. 6 .

�From Kennedy's Myth�to Johnson's Dream:�Liberal Fascism and the�Cult of the

State�f^ OR GENERATIONS, THE central fault line in American politie^ has involved
the growth�and power of the state. The conL ventional narrative has conservatives
trying to�shrink the size of�govemment and liberals trying#successfully#to expand
it. There's�Liberals often argue for restraining govemment in areas such as law
enforcement (the�Warren Court's�Miranda�ruling, for example), national security
(opposition to the Patriot Act�and domestic surveillance), and that vast but ill-
defined realm that�comes under the mbric of "legislating morality." While
disagreements over specitic�policies proliferate, virtually all conservatives�and
most libertarians favor assertiveness in govemment's traditional�role as the
"night-watchman state." Many go further, seeing the govemment as a protector�of
decency and cultural norms.�In short, the argument about the size of govemment is
often a�stand-in for deeper arguments about the role of govemment. This�chapter
will attempt to show that for some liberals, the state is in fact�a substitute for
God and a form of political religion as imagined by�Rousseau and Robespierre, the
fathers of liberal fascismHistorically, for many liberals�the role of the state
has been a matter less of size than of function. Progressivism�shared with
fascism�a�deep and abiding conviction that in a truly modem society, the
state�must take the place of religion.�:7or some, this conviction was bom^�of the
belief that God was dead. As Eugen Weber writes, "The�Fascist leader, now that God
is dead, cannot conceive of himself as�the elect of God. He believes he is elect,
but does not quite know of .�what#presumably of history or obscure historical
forces." This is�the fascism that leads to the Fuhrerprinzip and cults of
personality.�$ut there is a second kind of fascism that sees the state not as the
re- ;�placement of God but as God's agent or vehicle. In both cases, however, the
state�is the ultimate authority, the source and maintainer�of ^�While not a modem
liberal himself, JFK was tumed after his�death into a martyr to the religion of
govemment. This was due j�partly to the manipulations of the Kennedy circle and
partly to the�On November 22,1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas,�
Rather wasn't the only one eager to point fingers at the rightf�Within minutes
Kennedy's aides blamed deranged and unnamed #�right-wingers.�fiut when it became
clear that a deranged Marxist had done the deed, Kennedy's defenders�were
dismayed. "He didn't even have the satisfaction of being killerl fnr
civil�rights," Jackie lamented to Bobby Kennedy when he told her the�news.
"It's#it had to be some silly little Communist."1�Or maybe not, the Kennedy
mythmakers calculated. They set�about creating the fable that Kennedy died
battling "hate"#established code. then�and now. for the nolitical right. The story
became�legend because liberals were desperate to imbue Kennedy's assassination
with a more�exalted and politically useful meaning. Over and�The fact that Oswald
was a communist quickly changed from an�inconvenience to proof of something even
more sinister. How, liberals asked, could�a card-carryhg Marxist nurder a liberal
titan on the�side of social progress? The fact that Kennedy was a raging
anticommunist seemed�not to register, perhaps because liberals�had convinced
themselves, in the wake of the McCarthy era, that the real�threat to liberty must
always come from the right. Oswald's Marxism�\.nd so, over the course ofthe
1960s,�the conspiracy theories metastasized, and the Marxist gunman became a
patsy. "Cui�bono?" asked the Oliver Stones then and ever�Never mind that�Oswald
had alreadv tried tn mnrrlpr thp fnrmp.r arrnv maior general�and prominent right-
wing spokesman Edwin Walker or that, as the�Warren Commission would later report,
Oswald "had an extreme�dislike of the rightwing."3�an infonnal strategic response
developed that would�serve the purposes of the burgeoning New Left as well as
assuage the�consciences of liberals generally: transfonn Kennedy into an
allpurpose martyr for�causes he didn't take up and fpr a nnlitics he�didn't
subscribe to.�Tnrlpp.ft. over the course of the 1960s and beyond, a legend grew�up
around the idea that if only Kennedy had lived, we wou1d never�have gotten bogged
down in Vietnam�But even Robert F. Kennedy�conceded in an oral history intendew
that his brother never seriously�considered withdrawal and was committed to total
victory in�Vietnam. Kennedy was an aggressive anti-communist and Cold War�hawk.�.
The previous March, Kennedy had asked�!. The flattering legend is that Kennedy was
an unalloved champion of civil rights.�Supposedly, if he had lived, the�alloyed
champion of civil rights. Supposedly, if he had lived, the�racial turmoil ofthe
1960s could have been avoided. The tmth is far�more prosaic�ac..Yes. Kennedy
pushed for civil rights legislation, and�^Wepublicans had carried most of�the
burden of fulfilling the American promise of equality to blacks.�Eisenhower had
pushed through two civil rights measures over�strong opposition from southem
Democrais, auu in particular Senate�Maiority Leader Lyndon Johnson, who fought
hard to dilute the leg^iitmn. Again, Kennedy�was on the right side of history,
but�his efforts were mostlv reactive. "I did not lie awake worrying about
the�problems of Negroes," he confessed.5�Many elements of the Kennedy myth are as
obvious now as they�were then. He was the youngest man ever elected president
(Teddy�Roosevelt had been the youngest to serve). He v�3ut at the same time a
pragmatist who would never let the�pointy-headed Ivy Leaguers with whom he
surrounded himself get�in the way of the right course of action. He represented a
national�yeaming for "renewal" and "rebirth," appealing to American idealism and
calling for�common sacrifice.�Indeed, Kennedy was almost literally a superhero. It
is a littler. fi'ut it does�give you�a sense of how even leading intellectuals
like Mailer understood that�they were being offered a myth#and were eager to
accept it.8�The original Kennedy myth did not emphasize Kennedy's progressive
credentials. Ted�Sorensen recalled that JFK "never�identified himself as a
liberal; it was onlv aftp.r his death that thev began�to claim him as one of
theirs." Indeed, the Kennedy family had serious trouble with�many self-described
progressives (wt�In later years, staffers knew they could win Kennedy's ear if
they�could make him think that greatness was in the offing. His entire political
career�was grounded in the hope and aspiration that he would�follow FDR as a lion
of the twentieth century.�JFK famously inherited this ambition from his father,
Joseph P.�Kennedy, the pro-Nazi Democratic Party boss who was desperate to�put a
son in the White House. In 1946 Joe distributed a hundred�Kennedy was the first
modem politician to recognize and exploit�the new clout enjoyed by intellectuals
in American society. The old�Brain Tmsters were economists and engineers, men
concemed with�shaping earth and iron. The new Brain Tmsters were image men,
his;orians, and writers#propagandists�in the most benign sense#concemed with
spinning woras ana pictures. Kennedy was no�dunce,�u"+ k<a 'indftrstood that in
the modem aee style tends to tmmp substance. (An indisputably�handsome and
charming man, he obviously�benefited from the rise oftelevision.) And the Kennedy
machine represented nothing�if not the triumph of style in American
Dolitics.�^p.nnp.dv's political fortune also stemmed from the fact that he�seemed
to be riding the waves of history. Once again, the forces of�progressivism had
been retumed to power after a period of peace�and prosperity. And despite the
unprecedented wealth and leisure of�the postwar years#indeed largely because of
them#there was a�"More than anything else,"�the conservative publisher Henry Luce
wrote in 1960, "the people of�America are asking for a clear sense of National
Purpose."11�""^his was the dawn of the third fascist moment in American
life,�which would unfuri throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, both in�t. What
ended as bloodshed in the streets began in many respects as a well-
intentioned�"revolution�from above"�by heirs to the Wilson-FDR legacy incapable of
containing the�demons they unleashed�ts). Above all, a rebom America needed
to�stop seeing itself as a nation of individuals. Once again, "collective�action"
was the cure. Darlington's call tor a "decreased emphasis on�private enterprise"
amounted to a revival of the corporatism and war�socialism of the Wilson and
Roosevelt administrations.12�On the eve of JFK's inauguration in January 1960, a
Look report,�found that Americans ^�were actually feeling pretty good: "Most
Americans today are relaxed, unadventurous,�comfortably satisfied with their way
of life�and blandly optimistic about the future." The trick, then, was to rip�The
trick, then, was to rip�Americans' attention away from their TV dinners and fan-
tailed cars�and get them to follow the siren song of the intellectuals. And
that�And that�meant Kennedy needed a crisis to bind the public mind to a
new�Sorelian myth. "Great crises produce great men," Kennedy proclaimed in
Profiles in�Courage, and his entire presidency would be�dedicated to the creation
of crises commensurate with the greatness�lameniea me aua^ui uis^vmcnis ot the
American people.14�be unfair to label him a fascist. But his obsession with
fostering�crises in order to whip up popular sentiments in his favor demonstrates
the perils�of infatuation with fascist aesthetics in democratic�politics. Ted
Sorensen's memoirs count sixteen crises in Kennedy's�first eight months in office.
Kennedy created "crisis teams" that�could short-circuit the traditional
bureaucracy, the democratic�process, and even the law. David Halberstam writes
that Johnson inherited from Kennedy�"crisis-mentality men, men who delighted
in�the great intemational crisis because it centered the action right there�in the
White House#the meetings, the decisions, the tensions, the�power, they were movers
and activists, and this was what they had�come to Washington for, to meet these
challenges." Garry Wills and�Garry Wills and�Henry Fairlie#hardly right-wing
critics#dubbed the Kennedy administration a "guerilla�govemment" for its abuse of
and cnntemDt�for the traditional govemmental system. In an interview in 1963
Otto�Strasser, the left-wing Nazi who helped found the movement, told�the scholar
David Schoenbaum that Kennedy's abuse of authority�and crisis-mongering certainly
made him look like a fascist.15�. If, as the New Left so often claimed, the�m$|
bilization of "youth" in the 1960s was spurred by the anxiety of�living under the
shadow of "the bomb," then they have JFK to thank�for it.�Kennedy's tax cuts#aimed
to counteract the worst stock market crash since the Depression#were implemented
not in the spirit of supply-side economics (as some�conservatives are wont to
insinuate) but as a form of Keynesianism,�some observers charged that he was
making himself into a�strongman. The Wall Street Journal and the Chamber of
Commerce�likened him to a dictator. Ayn Rand explicitly called him a fascist in�a
1962 speech, "The Fascist New Frontier."�It is not ajoyful thing to impugn an
American hero and icon with�the label fascist. And if by fascist you mean evil,
cmel, and biented.�then Kennedy was no fascist. But we must ask, what made his
administration so popular? What made it so effective? What has given�it its
lasting appeal? On almost every front, the answers are those�very elements that
fit the fascist playbook: the creation of crises, nationalistic appeals to unity,
the celebration of martial values, the�blurring oflines between public and private
sectors, the utilization of�mass media to glamorize the state and its programs,
invocations of a�new "post-partisan" spirit that places the important decisions in
the�hands of experts and intellectual supermen, and a cult of personality�for thp
national leader.�Kennedy promised to transcend ideology in the name of what�would
later be described as cool pragmatism. Like the pra^�Like the pragmatists�who came
before him, he eschewed
labels, believing that he was beyond right and left. Instead, he shared Robert
McNamara's confiFhese problems "deal�with questions which are now beyond the
comprehension of most�men" and should therefore be left to the experts to settle
without subjecting them to divisive democratic debate.18�Kennedy presidencv
reDresented something more profound. It�marked the final evoludon of Progressivism
into a full-blown religion and a national cult of the state.�From the beginning,
Kennedv's presidency had tannerl into a nationalistic and religious leitmotif
increasingly central to American�liberalism and consonant with the themes of both
Progressivism and�fascism. The�The Kennedy "action-intellectuals" yeamed to be
supermen, a Gnostic priesthood imbued with the special knowledge of�how to fix
society's problems. JFK's inaugural opened the decade�John F. Kennedy represented
the cult of personality tradition of�American liberalism. He wanted to be a great
man in the mold of�Wilson and the Roosevelts. He was more concemed with guns
than�wilson ar�As we've seen, Wilson and the progressives laid the
intellectual�foundations for the divinized liberal state. The progressives,
it�should be remembered, did not argue for totalitarianism because the�war
demanded it; they argued for totalitarianism and were delighted�that the war made
it possible. But World War I also proved to be the�undoing of the progressive
dream of American collectivism. The total mobilization of the war#and the
stupidity of the war in the�first�place#reawakened in its aftermath the
traditional American resistance to such tyranny. In the 1920s the progressives
sulked while�Americans enjoyed remarkable prosperity and the Russians and�Italians
(in their view) had "all the fun of remaking a world." The�Great Depression came
along just in time: it put the progressives�back in the driver's seat. As we have
seen, FDR brought no new�ideas to govemment; he merely dusted off the ideas he had
absorbed�as a member of the Wilson administration. But he left the state
immeasurably strengthened and expanded. Indeed, it is worth�recalling�that the
origins of the modem conservative movement stem from an�instinctive desire to
shrink the state oacK aown to a manageable size�after the war. But the Cold War
changed that, forcing many conservatives to support a large national security
state in order�to defeat�communism. This decision on the part of foreign policy
hawks created a permanent schism on the American right. Nonetheless, even�though
Cold War conservatives believed in a limited govemment,�their support for anti-
communism prevented any conceivable at