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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate Dist. 2012

JUROR NUMBER ONE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; DEMETRIUS ROYSTER et al., Real Parties in Interest.
No. C067309. Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Sacramento. Filed May 31, 2012. The Rosenfeld Law Firm and Kenneth Rosenfeld for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. John K. Cotter, Michael Wise, and Keith J. Staten for Real Parties in Interest.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

HULL, J. Following the conviction of real parties in interest for various offenses stemming from an assault, respondent court learned that one of the trial jurors, fictitiously-named Juror Number One, had posted one or more items on his Facebook account concerning the trial while it was in progress, in violation of an admonition by the court. The court conducted a hearing at which Juror Number One and several other jurors were examined about this and other claimed instances of misconduct. Following the hearing, the court entered an order requiring Juror Number One to execute a consent form pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA) (18 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.) authorizing Facebook to release to the court for in camera review all items he posted during the trial. Juror Number One filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this court seeking to bar respondent court from enforcing its order. He contends the order violates the SCA, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and his state and federal privacy rights. We conclude the SCA is not applicable to the order at issue here and Juror Number One has otherwise failed to establish a violation of constitutional or privacy rights. We therefore deny the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Juror Number One was a juror in the trial of People v. Christian et al., Sacramento County Superior Court case No. 08F09791 (the criminal trial) in which the defendants, real parties in interest in this writ proceeding, were convicted of various offenses stemming from the beating of a young man on Halloween night in 2008. The criminal trial commenced in April 2010, and the jury reached its verdicts approximately two
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

monthslater,onJune25.OnAugust10,2010,oneofthetrialjurors(JurorNo.5)submitteda declarationinwhichshestated,amongotherthings,that,onoraboutMay18,2010,Juror NumberOnehad"postedcommentsabouttheevidenceasitwasbeingpresentedduringthe trialonhis`FacebookWall,'invitinghis`friends'whohaveaccesstohis`Facebook'pageto respond." OnSeptember17,2010,respondentcourtconductedahearingonthisandotherallegationsof jurormisconduct.Fourjurorswereexamined,includingJurorNumberOneandJurorNo.5. JurorNo.5testifiedthatshedidnotlearnabouttheFacebookpostingsuntilafterthetrial. JurorNumberOnehadinvitedhertobeaFacebook"friend"andthisgaveheraccesstohis postingsonFacebook,includingthoseduringthetrial.Thisiswhenshesawthepost mentionedinherdeclaration.AccordingtoJurorNo.5,onepersonhadrespondedtothepost thatheorshelikedwhatJurorNumberOnehadsaid. JurorNumberOneadmittedthatheposteditemsonhisFacebookaccountaboutthetrialwhile itwasinprogress.However,heindicatedthosepostscontainednothingaboutthecaseorthe evidencebutweremerelyindicationsthathewasstillonjuryduty.JurorNumberOne acknowledgedthatononeoccasionhepostedthatthecasehadbeenboringthatdayandhe almostfellasleep.AccordingtoJurorNumberOne,thiswasthedaytheyweregoingthrough phonerecordsandhepostedthathewaslisteningtopilesandpilesof"MetroPCSrecords." JurorNumberOnetestifiedthathepostedsomethingeveryotherdayonhisFacebook accountandlatertriedtodeletesomeofhisposts.Hedeniedreadinganyresponseshe receivedfromhis"friends"tothesepostings. Theothertwojurorswhowereexaminedbythecourthadnothingtocontributeonthisissue. Attheconclusionofthehearing,respondentcourtindicatedtherehadbeenclearmisconduct byJurorNumberOne,butthedegreeofsuchmisconductisstillatissue. OnOctober7,2010,counselforrealpartyininterestRoysterissuedasubpoenatoFacebook toproduce"[a]llpostingsfor[JurorNumberOne]dated3/01/2010to10/06/2010."Attached wasanorderfromrespondentcourtcompellingFacebookto"releaseanyandallinformation, includingpostingsandcommentsforFacebookmember[JurorNumberOne]." Facebookmovedtoquashthesubpoena,assertingdisclosureoftherequestedinformation wouldviolatetheSCA.Initsmemoranduminsupportofthemotiontoquash,Facebook assertedtherequestedinformationcanbeobtainedfromJurorNumberOnehimselfinasmuch ashe"ownsandhasaccesstohisownFacebookaccount,andcandisclosehisFacebook postingswithoutlimitation." OnJanuary28,2011,counselforrealpartyininterestRoysterissuedasubpoenatoJuror NumberOnetoproduce"[a]nyandalldocumentsprovidedto[him]byFacebook"and"[a]ny andallposts,comments,emailsorotherelectroniccommunicationsentorreceivedvia Facebookduringthetime[hewas]ajurorintheabovereferencedmatter." OnFebruary3,2011,JurorNumberOnemovedtoquashthesubpoena. Thefollowingday,respondentcourtgrantedJurorNumberOne'smotiontoquashthe subpoenabasedonoverbreadth.However,thecourtalsoissuedanorderrequiringJuror NumberOnetoturnovertothecourtforincamerareviewallofhisFacebookpostingsmade duringtrial. JurorNumberOnefiledapetitionwiththiscourtseekingtobarrespondentcourtfromenforcing itsFebruary4,2011,order.Wesummarilydeniedthepetition.However,onMarch30,2011, theCaliforniaSupremeCourtgrantedreviewandtransferredthematterbacktousforfurther consideration.Thehighcourtalsoissuedatemporarystayofrespondentcourt'sorder. OnApril5,2011,wevacatedourpriororderdenyingthepetition,issuedanordertoshow causetorespondentcourtandorderedthatthetemporarystayremainineffect.

DISCUSSION
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

CongresspassedtheSCAaspartoftheElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyActof1986 (Pub.L.No.99508(Oct.21,1986)100Stat.1860etseq.)tofillagapintheprotections affordedbytheFourthAmendment.Asonecommentatorobserved:"TheFourthAmendment offersstrongprivacyprotectionsforourhomesinthephysicalworld.Absentspecial circumstances,thegovernmentmustfirstobtainasearchwarrantbasedonprobablecause beforesearchingahomeforevidenceofcrime.Whenweuseacomputernetworksuchasthe Internet,however,auserdoesnothaveaphysical`home,'norreallyanyprivatespaceatall. Instead,ausertypicallyhasanetworkaccountconsistingofablockofcomputerstoragethat isownedbyanetworkserviceprovider,suchasAmericaOnlineorComcast.Althoughauser maythinkofthatstoragespaceasa`virtualhome,'infactthat`home'isreallyjustablockof onesandzeroesstoredsomewhereonsomebodyelse'scomputer.Thismeansthatwhenwe usetheInternet,wecommunicatewithandthroughthatremotecomputertocontactother computers.Ourmostprivateinformationendsupbeingsenttoprivatethirdpartiesandheldfar awayonremotenetworkservers."(Kerr,AUser'sGuidetotheStoredCommunicationsAct AndaLegislator'sGuidetoAmendingIt(2004)72Geo.Wash.L.Rev.1208,12091210,fns. omitted(Kerr).)TheFourthAmendmentprovidesnoprotectionforinformationvoluntarily disclosedtoathirdparty,suchasanInternetServiceProvider(ISP).(SeeSmithv.Maryland (1979)442U.S.735,743744[61L.Ed.2d220,229];UnitedStatesv.Miller(1976)425U.S. 435,443[48L.Ed.2d71,79].) Toremedythissituation,theSCAcreatesasetofFourthAmendmentlikeprotectionsthat limitboththegovernment'sabilitytocompelISP'stodisclosecustomerinformationandthe ISP'sabilitytovoluntarilydiscloseit.(Kerr,supra,atpp.12121213.)"The[SCA]reflects Congress'sjudgmentthatusershavealegitimateinterestintheconfidentialityof communicationsinelectronicstorageatacommunicationsfacility.Justastrespassprotects thosewhorentspacefromacommercialstoragefacilitytoholdsensitivedocuments, [citation],the[SCA]protectsuserswhoseelectroniccommunicationsareinelectronicstorage withanISPorotherelectroniccommunicationsfacility."(Thoefelv.FareyJones(9thCir. 2003)359F.3d1066,10721073.) TheSCAaddressestwoclassesofserviceproviders,thoseprovidingelectronic communicationservice(ECS)andthoseprovidingremotecomputingservice(RCS).AnECS is"anyservicewhichprovidestousersthereoftheabilitytosendorreceivewireorelectronic communications."(18U.S.C.2510(15);see18U.S.C.2711(1).)AnRCSprovides "computerstorageorprocessingservicesbymeansofanelectroniccommunicationssystem." (18U.S.C.2711(2).)Subjecttocertainconditionsandexceptions,theSCAprohibitsECS's fromknowinglydivulgingtoanypersonorentitythecontentsofacommunicationwhilein "electronicstorage"(18U.S.C.2702(a)(1))andprohibitsRCS'sfromknowinglydivulgingthe contentsofanycommunication"whichiscarriedormaintainedonthatservice"(id.at 2702(a)(2)).Oneexceptionisrecognizedwherethecustomerorsubscriberhasgivenconsent tothedisclosure.(Id.at2702(c)(2).) AnyanalysisoftheSCAmustbeinformedbythestateofthetechnologythatexistedwhen theSCAwasenacted.(Robison,FreeatWhatCost?:CloudComputingPrivacyUnderthe StoredCommunicationsAct(2010)98Geo.L.J.1195,1204(Robison).)"[C]omputer networkingwasinitsinfancyin1986.Specifically,atthetimeCongresspassedtheSCAin themid1980s,`personalusers[hadbegun]subscribingtoselfcontainednetworks,suchas Prodigy,CompuServe,andAmericaOnline,'and`typicallypaidbasedontheamountoftime theywereconnectedtothenetwork;unliketoday'sInternetusers,fewcouldaffordtospend hourscasuallyexploringtheprovider'snetwork.Afterconnectingtothenetworkviaamodem, userscoulddownloadorsendemail,postmessagesona"bulletinboard"service,oraccess information.'[Citation.]Notably,theSCAwasenactedbeforetheadventoftheWorldWide Webin1990andbeforetheintroductionofthewebbrowserin1994."(Crispinv.Christian Audigier,Inc.(C.D.Cal.2010)717F.Supp.2d965,972,fn.15(Crispin),quotingfromRobison, supra,atp.1198.)Inlightofrapidchangesincomputingtechnologysinceenactmentofthe SCA,"[c]ourtshavestruggledtoanalyzeproblemsinvolvingmoderntechnologywithinthe confinesofthisstatutoryframework,oftenwithunsatisfactoryresults."(Konopv.Hawaiian Airlines,Inc.(9thCir.2002)302F.3d868,874.) UndertheSCA,anECSisprohibitedfromdivulging"thecontentsofacommunicationwhilein electronicstoragebythatservice."(18U.S.C.2702(a)(1).)However,theterm"electronic
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

storage"hasalimiteddefinitionundertheSCA.Itcovers"(A)anytemporary,intermediate storageofawireorelectroniccommunicationincidentaltotheelectronictransmissionthereof; and(B)anystorageofsuchcommunicationbyanelectroniccommunicationservicefor purposesofbackupprotectionofsuchcommunication."(Id.2510(17).)Thus,onlycopiesof electroniccommunicationsheldbytheECSpendinginitialdeliverytotheaddresseeorheld thereafterforbackuppurposesareprotected.(Thoefelv.FareyJones,supra,359F.3datpp. 10751076.) AnRCSisprohibitedfromdivulgingthecontentofanyelectronictransmissionthatiscarried ormaintainedonitsservice"solelyforthepurposeofprovidingstorageorcomputer processingservicesto[the]subscriberorcustomer,iftheproviderisnotauthorizedtoaccess thecontentsofanysuchcommunicationsforpurposesofprovidinganyservicesotherthan storageorcomputerprocessing[.]"(18U.S.C.2702(a)(2)(B).)Thus,iftheserviceis authorizedtoaccessthecustomer'sinformationforotherpurposes,suchastoprovide targetedadvertising,SCAprotectionmaybelost.(SeeRobison,supra,atpp.12121214.) Inadditiontoprotectingtraditionalelectronicmailservicesandremoteprocessingservices, thecourtshaveindicatedtheSCAwasintendedbyCongresstoprotectelectronicbulletin boardsaswell."`Computerbulletinboardsgenerallyofferbothprivateelectronicmailservice andnewsgroups.Thelatterisessentiallyemaildirectedtothecommunityatlarge,ratherthan aprivaterecipient.'[Citation.]Theterm`computerbulletinboard'evokesthetraditionalcork andpinbulletinboardonwhichpeoplepostmessages,advertisements,orcommunitynews. [Citation.]CourtprecedentandlegislativehistoryestablishthattheSCA'sdefinitionofanECS providerwasintendedtoreachaprivate[BulletinBoardSystem].[Citations.]"(Crispin,supra, 717F.Supp.2datpp.980981.)Aprivatebulletinboardsystemisessentiallyonewith restrictedaccessratherthanoneopentothepublicatlarge. InitsordercompellingconsenttothereleaseofhisFacebookpostings,respondentcourtcited Morenov.HanfordSentinel,Inc.(2009)172Cal.App.4th1125,atpage1130,forthe propositionthattheinformationcoveredbytheorder"waspostedsothatothersmightreadit andthatitwasnotprivateinanysensethatrelatestothisinquiry."However,theMySpace postingatissueinMorenowasopentothepublicatlarge,notaselectgroupofFacebook "friends"likethepostingsatissuehere.ApartydoesnotforfeitSCAprotectionbymakinghis communicationsavailabletoaclosedgroup,i.e.,aprivatebulletinboard.(Crispin,supra,717 F.Supp.2datpp.980981,fn.omitted.)Thus,respondentcourt'srationaledoesnotwithstand scrutiny. JurorNumberOnecontendsFacebookhasbeenrecognizedasaproviderofelectronic communicationserviceswithinthemeaningoftheSCA,citingCrispin,supra,717F.Supp.2d 965.InCrispin,thefederaldistrictcourtconcludedFacebookandMySpacequalifyasboth ECS'sandRCS's.Thecourtprovidedthefollowingdescriptionofthosesites:"`Facebookand MySpace,Inc.,arecompanieswhichprovidesocialnetworkingwebsitesthatallowusersto sendandreceivemessages,throughpostingonusercreated"profilepages"orthroughprivate messagingservices.'...Facebook'susercreatedprofilepageisknownastheFacebook `wall,'`aspaceoneachuser'sprofilepagethatallowsfriendstopostmessagesfortheuserto see.'Thesemessages...`canbeviewedbyanyonewithaccesstotheuser'sprofilepage, andarestoredbyFacebooksothattheycanbedisplayedontheFacebookwebsite,notasan incidenttotheirtransmissiontoanotherplace.'Similarly...MySpacehasaprofilepagewith a`comments'featurethatisidenticaltotheFacebookwall."(Id.atpp.976977,fns.omitted.) ThecourtinCrispinconcludedthat,becauseFacebookandMySpaceprovidelimitedaccess tomessagespostedbyusersontheFacebook"wall"ortheMySpace"comments"feature, thereisnobasisfordistinguishingthosefeaturesfromarestrictedaccesselectronicbulletin board.Thereisalsonobasisfordistinguishingtheprivatemessagingservicesprovidedby thosecompaniesfromtraditionalwebbasedemail.Hence,thecourtconcludedFacebookand MySpacequalifiedasECS's.(Crispin,supra,717F.Supp.2datpp.981982.) ThecourtnextconsideredwhethermessagespostedontheFacebookwallarein"electronic storage"withinthemeaningoftheSCA.Asnotedabove,thisrequireseitherthatthemessage isintemporary,intermediatestorageawaitingdelivery,orisinbackupstorage.Regardingthe former,thecourtnotedthatmessagespostedtotheFacebookwallarenotinintermediate
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

storageawaitingdeliverytotherecipient,becausethewallitselfistherecipientorfinal destinationforthemessages.(Crispin,supra,717F.Supp.2datpp.988989.)Nevertheless, thecourtfoundthemessages,onceposted,areheldforbackuppurposes.(Id.atp.989.)In thealternative,thecourtconcludedFacebookqualifiesasanRCSwithrespecttoposted messagesheldonthewall.(Id.atp.990.) AssumingCrispinwascorrectlydecided,thatcasedidnotestablishasamatteroflawthat FacebookiseitheranECSoranRCSorthatthepostingstothatserviceareprotectedbythe SCA.ThefindingsinCrispinwerebasedonthestipulationsandevidencepresentedbythe partiesinthatcase.Thecourtnotedthattheparties"providedonlyminimalfactsregardingthe threethirdpartyentitiesthatweresubpoenaed."(Crispin,supra,717F.Supp.2datp.976.)The partiescitedthecompanies'homepagesandWikipediaasauthority.(Ibid.) JurorNumberOnehasprovidedthiscourtwithnothing,eitherbywayofthepetitionorthe supportingdocumentation,astothegeneralnatureorspecificoperationsofFacebook.Without suchfacts,weareunabletodeterminewhetherortowhatextenttheSCAisapplicabletothe informationatissueinthiscase.Forexample,wehavenoinformationastothetermsofany agreementbetweenFacebookandJurorNumberOnethatmightprovideforawaiverofprivacy rightsinexchangeforfreesocialnetworkingservices.Nordowehaveanyinformationabout howwidelyJurorNumberOne'spostsareavailabletothepublic. ButevenassumingJurorNumberOne'sFacebookpostingsareprotectedbytheSCA,that protectionappliesonlyastoattemptsbythecourtorrealpartiesininteresttocompel Facebooktodisclosetherequestedinformation.Here,thecompulsionisonJurorNumber One,notFacebook. InFlaggv.CityofDetroit(E.D.Mich.2008)252F.R.D.346(Flagg),theplaintiffissued subpoenasfortextmessagesheldbySkyTel,Inc.,atextmessagingservicethathad contractedwiththecitytoprovidesuchservicesuntil2004andhadmaintainedthemessages thereafter.Thecitymovedtoquashthesubpoena,arguingthemessageswereprotectedby theSCA.(Id.atpp.347348.)Thefederaldistrictcourtheldthat,becausethemessages remainedintheconstructivecontrolofthecity,theyweresubjecttodiscoveryunderthe federalrules,notwithstandingtheSCA.(Id.atpp.352357.)However,theproperprocedure wouldbetoseektheinformationbyadocumentrequesttothecityratherthanathirdparty subpoena.(Id.atp.366.)TotheextentconsentofthecityisrequiredbytheSCA,thecityhas anobligationunderthediscoveryrulestoprovidethatconsenttotheserviceprovider.(Id.atp. 359.) Ineffect,thecourtinFlaggequatedthesituationpresentedtothatwherethematerialssought tobediscoveredwereintheactualpossessionoftheparty.Thecourtexplained:"[A]party hasanobligationunder[FederalRulesofCivilProcedure]Rule34toproducematerialswithin itscontrol,andthisobligationcarrieswithittheattendantdutytotakethestepsnecessaryto exercisethiscontrolandretrievetherequesteddocuments....[A]party'sdisinclinationto exercisethiscontrolisimmaterial,justasitisimmaterialwhetherapartymightprefernotto producedocumentsinitspossessionorcustody."(Flagg,supra,252F.R.D.atp.363.)The courtcontinued:"Itisanecessaryandroutineincidentoftherulesofdiscoverythatacourt mayorderdisclosuresthatapartywouldprefernottomake....[T]hispowerofcompulsion encompassessuchmeasuresasarenecessarytosecureaparty'scompliancewithits discoveryobligations.Inthiscase,theparticulardevicethattheSCAcallsforis`consent,' and[thedefendant]hasnotcitedanyauthorityforthepropositionthatacourtlacksthepower toensurethatthisnecessaryauthorizationisforthcomingfromapartywiththemeansto provideit.Wereitotherwise,apartycouldreadilyavoiditsdiscoveryobligationsby warehousingitsdocumentswithathirdpartyunderstrictinstructionstoreleasethemonlywith theparty's`consent.'"(Ibid.;seealsoO'Gradyv.SuperiorCourt(2006)139Cal.App.4th1423, 1446["Whereapartytothecommunicationisalsoapartytothelitigation,itwouldseem withinthepowerofacourttorequirehisconsenttodisclosureonpainofdiscovery sanctions"].) Thus,thequestionhereisnotwhetherrespondentcourtcancompelFacebooktodisclosethe contentsofJurorNumberOne'swallpostingsbutwhetherthecourtcancompelJurorNumber Onetodoso.IfthecourtcancompelJurorNumberOnetoproducetheinformation,itcan
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

likewisecompelJurorNumberOnetoconsenttothedisclosurebyFacebook.TheSCAhasno bearingonthisissue. JurorNumberOnecontendsdisclosureoftherequestedinformationviolatestheFourth Amendment"inthat[he]hasalegitimateexpectationofprivacyintherecords."However, beyondmerelyassertingthistobeso,JurorNumberOneprovidesnoargumentorcitationto authority.Asnotedearlier,JurorNumberOnehasprovidednospecificsastotheoperationof Facebookorthenatureofhiscontractualrelationshipwiththewebsite.Obviously,theextent ofJurorNumberOne's"legitimateexpectationofprivacy"undertheFourthAmendmentwould dependontheextenttowhichhiswallpostingsaredisseminatedtoothersorareavailableto Facebookorothersfortargetedadvertising.Whereapointisraisedinanappellatebrief withoutargumentorlegalsupport,"itisdeemedtobewithoutfoundationandrequiresno discussionbythereviewingcourt."(Atchleyv.CityofFresno(1984)151Cal.App.3d635,647.) LikewisewithJurorNumberOne'sFifthAmendmentclaim.JurorNumberOneassertshemay notbecompelledtogiveevidenceagainsthimself.JurorNumberOneagainprovidesno furtherargumentorcitationtoauthority.But,moresignificantly,atthispointinthelitigation andonthisrecord,hisFifthAmendmentclaimis,atbest,speculative.ShouldJurorNumber One'srightsundertheFifthAmendmentinfactcomeintoplayasthislitigationproceeds,the courtwillbeabletoconsiderandresolvethematthattime. JurorNumberOnearguesheneverthelesshasaprivacyrightnottodisclosehisFacebook posts.HecitesassupportCodeofCivilProceduresections206and237,whichprotectjurors againstinvoluntarydisclosureofpersonalidentifyinginformation.JurorNumberOneargues theseprovisionsdemonstrateastrongpublicpolicytoprotectjurorsfrombeingcompelledto discusstheirdeliberations.However,asnotedabove,JurorNumberOnehasfailedto demonstrateanyexpectationofprivacyinhisFacebookposts.Atanyrate,protectionagainst disclosureofpersonalidentifyinginformationthatmightbeusedbyaconvicteddefendantto contactorharassajurorisnotthesamethingasprotectionofajuror'scommunications,which themselvesaremisconduct. ButevenifJurorNumberOnehasaprivacyinterestinhisFacebookposts,thatinterestisnot absolute.Itmustbebalancedagainsttherightsofrealpartiesininteresttoafairtrial,which rightsmaybeimplicatedbyjurormisconduct.Thus,thequestionbecomeswhetherrespondent courthadtheauthoritytoorderJurorNumberOnetodisclosethemessageshepostedto Facebookduringthecriminaltrialaspartofitsinherentpowertocontroltheproceedings beforeitandtoassurerealpartiesininterestafairtrial. "Atrialcourthasinherentaswellasstatutorydiscretiontocontroltheproceedingstoensure theefficaciousadministrationofjustice."(Peoplev.Cox(1991)53Cal.3d618,700, disapprovedonothergroundsinPeoplev.Doolin(2009)45Cal.4th390,421,fn.22.)"Criminal defendantshavearighttotrialbyanimpartialjury.(U.S.Const.,6thAmend.)`[T]hereexistsa "strongpublicinterestintheascertainmentofthetruthinjudicialproceedings,includingjury deliberations."[Citation.]...Liftingtheveilofpostverdictsecrecytoexposejurormisconduct servesanimportantpublicpurpose."`[T]ohearsuchproofwouldhaveatendencytodiminish suchpracticesandtopurifythejuryroom,byrenderingsuchimproprietiescapableand probableofexposure,andconsequentlydeterringjurorsfromresortingtothem.'"[Citations.]' [Citation.]"(Peoplev.Tuggles(2009)179Cal.App.4th339,379380.)"Whenatrialcourtis awareofpossiblejurormisconduct,thecourt`must"makewhateverinquiryisreasonably necessary"'toresolvethematter."(Peoplev.Hayes(1999)21Cal.4th1211,1255.) JurorNumberOnecontendsthetrialcourthadnoauthoritytocompelproductionofthe Facebookposts,becauseithadcompleteditsinvestigationofjurormisconduct.Herepeatedly assertsthetrialcourtconductedahearing,examinedthejurors,andfoundthejurorstestified truthfully.Implicitly,JurorNumberOnequestionstheneedforanyfurtherinvestigationofthe matter,inasmuchashetestifiedhepostednothingofsubstanceonFacebook.Accordingto JurorNumberOne,onceheinformedthecourtunderoaththathedidnotpostanythingof substancetoFacebook,thecourthasnopowertoinquirefurther.JurorNumberOneargues theorderatissuehereisnotreallypartofthecourt'scontinuedinquiryintomisconductbutan efforttoenforcethefailedattemptsbyrealpartiesininteresttosubpoenatheFacebook records.
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

JurorNumberOne'sassertionthatthetrialcourtacceptedJurorNumberOne'sclaimthathe postednothingsubstantivetoFacebookisapparentlybasedonthefollowingcommentbythe courtduringdiscussionsaboutwhethertobringinadditionaljurorstotestify:"Itseemstome thatallfourjurorswhospokewerecredible.Itseemstomethatallfourjurorsweredoingtheir besttobeopenandhonest,andtoconveywhattheyrecallwithregardtothedeliberations.I didnotgetanimpressionfromanyoneofthefourjurorsthattherewasanefforttohide anything." ButassumingthecourtbelievedJurorNumberOnehadmadenoefforttohideanything,that doesnotalsomeanitbelievedhetestifiedaccurately.JurorNumberOnemaywellnothave rememberedpostinganythingofsubstanceonFacebook,yettheevidencemayshow otherwise.Whenaskedhowmanytimesherecalledpostingaboutthecaseduringtrial,Juror NumberOneinitiallyresponded:"Iprobablypostedabout`Day22'or`Day24.'That'saboutit. Notreallypostingeverydaysomethingnegativeoranythingatall."Later,JurorNumberOne acknowledgedhe"postedsomethingeveryotherday."Healsotestifiedthathewouldgoonto Facebooktoseewhatothershadpostedtohisaccount,butclaimedhedidnotlookatitems postedinresponsetohisownpostingsaboutthetrial. InlightofJurorNumberOne'sequivocationabouthowoftenandwhathepostedtoFacebook, andthecourt'sexpressfindingthattherehadbeenmisconduct,withthedegreeofmisconduct stillatissue,itcanhardlybesaidrespondentcourtconcludeditsinvestigationofthematter. Thecourtmayhavecompleteditsexaminationofthejurors,buttherewasstillsomequestion aboutthecontentoftheFacebookpoststhemselves.Inthisregard,itmustberemembered thatthosepostsarenotjustpotentialevidenceofmisconduct.Theyarethemisconduct. JurorNumberOnealsocontendsrespondentcourt'sorder"necessarilyencompass[es]not only[his]privacy,butthatofotherindividualswhowerenotjurors,merelybecausetheyare [his]Facebook`friends'andmayhavepostedtohisFacebooksiteduringthetrial."Butthe orderatissueheredoesnotencompasspostsbyJurorNumberOne's"friends."Thecourt orderedonlythatJurorNumberOneconsenttothereleaseofpostsmadebyhimduringtrial. Inanyevent,totheextentothershavepostedtoJurorNumberOne'sFacebookwall,they havegivenupanyprivacyrightinthosepostsastoJurorNumberOne.Itwouldbeasifthe "friend"hadsentJurorNumberOnealetterwhichwasstillinthejuror'spossession.Ifthe juror'spapersaresubjecttosearch,thentheletterfromthe"friend"wouldalsobesubjectto search. JurorNumberOnearguesseveralofhisFacebookpostswerepresentedtothetrialcourt duringthemisconducthearingandnonerevealedanyprejudicetorealpartiesininterest. However,thisputsthecartbeforethehorse.Ifajurorweretoacknowledgehavingconsulted withanattorneyduringtrialbutrefusedtosaywhatwasdiscussed,therewouldbenowayto determinefromthisaloneifthecommunicationswerepotentiallyprejudicial.ByJurorNumber One'stheory,thecourtcouldinquirenofurther. Thetrialinthismatterlastedapproximatelytwomonths.JurorNumberOneadmittedposting somethingeveryotherdayduringtrial.Thus,therewerepotentially30posts.JurorNumber Oneacknowledgeddeletingsomeofhisposts,althoughthereisnoexplanationastowhy. Thepresentmatternolongerinvolvesaclaimofpotentialmisconduct.Misconducthasbeen establishedwithoutquestion.Theonlyremainingissueiswhetherthemisconductwas prejudicial.ThiscannotbedeterminedwithoutlookingattheFacebookposts.YetJuror NumberOnewouldbarthetrialcourtfromexaminingthepoststodetermineiftherewas prejudicebecausetherehasbeennoshowingofprejudice. Insummary,inthepresentmatter,JurorNumberOnedoesnotclaimrespondentcourt exceededitsinherentauthoritytoinquireintojurormisconduct.Justasthecourtmayexamine jurorsunderoath(Peoplev.Hedgecock(1990)51Cal.3d395,417418),itmayalsoexamine otherevidenceofmisconduct.Inthisinstance,thecourtseekstoreviewincamerathevery itemstheFacebookpoststhatconstitutethemisconduct.JurorNumberOnecontends suchdisclosureviolatestheSCA,butitdoesnot.EvenassumingtheFacebookpostsare protectedbytheSCA,theSCAprotectsagainstdisclosurebythirdparties,nottheposting party.JurorNumberOnealsocontendstheorderisnotauthorized,becausethecourthas completeditsinvestigationofmisconduct.Butsuchinvestigationobviouslyhasnotbeen
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

completed.JurorNumberOnealsocontendsthecompelleddisclosureviolateshisFourthand FifthAmendmentrights.However,beyondassertingthistobeso,heprovidesnoargumentor citationtoauthority.Thus,thoseargumentsareforfeited.Finally,JurorNumberOneargues forceddisclosureofhisFacebookpostsviolateshisprivacyrights.However,JurorNumber Onehasnotshownhehasanyexpectationofprivacyinthepostsand,inanyevent,those privacyrightsdonottrumprealpartiesininterest'srighttoafairtrialfreefromjuror misconduct.Thetrialcourthasthepowerandthedutytoinquireintowhethertheconfirmed misconductwasprejudicial. Intheabsenceoffurtherargumentorauthority,weconcludeJurorNumberOnehasfailedto establishrespondentcourt'sorderexceededitspowertoinquireintoallegedjurormisconduct. Thepetitionforwritofprohibitionmustbedenied.

DISPOSITION
Thepetitionforwritofprohibitionisdenied.Uponthisdecisionbecomingfinal,thestay previouslyorderedinthismatterisvacated. RAYE,P.J.,concur. MAURO,J.,concurring: Theleadopinionstatesthat"evenassumingJurorNumberOne'sFacebookpostingsare protectedbythe[StoredCommunicationsAct(SCA)(18U.S.C.2701etseq.)],that protectionappliesonlyastoattemptsbythecourtorrealpartiesininteresttocompel Facebooktodisclosetherequestedinformation.Here,thecompulsionisonJurorNumber One,notFacebook."(Maj.opn.atpp.1213.) ItistruethecompulsionisonJurorNumberOneto"consent"totheproductionofdocuments. ButthetrialcourtisseekingthedocumentsfromFacebook,notfromJurorNumberOne.The trialcourtcrafteditsordertotakeadvantageoftheconsentexceptionintheSCA.(18U.S.C. 2702(c)(2).)ItorderedJurorNumberOneto"executeaconsentformsufficienttosatisfythe exceptionstatedinTitle18,U.S.C.section2702(b)allowingFacebooktosupplythepostings madeby[JurorNumberOne]duringtrial."Inessence,thetrialcourt'sorderisaneffortto compelindirectly(throughJurorNumberOne)whatthetrialcourtmightnotbeabletocompel directlyfromFacebook.Thisisarguablyinconsistentwiththespiritandintentofthe protectionsintheSCA.Compelledconsentisnotconsentatall.(See,e.g.,Schnecklothv. Bustamonte(1973)412U.S.218,228,233[36L.Ed.2d854,863,866][coercedconsentis merelyapretextforunjustifiedintrusion].) Theleadopinionexplainsthat"[i]fthecourtcancompelJurorNumberOnetoproducethe information,itcanlikewisecompelJurorNumberOnetoconsenttothedisclosureby Facebook."(Maj.opn.atp.14.)Thismayultimatelybetrue,butherethetrialcourtbypassed adeterminationastowhetheritcouldcompelJurorNumberOnetoproducethedocuments. DefendantRoysterhadissuedsubpoenastobothFacebookandJurorNumberOnedirecting themtoproduceJurorNumberOne'spostings.FacebookandJurorNumberOnebothmoved toquashthesubpoenas.ThetrialcourtcontinuedthehearingonFacebook'smotiontoquash andgrantedJurorNumberOne'smotiontoquash,rulingthatthesubpoenaagainstJuror NumberOnewasoverbroad.Thetrialcourtthenconcludeditwas"unnecessary"todetermine whetheritcoulddirectlycompelFacebookorJurorNumberOnetoproducethedocumentsin theirpossession.[1]Thus,thetrialcourtcompelledconsenteventhoughotherstatutory procedurestodirectlycompelproductionofthedocumentswerestillavailableandhadnotyet beenexhausted. Nonetheless,JurorNumberOnedoesnotassertthesespecificconcernsascontentionsinhis petitionforwritofprohibition,perhapsrecognizingthatraisingsuchproceduralmatterswould merelydelayresolutionoftheultimateissuesinthecase.Instead,hearguesthetrialcourt's orderviolatedhisrightsunderconstitutionalandfederallaw.Healsoassertsthattheorderwas anunreasonableintrusionbecausethereisnoevidencetheFacebookpostswereprejudicial. ThisfinalcontentionencompassestheappropriatebalancebetweenJurorNumberOne's privacyconcernsanddefendants'righttoafairtrial,anditwarrantsfurtherdiscussion.
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

JurorNumberOne'sFacebookpostsviolatedthetrialcourt'sinstructionstothejury.(Pen. Code,1122,subd.(a)(1);CALCRIMNo.101.)Thiswasseriousmisconductgivingrisetoa presumptionofprejudice.(InreHitchings(1993)6Cal.4th97,118(Hitchings);accord,People v.Wilson(2008)44Cal.4th758,838(Wilson).) "Thedisapprovalofjurorconversationswithnonjurorsderiveslargelyfromtheriskthejurorwill gaininformationaboutthecasethatwasnotpresentedattrial."(Peoplev.Polk(2010)190 Cal.App.4th1183,1201.)Nonetheless,thepresumptionofprejudicethatarisesfrom discussingthecasewithnonjurors"isrebutted...iftheentirerecordintheparticularcase, includingthenatureofthemisconductorotherevent,andthesurroundingcircumstances, indicatesthereisnoreasonableprobabilityofprejudice,i.e.,nosubstantiallikelihoodthatone ormorejurorswereactuallybiasedagainstthedefendant."(InreHamilton(1999)20Cal.4th 273,296(Hamilton),originalitalics;accord,InreLucas(2004)33Cal.4th682,697.) AstheCaliforniaSupremeCourtexplainedinHamilton,"Thestandardisapragmaticone, mindfulofthe`daytodayrealitiesofcourtroomlife'[citation]andofsociety'sstrongcompeting interestinthestabilityofcriminalverdicts[citations].Itis`virtuallyimpossibletoshieldjurors fromeverycontactorinfluencethatmighttheoreticallyaffecttheirvote.'[Citation.]Moreover, thejuryisa`fundamentallyhuman'institution;theunavoidablefactthatjurorsbringdiverse backgrounds,philosophies,andpersonalitiesintothejuryroomisboththestrengthandthe weaknessoftheinstitution.[Citation.]`[T]hecriminaljusticesystemmustnotberendered impotentinquestofaneverelusiveperfection....[Jurors]areimbuedwithhumanfrailtiesas wellasvirtues.Ifthesystemistofunctionatall,wemusttolerateacertainamountof imperfectionshortofactualbias.'[Citation.]"(Hamilton,supra,20Cal.4thatp.296.) Accordingly,jurorconversationsinvolvingperipheralmatters,ratherthantheissuestobe resolvedattrial,aregenerallyregardedasnonprejudicial.(Wilson,supra,44Cal.4thatpp.839 840["trivial"commentstoafellowjurorwerenotprejudicialwherenotmeanttopersuade]; Peoplev.Page(2008)44Cal.4th1,5859[circulationofacartooninthejuryroomthatdidnot bearonguiltwasnotmisconduct];Peoplev.Avila(2006)38Cal.4th491,605[jurorstatements disparagingcounselandthecourtwerenotmaterialbecausetheyhadnobearingonguilt]; Peoplev.Stewart(2004)33Cal.4th425,509510[ajurorwhocomplimentedtheappearanceof thedefendant'sformergirlfriendcommittednonprejudicialmisconductofa"`triflingnature'"]; Peoplev.Majors(1998)18Cal.4th385,423425[generalcommentsbyjurorsthatdidnot addresstheevidencewerenotprejudicial];Peoplev.Loot(1998)63Cal.App.4th694,698699 [ajurorwhoaskedapublicdefenderwhethertheprosecutorwas"`available'"committed "technical,"butnonprejudicial,misconduct].) Indeterminingwhethercommunicationsareprejudicialorifthepresumptionofprejudicehas beenrebutted,thecourtmustconsiderthe"`"natureandseriousnessofthemisconduct,and theprobabilitythatactualprejudicemayhaveensued."'[Citation.]"(Wilson,supra,44Cal.4th atp.839,italicsomitted;Peoplev.Polk,supra,190Cal.App.4thatpp.12011202.) Fourjurorstestifiedunderoathattheposttrialhearing.JurorNo.5testifiedthatshehad accesstoJurorNumberOne'sFacebookpostingswhenshebecameaFacebookfriendofhis afterthejurywasdischarged.ShesaidshedidnotreceiveanyFacebookcommunications regardingthetrialduringtrialordeliberations.Afterthejurywasdischarged,JurorNo.5found atleastoneFacebookpostingbyJurorNumberOnethathemadeduringthetrial,butshedid notrememberanyothers.ShedidnotnoticeanycommentsinresponsetoJurorNumber One'spost.WhenpresentedintheposttrialhearingwithacopyoffivepagesfromJuror NumberOne'sFacebookwallExhibitD,pages19through23intherecordJurorNo.5 saidtheyappearedtobetheFacebookpagesthatshehadpreviouslyseen.JurorNo.5 recognizedonthosefivepagestheFacebookpostingonMay18,at7:36a.m.fromJuror NumberOnethatshehadseen.JurorNo.5testifiedthattherewasnothingmissingonthe copyofthefiveFacebookpagesfromwhatsherememberedseeing.SheisstillaFacebook friendwithJurorNumberOne,andotherjurorshadbeen"friended"byJurorNumberOne,too. JurorNo.5didnottalktotheotherjurorFacebookfriendsaboutwhatJurorNumberOnehad posted. ExhibitD,thecopyofFacebookpostings,includesthefollowingrelevantentries(withoriginal ellipsispoints):
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

"May17at3:09pmviaFacebookforiPhone":"Week5ofjuryduty...[.]"Below thatpostwasthefollowingcommentfromaFacebookfriendlaterthatafternoon: "[W]ow....neverbeenonjurydutythatlong...."Andbelowthat,another friendpostedacommentlaterthatevening,saying"5weeks,difil[sic]decreer, puesquehicieronparaestarenuncasotanlargo"whichcouldbeunderstoodto mean"5weeks,hardtobelieve,butwhatdidtheydoinordertobeinacaseso long." "May18at7:36am":"BacktojurydutycanitgetanymoreBORINGthangoing overpilesandpilesofmetropcsphonerecords....uuuggghhhhhh[.]"Belowthe post,aFacebookfriendindicatedthatthey"like[d]"thatcomment. "May24at12:28am":"Jurydutyweeksix...[.]"Thecopyindicatestherewere fourcommentsfromfriends,butonlytwoarevisibleonthecopy.Onecomment thateveningsays,"didtheyconvict[S]acramentoforpretendingtohaveapro basketballteam?"Theothercommentthateveningsays,"Youstilldoingthat shit?Sorrytohearholmes!" "June27at11:21pmviaFacebookforiPhone":"Greattohavemylifebackto normal....NOMOREJURYDUTY...."Thecopyindicatesthatthepostwas madeafterthejuryhadbeendischarged,andthattherewerefivecommentsto thepost. JurorNumberOnetestifiednext.HeadmittedpostingFacebookentriessporadicallyaboutthe trialeventhoughthetrialjudgehadinstructedthejurorsnottotalkaboutthecasewith anyone.HeauthenticatedExhibitDasdepictinghimonFacebook.Hetestifiedthathedidnot recallpostinganythingotherthanthathewasinjuryduty,countingdownthedays,andinone postinghesaidthepilesandpilesofMetroPCSphonerecordevidencewasboringandthathe almostfellasleep.HesaidiftheyhadaccesstohisFacebookthatday,hedidnotthinkthey wouldstillfindthepostingshemadeduringthetrial,becausehetriestodeletealotofthings. Buthesaidhehadnoideapriortothehearingwhyhehadbeencalledinforthehearing. JurorNumberOnetestifiedthatheneverhadverbaldiscussionswithpeopleaboutthecase. HesaidhenevertalkedtootherjurorsabouttheFacebookpostings,andtheydidnotknow aboutthemduringthetrial. JurorNo.8testifiedthatJurorNumberOnenevermentionedFacebooktoher,shedoesnot useFacebook,andshedoesnotknowanythingaboutit.JurorNo.5toldher,astheywere waitinginthehallpriortotheposttrialhearing,thatJurorNumberOnehadpostedon Facebook,butJurorNo.8didnothaveanypersonalknowledgeaboutthat. JurorNo.3testifiedthathewasnotawarethatanyjurormighthavebeendoinganythingwith Facebook,andhehadnoFacebookcommunicationswithotherjurors. TheevidencepresentedattheposttrialhearingindicatedthattheFacebookpostsinvolved peripheralmattersanddidnotinvolveissuestoberesolvedattrial.AlthoughJurorNumber OneadmitteddeletingFacebookposts,hetestifiedthattheonlythingheeverposted regardingthetrialwascommentsaboutthenumberofweekshewasonjuryduty,counting downthedays,andinonepostmentioningthatthephonerecordevidencewasboring.Juror No.5andJurorNumberOnebothtestifiedthatExhibitDaccuratelyreflectedthetypeof FacebookpostsmadebyJurorNumberOneaboutthetrial.TherewasnoevidencethatJuror NumberOnedeletedFacebookpostsinanticipationoftheposttrialhearing.JurorNo.5said inherdeclarationthattheallegedinappropriateconductdidnotinfluenceherdecisioninthe case,andtheotherjurorsdidnothaveaccesstothepostsduringthetrialanddidnottalk aboutthemduringthetrial.Afterthehearing,thetrialcourtsaidthetestifyingjurorswere credibleandseemedtobedoingtheirverybesttobeopenandhonest.Thetrialcourtadded, "Ididnotgetanimpressionfromanyoneofthefourjurorsthattherewasanefforttohide anything." Thequestioniswhetherthisevidentiaryrecordrebutsthepresumptionofprejudice.Juror NumberOnesaysitdoes.Theleadopinionsaysthisrecordcannotrebutthepresumptionuntil alloftheFacebookpostsarereviewedbythetrialcourt,notingthat"JurorNumberOnewould
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JUROR NUMBER ONE v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, Cal: Court of Appeal, 3rd Appellate

barthetrialcourtfromexaminingthepoststodetermineiftherewasprejudicebecausethere hasbeennoshowingofprejudice."(Maj.opn.atp.20.) Theleadopinioniscorrectthattherehasbeennoshowingofprejudiceonthisrecord. Moreover,theevidenceelicitedattheposttrialhearingcouldbeconstruedtonegatethe possibilityofprejudice,eveninthedeletedposts.Thus,itispossibletoconclude,asJuror NumberOneurges,thattherecorddoesnotestablishasubstantiallikelihoodthatoneormore jurorswereactuallybiasedagainstdefendants.(Hamilton,supra,20Cal.4thatp.296.) Thatmighthavebeentheendoftheanalysisifthetrialcourthadmadesuchfindingsand declinedtocontinuetheinvestigation.Buthere,thetrialcourtwhichwasinthebest positiontoevaluatetheevidencedeterminedthatitneededtoseethedeletedFacebook postsinordertoruleoutprejudice.Atthesametime,thetrialcourtsoughttobalanceJuror NumberOne'sprivacyconcernsbyorderingincamerareviewoftheposts. Althoughatrialcourtmustavoida"`fishingexpedition'"whenconsideringallegationsofalleged misconduct(Peoplev.Hedgecock(1990)51Cal.3d395,419),Iamunawareofanyauthority preventingatrialcourtfromtakingstepstoruleoutprejudiceoncejurormisconducthasbeen established.BecauseprejudiceispresumedbasedonJurorNumberOne'smisconductin postingaboutthetrialonFacebook,andbecausewedonothaveallofJurorNumberOne's Facebookpostsregardingthecase,Icannotsaythereis"nosubstantiallikelihood"Juror NumberOnewasbiasedagainstdefendants.(Hamilton,supra,20Cal.4thatp.296.)Under thesecircumstances,thebalancebetweenJurorNumberOne'sprivacyconcernsand defendants'righttoafairtrialtipsinfavorofdefendants. Accordingly,Iconcurinthedisposition.
[1]CounselforJurorNumberOneadmittedduringoralargumentinthiscourtthatFacebooksenthimtheposts soughtbythetrialcourt.

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