the necessary data to rationalize the exemptions of all government agencies from the SSL. The power of judicial review of legislative acts presumes that Congress has enacted a law that may violate the Constitution. This Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review before Congress has enacted the questioned law. In this case, Congress is still considering the bill exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL. There is still no opportunity for this Court to exercise its review power because there is nothing to review. The majority opinion, however, claims that because of the failure of Congress to enact the bill exempting BSP rank-and-file employees from the SSL, this Court should now annul the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653 to totally exempt BSP from the SSL. This is no longer an exercise of the power of judicial review but an exercise of the power of legislation - a power that this Court does not possess. The power to exempt a government agency from the SSL is a legislative power, not a judicial power. By annulling a prior valid law that has the effect of exempting BSP from the SSL, this Court is exercising a legislative power. The power of judicial review is the power to strike down an unconstitutional act of a department or agency of government, not the power to initiate or perform an act that is lodged in another department or agency of government. If this Court strikes down the law exempting PDIC from the SSL because it is discriminatory against other government agencies similarly situated, this Court is exercising its judicial review power. The effect is torevert PDIC to its previous situation of being subject to the SSL, the same situation governing BSP and other agencies similarly situated. However, by annulling the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653, BSP is not reverted to its previous situation but brought to a new situation that BSP cannot attain without a new legislation. Other government agencies similarly situated as BSP remain in their old situation still being subject to the SSL. This is not an annulment of a legislative act but an enactment of legislation exempting one agency from the SSL without exempting the remaining agencies similarly situated. The majority opinion cites Rutter v. Esteban2 as precedent for declaring the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653 unconstitutional. Rutter is not applicable to the present case. In Rutter, the Court declared on 18 May 1953 that while the Debt Moratorium Law was valid when enacted on 26 July 1948, its "continued operation and enforcement x x x is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer." With the discontinuance of the effectivity of the Debt Moratorium Law, the debtors who benefited from the law were returned to their original situation prior to the enactment of the law. This meant that the creditors could resume collecting from the debtors the debts the payment of which was suspended by the Debt Moratorium Law. The creditors and debtors were restored to their original situation before the enactment of the Debt Moratorium Law. No debtor or creditor was placed in a new situation that required the enactment of a new law. In the present case, declaring the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653 no longer legally effective does not restore the BSP rank-and-file employees to their original situation, which subjected them to the SSL. Instead, the discontinuance of the validity of the proviso brings the BSP rank-and-file employees to a new situation that they are not entitled without the enactment of a new law. The effect of the majority decision is to legislate a new law that brings the BSP rank-andfile

employees to a new situation. Clearly, the Rutterdoctrine does not apply to the present case. Erroneous Classification of BSP as GFI Similar to LBP, DBP and Others The majority opinion classifies BSP as a GFI just like GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS, SBGFC, HGC and PDIC. Here lies the basic error of the majority opinion. GSIS, LBP, DBP, SSS, SBGFC and HGC are GFIs but are not regulatory agencies. BSP and PDIC are GFIs but are also regulatory agencies just like other governmental regulatory agencies. The majority opinion is comparing apples with oranges. GFIs that do not exercise regulatory functions operate just like commercial financial institutions. However, GFIs that exercise regulatory functions, like BSP and PDIC, are unlike commercial financial institutions. BSP and PDIC exercise sovereign functions unlike the other non-regulatory GFIs. Non-regulatory GFIs derive their income solely from commercial transactions. They compete head on with private financial institutions. Their operating expenses, including employees' salaries, come from their own self-generated income from commercial activities. However, regulatory GFIs like BSP and PDIC derive their income from fees, charges and other impositions that all banks are by law required to pay. Regulatory GFIs have no competitors in the private sector. Obviously, BSP and PDIC do not belong to the same class of GFIs as LBP, SSS, GSIS, SBGFC, DBP and HGC. Exempting non-regulatory GFIs from the SSL is justified because these GFIs operate just like private commercial entities. Their revenues, from which they pay the salaries of their employees, come solely from commercial operations. None of their revenues comes from mandatory government exactions. This is not the case of GFIs like BSP and PDIC which impose regulatory fees and charges. Conclusion Under the Constitution, Congress is an independent department that is a co-equal of the Supreme Court. This Court has always accorded Congress the great respect that it deserves under the Constitution. The power to legislate belongs to Congress. The power to review enacted legislation belongs to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no power to declare a pending bill in Congress as deemed enacted into law. That is not the power to review legislation but the power to usurp a legislative function. The majority opinion is leading this Court into usurping the primary jurisdiction of Congress to enact laws. The majority opinion brings this Court and Congress into a needless clash of powers - whether the power of judicial review of legislative acts includes the power to initiate legislative acts if this Court becomes impatient with the pace of legislative process. Clearly, this Court does not have the power to legislate. Congress has a right to guard zealously its primary power to enact laws as much as this Court has a right to guard zealously its power to review enacted legislations. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Is being an employee of a Government Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC) or a Government Financial Institution (GFI) a reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption from the compensation and position classification system for all government personnel provided in Republic Act No. 6758,1 entitled Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, also known as the Salary Standardization Law?

The main opinion, by simultaneously applying two different standards for determining compliance with the constitutional requirement of equal protection - the "rational basis test" and the "strict scrutiny test" - under the rubric of "relative constitutionality," holds that it is. Upon studied reflection, however, I find that such conclusion is contrary to the weight of the applicable legal authorities; involves an evaluation of the wisdom of the law and a pre-emption of the congressional power of appropriation, which are both beyond the scope of judicial review; and results in increased, rather than reduced, inequality within the government service - creating, as it does, a preferred sub-class of government employees,i.e. employees of GFIs, devoid of either a rational factual basis or a discernable public purpose for such classification. Consequently, I am constrained to respectfully register my dissent. The relevant antecedents of this case are as follows: On August 21, 1989, R.A. No. 6758 (the Salary Standardization Law), amending Presidential Decree No. 985 (the Old Salary Standardization Law), was enacted2 in response to the mandate to provide for a standardized compensation scale for all government employees, including those employed in GOCCs, under Section 5, Article IX-B, of the Constitution: Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. This provision was taken from the 1973 Constitution in order to address the wide disparity of compensation between government employees employed in proprietary corporations and those strictly performing governmental functions, the disparity, having been brought about by the increasing number of exemptions of proprietary corporations through special legislation from the coverage of the then Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972.3Part III, Chapter II, Article II of the latter stated: Article II - Reexamination of the WAPCO4 Plans After thirteen years in operation, the WAPCO Plans have been undermined by the increasing number of exemptions from its coverage through special legislation. Moreover, through court decisions and the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the so-called proprietary corporations are no longer subject to the Plans Through collective bargaining, employees of government corporations have been able to secure not only higher salaries but liberal fringe benefits as well. As revealed by the 1970 Presidential Committee to Study Corporate Salary Scales, the average compensation in some of these corporations, using the average compensation of positions covered by the WAPCO Plans as base (100%), is as follows: DBP - 203%, CB 196%, GSIS -147%, SSS - 150%, and NWSA - 111%.5 Thus, the stated policy behind the Salary Standardization Law is to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, while giving due regard to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work: SECTION 2. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Managements (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System, hereinafter referred to as the System, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be applied for all

government entities, as mandated by the Constitution. xxx (Emphasis supplied) The Salary Standardization Law applies to all positions, whether elective or appointive within the entire length and breadth of the Civil Service including those in the GOCCs and GFIs: Sec. 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Nota bene, Section 21 of the Salary Standardization Law provides that "[a]ll provisions of Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597, which are not inconsistent with this Act and are not expressly modified, revoked or repealed in this Act shall continue to be in full force and effect." Thus, the definition of terms found in Section 3 of P.D. No. 985 continues to be applicable to the Salary Standardization Law, including: SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall mean: xxx c. Class (of position) The basic unit of the Position Classification System. A class consists of all those positions in the system which are sufficiently similar as to (1) kind or subject matter of work, (2) level of difficulty and responsibility, and (3) the qualification requirements of the work, to warrant similar treatment in personnel and pay administration. d. Class Specification or Standards A written description of a class of position(s). It distinguishes the duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements of positions in a given class from those of other classes in the Position Classification System. e. Classification The act of arranging positions according to broad occupational groupings and determining differences of classes within each group. xxx g. Compensation or Pay System A system for determining rates of pay for positions and employees based on equitable principles to be applied uniformly to similar cases. It consists, among others, of the Salary and Wage Schedules for all positions, and the rules and regulations for its administration. h. Grade Includes all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibility and level of qualification

requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. xxx m. Position A set of duties and responsibilities, assigned or delegated by competent authority and performed by an individual either on full-time or part-time basis. A position may be filled or vacant. n. Position Classification The grouping of positions into classes on the basis of similarity of kind and level of work, and the determination of the relative worth of those classes of positions. o. Position Classification System A system for classifying positions by occupational groups, series and classes, according to similarities or differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements. It consists of (1) classes and class specifications and (2) the rules and regulations for its installation and maintenance and for the interpretation, amendment and alternation of the classes and class specifications to keep pace with the changes in the service and the positions therein. xxx q. Reclassification or Reallocation A change in the classification of a position either as a result of a change in its duties and responsibilities sufficient to warrant placing the position in a different class, or as result of a reevaluation of a position without a significant change in duties and responsibilities. r. Salary or Wage Adjustment A salary or wage increase towards the minimum of the grade, or an increase from a non-prescribed rate to a prescribed rate within the grade. s. Salary or Wage Grade The numerical place on the salary or Wage Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class. t. Salary or Wage Schedule A numerical structure in the Compensation System consisting of several grades, each grade with multiple steps with a percentage differential throughout the pay table. A classified position is assigned a corresponding grade in the Schedule. u. Salary or Wage Step Increment An increase in salary or wage from one step to another step within the grade from the minimum to maximum. Also known as within grade increase. xxx At the same time, Section 16 of the Salary Standardization Law expressly repealed all laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof that exempted government agencies, including GOCCs and GFIs from the coverage of the new Compensation and Position Classification System: Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations. All laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions, or groups of officials and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including the proviso under Section 2, and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 985 are hereby repealed. Thus, all exemptions from the integrated Compensation Classification System granted prior to the effectivity of the Salary

Standardization Law, including those under Sections 26 and 167 of Presidential Decree No. 985 (the Old Salary Standardization Law) as well as under the respective GOCC and GFI charters, were repealed8, subject to the nondiminution provision of Section 12.9 As a result, the general rule is that all government employees, including employees of GOCCs and GFIs, are covered by the Compensation Classification System provided for by the Salary Standardization Law. Nonetheless, Congress acknowledged the need of GOCCs and GFIs performing proprietary functions to maintain competitive salaries comparable to the private sector with respect to key top-level positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private sector. Thus, Section 9 of the Salary Standardization Law empowers the President,in truly exceptional cases, to approve higher compensation, exceeding Salary Grade 30, to the chairman, president, general manager, and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions: SECTION 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions below the Officials mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. xxx In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator, and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions exceed Salary Grade 30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation for the aforesaid officials. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On July 3, 1993, Republic Act. No. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, took effect. Section 15 (c) thereof authorizes the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to institute a compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys as an integral component of the BSP's human resource development program, thereby implicitly providing for a wider scope of exemption from the Compensation Classification System than that found in the last paragraph of Section 9 of the Salary Standardization Law, to wit: SEC. 15. Exercise of Authority. - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: xxx (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758. Provided, however,That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No.

6758.(Emphasis supplied; italics in the original) However, the last proviso of Section 15 (c) expressly provides that the compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under Salary Grade (SG) 19 and below shall, like all other government employees, be in accordance with the rates prescribed under the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, on account of the above-quoted provision, BSP rank and file employees with (SG) 19 and below, like their counterparts in the other branches of the civil service, are paid in accordance with the rates prescribed in the New Salary Scale under the Salary Standardization Law, while officers with SG 20 and above are exempt from the coverage of said law, they being paid pursuant to the New Salary Scale containing Salary Grades A to J10 issued by the Monetary Board which took effect on January 1, 2000. The Case for the Petitioner The Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc., via the instant petition for prohibition filed on June 8, 2001, seeks to prohibit herein respondents BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President from further implementing the last proviso of Chapter I, Article II, Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, which it assails as unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause,11 hence, null and void. It is petitioner's allegation that the application of the Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law to the rank and file employees, but not the BSP's officers, would violate the equal protection clause as the former are placed in a less favorable position compared to the latter. Petitioner asserts that the classification of BSP employees into two classes based solely on the SG of their positions is not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences. For, so petitioner contends, all BSP personnel are similarly situated since, regardless of the salary grade, they are appointed by the Monetary Board and required to possess civil service eligibilities, observe the same office rules and regulations, and work at the same national or regional offices, and, even if their individual duties differ, directly or indirectly their work would still pertain to the operation and functions of the BSP.12 More specifically, it argues that there is "nothing between SGs 19 and 20 that should warrant the parting of the BSP 'Red Sea' of civil servants into two distinct camps of the privileged and the less privileged."13 Petitioner further submits that the personnel of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Social Security System (SSS) are all exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, within the class of rank and file personnel of government financial institutions, the BSP rank and file personnel are also discriminated upon.14 The Case for Respondent Executive Secretary On the other hand, respondent Executive Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that the assailed proviso does not violate the equal protection clause. He submits that the classification of BSP employees relative to compensation structure is based on actual and real differentiation between employees exercising managerial functions and the rank and file,15 even as it strictly adheres to the enunciated policy in The New Central Bank Act to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.16 In addition, he notes that Article II, Section 15 (c) serves as an exemption to the Salary Standardization Law which, for all intents and purposes is a general law applicable to all government employees. As such, the provision exempting certain BSP employees from its coverage must be strictly construed.17 The Case for Respondent Bangko Sentral

Likewise advancing the view that the assailed proviso is constitutional, respondent BSP argues that Congress, in passing the New Central Bank Act, has in fact determined that there are substantial reasons for classifying BSP employees into those covered by the Salary Standardization Law and those not covered by the Salary Standardization Law.18 However, BSP additionally claims that while the assailed proviso is constitutional, the manner by which it is implemented may give rise to the question of constitutional infirmity.19 It thus proffers that the assailed provision should be interpreted together with the other provisions of The New Central Bank Act, such as that vesting it with "fiscal and administrative autonomy" and that directing the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence in all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."20 It concludes that the assailed provision does not adopt provisions of the Salary Standardization Law in their entirety, but refers only to the basic pay of the employees and does not cover other benefits which it (the BSP) may deem necessary to grant its employees.21 Admittedly, the BSP Monetary Board has endeavored to grant additional allowances to the "rank and file" so that they may be given substantially similar benefits being enjoyed by the officers. The Commission on Audit (COA), however, disallowed these additional allowances on the ground that the grant of the same violates the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law and The New Central Bank Act.22 Issues for Resolution In essence, petitioner asserts that its members are similarly situated to both the executive/officer corps of the BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS such that the operation of the equal protection guaranty in either case would entitle them to be placed under a compensation and position classification system outside of that mandated by the Salary Standardization Law. Clearly, the resolution of the instant petition hinges on a determination of whether the right of petitioner's members to the equal protection of the laws has been violated by (a) the classification in The New Central Bank Act between the executive personnel (those with SG 20 and above), who are exempt from the Compensation Classification System mandated under the Salary Standardization Law, and the rank and file employees (those with SG 19 and below) who are covered by the latter; and/or (b) the disparity in treatment between the rank and file employees of the BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, who were subsequently exempted from said Compensation Classification System by their amended charters. Put differently, the instant Petition presents two principal issues for resolution: (1) whether the distinction between managerial and rank and file employees in The New Central Bank Act partakes of an invidious discrimination proscribed by the equal protection clause; and (2) whether, by operation of the equal protection clause, the rank and file employees of the BSP are entitled to exemption from the Compensation Classification System mandated under the Salary Standardization Law as a consequence of the exemption of the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS. Standards for Equal Protection Analysis Before proceeding to resolve these issues, it may serve the ends of clarity to first review the basic framework by which the courts analyze challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as well as the standards by which compliance with the equal protection clause may be determined. Presumption of Constitutionality It is a basic axiom of constitutional law that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality and a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. Thus, if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, the same should be upheld. Consequently, the burden is squarely on the shoulders of the one alleging unconstitutionality to prove invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt by negating all possible

bases for the constitutionality of a statute.23 Verily, to doubt is to sustain.24 The rationale for this presumption in favor of constitutionality and the corresponding restraint on the part of the judicial branch was expounded upon by Justice Laurel in the case of People v. Vera,25 viz: This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive.The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. (6 R. C. L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, it has been observed that classification is the essence of legislation.27 On this point, the observation of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney28 is illuminating: The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power of classification. Most laws classify, and many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other members of the class described by the law. When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern. The calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility. In assessing an equal protection challenge, a court is called upon only to measure the basic validity of the legislative classification.When some other independent right is not at stake and when there is no "reason to infer antipathy," it is presumed that "even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process ...."29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Hence, in enacting laws, the legislature is accorded the widest scope of discretion within the bounds of the Constitution; and the courts, in exercising their power of judicial review, do not inquire into the wisdom of the law. On this point, this Court in Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento,30 stated: e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and

unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.31 (Emphasis supplied) Only by faithful adherence to this principle of judicial review is it possible to preserve to the legislature its prerogatives under the Constitution and its ability to function.32 The presumption of constitutionality notwithstanding, the courts are nevertheless duty bound to strike down any statute which transcends the bounds of the Constitution including any classification which is proven to be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive. The question that arises then is by what standard(s) should the reasonableness, and therefore the validity, of a legislative classification be measured? The Rational Basis Test It may be observed that, in the Philippines, the traditional and oft-applied standard is the so-called "rational basis test," the requisites of which were first summarized by Justice (later Chief Justice) Moran in the case of People v. Cayat33 to wit: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.34 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) To the foregoing may be added the following observations of the Court in Philippine Judges Association, v. Prado,35 to wit: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.36 (Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted) The Rational Basis Test has been described as adopting a "deferential" attitude towards legislative classifications. As previously discussed, this "deference" comes from the recognition that classification is often an unavoidable element of the task of legislation which, under the separation of powers embodied in our Constitution, is primarily the prerogative of Congress.

Indeed, in the United States, from where the equal protection provision of our Constitution has its roots, the Rational Basis Test remains a primary standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute. Thus, in Lying v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,37 where a statute providing that no household may become eligible to participate in the food stamp program while any of its members are on strike, or receive an increase in the allotment of food stamps already being received because the income of the striking member has decreased, the U.S. Supreme Court held: Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on any fundamental interest and does not "affect with particularity any protected class," we confine our consideration to whether the statutory classification is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." We have stressed that this standard of review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are "presumed to be valid," largely for the reason that "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and unavoidable one." xxx We have little trouble in concluding that 109 is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. The Senate Report declared: "Public policy demands an end to the food stamp subsidization of all strikers who become eligible for the program solely through the temporary loss of income during a strike. Union strike funds should be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers during labor-management disputes." It was not part of the purposes of the Food Stamp Act to establish a program that would serve as a weapon in labor disputes; the Act was passed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition and to strengthen the agricultural economy. The Senate Report stated that "allowing strikers to be eligible for food stamps has damaged the program's public integrity" and thus endangers these other goals served by the program. Congress acted in response to these problems. xxx It is true that in terms of the scope and extent of their ineligibility for food stamps, 109 is harder on strikers than on "voluntary quitters." But the concern about neutrality in labor disputes does not arise with respect to those who, for one reason or another, simply quit their jobs. As we have stated in a related context, even if the statute "provides only 'rough justice,' its treatment ... is far from irrational." Congress need not draw a statutory classification to the satisfaction of the most sharp-eyed observers in order to meet the limitations that the Constitution imposes in this setting. And we are not authorized to ignore Congress' considered efforts to avoid favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by the two significant provisos contained in the statute. The first proviso preserves eligibility for the program of any household that was eligible to receive stamps "immediately prior to such strike." The second proviso makes clear that the statutory ineligibility for food stamps does not apply "to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout." In light of all this, the statute is rationally related to the stated objective of maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations and footnotes omitted) More recently, the American Court summarized the principles behind the application of the Rational Basis Test in its jurisdiction in Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.,39 as follows: Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes

fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485, 110 S.Ct. 2499, 2504, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990);Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-603, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 3016- 3018, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459-462, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); Dandridge v, Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). Where there are "plausible reasons" for Congress' action, "our inquiry is at an end." United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461. This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1192, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988),and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden "to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001. 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-332, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2387, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981). Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct., at 461. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960). Thus, the absence of "'legislative facts' " explaining the distinction "[o]n the record," 294 U.S.App.D.C., at 389, 959 F.2d, at 987, has no significance in rational-basis analysis. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. See Vance v. Bradley, supra, 440 U.S., at 111, 99 S.Ct., at 949. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981). "'Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.'"Lehnhausen, supra, 410 U.S., at 365, 93 S.Ct., at 1006 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,301 U.S. 495, 510, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937)). These restraints on judicial review have added force "where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing." United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct., at 461. Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement-- much like classifying governmental beneficiaries--"inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some Points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The distinction at issue here represents such a line: By excluding from the definition of "cable system" those facilities that serve commonly owned or managed buildings without using public rights-of-way, 602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the regulatory field. Such scope-of-coverage provisions are unavoidable components of most economic or social legislation. In establishing the franchise requirement, Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it had to choose which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955):

"The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination."40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; footnotes omitted) Deferential or not, in the Philippines, the Rational Basis Test has proven to be an effective tool for curbing invidious discrimination. Thus, in People v. Vera,41 this Court held as unconstitutional Section 11 of Act No. 4221, which provided that the Probation Law "shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals."42 The Court held that the challenged provision was an undue delegation of legislative power since it left the operation or non-operation of the law entirely up to the absolute and unlimited (and therefore completely arbitrary) discretion of the provincial boards.43 The Court went on to demonstrate that this unwarranted delegation of legislative power created "a situation in which discrimination and inequality [were] permitted or allowed"44 since "a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits,"45 despite the absence of substantial differences germane to the purpose of the law. For this reason the questioned provision was also held unconstitutional and void for being repugnant to the equal protection clause.46 In Viray v. City of Caloocan,47 the Court invalidated on equal protection grounds, among others, an Ordinance providing for the collection of "entrance fees" for cadavers coming from outside Caloocan City for burial in private cemeteries within the city. The city government had sought to justify the fees as an exercise of police power claiming that policemen using the city's motorcycles or cars had to be assigned to escort funeral processions and reroute traffic to minimize public inconvenience.48 This Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes held that: While undeniably the above-described activity of city officers is called for by every funeral procession, yet we are left without explanation why the Ordinance should collect the prescribed fees solely in the case of cadavers coming from places outside the territory of Caloocan City for burial in private cemeteries within the City. Surely, whether the corpse comes from without or within the City limits, and whether interment is to be made in private or public cemeteries, the City police must regulate traffic, and must use their City cars or motorcycles to maintain order; and the City streets must suffer some degree of erosion. Clearly, then, the ordinance in question does unjustifiably discriminate against private cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, a defect adequate to invalidate the questioned portion of the measure.49 (Italics in the original) In Philippine Judges Association. v. Prado,50 this Court ruled that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354,51 withdrawing the franking privileges of the Judiciary52 but retaining the same for the President, the Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, and others,53 violated the equal protection clause. In analyzing the questioned legislative classification, the Court concluded that the only reasonable criteria for classification vis--vis the grant of the franking privilege was "the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people."54 The Court then went on to state that: Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, oh this basis,

deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving. xxx In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice. xxx We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.55 More recently, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,56 this Court ruled that the proviso in Section 18 of P.D. No.1146,57 which prohibited a dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension, was unconstitutional for, among others, violating the equal protection clause. Said the Court: The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employee's death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee's Retirement System of Illinois, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the

dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. (Footnotes omitted) Even in the American context, the application of the "deferential" Rational Basis Test has not automatically resulted in the affirmation of the challenged legislation. Thus, in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,58 a city's zoning ordinance requiring a special permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded was challenged on equal protection grounds. The American Court, ruling that the Rational Basis Test was applicable and limiting itself to the facts of the particular case, held that there was no rational basis for believing that the mentally retarded condition of those living in the affected group home posed any special threat to the city's legitimate interests any more than those living in boarding houses, nursing homes and hospitals, for which no special permit was required. Thus, it concluded, the permit requirement violated the respondent's right to equal protection.59 And, in Romer v. Evans,60 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution which precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their homosexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.61 Strict Scrutiny While in the Philippines the Rational Basis Test has, so far, served as a sufficient standard for evaluating governmental actions against the Constitutional guaranty of equal protection, the American Federal Supreme Court, as pointed out in the main opinion, has developed a more demanding standard as a complement to the traditional deferential test, which it applies in certain well-defined circumstances. This more demanding standard is often referred to as Strict Scrutiny. Briefly stated, Strict Scrutiny is applied when the challenged statute either (1) classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or (2) infringes fundamental constitutional rights.62 With respect to such classifications, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and it is incumbent upon the government to demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests,63otherwise the law shall be declared unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.64 Like other rights guaranteed by the post-Civil War Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause (also known as the Fourteenth Amendment) was motivated in large part by a desire to protect the civil rights of African-Americans recently freed from slavery. Thus, initially, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to limit the scope of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimination claims brought by African-Americans.65 In Strauder v. West Virginia,66 the American Supreme Court in striking down a West Virginia statute which prohibited a "colored man" from serving in a jury, traced the roots of the Equal Protection Clause: This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that

the superior race enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of the amendments, as we said in the Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall. 36), cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of the times when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish. At the time when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed, xxx To quote the language used by us in theSlaughter-House Cases, "No one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in all the amendments, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been suggested,--we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them." So again: "The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied, and by it [the Fourteenth Amendment] such laws were forbidden. If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then, by the fifth section of the article of amendment, Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation." And it was added, "We doubt very much whether any action of a State, not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes, as a class, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." x x x It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,--exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race. That the West Virginia statute respecting juries--the statute that controlled the selection of the grand and petit jury in the case of the plaintiff in error--is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor would it be if the persons excluded by it were white men. If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration of justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there by any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment. The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.67 Over the years however, the Equal Protection Clause has been applied against unreasonable governmental discrimination directed at any identifiable group.68 In what Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf call the most famous footnote in American constitutional law,69 Justice Stone in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.70 maintained that state-sanctioned discriminatory practices against discrete and insular minorities are entitled to a diminished presumption of constitutionality: xxx the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation

affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. [FN4] xxx FN4 There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 370, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949, decided March 28, 1938. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 - 714, 718--720, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625, 630, 632, 633, 75 L.Ed. 1357; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra. 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484; Fiske v. Kansas. 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-- 378, 47 S.Ct. 641, 647. 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095; Herndon v. Lowry. 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278. Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39. A.L.R. 468, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628, 67 L.Ed. 1047; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 47 S.Ct. 406, 71 L.Ed. 646, or racial minorities. Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra;whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428, 4 L.Ed. 579; South Carolina State Highway Department v, Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734, decided February 14, 1938, note 2, and cases cited.71 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The use of the term "suspect" originated in the case of Korematsu v. U.S.72 In Korematsu,73 the American Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from San Leandro California, a military area, beginning May 9, 1942. However, in reviewing the validity of laws which employ race as a means of classification, the Court held: It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.74 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Racial classifications are generally thought to be "suspect" because throughout the United States' history these have generally been used to discriminate officially against groups which are politically subordinate and subject to private prejudice and discrimination.75 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has "consistently repudiated distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry as being odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."76 The underlying rationale of the suspect classification theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken down.77 Moreover, classifications based on race, alienage or national origin are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded on such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy - a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.78 Almost three decades after Korematsu, in the landmark case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,79 the U.S. Supreme Court in identifying a "suspect class" as a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,80 articulated that suspect classifications were not limited to classifications based on race, alienage or national origin but could also be applied to other criteria such as religion.81 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that suspect classifications deserving of Strict Scrutiny include those based on race or national origin82, alienage83 and religion84 while classifications based on gender85, illegitimacy86, financial need87, conscientious objection88 and age89 have been held not to constitute suspect classifications. As priorly mentioned, the application of Strict Scrutiny has not been limited to statutes which proceed along suspect lines but has been utilized on statutes infringing upon fundamental constitutionally protected rights. Most fundamental rights cases decided in the United States require equal protection analysis because these cases would involve a review of statutes which classify persons and impose differing restrictions on the ability of a certain class of persons to exercise a fundamental right.90 Fundamental rights include only those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.91 And precisely because these statutes affect fundamental liberties, any experiment involving basic freedoms which the legislature conducts must be critically examined under the lens of Strict Scrutiny. Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation,92 the right to marry,93 the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth,94 the right to travel,95 and the right to vote.96 Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored.97 Gerald Gunther explains as follows: ... The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.98 Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available for achieving the governmental objective.99 While Strict Scrutiny has, as yet, not found widespread application in this jurisdiction, the tenet that legislative classifications involving fundamental rights require a more rigorous justification under more stringent standards of analysis

has been acknowledged in a number of Philippine cases.100 Since the United States' conception of the Equal Protection Clause was largely influenced by its history of systematically discriminating along racial lines, it is perhaps no surprise that the Philippines which does not have any comparable experience has not found a similar occasion to apply this particular American approach of Equal Protection. Intermediate Scrutiny The Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny form what Gerald Gunther termed as the two-tier approach to equal protection analysis - the first tier consisting of the Rational Basis Test (also called by Gunther as the old equal protection) while the second tier consisting of Strict Scrutiny (also called by Gunther as the new equal protection).101 Gunther however described the two-tier approach employed by the U.S. Supreme Court as being rigid, criticizing the aggressive new equal protection for being "strict in theory and fatal in fact"102 and the deferential old equal protection as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."103 Gunther's sentiments were also shared by certain members of the Burger Court, most notably Justice Marshall who advocated a Sliding Scale Approach which he elaborated on in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:104 To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519--521, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1178--1180, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90, 92 S.Ct. 254, 261, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review--strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. I find in fact that many of the Court's recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously argued--that is, an approach in which 'concentration (is) placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.' Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 397 U.S., at 520--521, 90 S.Ct., at 1180 (dissenting opinion).105 Shortly before his retirement in 1991, Justice Marshall suggested to the Supreme Court that it adopt a Sliding Scale that would embrace a spectrum of standards of review.106 Other sources of discontent in the U.S. Supreme Court are Justice Stevens who argues for a return to the Rational Basis Test which he believes to be adequate to invalidate all invidious forms of discrimination and Chief Justice Rehnquist who is disgruntled with the Court's special solicitude for the claims of discrete and insular minorities.107 Yet, despite numerous criticisms from American legal luminaries, the U.S. Supreme Court has not done away with the Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny as they continue to remain viable approaches in equal protection analysis. On the contrary, the American Court has developed yet a third tier of equal protection review, falling between the Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny -Intermediate Scrutiny (also known as Heightened Scrutiny). The U.S. Supreme Court has generally applied Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny when the challenged statute's classification is based on either (1) gender or (2) illegitimacy.108

Gender-based classifications are presumed unconstitutional as such classifications generally provide no sensible ground for differential treatment. In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,109 the United States Supreme Court said: "[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.110 In the same manner, classifications based on illegitimacy are also presumed unconstitutional as illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society.111 Similar to Strict Scrutiny, the burden of justification for the classification rests entirely on the government.112 Thus, the government must show at least that the statute serves an important purpose and that the discriminatory means employed is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.113 Summary of the American Supreme Court Approach to Equal Protection In fine, the three standards currently employed by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court for determining the constitutional validity of a statutory classification in the light of the equal protection clause maybe summarized114as follows: Equal Protection Standards Rational Basis Strict Scrutiny Intermediate Scrutiny Applicable Legislative Legislative Legislative classifications classificationsaffectingfundamental rightsor classifications based on To in suspect classes. gender or illegitimacy general, such as those pertaining to economic or social legislation, which do not affect fundamental rights or suspect classes; or is not based on gender or illegitimacy. Must be compelling. Must be important. Legislative Must be legitimate. Purpose Relationship Classification Classification must benecessary and Classification must narrowly tailored to achieve the legislative be substantiallyrelated to of must Classification berationally purpose. the legislative purpose. to Purpose related to the legislative purpose.

Appropriate Standard for Evaluating the Present Case Which of the foregoing three standards should be applied in arriving at a resolution of the instant petition? Impropriety of a double standard for evaluating compliance with the equal protection guaranty As noted earlier, the main opinion, in arriving at its conclusion, simultaneously makes use of both the Rational Basis Test and the Strict Scrutiny Test. Thus, in assessing the validity of the classification between executive and rank and file employees in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, the Rational Basis Test was applied. In evaluating the distinction between the rank and file employees of the BSP and the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, the Strict Scrutiny Test was employed. Despite my best efforts, I fail to see the justification for the use of this "double standard" in determining the constitutionality of the questioned proviso. Why a "deferential test" for one comparison (between the executives and rank and file of the BSP) and a "strict test" for the other (between the rank and file of the BSP and the rank and file of the other GOCCs/GFIs)? As the preceding review of the standards developed by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court shows, the choice of the appropriate test for evaluating a legislative classification is dependent on the nature of the rights affected (i.e.whether "fundamental" or not) and the character of the persons allegedly discriminated against (i.e. whether belonging to a "suspect class" or not). As determined by these two parameters, the scope of application of each standard is distinct and exclusive of the others. Indeed, to my knowledge, the American Court has never applied more than one standard to a given set of facts, and where one standard was found to be appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court has deliberately eschewed any discussion of another.115 Assuming that the equal protection standards evolved by the U.S. Supreme Court may be adopted in this jurisdiction, there is no reason why the exclusive manner of their application should not be adopted also. In the present case, the persons allegedly discriminated against (i.e. the rank and file employees of the BSP) and the rights they are asserting (to be exempted from the Compensation Classification System prescribed by the Salary Standardization Law) remain the same, whether the classification under review is between them and the executive officers of the BSP or the rank and file employees of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS. It therefore stands to reason that the test or standard whether Rational Basis, Strict Scrutiny or Intermediate Scrutiny against which petitioner's claims should be measured should likewise be the same, regardless of whether the evaluation pertains to the constitutionality of (1) the classification expressly made in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act or (2) the classification resulting from the amendments of the charters of the other GOCCs/GFIs. To illustrate further, if petitioner's constitutional challenge is premised on the denial of a "fundamental right" or the perpetuation of prejudice against a "suspect class," as suggested (but not fully explicated) in the closing pages of the main opinion; then, following the trend in American jurisprudence, the Strict Scrutiny Test would be applicable, whether the classification being reviewed is that between the officers and rank and file of the BSP or between the rank and file of the BSP and the rank and file of the other GOCCs/GFIs. But certainly, the same group of BSP rank and file personnel cannot be considered a "non-suspect class" when compared to the BSP executive corps, but members of a "suspect class" when compared to the rank and file employees of the other GOCCs/GFIs. Neither could the rights they assert be simultaneously "fundamental" and "less than fundamental." Consequently, it would be improper to apply the Rational Basis Test as the standard for one comparison and the Strict

Scrutiny Test for the other. To do so would be to apply the law unevenly and, accordingly, deny the persons concerned "the equal protection of the laws." "Relative Constitutionality" Not A Justification for the Double Standard It would appear that the employment of a "double standard" in the present case is sought to be justified somehow by the concept of relative constitutionality invoked by the main opinion. Thus, the main opinion holds that the "subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15 (c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, and exposes the proviso to more serious scrutiny." The ponencia likewise invites this Court to reflect on the following questions: "Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually through seven separate acts? Is the right to equal protection bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can be invoked only against classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to discrimination that arises indirectly as a consequence of several other acts? and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute x x x thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the groupings or the lack thereof among several similar enactments made over a period of time?"116 To clarify, it was never suggested that judicial review should be confined or limited to the questioned statute itself without considering other related laws. It is well within the powers of this Court to resolve the issue of whether the subsequent amendments of the charters of other GOCCs and other GFIs altered the constitutionality of Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act. It is, however, what to me is the improper resort by the main opinion to relative constitutionality, and as to be subsequently demonstrated, the use of an inappropriate standard for equal protection analysis, that constrained me to register my dissent. As illustrated in the main opinion, "relative constitutionality" refers to the principle that a statute may be constitutionally valid as" applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another set of facts. Thus, a statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered factual circumstances. This principle is really a corollary to the requirements that a valid classification (a) must be based on real and substantial (not merely superficial) distinctions and (b) must not be limited to existing conditions only. "Substantial distinctions" must necessarily be derived from the objective factual circumstances of the classes or groups that a statute seeks to differentiate. The classification must be real and factual and not wholly abstract, artificial, or contrived. Thus, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,117 this Court stated: We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that

comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be ignored.118 (Emphasis supplied) In the words of Justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court in Walters v. City of St. Louis, Missouri:119 x x x Equal protection does not require identity of treatment. It only requires that classification rest on real and not feigned differences, that the distinctions have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary, x x x120 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For this reason, in reviewing legislation challenged on equal protection grounds - particularly when a statute otherwise valid on its face is alleged to be discriminatory in its application - a court must often look beyond the four corners of the statute and carefully examine the factual circumstances of the case before it. Thus, in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Associations, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila,121 this Court, in reversing a trial court decision invalidating an ordinance regulating the operation of motels and hotels in Manila, held: Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity . . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. Asunderlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.122 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And in Peralta v. Commission on Elections,123 this Court stated: The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What [it] proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do

not. There is, of course, no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved.The determination must be made in accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, mustrest upon material differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded.' There must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect to the law are treated alike, x x x124 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A similar thought was expressed in Medill v. State of Minnesota,125 cited in the main opinion,126 where the State Supreme Court of Minnesota127 reversed a decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and held that a statute exempting "[r]ights of action for injuries to the person of the debtor or of a relative" from "attachment, garnishment, or sale on any final process, issued from any court," did not contravene the provisions of the Minnesota Constitution limiting exemptions to a "reasonable amount" to be determined by law. The Minnesota Court held: x x x we must determine here whether there is an objective measure which limits the amount or extent of the personal injury right of action exemption since there is no dollar limit or "to the extent reasonably necessary" limiting language on the face of the provision. The trustee argues that the case is "incredibly simple" because there is no language on the face of the statute purporting to limit the exemption. The state and debtors argue that the judicial determination of general damages in a personal injury action is based on objective criteria; therefore, the amount of the exemption is reasonable and "determined by law" under article 1, section 12. We think that the latter interpretation is reasonable and that the trustee has failed to meet his burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the provision is unconstitutional. xxx Here, the resolution of the Medills' personal injury action involved a judicial determination of an amount that reasonably compensated them for their injuries. The Medills' recovery was reasonably limited by a jury's determination of damages, which was then approved by a court. Contrary to the trustee's argument, we believe that the limits on out-of-court settlements are similarly reasonable. First, unless a statute is inherently unconstitutional, "its validity must stand or fall upon the record before the court and not upon assumptions this court might [otherwise] make * * *." Grobe v. Oak Center Creamery Co , 262 Minn. 60, 63, 113 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1962). Moreover, even in the case of an out-of-court settlement, the "inherent" limitation on the right of action still exists; the amount of a settlement is limited to or by the extent of injury, and no party will agree to an "unreasonable" settlement. The trustee vigorously argues that the court must go considerably beyond the plain language of the statute and rules of statutory construction to impose the required constitutional limit on the exemption provision at issue here. However, the constitutionality of a statute cannot in every instance be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with the applicable provisions of the constitution. A statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. Grobe, 262 Minn, at 62, 113 N.W.2d at 460. Thus, unless we find the exemption unconstitutional on its face, it must be unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the instant case in order to be stricken.128 (Emphasis supplied) This does not mean that the factual differences must be prominent for the distinction between two classes to be substantial. Nor are fine distinctions between two classes, otherwise sharing several common attributes, prohibited. Thus, the Court in Peralta, went on to state:

x x x It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to foresee and provide for every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division. Classification which has some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety.(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) The pronouncement in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,129 is also instructive: In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.130 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) To be sure, this Court has adjudged as valid statutes providing for differences in treatment between: inter-urban buses and provincial buses;131 taxpayers receiving compensation income and other taxpayers;132 male overseas workers and female overseas workers;133 electric cooperatives and other cooperatives;134 businesses inside the secured area of the Subic Special Economic Zone and those outside the secured area;135 public officers with pending criminal cases which have not yet gone to trial and those with cases wherein trial has already commenced;136 and City and Municipal Election Officers of the Commission On Elections (COMELEC) and other COMELEC officials.137 Nevertheless, to be substantial, these distinctions, no matter how finely drawn, must still be rooted on someobjective factual foundation; and cannot be left to the arbitrary, whimsical or capricious imagination of the law maker. Thus, relative constitutionality, as I understand it, merely acknowledges that the factual circumstances which form the bases for the substantial and real distinctions between two classes may change over time. Thus, it is entirely possible that a legislative classification held to be valid at one time upon a particular state of facts may be subsequently invalidated if the factual basis for the substantial distinctions that existed between the two classes has ceased to exist. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.138 Just such a possibility was acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair,139where the Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, declared: The original Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, tit. 2, 41 Stat. 297, considered in Block v. Hirsh, was limited to expire in two years. Section 122. The Act of August 24, 1921, c. 91, 42 Stat. 200, purported to continue it in force, with some amendments, until May 22, 1922. On that day a new act declared that the emergency described in the original title 2 still existed, reenacted with further amendments the amended Act of 1919, and provided that it was continued until May 22, 1924. Act of May 22, 1922, c. 197, 42 Stat. 543. We repeat what was stated in Block v. Hirsh, as to the respect due to a declaration of this kind by the Legislature so far as it relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared. And still more obviously so far as this declaration looks to the future it can be no more than prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed, x x x140 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Indeed, this appears to be the thrust of the cases cited141 by the main opinion to illustrate relative constitutionality: The case of Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon142 concerned a parcel of land adjacent to a railroad station and located in the middle of a highly developed business district had continually been used as a car park. In 1927 it was placed in a Residence 'B' district under a zoning ordinance under which its use as a car park remained a valid nonconforming use. In 1951, the area was sold to Vernon Park Realty which applied for, but did not obtain, a permit to build a retail shopping center (prohibited under the 1927 ordinance). In 1952, after Vernon Park had brought suit to declare the 1927 ordinance unconstitutional, the city's common council amended the zoning ordinance to prohibit the use of the property for any purpose except the parking and storage of automobiles and the continuance of prior nonconforming uses. The Court of Appeals of New York found the 1927 zoning ordinance and the 1952 amendment illegal and void, ruling that: While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.143 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) In Nashville, Chatanooga & St. Louise Railways v. Walters,144 the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of a provision of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1921, which authorized the state highway commissioner to require the separation of grades whenever a state highway crosses a railroad if in its discretion "the elimination of such grade crossing is necessary for the protection of persons traveling on any such highway or any such railroad" and requiring the railroad company to pay in every case, one-half of the total cost of the separation of grades. In remanding the case to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the U.S. Federal Supreme Court declared: The Supreme Court [of Tennessee] declined to consider the Special facts relied upon as showing that the order, and the statute as applied, were arbitrary and unreasonable; and did not pass upon the question whether the evidence sustained those findings. It held that the statute was, upon its face, constitutional; that when it was passed the state had, in the exercise of its police power, authority to impose upon railroads onehalf of the cost of eliminating existing or future grade crossings; and that the court could not "any more" consider "whether the provisions of the act in question have been rendered burdensome or unreasonable by changed economic and transportation conditions," than it "could consider changed mental attitudes to determine the constitutionality or enforceability of a statute." A rule to the contrary is settled by the decisions of this Court. A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably. To this limitation, attention was specifically called in cases which have applied most broadly the power to impose upon railroads the cost of separation of grades. First. Unless the evidence and the special facts relied upon were of such a nature that they could not conceivably establish that the action of the state in imposing upon the railway one-half of the cost of the underpass was arbitrary and unreasonable, the Supreme Court [of Tennessee] obviously erred in refusing to consider them. The charge of arbitrariness is based primarily upon the revolutionary changes incident to transportation wrought in recent years by the widespread introduction of motor vehicles; the assumption by the federal government of the functions of road builder; the resulting depletion of rail revenues; the change in the character, the construction, and the use of highways; the change in the occasion for elimination of grade crossings, in the purpose of such elimination, and in the chief

beneficiaries thereof; and the change in the relative responsibility of the railroads and vehicles moving on the highways as elements of danger and causes of accidents. x x x xxx Second. x x x The promotion of public convenience will not justify requiring of a railroad, any more than of others, the expenditure of money, unless it can be shown that a duty to provide the particular convenience rests upon it.145 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey,146 an action for damages was filed against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for the killing of a cow on an unfenced right of way under certain Florida statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way, without proof of negligence. The railroad company alleged that several changes in economic, transportation and safety conditions had occurred since these statutes were passed in 1899147 and that, in view of these changes, it was unfair, unjust and inequitable to require railroad companies to fence their tracks to protect against livestock roaming at large without making a similar requirement for the owners of automobiles, trucks and buses carrying passengers on the unfenced public highways. In ruling that the questioned statutes violated the equal protection guaranty, the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned: It stands adjudicated that the purpose of the statutes, supra, is the protection against accidents to life and property in conducting public transportation and that such statutes are in the exercise of the police power. It cannot be questioned that those transportation companies engaged as common carriers on the public roads and those so engaged on their privately owned roads such as railroad companies, owe like duties to the public and are under like obligations for the protection against accidents to life and property in conducting such business. It is well settled that a statute valid when enacted may become invalid by. change in conditions to which it is applied. The allegations of the pleas are sufficient to show, and the demurrer admits, that compliance with the statute places a burden of expense on the railroad company to provide for the safety of life and property of those whom it assumes to serve which is not required to be borne by competitive motor carriers which subject the lives and property of those whom they assume to serve to greater hazards of the identical character which the railroad is required to so guard against and it is also shown that under the statutes penalties are imposed on the railway carrier in favor of individuals who are neither shippers nor passengers. Under the statutes, as shown by the record here, the railway common carrier is not only required to carry the burden of fencing its traffic line for the protection of the persons and property it transports, while othercommon carriers are not required to provide the like protection, but in addition to this, there is another gross inequality imposed by the statute, viz: Under the statutes the plaintiff to whom the carrier, as such, was under no obligations, was allowed to recover double the value of the animal killed, plus $50 as attorney's fees, and was not required to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of its equipment, while if a common carrier bus or truck had by the operation of its equipment killed the same animal in the same locality, the plaintiff would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of the equipment and the common carrier would have been liable only for the value of the animal. This certainly is not equal protection of the law.148(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Similarly, the case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner149 concerned an action to recover the value of a mule killed by the railroad company's train under a Kentucky statute which made the killing or injury of cattle by railroad engines or cars prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad's agents or servants. The Kentucky Supreme Court, following the rulings in Nashville and Atlantic Coast, adjudged the questioned statute to be unconstitutional, viz:

The present statute which places the duty upon a railroad company to prove it was free from negligence in killing an animal upon its track is an act of 1893. The genesis of the legislation, however, goes back to the beginning of railroad transportation in the state. The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Belcher, 89 Ky. 193, 12 S.W. 195,11 Ky.Law Rep. 393, a decision rendered in 1889. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488. 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, 'A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.' A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. See 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, 102. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation of his train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So.2d 244, 247, 139 A.L.R. 973, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, 'This certainly is not equal protection of the law.' As stated in Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W.2d 516, 127 A.L.R. 416, appeal dismissed Friedman v.. Markendorf, 309 U.S. 627, 60 S.Ct. 610, 84 L.Ed. 987, the purpose of the provisions of 3 and 59 of the Kentucky Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality and to render it impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment. Applying this proscription of inequality and unreasonable discrimination, we held invalid an amendment to a statute regulating motor transportation for hire which exempted from the operation of the statute such vehicles engaged in transporting farm products.Priest v. State Tax Commission, 258 Ky. 391, 80 S.W.2d 43. We, therefore, hold that the part of KRS 277.330 which imposes a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars is invalid and unconstitutional.150 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original) Finally, in Rutter v. Esteban,151 this Court invalidated Section 2 of R.A. No. 342 providing for an eight-year moratorium period within which a creditor could not demand payment of a monetary obligation contracted before December 8, 1941 (counted from the settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor) after taking judicial notice of the significant change in the nation's economic circumstances in 1953, thus it held: xxx We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can see it and feel it as we gaze around to observe the wave of reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the country since liberation thanks to the aid of America and the innate progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit have worked

wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely stated that in the main the financial condition of our country and our people, individually and collectively, has practically returned to normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance of peace and order in our midst. Business, industry and agriculture have picked up and developed at such stride that we can say that we are now well on the road to recovery and progress. This is so not only as far as our observation and knowledge are capable to take note and comprehend but also because of the official pronouncements made by our Chief Executive in public addresses and in several messages he submitted to Congress on the general state of the nation, x x x xxx In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. x x x152(Emphasis supplied) As the financial ruin and economic devastation which provided the rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 342 was no longer present, this Court did not hesitate to rule that the continued enforcement of the statute was "unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer." In the case at bar, however, petitioner does not allege a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and qualifications standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank and file) since the enactment of The New Central Bank Act. Neither does the main opinion identify the relevant factual changes which may have occurred vis--vis the BSP personnel that may justify the application of the principle of relative constitutionality as above-discussed. Nor, to my knowledge, are there any relevant factual changes of which this Court may take judicial knowledge. Hence, it is difficult to see how relative constitutionality may be applied to the instant petition. Moreover, even if such factual changes were alleged and proved or judicially discoverable, still there is absolutely nothing in any of the cases above-cited which would justify the simultaneous application of both the Rational Basis Test and the Strict Scrutiny Test. In fact, in the case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,153 wherein a statute previously held to have complied with the requirements of the equal protection clause in 1889 was subsequently ruled to have violated the equal protection guaranty in 1957 due to changed factual conditions, the only testapplied in both instances was the Rational Basis Test.154 It is true that petitioner alleges that its members' claim to exemption from the Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law was bolstered by the amendments to the charters of the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, which exempted all the employees of these GOCCs/GFIs from said Compensation Classification System. However, these subsequent amendments do not constitute factual changes in the context of relative constitutionality. Rather, they involve subsequent legislative classifications which should be evaluated in accordance with the appropriate standard. To assess the validity of the questioned proviso in the light of subsequent legislation, all that need be applied is the familiar rule that statutes that are in pari materia155 should be read together. As this Court declared in City of Naga v. Agna,156 viz: x x x Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation . . . It will also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter enactment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari

materia. Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together.157 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Here, it can be said that the Salary Standardization Law, the New Central Bank Act, and the amended charters of the other GOCCs and GFIs are in pari materia insofar as they pertain to compensation and position classification system(s) covering government employees. Consequently, the provisions of these statutes concerning compensation and position classification, including the legislative classifications made therein, should all be read and evaluated together in the light of the equal protection clause. Consequently, the relevant question is whether these statutes, taken together as one uniform system of compensation for government employees, comply with the requisites of the equal protection guaranty. Rational Basis Test Appropriate to the Case at Bar Turning then to the determination of the standard appropriate to the issues presented by the instant petition, it is immediately apparent that Intermediate Scrutiny, inasmuch as its application has been limited only to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy, finds no application to the case at bar. The choice of the appropriate standard is thus narrowed between Strict Scrutiny and the Rational Basis Test. As has been observed, Strict Scrutiny has been applied in the American context when a legislative classification intrudes upon a fundamental right or classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic. Strict Scrutiny cannot be applied in the case at bar since nowhere in the petition does petitioner allege that Article II, Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act burdens a fundamental right of its members. The petition merely states that "the proviso in question violates the right to equal protection of the laws of the BSP rank and file employees who are members of the petitioner."158 While it is true that the Equal Protection Clause is found in the Bill of Rights of both the American and Philippine Constitutions, for strict scrutiny to apply there must be a violation of a Constitutional right other than the right to equal protection of the laws. To hold otherwise would be absurd as any invocation of a violation of the equal protection clause would automatically result in the application of Strict Scrutiny. In Vacco v. Quill,159 several physicians challenged a New York statute which prohibits assistance to suicide. They argued that although it was consistent with the standards of their medical practice to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are suffering great pain and desire a doctor's help in taking their own lives, they are deterred from doing so by New York's ban on assisting suicide.160 They contend that because New York permits a competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and because the refusal of such treatment is "essentially the same thing" as physician-assisted suicide, the ban violates the Equal Protection Clause.161 A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court applied the Rational Basis Test as the statute did not infringe fundamental rights. Moreover, the Court held that the guarantee of equal protection is not a source of substantive rights or liberties. The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This provision creates no substantive rights. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278. 1296-1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); id., at 59, 93 S.Ct., at 1310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, it embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases

alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly. Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) ("'[T]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same'") (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940)). If a legislative classification or distinction "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). New York's statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect and address matters of profound significance to all New Yorkers alike. They neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications. Washington v. Glucksberg, at 719-728, 117 S.Ct., at 2267-2271; see 80 F.3d, at 726; San Antonio School Dist., 411 U.S., at 28, 93 S.Ct., at 1294 ("The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness"); id., at 33-35, 93 S.Ct., at 1296-1298 (courts must look to the Constitution, not the "importance" of the asserted right, when deciding whether an asserted right is "fundamental"). These laws are therefore entitled to a "strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Neither does the main opinion identify what fundamental right the challenged proviso of the New Central Bank Act infringes upon. Instead the ponencia cites the following Constitutional provisions: PREAMBLE: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. ARTICLE II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social service, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. ARTICLE III: Bill of Rights SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ARTICLE IX: Constitutional Commissions B. The Civil Service Commission

SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. ARTICLE XII: National Economy and Patrimony SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law. ARTICLE XIII: Social Justice and Human Rights SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. Labor SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and oversea, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organizations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

With the exception of Section 1, Article III and Section 3, Article XIII, the foregoing Constitutional provisions do not embody any particular right but espouse principles and policies.163 As previously discussed, mere reliance on the Equal Protection Clause which is in the Bill of Rights is not sufficient to justify the application of Strict Scrutiny. While Section 3 of Article XIII enumerates the seven basic rights of workers - the right to organize, the right to conduct collective bargaining or negotiation with management, the right to engage in peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law, the right to enjoy security of tenure, the right to work under humane conditions, the right to receive a living wage, and the right to participate in policy and decision-processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law - I fail to see how Article II, Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act can impinge on any of these seven rights. Another reason why Strict Scrutiny is inappropriate is the absence of a classification which is based on an inherently suspect characteristic. There is no suspect class involved in the case at bar. By no stretch of the imagination can the rank and file employees of the BSP be considered a suspect class - a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. As examined earlier, in applying this definition of suspect class, the U.S. Supreme Court has labeled very few classifications as suspect. In particular, the Court has limited the term suspect class to classifications based on race or national origin, alienage and religion. It is at once apparent that Article II, Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act, in exempting the BSP officers from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law and not exempting the rank and file employees of the BSP, does not classify based on race, national origin, alienage or religion. The main opinion however seeks to justify the application of Strict Scrutiny on the theory that the rank and file employees of the BSP constitute a suspect class "considering that majority (if not all) of the rank and file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment." The ponencia concludes that since the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or office-employee status a distinction based on economic class and status is created. With all due respect, the main opinion fails to show that financial need is an inherently suspect trait. The claim that the rank and file employees of the BSP are an economically disadvantaged group is unsupported by the facts on record. Moreover, as priorly discussed, classifications based on financial need have been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court as not suspect. Instead, the American Court has resorted to the Rational Basis Test. The case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez164 is instructive. In the said case, the financing of public elementary and secondary schools in Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. A class action suit was brought on behalf of school children said to be members of poor families who reside in school districts having a low property tax base. They argue that the Texas system's reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and violates the equal protection clause because of substantial inter-district disparities in per pupil expenditures resulting primarily from differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The Court held that wealth discrimination alone does not provide adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.165 The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in this case, and by several other courts that have recently struck down school-financing laws in other States, is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under the

Constitution that the class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, and whether the relative--rather than absolute--nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed more closely than they were in the court below. The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests, however, at least three ways in which the discrimination claimed here might be described. The Texas system of school financing might be regarded as discriminating (1) against 'poor' persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally 'indigent, or (2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts. Our task must be to ascertain whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification may be regarded as suspect. The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and its progeny the Court invalidated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown if the State had provided some 'adequate substitute' for a full stenographic transcript. xxx Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the class disadvantaged by the Texas school-financing system--discrimination against a class of defineably 'poor' persons--might arguably meet the criteria established in these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the 'poor,' appellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. xxx Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by the amount of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Nor indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an 'adequate'

education for all children in the State. By providing 12 years of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to 'guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall have at least an adequate program of education. xxx For these two reasons--the absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of education--the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms. xxx This brings us, then, to the third way in which the classification scheme might be defined--district wealth discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it may be argued that discrimination might be found without regard to the individual income characteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the district that has the most assessable wealth and spends the most on education. Alternatively, as suggested in Mr. Justice MARSHALL'S dissenting opinion the class might be defined more restrictively to include children in districts with assessable property which falls below the statewide average, or median, or below some other artificially defined level. However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this contention. x x x166 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations and footnotes omitted) To further bolster the theory that a classification based on financial need is inherently suspect, the main opinion cites a number of international conventions as well as foreign and international jurisprudence, but to no avail. The reliance by the main opinion on these international conventions is misplaced. The ponencia cites the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter of 1996 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 1994. It should be noted that the Philippines is not a signatory to any of these conventions. The main opinion also cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. While it is true that these instruments which the Philippines is a party to include provisions prohibiting discrimination, none of them explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of financial need. While certain conventions mention that distinctions based on "other status" is prohibited, the scope of this term is undefined. Even Gay Moon, on whom the main opinion relies, explains thus:

The [UN Human Rights] Committee provides little guidance on how it decides whether a difference in treatment comes within the rubric of "other status". Its approach to this issue lacks consistency and transparency.167 Furthermore, the U.K. cases cited in the main opinion are not in point since these cases do not support the thesis that classification based on financial need is inherently suspect. In Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pension168 the discrimination in question was based on gender, that is, whether the widowers are entitled to the pension granted by the State to widows. In Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom169 the discrimination was based on sex and race; In Wilson and Others v. United Kingdom170 the questioned law allows employers to discriminate against their employees who were trade union members. Notably, the main opinion, after discussing lengthily the developments in equal protection analysis in the United States and Europe, and finding no support thereto, incongruously concluded that "in resolving constitutional disputes, this Court should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."171 After an excessive dependence by the main opinion to American jurisprudence it contradicted itself when it stated that "American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit."172 Intrinsic Constitutionality of Section 15(c) of the New Central Bank Act Is the classification between the officers and rank and file employees in Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act in violation of the equal protection clause? Petitioner, contending that there are no substantial distinctions between these two groups of BSP employees, argues that it is. On the other hand, the main opinion, applying the Rational Basis Test, finds the classification between the executive level and the rank and file of the BSP to be based on substantial and real differences which are germane to the purpose of the law. Thus, it concludes: In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. and declines to grant the petition on this ground. For her part, Justice Chico-Nazario, in her separate concurring opinion, sides with petitioner believing that the difference in treatment is "purely arbitrary" and thus violates the Constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws. On this point, I am in accord with the main opinion. For ease of reference, Section 15 (c) is reproduced hereunder: SEC. 15. Exercise of Authority. In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

xxx (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758. Provided, however,That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.(Emphasis supplied) It is readily apparent that Section 15 (c), by implicitly exempting the executive corps of the BSP (those with SG 20 and above) from the Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law, makes a classification between the officers and the rank and file of the BSP and, who, like all other government employees, are squarely within the ambit of the Compensation Classification System by the Salary Standardization Law. To be valid, therefore, the difference in treatment as to compensation between the executive level and the rank and file of the BSP must be based on real differences between the two groups. Moreover, this classification must also have a rational relationship to the purpose of the New Central Bank Act. An examination of the legislative history of the New Central Bank Act may thus prove useful. Legislative History of the New Central Bank Act An examination of the legislative deliberations of both the House of Representatives and the Senate shows that it was never the intention of both houses to provide all BSP personnel with a blanket exemption from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, while House Bill No. 7037 (the House of Representatives version of the New Central Bank Act) did not expressly mention that the Salary Standardization Law was to apply to a particular category of BSP employees, the deliberations in the lower house show that the position and compensation plans which the BSP was authorized to adopt were to be in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws, including the Salary Standardization Law: MR. JAVIER (E.). No, Mr. Speaker, we have that phrase in Section 14 (c). The power to organize, the power to classify positions, the power to adopt compensation plans are subject to the provisions of applicable laws. The bill is clear, so I do not think we should have a quarrel on whether the Monetary Board has absolute power over the organization and compensation plans of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Of course, this power is subject to applicable laws, and one of these laws is the Salary Standardization Law, Mr. Speaker. MR. ARROYO. To cut the argument short, Mr. Speaker, in effect, he is now saying that the proposed bill will authorize the Bangko Sentral to fix its own salary scale for its employees? MR. JAVIER (E.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker, but in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws. MR. ARROYO. I am only asking if it will be able to fix its own salary scale.

MR. JAVIER (E.). Yes, in accordance with the provisions of applicable laws. MR. ARROYO. May I know Mr. Speaker, what is the applicable law that will curtail this? MR. JAVIER (E.). The Salary Standardization Law. MR. ARROYO. So, the Gentleman is now suggesting that the Standardization Law will apply to this? MR. JAVIER (E.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.173 (Emphasis supplied) In fact, the deliberations show that, in keeping with the recognition in Section 9174 of the Salary Standardization Law that compensation higher than SG 30 might be necessary in certain exceptional cases to attract and retain competent top-level personnel, the initial intention of the drafters of the House Bill was to exempt only the Governor and the Monetary Board from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System: MR. LACSON. Mr. Speaker, Section 12 mentions only the remuneration of the governor and the members of the monetary board. MR. CHAVES. So, it will not cover any other employees of the Central Bank because the limitation set forth under the Salary Standardization Law will apply to them. I just want to make that sure because if it is not clear in the law, then we can refer to the debates on the floor. MR. LACSON. Mr. Speaker, Section 12 mentions only the governor and the members of the monetary board. All the rest in the lower echelons are covered by law. MR. CHAVES. In other words, I just want to make it clear whether or not they are covered by the Salary Standardization Law because later on if there is any conflict on the remuneration of employees lower than the governor and members of the Monetary Board, we have limits set under the Salary Standardization Law. MR. LACSON. Under the Salary Standardization Law.175 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The application of the Salary Standardization Law to all other personnel of the BSP raised some concerns, however, on the part of some legislators. They felt the need to reconcile the demand for competent people to help in the management of the economy with the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.176 The Senate thus sought to address these concerns by allowing the BSP to determine a separate salary scale for the executive level. The purpose behind the exemption of officers with SG 20 and above from the Salary Standardization Law was to increase the BSP's competitiveness in the industry's labor market such that by offering attractive salary packages,top executives and officials would be enticed and competent officers would be deterred from leaving. Senator Maceda. x x x We have a salary grade range, if I am not mistaken, Mr. President, up to Grade 32. Those executive types are probably between Grade 23 to Grade 32. If we really want to make sure that the vice-president types of the banks will come in, it should be cut off at around Grade 23 level and that the Standardization Act should still refer to those around Grade 22 and below. But if we cut it off at Grade 9 and below, we are just hitting only the drivers, the janitors, the filing clerks, the messengers. The Gentleman will only be cutting off a part of my heart again if he does that. My heart bleeds for this

people, Mr. President. Senator Osmea. If that is an amendment, Mr. President, I move that we reconsider the prior approval of my amendment which was accepted by the Sponsor, and I will accept the amendment of Senator Maceda that the grade level should not be Grade 9 but Grade 22 instead. Senator Maceda. After consulting the principal Author of the Standardization Law, the distinguished Majority Leader, he confirms that the executive group is really Grade 23 and above. I think that is where the Gentleman really wants to have some leeway to get some people in at the executive level. So I propose the amendment to the amendment to Grade 22 and below.177 (Underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original) Ultimately, the Bicameral Conference Committee on Banks, in consultation with the BSP, determined that the BSP's executive level began at SG 20 and resolved to exempt those at that level and above from the Compensation Classification System under the Salary Standardization Law, leaving the rank-and-file employees, or those personnel with a SG of 19 and below, under the coverage of the said compensation system. This is clear from the deliberations as reproduced by the petitioner itself: CHAIRMAN ROCO. x x x x x x x x x Number 4, on compensation of personnel. We have checked. The exemption from the Salary Standardization Law shall apply only from Salary Grade 21 and above. The division chief is salary grade 22. CHAIRMAN ZAMORA. I understood, Mr. Chairman, from the Central Bank itself that their range for rank-and-file starts from range 19 and downward. So what we should propose is that we subject all personnel to salary standardization starting from range 19 going down, and exempt them from range 20 and going up. CHAIRMAN ROCO. That will cover also assistant division chiefs? CHAIRMAN ZAMORA. That includes assistant division chiefs, division chiefs, and obviously higher personnel. CHAIRMAN ROCO. Yes, because in terms of x x x We are being more generous than original. So assistant division chiefs shall be exempted already from the salary standardization.178 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Classification is Based on Real Differences between the Officers and the Rank and File of the BSP, and is Germane to the Purpose of the Law As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,179 the foregoing classification of BSP personnel into managerial and rank-and-file is based on real differences as to the scope of work and degree of responsibility between these two classes of employees. At the same time, the exemption of the BSP managerial personnel from the Salary Standardization Law bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the New Central Bank Act.180 In the words of the Solicitor General: x x x Article II, Section 15 (c) of RA 7653 was purposely adopted to attract highly competent personnel, to ensure professionalism and excellence at the BSP as well as to ensure its independence through fiscal and administrative autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy. This

purpose is undoubtedly being assured by exempting the executive/management level from the Salary Standardization Law so that the best and the brightest may be induced to join the BSP.After all, the managers/executives are the ones responsible for running the BSP and for implementing its monetary policies.181 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the light of the foregoing, Justice Chico-Nazario's conclusion that the distinction is "purely arbitrary" does not appear to hold water. In support of her view, Justice Chico-Nazario cites Section 5 (a) of the Salary Standardization Law, which provides that positions in the Professional Supervisory Category are assigned SG 9 to SG 33. Thus, she argues: x x x SG 20 and up do not differ from SG 19 and down in terms of technical and professional expertise needed as the entire range of positions all 'require intense and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor's degree or higher courses. Consequently, if BSP needs an exemption from R.A. No. 6758 for key positions in order that it may hire the best and brightest economists, accountants, lawyers and other technical and professional people, the exemption must not begin only in SG 20. However, it is clear that while it is possible to group classes of positions according to the four main categories as provided under Section 5 of the Salary Standardization Law, viz: SECTION 5. Position Classification System. The Position Classification System shall consist of classes of positions grouped into four main categories, namely: professional supervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its implementation. Categorization of these classes of positions shall be guided by the following considerations: (a) Professional Supervisory Category. This category includes responsible positions of a managerial character involving the exercise of management functions such as planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and overseeing within delegated authority the activities of an organization, a unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of professional, technical or scientific knowledge and experience, application of managerial or supervisory skills required to carry out their basic duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance and control, leadership, as well as line supervision. These positions require intensive and thorough knowledge of a specialized field usually acquired from completion of a bachelor's degree or higher degree courses. The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33. (b) Professional Non-Supervisory Category. This category includes positions performing task which usually require the exercise of a particular profession or application of knowledge acquired through formal training in a particular field or just the exercise of a natural, creative and artistic ability or talent in literature, drama, music and other branches of arts and letters. Also included are positions involved in research and application of professional knowledge and methods to a variety of technological, economic, social, industrial and governmental functions; the performance of technical tasks auxiliary to scientific research and development; and in the performance of religious, educational, legal, artistic or literary functions. These positions require thorough knowledge in the field of arts and sciences or learning acquired through completion of at least four (4) years of college studies.

The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 8 to Salary Grade 30. (c) Sub-Professional Supervisory Category. This category includes positions performing supervisory functions over a group of employees engaged in responsible work along technical, manual or clerical lines of work which are short of professional work, requiring training and moderate experience or lower training but considerable experience and knowledge of a limited subject matter or skills in arts, crafts or trades. These positions require knowledge acquired from secondary or vocational education or completion of up to two (2) years of college education. The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 4 to Salary Grade 18. (d) Sub-Professional Non-Supervisory Category. This category includes positions involves in structured work in support of office or fiscal operations or those engaged in crafts, trades or manual work. These positions usually require skills acquired through training and experience of completion of elementary education, secondary or vocational education or completion of up to two (2) years of college education. The positions in this category are assigned Salary Grade 1 to Salary Grade 10. (Emphasis supplied) the same does not preclude classifying classes of positions, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, according to level of difficulty and responsibility and level of qualification requirements - that is, according to grade.182 It should be borne in mind that the concept of "grade" from the Old Salary Standardization Law is maintained in the present one. Thus Sections 8 and 9 of the present Salary Standardization Law provide for the general assignment of the various salary grades to certain positions in the civil service according to the degree of responsibility and level of qualifications required: SECTION 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent. Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the Salary Grades indicated hereunder: Salary Grades President of the Philippines Vice-President of the Philippines President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Senator Member of the House of Representatives Associate Justices of the Supreme 33 32 32 32 32 31 31 31

Court Chairman of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 Constitution Member of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 Constitution

31

30

The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the same Salary Grades based on the following guidelines: GRADE 33 This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest position in the government. No other position in the government service is considered to be of equivalent rank. GRADE 32 This Grade is limited to the Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines and those positions which head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No other positions in the government service are considered to be of equivalent rank. GRADE 31 This Grade is assigned to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and those with equivalent rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank, Presidential Adviser, National Economic and Development Authority Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and President of the University of the Philippines. An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of coverage ranging from top level policy formulation to the provision of technical and administrative support to the units under it, with functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be considered organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a Department Secretary. GRADE 30 Positions included are those of Department Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Presidential Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director General, Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy Ombudsman, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines President of and President of other state universities and colleges of the same class. Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose operations cut across offices or departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or whose functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding paragraph, may be placed at this level.

The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that may be created hereafter shall be determined based on these guidelines. The Provisions of this Act as far as they upgrade the compensation of Constitutional Officials and their equivalent under this section shall, however, take effect only in accordance with the Constitution: Provided, That with respect to the President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Senators, and the Members of the House of Representatives, no increase in salary shall take effect even beyond 1992, until this Act is amended: Provided, further, That the implementation of this Act with respect to Assistant Secretaries and Undersecretaries shall be deferred for one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act and for Secretaries, until July 1, 1992: Provided, finally, That in the case of Assistant Secretaries, Undersecretaries and Secretaries, the salary rates authorized herein shall be used in the computation of the retirement benefits for those who retire under the existing retirement laws within the aforesaid period. SECTION 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions below the Officials mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. Benchmark Position Schedule Position Title Laborer I Messenger Clerk I Driver I Stenographer I Mechanic I Carpenter II Electrician II Secretary I Bookkeeper Administrative Assistant Salary Grades 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 8

Education Research Assistant I Cashier I Nurse I Teacher I Agrarian Reform Program Technologist Budget Officer I Chemist I Agriculturist I Social Welfare Officer I Engineer I Veterinarian I Legal Officer I Administrative Officer II Dentist II Postmaster IV Forester III Associate Professor I Rural Health Physician

9 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator, and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions exceed Salary Grade 30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation for the aforesaid officials. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, while the positions of Agriculturist I with SG 11 and the President of the Philippines with SG 33 may both belong to the Professional Supervisory Category because of the nature of their duties and responsibilities as well as the knowledge and experience required to discharge them, nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the level of difficulty and responsibility of the latter is significantly greater than that of the former. It may be that the legislature might have chosen the four categories of the position classification system as the basis for the classification in Section 15 (c), as suggested by Justice Chico-Nazario, or even that no distinction might have been made at all. But these are matters pertaining to the wisdom of the legislative classification and not to its constitutional validity as measured against the requirements of the equal protection clause. As this Court stated in Ichong v. Hernandez:183

x x x Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is on duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.184 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) At this juncture, it is curious to note that while the main opinion initially states that the classification contained in Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act "has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense," and is thus valid on its face; the same opinion subsequently opines that: In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of salary grade or officer-employee status. It is a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Significantly, petitioner never advanced this argument anywhere in its pleadings. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the pleadings or records of this petition to suggest that: (1) petitioner's members belong to a separate economic class than those with SG 20 and above; and (2) that the distinction between the officers and the rank and file in Section 15(c) is based on such economic status. What is more, the foregoing statement flies in the face of a basis of classification well-established in our law and jurisprudence. Indeed, the distinction between "officers" and "employees" in the government service was clearly established as early as 1917 with the enactment of the Old Revised Administrative Code and later incorporated into the language of the Constitution: In terms of personnel, the system includes both "officers and employees." The distinction between these two types of government personnel is expressed by Section 2 of the Old Revised Administrative Code (1917) thus: Employee, when generally used in reference to persons in the public service, includes any person in the service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. Officer, as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to those officials whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not. Officer, when used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, shall include any Government employee, agent, or body having authority to do the act or exercise of the function in question. It is in these senses that the terms "officers and employees" are used in the Constitution and it is this sense which should also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to officers and employees of government-owned and or controlled corporations with original charter.185 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original) Clearly, classification on the basis of salary grade or between officers and rank and file employees within the civil service are intended to be rationally and objectively based on merit, fitness and degree of responsibility, and not on economic status. As this Court summarized in Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan:186

Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that: The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII thereof, contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then President Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985. However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to "(take) into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required" for the positions of government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as: Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that they may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation." Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades of officials holding constitutional positions, as follows xxx xxx x x x Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades) to the DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing the DBM to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable," and to assign them the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section. For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by (a) the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9, and (b) the following factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position; (2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;

(3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. x x x187 (Emphasis supplied) In view of the foregoing, the statement in the latter portion of the main opinion to the effect that the classification between the officers and the rank and file of the BSP is founded on economic status, and not on the level of difficulty and responsibility as well as the qualification requirements of the work to be performed, must be considered extremely suspect a conclusion without legal or factual tether bordering on sophistry. En passant, it may be observed that the distinction between the managerial personnel and the rank and file of the BSP in the New Central Bank Act is similar to the distinction between Justices, Judges and those of equivalent judicial rank on the one hand and other court personnel on the other hand in R.A. No. 9227.188 In furtherance of the declared policy "to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary x x x ensure impartial administration of justice, as well as an effective and efficient system worthy of public trust and confidence,"189 Section 2 of R.A. No. 9227 provides: Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances. - All justices, judges and all other positions* in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4) years. The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 hereof. Under the foregoing, personnel with judicial rank190 are entitled to the grant of certain special allowances while the other personnel of the judiciary are not. The reason for the difference in treatment may be gleaned from the legislative deliberations191 wherein the legislature, while acknowledging the need to augment the salaries and emoluments of members of the judiciary in order to attract and retain competent personnel and insulate them from possible outside influence, nevertheless had to take into consideration the limited resources of the government as well as the primary aim of the law, and consequently prioritized those holding judicial offices or with judicial rank over other court personnel. The Subsequent Amendment of the Charters of the

other GOCCs and GFIs Did Not Alter the Constitutionality of Section 15 (c) By operation of the equal protection clause, are the rank and file employees of the BSP entitled to exemption from the Compensation Classification System provided for under the Salary Standardization Law as a consequence of the exemption of the rank and file employees of certain other GOCCs and GFIs? Petitioner argues in the affirmative maintaining that: This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the rank-and-file employees of the other government financial institutions, such as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and the Social Security System (SSS), together with the officers of such institutions, are exempted from the coverage of the SSL under their respective charters x x x Thus, within the class of rank-and-file employees of the government financial institutions, the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are also discriminated upon.192 (Emphasis supplied) The charters of the GOCCs/GFIs adverted to by petitioner, together with their relevant provisions are as follows: (1) R.A. No. 7907, which took effect on February 23, 1995 and amended Section 90 of R.A. 3844, the Agrarian Land Reform Code, giving the Board of Directors of the LBP authority to approve the bank's own compensation, position classification system and qualification standards: SECTION 10. Section 90 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 90. Personnel. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, appoint and fix their remunerations and other emoluments, and remove such officers and employees: Provided, That the Board shall have exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer, assign or reassign personnel of the Bank, any provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. The Bank officers and employees, including all members of the Board, shall not engage directly or indirectly in partisan activities or take part in any election except to vote. No officer or employee of the Bank subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) (2) R.A. No. 8282, the Social Security System Act of 1997, approved on May 1, 1997, Section 3 (c) of which exempts all SSS employees from the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law:

Section 3. x x x (c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits, prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice-President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission: Provided, further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (Underscoring supplied) (3) R.A. No. 8291, the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, approved on May 31, 1997, which empowers its Board of Trustees of the GSIS to approve a compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards for its employees: SECTION 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions: xxx (d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and the employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law; x x x (Emphasis supplied) (4) R.A. No. 8523, which amended the Charter of the DBP on May 31, 1997 and exempted the bank from the coverage of the existing Salary Standardization Law: SECTION 6. Section 13 of the same Charter is hereby amended to read as follows: "SEC. 13. Other Officers and Employees. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standard. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as possible with the principles under Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). No officer or employee of the Bank subject to Civil Service Law shall be dismissed except for cause as

provided by law." (Underscoring supplied) Following this second line of argument, it appears that petitioner bases its claim to exemption from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law not only on (1) a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the proviso in Section 15(c) of The New Central Bank Act, which expressly places the rank and file employees of the BSP under the coverage of the former; but also on (2) an indirect assertion that the rank and file employees of the BSP are entitled to benefit from the subsequent exemptions of the rank and file personnel of certain GOCCs/GFIs from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. This second argument, that the rank and file employees of the BSP may benefit from subsequent classifications inother statutes pertaining to other GFI employees, on the theory that the former and the latter are identically or analogously situated (i.e. members of the same class), is not entirely new and is apparently founded on the fourth requisite of the Rational Basis Test - that is, that a reasonable classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, in Rubio v People's Homesite & Housing Corporation,193 the Court applied Section 76 of B.P. Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code, to benefit employees of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation who had been illegally dismissed some 23 years earlier, even though the latter were not local government employees. The Court, speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa held: Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was passed by the legislature and became effective on February 10, 1983. Section 76 thereof (under Title Four: Personnel Administration) provides as follows: SEC. 76. Abolition of Position. When the position of an official or employee under the civil service is abolished by law or ordinance the official or employee so affected shall be reinstated in another vacant position without diminution of salary. Should such position not be available, the official or employee affected shall be granted a separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service over and above the monetary privileges granted to officials and employees under existing law. To be sure, the provision on its face is apparently intended for the benefit only of officers and employees in the local political subdivisions. The Court however sees no reason why it should not be applied as well to other personnel of the government, including those in the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, which was then considered part of the Civil Service. A contrary conclusion would make the provision questionable under the equal protection clause of the Constitution as there appears to be no substantial distinction between civil servants in the local government and those in other branches of government to justify their disparate treatment. Since the petitioners are "employees under the civil service," the matter of their reinstatement to their former positions at this time should logically and justly be governed by the above cited statute although enacted many years after the abolition of their positions. And since, too, it may reasonably be assumed that reinstatement to their former positions is no longer possible, or feasible, or even desired or desirable, the petitioners or their heirs must be deemed entitled to receive the separation pay provided by said BP Blg. 337.194 (Emphasis supplied) Some Basic Principles of Legislative Classification Considering that the thrust of petitioner's second argument is that its members belong to the same class as other GFI employees (such that they are also entitled to exemption from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law), a brief discussion on legislative classification is in order.

As adverted to earlier, classification has been defined as "the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all other in these same particulars."195 To this may be added the following observations of Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek in their influential article196 on The Equal Protection of the Laws,197 viz: We begin with an elementary proposition: To define a class is simply to designate a quality or characteristic or trait or relation, or any combination of these, the possession of which, by an individual, determines his membership in or inclusion within the class. A legislature defines a class, or "classifies," when it enacts a law applying to "all aliens ineligible for citizenship," or "all persons convicted of three felonies," or "all citizens between the ages of 19 and 25" or "foreign corporations doing business within the state." This sense of "classify" (i.e., "to define a class") must be distinguished from the sense in which "to classify" refers to the act of determining whether an individual is a member of a particular class, that is, whether the individual possesses the traits which define the class. x x x It is also elementary that membership in a class is determined by the possession of the traits which define that class. Individual X is a member of class A if, and only if, X possesses the traits which define class A. Whatever the defining characteristics of a class may be, every member of that class will possess those characteristics Turning now to the reasonableness of legislative classifications, the cue is to be taken from our earlier reference to the requirement that those similarly situated be similarly treated. A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. The question is, however, what does that ambiguous and crucial phrase "similarly situated" mean? And in answering this question we must first dispose of two errors into which the Court has sometimes fallen. First, "similarly situated" cannot mean simply "similar in the possession of the classifying trait." All members of any class are similarly situated in this respect and consequently, any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test. x x x xxx The second error in the interpretation of the meaning of similarly situated arises out of the notion that some classes are unnatural or artificial. That is, a classification is sometimes held to be unreasonable if it includes individuals who do not belong to the same "natural" class. We call this an error without pausing to fight the ancient controversy about the natural status of classes. All legislative classifications are artificial in the sense that they are artifacts, no matter what the defining traits may be. And they are all real enough for the purposes of law, whether they be the class of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, or the class of makers of margarine, or the class of stockyards receiving more than one hundred head of cattle per day, or the class of feeble-minded confined to institutions. The issue is not whether, in defining a class, the legislature has carved the universe at a natural joint. If we want to know if such classifications are reasonable, it is fruitless to consider whether or not they correspond to some "natural" grouping or separate those who naturally belong together. But if we avoid these two errors, where are we to look for the test of similarity of situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification? The inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.198 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

Moreover, Tussman and tenBroek go on to describe the task of the courts in evaluating the reasonableness of a legislative classification: Since it is impossible to judge the reasonableness of a classification without relating it to the purpose of the law, the first phase of the judicial task is the identification of the law's purpose. x x x xxx It is thus evident that the attempt to identify the purpose of a law - an attempt made mandatory by the equal protection requirement - involves the Court in the thornier aspects of judicial review. At best, the Court must uncritically and often unrealistically accept a legislative avowal at its face value. Wt worst, it must challenge legislative integrity and push beyond the express statement into unconfined realms of inference. Having accepted or discovered the elusive "purpose" the Court must then, under the discriminatory legislation doctrine, make a judgment as to the purity of legislative motive and, under substantive equal protection, determine the legitimacy of the end. Only after the purpose of the law has thus been discovered and subjected to this scrutiny can the Court proceed with the classification problem. x x x Except when the class in the law is itself defined by the mischief [to be eliminated], the assertion that any particular relation holds between the [classifying trait and the purpose] is an empirical statement. The mere assertion that a particular relation exists does not establish the truth of the assertion. A legislature may assert that all "three-time felons" are "hereditary criminals" and that all "hereditary criminals" are "three-time felons." But whether this is the case is a question of fact, not fiat. Consequently, the Court, in determining the actual relation between the classes [i.e. the classifying trait and the purpose of the law] is engaged in fact-finding or in criticism of legislative fact finding. Thus the Court is confronted with a number of alternative formulations of the question: 1) what is the legislative belief about the relation between the classes? and, 2) is this belief reasonable? or simply, 3) what relation exists between the two classes?199 With the foregoing in mind, the relevant question then (as regards petitioner's second line of argument) is whether in fact petitioner's members and the other GFI employees are so similarly situated as to members of a single class for purposes of compensation and position classification. There is no Basis for the Classification of GFI Employees as a Discrete Class, entitled to "Special Treatment" with respect to Compensation Classification Without identifying the legislative purpose for exemption from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System mandated by the Salary Standardization Law, the main opinion concludes that the classifying trait among those exempted from the coverage is their status as GFI employees. On this basis, it would grant the instant petition upon the assumption that "there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate the BSP rank and file from the other rank and file of the [other] GFIs." The foregoing tacitly rests on the assumptions that, with respect to their compensation, position classification and qualifications standards, (1) the rank-and-file employees of the BSP together with the rank-and-file employees of the LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP belong to a single class; and (2) there are no reasonable distinctions between the rank-and-file employees of the BSP and the exempted employees of the other GOCCs/GFIs. However, these assumptions are unfounded, and the assertion that "GFIs have long been recognized as one distinct class,

separate from other governmental entities" is demonstrably false. As previously discussed, Section 2 of P.D. 985200 cited in support of the foregoing proposition has been expressly repealed by Section 16 of Salary Standardization Law. Sec. 16. Repeal of Special Salary Laws and Regulations. All laws, decrees, executive orders, corporate charters, and other issuances or parts thereof, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position classification, salaries, pay rates or allowances of specified positions, or groups of officials and employees or of agencies, which are inconsistent with the System, including the proviso under Section 2, and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 985 are hereby repealed. (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, neither the text nor the legislative record of the Salary Standardization Law manifests the intent to provide "favored treatment" for GOCCs and GFIs. Thus, Section 3 (b), erroneously cited by the main opinion, provides for the general principle that compensation for all government personnel, whether employed in a GOCC/GFI or not, should generally be comparable with that in the private sector, to wit: SECTION 3. General Provisions. The following principles shall govern the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government: (a) All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels, giving due consideration to higher percentage of increases to lower level positions and lower percentage increases to higher level positions; (b) Basic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages; (c) The total compensation provided for government personnel must be maintained at a reasonable level in proportion to the national budget; (d) A review of government compensation rates, taking into account possible erosion in purchasing power due to inflation and other factors, shall be conducted periodically. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, Section 4 of the Salary Standardization Law expressly provides the general rule that GFIs, like other GOCCs and all other members of the civil service, are within the coverage of the law: SECTION 4. Coverage. The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall include all corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary functions. (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied) Furthermore, a reading of the deliberations on what eventually became the Salary Standardization Law leaves no doubt that one of its goals was to provide for a common compensation system for all so that the stark disparities in pay between employees of the GOCCs and GFIs and other government employees would be minimized if not eliminated, as the following excerpt plainly shows: Senator Guingona. Mrs. President, the PNB and DBP transferred nonperforming assets and liabilities to the National Government in the sum of over P120 billion in 1986. They are reportedly having profits of, I think over P1 billion. They have not declared dividends so that the National Government is the one that absorbed the indebtedness. The financial institutions are enjoying clean books and increased profits. Yet, employees of these institutions are receiving far more, whereas, the employees of the National Government which absorbed the nonperforming assets are receiving less. And the Central Bank is dumping into the National Government liabilities of more than P5 billion... Senator Romulo. Eventually P34 billion. Senator Guingona. And, yet, the janitor in the Central Bank is receiving a higher rate of salary than the clerk or even the minor executives in some National Government agencies and bureaus. This does not seem just and violates the equal pay for equal work principle which the distinguished Sponsor has nobly established in the policy statement.201 Thus, during the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations, the sentiment was that exemptions from the general Compensation Classification System applicable to all government employees would be limited only to key positions in order not to lose these personnel to the private sector. A provision was moreover inserted empowering the President to, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation, exceeding Salary Grade 30, to the chairman, president, general manger, and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions:202 SEC. CARAGUE. Actually, we are requesting that government corporations that are performing proprietary functions and therefore competing with the private sector should evolve a salary structure in respect to key positions. There are some positions in banking, for example, that are not present in the ordinary government offices. I can understand for example, if the government corporation, like NIA, it is performing a governmental function. I believe it is not strictly a proprietary function - NIA and NAWASA. But there are government corporations that are engaged in very obviously proprietary type of function. For example, transportation companies of the government; banking institution; insurance functions. I feel that they have to be competitive with the private sector, not with respect to all positions. Like, for example, janitor or messenger, because there is no danger of losing this out to the private sector; you can always get this. But there are certain key position - even the key men of the government corporations performing proprietary functions, sometimes they got - the market analyst, commodities analyst and so on - they have certain functions that are not normal in government, and it is very difficult to get this specialists. So, I was wondering if we could provide a provision that government corporations engaged in proprietary activities, that positions that are peculiar to them should be allowed a different compensation structure. THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Andaya). But that can be solved, when implemented, you just assign him a higher rate.203 (Underscoring supplied)

xxx THE CHAIRMAN (Sen. Rasul). Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering if perhaps we should also include "financial institutions," not just "government-owned or controlled corporation." SEC. CARAGUE. I think it is broad enough, Madam Senator. THE CHAIRMAN (Sen. Rasul). Broad enough? SEC. CARAGUE. Yes. THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Andaya). It covers everybody. Everybody is covered that way. REP. LAGUDA. Mr. Chairman, if we go back to the amendment of Senator Rasul, I think what she has put there is that it is the President's discretion, because in the House version, it is an across-the-board-thing. There is no mention of the President's discretion here. So maybe we should accept the amendment of Senator Rasul that "it is the President who shall decide." In other words, when she said "the President may," it is the discretion of the President rather than automatic. SEC.CARAGUE. Yes. Like for example, there are, I think, quite a number of Vice Presidents that really are also important because it is very difficult if the President will have a salary that is so way, way above the Vice Presidents. And usually the Vice Presidents are the ones that support, that provided teamwork for the President. Sometimes there are certain key people, like money market specialists that are difficult to keep because they easily transfer to another company. xxx SEC. CARAGUE. In the end, Your Honor, it may be more expensive to limit the salaries of these kind of people because if you don't get good people, the viability of the corporation, the profitability goes down. So you actually, in the end, lose more. You don't see it because it is just loss of revenue, in lack of profitability, but actually it costs you more. And that is the problem of this kind of...204 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) What is more, the exemption of the personnel of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)" from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System, as pointed out in the main opinion,205 only underscores the error in maintaining employment in a GFI as the defining trait of employees exempted from said System. In actual fact, the employees of a number of GFIs remain within the coverage of the Compensation Classification System,206 while employees of several other GOCCs207 and government agencies208 have been exempted from the same. Hence, GFI employment, as advocated by the main opinion, cannot be reasonably considered to be the basis for exemption for the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law. Curiously, how could the exemption of the SEC personnel "add insult to petitioner's injury" when, going by what the main opinion holds to be the defining characteristic of the class to which petitioner's members belong - that is, employment in a GFI, the two groups of employees would obviously not be comparable? Mere Employment in a GOCC or GFI is not

Determinative of Exemption from the Salary Standardization Law More importantly, an examination of the legislative proceedings leading up to the amendment of the charters of the GOCCs and GFIs exempted from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System discloses that mereemployment in a GFI was not the decisive characteristic which prompted the legislature to provide for such exemption. Thus, Republic Act No. 3844 (R.A. No. 3844) otherwise known as the "Agrarian Reform Code" created the Land Bank which is mandated to be the financing arm of the Agrarian Reform Program of the government. More specifically, the Land Bank is tasked to be the primary government agency in the mobilization and the provision of credit to the small farmers and fisher folk sector in their various economic activities such as production, processing, storage, transport and the marketing of farm produce. Since its inception, the Land Bank has transformed into a universal bank, seeking to continually fortify the agricultural sector by delivering countryside credit and support services. In order to continue performing its mandate of providing non-traditional banking services and developmental assistance to farmers and fishermen, Congress saw the need to strengthen the bank by introducing amendments to R.A. No. 3844. Republic Act No. 7907 (R.A. No. 7907) amended R.A. No. 3844 by strengthening the Land Bank not only for the purpose of implementing agrarian reform, but also to make it more competitive with foreign banks.209 One of the salient points of R.A. No. 7907 is the exemption of all of the Land Bank's personnel from the Salary Standardization Law, authorizing at the same time its board of directors to provide compensation, position classification system and qualification standards. The discussion of the House of Representatives' Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries reveals the surrounding circumstances then prevailing, which prompted Congress to exempt the Land Bank from the Salary Standardization Law. The Committee likewise recognized the* role of the rank and file employees in fulfilling its unique task of providing credit to support the agricultural sector. MR. GOLEZ. Madam Speaker, the points of the distinguished sponsor are very well taken. But what I would like to emphasize is that the Land Bank as already stated, is not just almost unique, it is unique. It cannot be likened to a conventional commercial bank even in the case of the Philippine National Bank where its employees can very easily move from one bank to another. An employee, an average employee in the Philippine National Bank can easily transfer to a private commercial bank and vice-versa. So in fact we are witnessing almost on a daily basis these periodic transfers, piracy of executives, employees from one commercial bank to another. However, in the case of the Land Bank precisely because of its very unique operations, the very life of the viability of the Land Bank of the Philippines depends decisively and critically on its core group, which in this particular case would be the rank and file, the technical employee below the level of managers. They are not substitutable at all. They are very critical. And as such, the position of this Representation, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, is that that critical role gives them the importance as well as the inherent right to be represented in the highest policy making body of the bank.210 (Emphasis supplied) xxx MR. APOSTOL. Now, may I know why the employees of Land Bank should be exempted from the compensation and position classification? MR. FUENTEBELLA. Are we now in Section 87, your Honor? MR. APOSTOL. Yes.

MR. FUENTEBELLA. The present compensation package of the employees of the bank are no longer competitive with the banking industry. In fact, the turnover of bank personnel is concerned, I think they had a turnover of more than 127 rank and file and more than 43 or 50 officer level. For the reason that the present compensation through bank officers and personnel are no longer competitive with the other banks despite the fact that there is a provision in our Constitution and this is sanctioned by existing provisions of the Civil Service, that we ma enact laws to make the position classification of certain sectors in the government comparable with the same industry. That is the reason why... MR. APOSTOL. Is it not that the compensation of officials and employees of the Land Bank must be similar or comparable to the salaries and compensation of government banks or financial institutions? MR. FUENTEBELLA. Yes. In fact, the Philippine National Bank has a better financial compensation package compared to the Land Bank. MR. APOSTOL. Yes, it should and it must because PNB is already privatized, Land Bank is not yet. MR. FUENTEBELLA. Not yet, your Honor. MR. APOSTOL. If the compensation package of the employees of Land Bank should be similar to PNB, then why not privatize so that Land Bank will be exempted from this... MR. FUENTEBELLA. Well, as I said, your Honor, in due time, we can go into that aspect of privatization. We are not closing our eyes to that possibility. But for the moment that the bank is still tasked with numerous problems, particularly on agrarian reform, and for as long as the bank has not been able to perform its major task in helping the government provide the necessary mechanisms to solve and address the problems of agrarian reform, then we cannot talk about privatization yet. Because the function of the bank is not purely for profit orientation, your Honor. Whatever profits are generated under the commercial banking transactions are channeled to the agrarian sector, which is a losing proposition actually.211 (Emphasis supplied) Like the Land Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the country's premier development bank, was also exempt from the Salary Standardization Law. Republic Act No. 8523 (RA 8523) amended Executive Order No. 81 otherwise known as the "1986 Revised Charter of the Development Bank of the Philippines" to enable DBP to effectively contribute to the nation's attainment of its socio-economic objectives and fill the gaps left by the private sector which might be unwilling or unprepared to take on critical projects and programs. The bottom line of this bill which seeks to amend the existing charter of the Development Bank of the Philippines is to enable the DBP as the country's premier development bank to effectively contribute to the nation's attainment of its socio-economic objectives, such as the alleviation of poverty, creation of employment opportunities, and provision of basic needs such as food, shelter, health and education. Given the present state of financial intermediation and capital markets in the Philippines, economic activities and projects still remain which private financial institutions may not be willing to finance because of the risks involves. And even if some of these private institutions are willing to do so, they may not have the capability to assist such projects and activities. Development lending is much more than simply providing medium to long-term funds to economically viable projects. The proposed DBP charter amendment will help remodel DBP in the financial community as a predominantly development bank that works closely with individuals, institutions and associations which can provide resources and other types of assistance to projects with clearly-defined development impact.212

In order to achieve DBP's vision as the country's premier development bank in a rapidly growing economic environment, the legislature sought to (1) increase the authorized capital of DBP from P5 billion to P10 billion; and (2) restructure DBP's organization into one which is market-responsive, product focused, horizontally aligned, and with a lean, highly motivated work force by removing the DBP from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. The DBP's exemption from the Salary Standardization Law was justified by the fact that it is an institution engaged in development activities which should be given the same opportunities as the private sector to compete.213 The exemption from the Salary Standardization Law does not only involve banks but government entities that manage pension funds such as the SSS and the GSIS. Republic Act No. 1161 (R.A. No. 1161) established the SSS pursuant to a state policy of providing meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies, resulting in loss of income or financial burden. Republic Act No. 8282 amended R.A. No. 1161 by providing for better benefit packages, expansion of coverage, flexibility in investments, stiffer penalties for violators of the law, condonation of penalties of delinquent employers and the establishment of a voluntary provident fund for members. The fund that the SSS administers comes from the compulsory remittances of the employer on behalf of his employees. The House of Representatives noted that the fund in 1996 amounted 5.5 billion dollars, the sheer enormity of which necessitated that it be exempt from the Salary Standardization Law in order for it to attract quality personnel to ensure that the funds will not be mismanaged, abused or dissipated due to the negligence of its personnel. Moreover, the SSS, like the Land Bank and the DBP, was facing a massive exodus of its personnel who were migrating to greener pastures. MR. VALENCIA. x x x Now, the other law refers to the law on salary standardization. Again, we are in a situation where we are competing for personnel with the private sector, especially the financial institutions. We compete with banks, we compete with insurance companies for people. So what happens invariably is we lost our people after we have trained them, after they have proven themselves with a track record, with the very low pay that is being given to our people. We believe that with the magnitude of the accountability that we have, (We are accountable for 5.5 billion dollars, some 132 million pesos) ah, we think that we deserve the quality of people to ensure that these funds...and the pay out by the billions of pesos in terms of benefits and we collect by the billions of pesos, we believe that the magnitude of money and accountability we have is even higher than that of the local financial institutions. And the pay, for example, of the Administrator is similar to a small branch in a bank. So, I don't think our pay will be very competitive but certainly it's too low considering the accountability that is on the shoulder of the employees. If we end up with poor quality of personnel, what would happen is these funds could be mismanaged, abused or just out of pure negligence could be dissipated. HON. PADILLA. Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. Congressman Padilla. HON. PADILLA. With the Standardization Law, how can we resolve that problem just mentioned by the Administrator? MR. VALENCIA. What will happen, Sir, is that we will ask outside assistance to work out a salary structure that would be modest but at the same time at least make it more difficult (sic) that will attract new people, new blood to the System - quality personnel, and will also help make it a bit more difficult for private sector to pirate from the institution.214 (Emphasis supplied) As the SSS exercises the same functions as the GSIS - the handling of sensitive and important funds - the GSIS'

exemption from the Salary Standardization Law was easily justifiable, viz: HON. TUAZON. xxx Now, the GSIS and the SSS, they are more or less performing the same functions. So I am asking whether in the proposed amendments on the charter of the GSIS they also have similar proposal, because if I still recall, there was a time when the GSIS employees were the envy - not the SSS because the SSS has never been the envy of government employees because they really never have been paid very good salaries. There was a time when the GSIS was the envy of other government employees because they had fat bonuses, they had quarterly bonus, they had mid-year bonus, they had 3 months bonus, Christmas bonus and their salaries were very much higher than their counterparts in the government and they are saying, "By golly, the GSIS, they are only using the funds of the government employees and yet they are receiving fat salaries from the contributions of the government employees. That was one of the complaints I was hearing at that time - I was still First Year College -, so the next time I realized, all these fat salaries of the Central Bank... Central Bank was also the envy of the other government employees, PNB, but SSS has never been noted to be paying fat salaries that will be sufficient to attract well qualified employees from the other sectors. So, the reason for my question is that, if we grant SSS, we have also to grant GSIS on the rationale that they are both performing the same functions.215 (Emphasis supplied) In sum, the basis for the exemption of certain employees of GOCCs or GFIs from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law rests not on the mere fact that they are employees of GOCCs or GFIs, but on a policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is needed to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provision of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for and the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental. There are real differences between the Rank & File of the BSP and the Exempted Rank & File Employees of the other GOCCs/GFIs There can be no doubt that the employees of the BSP share a common attribute with the employees of the LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP in that all are employees of GOCCs performing fiduciary functions. It may also be reasonable to assume that BSP employees with SG 19 and below perform functions analogous to those carried out by employees of the other GOCCs with the corresponding salary grades. Nonetheless, these similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualifications standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification. Thus, inJohnson, et al. v. Robison, et al,.,216 involving the alleged violation of a conscientious objector's right to equal protection, the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to observe: Of course, merely labeling the class of beneficiaries under the Act as those having served on active duty in the Armed Services cannot rationalize a statutory discrimination against conscientious objectors who have performed alternative civilian service, if, in fact, the lives of the latter were equally disrupted and equally in need of readjustment. The District Court found that military veterans and alternative service performers share the characteristic during their respective service careers of "inability to pursue the educational and economic objectives that persons not subject to the draft law could pursue." But this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to

invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups. Congress expressly recognized that significant differences exist between military service veterans and alternative service performers, particularly in respect of the Act's purpose to provide benefits to assist in readjusting to civilian life. These differences "afford the basis for a different treatment within a constitutional framework."217 (Underscoring and emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Indeed, from the foregoing examination of the legislative records of the amended charters of the exempt GOCCs and GFIs, the following real and material differences are readily manifest: First, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, the BSP, in particular the Central Monetary Authority,218 performs a primarily government function, not a proprietary or business function. In this respect it is more similar to the other government agencies involved in the management of the economy, such as the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), than a commercial bank. Second, while the importance of its functions is undoubted, the BSP, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, is not subject to cut throat competition or the pressures of either the financial or job markets. Third, there is no indication in the record that the BSP, unlike the LBP, DBP, SSS and GSIS, is experiencing difficulty in filling up or maintaining competent personnel in the positions with SG 19 and below. The Questioned Proviso Cannot be Considered Oppressive or Discriminatory in Its Implementation Given the factual basis for the classification between exempt and non-exempt employees (i.e. real distinctions as to the proprietary or governmental character of the GOCC/GFI, competition with the private sector, and difficulty in attracting and maintaining competent personnel) and the reasonable relationship of this classification to the attainment of the objectives of the laws involved, the questioned proviso cannot be considered oppressive or discriminatory in its implementation. Significantly, neither the petitioner nor the main opinion demonstrates what injuries petitioner's members have sustained as a result of the proviso in Section 15 (c) of The New Central Bank Act, whether or not the same is read together with subsequent legislative enactments. This is unsurprising for how could a provision which places the BSP rank and file at par with all other government employees in terms of compensation and position classification be considered oppressive or discriminatory? Moreover, Congressional records show that House Bill 123 has been filed with the present Thirteenth Congress219 seeking to amend The New Central Bank Act by, among other things, exempting all positions in the BSP from the Salary Standardization Law. Thus, it cannot be said that Congress has closed its mind to all possibility of amending the New Central Bank Act to provide for the exemption of the BSP rank and file from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law. In fine, judged under the Rational Basis Test, the classification in Section 15 (c) of the New Central Bank Act complies with the requirements of the equal protection clause, even taken together with the subsequent amendments of the charters of the other GOCCs and GFIs. Petitioner's Members' Remedy is with Congress and Not With The Courts While the main opinion acknowledges the propriety of judicial restraint "under most circumstances" when deciding

questions of constitutionality, in recognition of the "broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power," it nevertheless advocates active intervention with respect to the exemption of the BSP rank and file employees from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law. Considering, however, that the record fails to show (1) that the statutory provision in question affects either a fundamental right or a suspect class, and, more importantly, (2) that the classification contained therein was completely bereft of any possible rational and real basis, it would appear that judicial restraint is not merely preferred but is in fact mandatory, lest this Court stray from its function of adjudication and trespass into the realm of legislation. To be sure, inasmuch as exemption from the Salary Standardization Law requires a factually grounded policy determination by the legislature that such exemption is necessary and desirable for a government agency or GOCC to accomplish its purpose, the appropriate remedy of petitioner is with Congress and not with the courts. As the branch of government entrusted with the plenary power to make and amend laws,220 it is well within the powers of Congress to grant exceptions to, or to amend where necessary, the Salary Standardization Law, where the public good so requires. At the same time, in line with its duty to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments,221 this Court is naturally hesitant to intrude too readily into the domain of another co-equal branch of government where the absence of reason and the vice of arbitrariness are not clearly and unmistakably established. The contention in the main opinion that herein petitioner represents the "politically powerless," and therefore should not be compelled to seek a political solution, rings hollow. First, as pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,222 "[a]ny minority can be said to be powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social legislation would now be suspect."223 Second, there is nothing of record which would explain why the rank and file employees of the BSP in particular should be considered more "powerless" than the rank and file employees of the other GOCCs and GFIs, particularly those to whom Congress has granted exemption. Third, as already mentioned, House Bill 123, providing for, among others, the exemption of all BSP employees from the coverage of the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law is already pending in Congress. Thus, it would seem that the petitioner and its members are not without any support from within that legislative body. Moreover, in view of the tight fiscal and budgetary situation confronting the national government, both the executive and legislative branches of the government are actively reassessing the statutes which have exempted certain GOCCs and GFIs from the Salary Standardization Law, as reported in a number of newspapers of general circulation.224 Thus, in line with the austerity program set under Administrative Order 130 issued by the President on August 31, 2004, the Department of Budget and Management is reviewing the pay packages of 1,126 GOCCs and their subsidiaries,225 particularly those which have been exempted from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law,226 to bring their salaries at par with national agencies.227 Additionally, the Department of Budget has moved for the removal of all the exemptions of the GOCCs from the Salary Standardization law and the slashing of salaries of some GOCC officials to help ease the government's financial problems.228 There have also been suggestions to shift to a performance-based compensation structure,229 or to amend the charters of the GOCCs exempted from the Salary Standardization Law to allow the President to set limits on the compensation230 received by their personnel. Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin has also disclosed that the President had mandated "a cut in pay of members of the board and officers of GOCCs that are not competing with the private sector," adding that those who "d[o] not compete with the private sector would have to observe the Salary Standardization Law."231

Together with these developments, House Majority Leader Prospero Nograles has called on Congress to step in and institute amendments to existing charters of GFI's and GOCCs232 which have been exempted from the Compensation Classification System of the Salary Standardization Law; and, thereafter, pass a law standardizing the salaries of GOCC and GFI employees and executives.233 Other members of the House of Representatives, particularly the party-list lawmakers, have suggested a cut on the salary schemes of GOCC executives, with the funds saved to be channeled to a "special fund" for giving lowly paid government employees a salary increase.234 Whether any of the foregoing measures will actually be implemented by the Congress still remains to be seen. However, what is important is that Congress is actively reviewing the policies concerning GOCCs and GFIs with respect to the Salary Standardization Law. Hence, for this Court to intervene now, when no intervention is called for, would be to prematurely curtail the public debate on the issue of compensation of the employees of the GOCCs and GFIs, and effectively substitute this Court's policy judgments for those of the legislature, with whom the "power of the purse" is constitutionally lodged. Such would not only constitute an improper exercise of the Court's power of judicial review, but may also effectively stunt the growth and maturity of the nation as a political body as well. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to reflect upon the words of Mr. Chief Justice Berger of the American Court in his dissenting opinion in Plyler v. Doe,235 to wit: The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across our borders. The failure of enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma that has not yet been fully assessed, let alone addressed.However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide "effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government fail to do so. The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of "remedies" for the failures - or simply the laggard pace - of the political processes of our system of government. The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make amends for the defaults of others. xxx The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Moreover, when this Court rushes to remedy what it perceives to be the failing of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.236(Emphasis supplied; citations and footnotes omitted) The Social Justice Provisions of the Constitution do not Justify the Grant of the Instant Petition May this Court depart from established rules in equal protection analysis to grant a group of government employees, the

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' rank and file, adjustments in their salaries and wages? Can the exemption from a law mandating the salary standardization of all government employees be justified based on the economic and financial needs of the employees, and on the assertion that those who have less in life should have more in law? Can the social justice provisions in the Constitution override the strong presumption of constitutionality of the law and place the burden, under the test of "strict scrutiny", upon the government to demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests? Notwithstanding the lack of support from both local and foreign jurisprudence to justify the grant of the instant petition, the main opinion maintains that the policy of social justice and the special protection afforded to labor237require the use of equal protection as a tool of effective intervention, and the adoption of a less deferential attitude by this Court to legislative classification.238 The citation of the social justice provisions of the Constitution are non sequitur. As previously discussed, neither the petitioner nor the main opinion has clearly explained how a provision placing the rank and file of the BSP on equal footing with all other government employees in terms of compensation and position classification can be considered oppressive or discriminatory. In this regard, the citation of International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing239 is doubly ironic. For to demonstrate the institutionalization of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" in our legal system, footnote 22 of the decision refers specifically to the Salary Standardization Law as embodying said principle: Indeed, the government employs this rule "equal pay for equal work" in fixing the compensation of government employees. Thus, Republic Act No. 6758 (An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in Government and for Other Purposes) declares it "the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. See also the Preamble of Presidential Decree No. 985 (A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government, and Integrating the same)240 At the same time, the General Provisions of the Salary Standardization Law clearly incorporate the spirit and intent of the social justice provisions cited in the main opinion, to wit: SECTION 3. General Provisions. The following principles shall govern the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government: (a) All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels, giving due consideration to higher percentage of increases to lower level positions and lower percentage increases to higher level positions; (b) Basic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages; (c) The total compensation provided for government personnel must be maintained at a reasonable level in proportion to the national budget; (d) A review of government compensation rates, taking into account possible erosion in purchasing power due to inflation and other factors, shall be conducted periodically.

How then are the aims of social justice served by removing the BSP rank and file personnel from the ambit of the Salary Standardization Law? In the alternative, what other public purpose would be served by ordering such an exemption? Surely to grant the rank and file of the BSP exemption solely for the reason that other GOCC or GFI employees have been exempted, without regard for the reasons which impelled the legislature to provide for those exemptions, would be to crystallize into our law what Justice Holmes sardonically described as "merely idealizing envy."241 Similarly, the justification that petitioner and its members represent "the more impotent rank and file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific rights to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions for employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices" is unconvincing. This Court's discussion of the differences between employment in the GOCCs/GFIs and the private sector, to my mind, is more insightful: The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. xxx Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil service. It would not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from Government even as other civil service personnel such as the hundreds of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are denied the right to engage in similar activities. To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in nightmarish budgetary problems. For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate the financial difficulties of courts, judges, and court personnel in the entire country but it can do so only within the limits of budgetary appropriations. Public school teachers have been resorting to what was formerly unthinkable, to mass leaves and demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised increases in basic salaries and small allowances for school uniforms. The budget of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports has to be supplemented every now and then for this purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from appropriations or savings under the law, and not from concerted activity. The Government Corporate Counsel, Justice Manuel Lazaro, in his consolidated comment for respondents GSIS, MWSS, and PVTA gives the background of the amendment which includes every government-owned

or controlled corporation in the embrace of the civil service: xxx '"Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of the management of the public service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies in the performance of their duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and must always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It would be highly incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from union leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government. This would be inimical to the public interest. xxx "Similarly, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing support for the inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service, argued: "'It is meretricious to contend that because Government-owned or controlled corporations yield profits, their employees are entitled to better wages and fringe benefits than employees of Government other than Government-owned and controlled corporations which are not making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is the people's money.' (see: Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention). "Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of Governmentowned or controlled corporations, Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila University Professional School of Law, stated that government-owned corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in the various branches of government, while the capital of these corporations belongs to the Government and government money is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore come under the stric[t] surveillance of the Civil Service System.(Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524)." xxx Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government employees represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in matters of salaries different from that extended to all others government personnel. The provision states: "SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions concerned." It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not the collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from management that determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of salaries, 13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government institutions which can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their budgetary appropriations. However, these payments must be pursuant to law or regulation.242 (Emphasis supplied)

Certainly, social justice is more than picking and choosing lines from Philippine and foreign instruments, statutes and jurisprudence, like ripe cherries, in an effort to justify preferential treatment of a favored group. In the immortal words of Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams:243 The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle ofsalus populi est suprema lex244 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Postscript I agree wholeheartedly with the main opinion's statement that "[t]here should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society." However, because I find that the classification contained in the questioned proviso is based on real differences between the executive level and the rank and file of the BSP; is rationally related to the attainment of the objectives of the new Central Bank Act; and, further, that the subsequent amendments to the charters of certain other GOCCs and GFIs did not materially affect the rational basis for this classification, I do not believe that the classification in the case at bar is impressed with the vice of irrationality. The mere fact that petitioner's members are employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, admittedly perhaps the biggest among the GFIs, does not, to my mind, automatically justify their exemption from the Compensation Classification System provided for by the Salary Standardization Law. In my humble view, the equal protection clause ought not to be used as a means of "reserving greener pastures to sacred cows" in contravention of the Constitutional mandate to "provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions." WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the instant petition.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 7. Id., p. 9.

i.e., (1) make the salary of the BSP personnel competitive to attract highly competent personnel; (2) establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; and (3) ensure the administrative autonomy of the BSP as the central monetary authority

Rollo, pp. 8-10.

Id., pp. 10-12, quoting Former Senator Maceda, Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, March 15 to June 10, 1993, Vol. IV, No. 86, p. 1087.
6

Id., pp. 12-14. Id., p. 14. Id., pp. 2-5. Id., pp. 14-15. Id., pp. 62-75. Id., pp. 76-90. 1987 Constitution, Art. III, 1. No. L-25246, 59 SCRA 54, 77-78 (September 12, 1974).

10

11

12

13

14

Basa v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF), No. L27113, 61 SCRA 93, 110-111 (November 19, 1974); Anucension v. National Labor Union, No. L-26097, 80 SCRA 350, 372-373 (November 29, 1977); Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, No. L-29646, 86 SCRA 270, 275 (November 10, 1978); Dumlao v. Comelec, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392, 404 (January 22, 1980); Cenizav. Comelec, G.R. No. L-52304, 95 SCRA 763, 772-773 (January 28, 1980); Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, 237 SCRA 538 (October 7, 1994); The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, 243 SCRA 666, 677 (April 21, 1995); JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 260 SCRA 319, 331332 (August 5, 1996); and Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 301 SCRA 278, 288-289 (January 20, 1999). See also Ichong v. Hernandez, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (May 31, 1957); Vera v. Cuevas, Nos. L-33693-94, 90 SCRA 379, 388 (May 31, 1979); and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873, and 115931, 235 SCRA 630, 684 (August 25, 1994).
15

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, 175 SCRA 343 (July 14, 1989). See Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 301 SCRA 278 (January 20, 1999).
16

Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (May 31, 1957), citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 824-825.
17

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 301 SCRA 278 (January 20, 1999); Dumlao v. Comelec, No. L52245, 95 SCRA 392, 404 (January 22, 1980); and Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, 237 SCRA 538 (October 7, 1994). See also JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 260 SCRA 319, 331-332 (August 5, 1996); The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, 243 SCRA 666, 677 (April 21, 1995); Ceniza v. Comelec, No. L-52304, 95 SCRA 763, 772 (January 28, 1980); Vera v. Cuevas, Nos. L-33693-94, 90 SCRA 379 (May 31, 1979); and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 and 115931, 235 SCRA 630 (August 25, 1994).

18

Dumlao v. Comelec, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392, 405 (January 22, 1980), citing Peralta v. Comelec, No. L-47771, No. L-47803, No. L-47816, No. L-47767, No. L-47791 and No. L-47827, 82 SCRA 30 (March 11, 1978); Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, No. L-19978, 21 SCRA 336 (September 29, 1967); and Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento, No. L-7995, 101 Phil 1155 (May 31, 1957). See also JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 260 SCRA 319 (August 5, 1996); Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 703 (November 11, 1993); and Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, No. L-29646, 86 SCRA 270, 275 (November 10, 1978).
19

People v. Carlos, No. L-239, 78 Phil. 535 (June 30, 1947).

20

See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, No. L-1123, 78 Phil. 1 (March 5, 1947); Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.v. Gimenez, No. L-17931, 7 SCRA 347 (February 28, 1963); Morales v. Subido, No. L-29658, 27 SCRA 131 (February 27, 1969); and Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 703 (November 11, 1993).
21

People v. Vera, No. 45685, 65 Phil. 56 (November 16, 1937).

22

Id., citing U. S. v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1, 10 (December 28, 1912); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250, 276 (February 4, 1913); and U. S. v. Joson, No. 7019, 26 Phil. 1 (October 29, 1913).
23

Dumlao v. COMELEC, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392, 404 (January 22, 1980).

24

Medill v. State, 477 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1991) (followed with reservations by, In re Cook, 138 B.R. 943 [Bankr. D. Minn. 1992]).
25

Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. Ed. 949 (1935); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244, 139 A.L.R. 973 (1941); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Faulkner, 3 G.R. No. L-29646 07 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1957); and Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
26

Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954). Id. No. L-3708, 93 Phil. 68 (May 18, 1953).

27

28

29

30

On the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342, Section 2 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; and Section 3 of said Act provides that should the provision of Section 2 be declared void and unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the provisions of Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945, relative to debt moratorium, shall continue to be in force and effect, any contract affecting the same to the contrary notwithstanding, until subsequently repealed or amended by a legislative enactment. It thus clearly appears in said Act that the nullification of its provisions will have the effect of

reviving the previous moratorium orders issued by the President of the Philippines.
31

Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, 93 Phil. 68 (May 18, 1953). 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244, 139 A.L.R. 973 (1941). 307 S.W.2d 196 (Ky. 1957). Id. People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 350 SCRA 163 (January 24, 2001).

32

33

34

35

36

People v. Vera, No. 45685, 65 Phil. 56 (November 16, 1937). Parenthetically, this doctrine was first enunciated in the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Matthews, declared: "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearances, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
37

Rollo, pp. 12-14. Formerly the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).

38

39

R.A. No. 8799 (2000), Section 7.2 provides: All positions of the Commission shall be governed by a compensation and position classification systems and qualification standards approved by the Commission based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other government financial institutions and shall be subject to periodic review by the Commission no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and efficiency. The Commission shall, therefore, be exempt from laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The Commission shall, however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended).
40

People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 350 SCRA 163 (January 24, 2001). People v. Vera, No. 45685, 65 Phil. 56 (November 16, 1937). P.D. No. 985 (August 22, 1976).

41

42

43

R.A. No. 6758, Section 2, the policy of which is to "provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
44

Section 3(a) provides that "All government personnel shall be paid just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions must necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at equitable levels giving due consideration to higher percentages of increases to lower level positions and lower percentage increases to

higher level positions."

45

Section 3(b) states that "Basic compensation for all personnel in the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) and financial institutions (GFIs) shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
46

Id., Section 9.

47

Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions."
48

R.A. No. 7653, Sections 1 and 3. Id., Sections 110 and 113. R.A. No. 7653, Section 50. Id., Sections 1 and 3. R.A. No. 8289 [SBGFC], Section 8; R.A. No. 9302 [PDIC], Section 2. R.A. No. 8799 (2000), Section 7.2. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Id. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 703 (November 11, 1993). G.R. No. 146494 ( July 14, 2004). Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

See Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 703, 713-715 (November 11, 1993).
60

[2002] EWHC 191 (Admin).

61

Id. The significance of international human rights instruments in the European context should not be underestimated. In Hooper for example, the case was brought on the alleged denial of a right guaranteed by the ECHR, given domestic effect in the U.K. through its Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), and the ECHR, as one of the contracting parties. Also, in Wilson v United Kingdom, (30668/96) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 20 (ECHR), the European Court of Human Rights took into account the requirements of ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98, and of the European Social Charter of 1961, in ruling that the United Kingdom had breached the applicants' freedom of association. See Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).

62

J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, 31 SCRA 413, 435 (February 18, 1970).
63

See Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777 (July 14, 1989).
64

People v. Vera, supra, citing U. S. v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1, 10 (December 28, 1912); Case v. Board of Health and Heiser, supra; and U. S. v. Joson, supra. See Peralta v. COMELEC, No. L-47771, No. L-47803, No. L47816, No. L-47767, No. L-47791 and No. L-47826, 82 SCRA 30 (March 11, 1978), citing Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law 56 (3rd ed. 1942).
65

Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 586-589 (11th ed. 1985). San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

66

67

See Gay Moon, Complying with Its International Human Rights Obligations: The United Kingdom and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 E.H.R.L.R. 283-307 (2003).
68

(No.2) (A/6) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 (1979-80) (ECHR).

69

The European Court has also taken an even more restricted approach to Article 14, asking only whether the treatment at issue had a justified aim in view or whether the authorities pursued "other and ill-intentioned designs." National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 1 E.H.R.R. 578 (1979-80); and Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden 1 E.H.R.R. 617 (1979-80).
70

Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, (A/94) 7 E.H.R.R. 471 (1985) (ECHR). 23 E.H.R.R. 364 (1997). Id. Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).

71

72

73

74

Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003). SeeTufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 24-52 (2003).
75

Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003). Article 26 of the ICCPR provides that:

76

"All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
77

Article 5(b) of CERD requires States to protect individuals from (racially discriminatory) violence "whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution."

78

Article 1 of the American Conventions on Human Rights provides that: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition;"

79

Article 26 of the ICCPR is echoed in its broad proscription of discrimination by Article 3 of the African Charter which provides that: "1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law."
80

Article 14 of the European Conventions on Human Rights provides that: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."

81

See Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003); and Tufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 24-52 (2003).
82

Also, Articles 2 and 3 of the ICCPR require that Contracting States agree to "respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status," and (Article 3) "to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present may not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." Other examples include: Article 2 of CEDAW, which require States Parties to the Convention not only to "embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation" but also "to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle"; and Article 5(b) of CERD requires States to protect individuals from (racially discriminatory) violence "whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution." See also Articles 2 and 3 CSECR, and Article 2 of the African Charter, which is similar to Article 2 of the ICCPR. Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).
83

Article 7 of the ICESCR provides the right: ". . . to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work ... in particular ... fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work [and] ... equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence."

84

See Convention Nos. 100 of 1951, 103 of 1952, 111 of 1958, 118 of 1962 and 156 of 1981 which deal respectively with equal pay for men and women; maternity rights; discrimination in employment and occupation; equality of treatment in social security; and workers with family responsibilities. Convention No.

100 has been ratified by no less than 159 countries and Convention No. 111 by 156 (these being two of the eight fundamental Conventions the ratification of which is all but compulsory). Conventions Nos. 103, 118 and 156 have been ratified by 40, 38 and 34 countries, respectively.
85

For example, Articles 11, 12 and 13 of CEDAW require the taking of "all appropriate measures" to eliminate discrimination against women in the fields of employment, health care, and other areas of economic life including the right to benefits and financial services. Article 15 of the African Charter provides a right for "every individual" to "equal pay for equal work," which, like Article 7 of the ICESCR, applies whether an individual is employed by the state or by a private body. The Council of Europe's Revised Social Charter provides for the "right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex" and to the protection of workers with family responsibilities. The Social Charter of the Council of Europe also incorporates a commitment on the part of Contracting States to "recognise the right of men and women workers to equal pay for work of equal value" as well as that of children, young persons and women to protection in employment (the latter group in connection with pregnancy and childbirth), and rights for migrant workers. Article 5 CERD does not merely require Contracting States to eliminate race discrimination in their own practices but also obliges them to prohibit race discrimination "in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights," in particular, employment rights including rights to "just and favourable conditions of work", protection against unemployment, "just and favourable remuneration" and to form and join trade unions. See Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).
86

Tufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 24-52 (2003).
87

SWM Broeks v. the Netherlands (172/1984). F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands (182/1984). S.W.M. Broeks v. Netherlands (172/1984), paragraph 12.4. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18 (1989).

88

89

90

91

Id. In the Belgian Linguistics case, (No.2) (A/6) (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 (ECHR), the European Court of Human Rights referred to the "aims and effects" of the measure challenged under Article14 of the European Convention, implying that indirect as well as direct discrimination could be contrary to the provision. And inThlimmenos v Greece, 31 E.H.R.R. 15 (2001), the European Court ruled that discrimination contrary to the European Convention had occurred when a man who had been criminalised because of his refusal (as a Jehovah's Witness and, therefore, a pacifist) to wear a military uniform during compulsory military service, was subsequently refused access to the chartered accountancy profession because of a rule which barred those with criminal convictions from being chartered. According to the Court: "[We have] so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated when States treat differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification ... However, the Court considers that this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14. The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different."

See also Jordan v. United Kingdom (App. No. 24746/94), para.154. Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).
92

The 1987 Constitutional provisions pertinent to social justice and the protection granted to Labor are: PREAMBLE: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. ARTICLE II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies: Principles SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. ARTICLE III: Bill of Rights SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ARTICLE IX: Constitutional Commissions B. The Civil Service Commission SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions. ARTICLE XII: National Economy and Patrimony SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law. ARTICLE XIII: Social Justice and Human Rights SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. Labor SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
93

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, 333 SCRA 13 (June 1, 2000).

94

See Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, 175 SCRA 343 (July 14, 1989).
95

Republic v. MERALCO, G.R. Nos. 141314 and 141369, 401 SCRA 130 (April 9, 2003).

96

Sanders v. Veridiano II, No. L-46930, 162 SCRA 88 (June 10, 1988). Republic v. MERALCO, G.R. Nos. 141314 and 141369, 401 SCRA 130 (April 9, 2003). Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, (November 10, 2003). Id. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 160 (2003). Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82511, 206 SCRA 701 (March 3, 1992). Uy v. COA, G.R. No. 130685, 328 SCRA 607 (March 21, 2000). Ibid. Calalang vs. Williams, No. 47800, 70 Phil. 726 (December 2, 1940).

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

See Dumlao v. COMELEC, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392, 404 (January 22, 1980); Peralta v. Comelec, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791, and L-47827, 82 SCRA 30 (March 11, 1978); Felwa v. Salas, No. L-26511, 18 SCRA 606 (October 29, 1966); Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, No. L-19978, 21 SCRA 336, (September 29, 1967); People v. Carlos, No. L-239, 78 Phil. 535 (June 30, 1947); and Ichong, etc., et.al. v. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (May 31, 1957).
106

Belarmino v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 90204, 185 SCRA 304 (May 11, 1990).

107

Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, No. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236 and L-36283, 50 SCRA 30 (March 31, 1973).
108

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 9.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1

New Central Bank Act. Salary Standardization Law. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56. V Records of the House of Representatives, 9th Congress, 1st Session 783 (31 March 1993) at 166. Section 5(a), Rep. Act No. 6758. Sections 7 and 8, ibid. IV Records of the Senate, 9th Congress, 1st Session 1086-87 (05 June 1993).

PANGANIBAN, J.:
1

See ponencia footnote nos. 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. Medill v. State, 477 NW 2d 703, November 22, 1991. Id., p. 704. Ibid. Id., pp. 706-707. Id., pp. 705-708. Id., p. 708. Id., p. 709, per Yetka, J. These rulings were on fraternal benefit and homestead exemptions. Id., p. 708. Ibid. Ibid. In re Cook, 138 BR 943, April 15, 1992. Id., p. 946, per Kressel, CJ.

10

11

12

13

14

These are damages accruing at the time a petition is filed and include existing medical costs; actual lost income; existing non-medical costs and expenses; and property lost, damaged or destroyed in the incident that caused the injury. Id., p. 945.
15

These damages include temporary or permanent physical and mental loss or impairment; pain or suffering; and future medical costs. Id., pp. 945-946.
16

As to general damages, however, reliance was made upon Medill. Id., p. 946.

17

In fact, in Medill it was held that because special damages reimbursed an individual for expenses that would ordinarily be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding, their exemption would be a windfall to the debtor. Medill v. State; supra, p. 706.
18

Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway v. Walters, 294 US 405, 415, 79 L.ed. 949, 955, March 4, 1935.
19

Id., p. 413. Id., p. 434.

20

21

Id., p. 433. Id., pp. 415-416. Id., pp. 428-429. Id., p. 429. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey, 5 So.2d, 244, 247, January 8, 1942. Id., pp. 245-246. Id., p. 247. Id., p. 246. Ibid. Id., p. 247. Ibid. Ibid. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner, 307 SW 2d. 196, November 15, 1957. Id., pp. 196-197. Id., p. 197. Id., p. 198. Id., pp. 197-198. Id., p. 197. Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517, 307 NY 493, July 14, 1954. Id., p. 518. Id., pp. 520-521. Id., p. 519. Ibid., per Dye, J. Ibid.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

Id., pp. 518-519. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 325 Md. 342, February 7, 1992. Id., p. 104. Id., pp. 105-106, 116 & 119.

46

47

48

49

This amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall x x x deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
50

Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 107. Id., pp. 105 & 112. Id., pp. 105-106. Id., p. 108. Id., pp. 111 & 114. Id., p. 115, per Eldridge, J. Ibid. In re Cook; supra, p. 945 (citing Medill v. State; supra, p. 708). Medill v. State, supra, p. 708. This refers to In re Bailey decided in 1988 in the state of Minnesota. Id., pp. 705-706 and 708. In re Cook; supra, pp. 944-945. Cruz, Constitutional Law (2003 ed.), p. 37. Id., p. 49. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway v. Walters; supra, p. 415. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (2nd ed., 1990), p. 27. Id., p. 78.

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

"In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases not covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions." In re Shoop, 41 Phil. 213, 254-255, November 29, 1920,

per Malcolm, J.
67

"Stare decisis" means one should follow past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled.See Agpalo, supra, p. 92.
68

To be controlling, the ruling must be categorically rendered by our Supreme Court on an issue expressly raised by the parties. Ibid.
69

Article 8 of the Civil Code. Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 112, per Eldridge, J. In re Shoop; supra, pp. 220-221, per Malcolm, J.

70

71

While it may be argued that we are not a common law country, our peculiar national legal system has blended both civil and common law principles. Gamboa, An Introduction to Philippine Law, 7th ed., 1969 p. 59.
72

Salas v. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690, August 30, 1972. Agpalo, supra, p. 20. In re Cook; supra, p. 944. Medill v. State; supra, p. 704. Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68, May 18, 1953. Rutter v. Esteban; supra, p. 70. Id., p. 71. Id., p. 70. Approved by Congress on July 26, 1948. Rutter v. Esteban; supra, p. 71. Id., p. 83.

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

Moreover, Executive Order Nos. 25 and 32, issued on November 18, 1944 and March 10, 1945, were respectively voided. 1 of RA 342, 45 OG No. 4, p. 1680.
83

2 of RA 342, 45 OG No. 4, p. 1681. Rutter v. Esteban; supra, pp. 81-82. Id., p. 77.

84

85

86

Ibid.

87

"Conventions and laws are x x x needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object. x x x In the state of society all rights are fixed by law x x x." Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762, translated by G.D.H. Cole. http://www.constitution.org/jjr /socon.htm (Last visited September 16, 2004; 12:04:50 p.m. PST).
88

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey; supra, per Buford, J. (citing Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway v. Walters; supra, per Brandeis, J.)
89

Cruz, International Law (1990), p. 1; and Salonga and Yap, Public International Law (1992), p. 1.

International legal subjects -- in the modern sense of international law as a process rather than as a set of rules -- refer to states, international organizations, insurgents, peoples represented by liberation movements, and individuals by virtue of the doctrine of human rights and its implicit acceptance of their right to call upon states to account before international bodies. Defensor-Santiago, International Law with Philippine Cases and Materials and ASEAN Instruments (1999), pp. 15-24.
90

Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, 77, March 11, 1978, per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ.). "Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance."Farias v. The Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003, per Callejo Sr., J.
91

Id., p. 78, per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ; citing Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., Inc., 57 Phil. 600, 605, November 25, 1932, per Malcolm, J.).
92

Ibid., per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ; citing ibid., per Malcolm, J.). See ponencia. Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra, pp. 46-47.

93

94

"For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." Munnv. Illinois; supra, 134, per Waite, CJ.
95

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, July 1, 1985, per White, J.
96

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, June 1, 1993 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 US 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-943, February 22, 1979).
97

Peik v. Chicago and North-Western Railway Co.; supra, p. 178, per Waite, CJ. Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra, p. 47. Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, May 20, 1996, per Kennedy, J.

98

99

100

Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra, p. 47. Calder v. Bull; supra, p. 399; p. 8, per seriatim opinion of Iredell, J. (citing 1 Bl. Com. 91). Rousseau, supra.

101

102

103

In fact, under 1 of pending House Bill No. 2295, it is proposed that "[a]ll officials and employees of government owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions which, by virtue of their Charters, are exempted from the Compensation and Position Classification System [or the SSL] providing for the salary standardization of government employees shall receive compensation of no more than twice the salaries of equivalent ranks and positions in other government agencies." This proves that Congress can,inter alia, put a statutory limit to the salaries currently being received by such officials and employees.
104

18 of Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

105

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, p. 316; supra, p. 2102 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 US 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, March 28, 1955).
106

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 445; supra, p. 3257, per White, J.

107

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, pp. 313-314; supra, p. 2101, per Thomas, J. (citing United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 US 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, December 9, 1980, per Rehnquist, J.).
108

This law was approved on June 14, 1993 and published on August 9, 1993. 89 OG 32, p. 4425. See also Villegas, Global Finance Capital and the Philippine Financial System (2000), p. 48.
109

These GFIs are the LBP and DBP mentioned earlier, as well as the Social Security System (SSS); the Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC); the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC, formerly the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation [HIGC]); and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). See ponencia.
110

See ponencia. The last proviso of the 2nd paragraph of 15(c) of RA 7653, copied verbatim including italics, provides:

111

"Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758."
112

Petition, p. 13; rollo, p. 15.

113

A "salary grade" under 3.s. of Pres. Decree No. (PD) 985 refers to "the numerical place on the Salary x x x Schedule representing multiple steps or rates x x x assigned to a class," while a "position" under 3.m. means the "set of duties and responsibilities, assigned or delegated by competent authority and performed by an individual either on full-time or part-time basis."
114

Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 5. Id., pp. 10 & 12.

115

116

Id., pp. 4-5 & 6-7. 5(a) of RA 6758. Ibid. 5(b) of RA 6758.

117

118

119

120

A "class of position" is "the basic unit of the Position Classification System" under 3.c. of PD 985. It "consists of all those positions in the system which are sufficiently similar as to (1) kind or subject matter of work, (2) level of difficulty and responsibility, and (3) the qualification requirements of the work, to warrant similar treatment in personnel and pay administration." A "grade," on the other hand, under 3.h. thereof, "includes all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibility and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation."
121

Petition, p. 5; rollo, p. 7.

122

The BSP, on the one hand, has authority and responsibility over the Philippine financial system. Aside from credit control, monopoly of currency issues, clearing functions, and custody and management of foreign exchange reserves, it also regulates and supervises the entire banking system. Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector (2003), pp. 13-14. The cited GFIs, on the other, perform under special charters purely banking, finance, or related insurance functions that may include safekeeping, accepting deposits and drafts, issuing letters of credit, discounting and negotiating notes and other evidences of indebtedness, lending money against real or personal property, investing in equities of allied undertakings, insuring bank deposits of insolvent banks, and extending social security protection to workers or employees and their beneficiaries. Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector; supra, pp. 16-17. See also Villegas, Global Finance Capital and the Philippine Financial System; supra, p. 27; 2 and 4 of RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law of 1997," which amended RA 1161; and RA 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997," which amended PD No. 1146.
123

For a longer discourse on this point, see the Dissenting Opinion of Carpio Morales, J. Consolidated Reply, p. 10; rollo, p. 105.

124

125

See Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector; supra, p. 59.
126

Petition, p. 13; rollo, p. 15.

127

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 346-347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, February 17, 1936, per Brandeis, J.
128

Id., p. 347; ibid., per Brandeis, J.

129

Munn v. Illinois; supra, per Waite, CJ. Calder v. Bull; supra, p. 399; p. 9, per seriatim opinion of Iredell, J. Ibid. Munn v. Illinois; supra p. 123.

130

131

132

133

These amendments pertain to the charters of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
134

To date, there are two pending bills in the House of Representatives that may have an impact -- direct or indirect -- on the assailed provision. These are: (1) HB 00123 which was filed on July 1, 2004 by Rep. Joey Sarte Salceda, entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act," and pending with the Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries since July 27, 2004; and (2) HB 02295 which was filed on August 10, 2004 by Rep. Monico O. Puentebella, entitled "An Act Providing for the Rationalization of Salaries, Allowances and Benefits of Officials and Employees of Government Owned or Controlled Corporations and Government Financial Institutions Exempted from the Compensation and Position Classification System," and pending first reading. There are also other pending bills advocating for similar exemption from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). These are: (1) HB 01926 which was filed on July 29, 2004 by Rep. Robert Ace S. Barbers, entitled "An Act Granting Exemption to the Public School Teachers from the Coverage of Republic Act 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor," and pending with the Committee on Appropriations since August 9, 2004; (2) HB 01442 which was filed on July 14, 2004 by Rep. Hussin U. Amin, entitled " An Act Providing for a Separate Compensation Scheme for Lawyer Positions in the Office of the Secretary of Justice, Department of Justice, thereby Exempting The Said Positions from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law," and pending with the Committee on Appropriations since August 3, 2004; and (3) HB 00949 which was filed on July 1, 2004 by Rep. Judy J. Syjuco, entitled "An Act Providing for a Salary Standardization for Military and Police Personnel amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6758 otherwise known as the 'Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989' and for other purposes," and also pending with the Committee on Appropriations since August 28, 2004.
135

Peralta v. COMELEC; supra, p. 79, per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ.). RA 6758. 2 of HB 00123 provides: "Section 2. Section 15, paragraph (c) of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

136

137

"x x x x x x x x x "A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: x x x Provided, that all position (sic) in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Monetary Board based on comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bangko Sentral shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended."
138

See "Should The Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally?: The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation." 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1798, April 2003.
139

The 1st paragraph of 15(c) of RA 7653, copied verbatim including italics, provides: "Sec. 15. Exercise of Authority. In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: "x x x x x x x x x "(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. "x x x x x x x x x."

140

2 of RA 6758. 2 and 3(b) of RA 6758. 3(c) of RA 6758. 3(d) of RA 6758. 9 of RA 6758. 3(ff) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 1011, July 23, 1998, per dissenting opinion of Mendoza, J. (citing Garciav. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516, 522, December 2, 1991).

148

Peralta v. COMELEC; supra, p. 96, per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ.). Id., p. 79, per concurring and dissenting opinion of Fernando, J. (later CJ.).

149

150

1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. See also Angara v. The Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158, July 15, 1936; and Marbury v. Madison; supra, p. 178, per Marshall, CJ.
151

Arceta v. Hon. Mangrobang, GR No. 152895, p. 5, June 15, 2004, per Quisumbing, J. Francisco Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra, p. 222, per separate opinion of Vitug, J. Farias v. The Executive Secretary; supra, p. 14.

152

153

154

This was pronounced as early as 1947 in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 3, 18-19, March 5, 1947. See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 394, November 5, 1997, per dissenting opinion of Melo, J.
155

Farias v. The Executive Secretary; supra, p. 26. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy; supra, p. 394, per dissenting opinion of Melo, J. Petition, p. 6; rollo, p. 8.

156

157

158

Article XIV was proposed by Congress and ratified pursuant to the 5th Article of the 1787 U.S. Constitution.
159

"Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight." Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, June 26, 2003, per Kennedy, J. (Last visited September 13, 2004, 8:01:18 a.m. PST)
160

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.ed. 220, 227, May 10, 1886, per Matthews, J.
161

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner; supra, p. 198, per Stanley, J. Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, 58 Phil. Law Journal 1, 3, March 1983. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 543, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1140, May 18, 1896. Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, p. 1. Vacco v. Quill, 521 US 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, June 26, 1997, per Rehnquist, CJ.

162

163

164

165

166

Romer v. Evans; supra, pp. 633-634; supra, p. 1628, per Kennedy, J. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, June 1, 1942, per Douglas, J., quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins; supra, p. 369; supra, p. 1070; supra, p. 226, per Matthews, J.).
167

Romer v. Evans; supra, p. 631; supra, p. 1627, per Kennedy, J.

168

1 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No person shall be x x x denied the equal protection of the laws."
169

Foremost of these were the proponents of The Federalist Papers, namely: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.
170

US v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 269, 283-284, May 16, 1903, per Cooper, J. In re Shoop; supra, p. 223. Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 50, October 20, 1915.

171

172

173

Mendoza, From McKinley's Instructions to the New Constitution: Documents on the Philippine Constitutional System (1978), pp. 5-6.
174

Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra, p. 124 (citing Lao H. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1164, 11751176, May 31, 1957, per Labrador, J.).
175

Actually, the equal protection clause was first raised on appeal in US v. Mendezona, 2 Phil. 353, July 25, 1903, but was not discussed by this Court thru Torres, J. It was in fact only briefly mentioned in the Court's denial of accused-appellee's Motion for Rehearing. Moreover, it referred to the clause as embodied not in our own Constitution but in that of the United States.
176

Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, March 7, 1919. Yick Wo v. Hopkins; supra, p. 373; supra, pp. 1072-1073; supra, p. 227, per Matthews, J.

177

178

Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro; supra, p. 703, per Malcolm, J. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins;supra, p. 369; supra, p. 1070; supra, p. 226, per Matthews, J.)
179

Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro; supra, pp. 707 and 718. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, November 16, 1937. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, May 5, 1939. Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, p. 7.

180

181

182

"A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 40, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16, 47, March 21, 1973, per Powell, J. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/ scripts/ getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us& vol=411&page=1. (Last visited September 13, 2004, 2:12:45 p.m. PST).
183

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 440; supra, p. 3254, per White, J. People v. Vera; supra, p. 126. See People v. Cayat; supra, p. 18. Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 108.

184

185

186

Ibid.

187

Johnson v. Robison, 415 US 361, 374-375, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169, March 4, 1974, per Brennan, J. (citingReed v. Reed, 404 US 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, November 22, 1971).
188

20 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, p. 5.

189

190

International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 US 199, 210, 34 S.Ct. 859, 863, June 8, 1914, per McKenna, J.
191

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, p. 315; supra, p. 2102 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US 1, 15, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, June 18, 1992).
192

Ibid., ibid., per Thomas, J. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 444; supra, p. 3257, per White, J. Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 114. These amendments as enumerated in the ponencia are: 1. RA No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); 2. RA No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS); 3. RA No. 8289 (1987) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC); 4. RA No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); 5. RA No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); 6. RA No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC); and 7. RA No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

193

194

195

196

In fact, as of April 1, 2002, the LBP and DBP already perform universal banking functions, thus allowing them to combine their resources with those of investment houses and to generate long-term investment capital. As expanded commercial banks today, these two institutions are certainly subject to the regulatory and supervisory powers of the BSP. Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector, supra, pp. 17-18.
197

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 77, September 12, 1974, per Zaldivar, J. Ibid.

198

199

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, pp. 315-316; supra, p. 2102, per Thomas, J. (citing United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz; supra, p. 179; supra, p. 461,

per Rehnquist, J. [later CJ.]).

200

Vacco v. Quill; supra, p. 801; supra, p. 2298, per Rehnquist, CJ. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez; supra, p. 33; supra, p. 43, per Powell, J.

201

202

The effectivity date is August 12, 2004. http://www.pdic.gov.ph/ra9302.htm. (Last visited September 1, 2004; 9:06:01 a.m. PST).
203

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, p. 315; supra, p. 2102, per Thomas, J. (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US 356, 365, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, February 22, 1973, per Douglas, J., quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 US 495, 510, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872, May 24, 1937, per Stone, J.).
204

Johnson v. Robison; supra, pp. 366-367; supra, p. 1165. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union; supra, p. 82. People v. Vera; supra, p. 128. Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, pp. 7 & 9. Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 109.

205

206

207

208

209

Ibid., per Eldridge, J. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 440; supra, p. 3254, per White, J.
210

Korematsu v. US, 323 US 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, December 18, 1944, per Black, J. Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 US 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, June 12, 1967. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson; supra, p. 541; supra, p. 1113. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621, 626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, June 16, 1969.

211

212

213

214

Speech here refers to the right to engage in political expression. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 666, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, March 27, 1990.
215

Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898, 903-904, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2321-2322, June 17, 1986. See Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 109.
216

Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, p. 11, March 1983.

217

Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562, US Mass., June 25, 1976, per curiam (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez; supra, p. 28; supra, p. 40, per Powell, J.). (Last visited September 2, 2004; 09:36:35 a.m. PST).
218

For instance, it has long been declared by the US Supreme Court that "racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional." Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 349 US

294, 298, 75 S.Ct. 753, 755, May 31, 1955, per Warren, CJ.
219

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2337-2338, June 23, 2003. In re Griffiths, 413 US 717, 721-724, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 2854-2856, June 25, 1973. Larson v. Valente, 456 US 228, 246, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1684, April 21, 1982. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 440; supra, p. 3254, per White, J. See ponencia. Yick Wo v. Hopkins; supra, p. 220; supra, p. 1064; supra, p. 356. Id., pp. 373-374; id., p. 1073; id., p. 227, per Matthews, J. Id., pp. 366, 368 and 374; id., pp. 1069, 1070, and 1073; id., pp. 225-226, and 228. Id., pp. 366 and 374; id., pp. 1069 and 1073; id., pp. 225 and 228. Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464, 470-471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2380-2381, June 20, 1977. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez; supra, p. 24; supra, p. 37, per Powell, J.

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union; supra, p. 77, per Zaldivar, J. (citing International Harvester Co. v. Missouri; supra, p. 210; supra, p. 862, per McKenna, J.).
231

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, p. 313; supra, p. 2101, per Thomas, J. In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, supra, p. 442; supra, p. 3255, the Court implied that the rational basis test is the standard of judicial review normally accorded economic and social legislation.
232

Defensor-Santiago, The "New" Equal Protection, supra, pp. 7-8. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 441; supra, p. 3255, per White, J. Id., pp. 440-441; id., pp. 3254-3255. Id., p. 441; id., p. 3255. Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, pp. 109-110.

233

234

235

236

237

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez; supra, p. 98; supra, pp. 80-81, per dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.
238

Dandridge v. Williams, 90 S.Ct. 1153, US Md., April 6, 1970, per Stewart, J. (citing Lindsley v. Natural

Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, March 13, 1911, per Van Devanter, J.).
239

International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri; supra, p. 210; supra, p. 862, per McKenna, J. (citing Atchison, T.& S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 US 96, 106, 19 S.Ct. 609, 613, April 17, 1899, per Brewer, J.).
240

Goesrt v. Cleary, 335 US 464, 467, 69 S.Ct. 198, 200, December 20, 1948, per Frankfurter, J. (citing Roschen v. Ward, 279 US 337, 339, 49 S.Ct. 336, April 22, 1929, per Holmes, J.).
241

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 US 641, 657, 16 L.Ed. 2d 828, 839, June 13, 1966, per Brennan, J. (citing Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 US 608, 610, 55 S.Ct. 570, 571, 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089, April 1, 1935, per Hughes, CJ.).
242

Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 611-612, December 21, 1915, per Trent, J. (quoting Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 US 224, 227, 34 S.Ct. 856, 857, June 8, 1914, per Holmes, J.).
243

International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri; supra, p. 214; supra, p. 864, per McKenna, J. (citing Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Co. of Texas v. May, 194 US 267, 269, 24 S.Ct. 638, 639, May 2, 1904, per Holmes J.).
244

Id., p. 215; id., p. 865, per McKenna, J. Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 5. People v. Cayat; supra, p. 21. Peralta v. Comelec; supra, p. 55. People v. Cayat; supra, p. 21.

245

246

247

248

249

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.; supra, p. 313; supra, p. 2101, per Thomas, J. CARPIO, J.:
1

Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7656 provide: Section 3. Dividends. All government-owned or -controlled corporations shall declare and remit at least fifty percent (50%) of their annual net earnings as cash, stock or property dividends to the National Government. This section shall also apply to those government-owned or -controlled corporations whose profit distribution is provided by their respective charters or by special law, but shall exclude those enumerated in Section 4 hereof: Provided, That such dividends accruing to the National Government shall be received by the National Treasury and recorded as income of the General Fund. Section 4. Exemptions. The provisions of the preceding section notwithstanding, governmentowned or -controlled corporations created or organized by law to administer real or personal properties or funds held in trust for the use and the benefit of its members, shall not be covered by this Act such as, but not limited to: the Government Service Insurance System, the Home Development Mutual Fund, the Employees Compensation Commission, the Overseas Workers

Welfare Administration, and the Philippine Medical Care Commission.

2

93 Phil. 68 (1953).

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

1

Entitled "AN ACT PRESCRIBING A REVISED COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
2

The Salary Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989 pursuant to Section 23 thereof: Sec. 23.Effectivity. This Act shall take effect July 1, 1989. The DBM shall, within sixty (60) days after its approval, allocate all positions in their appropriate position titles and salary grades and prepare and issue the necessary guidelines to implement the same. Vide Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653, 655 (1992).

J. BERNAS, S.J. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 1029 (2003).
4

Wage and Position Classification Office. Id. at 1029-1030.

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the national government to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in private industry for comparable work. For this purpose, there is hereby established a system of compensation standardization and position classification in the national government for all departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices including government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions: Provided, That notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies. (Underscoring supplied)
7

SECTION 16. Compensation Committees. Subject to the approval of the President, compensation committees may be created under the leadership of the Commissioner of the Budget whose purposes shall be to recommend on compensation standards, policies, rules and regulations that shall apply to critical government agencies, including those of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions. For purposes of compensation standardization, corporations may be grouped into financial institutions, industrial, commercial, service or development corporations. The OCPC shall provide secretariat assistance to the compensation committees, and shall be responsible for implementing and enforcing all compensation policies, rules and regulations adopted. Salary expenditures in all agencies of the national government, including those of the government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall conform to policies to be laid down by the Budget Commission in consultation with the heads of the agencies and corporations concerned and which policies, upon prior approval by the President, shall be monitored and implemented through its Office of Compensation and Position Classification. (Underscoring supplied)

Vide Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audi, supra at 662; Philippine International Trading Corp. v. Commission on Audit, 309 SCRA 177, 190-192 (1999); Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, 384 SCRA 548, 555-559 (2002).
9

SECTION 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed.Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
10

Rollo at 6. CONST., art. Ill, sec. 1, viz: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied)

11

12

Rollo at 6-7. Id. at 7. Id. at 12-13. Id. at 83. Id. at 79-80. Id. at 84. Id. at 65. Id. at 63. Ibid. Id. at 69. Id. at 69-70. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 66 (1974).

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 706 (1993); Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 57, 68-69 (1991).

25

65 Phil. 56 (1937). Id. at 95; vide Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139, 159 (1936).

26

27

Vide Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 662-663 (1984); Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628, 663-664 (1995).
28

442 U.S. 256 (1979). Id. at 271-272. 101 Phil. 1155 (1957). Id. at 1165-1166.

29

30

31

32

Vide Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke, 301 U.S. 495, 510 (1937); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
33

68 Phil. 12 (1939). Id. at 18. Supra. Id. at 711-712. 485 U.S. 360(1988). Id. at 370-373. 508 U.S. 307(1993). Id. at 313-316. Supra. Id. at 115. Id. at 120. Id. at 127. Id. at 126. Id. at 129. 20 SCRA 791 (1967).

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

Id. at 796. Id. at 796-797. Supra.

49

50

51

"AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWER, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THERE WITH."
52

Id. at 711; the privilege was also withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
53

Ibid. The franking privilege was also retained for the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or officers violated the guaranty of equal protection
54

Id. at 713. Id. at 713-715. G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004. The Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court stated: The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The city does not require a special use permit in an R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District Court found, because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded. May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multipledwelling facilities are freely permitted? It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be different from those who would occupy other facilities that would be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit. But this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses and hospitals would not. Because in our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for

55

56

57

58

59

believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case. xxx The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law. (At 447-450; citations omitted)
60

517 U.S. 620 (1996). The U.S. Supreme Court explained the reasons for its decision in this wise: xxx Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. We conclude that, in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, and Amendment 2 does not. The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit. "[C]lass legislation ... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment...." We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed. (At 631-636; citations omitted)

61

62

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 (1982); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982). Mclaughin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).

63

64

Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993);Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996).
65

O. STEPHENS & J. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 737 (2nd Ed., 1999). 100 U.S. 303 (1879).

66

67

Id. at. 303, 306-310. O. STEPHENS & J. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 738 (2nd Ed., 1999). L. TRIBE & M. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 72 (1991). 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Id. at 153 J. NOWARK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (4th Ed., 1991). 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Id. at 216. Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1107-1108 (1969).

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
77

Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 (1974). City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Id. at 28 (1973). The definition was reiterated in Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976). In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court said: When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. See, E. g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973). Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest... (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

78

79

80

81

82

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Ibid. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures," we have no way to determine what "classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (plurality opinion). We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a

goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." Ibid. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
83

In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-724 (1973). The Court has consistently emphasized that a State which adopts a suspect classification'bears a heavy burden of justification,' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196, 85 S.Ct. 283, 290, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest. Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

84

In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982), the Supreme Court through Justice Brennan held that the Minnesota statute, in imposing certain registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious organizations that solicit more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers discriminates against such organizations in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. In so doing, the Court said: Since Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), this Court has adhered to the principle, clearly manifested in the history and logic of the Establishment Clause, that no State can "pass laws which aid one religion" or that "prefer one religion over another." Id., at 15. 67 S.Ct., at 511. This principle of denominational neutrality has been restated on many occasions. InZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952), we said that "[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects." Id., at 314, 72 S.Ct., at 684. InEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968), we stated unambiguously: "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion.... The State may not adopt programs or practices ... which 'aid or oppose' any religion.... This prohibition is absolute." Id., at 104, 106, 89 S.Ct., at 270, 271, citing Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1573, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). And Justice Goldberg cogently articulated the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause when he said that "[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government ... effect no favoritism among sects ... and that it work deterrence of no religious belief." Abington School District, supra, at 305, 83 S.Ct., at 1615. In short, when we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) While the Court viewed the case from perspective of the Non-Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the principles on Equal Protection would also apply since the Non-Establishment Clause stripped to its bare essentials is in reality merely a more specific type of equal protection clause but with regards to religion.
85

See discussion on the Intermediate Scrutiny Test. Ibid.

86

87

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-471 (1977). This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class. An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 29, 93 S.Ct., at 1294; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

88

Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 (1974), footnote number 14, states: Appellee argues that the statutory classification should be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld only if a compelling governmental justification is demonstrated because (1) the challenged classification interferes with the fundamental constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, and (2) I--O conscientious objectors are a suspect class deserving special judicial protection. We find no merit in either contention. Unquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right. However, since we hold in Part III, infra, that the Act does not violate appellee's right of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to apply to the challenged classification a standard of scrutiny stricter than the traditional rational-basis test. With respect to appellee's second contention, we find the traditional indicia of suspectedness lacking in this case. The class does not possess an 'immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,' Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S., at 686, 93 S.Ct., at 1770, nor is the class 'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,' San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1298, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

89

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1976). Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, observed that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

90

J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (4th Ed., 1991).

91

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982).
92

Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the foregoing cases requires. We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws... (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

93

Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655(1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

94

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990). Because the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitutional system, statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). We find that, even under such strict scrutiny, the statute's classifications pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause. As we explained in the context of our discussions of whether the statute was overinclusive, supra, at 1397-1398, or underinclusive, supra, at 1400-1401, the State's decision to regulate only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive effect of political "war chests" amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

95

Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903-904 (1986). A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see, e.g., Crandall v.

Nevada, supra, at 46; see also Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 629, 89 S.Ct., at 1328, when impeding travel is its primary objective, see Zobel, supra 457 U.S., at 62, n. 9, 102 S.Ct., at 2314, n. 9; Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 628-631, 89 S.Ct., at 1328-1329, or when it uses " 'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.' " Dunn, supra 405 U.S., at 340, 92 S.Ct., at 1002 (quotingShapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331). Our right-to-migrate cases have principally involved the latter, indirect manner of burdening the right. More particularly, our recent cases have dealt with state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they established residence, resulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents. Hooper, supra; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982);Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Memorial Hospital, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro, supra. Because the creation of different classes of residents raises equal protection concerns, we have also relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in these cases. Whenever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law. See,e.g., Cleburne v, Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328, n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1842, n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d 879 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 and n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-2395 and n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Memorial Hospital, supra 415 U.S., at 258, 262, 94 S.Ct., at 1082, 1084; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 and n. 39, 30-32, 40, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287 and n. 39, 1295-1296, 1300, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Police Dept. of Chicago v Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Dunn, supra 405 U.S., at 335, 342, 92 S.Ct., at 999, 1003; Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331. Thus, in several cases, we asked expressly whether the distinction drawn by the State between older and newer residents burdens the right to migrate. Where we found such a burden, we required the State to come forward with a compelling justification. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra; Dunn, supra; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
96

Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 'In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). And, in this case, we must give the statute a close and exacting examination. '(S)ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 31, 89 S.Ct. at 10; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government. xxx Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. See Carrington v. Rash, supra,

380 U.S., at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 780. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

97

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).

98

http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/wolfe/gunther.htm quoting excerpts from Chapter 9 of G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th Ed., 1991).
99

Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972).
100

Vide Bautista v. Juinio 127 SCRA 329, 341 (1984).

101

Vide Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
102

To this observation, the U.S. Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (515 U.S. 200, 237 [1995]) said: Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Fullilove, supra, at 519, 100 S.Ct., at 2795 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it. As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S., at 167, 107 S.Ct., at 1064 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at 190, 107 S.Ct., at 1076 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 196, 107 S.Ct., at 1079-1080 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases. And in Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306, 326-327 [2003]), the same Court said: Strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pea, supra, at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, "whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection." 515 U.S., at 229-230, 115 S.Ct. 2097. But that observation "says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny."Id., at 230, 115 S.Ct. 2097. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.
103

Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
104

411 U.S. 1 (1973). Id. at 98-99.

105

106

O. STEPHENS & J. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741 (2nd Ed., 1999). Ibid. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Id. at 440-441. Id. at 441. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

Vide City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, supra at 441; Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
115

Vide Lying v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, supra at 370: Because the statute challenged here has no substantial impact on any fundamental interest and does not "affect with particularity any protected class,"we confine our consideration to whether the statutory classification is "rationally related to a legitimate government interest. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
116

Main Opinion at 24-25. Supra. Id. at 78-79. 347 U.S. 231 (1954). Id. at 237. 127 Phil. 306 (1967).

117

118

119

120

121

122

Id. at 314-315; Motion for Reconsideration denied in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Associations, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 128 Phil. 473 (1967); vide Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra., at 55.
123

82 SCRA 30 (1978). Id. at 54. 477 N.W. 2d 703 (1991).

124

125

126

The case of In re: Cook, 138 B.R. 943 (1992) decided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and cited in the main opinion as following Medill with reservations does not appear to be in point. The former cites Medillwith respect to the matter of punitive damages, to wit: Last, the Medill court found that "punitive damages are not in the nature of compensatory damages and thus are not exempt from creditors." While the Medill opinion gave a clear answer, I am still confused. The opinion lacks any reasons for the conclusion. I don't know if the court's decision was based on the Minnesota Constitution, the exemption statute or both, i.e., Is the court saying that punitive damages are not within the scope of 550.37, subd. 22 or is it saying that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to punitive damages. Once again, it does not really matter. The result is clear. A claim for punitive damages is not exempt. (At 946)
127

Citing the earlier State case of Grobe v. Oak Center Creamery Co., 113 N.W. 2d 458, where the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: We cannot agree with the relators that a review of the facts bearing upon the application of the statute is not necessary to determine the constitutional issue. The constitutionality of a statute cannot in every instance be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with the applicable provisions of the constitution. A statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. This is particularly true of statutes granting the right of eminent domain. We have in recent years considered a number of cases involving the constitutionality of such statutes and have considered that question against the factual background of each case. The records in each of these cases, including the Dairyland case which was reviewed on certiorari, came to us with a settled case. The legislation comes to this court with a presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Where, as here, we cannot say the statute is inherently unconstitutional, its validity must stand or fall upon the record before the lower court and not upon assumptions this court might make in the absence of proof incorporated in a settled case. This is not a case where the constitutional facts are adequately ascertainable by judicial notice or even judicial assumption. Because of the absence of a settled case or a certificate of the trial judge as to the accuracy and completeness of the record, we decline to pass upon the constitutionality of the act. (At 460; emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
128

Supra at 706-708. Supra. Id. at 78. Luque v. Villegas, 30 SCRA 408 (1969). Sison v. Ancheta, supra. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988). Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra. Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12741, January 20, 1999.

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999. De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (2000). When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 265 U.S. 543 (1924). Id. at 547-548.

137

138

139

140

141

Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A. 2d 102 (1992), decided by the Maryland Supreme Court, is cited in the main opinion in support of the proposition that "a statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances." However, the text of the decision does not appear to touch on relative constitutionality. In Murphy, appellants challenged the constitutionality of a statute providing for a US$350,000 statutory cap on non-economic damages in personal injury actions. The Maryland Supreme Court held: We reject the plaintiffs' contention that the classification created by 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is subject to any level of scrutiny higher than the traditional, deferential rational basis test. Moreover, we disagree with the holdings in the above-cited cases applying heightened scrutiny to legislative caps upon recoverable damages. Whatever may be the appropriate mode of equal protection analysis for some other statutory classifications, in our view a legislative cap of $350,000 upon the amount of noneconomic damages which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff does not implicate such an important "right" as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny. Instead, the statute represents the type of economic regulation which has regularly been reviewed under the traditional rational basis test by this Court and by the Supreme Court. xxx The General Assembly's objective in enacting the cap was to assure the availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in order to cover claims for personal injuries to members of the public. This is obviously a legitimate legislative objective. A cap on noneconomic damages may lead to greater ease in calculating premiums, thus making the market more attractive to insurers, and ultimately may lead to reduced premiums, making insurance more affordable for individuals and organizations performing needed services. The cap, therefore, is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective. Since, the General Assembly had before it several studies which concluded that $250,000 would cover most noneconomic damage claims, the Legislature did not act arbitrarily in enacting the cap at $350,000. It is also significant that the cap applies to all personal injury claimants equally rather than singling out one category of claimants. Therefore, we hold that the legislative classification drawn by 11-108 between tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are less that $350,000 and tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are greater than $350,000, and who are thus subject to the cap, is not irrational or arbitrary. It does not violate the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. (At 115-116; citations omitted).
142

307 N.Y. 493 (1954). Id. at 498-499.

143

144

294 U.S. 405 (1935). Id. at 414-429. 5 So. 2d 244 (1941). Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. alleged: "In the year 1899 when said statutes were passed, there were no paved highways in the State of Florida, no automobiles, no motor busses, no motor trucks, and substantially all the freight and passenger traffic into, in and out of the State of Florida was transported by railroads; today there are many thousands of paved highways in Florida, thousands of automobiles, and hundreds of motor busses and motor trucks carrying and transporting daily, besides their operators, property of great value and thousands of passengers at rates of speed fairly comparable to, and in many instances exceeding, the rate of speed at which the Defendant operates its trains; much of said freight and passenger transportation is for hire and is in competition with the transportation of passengers and freight by the defendant and other railroad companies in the State, and at some seasons of the year more passengers in number are carried by said automobile, bus and truck transportation upon the paved highways of the State than by all the railroads operating within said State; whatever hazard, jeopardy or danger there now may be to property or to passengers on railroad trains from the failure to fence the railroad tracks, exists to an equal, and in many instances, to a greater degree in respect to the property and passengers carried in such automobiles, trucks and busses; since the year 1889, the numbers of domestic livestock roaming at large in Florida have continuously decreased so that at all times mentioned in the Declaration herein approximately 70% of the domestic livestock in Florida does not and did not roam at large, whereas in 1889 practically all domestic live stock in Florida did roam at large, and by consequence of such changed conditions the burden placed by said statutes upon this Defendant as a railroad company has become and is greatly disproportionate to the public good or benefit, and an unreasonable expense on this Defendant; it has been many years since any property being carried by a railroad train in Florida has been damaged, injured or destroyed, or any persons being so carried killed or injured, as a result of a collision between a railroad train and domestic live stock; but injury to and death of persons being carried in automobiles and trucks upon the public highways of the State resulting in collisions between motor driven vehicles and domestic live stock are a matter of almost daily occurrence, and in each of the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, from 20 to 25 persons were so killed; x x x (at 245-246).

145

146

147

148

Supra. at 246-247. 307 S.W. 2d 196 (1957). Id. at 197-198. 93 Phil. 68 (1953). Id. at 81-82. Supra.

149

150

151

152

153

154

Notably, the application of "rigid scrutiny "in equal protection analysis was espoused as early as 1944 in the case of Korematsu v. U.S., supra.

155

I.e. relating to the same matter. 71 SCRA 176 (1976).

156

157

Id. at 183-184; vide C & C Commercial Corporation v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority,G.R. L-27275, November 18, 1967; Maceda v. Macaraig, 223 SCRA 217 (1993); Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680 (1994); Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 181 (1998); Vda. De Urbano v. Government Service Insurance System, 367 SCRA 672 (2001).
158

Rollo at 5. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Id. at 797. Id. at 798. Id. at 799-800.

159

160

161

162

163

It should be noted however that not all rights enumerated in the Constitution are found in the Bill of Rights. Though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is found under the Declaration of Principles and States Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, this Court in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. (224 SCRA 792, 804805 [1993]) held that the said right was legally enforceable without need for further legislation a selfexecuting provision.
164

Id. at 29. 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). Id. at 18-29.

165

166

167

Gay Moon, Complying with its International Human Rights Obligations: The United Kingdom and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, E.H.R.L.R. 2003, 3, 283-307.
168

(2002) U.K.H.R.R. 785; (2002) EWHC 191). (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 471. (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 20). Main Opinion at 56. Id. at 56. V Records of the House of Representatives, 9th Congress, 1st Session 182 (March 2, 1993). For ease of reference, Section 9 of the Salary Standardization Law is reproduced hereunder: SECTION 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions below the Officials

169

170

171

172

173

174

mentioned under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the national Government, local government units, government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions; (2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job. xxx In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator, and the board of directors of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions exceed Salary Grade 30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation for the aforesaid officials. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
175

Id. at 787 (march 31, 1993). VI Records of the House of Representatives, 9th Congress, 1st Session 353 (May 18, 1993). IV Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, 1st Session 1086-1987 (June 5, 1993).

176

177

178

Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), Bicameral Conference Committee on Banks (CMA), June 9, 1993, 1:20 p.m. at 39.
179

Rollo at 82-83.

180

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain a central monetary authority that shall function and operate as an independent a

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982 TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION,respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 7742, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation. Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances; WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis; WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments; NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations: 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit: 1980 Model 1974 1981 Model 1975, etc. All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular: Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

Year Model

Automatic Phase-Out Year 1980

1974 1975 1976 1977 etc.

1981 1982 1983

etc.

Strict compliance here is desired. 2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3 On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this Court: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power 4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree. The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular. It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary

authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972): Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasijudicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. On Equal Protection of the Law: Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant

use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7 In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable.10 WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

Footnotes 1 Annex "A", pp. 26-27, Rollo. 2 Annex "B", p. 28, Ibid. 3 Annex "D", pp. 38-53, Ibid. 4 p. 19, Ibid 5 Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

6 Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 (1974). 7 The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548. 8 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; Central Bank vs. Cloribel 44 SCRA 307 (1972); Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 (1977) citing Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers 'Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974) & Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas, 61 SCRA 93 (1974). 9 Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971). 10 Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1868).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents. FELICIANO, J.: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 19871988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following: (a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine; (b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern trends; (c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio; (d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine; (e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum; (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; (g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied) Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former

professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible. xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: 2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges. 3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT. xxx xxx xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied) Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.
1avvphi1

Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.

1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows: (a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect of human rights. " (b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs." (c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total human liberation and development. " (d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. " (e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners. Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. " 2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue

delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1 must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2 One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3 The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5 We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle. 3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7 Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. 4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that

the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied) infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet circumstances as they change. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition. WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Pelaez v. Auditor general, 15 SCRA 569 (1965).
2

70 Phil. 221 (1940). 70 Phil., at 229; underscoring supplied. 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

35 SCRA, at 497; underscoring supplied. At this point, Mr. Justice Fernando dropped a useful footnote of the following tenor:

"This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," Municipality of Cardona v. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (I 917); "necessary in the interest of law and order," Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); "public interest," People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case," International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940). " In People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), Mr. Justice J.B. L. Reyes said: "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it imprac ticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law," that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes-." (101 Phil. at 1129; underscoring supplied).
6

E.G., U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967) and Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
7

E.G., Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256 (1913); People vs. Witte, 146 NE 178 (1925) and Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927).
8

Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442, 98 L.Ed. 829, 74 SCT. 650 (1954); Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1, 55 So2d. 761 (1951) and Reisinger v. Com., State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, et al., 399 A2d 1160 (1979).
9

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114, 32 L.Ed. 623, 9 SCt. 231 (1889); State v. Bair, 112 Jowa 466,84 NW 532 (1900).
10

People v. Love, 298 Ill 304, 131 NE 809, 16 ALR 703 (1921); Collins v. Texas, 223 US 288, 56 L.Ed. 439, 32 SCt. 286 (1912).
11

See, e.g., McDonald v. Hogness, et al., 92 Wash. 431, 598 P. 2d. 707 (1979).