Evaluation of methods for breaker flashover protection Reasons Conditions which cause breakers to lose their di-electric strength

& allow arcing between their open contacts are Internal & External Contamination Low Di-electric Pressure Humidity Risk of flashover increases if overload on transmission networks low-cost breakers with reduced security margins are more porn to flashover (taking equipment out of service for maintenance is very difficult)

NTPC have reported an increase in the number of breaker flashovers. Dedicated protection is required to prevent/reduce damage resulting from breaker flashover This project evaluates Different breaker flashover protection schemes with particular emphasis on reliability and on the equipment required We develop and use The fault tree analysis method to make numerical reliability calculations for comparison purposes. An ATP (Alternate Transient Programming) Simulation model to get a better understanding of this kind of failure (breaker flashover) What is a FLASHOVER From the power system point of view A flashover is a series fault. Not a ground or phase-to-phase fault. But

 A condition that resembles one phase of a breaker closed, with a residual current much lower than a phase to ground fault. A flash over can lead to a power oscillation. Line, transformer, and generator protection are not effective in this situation because they either do not detect flashover failure or do not detect it quickly enough. Neither is traditional or standard breaker-failure protection effective at detecting flashover failure, because these require an external trip signal from another protection device to initiate the breaker failure Causes For Flashover Flashover can occur on any breaker in the network where an over voltage condition is present, but the probability is higher on breakers used to synchronize two isolated power systems or on generator breakers. Cause1

During the synchronization process, the out of phase angle between breaker contacts changes from 0 to 360 continuously. The voltage between breaker contacts reaches its maximum instantaneous value when the angle difference between the voltages is 180, with a magnitude equal to double the nominal phase to ground peak voltage.

Ex: Breaker that synchronizes a generator on a 500kV system The voltage continuously changes between 0 & 577.3 kV rms (or) 0 & 816 kV Peak Instantaneous voltage Vrms = 500/3 l 0 - 500/3 l 180 = 577.3 kV. Vpeak = 816 kV.

Voltage waves on both sides of an open breaker when the angle is 1800 Cause2 When a long line (H.V) without line reactors, is energized.

When the local breaker is closed, the capacitive effect of the line will cause an over voltage at the remote end. This over voltage could cause the remote end breaker to experience a flashover.

Cause3 If the dielectric strength on any of the breaker phases is lower than normal, a flashover can occur when the voltage across the open breaker contacts increase. The highest probability that this will happen is when the voltage angle is near 180. Besides damaging breaker, this out of phase and unbalanced condition affects system stability and can lead to abnormally high stresses on electrical equipment near the breaker, such as a generator or transformer. Real Case Analysis Our case study is of a system where a real flashover happened during the synchronization process in a generator-transformer group connected to a 400 kV power system. The group included a generator & a generator-transformer. The substation arrangement is breaker and a half; the flashover has occurred in the main breaker. The half breaker was open. There was no oscillographic records for the 400 kV breaker where the flashover occurred, but there were oscillographic records for the generator and adjacent 400 kV line

Case Study Data And Oscillographic Recorder Location

During the fault a key record was obtained at the 20kv generator terminals.
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We can see voltages & currents at the generator & calculate the same variables at the 400kv level where the breaker flashed. Voltages on the adjacent 400kv line were recorded at line capacitive voltage transformers. Order of occurrence (flashover) 400Kv breaker phase A flashed over during synchronization Approx after 1 sec(58 cycles) power plant protection tripped after 9 cycles breaker failure scheme sent a trip signal to the breaker failure auxiliary relay (86BF) & cleared the bus. Therefore after 67 cycles flashover occurred. And after 4 cycles 86BF tripped. Currents in A & B phases reappeared because of a winding failure in unit transformer (400Kv phase A winding) from the high electro mechanical stress caused by the flashover.

Analysis of current & voltage phase angles shows that at the beginning of flashover Both phases are in phase.

As the generator begins to deliver active power to the system, the phase angle between the voltage changes & voltage & current begins to oscillate. During flashover ( values of voltage & currents at the generator & 400Kv bus)

Failure Consequences The high electromechanical stresses during the out of phase, unbalanced energization caused SEVERE TRANSFORMER DAMAGE. The failure to isolate the generator from feeding the damaged H.V transformer windings for several seconds resulted in HIGH TRANSFORMER REPAIR COSTS.
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 CUMULATIVE DAMAGE & LOSS OF LIFE OF NEIGHBOPURING EQUIPMENT. BASE GENERATION OUT OF DISPATCH FOR SOME DAYS until a replacement transformer was installed & tested. HIGH COST OF REPLACING LOST ENERGY with more expensive remote sources. POWER SYSTEM OSCILLATIONS OCCURRED.

Even when the probability of a breaker flashover is low, the high costs of a failure justify using dedicated flashover protection that isolates the failed breaker as soon as possible, there by avoiding damage to primary equipment. Implementation costs depend on the protection methods selected. But with present digital multifunctional relays this can be done without additional equipment costs.

Closing circuit of a 6.6Kv circuit breaker

S.No. 1 2

Name of the part F41,F42,F43,F44 Emerg. Trip (emergency push button

Nature of action proposed Fuses self explanatory This will be at remote A light will glow in the remote and this shows that an abnormality is there in the circuit. then noticing this the emergency push button is operated manually. This relay is also called as master trip relay. This relay will trip when the following relays are actuated. They are : over load relay, earth fault relay, short circuit relay, differential short circuit relays etc. The close signal is resieved from UCB only. During the operation (or) service. The normal condition is present and then the tripping & closing will be the commands obtained according to the requirement. & two more settings was there . Test/rack out position, Service/rack in position Through anti pumping relay supply is extended to closing coil. Anti pumping relay is used to prevent the burning and failure due to continuous supply to the closing coil

K 24 RELAY

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UCB(UNIT CONTROLBOARD) SETTINGS OF THE BREAKER (3 TYPES) TRIP, NORMAL, CLOSE SWGR, NORMAL,TRIAL TEST, SERVICE

Mechanical interlocks (switches, closing coils, anti pumping relay,k1

Tripping circuit of a 6.6Kv circuit breaker

S.No. 1 2

Name of the part F45,F46 Emerg. Trip (emergency push button

Nature of action proposed Fuses self explanatory This will be at remote A light will glow in the remote and this shows that an abnormality is there in the circuit. then noticing this the emergency push button is operated manually. If there is any abnormality in the process of the system i,e any control systems (or) instruments failure is present the C & I department (control & instrumentation) will give an indication to trip the circuit.. This is self explanatory. This tripping is initiated when ever there is any tripping signal present from the following relays. Earth fault relay, over current relay, over voltage relay, locked rotor relay, short circuit relay, differential short circuit relay and over load relay etc. This is for safety purpose.In USB we are having three lights R,G,&W. R-Red-indicates that the C.B.is ON G-Green-indicates that the C.B.is OFF W-Wight-indicates that the C.B.is under AUTOTRIP.

Process trip (C & I)

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UNDER VOLTAGE TRIP Electrical protection trip

Normal trip from USB

VAJC-K25 (voltage actuated relay)

Energizes when breaker is in ON condition.

Simulation of different flashover conditions To obtain a better understanding for flashover conditions, a model of the actual power system was created in ATP (Alternate Transient Program) comparing the simulation results from the modeled power system to the actual recorded results validated the power system model. From graphs it can be seen that the actual & simulated results match closely, which confirms the accuracy of the simulated model.

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Methods For Flashover Protection Electrical utilities use several different schemes for flashover protection. These methods can use information from any of the following. Phase currents Residual currents Voltages from one or both sides of the breaker Breaker position auxiliary contacts (52a or 52b) Close signal monitoring or timers Circuit breaker flashover protection may be realized in a separate protection relay (or) in a multifunctional breaker, line, transformer, or generator relay. Separate flashover protection relays are available, but their functionality can be replicated in multifunctional programmable protective relays.

Once the flashover is detected, all the breakers in the bus must be tripped, as in a conventional breaker failure scheme. Security considerations are very important to avoid mal operations

There is a very little literature available about breaker flashover protection IEEE standard C37.102 1987 [5] describes a simple method to detect flashover in generator breakers that has both LOW SECURITY & LOW DEPENDABILITY. In addition this method cannot be directly applied in double breaker substation arrangements (ring bus,
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double breaker or breaker and a half) or in single pole trip-and-reclose breakers for transmission lines. It also fails to detect three phase flashovers. Engineers at NTPC have had to look for other methods to resolve these problems. This project tries to serve as a guide in selecting and comparing those different methods, from the point of view of equipment needed and reliability. Most examples are based on generator breakers, but may be used for any breaker. METHOD A (Inputs; Residual current, breaker auxiliary contacts) Should trip when Residual current is 0.3A to 0.5A 52b, Bkr auxiliary contacts are open Then a delay of 100 to 125ms is given afterwards send a trip signal to 86BF relay

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METHOD B (Inputs; Residual current, breaker auxiliary contacts for each phase) Should trip when Residual current is 0.3A to 0.5A 52b, Bkr auxiliary contacts are open Operation same as method 1 but the inputs are each and every phase. METHOD C

Inputs Phase current (nominal current-541A per phase) Breaker auxiliary contact Close signal

Should trip when Phase current > the setting value (or) without no current 5 cycles before the start Breaker auxiliary contact open No closing signal to breaker at least 6 cycles before the start

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METHOD D

Inputs

live bus voltage

Condition to trip: Live bus voltage Should be at normal levels (or) higher before or during the flashover live bus voltage Before flashover 0.8 pu i.e. 53 V METHOD E

During flashover > 0.6 pu

Inputs Voltages at both sides of breakers Breaker auxiliary contact Close signal monitoring

Should trip when The breaker flashes with H.V on one side and the other side dead. For our case study recommended setting is 53V secondary. During flashover, current flows and voltage drops to near zero - recommended setting is 6.8V secondary when breaker contacts are open in the breaker in the first 5 cycles No closing signal to the breaker at least 6 cycles before the start. This method is not common in many electric companies; field engineers are not familiar with it. Training and information would be very important to applying it.

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Breaker states & Failure modes Figure describes all the possible states and failure modes in a breaker. A comprehensive breaker-protection scheme should cover all these modes of failure and can be achieved in modern multifunction relays

FAULT TREE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF FLASHOVER-PROTECTION METHODS To numerically evaluate security, dependability & quantitatively compare different flashover protection methods. Failure of concern is called the TOP EVENT. Is the combination of the failure probabilities of the components in the scheme. We use AND & OR gates To represent combinations of failure probabilities. OR Gate Any inputs may cause failure. i,e. sum of the failure probabilities of input events AND Gate Any inputs together must fail to cause scheme failure.

i,e product of input probabilities Failure probability (or) Failure rates will be carried out as MTBF. If we have 50 Aux relays if 1 such relay fails for 1 year. Then failure rate = 1/50 per year
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