Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution Author(s): John Gerard Ruggie Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol.

46, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 561-598 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706989 . Accessed: 09/04/2012 10:40
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GerardRuggie of an institution John

the Multilateralism: anatomy

had declared a very In 1989,peacefulchange,whicha leadingrealisttheorist politics less than a decade before,1 event in international low-probability of geopoliticalshift thepostwarera and the accommodated mostfundamental century:the collapse of the Soviet East perhaps of the entire twentieth were end of the cold war. Many factors European empireand the attendant norms thereseems littledoubt thatmultilateral But for responsible thatshift. consequences. Inhave helped stabilize theirinternational and institutions a role to be playing significant in the normsand institutions appear deed, such of a broad arrayof regional and global changes in the world management today. system in are multilateral groupings involved In Europe,byone countat leastfifteen The (EC) is the continent's collectivedestiny.2 European Community shaping of the undisputedanchor of economic relationsand increasingly a common East European countrieswant vision in the West. And the former political so nothing much as to tie theireconomicfate to the EC, a goal thatthe EC
discussionpaper forthe Ford FoundationWest This articlewas prepared as the background Several otherpapers preparedforthatworkshopare being Coast Workshopon Multilateralism. and Organization, theentiresetwillbe presented in published thisand otherissuesofIntemational Form and The Theory Praxisofan Institutional Matters. in JohnGerard Ruggie,ed., Multilateralism the I Press,forthcoming).thanktheFord Foundationformaking (New York: ColumbiaUniversity and Cooperationfor on Institute Global Conflict of projectpossibleand the University California that in for to it. orchestrating I am also verygrateful the otherparticipants the workshop proving and profitable is cooperationunderanarchy notonlyfeasiblebut can also be mutually multilateral of critiques an earlierdraft thisarticle, of and helpful fun;to Robert0. Keohane forhis extensive severalkey issues; to Ernst B. Haas forhis constructive and clarify whichforcedme to rethink comments; to David Auerswaldforresearchassistance. and Press, University Politics (New York: Cambridge 1. See RobertGilpin,Warand Changein World is disequilibrium possible, the of 1981), p. 15: "Although. .. peaceful adjustment the systemic has history been war,or whatwe shall call hegemonic of mechanism changethroughout principal the and willgovern system)." whichstateor stateswillbe dominant war (i.e., a warthatdetermines Banker 1 (Summer 2. See William M. Clarke, "The Midwivesof the New Europe," Central nos. 33 and 34, August NationalJoumal, Shift," 1990), pp. 49-51; and Bruce Stokes,"Continental 1990,pp. 1996-2001. 46, Organization 3, Summer1992 Intemational of ? 1992 bytheWorldPeace Foundationand the Massachusetts Institute Technology

562 International Organization membershave facilitatedthroughthe creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction Developmentand, in some cases, through prospectof and the associationagreements. Yet the authorof anotherinfluential realisttreatise publisheda decade ago gave the EC onlya fewfleeting references-and then only to argue that it would never amount to much in the international "structure" unlessittookon theform a unified of state,whichitshowsno signs of doingevennow.3 In the realm of European security the relations, centralpolicyissue of the day concerns the adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the new European geopolitical realities and the question of whether supplementary indigenous West European or all European multilateral security mechanisms shouldbe fashioned.4 The SovietUnion, contrary to mostpredictions, posed no obstacles to German reunification, thata betting united Germanyfirmly embedded in a broader Westerninstitutional matrix would pose far less of a security threatthan a neutral Germanytuggedin different directionsin the center of Europe.5 But perhaps the most telling indicator institutional in Europe todayis theproverbial thathas not of bite dog barked:no one in anypositionof authority is or anywhere advocating, quietly preparing for,a returnto a system competitive of bilateralalliances-which time that this has happened at any comparable historical surelyis the first juncturesincetheCongressofVienna in 1815.6
3. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory International of Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979),especially references a unitedEurope on p. 180 and the discussion pp. 201-2. the to on 4. Moreover, Hungary and Czechoslovakiahave already joined theCouncilofEurope, and both have raisedthe issue of forging some typeof affiliation NATO. See "Prague CourtsNATO," with LosAngelesTimes, March 1991,p. Ml. 19 5. Mearsheimer and otherswho discountthe efficacy institutions of have drawndire inferences from end of the cold war forthe future European stability. contrast, the of In Van Evera, Snyder, and otherswho take institutions have been muchmoreproneto see an adaptivepolitical seriously orderahead. See JohnJ.Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:Instability Europe After Cold in the War," Intemational Security (Summer1990), pp. 5-56; JackSnyder, 15 in "Averting Anarchy the New Europe," Intemational Security (Spring1990), pp. 5-41; and StephenVan Evera, "Primed 14 forPeace: Europe After Cold War,"Intemational the Security (Winter1990-91),pp. 7-57. 15 6. In 1989, accordingto Weber, "some foreign in policythinkers Paris reverted old ideas, to suggesting new alliance withPoland, the emerging a Eastern European states,and perhaps the SovietUnion as well in oppositionto Germany. These flirtations bilateraltreatiesand a new with balance of power have been mostly by the wayside."See Steve Weber,"Security left After1989: The FuturewithNuclear Weapons," in PatrickGarrity, TheFuture NuclearWeapons(New ed., of York: Plenum Press, forthcoming). comparablehistorical By junctures,I mean 1848, 1919, and 1945.After1848,whatwas leftof the Concertof Europe system rapidly degenerated intoa system of competitive alliances; after WorldWar I, France in particular of soughtthe protection bilateral alliances against Germany;and afterWorld War II, several West European countriessought bilateralallianceswiththe United States and withone another.Amongthe usefulsourcesforthe twoearlierperiodsare the following: Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic A History EuropeSince of the Congress Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, 1958); E. H. Carr, Intemational of Relations Between Two World the Wars(New York: St. Martin'sPress,1961); HenryW. Degenhardt, Treaties and Alliancesof the World, ed. (Essex: Longmans,1981); and A. J. P. Taylor,The Struggle 3d for Mastery Europe,1848-1918(New York: Oxford of University Press,1971).

Multilateralism 563 Security relationsin the Asia-Pacificregionmake the same points in the negative.In the immediatepostwarperiod, it was not possible to construct in frameworks thisregion.Today,theabsence of such multilateral institutional The globalshifts. adaptationto fundamental inhibits progressive arrangements United States and Japan are loath to raise serious questions about their a for anachronistic bilateraldefensetreaty, example,out of fearof unraveling the arms races throughout region.In and thereby triggering fragilestability the thereis no EC and no NATO to have transformed multitude Asia-Pacific, of regional securitydilemmas,as has been done in Europe with Francowhich processthrough for Germanrelations, example.Indeed no Helsinki-like buildingexistsin the region.7 to begin the minimaltask of mutualconfidence politics in to Thus,whereastodaythepotential movebeyondbalance-of-power in stablebalance is thebestthat itstraditional form exists Europe, a reasonably region.8 one can hope to achievein theAsia-Pacific At the level of the global economy,despite sometimesnear-hysterical breakupand tradewars monetary for yearsnowofimminent predictions twenty in thatcould become real wars, "just like in the 1930s,"9the rate of growth in worldtrade continuesto exceed the rate of growth worldoutput;international capital flows dwarf both; and the eighth periodic round of trade toward pronounceddead, is moving whichhad been prematurely negotiations, issues domestic and newtransnational difficult completion-thistimeinvolving that the originators the regimenever dreamed would become subject to of internationalrules. And despite considerable tension between them, the in United States and Japan continue, Churchill's phrase,to "jawjaw" rather tradedifferences.10 fundamental than"war-war" overtheir successes can be found even in the global security Limited multilateral Many responsible realm. One is in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. would thatbythe 1980sthere in and officials policyanalysts the 1960spredicted
for by 7. Some proposals along these lines are offered StuartHarrisin " 'Architecture a New 3 PacificResearch (May 1990),pp. 8-9. Era' in Asia/Pacific," 8. Latin America seems to fall somewherein between.Accordingto one recentassessment, in "While the United States was ignoringand underminingmultilateralism the Western or towards greater co-operation, were moving the hemisphere, LatinAmericannationsthemselves concertacion, theycall it,to some degree as a responseto United States policy."See RichardJ. as in Institutions a Time of Change," Bloomfieldand Abraham F. Lowenthal,"Inter-American Joumal45 (Autumn1990),p. 868. Intemational 9. This refrain was begun by C. Fred Bergstenin "The New Economics and U. S. Foreign see 1972), pp. 199-222. For a recentrendition, "Echoes of the Affairs (January 50 Policy,"Foreign 5 1991,pp. 15, 16,and 18. 1930s,"TheEconomist, January and Trade (GATT), see in 10. On recent developments the General Agreementon Tariffs Joumal 45 Gilbert R. Winham,"GATT and the InternationalTrade Regime," Intemational of (Autumn1990), pp. 796-882. One real problemis thatthe variety extanttrade arrangements and GATT terminology thatno new consensus todayis well beyondthe scope of the traditional or and othermeasuresare compatible incompatible bilateral, of existsaboutwhattypes unilateral, characterof GATT. This gives added relevanceto the typeof multilateral withthe underlying I here. conceptualclarificationam proposing

564 International Organization As existsome twodozen nuclearweapons states.1" it has turnedout,however, problemstatestodayconsistsof onlyhalf the total set of actual and potential official the U.S. Arms Control and of that number.Accordingto a former DisarmamentAgency and an analystat the Lawrence LivermoreNational treaty (NPT) this is at least in part due to the nonproliferation Laboratory, has initiative turnedout to be much regime:"Virtually every nonproliferation thanexpectedwhenitwas proposedor designed, and nonprolifmoreeffective eration success has been cheaper than expected. The fact that the nuclear has meansthatpolicy proliferation problem been 'bounded'bytheNPT regime can of initiatives be focusedon a handful states.'"12 by Moreover,afteryearsof being riveted the cold war,the United Nations in to conflict manage(UN) has been rediscovered have utility international and its decolonization ment: its figleafrole proved useful in Afghanistan, aided Namibia. It servesas one means bywhichto try disentangle to function regionalmorasses fromCambodia to the WesternSahara. And perhaps of for greatest importance thenew,post-coldwar era, thepostureadoptedbythe and annexation Kuwait of Councilto sanctionIraq foritsinvasion UN Security and constituted organization's the mostcomprehensive, firm, unitedresponse everto an act of international aggression.13 the theoriesof international Seen through lenses of conventional relations, distribution politicalor ecoof which attribute outcomes to the underlying in constraints institutions the and nomicpower,the rolesplayedbynormative must seem paradoxical. Norms and currentinternationaltransformation are institutions notmatter do muchin thatliterature beginwith;they viewed to as by-products ifnot epiphenomenaladjunctsto, the relationsof forceor of, of therelations production. Whatis more,insofar theconventional as literature in institutionalization the international has anyexplanationat all of extensive is the of system, so-called theory hegemonicstability it. But in additionto all the other historicaland logical problemsfromwhich that theorysuffers,14
11. Regardingthese predictions, MitchellReiss, Without Bomb: The PoliticsofNuclear see the Nonproliferation York: ColumbiaUniversity (New Press,1988),pp. 3-36. and 12. See Thomas W. Graham and A. F. Mullins,"ArmsControl,Military Strategy, Nuclear Proliferation," paper presented a conference at entitled "Nuclear Deterrenceand Global Security on La in Transition," Institute Global Conflict and Cooperation,University California, Jolla, of 21-23 February1991,p. 3. As Graham and Mullinspointout, stateshave leftthe "problem"list more rapidlythan theyhave joined it in recentyears. See also JosephF. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds.,Beyond1995: TheFuture theNPTRegime(New York: PlenumPress,1990). of 13. As Heisbourghas suggested, is also quite possible,though it difficult prove,that"without to coalition the decisionsof the U. N. Security Council, therewould have been no [international] of capable ofweathering close to seven months crisisand war [and] the U. S. Congresswould not have approvedoffensive military operationsin the absence of the Security Council's Resolution 678,whichauthorizedthe use of force."See FrancoisHeisbourg,"An Eagle Amid Less Powerful 10 Fowl,"LosAngelesTimes, March 1991,p. M5. and 14. See Robert0. Keohane, "The TheoryofHegemonicStability Changesin International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson,and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the Intemational System(Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1980), pp.

Multilateralism 565 array regionaland global of to merely finding hegemony whichthe current the institutional roles could be ascribed is a daunting,if not insurmountable, challenge. to matter comes as no surprise the"new The factthatnormsand institutions in relations;afterall, thathas long been their institutionalists" international theyhave paid littleexplicitand detailed analytic message.15 But, curiously, international institutional arrangements: attention a core feature current to of A searchkeyedon the conceptof multilatertheir multilateral form. literature and onlya tiny number theseare of any of few alismturns relatively entries, up The focusofthenewinstitutionrelations theorist. interest theinternational to in alists has been on "cooperation" and "institutions" a genericsense, with sometimesconceived as speinternational regimesand formalorganizations more to For cificinstitutional subsets.16 example,no scholarhas contributed in relationsthan RobertKeohane. Yet the new institutionalism international in is even in a literature theconceptofmultilateralism used sparingly hiswork, that is of on survey thatsubject.And the definition multilateralism he employs nationalpolicies in groupsof purelynominal:"the practiceof co-ordinating threeor morestates."17 The nominaldefinition multilateralism be usefulforsome purposes. of may formsthat traditionally But it poses the problemof subsuming institutional not of have been viewed as being expressions bilateralism, multilateralismfor alliance system, example,such as the League instances the Bismarckian of

A. 131-62; Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain,the United States,and the 38 Organization (Spring1984),pp. 355-86; Duncan EconomicOrder,"Intemational International 39 Intemational Organization (Autumn1985), Theory," Snidal,"The LimitsofHegemonicStability and Practiceof Intemational pp. 579-614; and JohnA. C. Conybeare,Trade Wars: The Theory Press,1987). Rivalry (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Commercial and identified Keohane: the rationalist by of 15. I mean to includeherebothstrands theorizing Two Approaches,"IntemaInstitutions: the reflectivist. Robert 0. Keohane, "International See 32 tionalStudies Quarterly (December 1988),pp. 379-96. Press, Regimes (Ithaca, N. Y.: CornellUniversity ed., Intemational 16. See StephenD. Krasner, N. Anarchy (Princeton, J.: PrincetonUniversity Under 1983); KennethA. Oye, ed., Cooperation (Princeton,N. J.: PrincetonUniversity Hegemony Press, 1986); and Robert 0. Keohane, After Press,1984). Joumal An 17. See Robert0. Keohane, "Multilateralism: Agenda forResearch,"Intemational it and the 45 (Autumn1990), p. 731. Afterintroducing conceptof multilateralism defining in this in institutions thegenericsense. See goes on to discussinternational Keohane essentially manner, to in references multilateralism, Hegemony, whichthereare but twofleeting also Keohane,After and Institutions State Power both to specificagreementsin trade; and Keohane, Intemational in undermultilateralism itsindex. Press,1989),whichcontainsno entry (Boulder,Colo.: Westview on applyas well to myown writings the subjectof institutions. I mustadmitthatthese criticisms to Keohane has kindlyreferred a 1975 paper of mine as having"foreshadowedmuch of the this blind spot, havingbeen conceptualwork of the next decade." Alas, it also foreshadowed of from study the of organization withdifferentiating study international the concernedprimarily of organizations-hence, the introduction the concept of "regimes." See formalinternational to p. Keohane, "Multilateralism," 755, fn. 44, referring Ruggie, "InternationalResponses to 29 Organization (Summer1975),pp. 557-83. Conceptsand Trends,"Intemational Technology:

Organization 566 International of of the ThreeEmperors. In short,the nominal definition multilateralism thatmakesit distinct.18 dimension thephenomenon of missesthequalitative to In a superb discussionof this issue, attempting sort out the enormous for WilliamDiebold insists starters in of variety traderelations theworldtoday, multilateralbetween"formal"and "substantive" on the need to distinguish what I mean by nominalversusqualitative. ism,by whichhe means roughly of The bilateralagreements Cordell the "But thatis farfrom end ofthematter. That is to say, thoseof Hjalmar Schacht."19 from Hull were basicallydifferent as the issue is not the numberof partiesso much,Diebold suggests, it is the or among them. It is this substantive kind of relationsthat are instituted that concernsme in the present of qualitativecharacteristic multilateralism dimension international of essay,notonlyfortradebutalso fortheinstitutional in relations general. dimension by capturedentirely theconceptsof Nor is themissing qualitative There are instances organizations. or regimes intergovernmental international in such as the Nazi of international regimesthatwere not multilateral form, As trade and monetary regimes,to whichwe will returnmomentarily. for all mystery, formal althoughtheyentailno analytic multilateral organizations, agree that these organizations practitionersof the new institutionalism instituconstitute onlyone small part of a broader universeof international them. thatinterest tionalforms comesinto of immediately dimension multilateralism The missing qualitative one informed discourse, if to however, we return an olderinstitutionalist focus, order. the aimsoftheUnitedStatesto restructure international bythepostwar trade, we know in When we speak here of multilateralism international to that immediately it refers tradeorganizedon thebasis of certainprinciples Similarly, when we speak of state conduct-above all, nondiscrimination.20 in we relations, know that it refersto some here of multilateralism security And or self-defense.21 when or security collective expression otherof collective PresidentGeorge Bush todayenunciatesa "new worldorder" forthe Middle
is 18. In the UN context,what Keohane defines as multilateral called multinational-for teamin theSinai. In theUN, onlythatis considered example,themultinational (non-UN) observer forum.But if Keohane's definition is multilateral which is duly authorizedby a multilateral as too is analytically loose, theUN conception too limiting, I discusslaterin myarticle. 19. See William Diebold, Jr.,"The Historyand the Issues," in William Diebold, Jr.,ed., Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), and Bilateralism, Multilateralism Canada in U. S. TradePolicy(Cambridge, basis fordistinguishing kindof recenttrade what some principled p. 1. Diebold seeks to formulate and whathe calls plurilateral-are consistent with, and whatkind measures-unilateral,bilateral, of on the undermine, principles multilateralism whichthe GATT regimeis based. Perspective, ed. (New rev. Sterling-DollarDiplomacy in Current 20. See ibid.;RichardN. Gardner, of a York: Columbia University Press, 1980); JacobViner,"Conflicts Principlein Drafting Trade 25 Charter,"Foreign Affairs (July1947), pp. 612-28; Herbert Feis, "The Conflictover Trade 25 1947), pp. 217-28; and RobertPollard,EconomicSecurity Ideologies,"Foreign Affairs (January Press,1985). and theOrigins theCold War(New York: ColumbiaUniversity of Policy(New York: Oxford D. and American Foreign 21. See Robert Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt University Press, University Press,1979); JohnLewis Gaddis, TheLong Peace (New York: Oxford and of 1987),pp. 3-47; and Pollard,EconomicSecurity theOrigins theCold War.

Multilateralism 567 and joint cooperativedeterrence, East and elsewhere-universalaspirations, vision or rhetoric,the it action against aggression22-whether constitutes withtheAmericanpostwarmultilaterconsistent notionevokesand is entirely about multilateralism alistagenda,as I arguebelow. In sum,whatis distinctive is not merelythatit coordinatesnationalpolicies in groupsof threeor more also do, but thatit forms thatotherorganizational states,whichis something does so on the basis of certainprinciplesof orderingrelationsamong those states. Thus, there exists a compound anomaly in the world of international phenomenonof whichconventional relationstheorytoday. An institutional but theoriesbarelytake note is both widespreadand significant; at the same thatmake it so are glossedoverbymoststudents features time,the particular This articleis intendedto help resolve institutions themselves. of international bothpartsof theanomaly. the The premiseof the presentarticleis thatwe can betterunderstand role in international transformanormsand institutions the current of multilateral fromactual the principledmeaningsof multilateralism tion by recovering practice;by showinghow and whythose principledmeaningshave historical of the throughout history the moderninterstate come to be institutionalized today, how and whytheymayperpetuatethemselves and by exploring system; thatinitially gave riseto themhave changed. even as theconditions This "grounded" analysis of the concept suggests a series of working claims validity beforestrong testing whichrequiremore extensive hypotheses, to I can be made for them. Nevertheless, and my fellow contributors this believe that the hypothesesare sufficiently on symposium multilateralism plausible to interesting and that the case we make for them is sufficiently The warrantsuch further study,and we presentthem here in that spirit.23 is argument,in brief,goes somethinglike this: Multilateralism a generic life, form moderninternational and as suchit has been present of institutional mustnot be formof multilateralism fromthe start.The genericinstitutional recentarrival and a withformal multilateral organizations, relatively confused the modest importance.Historically, generic formof still of only relatively to arrangements define and can be found in institutional multilateralism of rights states,to manage coordination stabilizethe international property The last of theseuses of the problems. and to resolvecollaboration problems, In thisfact formis historically least frequent. the literature, the multilateral has traditionally been explainedby the rise and fallof hegemoniesand, more considerations. Our analysissuggeststhat a recently, various functional by
22. George Bush,citedin "PresidentBush's Addressto Congresson End of theGulfWar," The 7 New YorkTimes, March 1991,p. A8. Relations articlesin thisissue of IO: JamesA. Caporaso, "International 23. See the following with The Search forFoundations"; Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism Theoryand Multilateralism: Small and Large Numbers"; and Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Matters. to in Multilateralism NATO." See also thecontributions Ruggie,Multilateralism

Organization 568 International in domesticenvironment theleadingpowersof thedayis at least as permissive When we look morecloselyat and, in some cases, more important. important thatitwas less thefactof we for War II situation, example, find thepost-World arrangethat accountsfor the explosionof multilateral Americanhegemony Finally,we suggestthat mentsthan it was the fact of Americanhegemony. formhave adaptive and even of arrangements the multilateral institutional formsmay lack and which, capacities whichother institutional reproductive play in arrangements may help explain the roles that multilateral therefore, transformation. international the stabilizing current

The meaningsofmultilateralism
relationsamong three or refersto coordinating At its core, multilateralism are But principles. what,precisely, those morestatesin accordancewithcertain To facilitate pertain? do principles?And to what,precisely, those principles an let of the construction a more formaldefinition, us begin by examining not: is that everyoneagrees multilateralism instanceof something historical bilateralism. a honing pureform succeeded infinely Nazi Germany Earlierin thiscentury, as Diebold notes,the Now, principle. organizing intoa systemic ofbilateralism neutralwith regard to the qualitative term "bilateral" is entirely everyday to So amongcountries.24 as to giveexpression its thatis instituted relationship to has been referred as therefore typically nature,the Nazi system qualitative as itsorganizing principle. bilateralism or in bilateralist character as embodying in took effect 1934, In any case, once the New Plan of the Nazi government and tradeagreements clearing HjalmarSchachtdeviseda schemeofbilateralist trade regimewas The arrangements.25 essence of the German international "reciprocal" agreementswith its foreigntrading that the state negotiated were to be whichgoods and services determined These negotiations partners. exchanged,their quantities,and their price. Often, Germanydeliberately to thanit exported them.But it requiredthat its morefrom partners imported thereor by liquidatetheirclaimson Germany reinvesting partners its trading partoverpricedGerman goods. Thus, its trading deliberately by purchasing nerswere doublydependenton Germany. This trade regime in turn was linked to bilateralistmonetaryclearing a Under these arrangements, German importerwould, for arrangements. ratherthanto example,pay marksto the GermanReichsbankforits imports of counterpart the whiletheforeign sourceofthegoods or services, theforeign
and the Issues." 24. Diebold, "The History titled studyof the Nazi systemis Albert 0. Hirschman's 25. The classic and appropriately of University California Berkeley: Trade(1945; reprint, of NationalPowerand theStructure Foreign and History, Relations:Theory, Monetary Press, 1980). See also Leland B. Yeager, Intemational Policy(New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 357-76.

Multilateralism 569 from central its currency in would receivepayment home country transaction bank-and vice versa for German exports.No foreignexchange changed exchange hands; the foreignexchangemarketswere bypassed; and artificial total amountsto be cleared in thismanner rates prevailed.The permissible by werenegotiated thetwostates. focused on smallerand but German bilateralismtypically not exclusively weaker states in East Central Europe, the Balkans, and Latin America, exports.But the importsfor manufactured primary commodity exchanging universalized schemehad no inherent limit;it could have been geographically agreeto cover the entireglobe, withan enormousspiderwebof bilateralist mentsradiating from out Germany.26 would not excludethe Schachtian of The nominaldefinition multilateralism bilateralist device: it coordinatedeconomicrelationsamongmore than three after all, tookplace bilaterally: states.Nor is thefactdecisivethatnegotiations reductionsin the General Agreementon Tariffsand Trade many tariff The is, bilaterally. difference ofcourse,thatwithin (GATT) are also negotiated tariff are GATT bilaterally reductions extendedto all otherparties negotiated whereasthe Schachtian on thebasis ofmost-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, so and fundamentally discriminatory, that bilateral scheme was inherently basis, even if they deals held onlyon a case-by-caseand product-by-product coveredtheentireglobe in doingso. acknowlthatis generally Let us examinenextan institutional arrangement None a system. principles: collectivesecurity edged to embodymultilateralist but in principlethe scheme is quite simple.It has ever existedin pure form, so restson thepremisethatpeace is indivisible, thata war againstone stateis, is of ipso facto,considereda war againstall. The community statestherefore by obliged to respond to threatenedor actual aggression,first diplomatic economicsanctions,and finally the collectiveuse of by means, then through of response,any forceifnecessary. Facingtheprospect sucha community-wide rationalpotentialaggressorwould be deterredand would desist. Thus, the would decline. incidenceofwargradually relationsamong schemecertainly coordinatessecurity A collectivesecurity threeor morestates.But so, too, as noted above, did the League of the Three Whatis alliances.27 morethana set of traditional which was nothing Emperors, as scheme is thatit comprises, Sir Arthur distinct about a collectivesecurity Salter put it a half-century a permanentpotentialalliance "against the ago, unknown enemy"28-and,he should have added, in behalf of the unknown betweenan allianceand a collective The institutional difference security victim.
agreements GreatBritainand theUnited States,had limited 26. Severalmajorstates,including the sale of could earn through which foreigners Sondermarks-marks with Germanyinvolving purchasesfrom to in but to products Germany whichGermany turnrestricted particular specified Germany. of for 27. Taylor,TheStruggle Mastery Europe,chap. 12. (London: Macmillan,1939),p. 155; emphasisin original. Salter,Security 28. Arthur

570 International Organization scheme be simply inbothinstances, A is pledged cometo the can state put: to aidofB ifB is attacked C. In a collective by A security scheme, however, isalso pledged cometo theaid ofC ifC is attacked B. Consequently, G. F. to by as as Hudsonpoints out,"A cannot regard itself theallyof B morethanof C, becausetheoreticallyis an open question it whether, an act ofwarshould if B In occur, or C wouldbe theaggressor. thesamewayB has indeterminate towards and C, and C towards and B, and so on with vast obligations A A a number variants thesystem extended more more of as is to and states."29was It precisely difference this between collective a security system an alliance and that doomed fate theLeagueofNations theU. S. Senate.30 the of in ultimately TheUnited States frequently invoked collective the security model leading in theanti-Iraq coalition thePersian in and in Gulf crisis then war, what if though anypermanent institutional will from effort that consequences follow remains a tobe seen.31 NATO reflectstruncated version themodel, which subset of in a a ofstates of organized collective self-defense scheme indefinite de duration, de jureagainst potential any one.Nevertheless, aggressor though facto against the internally scheme predicated two was on multilateralist principles. first The was the indivisibilitythreats thecollectivity-that it did notmatter of to is, it whether was Germany, GreatBritain, Netherlands, Norway was the or that nor attacked, in theory whom-andthesecond by was therequirement an of unconditional collective response.32 We are nowin a position be morepreciseaboutthecore meaning to of multilateralism. Keohanehas defined as institutions, generically, "persistent and connected ofrules, sets formal informal, prescribe and that behavioural and roles,constrain activity, shape expectations."33 simply, term Very the "multilateral" an adjective is thatmodifies noun "institution." the Thus,
29. See G. F. Hudson, "CollectiveSecurity and Military Alliances," in HerbertButterfield and MartinWight, eds.,Diplomatic Mass.: HarvardUniversity Investigations (Cambridge, Press,1968), pp. 176-77. See also CharlesA. Kupchanand Clifford Kupchan,"Concerts,CollectiveSecurity, A. and the FutureofEurope," International 16 Security (Summer1991),pp. 114-61. to 30. Contrary folklore, Woodrow Wilson was not prepared to committhe United States to specificand automaticmilitary obligationsunder the League of Nations; his collectivesecurity scheme would have relied on public opinion, arms limitations, and arbitration more than on enforcement mechanisms. SenatorHenryCabot Lodge's fundamental objectionto the League of Nations was that its permanenceand universalism would entail limitless for entanglements the United States.Lodge in turn favored and stronger morespecific security guaranteesto France and againstGermany. LloydE. Ambrosius, See Woodrow Wilson and theAmerican Tradition Diplomatic (New York: Cambridge University Press,1987),pp. 51-106. 31. The keyshortcoming collective of security style of course,thatthe UN has no means UN is, of its own to implement military a responseto aggression, since no state has ever negotiatedan Article43 agreement making forcesavailable.After war in the PersianGulf,theU. S. standby the ambassadorto theUN, Thomas Pickering, proposedthereconsideration Article43 provisions of in speeches beforethe Veterans of ForeignWars on 4 March 1991 and beforethe AmericanBar Associationon 26 April1991 in Washington, C. D. 32. French absence from the unifiedcommand and U. S. control over nuclear weapons further. complicatematters 33. Keohane, "Multilateralism," 732. p.

Multilateralism 571 relations. formin international multilateralism depicts a generic institutional suggest that How does multilateralmodifyinstitution?Our illustrations formwhich coordinatesrelations among multilateralism an institutional is of threeor morestateson thebasis of "generalized"principles conduct-that appropriate conductfora class of actions,without is, principles whichspecify exigencies interests the partiesor the strategic of regardto the particularistic MFN treatment a classicexamplein is thatmayexistin anyspecific occurrence. producing the amongcountries the economicrealm:it forbids discrimination in relationsis the requirement that same product.Its counterpart security and wherever occurs-whetheror not it statesrespondto aggression whenever the any specificinstancesuits theirindividuallikes and dislikes.In contrast, bilateralistform,such as the Schachtian device and traditionalalliances, on differentiates relationscase-by-case based precisely a prioriparticularistic or exigencies. grounds situational repertoire and multilateralism not exhaustthe institutional do Bilateralism form. of states. Imperialismcan be considered a thirdgeneric institutional that coordinatesrelationsamong threeor Imperialismalso is an institution it more states though,unlike bilateralismand multilateralism, does so by of denying sovereignty thesubjectstates.34 the First, generalfollowfrom definition multilateralism. our of Two corollaries amongthe members entailan indivisibility logically ized organizing principles ofa collectivity respectto therangeofbehaviorin question.Dependingon with different that indivisibility take markedly can forms, ranging circumstances, chooses to standardfrom physical the tiesof railway linesthatthe collectivity all ize across frontiers, the way to the adoptionby statesof the premisethat not here But peace is indivisible. notethatindivisibility is a socialconstruction, a scheme,statesbehave as if peace technicalcondition:in a collectivesecurity in and make it so. Similarly, the case of trade,it is the were indivisible thereby of whichmakesthesystem trade GATT members' adherenceto theMFN norm attribute tradeitself.35 of an indivisible Bilateralism, whole,not some inherent intomultiples dyadsand compartmentalizes of in contrast, relations segments them. Second, as discussed in furtherdetail below, successful cases of in multilateralism practice appear to generate among their memberswhat That reciprocity."36 is to say,the of Keohane has called expectations "diffuse is arrangement expected by its membersto yield a rough equivalence of in is in benefits the aggregateand over time.Bilateralism, contrast, premised
Press,1986),pp. 19-47. Some 34. See Michael Doyle,Empires (Ithaca, N. Y.: CornellUniversity came veryclose to if theydid not of expressions the Nazi arrangements of the more predatory form. the actually constitute imperial or externalities, 35. Obviously, existenceof nuclearweapons, economic interdependence, the that the can and probably does affect social constructions stateschoose. I othertechnicalfactors a clarifyingconcept. causality here,simply am notimputing 40 Organization in Relations,"International 36. Robert0. Keohane, "Reciprocity International (Winter1986),pp. 1-27.

Organization 572 International balancingof specificquids-pro-quos the on specificreciprocity, simultaneous otherat all times.37 withevery byeach party is and its corollariesthat multilateralism a It followsfromthis definition is therefore, likely incidence, form. historical Its institutional demanding highly and thanthatof its alternatives; ifits relativeincidenceat to be less frequent puzzle to be any time were to be high,that factwould pose an interesting explained. The obviousnextissue to addressis thefactthat,as Keohane pointsout,the applies in practice to many generic concept of internationalinstitution So relationsamongstates.38 too, therefore, different typesof institutionalized that the of does the adjectivemultilateral: genericattribute multilateralism, it coordinatesrelationsamongthreeor more statesin accordancewithgeneralon depending expressions specific will of ized principles conduct, have different Let relations whichitpertains. us examinesome to thetypeofinstitutionalized amongthreeinstitudistinguishes instances.Commonusage in the literature tional domains of interstaterelations: internationalorders, international Each typecan be, but need not be, organizations. and international regimes, in multilateral form. economicorders,internarefersto international frequently The literature maritime orders,and so on. An "open" or tionalsecurity orders,international in as economicorderis multilateral form, is a maritime "liberal" international The New EconomicOrderof the of orderbased on theprinciple mareliberum. Nazis was not multilateralin form,for reasons that have already been ordercrafted Bismarck. by was the European security and neither suggested, rulesthatorder here refers the constitutive to The conceptof multilateralism dimension, life-their architectural in relations givendomainsof international economicorder of so to speak. Thus,thequality "openness" in an international of blocs, spheres,or as to refers such characteristics the prohibition exclusive similar barriers to the conduct of internationaleconomic relations. The securityorder-the quality that quality in an international corresponding of would cause it to be describedas "collective"-is thecondition equal access condition thatthecharacteristic To umbrella. the extent to a commonsecurity in are or conditions met,the orderin questionmaybe said to be multilateral of here In multilateralism depictsthecharacter an overallorderof form. short, it about how thatorder is relationsamong states; definitionally says nothing achieved. the A regime moreconcrete thanan order.Typically, term"regime"refers is or to a functional sectoralcomponentof an order.Moreover,the conceptof
37. Bilateral balancing need not imply equality; it simplymeans establishinga mutually in thatis determined practice.For an extended acceptable balance betweenthe parties,however see discussionof this difference, Karl Polanyi,"The Economy as InstitutedProcess," in Karl in and Conrad M. Arensberg, HarryW. Pearson,eds., Tradeand Market theEarlyEmpires Polanyi, (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,1957),pp. 243-70. Institutions." 38. Keohane, "International

Multilateralism 573 regimeencompasses more of the "how" question than does the concept of to the broadlyspeaking, term"regime"is used to refer common, orderin that, interstate means of conducting asymmetrical thoughoftenhighly deliberative, relations.That much is clear fromcommon usage. But while there is a widespread assumptionin the literaturethat all regimes are, ipso facto, multilateralin character, this assumption is egregiouslyerroneous. For example,thereis no reason not to call the Schachtianschemesfororganizing monetaryand trade relations internationalregimes; they fullymeet the Moreover, by standardcriteria specified StephenKrasnerand his colleagues.39 it is entirelypossible to imagine the emergence of regimes between two states-superpower securityregimes,for example, were a topic of some would not be discussion in the 1980s40-but such regimes by definition is the multilateral either.In sum,whatmakesa regimea regime thatit satisfies norms,rules, and decisioncriteriaof encompassingprinciples, definitional converge.But in and of makingproceduresaroundwhichactor expectations themselves,those terms are empty of substance. What makes a regime in multilateral form,beyond involvingthree or more states, is that the reflect appropriategeneralthe substantive meaningsof those termsroughly in ized principles conduct.By way of illustration, the case of a multilateral of corresponding traderegime, thesewould includethe normof MFN treatment, and and the applicationof safeguards, reductions rulesabout reciprocaltariff the sanctionedproceduresforimplementing rules.In the case of a collectively collectivesecurityregime,theywould include the norm of nonaggression, and, again, rules foruse of sanctionsto deter or punishaggression, uniform them. for sanctioned procedures implementing collectively withheadare organizations palpable entities formalinternational Finally, and generouspensionplans.They and letterheads, voting procedures, quarters to But,again,theirrelationship theconcept requireno conceptualelaboration. than is sometimesassumed. Two issues is of multilateralism less self-evident is it The first mention. issue,though maybe mootat themoment, deservebrief in thatwere not multilateral thattherehave been international organizations come to mind; theywere based form.The Cominternand the Cominform whichwere quite different on explicitly Leninistprinciplesof organization, fromtheir multilateralcounterparts.41 Along the same lines, the recently from multilatof differed collapsedSoviet-EastEuropean system organizations neverfully came in of eral forms waysthatstudents international organization

International Regimes. 39. Krasner, 40. Steve Weber predicted the emergence of a superpowersecurityregime in "Realism, 44 Organization (Winter1990), pp. 55-82. Robert Detente, and Nuclear Weapons," International Regimes,"in Krasner,International in Jervis discussedthe possibility two of his works:"Security Regimes,pp. 173-94; and "From Balance to Concert: A Study of InternationalSecurity Politics (October 1985),pp. 58-79. 38 Cooperation,"World with A International, an of Communism: History theCommunist 41. See Franz Borkenau,World of by introduction RaymondAron (Ann Arbor:University MichiganPress,1962).

Organization 574 International even today.There is a The second issue is more problematic to gripswith.42 and organizations, common tendencyin the world of actual international to sometimesin the academic community, equate the veryphenomenonof or organizations diplomacy. multilateralism withthe universeof multilateral It makesit clearwhythatviewis in error. maybe the discussion The preceding ordersor, thatdecisionsconcerning aspects of international case empirically The forums. in regimes factare made in multilateral morelikely, international the failed quest by EC exhibitsthis empirical pattern most extensively; Economic Order in the 1970s developingcountriesfor a New International tradeand the exhibits desireto achieveit; and decisionson mostinternational "multilateral in matters somewhere between.But definitionally, fall monetary behavior, organization"is a separate and distincttype of institutionalized rules as votingor consensus definedby such generalized decision-making procedures. In sum, the term "multilateral"is an adjective that modifiesthe noun from is form otherforms thatit the What distinguishes multilateral institution. coordinatesbehavioramongthreeor more stateson the basis of generalized that of institutions any of principles conduct.Accordingly, theory international of is dimension multilateralism bound to be a does not includethisqualitative within the and theory one thatis silentabout a crucialdistinction fairly abstract purposes, Moreover, analytic for forms. of institutional repertoire international withany it is important to (con)fuse the verymeaningof multilateralism not order, one particularinstitutional expressionof it, be it an international In in Each can be, but need not be, multilateral form. regime, organization. or the form shouldnotbe equated withuniversal geographaddition, multilateral characterize relations within ical scope; the attributesof multilateralism of that collectivities mayand oftendo fallshortof thewhole universe specific definitions, not it nations.Finally, shouldbe keptin mindthattheseare formal of descriptions actual cases, and we would not expectactual cases to empirical to But let us turnnow to some actual conform fully the formaldefinitions. the form. historical cases exhibiting multilateral

in Multilateralism history
has What can we of The institutional form multilateralism now been defined. over time,theirfrequency distribution, and about its specificexpressions say historical will some possiblecorrelates? brief A survey situatethephenomenon betterand help us beginto answerthesequestions.To organizethe discussion,

42. See GerardHolden, "The End ofan Alliance: SovietPolicyand theWarsawPact, 1989-90," PRIF Reports (Peace ResearchInstitute, Frankfurt), 16,December 1990. no.

Multilateralism 575 I adapt a standardtypology institutional the literature: defining roles from of rights, solvingcoordinationproblems, and stabilizing international property problems.43 and resolving collaboration Property rights instituted the in arrangements Not surprisingly, earliest multilateral the consequencesof the modernera were designedto cope withthe international states The newly emerged territorial novel principle of state sovereignty. and being,bythepossessionof territory the conceivedtheiressence,their very one it. exclusionof othersfrom But how does one possess something does not it? howdoes one excludeothersfrom own?And, stillmoreproblematic, could be The world's oceans posed this problem. Contiguouswaterways splitdown the middle; the jointly, more than likely, or, shared,administered The bilaterally. were established rights statesthereby of international property to oceans were anothermatter.States attempted projectexclusiveunilateral but they failed. Spain and Portugal tried a bilateral solution, jurisdiction, traderoutesto theFar East of whereby Spain claimeda monopoly thewestern too, failed.All such efforts and Portugalclaimedthe easternroutes.But they, if failedforthe simplereason thatit is exceedingly difficult not impossiblein a as right thatis notrecognized beingvalidby thelongruntovindicate property especiallywhen exclusion is as the relevantothers in a given community, to challenge difficult itwas in theoceans. Attempts do so lead to permanent as of A solutionto thegovernance theoceans, and recurrent conflict. multilateral whichwas first enunciatedbyHugo therefore, inescapable.The principle was and whichstates slowly of Grotiusat the beginning the seventeenth century maritime order in two came to adopt was one that definedan international whichcustomeventually sea parts:a territorial under exclusivestate control, set at threemilesbecause thatwas therangeofland-basedcannonsat thetime; and the high seas beyond,available for commonuse but owned by none." all Under thisarrangement, stateswere freeto utilizethe highseas, provided

was proposed by ArthurStein in and collaboration betweencoordination 43. The distinction "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in Krasner,International pp. Regimes, 115-40. See also Duncan Snidal,"IGO's, Regimes,and Cooperation:Challengesfor Relations Theory,"in MargaretP. Karns and Karen A. Mingst,eds., The United International (Boston: Unwin Hyman,1990), pp. 321-50; and Lisa Martin, Institutions Statesand Multilateral The forthcoming. international Organization, International Power,and Multilateralism," "Interests, are taken for granted,however,even thoughtheir stable rightsof states invariably property priorto the other two collectiveaction problems.I have definition logicallyand temporally is added thisdimension. therefore and discussionof how global warming 44. For a briefreviewof thissubjectand an interesting these practices,see David D. Caron, "When Law Makes Climate risingsea levels may affect the Change Worse: Rethinking Law of Baselines in Lightof a Rising Sea Level," EcologyLaw vol. Quarterly, 17,no. 4, 1990,pp. 621-53.

Organization 576 International And interests others.45 of damage the legitimate onlythattheydid notthereby each state had the same rules forall states,not one rule forsome and other rulesforothers. An even more profound instance of delimitingthe propertyrightsof as because it concernedinternal, opposed to external, states-more profound as the of of space-was the invention the principle extraterritoriality basis for As put diplomaticrepresentation. GarrettMattingly it permanent organizing to supreme in his magisterial studyof the subject:"By arrogating themselves power over men's consciences,the new states had achieved absolute soverwith one Having done so, theyfound theycould only communicate eignty. withinthemselves littleislands of alien sovereignty."46 anotherby tolerating in those little islands of alien sovereignty the end required a Instituting based on the religious arrangements solution, thoughdifferential multilateral And theirmaintenance were triedfirst. and social statusof rulers preferences came to be seen as being necessaryto the veryexistenceof a viable political of orderamongstates.47 a result, As gravebreachesof theprinciple extraterriare, toriality ipso facto,deemed to be a violationagainstthe entirecommunity of states.48 Until quite recently,neither regimes nor formal organizationsplayed and stabilization international of property roles in the definition significant rights.Conventionalpractice and episodic treatynegotiationssufficedto multilateral ordersof relations. establish Coordination problems about international property and conflicting States have strong preferences over In rights. the case of the oceans, forexample,coastal stateswere favored coastal states sea; landlockedstatesbytheallocationofanyterritorial different of of sized seas ended up withdifferentially territorial byvirtue thelength their no at wouldhavepreferred limit all to the coastalstatesnevertheless coastlines; territorial and so on. There also existsa class of problemsin international sea; in relations whereinstatesare more or less indifferent principleto the actual
came to century beforepiracy, frequently state-sponsored, 45. It tookuntilthe earlyeighteenth of damaging the legitimate to interests states.See Robert be generally definedas beinginherently C. Ritchie,CaptainKidd and the WarAgainstthePirates(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press,1986). Renaissance Md.: PenguinBooks, 1964),p. 244. Diplomacy (Baltimore, 46. Garrett Mattingly, role,see Adda thatextraterritoriality playeda systemic 47. On theemergence theperception of N. History (Princeton, J.: PrincetonUniversity B. Bozeman, Politicsand Culture International in Press,1960),especially 479-80. pp. condemns"Iraq thatUN Security Council Resolution667 "strongly 48. Note in thisconnection for"aggressive perpetrated... acts premisesand personnelin Kuwait,"whereas againstdiplomatic "condemns"the invasion, Resolution660, passed in responseto Iraq's invasionof Kuwait,merely withoutembellishment. The full textsare contained in UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES/667, 16 September1990,and S/RES/660,2 August1990; emphasisadded.

Multilateralism 577 outcome,providedonlythatall accept the same outcome.These are typically problems.49 referred as coordination to A paradigmaticcase of a coordinationproblem in the mid-nineteenth and whatwould happen telegraphy concerned century posed byelectronic was to a message as it came, forinstance,to the borderbetweenFrance and the "A procedurewas instituted: common Grand Duchy of Baden. The following at withtwoemployees, from French the one station was established Strasbourg the Telegraph Administration, other from Baden. The French employee received,for example, a telegramfromParis, which the electricwires had This messagehe wroteout byhand to transmitted himwiththe speed of light. ontoa special form and handed it acrossthetable to his Germancolleague.He However,with it translated intoGerman,and thensentit again on itsway."50 the intensification trade,the desire forthe lateststockmarketinformation of fromLondon, Paris, and Berlin, and importantdiplomaticmessages that wished to send to one another, this arrangementbecame governments and administrative untenable.Its costs in profits foregone, lost,opportunities The initialresponsewas to negotiatea resourcesexpended mountedrapidly. complexof the series of bilateraltreaties.But in the dense communications bilateralsolutionssoon also provedinadequate. Several European continent, constructed and were subsequently were therefore multilateral arrangements combinedin 1865,whenthe International TelegraphUnionwas established. for The multilateral consistedof threeparts.First, arrangement telegraphy linesthatwereto the of thepartiesdevisedrulesconcerning network telegraph within connectcountries Europe (and, later,in otherpartsof the world),the the of codes to be used, the agreedpriorities transmission, languagesthatwere to the permissible, scheduleof tariffs be levied,the mannerin whichproceeds secretariat wouldbe divided,and so on. Second, theyestablisheda permanent of these rules and to coordinate to administer day-to-day the implementation the technicaloperationsof the system.And, third,theyconvened periodic in as to conferences make anysuchrevisions thebasic system became necessary overtime. had alreadybeen anticipatedin the Much the same kind of arrangement as on theRhine and theDanube, typically domainofEuropean river transport, and judicial bodies-and, in some secretariats, consistingof commissions, similar for Later in thenineteenth century, evenuniforms officials.51 instances, in were instituted thefieldofpublichealth.52 multilateral arrangements are In situationsexhibiting coordination problems,the incentives highfor
49. Stein,"Coordination and Collaboration." to (Geneva: ITU, Union (ITU), FromSemaphore Satellite 50. International Telecommunications 1965),p. 45. for Rivers (New York: CarnegieEndowment of 51. J.P. Chamberlain, Regime International The Peace, 1923). International Press, 1964), University Calif.: Stanford 52. ErnstB. Haas, BeyondtheNationState (Stanford, pp. 14-17.

Organization 578 International of principles conduct. on their relations thebasisofgeneralized to states order costs transaction tends to the therefore, desire reduce Atleastinthelongrun, incidence the historically highest Not factor. surprisingly, to becomea driving in domain. is and regimes organizationsfound this ofmultilateral Collaboration problems of property and Where definition stabilization atleastsomeinternational the tomultilatan inevitability to there appears exist ultimate is rights concerned, alternatives, all may "ultimate" meanafter possible although eral solutions, there problems, In war, including havebeenexhausted. casesofcoordination is outcomes one as to an indifference which ofseveral to appears exist ultimate as sunk problems here mask suchconcrete "ultimate" may although selected, that statesmay have in the "equallyacceptable" investments individual that outcome didnotgetadopted. of lies and of the Between twoextremes inevitability indifference thedomain however, in thisdomain, Even of situations. conflict interest mixed-motive, on basis.Before it And sometimes occurs a multilateral occurs. cooperation often. it however, didnotdo so very 1945, a of case the celebrated is theConcert Europe, In thesecurity realm, most to more attention relations paidfar have ofinternational students caseinwhich that than thefact to a security regime or theissueofwhether notitconstituted and Clifford Charles Kupchan form. of elements themultilateral it exhibited security of us provided witha usefulcontinuum collective have recently at We at one endandconcerts theother. with arrangements, the"ideal"form to According ofthe"ideal"model. examined formal the attributes havealready of is by theconcert version characterized thedominance the theKupchans, and and taken informal negotiations consensus, no by decisions powers, great collective action. for of the mechanisms implementing specification explicit mechanisms-a security is putsitintheclassofcollective But-and this what Thatis, one."53 of on is nevertheless"predicated thenotion all against concert and its on ofpeace among members on is a concert predicated theindivisibility to to their obligation respond actsofaggression. nondiscretionary from 1815to 1854, peace in and wars, the Between Napoleonic theCrimean in words,by an institutional Europe was maintained, HenryKissinger's so as by "framework" was regarded participants being"legitimate," that that

and the Futureof Europe," p. 53. See Kupchan and Kupchan,"Concerts,CollectiveSecurity, Richard by analysisof the Treatyof Paris (1815) offered historian 120. Note also the following of of on Langhornein "Reflections the Significance the CongressofVienna," Review Intemational Castlereagh's Studies12 (October 1986),p. 317: "There appeared at clause 6, in whatwas certainly drafting, shift in] emphasis from a specific guarantee to a scheme for the continuous [a by system thegreatpowers." of management theinternational

Multilateralism 579 In [it] thanin itsoverthrow."54 doingso, within rather "theysoughtadjustment diverged from they"behaved in waysthatsharply accordingto RobertJervis, normal'powerpolitics.'"55 As Jervisdescribes it, the five leading powers-Austria, Great Britain, restoredwiththe aid of the other Prussia, Russia, and a French monarchy four-refrained from seeking to maximize their relative power positions theirdemands and behavior;they one another,instead moderating vis-'a-vis weaknessesand vulnerabiliexploiting another'stemporary one refrained from and as threatened forcesparingly used itrarely a meansto resolve ties;and they differences among them-except, Kal Holsti adds, thatthey"were clearlyof for or the opinionthatforcecould be used individually collectively enforcing the of certaindecisionsand forcoercing thosewho threatened foundations the orderor thesystem governance."56 of themselves as How were these featsachieved? The fivepowersconstituted convening "an executive body" of the European internationalsystem,57 that whichtheyacted on matters extensive multilateral consultations through created and the could have undermined peace. For example,theycollectively of those guaranteedthe neutrality Belgium and Greece, therebyremoving or As from temptations bilateralpartition competition. Rene the of territories has Albrecht-Carrie argued,the "Eastern question" in general-that is, the change and national independencein the problemof how to secure orderly decay of the Ottoman Empire-"provides many wake of the irreversible of illustrations an authenticcommon preferencefor orderlyand peaceful implemented."58 morethanonce successfully procedure, What could account for this unusual institutional development?It seems of to principle thatthethreat posed byNapoleon's imperialambitions thevery than the usual risksand uncertainties the balance of power provedweightier realm.Moreover,the threatposed by thatplague cooperationin the security rule seems to the Frenchrevolutionary wars to the veryprincipleof dynastic such in thanthe differences domesticsocial formations, have provedweightier betweenliberaland protestant England on the one hand and as thoseexisting Russia on the other. and the moreconservative catholicAustriaand orthodox These two threats helped crystalizethe norm of systemicstability-the
A 54. See Henry A. Kissinger, WorldRestored(New York: Universal Library,1964), p. 5. a system, subsetof the Concertof Europe, whichended by on concentrates the Congress Kissinger holdsfortheentireconcertsystem. about 1823,butmycommentary "From Balance to Concert"; 55. See RobertJervis, "Security Regimes,"p. 178. See also Jervis, World System," and RichardB. Elrod, "The ConcertofEurope: A FreshLook at an International 1976),pp. 159-74. 28 Politics (January Managing and Modes of Coordinating, 56. Kal Holsti, "Governance WithoutGovernment: Century Europe," paper presentedat the annual International Politicsin Nineteenth Controlling Vancouver,Canada, March 1991. StudiesAssociation, of meeting theInternational (New 57. The termis used byGordonA. Craig and AlexanderL. George inForceand Statecraft Press,1983),p. 31. York: Oxford University The of 58. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Concert Europe(New York: Walker,1968),p. 22.

580 International Organization the the was "repose"of Europewas theterm five preferred59-that concert statesto place a collective on their gearedto sustain. bet Theyemboldened via limited And consultations instituted theconcert the future. themultilateral a of on bet within which extent cheating that byprovidingforum intelligence actorintentions and for could be shared, questioned, justifications actions proferred assessed. and of eroded only TheConcert Europe not of gradually becausethememory the initial threats faded alsobecauseover but time parameters thesituation the of Aboveall else,therevolutions 1848seriously weretransformed. of shook the of prevailing concept legitimate order from political and within, thesenseof "I international cohesiondiverged thereafter. do not see Europe sharply a minister at In anymore,"French lamented thetime.60 thesecond foreign half ofthenineteenth century, multilateral consultation self-restraint and yielded to thestriving unilateral for checked advantage only external by constraints, while bilateral alliance formation raised a newlevelofsophistication was to by Bismarck. In theeconomic the realm, nineteenth witnessed whateconomists century if to consider be paradigms,notparagons, multilateralism: trade the of and free a of goldstandard. freetradeis meanttwothings: minimum barriers By to tariff trade, including andnontariff and treatment barriers; nondiscriminatory intrade. international standard An exists when setsofconditions two are gold approximated. themajor First, countries must maintain linkbetween a their domestic fixedratios.Second,in money supplyand gold at substantially allowtheoutflow goldtoliquidate adverse of an principle must they balanceof current and in obligations mustaccept a corresponding inflow case of a favorable Theseconditions establish convertibility balance. also the ofcurrenciesatrelatively rates, they fixed and facilitate international insofar adjustment imbalance thecurrent as the initial in in account principle be rectified will in and automaticallyboth countries theappropriate surplus deficit by domestic from inflow outflow gold. measures follow that the and of By the mid-nineteenth Great Britain-thefront-runnerthe century, in Industrial Revolution, foremost the of importer rawmaterials exporter and of manufactured and of products, theenthusiastic occupant thedoctrinal house built AdamSmith DavidRicardo-wasprepared movetoward and by to free trade a unilateral on basis.Prime Minister Peel declared Parliament Robert in "if that other choosetobuy thedearest in countries such market, an option on their partconstitutes reason no why should be permitted buyinthe we not to Britain liberalize did cheapest."6' Indeed, trade unilaterally, in culminatingthe
59. Holsti,"GovernanceWithout p. Government," 4. 60. The Frenchofficial citedby F. H. Hinsleyin Powerand thePursuit Peace (Cambridge: is of Cambridge University Press,1963),p. 243. 61. RobertPeel, in Parliamentary Debates,House of Commons, London, 29 June1846; citedby N. Jagdish Bhagwatiand Douglas A. Irwinin "The Returnof the Reciprocitarians," The World Economy10 (June1987),p. 114.

Multilateralism 581 did abolitionof the Corn Laws in 1846. Others,however, notfollowtheBritish and in part also therefore, example as Britain had expected. Reluctantly, Britain commencedwith a inspiredby broader diplomaticconsiderations, with other countries,and those other negotiations series of bilateral tariff of and thishad theeffect significantly parties, did countries thesame withthird Treatybetween The model was the Cobden-Chevalier tariff barriers. lowering it thiswas a bilateraltreaty, Although Britainand France,concludedin 1860.62 consequencesbecause it contained an unconditionalMFN had multilateral provision:it committedBritain and France to extend to each other any subsequent concessions obtained from agreementswith any third party. primarily Bismarck, Louis Napoleon, and Cavourall viewedsuchtradetreaties bilateral diplomacyand less as the means to of as instruments traditional multilateralize trade. But theynegotiatedthem,and theyincludedthe MFN in The inclusionof thisprovision a series of trade treatieshad the provision. order.63 the effect multilateralizing trading of trade, Britain followed the rules of the gold As it did in international the provided worldeconomy standard morecloselythananyoneelse. It thereby in makingmultilateral witha pillar of financialstability the pound sterling, Britain'spolicies and thatmuch easier to achieve.64 convertibility adjustment in mayhave been conduciveto multilateralism twootherwaysas well. As the world's largest creditor country,Britain did not exploit its position to accumulatelarge gold stocksbut instead made those surplusesavailable for economyas a and loans. The international additionaloverseas investments thanwould otherwise and moresmoothly grewmoresteadily resultfunctioned have been the case. In addition, Britain always allowed debts to Britain to incurred othercountries be cancelled by creditstheyearned elsewhere. by of balances.65 the clearing payments That in turnfacilitated multilateral of gold standard The multilateralism free trade and the international it Although appears to have been createdand sustainedbytwosets of factors. were not may appear paradoxical, these paragon cases of multilateralism achieved by multilateralmeans. The decisive factor seems to have been
see of 62. For an excellentheterodoxtreatment these developments, Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma." 63. See Jacob Viner, "The Most-Favored-NationClause," in Jacob Viner, International Economics(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951). The United States continuedto rejectunconditional until1923. in MFN provisions itstradetreaties Bank of EnglandLeadership Orchestra: "Conducting International the Eichengreen, 64. Barry and Finance,vol. 6, no. 1, 1987, Money Journal Intemational of Under theClassical Gold Standard," pp. 5-29. were thatthe United Kingdom to "The keyequationsof multilateralism 65. According Briggs, settled and countries, thatthey producing balance in itsdealingswiththeprimary had a credit itself countries and to the United by theirbalance of indebtedness an exportsurplusto the continental States. The continentalcountriesin their turn financed importsurpluses with the primary and withthe United States byexportsurplusesto the United Kingdom."See countries producing Modem in and "The WorldEconomy:Interdependence Planning," TheNew Cambridge Asa Briggs, Press,1968),vol. 12,p. 42. University History, ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge 2d

Organization 582 International Britain's unilateralmove toward free trade and the gold standard and its signaleditswillingness bilateraldealingsto achievebothgoals. Britainthereby orderand thus orderand a stablemonetary to bear thecostsof an open trading for of and uncertainties these arrangements reduced the distributive strategic In others.66 that sense, freetrade and the gold standardcan be said to have factor thanwas theConcertof Europe. Anothercritical been less "regime-ish" As domesticpolitical environment. ArthurBloomfieldhas was a permissive pointed out with regard to the monetaryrealm, "The view, so widely recognizedand accepted in recent decades, of centralbankingpolicy as a and maintenance reasonablestability of the means of facilitating achievement and prices was scarcelythought in the level of [domestic]economic activity about before 1914, and certainlynot accepted, as a formal objective of to capacity lacked the institutional Indeed,manycountries monetary policy."67 even a centralbank policy,in some cases including pursue such a monetary collapsedwellbeforethefirst.68 The second oftheseconditions itself. suggests century priorto thetwentieth of This brief overview multilateralism that shed further lighton the characterof the severalbroad generalizations has form.First,the strategictask environment an institutional multilateral and delimiting property the take.Defining thatagreements impacton theform a of rights statesis as fundamental collectivetask as any in the international in basis seems inevitable The performance thistaskon a multilateral of system. conceivablealternative every in the longrun,although factstatesappear to try thatdid emergein arrangements first. Moreover,in the past the multilateral codifiedstatepractice thisdomainwere monopolizedbystatesand essentially transaction limiting ordersof relations.At the otherextreme, into prevailing neithercomplexnor problemsis institutionally costs by solvingcoordination in and it was the domainin whichmultilateralism all demanding, particularly expressions-orders, regimes,and organizations-flourthree institutional terrain Betweenthesetwolies theproblematic century. ishedin thenineteenth in but of conflict interest situations, whichstatessometimes, prior of significant even arrangements multilateral not century often,construct to the twentieth are available and viable. The major powers could have thoughalternatives selected bilateral alliances in the early nineteenthcenturyand selected as in century, they economicarrangements the mid-nineteenth discriminatory had done before and as they would do again subsequently.But at those multilateralism pointsin time,theydid not. Whynot? Presumably, particular does thatmean? How and whydid But was in theirinterest. what,concretely, in statescome to definetheirinterests a mannerthatyieldedsuch an unusual institutional outcome? As noted above, it seems thatthe Concertof Europe
66. Stein,"The Hegemon'sDilemma." Gold Standard(New York: Policy UndertheIntemational Monetary 67. ArthurI. Bloomfield, Federal ReserveBank ofNew York, 1959), p. 23. Press, 1986), Politicsin Hard Times (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University 68. Peter Gourevitch, chap. 3.

Multilateralism 583 system and the was due in partto exogenousshocksto both the international of system domesticrule.Free tradeand thegold standardin partseem to have to of and been due to thewillingness thecapability Great Britain takethelead. Both cases also were made possibleby the existenceof compatibleor at least domestic settings. permissive Second, as was alluded to earlier, it seems that successfulinstances of For "diffuse reciprocity."69 example,whatwas multilateralism come to exhibit "is crucialto the success of the Concertof Europe, accordingto Jervis, that thanusual.... For 'self-interest' broaderthanusual [and] also longer-run was sacrifices wouldin each statehad to believethatitscurrent thissystem work, to that otherswould not renege on theirimplicit return, factyield a long-run in positions."70 foundthemselves tempting whenthey commitments century, very few Third, the record shows that prior to the twentieth The Concertof generatedformalorganizations. instancesof multilateralism whilefreetradeand the Europe neverwentbeyondgreatpowerconsultations, and were instituted sustainedbyeven moread hoc gold standard international that did exist organizations bilateraland unilateralmeans. The multilateral wherethe task in problems, functioned exclusively the domainof coordination acceptablerulesoftheroad and to changethem at handwas to devisemutually as technologyand other such factors changed. And the role of these by was strictly circumscribed the overall normativestructure organizations within whichtheyexisted. discontinuity The twentieth-century withthetwentieth-century occurred An important breakin thisthird pattern as ''move to institutions," the critical legal theoristDavid Kennedy has organizations.71 describedit-by whichhe means a moveto formal was added to the institutional novelform repertoire Above all, a completely of states in 1919: the multipurpose,universal membershiporganization, instantiatedfirstby the League of Nations and then by the UN. Prior determined power, had by membership, international organizations butlimited circumscribed or function, both, and theywere assigned specificand highly based on littlemore than shared here were organizations tasks. In contrast, withbroad agendas in whichlargeand smallhad a constitutionally aspirations, within international decisionmaking organizations mandatedvoice. Moreover, as of became subjectto the mechanism voting, opposed to treaty increasingly shifted itself or awayin subsequently accretion;and voting drafting customary with thatwas consistent the mostinstancesfrom earlyunanimity requirement proceedings.Finally,the the traditionalmode of conductinginternational
Relations." in 69. Keohane, "Reciprocity International Regimes,"p. 180. 70. Jervis, "Security Cardozo Law Review 8 (April 1987), pp. 71. David Kennedy,"The Move to Institutions," 841-988.

Organization 584 International a century, trend move amplifieda trendthat had begun in the nineteenth bilateraldiplomacy, especiallyin the as towardmultilateral opposed to merely diplomacy."72 form "conference of consequencesforthe producedseveralimportant This move to institutions and in some instancesactually First,it complicated, statusof multilateralism. prevailed ends-meansrelationthat previously reversed,the straightforward formal and arrangements whatever betweenthegoals embodiedin multilateral organizationalmechanismmay have existed to serve them. Or, to put it problemsthat had not existedbefore. it differently, created principal-agent outcomes,of Any formof organizationalmediationis capable of affecting elementsinto the substanceor process of decision makingthat introducing membership organizauniversal were not present.A multipurpose, previously itselfeven in areas where no tion complicatesthat situationby involving consensusexists;aspectsofboththe League of Nationsand theUN normative have increasingly forums in that illustrate problem spades. Second,multilateral and conveningpower of states. For come to share in the agenda-setting conferencediplodrivethe international example,such forumsincreasingly multilateral diplomacyhas macygame. Third,and perhaps most important, oftena hotly come to embodya proceduralnorm in its own right-though withit an international legitimacy contestedone-in some instancescarrying notenjoyedbyothermeans. a move to institutions, In short, as a result of the twentieth-century at multilateral politicalorderthatis "capable of handling least some collective I tasks in an ex ante co-ordinatedmanner" has emerged.73 mightadd in of conclusionthat while numerousdescriptions this "move to institutions" of in I exist, knowof no good explanation theliterature whystatesshouldhave wanted to complicate their lives in this manner. And I would think it explanationwithinthe difficult formulate to any straightforward particularly rationality. ascendantlogicof instrumental currently

The UnitedStatesand postwarmultilateralism

was clear thatmultilateralism The precedingdiscussionmakes it abundantly formin the modernstate not inventedin 1945. It is a generic institutional system,and incipientexpressionsof it have been present fromthe start. acrossa broad of arrangements However,thebreadthand diversity multilateral thereafter1945. Quite naturally, arrayof issue-areasincreasedsubstantially positionof the UnitedStates. fore,one associatesthe changewiththe postwar
"Global ConferenceDiplomacy review, VolkerRittberger, see 72. For a briefthoughexcellent vol. 11, no. 2, 1983,pp. Research, EuropeanJoumalofPolitical Policy-Making," and International 167-82. 73. Ibid.,pp. 167-68.

Multilateralism 585 powersare alike of hegemonic stability, to According the theory hegemonic theory Hegemonicstability system. in theirquest to organizethe international onlyup to a point. To the extentthat it is possible to "know" these is right suggestthat the likeness among hegemons historicalcounterfactuals things, forn by which they choose to organize the stops short of the institutional or had Nazi Germany the SovietUnion ended up as the For system.74 instance, whatsoever world'sleading power afterWorld War II, thereis no indication remotely like includedcreatinganything of thatthe intentions eithercountry Germany orderthatcame to prevail.Politically, institutional the international pursued an imperialdesign in the European core, complete with tributary discriminathe Economically, Nazi schemeofbilateral, stateson theperiphery. no clearingarrangements tradepacts and monetary and state-controlled tory, to doubt would have been extendedgeographically complementGermany's would have soughtpolitical The SovietUnion presumably politicalobjectives. in a whilecausingthemodes ofproduction control Comintern through restored amongthoseeconomies itssubjecteconomiesto be socializedand therelations basis. on to be administered a plannedand discriminatory things wouldhave assurance, In pointoffact, and thiswe can saywithgreater in differed some respectseven ifBritainhad become hegemon.Colonialismas would have continued longer. And while monetary a political institution merelybased on relations probablywould have been organized similarly, would have Britishimperialpreferences insteadof the U. S. dollar,75 sterling othersto trade,possiblyforcing remaineda centralfeatureof international blocs forthemselves.76 carveout regionaltrading by would have been "integrated" a German or a Finally,Europe certainly different fashionthan existsvia the EC Soviethegemony-but in a markedly wouldhave returned Europe mostprobably system, today.And in a British-run and the continued existence of separate national to prewar multipolarity economies. Thus, all hegemoniesare not alike. The most that can be said about a orderinsome an poweris thatitwillseek to construct international hegemonic along lines that are compatiblewithits own international presumably form,
or factors"determine at of 74. The counterto myargument, course,would be that"systemic As That,too, is plausibleas a hypothesis. it and least shape thepreferences behaviorofhegemons. plansof to I credibility theactualpostwar however, attachgreater instance, thisparticular concerns the ThirdReich and to what,since 1917,we knewLeninistworldorderdesignsto be thanI do to discussionsof For generalmethodological theory. value of systemic or the explanatory predictive in see Philip Nash, "The Use of Counterfactuals History:A Look at the counterfactuals, no. 22, March Relations, of for of Newsletter theSociety Historians AmericanForeign Literature," Testingin PoliticalScience," World and 1991; and JamesD. Fearon, "Counterfactuals Hypothesis 1991),pp. 169-95. 43 Politics (January orderwas quite strong monetary of 75. The consensuson thebasic contours a desirablepostwar and widespreadbeyondthe Axis powersand the Soviet Union. See League of Nations [Ragnar Period (Geneva: League of Lessons of theInter-War Experience: Currency Nurkse],Intemational pp. Nations,1944),especially 66-112. in Perspective, chaps. 5-8. Diplomacy Current 76. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar

Organization 586 International is structures. in theend,thatreally notsaying But, objectives domestic and much. in its senseserved planners, multilateralism generic ForAmerican postwar on to architectural principle thebasisofwhich reconstruct as a foundational the realm.Duringthe war,when the postwar world.Take first economic order was thefocal era planning thepostwar began,theNazi economic for It excluded nonparticipants, antipathy.77had effectively pointof American American trade to not limited opportunities which according U. S. officials only overintothesecurity conflicts readily that spilled butalso triggered economic cannotlongbe whichact as enemiesin the market-place realm."Nations of secretary state for at friends the counciltable,"warnedthe assistant of refrain his boss, WilliamClayton, economic echoinga favorite affairs, Hull.78 Cordell and of sector The defeatof Germany the allied occupation its Western to the social the afforded United Statesan opportunityhelpimplant domestic form economic a different offoreign policy thenewWest by basesfor markedly state. Muchofthenegotiating States German expended theUnited by energy was toward on thecreation thepostwar of economic therefore, directed order, It of but British the position. consisted a undoing morebenign stillvexing of and commitmentimperial to on preferences thepart theTories toextensive of on economic transactions theLabourparty part as controls international by national economic Bothwere its objective institute to planning. systematic in place The States sought substitute their to inherently discriminatory. United trade and of a globalversion the "open door."79 Discriminatory barriers tariffs and were reduced, decolonizacurrency arrangements tobe dismantled, But sustain merereturn a to tionsupported. nowhere woulddomestic politics laissez-faire unrestricted and thegoldstanof trade thenineteenth-century the economic was by activity governed the dard,wherein levelof domestic balanceofpayments. Evenfortherelatively moreliberal UnitedStates, the the edifice the "open door"had to accommodate domestic of international ofthe interventionism NewDeal.80
of 77. This is quiteclearfrom provisions theAnglo-American the Atlantic Charter, promulgated in August1941. 78. WilliamClayton, citedbyPollardinEconomicSecurity theOrigins theCold War, 2. and of p. in 79. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy Current Perspective, 1. part 80. For a depictionof the subsequenteconomic regimesalong these lines, see JohnGerard in Ruggie,"International Regimes,Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism thePostwar Economic Order," in Krasner, Intemational Regimes, 195-231. For additionaldocumentation, pp. see G. JohnIkenberry, WorldEconomyRestored:ExpertConsensusand theAnglo-American "A PostwarSettlement," International Organization (Winter1992), pp. 289-321. The historian 46 of the Marshall Plan, Michael Hogan, similarly has argued that U. S. postwarplanners"married Hull's free-tradedictums to the new theories of economic regulation and countercyclical See stabilization." Michael J.Hogan, "One WorldintoTwo: AmericanEconomicDiplomacyfrom Bretton Woods to the MarshallPlan," unpublished manuscript, Ohio State University, Columbus, n. d., p. 7.

Multilateralism 587 in about the role of multilateralism There is littledebate in the literature organizingthe postwareconomic order; the consensus is that its role was domain There has been littledebate about its role in the security substantial. reason that studentsof international either-but here forthe verydifferent is relations have assumed that there was none. That interpretation not in recordifwe thinkof multilateralism its broad supportedby the historical organizations. of thanmerely theform multilateral in genericsense rather As WorldWar II drewto a close, PresidentRooseveltfaced an institutional America," back into a "fortress problem.The United States mustnot retreat or Rooseveltinsisted, else itwouldonce againhavewonthewaronlyto lose the subsequent peace. Winningthe peace, Roosevelt felt,would require active involvement. But at the same time,the Americanpublic U.S. international via "entanglingalliances."'81 would not accept internationalinvolvement Hence, some other formwould have to be found. To complicate matters by further, JohnGaddis putsit,Rooseveltfavoreda policyof "containment as cooptation"towardthe Soviet Union and feltthat a stable postwarsecurity orderrequired"offering Moscow a prominent place in it; by makingit,so to speak, a memberof the club."82That in turnrequired a club to whichboth belonged. but Roosevelthad littlealternative to Giventhatcombination objectives, of But it was to be a of move towardsome form collectivesecurity organization. that in modified form the sense thatit strippedawaythe Wilsonianaspiration politics.That collectivesecurity somehowbe substituted balance-of-power for U. was too wild and woolya notionforthe depression-and war-hardened S. so in officials 1945. Instead,theysoughtto make the two compatible, thatthe would have a basis in the balance of powerbut collectivesecurity mechanism of also mutethe more deleteriouseffects balance-of-power politics.Thus was "withteeth,"but subject mechanism the UN born:at itscore, an enforcement to greatpowerveto.83
Foreign Policy, 406-41. WoodrowWilson pp. D. andAmerican 81. See Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt a had confronted similardilemmaat the end of WorldWar I-though, unlikeRoosevelt,Wilson politicsin the of what he termed"the evil machinations" balance-of-power soughtto transcend process of resolvingit. "We still read Washington'simmortalwarningsagainst 'entangling and an answering purpose," he proclaimedin a 1918 speech. alliances' withfullcomprehension of alliancesentangle;and we recognizeand accepttheduty a newday "But onlyspecial and limited and to in whichwe are permitted hope fora generalalliancewhichwillavoid entanglements clear of Wilsonis and theairoftheworldforcommonunderstandings themaintenance commonrights." Tradition, 46. p. Diplomatic Wilson and the American in citedbyAmbrosius Woodrow Press, (New York: OxfordUniversity of 82. See JohnLewis Gaddis, Strategies Containment to Policy, 508. According p. Foreign andAmerican D. 1982),p. 9. See also Dallak, Franklin Roosevelt Russia into Dallek, forRoosevelt"a United Nationswould notonlyprovidea vehiclefordrawing in extended cooperation with the West, but would also assure initial American involvement foreign affairs." postwar D. and American see 83. For a good discussionof thiscompromise, Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt Collective (as pp. Foreign Policy, 442-82. On theKupchans'continuum outlinedin their"Concerts, a placed within and Security, theFutureofEurope"), theUN designmaybe describedas a concert security organization. collective

Organization 588 International Moscow wentdown and Europe was split,containing Once the ironcurtain by exclusion became the dominant U.S. objective, and the UN became concerns.84 the Americanproblemof But to marginalized core U.S. security America and an entrance avoidingboth a retreatintofortress simultaneously Europe. a alliances stillhad to be resolvedvis-a-vis threatened intoentangling back requests turned As SteveWeber reminds theUnitedStatesrepeatedly us, Instead,the bilateralallianceswiththem.85 to from European friends form its of of United States initially pursueda strategy "economicsecurity," providing to the Europeans with the economic wherewithal take care of their own needs.86 1947,bilateraleconomicassistanceto Europe gave wayto By security Marshall Plan, which required the Europeans to the more comprehensive in framework their own postwar reconstruction for develop a multilateral the for aid. return receiving Moreover, UnitedStateswas an earlyadvocateand to strong supporterof European efforts achieve economic and political integration.87 of demandedmore.Drivenby"la grandepeur" 1948, But European security to the Europeans came to feelthat"it was [also] necessary have some measure Still,theUnitedStates ofmilitary 'reassurance,'" as Michael Howard argues.88 of commitments any continuedto resistbilateral deals and avoid military but the kind.89 Eventually, State Departmentrelented, not untilsucceedingin its insistencethat the United States would only aid a European-initiated The Belgians under Paul-HenriSpaak took the effort. collectiveself-defense lead. In March 1948, the Benelux countries,France, and Britain signed a mutual assistance treaty.But how could theytie the United States to this an swingrole in defining indivisible The playedthe critical framework? British from Scandinaviato theMediterranean and,withCanadian security perimeter
role in the form of 84. The UN withU. S. supportacquired a more modestcollectivesecurity Atomic role peacekeepingin the 1950s and acquired a nuclearnonproliferation via International treaty the 1960s. in and thenonproliferation Energy Agencysafeguards 85. Weber,"ShapingthePostwarBalance of Power." and of 86. Pollard,EconomicSecurity theOrigins theCold War. basis on that the Europeans cooperate in reconstruction a multilateral 87. The requirement became the for producedtheOrganization European EconomicCooperationin 1948;it eventually chief mechanism Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-the throughwhich economic bureaucratsof all the advanced capitalist countriescoordinate the by conductof day-to-day policies. As forEuropean integration, 1947 the idea had gained strong Boggswentso and Representative supportin U. S. media and politicalcircles.SenatorFulbright far as to introduceidenticalresolutionsinto the Congress thatyear, askingit to endorse "the of the creationof a UnitedStatesofEurope within framework theUnitedNations."The billswere idea forEuropean was seen as a more promising European integration passed overwhelmingly. alone, and it offeredsafeguardsfor the economic recoverythan individualnational efforts seen as being necessaryfor of reindustrialization Germany,which in turn was increasingly the articulated S. policyofcontaining Soviet U. and European recovery forthesuccessofthenewly Plan:America, and of Britain, theReconstructionEurope Union. See Michael J.Hogan, TheMarshall University Press,1987). (New York: Cambridge The Years Security: Formative 88. Michael Howard, "Introduction," Olav Riste, ed., Westem in 1985),p. 14. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 89. Gaddis, TheLongPeace, pp. 48-71.

Multilateralism 589 The it help,getting to reachacrossto theWesternhemisphere.90 conceptofthe "NorthAtlantic"emergedas the spatial image that helped tie the knot.Its by formulation acceptance perhapswere facilitated the recentrevolution and wherebythe "airman's view," and thus the polar cartography, in military of proximity the Soviet Union to the United States, came to shape U.S. The strategic planning.91 NorthAtlanticTreatywas concluded in 1949. "The of signing the NATO Alliance," Howard has said, "provideda sense thatnow at last all were forone and one was forall."92And this,of course,is whatthe has security alwaysmeant. notionofcollective of as Indeed, NATO was conceivedand justified an expression thecollective provisionof the UN Charter.There is a directpath fromthe self-defense of right an endorsing inherent overArticle51 of the UN Charter, negotiations of to individualand collectiveself-defense, the drafting the NorthAtlantic at the who negotiated UN provision San The Treaty.93 same cast of characters Vandenberg side and SenatorArthur Jebbon the British Francisco,Gladwyn on the Americanside, also soughtto ensure that the NorthAtlanticTreaty allowed the United States would be compatiblewithit. That accomplishment the Charter, but outsidethe [Soviet]veto," as the Senator to operate "within NATO in witha future What is more,Article51 was notdrafted likedto say.94 by mind;it was instigated the Latin Americansto allow fora Latin American thatwas beyondthereachoftheU. S. vetoin the organization regionalsecurity UN Security Council. the To underscore obvious,the United States did not seek to endow formal powers;thatwas notits independent withextensive international organizations agenda. The Americansinsistedon a veto in the UN Security multilateralist Council everybit as much as the Soviets did. Voting in the international the institutions and remainsweighted, United States stillhaving was financial (it the largestsingleshare. GATT barelyexistsas a formalorganization was that Trade Organization supposed to have been foldedintothe International for State Departmentfunding it never came into being), and until recently And the "O" in conferences. came out of an accountforad hoc international
the 90. MartinH. Folly,"BreakingtheVicious Circle:Britain, UnitedStates,and theGenesis of 12 History (Winter1988),pp. 59-77. Diplomatic Treaty," theNorthAtlantic Imagery Duringthe "The Map as an 'Idea': The Role of Cartographic 91. Alan K. Henrikson, 2 Cartographer(April 1975),pp. 19-53 and 88. Second WorldWar," TheAmerican p. 92. Howard,"Introduction," 16. 93. On Article51, see J.Tillapaugh,"Closed Hemisphereand Open World?The Dispute over 2 History (Winter1978), pp. 25-42. 1945,"Diplomatic at Regional Security the U. N. Conference, On the Vandenberg resolution,which paved the domestic political way for the eventual linkto Article51, see Daryl J.Hudson, of negotiations the NorthAtlanticTreaty,and itsexplicit "Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and AmericanForeign Policy,"Diplomatic 1 History (Winter1977),pp. 46-63. cited by Hudson in "VandenbergReconsidered."Those who assume Vandenberg, 94. Arthur have not morethanwindowdressing thatVandenberg'sexpressedconcernsamountedto nothing made a case for why a Republican senator, who had only recentlybeen convertedfrom for to it shouldhave thought necessary expendso muchenergy so punya purpose. isolationism,

590 International Organization of NATO never has and does not now determinethe collectivesecurity its members. agenda consistedabove all of a desire The Americanpostwarmultilateralist lines,at the order along broadlymultilateral to restructure international the global level, and withinWesternEurope and across the NorthAtlantic.(In anything East Asia, on the otherhand, the potentialwas lackingto construct but the bilateralsecurity ties on whichthe United States turnedits back in the Europe.95)Secondarily, United States occasioned the creationof several as of majormultilateral regimes, in thefields moneyand trade,and also helped to establishnumerousformalinternational organizations providetechnically in of or convenient services support thoseobjectives.96 competent politically But acted againstits self-interests. the To be sure,the United States hardly withits interests does not explainthe factthatU. S. behaviorwas consistent whatsomewouldcall "a consumption good" behavior. Nor was multilateralism fortheUnitedStates,an end in itself. how do we explainU. S. actions?One So agenda is the possible source of explanationforthe Americanmultilateralist theories of international relations, international systemitself.System-level are muchfavored the discipline themoment, in at essentially of twosorts.One and oftenpowerful is structural, otherfunctional. the Both offer parsimonious accountsof the postwarmultilateralist posfirst-cut explanations.Structural or tureof the United Stateswould focuseitheron U. S. hegemony on strategic variable.97 The problemwithusinghegemonyas bipolarity the independent toutcourt-as an explanationhas already been addressed: other hegemons would have been and would have done it differently, so subsequenthistory intowhythisparticular hegemondid different. Hence, we stillrequireinsight in things thisparticular way. Invoking bipolarityas an explanation is much more promising-once But for exists.98 it is notwithout years, problems theearliestpostwar bipolarity when bipolarity was just in the process of becoming,even as some of the multilateral describedabove were takingplace. Indeed, it took developments and analystsquite some time to grasp the fact of bipolarity. policymakers Serious postwarplanningby the United States began in 1942. WilliamFox's book, The Super-Powers, publishedin 1944,stillassumed thattherewould be
95. See Marc S. Gallicchio,The Cold WarBegins Asia (New York: ColumbiaUniversity in Press, and of 1988); Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 72-103; and Pollard,EconomicSecurity theOrigins the Cold War, chap. 8. on conference food 96. For example,TheNew YorkTimesdescribedtheApril 1943Hot Springs and agriculture, conferencethat led eventually the creationof the Food and Agriculture a to to Organizationof the UN, as "a prologue-a kind of dress rehearsal-preparatory the world organization[Washington]hoped to set up after the war." Cited by Craig Alan Wilson in 4 DiplomaticHistory (Summer "Rehearsal fora United Nations: The Hot SpringsConference," 1980),p. 264. that the 97. Whiletheworkof RobertGilpinexemplifies first, ofKennethWaltz exemplifies the second. 98. Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity,Multipolarity, and Free Trade," AmericanPolitical Science 83 Review (December 1989),pp. 1245-56.

Multilateralism 591 was held thatyear,withthe The BrettonWoods conference threeof them.99 the Sovietsin attendance.Moreover,the option of dividing world into three had notyetbeen management for spheresof influence thepurposesof conflict entirely discardedin 1944. By 1945,it had been discarded,but in favorof the universalUN.100In his 1946 "long telegram"and again in his 1947 "Mr. X" Sovietsphereof influence, article, George Kennanwarnedabout theemerging of the from devastation the to expectedmultipolarity reemerge buthe explicitly in strategy orderto warbeforelong,and he designedhisproposedcontainment to weretrying Moreover,as late as 1947,tradenegotiators achievethatgoal.101 trade regimethat could accommodate square circlesto devise a multilateral also in 1947,Lucius Even more important, countries.102 socialiststate trading blamed the French,not in initially governor Germany, Clay,the U. S. military there when it was still government the Soviets,for impedingquadripartite in doable; the failureto achieve it resultedultimately the bizonal divisionof of thatbecame emblematic thecold war.103 Germany theories. actor perceptionsdo not mattermuch in structural Admittedly, as to it Nevertheless, does seem morethana littleawkward retroject incentives emergedand whichhad notyetclearly conditions foractorbehaviorstructural and whichin some measureonlythe subsequent understood were notyetfully behaviorof actorshelped to produce.104 as institutions, we noted at the outset, Functionaltheoriesof international "cooperation" and thus far have focused largely on undifferentiated on Their limited utility of form multilateralism. not "institutions," the specific theories have functional on. thiscounthas alreadybeen commented Moreover, transaction as withsuchfactors the desireto minimize been concernedlargely This inefficiencies. rationale, costs,and similarinstitutional costs,information cases are too fewto make a strong our First,although historical too,has limits. of inefficiencies this case, theydo suggestthatthe driveto limitinstitutional
and theSovietUnion(New States, Britain, The 99. WilliamT. R. Fox, The Super-Powers: United Brace, 1944). York: Harcourt, chaps. 14-15. Foreign Policy, andAmerican D. 100. Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt pp. of see of 101. For a discussion Kennan's strategy, Gaddis,Strategies Containment, 25-53. a of 102. See Viner,"Conflicts Principlein Drafting Trade Charter";and Feis, "The Conflict Over Trade Ideologies." Life (New York: HenryHolt, 1990), Lucius D. Clay:An American 103. See JeanEdward Smith, as of pp. especially 423-49. Smith'soverallassessment U. S.-Sovietrelations seen on thegroundin to a is Germany this:"The questionoferecting counterpoise theSovietUnion did notenterClay's untillate 1947, and untilthen his relationswiththe Russians were warmand cordial" thinking (p.7). of the has 104. Jervis pointedout thatthe decisiveeventin instituting peculiarform bipolarity knownas the cold war was the Korean War. High U. S. defensebudgets,a large U. S. armed guarantees,and anticommunist presence in Europe to back the NorthAtlanticTreatysecurity argues,"there thatwar.What is more,Jervis all commitments acrosstheglobe tookhold onlyafter for substitutes the war"-and were no eventson the horizonwhichcould have been functional security of thosefeatures theinternational wouldhavebeen capable ofproducing therefore, which, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Joumalof See environment. Robert Jervis, 24 Resolution (December 1980),p. 563. Conflict

592 International Organization When it comes to problems. kindis mostdecisivein the realmof coordination hopes for lastingpeace, the calculus of sheddingblood or institutionalizing universeof discourse.Second, it also countries appears to drawon a different inefficiencies costs is not entirely or institutional seems thatwhat constitutes independent of the attributesof the states making the calculation. For arrangement that imposed example,it is difficult imaginean institutional to highertransaction costs on all concernedthan the Nazi trade and monetary objectivesof the German state at the regimes.But giventhe overallstrategic was thosearrangements seen as an investment, time, priceof administering the thatshape the to The domesticmechanisms not an expenditure be minimized. Japanese foreigntrade posture today, with all their reputed institutional "inefficiencies," pose an analogousconceptualproblem.105 may it agenda was pursued, In short, determine why particular this institutional to hegemon. is inescapable at some pointto look more closelyat thisparticular the situation That in turnrequiresnotonlyexamining hegemon'sinternational realm. but also delving intoitsdomestic the It seems clear thatacross a broad arrayof social and economicsectors, WorldWar II soughtto projectthe experienceof the New United States after arena.106 to Deal regulatory stateintotheinternational According Anne-Marie dimensions.107 first a belief The was Burley, thisendeavorentailedtwodistinct that the long-term maintenanceand success of domestic reformprograms at order.The second was a commitment requireda compatibleinternational level to institutional means which had alreadybeen tried the international that revolution and domestically whichgrewout ofthelegal and administrative of accompaniedthe New Deal. The combination the two translatedinto an a international economicand activeU. S. effort institutionalize multilateral to social order. In the security realm,a countof the domesticpoliticalnoses led President Roosevelt to believe that isolationist tendenciescould not be neutralizedby having the United States formbilateral alliances with or against the very it European statesthatkept dragging intowar-which is how the isolationists in the viewed the world.Accordingly, notionwas foremost Roosevelt's mind that onlyby "binding"the United States to a more permanentmultilateral traditional international institutional whichpromisedto transform framework,
ClydePrestowitz, Karel van Wolferen, and 105. The so-calledGang ofFour (ChalmersJohnson, in The JamesFallows) has insisted thatJapanis different thisregard;see "BeyondJapan-Bashing: 'Gang of Four' Defends the Revisionist Line," BusinessWeek,7 May 1990. For a dispassionate conclusions,see Edward J. Lincoln, empiricalanalysis, whichdoes not reach radicallydifferent D. Institution, 1990). Japan'sUnequalTrade(Washington, C.: Brookings Search fora 106. See Michael J. Hogan, "Revival and Reform:America'sTwentieth-Century 8 New Economic Order Abroad," DiplomaticHistory (Fall 1984), pp. 287-310; and Anne-Marie of International Law, and theProjection theNew Burley, "RegulatingtheWorld:Multilateralism, Matters. While Hogan stressesthe economic Deal Regulatory State," in Ruggie,Multilateralism and interest groupdimension, Burleyfocuseson the administrative legal dimensions. 107. Burley, "RegulatingtheWorld."

Multilateralism 593 By be could a relapse into isolationism avoided.108 1947,the Truman politics, rhetoric be a usefultool toward to discoveredanticommunist administration thatsame end.109 thesisthatthe Peter Cowheyhas advanced the provocative More generally, of enhancedthecredibility America'spostwar of very structure theU. S. polity The to commitment multilateralism.110 problemof "defection"thatis explored on focusesnoton thehegemonbut,rather, theother in at length the literature is states,potentialfree ridersone and all. But multilateralism an extremely and the factis thatthe hegemonhas farmore form, demandinginstitutional unilateral and bilateraloptionsavailableto itthananyotherstate.So howdoes credible?How can to the hegemonmake itsown commitment multilateralism willnotdefectifit shouldchange theotherstatesbe assuredthatthehegemon leaving them in the lurch? interests, its mind or recalculate its short-term to of the Cowheyattributes credibility the Americancommitment Ironically, multilateralism the veryfeaturesof the U.S. politythat are oftensaid to to policy.These includethe institutional conductof foreign hamperits effective of geared to the medianvoter;a division consequencesof an electoralsystem and of policyposturesdifficult; greater powersmakingreversals fundamental of transparency and access to the domesticpoliticalarena even on the partof interests. potential No Pax Nipponicatoday,Cowheyconcludes,would foreign it level of confidence; lacks the appropriatedomesticbase. instilla sufficient deservemoreextensive study. Cowhey'sthesisand thecomparison in of In sum,in one crucialsense the origins multilateralism the postwarera and the reiterate recordof priorperiods. Between the deep level of defining stabilizingthe internationalpropertyrightsof states and the relatively toward a level of solvingcoordination problems, pronouncedshift superficial of affairs in requiresa combination fairly multilateralism economicand security If domestic environments. thatis so, forcesand compatible international strong thatwas decisiveafterWorld then it was the factof an Americanhegemony And this in turnmakes the role of War II, not merelyAmericanhegemony. of transformation even greater in multilateralism the currentinternational interest.

and Multilateralism transformation

the declineand, ifso, whether The issue ofwhether UnitedStatesis in relative it is takingthe international order along with it has been debated in the

Foreign Policy. andAmerican D. 108. See Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt Threat:Trumanto Reagan (New York: the 109. See Thomas G. Paterson,Meeting Communist Press,1988),pp. 3-158. Oxford University 110. Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally, Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Multilateralism Matters. Cooperation,"in Ruggie,

Organization 594 International has the for literature nearlytwo decades.1"' More recently, end of bipolarity were The alarm.112 newinstitutionalists the been adduced as a cause forsimilar and betweeninternational powershifts first questionanydirectrelationship to reasons whystates They providedseveral functional unraveling. institutional institutions to remaincommitted existing would, under some circumstances, sunk as inertia, on focusing suchfactors institutional even"beyondhegemony," continue to provide, and the common costs, the services that institutions maycontinueto pursue.113 thatthey objectives the today,especially But as we saw at the outsetof our discussion, situation arrangeone of past multilateral in but not exclusively Europe, is not simply ments hangingon for dear life. There are numerous instances of active adaptation and even creation.Again, there is not much in the institutional and that providesready explanations.The definitional theoreticalliterature presentedhere, however,does suggest historicalanalysisof multilateralism severalfactors thatmaybe at work. itself. of is One suchfactor logically impliedbythedefinition multilateralism to difficult establish Ironically,the veryfeaturesthat make it strategically and in place may enhance the durability multilateral arrangements the first once theyare in place. I pointedout earlier of adaptability thesearrangements in arrangements the past have come to exhibit that successfulmultilateral that as It of reciprocity. seems plausible to hypothesize expectations diffuse does notinsist to continues hold,as longas each party longas thatexpectation of on being equally rewardedon everyround,the sustainability the arrangeand mentshouldbe enhancedbecause itmakesbothcross-sectoral intertemporal trade-offs and bargains feasible. Cooperation with the EC seems most clearlyto exhibitthis pattern.It may have benefitedfromor perhaps even it but at requiredactiveU. S. encouragement thestart, obviously has longsince on institutional takenoff a self-sustaining path.114 all based on generalized beingequal, an arrangement Similarly, otherthings shouldbe more elasticthanone based on particularistic principles organizing also exhibitgreater and situationalexigencies.It should,therefore, interests international power in including circumstances, continuity theface ofchanging as A more readilyabsorbs such shifts, shifts. collectivesecurity arrangement
by 111. The debate was triggered Charles Kindleberger'sbook, The Worldin Depression, of 1929-1939 (Berkeley:University CaliforniaPress, 1973),whichalso made popular the analogy betweenthe 1930sand subsequentdecades-first the 1970s,thenthe 1980s,and nowthe 1990s? "Back to theFuture." 112. See, forexample,Mearsheimer, and Keohane,After Hegemony. Regimes; 113. See Krasner, Intemational instance of to 114. In his contribution our project,Garrettanalyzes the most far-reaching of multilateralism ever:the EC members'adoptionand implementation the SingleEuropean Act. viewof institutions. he is If consistent witha "rationalist" as He describeshis story beingentirely to correct, would suggestthat,givena certainset of incentives collaborateand givena certain it any beyondsome pointno extrapushfrom "extraneous" institutional framework collaboration, for solutions.See Geoffrey or forces,symbols, aspirationsmay be necessaryto achieve integrative Garrett,"International Cooperation and InstitutionalChoice: The European Community's 46 InternalMarket," Intemational Organization (Spring1992),pp. 533-60.

Multilateralism 595 It does a trade regime based on MFN treatment. is hard to imagine the of the orderof the Nazis surviving hegemony the ThirdReich, discriminatory alliances, the major means of however.And even in the case of traditional the dyadicties.Although cases to is adjustment simply abandon the prevailing the no doubt are overdetermined, ready adaptation of NATO at least as a versusthetotalcollapse oftheWarsawPact neverthearrangement transitional this less mayhelp illustrate point. the arrangements, analysispresentedhere of The durability multilateral For of is suggests, also a function domesticenvironments. example,therewas century that could have around the mid-nineteenth in no shift multipolarity accountedforthefinalcollapse of the ConcertofEurope and thereemergence after did alliances,but domesticenvironments divergesharply of competitive of the revolutions 1848. The erosion of the gold standardand free trade to changed;but in some extentmaybe overdetermined thatboth sets of factors were as even beforeBritaindeclinedappreciably a worldpower,governments in compelled to intervene theirdomesticeconomies in ways that politically In were incompatiblewith the two multilateralarrangements. fact, even climacteric case ofthe 1933London EconomicConferCharlesKindleberger's couldn'tand the United Stateswouldn't"-does not ence-when "the British systemicaccount. What the United States lend itselfto a straightforward the of the form economicmultilateralism: "wouldn't"was to support prevailing laissez-fairekind, the London and New York bankers' kind, and Herbert out President Roosevelt,had yetfigured a Hoover'skind.But no one, including notes in As acceptable alternative.15 ArthurSchlesinger viable and mutually [betweenthe United States and Britain] his classic account,"This difference was too great to be bridgedby any formof economicor diplomaticlegerdecame It main. The London Conferencedid not create the difference. simply "116 No domestic along too late-or too early-to do anythingabout it. thatstarkexistsamongthemajorpowerstoday.The collapse ofthe divergence the changesin EasternEurope have eliminated SovietUnion and thedomestic of internationalsignificance the socialist economic model. The domestic but of comparableproblem, itis economicstructure Japanmaypose a remotely of hardly thesame magnitude."7

in 115. See HerbertFeis, 1933: Characters Crisis(Boston: Little,Brown,1966). The Comingof theNew Deal, vol. 2 of TheAge of Roosevelt 116. See ArthurM. Schlesinger, of rendering thiscase, whichnot 1958), p. 229. For a game-theoretic (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, on conclusion also shedsconsiderablelight thebroaderdebate,see but Schlesinger's onlysupports Triangle:MonetaryDiploworksof KennethA. Oye: "The Sterling-Dollar-Franc the following macy, 1929-1937," WorldPolitics 38 (October 1985), pp. 173-99; and "On the Benefitsof Bilateralism:Lessons fromthe 1930s," paper prepared for the Workshopon Change in the Los California, Angeles,5-6 May 1989. of University Southern International System, as in 117. Gilpin raises this,correctly myjudgment, one potentialfactorthatcould undermine on compromise whichthe postwareconomic regimeshave rested.See the embedded liberalism Relations (Princeton,N. J.: Princeton Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of Intemational Press,1987). University

Organization 596 International with wellby Furthermore, and large actual multilateralarrangements billing they in some of the get have notlivedup to thebad taskssimply defined of expressions the law of large numbers.This is so for as literature unwieldy in arrangements practice severalreasons. Firstof all, mostmajormultilateral "k-groups" that Duncan Snidal, are governed by subsets of states-the collective followingRussell Hardin, suggestsattenuate many international what Snidal postulates shows empirically action problems.18Miles Kahler by have been governed whathe globalregimes theoretically: majorpostwar the regimeswere not Thus, the withinthem.1"9 groupings terms"minilateralist" avoided obvious legitimacy and theythereby of mere expressions hegemony, basis of egalitariandecisionproblems.Nor did theyoperate purelyon the makingrules, however.Decolonization began to strainthis "minilateralist" whether the subsequentLaw in solutionin the 1960s and 1970s.Nevertheless, of GATT rounds,or drafting global environmental of the Sea negotiations, insuperKahler finds littleevidencethatstateshave encountered conventions, mechanisms which,at one and the in able difficulties devisinginstitutional their whileretaining of same time,accommodatelargernumbers participants complex and more capacityto reach decisions. Even in the extraordinarily of "democratic"context the UN Conferenceon the Law of the Sea, as Barry of inventiveness states to Buzan has shown in great detail, the institutional to and was largenumbers impressive, thefailure obtaina ratified accommodate any of not from fundamental conflicts interest, from mechanical resulted treaty ofsize.120 problem A final factorto be considered in explanationsfor the adaptabilityof is multilateralarrangements that in some instances the twentieth-century "move to institutions" clearlyhas kickedin. Indeed, muchof the institutional today is coming from the within multilateralarrangements inventiveness or represent at leastspeakfor that from themselves, platforms arguably institutions illustration, the at the collectivities hand. Again,the EC offers most dramatic EC withtheEuropeanFree it whether concerns plansfororchestrating relations itself.'21 of or Trade Area, the East Europeanstates, the future the Community that today explicitly are as WestEuropeanactors Patrick goesso far toargue Morgan lessonsthattheyderived to applying EasternEurope some of the institutional from theirown earlierpostwarexperiencewiththe United States,not onlyin Beyond Europe, the realm.122 the economic realm but also in the security
Theory"; and Russell Hardin, Collective 118. See Snidal, "The Limitsof Hegemonic Stability Press,1982). Md.: Johns HopkinsUniversity Action(Baltimore, withSmall and Large Numbers." 119. Kahler,"Multilateralism 120. Barry Buzan, "Negotiatingby Consensus: Developments in Technique at the U. N. Law 75 (April 1981), pp. Joumalof Intemational Conferenceon the Law of the Sea," American 324-48. 121. See "Western Europe Moves to Expand Free-Trade Links," The New York Times,8 16 December 1989,pp. 1 and D5; "All Europe's a Stage," TheEconomist, March 1991,p. 48; and 18 "InnerSpace," TheEconomist, May 1991,pp. 53-54. Prospectsin Europe," in Ruggie, and Security 122. See PatrickM. Morgan,"Multilateralism and the Matters. Multilateralism See also Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts,CollectiveSecurity, FutureofEurope."

Multilateralism 597 conveningand agenda-setting power of multilateral organizations perhaps is best illustrated the area of the commons.There would be no plan to try in to salvage the Mediterranean were it not formultilateral players, Peter Haas as has shown.123 Similarly, multilateral playerskeptfirst ozone issue and now the globalwarming thenegotiating on table evenwhenmajorpowers, including the at UnitedStates,were reluctant participants best.124 In sum, parts of the international institutional order today appear quite robust and adaptive. The above discussionsuggeststhat the reason is not are thatthese are institutions thatinstitutions "in demand." The and simply in reasonis also thattheseinstitutions multilateral form are and thatthisform, under certain circumstances,has characteristics which may enhance its and to durability ability adapt to change.This,at anyrate,is thecentralnotion thatthe exploration theconceptofmultilateralism of presentedhere advances forfurther what those circumstances and are scrutiny. Discoveringprecisely why the picture is far frombeing uniformacross issue-areas is clearly a necessary nextstep in thisline of inquiry.

Conclusion
withtwo sets of protagonists mind. The first in are This articlewas written matter little.It thosetheorists international of relationsforwhominstitutions may be true, as these theoristsinsist,that they do not purportto explain It does notfollow from but do everything thatwhatthey explainis important.125 And that truth, however,that what theyleave unexplainedis unimportant. institutions, clearly, notunimportant. are The second set of protagonists those of my fellowinstitutionalists are for take is left unexplored.Their focus is on whom the formthat institutions Much in institutions a genericsense or on cooperationeven more generally. But at the thatperspective. can be learned about international relationsfrom same time,too much is leftunsaid. And what is leftunsaid-the formthat institutions assume-affectsvitally role thatinstitutions on theworld the play for amidstrapid stagetoday.Above all else, policymakers groping alternatives change, hoping to grasp the flow of events and channel it in desirable do choicesare palpablyconcrete. directions, notdeal in genericchoices;their
Press,1990). (New York: ColumbiaUniversity 123. PeterM. Haas, SavingtheMediterranean Effortsto Epistemic Community 124. See Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Organization (Winter1992),pp. 187-223;JamesK. 46 ProtectStratospheric Ozone," Intemational in a Coalition:Negotiating Regime to ControlGlobal Warming," Sebenius,"Crafting Winning a D. a (Washington, Warming: Negotiating Global Regime RichardElliot Benedicket al., Greenhouse and the 1991); and Mark W. Zacher, "MultilateralOrganizations C.: World Resources Institute, Spaces," in The Developmentof Regimes forthe Non-Terrestrial Institution Multilateralism: of Matters. Ruggie,Multilateralism on 125. This has been Waltz'sstandard response;see, forexample,KennethWaltz,"Reflections in A Politics: Response to My Critics," Robert0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism Theory Intemational of Press,1986),pp. 322-45. and Its Critics (New York: ColumbiaUniversity

Organization 598 International arrangeinternational institutional A core and concretefeatureof current form.Why both the conventionalliteratureon ments is their multilateral should remainrelaon relationsand the literature institutions international ontology of to tively silenton it maywell have something do withthe atomistic of epistemology the other,as James the one and the instrumental-rationalist in Be ways,suggest.'26 thatas it Kratochwil, different Caporaso and Friedrich that it is may,I hope that the presentarticlehas established,at minimum, matters. the seriously issue thatform worth investigating was has No theory been advancedin thepresentarticle;no theory vindicated or even tested. We cannot explain what we have not firstdescribed.And description, informed conceptual explicationis a requisite for theoretically My itself. mainobjectivehere has been to to building leadingultimately theory and and both explicatethe conceptof multilateralism, analytically historically, about what may and may not to offer some preliminary guidinghypotheses and about how and whyitmatters. explainitsincidenceand correlates

and FriedrichV. 126. See Caporaso, "InternationalRelations Theory and Multilateralism"; Divide: A Unilateral Plea for Kratochwil,"Multilateralismand the Rationalist/Reflectivist in Communicative Rationality," Ruggie,Multilateralism Matters.