Crim Pro Outline - Prof. Bandes UMiami or U of Chicago

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Final Exam Information May 9, 2011 The exam will be a three-hour, closed-book cumulative final. The exam will consist of two essays and 45 multiple-choice questions. Professor Bandes knows the law; so, do not define the law. o Apply the law to a new fact situation o Rationales of the law o What the law says o How would this apply to a new situation I have not seen o Overruled Cases Belton was overrule by Gant Only use cases that advance the argument Essay Response Format o Paragraphs are not necessary. Use underlined headings. You do not need to know/cite case names, but you do need to know the facts and the rules of law from the assigned cases. Facts and Law for every point/issue Only ask questions about the exam during class so everyone else can hear the response Multiple Choice o Two examples o Not long fact situations, or serial questions based on long fact situations. o Each question is designed to test factual material. o Example: How long do you have to get a suspect before a magistrate after an arrest?
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SYLLABUS
Unit 1 2 3 Title The Norms of the Criminal Process: Intro to 4th Amendment What is a search? What is a search (continued) and What is a seizure? - Smith v. Maryland - Dog sniffs, Open fields - Kyllo, Karo Probable Cause Arrest Warrants Search Warrant Search Incident to Arrest (home, public place) Search Incident to Arrest (auto) Pretext Automobile Search Casebook Readings 49 - 65 84 - 102 103 109 113 119 126 140 150 169 171 183 199 217 218 235 235 258 258 - 266 266 272 278 287 290 297 304 310 310 321, 326 348 - 267 371 397 422 455 70 82 468 475 446 468 476 490 496 509 509 533 535 543 555 565 566 576 581 602 685 695 645 665 666 671 674 680 681 683 607 614 616 623 631 641 623 641 696 716
4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Plain View Consent Stop and Frisk Arrest vs. Stop Special Needs Searches The Exclusionary Rule Standing Exceptions to the Rule Good Faith Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery Recent Developments Torture and Due Process Approach Miranda v. Arizona
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Miranda Applied: Custody and Interrogation Miranda Applied: Waiver and Invocation Exceptions to Miranda
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Miranda Revisited 6th Amendment / Confessions
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BANDES COURSE OUTLINE 1 The Norms of the Criminal Process: Intro to 4th Amendment 49 - 65
The Fourth Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2 What is a search? 84 - 102
General Principles: If an action does not constitute a search, then the 4th Amendment does not apply. The Constitution does not prohibit ALL unreasonable law enforcement practices. o Just searches and seizures Therefore, it is necessary to examine what constitutes a search or seizure. 4th Amendment rights are personal, and cannot be asserted vicariously o The remedy to a 4th Amendment violation is the exclusion of the evidence obtained pursuant to the wrongful search. 4th Amendment is a pretrial Inquiry o Actions of a private citizen against another private citizen are not covered by the 4th Amendment, which only applies to the government. Katz v. United States (1967) (4th Amendment and the Expectation of Privacy) Facts Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone from LA to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. At trial the Government was permitted to introduce evidence of Katzs telephone conversations overheard by the FBI who had attached an electronic recording device to the outside of a phone booth. There was no warrant. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment because there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by Katz. Issue Whether the search and seizure conducted complied with the 4th Amendments clause regarding unreasonable searches. Holding First, it is important to note that the 4th Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy Its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Second, the 4th Amendment provides protection to people, not places.
The Government contends that the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the booth from which the petitioner places his calls. Since the 4th Amendment protects people, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. One who occupies a telephone booth, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to call somebody is surely entitled to assume that his conversations will not be broadcasted to the world. It does not matter that a phone booth is a public place, but that when somebody places a call in one, his or her expectations of freedom from intrusion is reasonable. Therefore, reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical evidence. What a person knowingly exposes to the public cannot be considered to be private anymore. Harlans 2-prong test to determine if the 4th Amendment applies (Katz Test) 1. A person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy 2. This expectation is objectively reasonable. *Problem is that a subjective part of this test does not establish a bright line rule. Also stated as. Dissent (Black, J.) A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized. Black thinks the Court is rewriting the Amendment in order to keep it in harmony with the times. If the framers wanted to restrict the use of evidence secured by eavesdropping, they could have easily put it in the Amendment. Trespass is no longer the test. Katz Test: reasonable expectation of privacy
United States v. White (1971) (Reasonable Expectations and Double-Crossing Friends) Facts White was tried and convicted for various illegal transactions involving narcotics. He was busted when a wired police officer and a team of cops listened in while the officer and White struck a drug deal. Katz argued that the evidence obtained through the recording was inadmissible because it violated the 4th Amendment. Court of Appeals held that the evidence was inadmissible and violated of the 4th Amendment. Issue Whether the 4th Amendment bars from evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations which had occurred between defendant White and a government informant, and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter carried by the agent and concealed on his person. Holding No. Reversed. White did not have a justifiable and protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not later turn him in. One contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. He voluntarily surrendered himself to a person who later betrayed him this is distinguishable from the situation in Katz.
Individuals assume the risk of communication with a friend. Thus, warrantless recording of conversations is not a search in the context of the 4th Amendment. Dissent (Douglas, J.) To equate electronic recording with eavesdropping is inappropriate. I would stand by Katz and reaffirm the need for judicial supervision under the 4th Amendment of the use of electronic surveillance, which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state. (Harlan, J.) We should not impose upon our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant requirement. This ruling applies not only to criminals, but to law abiding citizens are burdened with this risk. Two-pronged test for whether a search has occurred: Subjective Prong: whether the person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy Objective Pong: Whether the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Notes: Sharing info with a 3rd party is equal to sharing it with the world (including the government) 3 What is a search (continued) and What is a seizure? - Smith v. Maryland - Dog sniffs, Open fields - Kyllo, Karo
103 109 113 119 126 140
Notes: Is there a search? Does the 4th Amendment apply in this case? Smith v. Maryland (1979) (Pen Registers and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy) Facts Smith robs woman, then proceeds to call and threaten her. In response, the Police, without a warrant, before having a pen register set up to track the calls coming into and coming from the womans home. The pen register didnt tape the conversations, but merely took down the numbers. The trial court denied the suppression of the pen register, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate the 4th Amendment. Smith was convicted and sentenced to 6 years. Issue Whether the installation and use of pen register constitutes a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. Holding No. Affirmed. Telephone users, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of business related
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reasons. The fact that Smith made the phone call from his home is immaterial. Although Smith may have intended to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. Even if Smith did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society deems reasonable. Courts have consistently held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third persons. Dissent (Stewart, J. & Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.) Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed publicly, but it is doubtful that there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. It does not follow that people typically know that a phone company monitors calls for internal reasons would be aware that this information will be made public or to the government. Implicit in the concept of assumption of the risk is some notion of choice. At least in 3rd party consensual surveillance cases, the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential communications. It is idle to speak of assuming risks where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative. Privacy in placing calls is of value not only to those engaged in criminal activities. United States v. Knotts (1983) (Chloroform, Beepers, and Monitoring a Persons Movement) Facts Case discussed whether the monitoring of a beeper constitutes a search when federal authorities placed it into a five-gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by defendant. Police then monitored defendants movements from point to point. Police followed him to his cabin, and based on this information secured a search warrant. Defendant sought to suppress evidence found in the cabin, on the ground that the surveillance was conducted without a warrant. Holding A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. The only information conveyed by the beeper was the defendants movements. United States v. Place (1983) (Dog Sniffing is NOT a Search Within the Meaning of the 4th Amendment) Holding The Court held that a dog sniff search does not constitute a search under the 4th Amendment because there was no opening of the luggage. It doesnt expose contraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view. The sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, and therefore, the information is limited. - The argument for dog sniffs goes because the sniff can only reveal the presence of contraband items, the sniff does not implicate legitimate privacy interests and is not to be treated as a search. - False Positive from dog sniffing would induce a search despite the lack of contraband. - In this case, the authorities took the defendants luggage and held it for 90 minutes before the defendants flight. The court held that even if this was not a search of his belongings, it was a seizure of his property.
***Remember, states can grant more rights to individuals than the federal government. States may not further restrict these rights, however. Open Fields, Curtilage, and Beyond: When is the 4th Amendment Implicated? Open Fields Doctrine - Hester v. United States - Entry of an open field does not implicate the 4th Amendment. o An open field may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. Hence, intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those unreasonable searches proscribed by the text of the 4th Amendment. o Any asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable. An open field need be neither open nor a field as those terms are used in common speech. Oliver v. United States (1984) (Open Fields and Marijuana Shields) Facts Police had heard reports of marijuana being grown on Olivers farm. Narcotics agents, arriving at Olivers sidestepped around a gate with a no trespassing sign and a locked gate. They were yelled at by a man who was living in a camper. Over a mile from Olivers home, they found a field of marijuana. Holding Open fields fall outside the scope of the 4th Amendment test, which only prohibits unreasonable searches of persons, houses, papers, or effects. The term effects is less inclusive than property and cannot be said to encompass open fields. Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops. *The Supreme Court has given much more power to government since Katz. Curtilage Area that extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [persons] home and the privacies of life. - Courts have extended the 4th Amendment protection to curtilage. 4 Factors announced in Dunn to define Curtilage 1. Proximity of area claimed to be curtilage 2. Enclosure of the area 3. Nature of the use to which the area is put 4. Steps taken to preserve privacy from people passing by Justice Marshalls opinion of the Open Fields Doctrine Marshall believes that because property rights reflect societys explicit recognition of a persons authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [they] should be considered in determining whether an individuals expectations of privacy are reasonable.
Marshall sees no reason why a government official should not be obliged to respect such unequivocal and universally understood manifestations of a landowners desire for privacy.
Kyllo v. United States (2001) (thermal imaging of a home constitutes a 4th Amendment "search" and may be done only with a warrant) Facts Police believed Kyllo to be growing marijuana inside his home with heat lamps. Police acquired a thermal-imaging device that detected that his garage was emitting more intense heat than other areas of the house. Based on this information, Police obtained a search warrant. Issue Whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. Holding With few exceptions, people have a right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion while in their home. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation of privacy in the home would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the 4th Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search. Scalia relies on the fact that the thermal-imaging equipment is not available to the general public. We rejected a mechanical interpretation of the 4th Amendment in Katz. Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology. The Government relies on the argument that it did not detect private activities occurring in private areas. However, they were details of the home. Dissent Heat waves enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The equipment did not penetrate the walls of petitioners home, and while it did pick up details of the home that were exposed to the public, it did not obtain any information regarding the interior of the home. B. What constitutes a seizure? United States v. Karo (1984) (Seizures and Monitoring Devices) Facts DEA agent learned that Karo had ordered 50 gallons of ether from an informant. The informant told the agents that it was to be used to extract cocaine from clothing. With the informants consent the agents substituted their own can containing a beeper for one of the cans in the shipment. The Court of Appeals held that the violation occurred at the time the beeper-laden can was transferred to Karo. Issue Whether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment when that container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.
Holding No. Reversed. A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individuals possessory interests in that property. Although the can may have contained an unknown and unwanted foreign object, it cannot be said that anyones possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful way. Dissent When the government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property to its own use. Surely this is an interference with possessory rights. The right to exclude, which attached as soon as the can respondents purchased was delivered, had been infringed. This interference is meaningful because the character of the property is profoundly different when infected with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ free. The government thus asserted dominion and control over the can, and this is the definition of a seizure. Objects Subject to Seizure (4 Categories) 1. Contraband (evidence that may not lawfully be possessed by a private party) 2. Fruits of a crime 3. Instrumentalities used in the commission of an offense (e.g., a weapon or getaway vehicle) 4. Mere Evidence (i.e., an item of value to the police solely because it will help in the apprehension or conviction of a person for an offense) Seizure of Persons When an officer by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. In order to have a legal search or seizure under the 4th Amendment, the police authorities must have (1) probable cause in order to get (2) a warrant. 4 Probable Cause 150 169
Probable Cause Exists where facts and circumstances within an officers knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. - Probable cause to search: Evidence subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched. - Sources of Probable Cause: o Officer directly observes; o Through hearsay Probable Cause usually arises in Two Circumstances: 1. Police apply to a magistrate for an arrest or search warrant. Police set out to neutral and detached magistrate, under oath, of information in their possession that they believe justifies issuance of the warrant. i. Warrant Application Requirements: (Aguilar v. Texas)
1. Aguilar-Spinelli Two-Pronged Test a. Veracity (Is the affiant truthful?) i. Track record (prior tips) ii. Reason to believe him this time (e.g. admission against interest) iii. Assumed veracity (police officer, citizen informant) b. Basis of Knowledge (how does he know what he knows?) i. Direct statement of how he knows ii. Self-verifying detain (type and amount of detail suggests reliable way of knowing information) 2. Underlying circumstances enabling magistrate to independently judge the validity of informants conclusion. ii. Warrant must be sufficiently detailed 1. 4th Amendment demands reasonableness a. Informant was credible or information was reliable. i. Hearsay is acceptable if: Informant has seen fact or facts, or good reason to believe it. (Draper v. United States) Generally, the Court will apply a totality of the circumstances approach to granting a search or arrest warrant. (Illinois v. Gates) i. Gates lowers the standard to fair probability for Probable Cause ii. An informants veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant, but these elements shouldnt be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly applied. 1. Magistrate should make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before her, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 2. Police may conduct an arrest or search without a warrant. If search turns out to be unconstitutional, it will be subject to exclusion. i. Judge asks: If police had sought warrant, would it have been proper to grant it? Illinois v. Gates (1983) (anonymous tips and the totality of circumstances) Adopts Totality of Circumstances Test; abandons the Aguilar-Spinelli Two-Pronged Test Redefines/Lowers the standard for probable cause from substantial probability to a fair probability Directs reviewing courts to give great deference to a magistrates determination that a warrant is supported by probable cause. Brief Fact Summary The police received an anonymous letter outlining specific details about the Defendants, Gates and others (the defendants), plans to traffic drugs from Florida to Illinois. When the details were corroborated by the defendants actions, police obtained a search warrant and found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants home and automobile. Synopsis of Rule of Law
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Where an anonymous tip is corroborated with actual police findings, a totality of the circumstances approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the two-pronged test of veracity/reliability and basis of knowledge from Spinelli v. United States (1969). The 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution requires no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a substantial basis that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Facts The police received a highly detailed anonymous tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. The police, following up on the tip, observed the defendants conducting specific activities, which were outlined in the tip. On the basis of the tip and the defendants corroborating activities, the police obtained a search warrant. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants automobile and home. Issue May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informers basis of knowledge if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings? Held When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant, the elements of the informants credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge are to be used as guides when considering the totality of the circumstances and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case. The exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. The police acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons, which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The 4th Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Timeliness here was essential. Dissent (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.) Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth the analysis magistrates should follow on determinations of probable cause. To sufficiently uphold Fourth Amendment rights, magistrates must look at both the credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant. Basis of knowledge cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some factual assertions corroborate with actual police findings. Since some of the anonymous tips were not corroborated and actually proved false, the informants credibility/reliability was undermined and therefore the warrant should not have been issued. Police cannot use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a previously issued warrant. The Aguilar-Spinelli tests must be applied to anonymous informants tips, if we are to continue to insure that findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, are based on information provided by an honest or credible person who has acquired the information in a reliable way. We fear that the abolition of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard may foretell an evisceration of the probable cause standard altogether. The totality of the circumstances approach is an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the 4th Amendment. Todays decision threatens to obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state, where they are the law. Concurrence Even if the factual findings by police were only corroborated by innocuous behavior, a valid warrant could still have been issued because the defendants actions were suspicious. The main
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focus should be whether there is an inference, based upon the suspects actions that the informant is credible and the information was obtained in a reliable manner. Discussion Credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the 4th Amendment is not violated. Test The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before her... there is a fair probability that... evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Maryland v. Pringle (2003) (arrest everyone when no one claims ownership contraband) Facts Officer lawfully stopped a speeding vehicle, and noticed that the driver, while reaching for registration information, had a large wad of money in the glove compartment. Driver then consented to a search, which resulted in the officer finding cocaine. None of the passengers in the car admitted that the cocaine was theirs, so the police arrested all three of the men. Holding Court upheld the arrest. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause. Notes The Supreme Court noted that a car passenger will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoings. Franks v. Delaware (1978) (veracity of police officer is assumed) Facts A United States Supreme Court case dealing with defendants' rights to challenge evidence collected on the basis of a warrant granted on the basis of a false statement. The court held that where a warrant affidavit contains a statement, necessary to the finding of probable cause, that is demonstrated to be both false and included by an affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, the warrant is not valid. Holding Justice Blackmun held that in the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavits false material set to one side, the affidavits remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. They further held that the bulwark of the Fourth Amendment protection is the Warrant Clause, which requires that police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon the search. Moreover, they held that a challenge to a warrants veracity may be permitted. Notes
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Even if the police officer was lying, the warrant is not invalidated unless authorities lack probable cause. Schmerber v. California (1966) (probable cause does not change based on the level of imminent danger; sliding scale) Background A decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that a State may, over the suspect's protest, have a physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunken driving without violating the suspect's Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution rights. Facts A blood sample was taken from the defendant who was arrested for drunk driving, without his consent. Holding Because it involved an intrusion into a human body (a more offensive type of search), a clear indication that in fact such evidence of intoxication will be found. This may indicate a standard of: Probable Cause +, or a sliding scale of probable cause. Issue and Outcome Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self- incrimination? No. Justice Brennan argued for a unanimous Court that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."
Arrest Warrants
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When do you need a warrant for arrest? What time of warrant if you do need one? Exceptions Sometimes, you may even need a search warrant to serve an arrest warrant. Individual Interests Privacy (against intrusion into home, body) Liberty (against restraint, arrest) Possessory (against loss of belongings, or loss of their use) Arrest Warrant Requirements Probable cause that suspect committed a crime, and Reason to believe suspect is in the place at which the warrant will be executed Search Warrant Requirements Probable cause that suspect committed a crime, and Probable Cause that suspect is in the place at which the warrant will be executed Arrests: Type of Warrants Arrest in Public Place: Arrest in Own Home:
No Warrant Arrest Warrant

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Arrest in Third Partys Home: Search Warrant o A Search Warrant requires probable cause that the suspect is in the Third Partys home, rather than the less stringent standard required for an Arrest Warrant. A Search Warrant does everything that an Arrest Warrant does, and then more.
Payton v. New York (1980) Facts NY detectives found sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Payton had murdered the manager of a gas station in January 1970. On the morning of January 15, officers went to Paytons apartment, intending to arrest him without a warrant. There was no response to their knock on the metal door, so they used crowbars to break open the door and enter the apartment. Payton was not there, however there was a shell casing that was seized and later admitted into evidence at Paytons murder trial. Payton moved to suppress the evidence taken from his apartment, on the grounds that the seizure violated the 4th Amendment. Issue Under what circumstances may an officer enter a suspects home to make a warrantless arrest? Holding (Stevens, joined by Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell) The warrantless arrest was unreasonable. It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of general warrants were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the 4th Amendment. The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 4th Amendment is directed. It is a basic principle of 4th Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the 4th Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Must get a warrant to enter the home, absent exigent circumstances. Dissent (White, joined by Burger and Rehnquist) At the time of the Bill of Rights, the warrant functioned as a powerful tool of law enforcement rather than as a protection for the rights of criminal suspects. Further, the 4th Amendment is concerned with protecting people, not places, and no talismanic significance is given to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home rather than elsewhere. four restrictions on home arrestsfelony, knock and announce, daytime, and stringent probable causeconstitute powerful and complementary protections for the privacy interests associated with the home. (White, J.) Felony Requirement: protects against abusive or arbitrary enforcement Knock and Announce PLUS Daytime Requirements: protect against fear and embarrassment of being roused from bed in partial undress. And the requirements the arrestee to surrender at his front door, thereby maintaining his dignity and preventing the officers from entering other rooms of the dwelling. Probable Cause: ensures that the suspect is at home, preventing unnecessarily scaring family, ransack the home, or seize items in plain view. Notes Warrant Particularity Requirement - Intended to prevent general searches, the immediate evil that motivated the framing and adoption of the 4th Amendment. (Payton v. New York)
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Gerstein Hearing - After a warrantless arrest has been made, and the suspect is in custody, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrates neutral determination of probable cause evaporate. (Gerstein v. Pugh) o When a persons liberty is at stake, and that person is taken into custody, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the 4th Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. o In order to satisfy the Gerstein timeliness requirement, a jurisdiction must provide a probable cause determination within 48 hours after warrantless arrest, absent a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. (Riverside v. McLaughlin) Executing an Arrest: Use of Force - An arrest, even one based on probable cause, constitutes an unreasonable seizure of the person if the method of making the arrest is unreasonable. o Ex: An officer may not use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon. (Tennessee v. Garner) Exceptions to the Payton Rule - A warrantless intrusion may be justified by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to prevent a suspects escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling. (Minnesota v. Olson) Arrests in a 3rd Persons residence: The Steagold Principle - The court dealt with the issue of whether an arrest warrant is adequate to protect the 4th Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant, when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. The warrant in this case was an arrest warrant for another person, not a search warrant looking for drugs belonging to the petitioner. (Steagold v. United States) Midday Public Arrest - Court upheld a warrantless midday public arrest, because by voluntarily placing yourself in the public there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. (United States v. Watson) Traditional View Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrates disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity. (Johnson v. United States) - This represents the viewpoint that the 4th Amendment is better served if police officers apply for warrants, rather than act on the basis of their own probable cause determination. o This view has led many to say that there is a search warrant requirement in the 4th Amendment, even though it does not explicitly state so. Competing View - The proper 4th Amendment test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. (United States v. Rabinowitz) 199 217
Search Warrant
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) (execution of a search warrant; knock and announce rule)
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Facts Officers believed that Richards was selling drugs from his hotel room, so they obtained a search warrant after obtaining substantial evidence that he was doing so. The officers arrived at the hotel; many dressed in civilian clothes and one dressed as hotel maintenance. When they knocked on the door to announce their presence, the officer announced that he was maintenance. When Richards opened the door a crack to see, he identified one of the officers (who was actually wearing his police uniform). He slammed the door quickly. The police officers then busted down the door, and found Richards trying to sneak out a back window. They ultimately found the drugs. Richards sought to have the evidence from his hotel room suppressed on the ground that the officers had failed to knock and announce their presence prior to forcing entry. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held for the state, forming a blanket rule that the police were never required knock-and-announce in felony drug cases. Holding The US Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Courts decision, but did not agree that a blanket exception was allowable pursuant to the 4th Amendment. They noted two serious concerns: 1. The exception contained considerable overgeneralizations 2. The reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. In each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. Test In order to justify a no knock entry, the police must have 1. a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 2. dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime. Notes Executing a warrant after Entry - Once officers are lawfully on premises to execute a warrant, various rules apply: o Police may search containers large enough to hold the criminal evidence for which they are searching o They may seize an object not described in the warrant, IF they have probable cause to believe it is a seizable item (contraband, evidence of a crime, etc.) o Information that becomes available to officers immediately before or during the execution of a warrant may require them to cease or narrow their search, notwithstanding the dictates of the warrant. The items that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. - Warrant Clause: When are Warrants Required or Not Required? o Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 4th Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. (Katz v. United States)
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Warden v. Hayden (1967) (warrant clause; when warrants are required; exigent circumstances; exceptions to the warrant requirement) Facts Man holds up a cab company, took $363. Two cabbies that were in the vicinity followed the man as he fled, followed him to a home, and called the police. The police arrived, and a Mrs. Hayden answered the door, and allowed the cops to enter. Police found Hayden feigning sleep. They searched the rest of the home and found various guns, similar clothing that the assailant was wearing. All these things were introduced against Hayden at trial. Holding The exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. The police acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons, which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The 4th Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential. Search Warrants: The Constitutional Debate 4th Amendment has 2 clauses: 1. Reasonableness Clause Declares a right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects 2. Warrant Clause Sets out the requirements of any valid warrant i. Supported by Probable Cause ii. Specifically describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Three Constitutional Specifications of Valid Search Warrants: They must be 1. Based on Probable Cause 2. Supported by oath or affirmation 3. Must be approved by a neutral and detached magistrate Police Searches May Target the following: 1. Contraband (drugs) 2. Fruits of the Crime (stolen money) 3. Evidence (clothing used in crime) Watson creates an exception to the warrant requirement for a public place of felony arrest. 7 Search Incident to Arrest (home, public place) 218 235
Chimel v. California (1969) (search of the home) Facts 3 officers arrived at Chimels home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin ship. The Chimels wife allowed the officer into the house. When Chimel returned home
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from work, the officers showed him the warrant and asked if they could look around. Chimel objected, but was told that on the basis of the lawful arrest, they would nonetheless conduct a search of every room in the house, including inside drawers. No search warrant was issued, just an arrest warrant. The officers seized several items, mostly coins and tokens. They were used as evidence against him at trial to Chimels objection. Appellate court held that the search was justified, on the ground that it was incident to a valid arrest. Issue Whether the warrantless search of the petitioners entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. Holding No. The search here went far beyond the petitioners person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. The scope of the search was unreasonable it was beyond the area of immediate control. The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and the burden is on those seeking an exemption from the requirement to show the need for it. 1. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 2. Further, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. There is no justification for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs. Case Notes local custodial arrest Chimel overrules two cases: o Harris v. United States (1947) o United States v. Rabinowitz (1950) Notes Principle of Particular Justification - The Police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. United States v. Robinson (1973) (search of a vehicle) Facts Because an officer had recently issued Robinson a ticket after he was found to be driving with a revoked operators permit, the same officer believed Robinson to be committing the same offense just 4 days later, and arrested him a second time. Officer then searched Robinson, and from experience concluded that Robinson wasnt carrying a weapon, but knew that there was something in his jacket. He reached into the jacket, and found a crumpled up cigarette package, which had capsules of heroin inside. Court of Appeals held that even after a police officer lawfully places a suspect under arrest for the purpose of taking him into custody, he might not ordinarily proceed to fully search the prisoner. However, a limited frisk is appropriate.
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Holding In the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless full search of the person is permissible and reasonable as an exception to the 4th Amendment. Bright line Rule because the crime does not matter and the nature of the contraband in question does not matter. Court noted the well-settled tradition: A search incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment. o A search may be made of the person or o The area within the control of the arrestee. A police officers determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect is a quick ad hoc judgment, which the 4th Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the arrest. 8 Search Incident to Arrest (auto) Pretext 235 258 258 - 266
PowerPoint Notes (automobile searches) Search Incident to Arrest Triggered by lawful custodial arrest Must be contemporaneous in time and place with arrest Scope of Auto Search Incident to Arrest Search of entire passenger compartment includes the contents of any open or locked containers therein but only if o Arrestee is in reaching distance of car, or o There is reason to believe the car contains fruits of the crime that give rise to arrest There is no search of the trunk allowed incident to arrest Search of Auto Based on Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement Triggered by probable cause to believe the car contains contraband This doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement. The mobility of the car is an exigency excusing the warrant Scope of Auto Based on Automobile Exception The scope of the search is defined by the probable cause that triggered it. Police may search anywhere in the car where there is probable cause to believe they will find contraband (including the trunk). New York v. Belton (1981) (search incident to arrest; automobiles) Facts Officer chased down a speeding car, and pulled it over. There were four men in the car, none of who owned the vehicle or was related to its owner. The officer then smelled marijuana and had seen an envelope that said Supergold, which the officer knew related to marijuana. Officer arrested all four men, and then searched envelope. The envelope contained marijuana. Officer continued to search the passenger compartment of the car. He unzipped one of the pockets of a jacket, and found Beltons cocaine. By the time the officer had found the cocaine, Belton was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car.
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Issue Whether or not the officers search of the automobile after a lawful custodial arrest is within the scope of the 4th Amendment. Holding Yes. Affirmed. - When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may as a contemporaneous incident to that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. o They can also search any of the containers found within the passenger compartment. A search incident to an arrest requires no further justification. - The jacket was within the arrestees immediate control pursuant to Chimel. - **This is an increase in police authority Dissent (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.) The rule from Chimel was designed to maintain the safety of an officer and to preserve easily destructible evidence. Today, the Court adopts a fiction that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in a car. Belton could not have reached for his coat in this situation. (White, J. & Marshall, J.) This is an extreme extension of Chimel and one that the court should not subscribe. Here, searches of luggage, briefcases, and other containers in the interior of an auto are authorized in the absence of any suspicion whatsoever. Notes Still purporting to reaffirm Chimel, the Court in New York v. Belton held that police officers who had made a valid arrest of the occupant of a vehicle could make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compartment of the automobile, including containers found therein. Believing that a fairly simple rule understandable to authorities in the field was desirable, the Court ruled "that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item." In this particular instance, Belton had been removed from the automobile and handcuffed, but the Court wished to create a general rule removed from the fact-specific nature of any one case. "'Container' here denotes any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like. Our holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk." (quoting Chimel) Search Incident to Lawful Citation (Notes pg. 240 246) Knowles v. Iowa (1998) o Facts: Officer pulls Knowles over for speeding. State law authorized police to arrest traffic violators and take them immediately before a magistrate; however the officer just issued a citation. Even though the officer had no reason to believe he would find a weapon or criminal evidence in the car, he conducted a full search of the vehicle and found a bag of narcotics.
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o Holding: This was a violation of the 4th Amendment. There was no arrest, but just a citation. Thus, the search was not incident to the arrest. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) o Facts: Atwater was driving her pickup with her young children in the front seat without seatbelts on. The officer had warned her about this previously, but this time he took her to jail. Atwater filed a Section 1983 claim because she believed that the City lacked constitutional authority to permit custodial arrests for such minor offenses. o Holding: The Court rejected Atwaters assertion. Custodial arrests for minor offenses do not violate the 4th Amendment. o We have traditionally recognized that a responsible 4th Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into Thornton v. United States (2004) o Facts: After a police officer noticed that the car Petitioner was driving had a stolen license plate, the officer stopped Thornton to question him. After asking if he could search him, the officer found two bags of drugs on Petitioners body. At that point, he searched his vehicle and found a gun. Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses and he moved to have the gun dismissed because it was found as the result of an unconstitutional search. The Fourth Circuit found that the gun fell within the search incident to arrest exception and affirmed the conviction. o Rule of Law: Under the search incident to arrest exception of the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search the vehicle of a person after they have been arrested. o Issue: Whether, under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, it is appropriate to allow evidence obtained when an officer searches the vehicle of a person they have arrested, despite the fact that they did not make contact with the person until after they left the vehicle. o Holding: Affirmed. In affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, the officer found that forcing officers to determine whether a suspect had noticed them before exiting the car would be too subjective; additionally, if weapons or contraband were inside a vehicle, these items could still be easily accessed by someone who had just exited it. o Dissent: Justice Stevens dissents, finding the courts decision overreaching. Concurrence. Justice Scalia concurs in the affirmation; however finds: When petitioners car was searched in this case, he was neither in, nor anywhere near, the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Rather, he was handcuffed and secured in the back of the officers squad car. The risk that he would nevertheless grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car was remote in the extreme.
Arizona v. Gant (2009) (search of automobile incident to arrest)
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United States Supreme Court decision which held that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent occupants have been arrested and secured. Facts The case involved Rodney J. Gant, who was arrested by Tucson, Arizona police and charged with driving on a suspended drivers license. Police arrested Gant in a friend's yard after he had parked his vehicle and was walking away. Gant and all other suspects on the scene were then secured in police patrol cars. The officers then searched Gant's vehicle. After finding a a bag of cocaine, the police also charged him with possession of a narcotic for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. Issue Whether the officers are allowed the search the car of a person who just arrested, while the person is handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car? Holding No, the police may on search the area within the suspects immediate control. 1. Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupants arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. 2. Circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle The Arizona Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States both held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendments warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, did not justify the search in this case. Rationale The court relied in the decision set forth in Chimel by stating that a search incident to arrest may only include the arrestees person and the area within his immediate control If there is no possibility an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. The court also re-examined their reasoning in Belton by looking to Justice Brennens dissent, which stated the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before conducting the search. The majority in this present case (Arizona v. Gant) rejected the Appeals Courts reading of Belton, which they felt was too broad. The Supreme Court held that the Chimel rationale authorizes policed to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Concurrence Scalia begins by looking to what the framers felt was unreasonable within the Fourth Amendment. However, this was uncertain since automobiles did not exist during their time. He states that when an arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually always have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their safety and a means that is virtually always employed; ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting him down in the open, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car. Lastly he writes In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-Thronton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases. I
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would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is ispo facto reasonable only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred. Because respondent was arrested for driving without a license, I would hold the present case that the search was unlawful. Blurring the Belton Bright-Line Rule Gant argued that an unreasonable expansion of a limited authority to search vehicles incident to arrest provided by the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in New York v. Belton was occurring. Lower courts were allowing searches after the initial justifications for setting aside the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement had ceased to exist, relying on a so-called bright-line rule of "if arrest, then search." Gant argued, and the Court ultimately agreed, that such application of the Belton exception caused the exception to "swallow the rule," allowing unconstitutional searches. Thornton and Belton were distinguished by Arizona v. Gant, which restricted searches incident to arrest to circumstance where: 1. it is reasonable to believe that the arrested individual might access the vehicle at the time of the search; or 2. it is reasonable to believe that arrested individual's vehicle contains evidence of the offense that led to the arrest; or 3. the officer has probable cause to believe that there may be evidence of a crime concealed within the vehicle. Thus, while Arizona v. Gant modifies the search incident to arrest doctrine, it also leaves intact certain legal justifications for warrantless searches set forth in Chimel v. California (1969), Thornton, and United States v. Ross (1982). Dissent Argued that the court effectively overruled Belton and Thornton. Whren v. United States (1996) (Pre-Textual searches are acceptable) What if you can show that the police pulled you over for a minor traffic violation, so the police could search you for narcotics? Facts A plain clothed cop observed a dark truck remained stopped at an intersection for more than 20 seconds. When the cop pulled a U-turn in order to head back toward the truck, the truck suddenly turned to its right without signaling, and sped off at an unreasonable speed. When the cop finally pulled them over, he observed two bags of what seemed to be crack cocaine. Petitioners argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe, or even reasonable suspicion, that they were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the officers asserted ground for approaching the vehicle was pre-textual. Procedural History District court denied the suppression motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue Whether or not the pre-textual grounds for executing a search and seizure prevent an officer from conducting such search after a routine traffic violation. Holding Affirmed. The defendants argued that a police officer, acting reasonably, would not have made the stop for the reason given. They promulgate this test because they contend that the use of
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automobiles is so heavily regulated that total compliance with the rules is impossible. Therefore, a police officer will almost always be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. Reasoning The court ruled that it is impractical to apply the reasonable officer test in the current situation. The defendants violated a traffic rule and the officers had probable cause to believe that the violation took place and that is why they pulled the defendants over. The court further ruled that a balancing-test need not to be applied here because that officers did not conduct the stop and the search "in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests..." The court also stated that the defendants' claims of being discriminated against due to their race should be considered under the Equal Protection Clause and not the 4th Amendment. "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." So the conviction was affirmed. In United States v. Robinson, the court held that a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search. We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Subjective intentions play no role in 4th Amendment analysis. We think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure. Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the 4th Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible. 9 Automobile Search 266 272 278 287 290 297
Chambers v. Maroney (1970) Facts A service station was robbed by two men, each of whom had a gun. Two teenagers had seen a blue compact station wagon circling the block in the vicinity of the station, and then saw the station wagon speed away from a parking lot close to the station. The witnesses told police that four men were in the station wagon and one was wearing a green sweater. Within an hour, a light blue station wagon answering the description and carrying four men was stopped by the police about two miles from the station that had been robbed. The occupants were arrested and the car was taken to the police station. After a thorough search of the car at the station, incriminating evidence was obtained. Holding The search that produced the incriminating evidence was made at the police station some time after the arrest and cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest. However, in terms of the circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the Court has long distinguished between an automobile and a home or office. The Court quoted Carroll v. United States: Those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is . . . probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
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Carroll pointed out that since the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought, there should be an exception to the warrant requirement. The circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable. If an effective search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Rule Where the police may stop and search an automobile under Carroll, they may also seize it and search it later at the police station. Concurrence and Dissent (Harlan, J.) The Courts endorsement of a warrantless invasion of the privacy where another course would suffice is simply inconsistent with our repeated stress on the 4th Amendments mandate of adherence to judicial processes. Notes Carroll v. United States, discussed in Chambers, involved a prosecution under the National Prohibition Act. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) Facts: Police had probable cause to believe that Coolidge had killed a 14-year-old girl. He was arrested at his home. His cars were seized without a warrant seized on private property. One of the cars was searched and vacuumed for microscopic evidence two days after the arrest, again a year later, and a third time five months after the latter search. Holding: The warrantless car searches were unconstitutional b/c there was no exigency. The word automobile is not a talisman in whose presence the 4th Amendment fades away and disappears. There was no fleeing opportunity to seize the evidence in this case, and the objects to be looked for were neither stolen, contraband, nor dangerous. Cardwell v. Lewis (1974) One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as ones residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) Os automobile was towed to a city impound lot, as permitted by local ordinance, after it was ticketed twice for being parked in a restricted zone. Pursuant to standard operating procedures, officers unlocked the vehicle and, using a standard inventory form, inventoried the contents of the car. In the glove compartment, the police discovered marijuana. O was prosecuted for possession of marijuana discovered during the warrantless search.
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With respect to non-investigative police inventories of automobiles lawfully within governmental custody, the policies underlying the warrant requirement are inapplicable. Florida v. Wells (1990) The Court unanimously held that the officers were not permitted to open a locked suitcase they discovered during an inventory search because the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatsoever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search. Containers in Cars: Criminal Evidence in the Open In Chambers, the police discovered criminal evidence concealed in a compartment of the vehicle they searched. In Coolidge, the police found particles of gunpowder, apparently on the car upholstery or floor. In Carney, drugs and related paraphernalia were in plain view on a table inside the motor home. United States v. Chadwick (1977) (inherent mobility and containers) Facts Defendants were hauling 200 lbs. of marijuana in a doubly locked trunk. Officials at the train station became suspicious when talcum powder was leaking from the trunk. Authorities followed the two men to officials in Boston, who watched the men get off the train, wait a while, then get into Chadwicks car when he arrived. Police then arrested all three men. At the federal building an hour and half after the arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and luggage. They didnt obtain consent or a warrant. The Government sought to justify its failure to secure a search warrant under the automobile exception of Chambers. The district court held that this was merely coincidental and held that the footlocker was not part of the area from within which the guys might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence Issue Was the warrantless search in these circumstances unreasonable? Holding We do not agree with the governments contention that the Warrant Clause protects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales. The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; more particularly it protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy. By placing personal effects in a double locked chest, they manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination. A persons expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile. With the chest safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant. Once officers have reduced luggage not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
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Here, the search was conducted more than an hour after agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search cannot therefore be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency. When no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority. Dissent (Blackmun, J. & Rehnquist, J.) They would apply the rationale that a warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place. The approach taken by the Court has the perverse result of allowing fortuitous circumstances to control the outcome of the present case. Notes Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) (Overruled) Facts: Police had probable cause to believe that Sanders would arrive at the airport with a green suitcase filled with marijuana. The officers put the airport under surveillance. They observed Sanders, and later a second man, place a closed but unlocked green suitcase into a taxicab trunk and, shortly thereafter, drive away. Officers stopped the taxi within a few blocks, opened the trunk, too out the suitcase, and opened it, all without a search warrant Relative Fourth Amendment Worthiness of Different Containers: Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to plain view, thereby obviating a need for a warrant. United States v. Ross (1982) (Searching Containers that are Just the Right Size) Court held that since a warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle, including containers therein, then the same rule should apply to warrantless car searches: o When the police have probable cause to search a car without a warrant under the Carroll-Chambers-Carney (automobile exception rule) line of cases, they may also search any container found during the car search that is large enough to hold the evidence for which they are looking. Robbins v. California (1981) California v. Acevedo (1991) (Probable Cause, Cars and Searching Containers) Facts Jamie Diza picked up a package from Federal Express that had previously inspected and found to contain marijuana. Diza took the package back to his home. While the police watched the house, another officer went to get a warrant. During the wait for the warrant, Acevedo arrived at
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Dizas place, stayed 10 minutes, and then left with what the police knew to be a small brown package that they had previously inspected, and had found to contain marijuana. Acevedo placed the pot in his trunk. Fearing the loss of evidence, officers in a marked police car stopped him. They found the pot in the trunk. California Court of Appeal concluded that the marijuana found in the paper bag in the cars trunk should have been suppressed. Although the court agreed that the officers could seize the paper bag, it held that, under Chadwick, they could not open the bag without first obtaining a warrant for that purpose. Issue Whether the 4th Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to search the entire car. Holding No. The 4th Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle. It is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders. - The police may search an automobile and the containers within it without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause. o However, as in Ross, the court noted that if the police have probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence, then it DOES NOT justify a search of the entire cab. Court went further to note that it remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated rules. Dissent (Stevens, J. & Marshal, J) The Court does not attempt to identify any exigent circumstances that would justify its refusal to apply the general rule against warrantless searches. Notes Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) - Facts: The police lawfully stopped a vehicle containing a male driving and two female front seat passengers. The police had probable cause to search the car for drugs after they lawfully seized an illegal syringe from the driver, who admitted that he used it to take drugs. During the car search, the police discovered a purse in the back seat that one of the passengers, Houghton, claimed belonged to her. At the time, the officers did not have probable cause to suspect her of drug use, nor was the driver under arrest. - Holding: Court held that police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect any passengers belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. 304 310 310 321, 326
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Plain View Consent
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PLAIN VIEW (AND TOUCH) DOCTRINES Arizona v. Hicks (1987) (Bullets through the Floor, Probable Cause and the Plain View Doctrine) Facts A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks apartment, injuring the man in the apartment below. Police arrived and entered Hicks apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weapons and a stocking cap mask. One of the policemen thought it was strange that Hicks would have a fancy stereo in a shoddy apartment, so he picked up the stereo and wrote down the serial numbers, which were later found to have been stolen. Issue Whether the actions by the officer constituted a search and whether the search was unreasonable within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. Holding The actions by the police officer were a search separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. - Taking action, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents did produce a new invasion of respondents privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstances that validated the entry. It is clear, that the search here was valid if the plain view doctrine would have sustained a seizure of the equipment. - Probable cause is required in order to invoke the plain view doctrine. o A dwelling place search requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why the application of the plain view doctrine would supplant that requirement. Dissent (Powell, J.) He points out that the mere moving of articles should not be a factor, which constitutes a search. - He says that under the majoritys opinion, if the police have 2 stolen watches, one upside down, then the police are free to write down that serial number, but not pick up the other one for risk that it will constitute a search. (OConnor) She tries to implement a cursory inspection, which only requires a reasonable suspicion standard. In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy interests strongly supports a reasonable-suspicion standard for the cursory examination of items in plain view. Notes Plain Touch Doctrine. The Supreme Court announced for the first time in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993), the Court unanimously held that, when a police officer who is conducting a lawful patdown search for weapons feels something that plainly is contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not a weapon. By a 6-to-3 vote, however, the court held that the officer in this case had gone beyond the limits of a lawful patdown search before he could determine that the object was contraband, making the search and the subsequent seizure unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that there is a comparable plain touch doctrine. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing for weapons and feels an object whose contour or mass
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makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy beyond that already authorized by the officers search for weapons. CONSENT Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) Facts Cop pulled over a car filled with six men because the headlight and the cars license plate light were burned out. The officer requested the occupants to get out of the car, and the officer requested permission from one of the guys, who claimed to be the brother of the car owner, to search the vehicle. Wadded up under the left rear seat, the police discovered three stolen checks, later linked to Bustamonte, who was prosecuted for theft. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit concluded that it is an essential part of the States initial burden to prove that a person knows he has a right to refuse consent. Issue What must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that consent was voluntarily given? What role does the awareness of the right to refuse to give consent play in law enforcement? Holding In determining whether a defendants will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of the circumstances the characteristics of the accused and of the interrogation. - Whether consent was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. o We look to the totality of the circumstances. - While the subjects knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the government does not need to establish that the person had knowledge of the right to refuse in order for the consent to be effective. o It would be impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning similar to that required in the Miranda. Dissent (Marshall, J.) Knowledge of the right is irrelevant. The issue should turn directly to the question of compulsion. Our prior decisions simply do not support the view that a meaningful choice has been made solely because no coercion was brought to bear on the subject. Marshall said that, at a minimum, the prosecution may not rely on a purported consent to search if the subject of the search did not know that he could refuse to give consent. Consent - Consent justifies a warrantless, sans probable cause consent - Voluntary (need not be knowing) - Burden of Proof is on the State to show voluntariness o Totality of the Circumstances o When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.
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o Apparent Authority counts as consent If the police reasonably believe that a person has the authority to consent. (Illinois v. Rodriguez) Limitation o If co-occupant present and objects, then no consent (Georgia v. Randolph) Search cannot exceed the scope of the search o A person may also withdraw consent after it is granted. Police must honor a citizens wishes, unless their pre-withdrawal search gives them independent grounds to proceed. Must be explicit; clear and unequivocal Not just mere whining.
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) (Reasonableness, Mistake and Third Party Consent) Facts In 1985, police were summoned to Dorothy Jacksons home. They were met by Jacksons daughter, Fischer, who sowed signs of severe beating. She told the officers that she had been assaulted by Rodriguez earlier that day in an apartment. She consented to travel there with the police in order to unlock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and arrest him. Fischer referred to the apartment as our apartment. She unlocked the door and let the police inside. Once inside the officers observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and containers filled with white powder that they believed to be cocaine. Rodriguez was arrested. Procedural History Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence claiming that Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and had no authority to consent to the entry. The Circuit court granted the motion, holding that at the time she consented to the entry Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment. Holding Common authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. (United States v. Matlock). In this case, the state has not sustained the burden. Fischer candidly admits that she took the key without permission from Rodriguez. However, the state also suggests that even if Fischer did not have authority to give consent, it suffices to validate the entry that the law enforcement officers reasonably believed she did have the authority. Respondent asserts that permitting a reasonable belief of common authority to validate an entry would cause a defendants Fourth Amendment rights to be vicariously waived. We disagree. Rodriguez is assured that the government will not search unless the search is reasonable; he is not assured that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents. - Reasonableness does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment. o What is demanded is that the government agents beliefs be reasonable, not accurate. Reasonable, but mistaken is fine. - An objective criterion is required: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Dissent
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(Marshall, J., Stevens, J., Brennan, J.) Unlike searches conducted pursuant to the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, 3rd party consent searches are not based on an exigency and therefore serve no compelling social goal. - A search conducted pursuant to an officers reasonable but mistaken belief that a 3rd party had authority to consent is completely different that one based on the consent of a 3rd party who in fact has such authority. That a person who allows another joint access to his property thereby limits his expectation of privacy does not justify trampling the rights of a person who has not Notes United States v. Matlock (1974) was a Supreme Court of the United States case in which the Court which ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when the police obtained voluntary consent from a third party who possessed common authority over the premises sought to be searched. The ruling of the court established the "co-occupant consent rule," which was later explained by Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) and distinguished by Georgia v. Randolph (2006), in which the court held that a third party could not consent over the objections of a present co-occupant. Scope of Consent: A consent search is invalid, even if the consent was voluntary, if the police exceed the scope of the consent granted. (Florida v. Jimeno) o The 4th Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those, which are reasonable. State v. Wells (1989) the court held that consent to search the truck of a car did not include authorization to pry open a locked briefcase found inside the trunk. Breaking Open Containers: If an officer breaks open a container, which renders the container destroyed, then the search is unreasonable. (United States v. Osage) (United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez) Consent in Vehicle Situations o If police lawfully stop a vehicle, and obtain consent to search, the police must inquire as to whose luggage is whose before opening the luggage. (State v. Frank) This is not the case in consent in the home setting. o Passenger in a vehicle stopped in a public parking lot, voluntarily consented to a search of his person for drugs. As part of that search, one of the officers searched inside the passengers pants. At this time the passenger objected to the search, but the officer saw the cap of a hidden pill bottle. (State v. Stone) Stop and Frisk 348 - 267
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4th Amendment: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Police / Citizen Encounters:
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police conduct not covered by 4th amend (citizen free to leave) stop on reasonable suspicion/frisk reasonably related in scope to purpose of stop arrest on probable cause/full search incident to arrest
Terry Holding: We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. Terry v. Ohio (1968) (Reasonableness and the right of Cops to Stop and Frisk) Facts Officer McFadden was casually patrolling the streets of Cleveland when he began watching Terry and another man, for no particular reason (although it was probably because they were black). Apparently the two men were taking turns peeking through a store window and then immediately walking back to the corner sidewalk and resuming conversation. This happened a number of times within a short period. As an experience officer, McFadden believed that they were casing the joint, and were going to rob it. After awhile another guy came along, talked with the two men for a moment, then left. A little while later, the other two men left the scene, and met up with the third guy. McFadden approached the men; he identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names. Officer McFadden then grabbed Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two, and patted him down on the outside of his clothing. He found a gun in Terrys and the other mans pockets. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Issue Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest? Holding No. Affirmed. There is no question that Officer McFadden seized Terry and subjected him to a search when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. However, we must determine whether these actions were unreasonable The question is whether the officers action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances, which justified the interference in the first place. The court says that there must be a balancing test between governmental interests and the right to privacy In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulatable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
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An OBJECTIVE STANDARD is required o Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Court thought that Officer McFadden was warranted in believing Terry was armed and thus presented a threat to his safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. o The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby It must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.
Rule Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Notes Police cannot just pick out a person and stop and frisk them. o The officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. o The officer must have a right to be in the persons presence The right to frisk depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime. The Terry Doctrine after a crime has been committed. In United States v. Hensley (1985), the court unanimously ruled that the Terry doctrine also applies when an officer seeks to investigate a completed felony: Stops are allowed if the police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony. What can the police do if they believe you are engaged in criminal activity? Only what is necessary to dispel reasonable suspicions Triggered by legal suspicion and police can only detain for as amount of time necessary to dispel reasonable suspicions The Terry Rule applies to a search for weapons, not evidence (subsequent to arrest). Evidence discovered through plain touch during the course of a Terry search is admissible. The evidence discovered through plain touch creates probable cause. Stop and Frisk are supposed to be separate analyses. (not reality) Warrant clause does not work in a particularly narrow type of conduct o Terry Doctrine changes the constitutionality of a search to a more lenient reasonableness standard, from a more stringent warrant requirement. o Terry is a case-by-case determination (specific, articulable facts) Warrant clause is inapplicable in certain categories of cases. Two specific (categorical not case-by-case) examples of exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:
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Maryland v. Buie o Once police are legitimately in a home, they can do a sweep of a home on reasonable suspicion that there may be dangerous people in the home. Pennsyvania v. Mimms and Maryland v. Wilson o If police have stopped a car for a just cause, the police can order any passenger out of the vehicle without additional suspicion.
Maryland v. Buie (1990) (Red Track Suits and Protective Sweeps of the Home) Facts Following an armed robbery by two men, one of whom was wearing a red running suit, police obtained arrest warrants for respondent Buie and his suspected accomplice and executed the warrant for Buie at his house. After Buie was arrested upon emerging from the basement, one of the officers entered the basement "in case there was someone else" there and seized a red running suit lying in plain view. The trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress the running suit, the suit was introduced into evidence, and Buie was convicted of armed robbery and a weapons offense. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion, but the State Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the running suit was inadmissible because the officer who conducted the "protective sweep" of the basement did not have probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed. Holding - The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. o The arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest. - The search, may only extend to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. - It is not automatic, buy may be conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. o That Buie had an expectation of privacy in those remaining areas of his house, however, does not mean such rooms were immune from entry. - This case is distinguishable from Chimel because the search there was a full blown, top to bottom search of Chimels home. The Court in that case held that anything beyond the immediate control of Chimel was off limits. Dissent (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.) Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 4th Amendment is directed. A protective sweep would bring within police purview virtually all personal possessions within the house not hidden from view in a small enclosed space. A protective
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sweep is much closer to a full blown search than is a limited pat-down search pursuant to Terry v. Ohio. 12 Arrest vs. Stop 371 397
Florida v. Royer (1983) (Drawing Lines: moving the suspect (part 1)) Facts Two detectives became suspicious of Royer at Miami International Airport because he fit the description of a drug courier (however, they did not have probable cause). Royer was about to board a flight when the detectives approached him and informed Royer that they were narcotics investigators and that they suspected him of transporting narcotics. Without returning his license or ticket, they asked him to accompany them to a small room. During the interrogation, Royer consented to a search of his luggage that turned up marijuana. Holding At the time Royer produced the key to his suitcase, the detention to which he was then subjected was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on mere suspicion of criminal activity. - What began as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions. - The officers had Royers ticket, they had his identification, and they had seized his luggage. Royer was never informed that he was free to board his lane if he so chose, and he reasonably believed that he was being detained. - Officers Exceeded Powers in Three Ways: 1. Royer reasonably believed he was detained and his property was seized. Royer was effectively under arrest. 2. Officers conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention otherwise authorized by Terry. 3. There were other, less intrusive, methods available to screen the luggage for contraband (i.e. drug-sniffing dogs) *If there is not a constitutional seizure, then consent obtained later, may not be sufficient. Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) (Drawing Lines: moving the suspect (part 2)) Facts Officer validly stopped a vehicle and in order to issue Mimms a traffic ticket. When Mimms complied, the officer observed a large bulge under Mimms jacket. The officer frisked Mimms, felt a gun, and seized it. State court held that the officer did not have a right to order Mimms out of the car. The main issue of the case centered on the fact that the officer would not have seen the bulge if he had not ordered Mimms out of the car. Issue Whether the officer was permited to require the driver to exit the vehicle, which resulted in probable cause for a Terry search. Holding When an officer legally stops a driver on the highway, he may order the driver out of the car without further justification.
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The driver is being asked to expose very little more of his person than is already exposed. The request to get out of the car was de minimis. The only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting in the drivers seat of his car or standing alongside it. In this case, pulling someone over is a seizure, and asking them to step out of the vehicle is a second seizure or movement. Maryland v. Wilson (1997) o On the public interest side of the balance, the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger. o On the personal liberty side of the balance, the case for the passengers is stronger than that for the driver. There is probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no reason to stop or detain the passengers. o The court concluded that a change in circumstancesbeing ordered out of the carwas again too minor an additional intrusion to outweigh police safety.
United States v. Sharpe (1985) (Drawing lines: length of detention) Facts Three individuals were arrested after a car and a truck were pulled over on the highway. A substantial amount of marijuana was found in the truck. The arrests did not take occur until thirty or forty minutes after the cars were pulled over. Rule of Law Much as a bright line rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. Issue [W]hether an individual reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity[?] Held The majority found that [Terry] applied here. It observed [i]t is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of Sharpes detention was unreasonable, because that detention bears no causal relation to [the DEA agent's] discovery of the marihuana. The marihuana was in [the Respondent's] pickup, not in Sharpes Pontiac; the contraband introduced at respondents trial cannot logically be considered the fruit of Sharpes detention. [The majority] conclude[d] that the detention of [the Respondent] clearly meets the Fourth Amendments standard of reasonableness. Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, considered together, may in some instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest. Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individuals Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion, we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. Much as a bright line rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether
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an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. The Court of Appeals decision would effectively establish a per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. Such a result is clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area. In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. We readily conclude that, given the circumstances facing him, [the DEA agent] pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. During most of [the Respondent's] 20-minute detention, [the DEA agent] was attempting to contact the local police who remained with Sharpe while [the DEA agent] left to pursue Officer Thrasher and the pickup. Once [the DEA agent] reached Officer Thrasher and [the Respondent], he proceeded expeditiously: within the space of a few minutes, he examined [the Respondent's] drivers license and the trucks bill of sale, requested (and was denied) permission to search the truck, stepped on the rear bumper and noted that the truck did not move, confirming his suspicion that it was probably overloaded. He then detected the odor of marihuana. Clearly this case does not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. [N]o evidence [was presented] that the officers were dilatory in their investigation. The delay in this case was attributable almost entirely to the evasive actions of [the Respondent], who sought to elude the police as Sharpe moved his Pontiac to the side of the road. Except for [the Respondent's] maneuvers, only a short and certainly permissible pre-arrest detention would likely have taken place. The somewhat longer detention was simply the result of a graduate[d] . . . respons[e] to the demands of [the] particular situation[.] Discussion This case is a situation where the Supreme Court reiterated that a bright line rule is not sufficient. In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. United States v. Mendenhall (1980) (Travel, Drugs, Seizures and Undergarments) A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Facts At the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, a young woman was demonstrating characteristics that fit a drug courier profile as promulgated by the DEA. She was approached by the officers, who identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her identification and airline ticket. She appeared very nervous, and once the DEA agents told her that they were narcotics officers she became extremely nervous to the point that she had trouble speaking. One of the agents asked Mendenhall if she would accompany him to the DEA office for further questions. She did so, but the record doesnt indicate if verbally consented to such questioning.
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They told her that she had the right to decline to a search once at the office. She consented to a search of her purse. Then a policewoman told her that she would need to take off her clothes. Mendenhall said that she was going to miss her plane, but the policewoman said that if she had no drugs, there would be no problem. Mendenhall disrobed and handed some heroin to the officer, which was being stored in her undergarments. - Government concedes that its agents had neither a warrant nor probable cause to believe that the respondent was carrying narcotics when the agents conducted a search of Mendenhalls person. o Government relied on consent. Court of Appeals concluded that Mendenhall did not voluntarily consent. United States Supreme Court reversed. Holding Mendehall was not seized, but she consensually acquiesced to a search of her person (which was constitutionally conducted). A person has been seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. o A person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. (Terry v. Ohio) On the facts in this case, no seizure of the respondent occurred. The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions. Court also rejected the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that Mendenhall acted in a manner so contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to answer the agents questions. o The issue is not whether the statement was self-productive, but whether it was made voluntarily. - Whether the respondents consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. o The totality of the circumstances in this case was plainly adequate to support the District Courts finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office. Dissent (White, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., & Stevens, J.) This result is curious because a majority of the Members of the Court refuse to reject the conclusion that Mendenhall was seized, while a separate majority decline to hold that there were reasonable grounds to justify a seizure. The proper course would be to direct a remand to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether she was seized at all b/c the seizure question was never raised below. - None of the aspects of Mendenhalls conduct, either alone or in combination, were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity. - Also, the court cannot rely solely on acquiescence to an officers wishes to establish proper consent. When doing a 4th Amendment Seizure analysis:
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Did a seizure occur? o Was there a show of authority or physical restraint pursuant to the Terry definition of seizure (General Rule for seizure)? Terry o Would a reasonable person have felt like they could have refused? Mendenhall If no seizure occurred, then the analysis stops, and everything is fine with the Court. o If a seizure does occur, then proceed to ask: Exactly when did a seizure occur? Where did the seizure occur? Was there a point when the seizure became more than a Terry seizure and was a de facto arrest? o Was there Consent to be seized/searched? Was the show of authority coercive? Was it truly consensual? Remember, that simply because there is acquiescence to an officers wishes to establish proper consent, does NOT mean it was truly consensual. They do NOT have to know that they can refuse, but the test is objective. o Would a reasonable person have felt that they could have refused?
United States v. Drayton (2002) (Bus Searches and the Feeling that a Cop Gives its Passengers) Facts Drayton and a friend were riding on a bus. They seemed to fit a profile as drug courier due to their overly baggy and heavy clothes. One officer approached Drayton and his buddy while on the bus, and said in a soft voice that he was a drug and weapons investigator, and then asked if he could search their luggage. Both men agreed, and the search turned up nothing. Then the officer asked if he could search their person, and again both agreed, turning up bags of cocaine taped to their thighs. Drayton moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the consent to the pat-down search was invalid. The District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and respondents consent to the search was voluntary. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to suppress, holding that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard police officers requests to search absent some positive indication that consent could have been refused. Rule of Law The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. Issue [W]hether officers must advise bus passengers during these encounters of their right not to cooperate. Holding Reversed. Drayton was not seized and their consent to the search was voluntary. Law enforcement officers dont violate the 4th Amendments prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.
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If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized. Mendenhall o Totality of the Circumstances must be evaluated. Although the officer didnt inform respondents of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary, so the searches were reasonable. - Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. Florida v. Bostick (1991). o Two factors regarding Bostick decision applied to Drayton 1. Although it was obvious that an officer was armed, he did not remove the gun from its pouch or use it in a threatening way. 2. The officer advised the passenger that he could refuse consent to the search. - Bostick first made it clear that for the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context. The proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. - The court noted that the traditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of a bus encounter. - The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. - The Reasonable Person Test is objective and presupposes and innocent person. Dissent (Souter, J., Stevens, J., & Ginsburg, J.) There is an air of unreality about the Courts explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to enhance their own safety and the safety of those around them. It is hard to believe that Drayton would have believed that he stood to lose nothing if he refused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to ignore the police altogether. Brendlin v. California (2007) A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the governments action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.
13 Special Needs Searches 422 455
The special needs doctrine is another exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Special needs cases generally arise from searches by government actors other than police officers, such as school officials, public employers, and probation officers. The doctrine applies when the government can demonstrate that: 1. it is impracticable to obtain a warrant; 2. the governmental interest outweighs the intrusion;
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3. the immediate objective of the search is one other than to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes, even if the ultimate goal is non-criminal in nature. Special Needs Beyond Law Enforcement Privacy interest intruded upon Character of intrusion Nature and immediacy of government concern and efficacy of means of addressing it Police do not need a warrant to search you or your home if: You give consent (and are an adult with the authority to do so). You have just been arrested, and your person is searched. Vehicles may be searched as long as police believe that it is likely something will be found. Some others. A special needs search is something that doesn't fit the other criteria. This includes: Probation and parole searches. School searches. Searches of highly regulated businesses. Employment and educational drug screening. The immediate search for evanescent evidence (such as blood-alcohol content). Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) Facts On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the citys Housing Code. The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellants apartment a second time two days later, and again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district attorneys office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant. A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions. Rule of Law Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in [Frank v. Maryland] and in other cases for
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upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendments protections. Issue [W]hether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment? Held Yes. [Frank v. Maryland], to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled. In [Frank v. Maryland], [the Supreme Court] upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. [T]he Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The majority here observed, [t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property, which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But [the majority thought] that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated; yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions faulty wiring is an obvious example are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizens privacy. Further, [after] concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, [the majority observed] it is obvious that probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a synthetic search warrant and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, [t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic
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purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. Discussion The majority was careful not to limit all searches in emergency circumstances. It observed: Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendments requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. See v. City of Seattle (1967) was a court case that involved the Fourth Amendment. It was about a man named See who owned a warehouse in Seattle, Washington. During a routine inspection, the city wanted to look inside the building to make sure it met with the fire code. However, See would not allow anyone in without a warrant being presented. He was then arrested and charged with violating the fire code. Since the Camara-See doctrine was laid down, and as the Supreme Courts devotion to warrants has receded, the Court has approved warrantless administrative searches of closely [governmentally] regulated industries, even in the absence of emergency or consent. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) (birth of the special needs doctrine) Court held that neither the warrant requirement nor probable cause applies to searches by public school officials. 2 Conditions that satisfy the Court o Reasonable Grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence o Search in not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Facts On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N.J., discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T.L.O., who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal's office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T.L.O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule. T.L.O., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all. Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T.L.O. as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer examination
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of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing. Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O.'s mother and the police, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At the request of the police, T.L.O.'s mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed that she had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. Issue(s) Whether the Fourth Amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials, and whether the search of the students purse was unreasonable? Judgment/Disposition Reversed Holding Yes, the Fourth Amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures does apply to schools, and no the search of the students purse was not unreasonable. Reasoning The court rejected the state of New Jerseys argument, which was that children have no legitimate expectation of privacy while at school. However, the court struck a balance between the schoolchilds legitimate expectation of privacy and the schools equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place. They first held that the warrant requirement is unsuited to the school environment, since this would require teachers to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules, because this requirement will unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. The court balanced these competing interests by holding that the legality of a search should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. First, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception, second; one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. This reasonableness standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interest of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding (2009) (a special needs school search that went too far) A case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It held that a strip search of a middle school student violated the Fourth Amendment where the school lacked reasons to suspect either that the drugs (Ibuprofen) presented a danger or that they were concealed in her underwear. The court also held, however, that because this was not clearly-established law prior to the court's decision, the officials involved were shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
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Opinion of the Court: Justice Souter, writing for an 8-1 majority vote, held that the strip search violated Savana's Fourth Amendment rights, but that the individual school officials were entitled to qualified immunity, because the search's unconstitutionality was not clearly established at the time of the violation. 1. SUMMARY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO SCHOOL SEARCHES First, the court laid out the established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: school searches, to be valid, merely require "reasonable suspicion", not "probable cause"; in terms of the knowledge required to meet that threshold, this calls for only a "moderate chance" of finding the expected evidence, not at "fair probability" or "substantial chance." Law enforcement searches require "Probable cause": When searches are conducted by law enforcement officers, they must have "probable cause": i.e., the facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, must be "sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed, and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched. School searches merely require "reasonable suspicion:" Per New Jersey v. T. L. O., there is a lower level of suspicion necessary in the school setting: searches of students by school administrators require only "reasonable suspicion," such that "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. ... with a laxer (but more ambiguous) definition of reliable knowledge: This lower threshold comes with a correspondingly laxer definition of "reliable knowledge," but it has been hard to define. Cases have looked to "the degree to which known facts imply prohibited conduct," the specificity of the information received, and the reliability of its source. "At the end of the day, however, we have realized that these factors cannot rigidly control, and we have come back to saying that the standards are 'fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts' in which they are being assessed." The best distinction might be that prior to conducting an evidence search, a law enforcement officer must have knowledge that raises a fair probability, or a substantial chance, of discovering evidence of criminal activity, while school officials need only a "moderate chance" of finding evidence of wrongdoing. 2. ELABORATION OF FACTS The court then laid out facts that would determine the level of suspicion/knowledge that the school officials possessed that a school rule was being violated (explaining in a footnote why "the legitimacy of the rule usually goes without saying as it does here"). This evidence was "sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in pill distribution," a suspicion that in turn "was enough to justify a search of Savanas backpack and outer clothing" (as neither party disputed). 3. THESE FACTS DEMONSTRATE A VIOLATION OF REDDING'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS The court then applied these facts to the remainder of the search, concluding this search violated Savana's Fourth Amendment rights because it did not meet these requirements. Adolescent strip search through the lens of T.L.O.: He explained why the search would cause particular "indignity" to an early adolescent, and that this would be relevant to the
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"rule of reasonableness" as defined in T.L.O. -- namely, that the search as actually conducted be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," i.e. "not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." This strip search violated the standard set in T.L.O.: The court determined that, given these particular facts, "the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion," noting that petitioners failed to provide arguments sufficient to justify "the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a search down to the body of an adolescent" for "nondangerous school contraband". "In sum, what was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear." Concluding this section, Souter wrote: "[T]he T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions." 4. THESE SCHOOL OFFICIALS WERE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Finally, the court determined that the individual school officials were entitled to qualified immunity, because the search's unconstitutionality was not clearly established at the time of the violation. Qualified immunity requires "notice" of illegality: The legal question is whether the official had notice of the illegality of his actions. The Supreme Court had recently held that a school official searching a student is entitled to qualified immunity "where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The law can be "established clearly" even if the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful. T.L.O. standard has not provided adequate notice: However, "we realize that the lower courts have reached divergent conclusions regarding how the T.L.O. standard applies to such searches." "[T]he cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law." BORDER SEARCHES United States v. Ramsey (1977) Rule of Law Letters and envelopes from foreign countries are subject to search under the historical border exception to the Fourth Amendment. Facts Customs officials were investigating a heroin-by-mail enterprise in the Washington, D.C. area. Customs agents opened eight suspicious envelopes from Thailand, discovering heroin. They did not have a warrant to open the envelopes. Issue Whether mailed letters are subject to the border exception. Held
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No. The court discussed the historical rationale of the border exception. Border searches . . . have been considered to be reasonable by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There was no need for a warrant to open the envelopes. Discussion The border search . . . is a longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendments general principle that a warrant be obtained. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) Facts Officers were observing northbound traffic at the San Diego border and they stopped BrignoniPonce (Respondent) because, according to the officers, Respondent and his two passengers looked like Mexicans. After the stop, the officers discovered the two passengers were illegals and Respondent was convicted with two counts of transporting illegal immigrants. Issue Can an officer at the border stop a vehicle solely because of the foreign appearance of the occupants? Holding No. Rationale The Court noted that [w]e are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dispense entirely with the requirement that officers must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving-patrol stops. In the context of border area stops, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment demands something more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government. Roads near the border carry not only aliens seeking to enter the country illegally, but a large volume of legitimate traffic as well. According to the Court, [t]o approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference. Thus, the Court held that when an officers observation lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their investigation. In this case, the Court observed that the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping Respondents car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens. This factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte A decision of the United States Supreme Court that allowed the United States Border Patrol to set up permanent or fixed checkpoints on public highways leading to or away from the Mexican border, and that these checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Opinion The court ruled 7-2 that the internal checkpoints were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather were consistent with the amendment. They went on to say that it would be impracticable for the officers to seek warrants for every vehicle searched and that to do so would
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eliminate any deterrent towards smuggling and illegal immigration. The court felt that any intrusion to motorists was a minimal one and that the government and public interest outweighed the constitutional rights of the individual. The court also ruled that the stops were Constitutional even if largely based on apparent Mexican ancestry. However the court added that restrictions still exist: "We have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause to search" (though the court did hold that the probable cause bar was low for permanent checkpoints with limited impact on motorists). The Court also held, "our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion. Any further detention...must be based on consent or probable cause. Our prior cases have limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization, requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols [as opposed to permanent checkpoints]." Dissent: Justice William Brennan wrote in his dissent that the decision marks a radical new intrusion on citizens' rights, and that it "empties the reasonableness requirement of the Amendment". He also says: "The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard . . . . Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." Part of Justice Brennan's complaint was that this decision was the ninth that had ruled against Fourth Amendment protections that term. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990) A United States Supreme Court case involving the constitutionality of police sobriety checkpoints. By a vote of 6-3, the Court held that these checkpoints met the Fourth Amendment standard of "reasonable search and seizure." Facts The Michigan State Police Department and its Director established a highway sobriety checkpoint program with guidelines governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. During the only operation to date, 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint, the average delay per vehicle was 25 seconds, and two drivers were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The day before that operation, respondents, licensed Michigan drivers, filed suit in a county court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints. Procedural History The court applied the balancing test of Brown v. Texas, and ruled that the State's program violated the Fourth Amendment. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the lower court's findings that the State has a "grave and legitimate" interest in curbing drunken driving; that sobriety checkpoint programs are generally ineffective and, therefore, do not significantly further that interest; and that, while the checkpoints' objective intrusion on individual liberties is slight, their "subjective intrusion" is substantial.
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The Court has previously held that a 4th Amendment seizure occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. Holding Petitioners' highway sobriety checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment. - United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, which utilized a balancing test in upholding checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens, and Brown v. Texas, are the relevant authorities to be used in evaluating the constitutionality of the State's program. - There is no dispute about the magnitude of, and the States' interest in eradicating, the drunken driving problem. The courts below accurately gauged the "objective" intrusion, measured by the seizure's duration and the investigation's intensity, as minimal. o However, they misread this Court's cases concerning the degree of "subjective intrusion" and the potential for generating fear and surprise. The "fear and surprise" to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the particular stop, such as one made by a roving patrol operating on a seldom-traveled road. Brown v. Texas Test - Balancing states interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers - Effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving the goal - Level of intrusion on an individuals privacy caused by the checkpoints. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) (Drug Checkpoints and the 4th Amendment) The court ruled that police checkpoints set up for the purpose of "general crime control" were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Edmond required the trial court to suppress the evidence of Lidster's stop, the Court disagreed. Facts Indianapolis was operating vehicle checkpoints on its roads in an effort to eradicate unlawful drugs. Respondents, who were each stopped at such a checkpoint, filed suit, claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied respondents a preliminary injunction, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment. Holding - Because the checkpoint program's primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment. o The rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing has limited exceptions. For example, this Court has upheld brief, suspicionless seizures at a fixed checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez--Fuerte, and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz. The Court has also suggested that a similar roadblock to verify drivers' licenses and registrations would be permissible to serve a highway safety interest. Delaware v. Prouse.
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However, the Court has never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. o The object of the checkpoints in the previous cases were specific (highway safety and smuggling aliens into the US) Here, the searches had no real connection to the actual roadways. If this case were to rest ate such a high level of generality, there would be little check on the authorities' ability to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. The checkpoint program is also not justified by the severe and intractable nature of the drug problem. o The gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement may employ to pursue a given purpose. In determining whether individualized suspicion is required, the Court must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.
3. How far does Edmond reach? Illinois v. Lidster (2004) was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to use a roadblock to investigate a traffic accident. Unlike the checkpoint in Edmond, the "primary law enforcement purpose" of the stop in this case was to "ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others." Edmond was directed solely at roadblocks whose purpose was general crime control; however, not every activity undertaken by law enforcement falls under the rubric of general crime control. 4. Drug testing. Suspicionless drug testing (my means of urinalysis, breathalyzer, or blood) has been upheld by the Supreme Court in various circumstances. o Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association (1989) drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train accidents o National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry weapons or are involved in drug interdiciton o Vernonia School Disctrict 47J v. Acton (1995) random urinalysis of school students involved in athletics o Chandler v. Miller (1997) Georgias requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test did not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. Not all suspicionless drug testing is allowed. The Fourth Amendment shields society from urinalysis drug testing that diminishes personal privacy [solely] for a symbols sake. REMEDIES FOR 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 14 The Exclusionary Rule 70 82 468 475
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Conservatives are strongly opposed to the exclusionary rule. Justice Cardozo Wolf v. Colorado (1949) (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio) A United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held 6-3 that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the exclusionary rule was not. The Court specified no redressive measures for those whose rights were violated. The Court would address that in the landmark case Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Facts The petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit abortions in a State court and appealed. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures had been violated and that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been excluded from trial as a matter of due process. The conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court. Rule of Law The Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause does not prohibit the admission of evidence obtained during an apparently illegal search and seizure in State courts. Issue Whether a State court conviction for a State offense denies due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because evidence that would have been excluded in a federal court under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was admitted? Held Justice Frankfurter filed a majority opinion. No, due process is not denied when evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is admitted by a State court for a State offense. Unlike the requirements and restrictions placed by the Bill of Rights upon federal authorities, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does not subject criminal justice in the States to certain limitations. In Weeks v. United States (1914), the Supreme Court held that in a federal prosecution, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution was barred from use. As of the Weeks decision, twenty-seven states had passed on the Weeks doctrine, but had not left other means of protection which would be as effective as the federal exclusionary rule. The common law provides for an action for damages, the officer may have been resisted, and the officer may have been prosecuted for oppression. Additionally, the Weeks exclusionary rule is a federal court construct that is not found implicitly in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution nor is a law promulgated by Congress. Congress may easily remove the protection granted by Weeks by legislative enactment to the contrary. In light of alternatives to the States and legislative policy, the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to the States. Concurrence (Black, J.) The federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the 4th Amendment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence. Dissent (J. Rutledge) Rutledge rejected the Supreme Courts conclusion that the mandate embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, although binding on the States, does not carry with it the one sanction, exclusion of evidence. Failure to observe this means that the protection of the Fourth
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Amendment might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The Amendment without the sanction is a dead letter. Dissent (J. Murphy) Murphy observed that we are limited to three devices for the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio (1961) Facts In 1957, 3 police officers arrived at Mapps residence because of information they had received that a person was hiding out in the home, who was wanted for questioning connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large amount of gambling paraphernalia being hidden in the home. Upon arrival at the house, the officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance but Mapp, after calling her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. Later that day, and after the arrival of more officers at the scene, the policemen forcibly opened and gained admittance into the dwelling. Mapp demanded to see the search warrant, and an officer held up a piece of paper purported to be the warrant. Mapp grabbed the purported warrant after which a wrestling match between the officer and Mapp over the purported warrant ensued. The police searched the home, looking through many personal effects, and in the basement they discovered a trunk filled with the obscene materials. Mapp was convicted for such possession. Issue Was the entry into the home in violation of Mapps 4th Amendment rights, and if so, is the evidence collected at the scene inadmissible because of such violation? Holding Yes. Reversed. - There is considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the search of Mapps home. o At trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was one ever accounted for. - State argued that even if the search were made without authority, it is not prevented from using the unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial. (Wolf v. Colorado) However, the court sided with the rationale outlined in Weeks v. United States that conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, and that such evidence shall not be used at all. - All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. o Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties Purpose of Exclusionary Rule: To deter; to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it. - A state that allows the admission of evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution, which it is bound to uphold.
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Rationales for Exclusion Judicial Integrity Deterrence Personal right of defendant (?) Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule Lack of Standing o Evidence can only be suppressed if the illegal search violated the person's own (the person making the court motion) constitutional rights. The exclusionary rule does not apply to privacy rights of a third party. The Good Faith Exception o Warrant has been issued, but is invalid. And, the police officer truly believed that the warrant was valid. Independent Source o Evidence unlawfully obtained from the defendant by a private person is admissible. The exclusionary rule is designed to protect privacy rights, with the Fourth Amendment applying specifically to government officials. Inevitable Discovery o Nix v. Williams held that if the evidence obtained in the unlawful search would almost definitely have been found eventually even without said search (inevitable discovery); the evidence may be brought forth in court. Attenuation (limit on fruit of the poisonous tree) o Sometimes evidence would not have been found had it not been for the constitutional violation. But the evidence is so loosely connected to the initial violation that it is not fruit of the poisonous tree. o ANALYSIS: In analyzing any fruit of the poisonous tree case, study the facts carefully to: 1. Identify the constitutional violation, 2. The evidence the government seeks to introduce, 3. Determine whether the evidence comes from the constitutional violation, and 4. If yes, then ask whether the evidence came from the constitutional violation, and which facts may justify the conclusion that the constitutional violation has dissipated. Alternatives to Exclusion Civil rights suit against police or department Torts suit against police Criminal prosecution against police Internal police discipline From Mapp to Herring Ability to launder evidence through other actors Importance of deliberate or flagrant conduct Use of cost-benefit analysis
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Changes that make the exclusionary rule
Three Types of Errors after Leon 1) reasonable mistakes which don't violate the fourth amendment at all--as in Maryland v. Garrison 2) unreasonable mistakes which violate the fourth amendment, but about which reasonable minds can differ about whether the officer was acting lawfully. (good faith exception applies). 3) unreasonable mistakes which clearly violated established law, so no reasonable argument could be made that the action was lawful. Aguilar bare bones; Franks dishonesty Standing (rights) Liberty Privacy Freedom Independent Source vs. Inevitable Discovery Independent Source: Permits introduction of evidence initially discovered during or as a consequence of an unlawful search, but also obtained independently through a legal source untainted by the unlawful search Inevitable Discovery: Permits introduction of evidence initially discovered during or as a consequence of an unlawful search, if it inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means in the future. 15 Standing 446 468
Alderman v. United States (1969) (conspiracy to commit murderous threats and standing) Facts Alderman and Aderisio were charged with conspiracy to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce, sought to have statements each made excluded because they allegedly were the subjects of unlawful governmental electronic surveillance. Holding Suppression of the product of a 4th Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted. Court quoted Jones v. United States: In order to qualify as a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure one must have been a victim of a search or seizure [that was directed against that person], as opposed from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. - Generally, to establish standing, a person must prove that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy. Jones v. United States (1960)
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In order to qualify a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, on against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. The necessity for proving standing is not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule.
United States v. Payner (1980) Facts A decision of the United States Supreme Court reversing a district's court's suppression of evidence in the criminal prosecution of an Ohio businessman charged with tax evasion. The case concerned both issues of criminal procedure and the application of the exclusionary rule derived from the Fourth Amendment. By a 63 margin the Court both reaffirmed its earlier rulings holding that only the party whose Fourth Amendment protections may have been violated has standing to challenge the evidence seized in the search, and barred lower courts from exercising their supervisory power to exclude such evidence at the trial of third parties. Holding Defendant convicted of tax evasion did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of evidence resulting from unlawful investigative techniques that targeted others; supervisory power of the federal courts does not authorize a court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Sixth Circuit reversed. Reasoning The Court's many precedents in that area "do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they must be weighed against the considerable harm that would flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule." Thus its use was properly restricted to instances where it would most be useful in remedying the violation, wrote Powell. "Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury." Dissent (Marshall) The majority's holding, Marshall wrote, "effectively turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person." Courts should, he said, be allowed to prevent that. Rakas v. Illinois (1978) (Robbing Clothing Stores and Finding Rifles on the Suspects) Facts A police officer received a radio call notifying him of a robbery of a clothing store, which described the getaway car. After spotting and following a similar car, he and several other officers stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile were ordered out of the car and, after the occupants had left the car, two officers searched the interior of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. They were arrested. Procedural Posture
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Before trial, petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car on the ground that the search violated the 4th and 14th Amendments. Prosecutor challenged the petitioners standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car because neither the car, the shells nor the rifle belonged to them. Trial court agreed that petitioners lacked standing and denied the motion to suppress the evidence. Holding Petitioners, who asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property seized, and who failed to show that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the vehicle in which they were merely passengers, were not entitled to challenge the search of those areas. Notes Jones v. United States involved significantly different factual circumstances. Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the apartment. (legitimate expectation of privacy similar to Katz) Simmons v. United States (1968) o When a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. Minnesota v. Carter (1998) (The Peeping Tom Cop and Packaging Cocaine) Facts A police officer went to an apartment building to investigate a tip from a confidential informant. The informant said that he had walked by the window of a ground-floor apartment and had seen people putting white powder into bags. The officer observed this action himself. He then spotted two men leaving the building in a Cadillac and he stopped the car. Inside were respondents Carter and Johns. As the police opened the door of the car to let Johns out, they observed a black zippered pouch and a handgun, later determined to be loaded, on the floor. Carter and Johns were arrested and a later police search of the vehicle turned up pagers, a scale, and 47 grams of cocaine in plastic sandwich bags. After seizing the car, the police returned to Apartment 103 and arrested the occupant, Kimberly Thompson. A search of the apartment pursuant to a warrant revealed cocaine residue on the kitchen table and plastic baggies similar to those found in the Cadillac. Thompson was the lessee of the apartment, Carter and Johns living in Chicago and had never come to the apartment before and were only in the apartment for approximately 2 hours. Carter and Johns were charged with conspiracy to commit controlled substance crime in the first degree and aiding and abetting in a controlled substance crime in the first degree. They moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the apartment and the Cadillac as well as to suppress several post-arrest incriminating statements they had made. They were each convicted of both of those offences. Issue Whether Carter and Johns lacked standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence seized? Judgment/Disposition Reversed and remanded Holding The court held that they did lack standing since they were only visitors in the apartment for two and a half hours and had no prior relations with the owner and that their sole purpose of being in
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the apartment was to conduct [illegal narcotics] business. Therefore, they had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Majority The majority wrote in their opinion Respondents here were obviously not overnight guests, but were essentially present for a business transaction with Thompson, or that they were only in the home a matter of hours. There is no suggestion that they had a previous relationship with Thompson, or that there was any other purpose to their visit. Nor was there anything similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household. While the apartment was a dwelling place for Thompson, it was for these respondents simply a place to do business. Moreover they wrote But the purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between respondents and the householder, all lead us to conclude that respondents situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. The majority further held that Fourth Amendment is a personal right. Concurrence (Scalia) Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he felt that the reasonable expectation of privacy is a fuzzy standard. He writes It must be acknowledged that the phrase theirhouses in this provision is, in isolation, ambiguous. It could mean their respective houses, so that the protection extends to each person only in his own house. But it could also mean their respective and each others houses, so that each person would be protected even when visiting the house of someone else. Notes Question of standing different than question of search o This could be an illegal search, and yet the drug dealers can have no standing to object to the illegal search. Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) o Facts: Six police officers armed with a warrant for the arrest Lawrence Marquess on charges of drug distribution arrived at his home. In the house at the time the police arrived were one of his housemates, and four visitors. While searching unsuccessfully in the house for Marquess, several police officers smelled marijuana smoke and saw marijuana seeds on the mantel in one of the bedrooms. Two officers left to obtain a warrant to search the home while the other officers detained the occupants of the house in the living room. o When the officers returned with a warrant, they ordered Cox to empty the contents of her purse, which she did. Among the contents was a jar containing 1,800 tablets of LSD. At this point, Cox turned to Rawlings and told him to take what was his. He claimed ownership of the controlled substance. o The trial court denied petitioners motion to suppress the drugs and the money and to exclude the statements made by petitioner when the police discovered the drugs. According to the trial court, the warrant obtained by the police authorized them to search Coxs purse. Moreover, even if the search of the pure was illegal, the trial court believed that petitioner lacked standing to contest that search. He was found guilty of possession with intent. o The Court ruled that the test enunciated in Rakaswhether the petitioner ahd a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searchedis the exclusive test for determining whether a defendant may successfully challenge a search.
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o Issue(s): (1) Whether or not he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Coxs purse so as to allow him to challenge the legality of the search of that purse? (2) Whether his admission of ownership was the fruit of an illegal detention that began when the police refused to let the occupants of the house leave unless they consented to a search? (3) Whether the search uncovering the money and the knife was itself illegal? o Holding: As to the first issue the court held there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in Coxs purse. As to the second issue the court held that his admission was done on his own free will unaffected by any illegality in the initial detention. Lastly, the search uncovering the money and knife was not illegal because it was performed as a search incident to a lawful arrest. o The Court agreed with the lower court that Rawlings had not made a sufficient showing that his legitimate expectation of privacy was violated by the search of Coxs purse. The court wrote In sum, we find no reason to overturn the lower courts conclusion that petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Coxs purse at the time of the search. The majority also rejected the petitioners argument that his statements made during the illegal detention should be inadmissible by stating examining the totality of the circumstances present in this case, we believe that the Commonwealth of Kentucky has carried its burden of showing that petitioners statements were acts of free will unaffected by the illegality in the initial detention o Dissent: Justice Marshall and Brennan dissent by stating that the courts reading of the Fourth Amendment is far too narrow. They write The Court misreads the guarantee of security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures to afford protection only against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons and places. The Fourth Amendment, it seems to me, provides in plain language that if ones security in ones effects is disturbed by an unreasonable search and seizure, one has been the victim of a constitutional violation; and so it has always been understood. They also claimed the Fourth Amendment was not designed to protect only those with a privacy interest in the place searched and not those with an ownership or possessory interest in the thing seized. It was designed to protect property as well as privacy interest. 16 Exceptions to the Rule Good Faith Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery 476 490 496 509
When The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply United States v. Janis o In the complex and turbulent history of the exclusionary rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state. According to the Court, the deterrence benefit of extending the exclusionary rule to non-criminal proceedings would be comparatively slight, whereas the social costs of exclusion would be great. United States v. Calandra
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o Prosecutors may use evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment at grand jury proceedings, pre-trial preliminary hearings, sentencing, and probation and parole revocation hearings. Walder v. United States o The Supreme Court held that a defendant may not take advantage of a courts exclusion of narcotics found in his possession by testifying in direct examination that he has never possessed narcotics. o The exclusionary rule similarly applies if a prosecutor wishes to introduce unconstitutionally obtained evidence to impeach a defendants cross-examination testimony. (United States v. Havens). o On the other hand, the Court held that the impeachment exception does not apply to a defendants witnesses. (James v. Illinois) o The government cannot violate the 4th Amendment and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction. Nor can the Government make indirect use of such evidence for its case, or support a conviction on evidence obtained through leads from the unlawfully obtained evidence. All these methods are outlawed, and convictions obtained by means of them are invalidated, because they encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious to free men.
United States v. Leon (1984) (Good Faith) Facts In 1981, an informant of unproven reliability informed an officer that 2 people known as Armando and Patsy were selling large quantities of cocaine and meth from their residence in Burbank. Based on observations summarized in the affidavit, an officer prepared an application for a warrant to search the residences and automobiles registered to each of the suspects for an extensive list of items believed to be related to their narcotics business. A facially valid search warrant was issued. Leon moved to suppress the evidence seized b/c he claimed the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. The court made clear that the officer had acted in good faith, but rejected the Governments suggestion that the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant. Issue Should the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule be modified so as not to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued which ultimately is found to be unsupported by probable cause? Holding Yes. A balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged. The evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in this situation. - The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct, not to punish the errors of judges and magistrates
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There is no evidence to suggest that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the 4th Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of thee extreme sanction of exclusion. - There is no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. o Judges are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. If exclusion of evidence is to have any deterrent effect, it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments. - Marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. o The officers reliance on the magistrates warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable. It is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that a warrant was properly issued. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth. (Franks v. Delaware) In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Dissent (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.) Although the exclusionary rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their own cases. - But what the Court overlooks is that the deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of punishment of individual police officers for their failures to obey the restraints imposed by the 4th Amendment. - Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with the 4th Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies generally. - If evidence is consistently excluded in these circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish probable cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that whatever document the magistrate has signed will necessarily comport with 4th Amendment requirements. (Stevens, J.) The notion that a police officers reliance on a magistrates warrant is automatically appropriate is one the Framers of the 4th Amendment would have vehemently rejected.
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**In analysis discuss: 1) Does the 4th Amendment apply? Is the violation properly protectable within the 4th Amendment (i.e. does person have a reasonable expectation of privacy?) 2) Was the warrant sufficient (i.e. was there PC, particularization, etc. in the warrant) 3) If warrant is NOT sufficient, then was there reasonable reliance on the faulty warrant (was the warrant facially sufficient) by the police officer? 4) If there was NOT a good-faith reliance on the faulty warrant, then the exclusionary rule WILL apply. Notes Massachusetts v. Sheppard; Evidence Admitted Despite 4th Amendment Violation - Court permitted introduction of evidence obtained from a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that violated the particularity requirement in the 4th Amendment. o Although the warrant failed to be particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the officers executing the warrant acted in objective good faith. We refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested. Groh v. Ramirez; Distinguished from Sheppard - A warrant failed to specify the items to be seized; nor did the warrant incorporate by reference the itemized list of seizable items contained in the warrant application. o Court determined that the warrant was plainly invalid in that it failed altogether to comply with the particularity requirement of the 4th Amendment. Warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard the search as warrantless within the meaning of our case law. - Court also distinguished this from Sheppard by noting that, in this case, the agent didnt alert the magistrate to the defect in the warrant that he drafted. o Therefore, the Court cannot know whether the Magistrate was aware of the scope of the search he was authorizing. Nor would it have been reasonable for the agent to rely on a warrant that was so patently defective, even if the magistrate was aware of the deficiency. Murray v. United States (1988) (Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery) Facts While surveilling Murray and others suspected of illegal drug activities, federal agents observed both petitioners driving vehicles into, and later out of, a warehouse, and, upon petitioners' exit, saw that the warehouse contained a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long container. Petitioners later turned over their vehicles to other drivers, who were in turn followed and ultimately arrested, and the vehicles were lawfully seized and found to contain marijuana. After receiving this information, several agents forced their way into the warehouse and observed in plain view numerous burlap-wrapped bales of pot. The agents left without disturbing the bales and did not return until they had obtained a warrant to search the warehouse. In applying for the warrant, they did not mention the prior entry or include any recitations of their observations made during that entry. Upon issuance of the
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warrant, they reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana and other evidence of crime. Procedural History The District Court denied petitioners' pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting their arguments that the warrant was invalid because the agents did not inform the Magistrate about their prior warrantless entry, and that the warrant was tainted by that entry. Petitioners were subsequently convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, assuming for purposes of its decision on the suppression question that the first entry into the warehouse was unlawful. Rule of Law The independent source doctrine applies . . . to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. Issue Whether, . . . assuming evidence obtained pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion of such evidence that been observed in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed. Held No. The court applied the independent source rule formulated in Segura, permitting evidence found independently, despite an improper search. In the present case, knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if the later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry, there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. This was applied to the tangible evidence: the bales. However, the court was uncertain as to whether the search pursuant to the warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. The agents did not reveal the original search to the magistrate issuing the warrant. Thus, they remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it remand to the District Court for determination whether the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent source of the challenged evidence in the sense [the court] described. Holding Vacate and Remanded. - The Fourth Amendment does not require the suppression of evidence initially discovered during police officers' illegal entry of private premises, if that evidence is also discovered during a later search pursuant to a valid warrant that is wholly independent of the initial illegal entry. - The "independent source" doctrine permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the initial illegality. (Silverthorne v. United States) o Although the federal agents' knowledge that marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry, it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry, the independent source doctrine allows the admission of testimony as to that knowledge. This same analysis applies to the tangible evidence, the bales of marijuana.
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It is unpersuasive insofar as it distinguishes between tainted intangible and tangible evidence. The ultimate question is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue. This would not have been the case if the agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant. - If there is an independent legal means of obtaining the evidence, then the independent source doctrine is satisfied. - Because the District Court did not explicitly find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse, the cases are remanded for a determination whether the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent source in the sense herein described. Dissent The dissenting justices were concerned that by applying the independent source rule to the facts of this case, the court loses sight of the practical moorings of the independent source exception and creates an affirmative incentive for unconstitutional searches. Discussion The independent source doctrine . . . rest[s] upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. 1) observed M drive truck into warehouse 2) observed M drive out of warehouse with container 3) trucks lawfully seized and marijuana discovered 4) forced illegal entry into warehouse without a warrant; see plain view burlap bags 5) search warrant not mentioning viewing of marijuana in warehouse (pc based on independent source) 6) reentry into warehouse on warrant Attenuation Doctrine Evidence is attenuated, and therefore not the fruit of the poisonous tree if, even granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which objection is made has been come at not by exploitation of that illegality but by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun v. United States (1963) (Attenuation or Dissipation of Taint Doctrine) Facts After conducting surveillance on Mr. Way for 6 weeks, agents arrested him and found heroin in his possession. He said that he had bought it from Blackie Toy, which was presumed to be Mr. Toy, a owner of Oyes Laundry. Agent Wong went to Oyes Laundry, knocked on the door, and identified himself as a narcotics agent, at which point Mr. Toy took off running through his store to his residence in the back. After chasing him down and placing him in handcuffs, a search found no narcotics on the premises.
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Toy told the agents that he hadnt been selling narcotics, but that Johnny, who lived in a house on 11th Avenue, was selling narcotics. The police went to the residence described by Mr. Toy, and found Johnny Yee (Yee). Yee showed the agents several tubes containing almost an ounce of heroin, and gave them to the agents. Within the hour, Yee and Toy were taken to the agents office building, at which point Yee told the agents that the heroin had been brought to him 4 days ago by Sea Dog, who Yee clarified to mean Wong Sun. Agents went to Wong Suns house, and arrested him. A search of his apartment yielded no narcotics. Procedural History Toy and Yee were arraigned on June 4. Later that day, each was released on his own recognizance. Wong Sun was arraigned the next day and released on his own recognizance. Within a few days, all three men were interrogated at the office. A statement was prepared by the agent and was read to the three men, and Wong Sun refused to sign the statement although he admitted the accuracy of its contents. The Governments evidence tending to prove the defendants possession consisted of four items which the trial court admitted over timely objections that they were inadmissible as fruits of unlawful arrests or of attendant searches: 1) statements made orally by Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest, 2) the heroin surrendered by Yee, 3) Toys retrial unsigned statement, and 4) Wong Suns similar statement. Government argues that although closely related to the unlawful invasion, Toys statements were admissible because they resulted from an intervening independent act of a free will. Holding - The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. o It is unreasonable to infer that Toys response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion. - Further, since the narcotics taken from Yee were a result of an unlawful invasion upon Toy, it is clear that the narcotics were come at by the exploitation of that illegality and hence they may not be used against Toy. o It cannot be said that Toy was an independent source; nor is this a case in which the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. - Court further determined that Toys unsigned statement was also inadmissible. - However, the Court held that although Wong Suns arrest was without probable cause or reasonable grounds, the fact that Wong Sun voluntarily returned several days after his arrest to make the statement, that statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. o The fact that the statement was unsigned does not render it inadmissible. Wong Sun had understood and adopted its substance. - Finally the court held that although the heroin was inadmissible against Toy as the result of their tainted relationship to information unlawfully obtained from Toy, the drugs were not inadmissible against Wong Sun because the seizure of the drugs invaded no right of privacy, and thus lacked the standing that would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial. o In order to have standing, a persons rights must have been directly violated
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Cannot have standing vicariously The court affirmed the fruit of the poisonous tree rule, but found an exception to exclusion in Wong Sun's case on the grounds that Wong Sun had voluntarily returned to the police station to make his statement, an act, which "attenuated the taint" or broke the chain of inadmissible evidence. Wong Sun was granted a new trial, but his confession was admissible.
Notes Removing the Taint: Four factors in determining when the connection between a 4th Amendment violation and a fruit has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint: 1) Length of time that has elapsed between the initial illegality and the seizure of the fruit in question 2) Flagrancy of the initial misconduct 3) Existence or absence of intervening causes of the seizure of the fruit 4) Presence or absence of an act of free will by the defendant resulting in the seizure of the fruit 17 Recent Developments 509 533
Evolution of the Exclusionary Rule "The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands," but in Weeks v. United States (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, which generally operates to suppress i.e. prevent the introduction at trial of - evidence obtained in violation of Constitutional rights. "Suppression of evidence, however, has always been [the court's] last resort, not [its] first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs, which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large." In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court clarified that the exclusionary rule "operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Application of the rule should be sensitive to this purpose, the court said: If suppression "does not result in appreciable deterrence," the court had said, "its use ... is unwarranted." Thus, for example, in Leon itself, the court concluded that the fruits of a search based on a search warrant later found defective should not be excluded because the rule's deterrent purpose "will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances," and in Arizona v. Evans, the court concluded that the fruits of a search based on an arrest warrant that was no longer valid, but that was still listed in the police system because of an error by the issuing court's clerk, should not be excluded because such exclusion would have no deterrent effect. Hudson v. Michigan (2006) A decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that police officers knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering a private residence (the knock-and-announce requirement) does not require suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search. Facts
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Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker Hudson. They discovered both. Large quantities of drugs were found, including cocaine rocks in Hudsons pocket. A loaned gun was lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. When police arrived to execute the warrant, they announced their presence, but waited only a short time perhaps three to five seconds ---before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudsons home. Hudson moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the premature entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He was convicted of drug possession. Procedural Posture Michigan Trial court granted his motion. Michigan Court of Appeals: Reversed by relying on a Michigan Supreme Court case holding that suppression is inappropriate when entry is made pursuant to a warrant but without proper knock and announce. Issue Whether the exclusionary rule is appropriate for violation of the knock-and-announce requirement? Judgment/Disposition Affirmed Majority (Scalia) Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion, wrote exclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was bur-for cause of obtaining evidence. Our cases show that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for suppression. In this case, of course, the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Scalia also states that the knock-and-announce-rule protects police officers from people inside the home who might want to retaliate against them. Moreover he writes that the knock-and-announce rule has never protected ones interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. Holding The Court held that suppression of evidence has always been a last resort, not a first impulse. A violation of the knock and announce rule by police does not require the suppression of evidence found during the search. - The Exclusionary Rule generates substantial social costs, which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. - The Court has rejected indiscriminate application of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served o That is, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. - Exclusion of seized evidence may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a but for cause of obtaining evidence. Dissent (Breyer) Justice Breyer wrote that the applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce will serve as a deterrent for unlawful governmental behavior. Moreover, he argues that the Fourth Amendment was to safeguard privacy in ones home and that this ruling would be detrimental to that principle.
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Herring v. United States (2009) A case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 14, 2009. The court decided that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when a police officer makes an arrest based on an outstanding warrant in another jurisdiction, and the information is later found to be incorrect because of a negligent error by that agency. Facts Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Herring had driven to the Coffee Country Sheriffs Department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Herring was no stranger to law enforcement and Anderson asked the warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check for any outstanding warrants for Herrings arrest. When she found none, he contacted Sharon Morgan, a warrant clerk on the neighboring country. She was able to come up with an active warrant for Herrings arrest for failure to appear for Felony charges. Anderson and a deputy followed Herring out of the impound lot, pulled him over and a search incident to arrest found drugs and a gun. Herring was arrested. However, there had been a mistake about the warrant. The Dale County sheriffs computer records are suppose to correspond to actual arrest warrants, which the office maintains. But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the actual warrant to fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court clerk and learned that the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. For whatever reason this information about the recall did not appear in the computer database. After Morgan contacted Pope who contacted Anderson over a secure radio, Herring had already been placed under arrest. Procedural Posture District Court: Herring was indicted for illegally possessing the gun and drugs. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his initial arrest had been illegal because the warrant had been rescinded. Motion was denied since the judge believed that the officers acted in good-faith that the warrant was still outstanding. Eleventh Circuit Appeals: Affirmed but held that this error was negligent, but did not find it to be reckless or deliberate Issue Whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to evidence found as a result of an unlawful arrest, when in-fact, the officers were acting out of good-faith? Holding The court held that as long as the officers are acting in good-faith and that their conduct was not deliberate, reckless or grossly negligent, than the exclusionary rule does not apply. Evidence obtained after illegal searches or arrests based on simple police mistakes that are not the result of repeated patterns or flagrant misconduct cannot have the exclusionary rule used to suppress evidence. Convictions upheld. Majority (Roberts) Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion, referenced the Leon decision and stated that in Leon and in this case, the officers did nothing improper. He also wrote that If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. He also rejected the dissenters argument about the unreliability of warrant databases, by pointing out that there no evidence that errors in Dale Countys system are routine or widespread.
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"To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system." Suppression was unwarranted because an error in record keeping - not flagrant or deliberate misconduct - led to Herring's arrest. The court also warned that it was not "suggest[ing] that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. ... If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation." Nevertheless, in the case at bar, "the [police] conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion." "[W]hen police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements," the Chief Justice wrote, "any marginal deterrence does not 'pay its way.'" Dissent (Ginsburg) Justice Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer, write a dissenting opinion in which they held But the most serious impact of the Courts holding will be on innocent persons wrongfully arrested based on erroneous information [carelessly maintained] in a computer data base. Furthermore, they write that negligent recordkeeping errors by law enforcement threaten individual liberty are susceptible to deterrence by the exclusionary rule, and cannot be remedied effectively through other means. Justice Breyer and Souter, point out the fact that errors made by police record keepers should be treated the same as those made by judicial clerks. Justice Ginsburg wrote that "the exclusionary rule provides redress for Fourth Amendment violations by placing the government in the position it would have been in had there been no unconstitutional arrest and search. The rule thus strongly encourages police compliance with the Fourth Amendment in the future." The prosecution had contested the unlawful case in court because of contraband found on Herring's person and in his vehicle, but, Ginsburg wrote, narrowing the scope of the exclusionary rule would most typically hurt innocent persons who are wrongfully arrested. CONFESSIONS 18 Torture and Due Process Approach 535 543 555 565
PowerPoint Notes Why regulate interrogation? o Reliability o Police Misconduct o Voluntariness Constitutional Regulation of Confessions o 14th Amendment Due Process Clause o 5th Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination o 6th Amendment Right to Counsel th 14 Amendment Applies o When Miranda is inapplicable o When a confession violating Miranda is used for impeachment of defendants trial testimony
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o When a defendant seeks to exclude a confession as the secondary fruit of an earlier interrogation o When suspects waive Miranda o * Even if none of the above apply, always consider whether the confession violates the 14th Amendment in addition to other bases for suppression. th The 5 Amendment o No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The 5th Amendment (cont.) o Testimonial o Compelled o Incriminating Miranda Checklist o Does Miranda apply? Was there custody? Interrogation? o If so, were the warnings properly given? o If so, did the suspect waive his rights? o Or did the suspect assert his rights? Right to counsel or right to silence? o If he asserted his rights, was his assertion honored or violated? o If violated, what is the remedy? Exceptions to Miranda suppression: Quarles, Elstad, Siebert
Torture: Confessions Brown v. Mississippi (1936) (Racism and Torture in the 20th Century) Facts A murder had been committed and the police confronted Ellington. When Ellington vehemently denied the accusations, a lynch mob, which included a deputy sheriff, strung Ellington up by a rope repeatedly, and whipped severely. When he continued to deny the accusations, he was let go only to be arrested a few days later. While arresting Ellington the same deputy stopped and again severely whipped Brown, declaring that he would continue until he confessed. Ellington agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy would dictate, and he did so, after which he was taken to jail. Similar events occurred for the other two defendants, Brown and Shields, but they were severely beaten at the jail. The trial court admitted these confessions. State Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the defense failed to move to exclude the confessions after the state offered rebuttal witnesses and thus had waived the objection to the confessions as coerced. Rule of Law The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is violated when a confession obtained via physical torture is used to convict a defendant. Issue [W]hether convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and violence, are consistent with the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States[?] Holding Court held unanimously that this was a fundamental wrong that made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly void.
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The trial, conviction, and death sentence were all a sham because they rested upon two moral wrongs torture and racism. The state argued that pursuant to Twining v. New Jersey the exemption from compulsory selfincrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution. The state also relied on Snyder v. Massachusetts where the Supreme Court of the United States found the privilege against self-incrimination may be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state. The majority disregarded these arguments and observed [b]ut the question of the right of the state to withdraw the privilege against self-incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted statements refer is that of the processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter. Further, [t]he state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. However, the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Here, the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence. Accordingly, [t]he due process clause requires that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Moreover, [i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process. The majority observed, the trial court was fully advised by the undisputed evidence of the way in which the confessions had been procured. The trial court knew that there was no other evidence upon which conviction and sentence could be based. Yet it proceeded to permit conviction and to pronounce sentence. The conviction and sentence were void for want of the essential elements of due process, and the proceeding thus vitiated could be challenged in any appropriate manner. Discussion This case illustrates how federal constitutional rights also often times apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. DUE PROCESS: CONFESSIONS Spano v. New York (1959) (Getting the Shit Kicked out of You and then Getting Even) Facts Spano was a 25-year-old father who was robbed by a big guy at a bar. Spano followed the guy out of the bar, and a fight ensued in which Spano got his assed kicked. Spano was angry, went back to his place, got a gun, and went to a candy store where the guy was known to hang out. He walked in and shot the guy, killing him. He was witnessed by one other person even though three other witnesses were there. Spano disappeared for a while, but called an old friend of his named Bruno who was training to become a police officer. He told Bruno what he had done, and Bruno helped him to get an
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attorney, who then proceeded to surrender Spano to the authorities. The attorney instructed Spano to not speak to the police in any way. However, the police repeatedly asked him questions over the course of about 8 consecutive hours, using Bruno as a false friend. Bruno failed 3 times to get Spano to talk, however on the 4th attempt, Spano confessed. Throughout these circumstances Spano asked numerous time to speak to his attorney but was denied. His confession was offered into evidence, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. Rule of Law [The] petitioners will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting. Issue [W]hether [the] confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment[?] Holding The issue was whether police violated Spano's Sixth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation. The Court did not reach the Sixth Amendment question, however, because they held that the use of the confession was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment and fundamental fairness. The Court identified six factors that together constituted police misconduct: 1. Spano was relatively young and inexperienced in the criminal justice system. 2. Spano was subjected to leading questions and did not make a narrative statement to police. 3. He was questioned incessantly and through the night. 4. Police persisted questioning him even though he said his attorney advised him to remain silent. 5. Police ignored his request to contact his attorney. 6. The officers used his close friend, Bruno, to manipulate him. The Court held that the interrogation violated Spano's 14th Amendment due process rights because Spano's confession was not voluntary. The two concurring opinions emphasized Spano's right to counsel. On all the facts, this conviction cannot stand. - Spano was questioned for eight straight hours before he confessed, with his only respite begin a transfer to an arena presumably considered more appropriate by the police for the task at hand. o Nor was the questioning conducted during normal business hours, but began in the early morning and continued through the night until the next day. The questioners persisted despite Spanos repeated requests for his attorneys presence. o Using Bruno as a false friend was a factor weighed heavily by the court. - Under the totality of the situation, the confession was coerced. o Spanos will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts. The Court also noted that they had reversed conviction of facts less compelling than those in this case. The conviction cannot stand. As in all such cases, we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its
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interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. Petitioner was a foreign-born young man of 25 with no past history of law violation or of subjection to official interrogation, at least insofar as the record shows. He had progressed only one-half year into high school and the record indicates that he had a history of emotional instability. He did not make a narrative statement, but was subject to the leading questions of a skillful prosecutor in a question and answer confession. He was subjected to questioning not by a few men, but by many. Discussion Spano opened the door for Miranda v. Arizona. Even though the majority opinion used the traditional voluntariness analysis, the concurring opinions indicated that a person had a constitutional right to counsel, if that counsel had been retained, once the person was formally charged by indictment or information. The majority opinion did not preclude the right-to-counsel argument expressed in the concurring opinions. 19 Miranda v. Arizona 566 576 581 602 685 695
Notes Schmerber v. California (1966) The Miranda rule does not prohibit compelling a person to engage in conduct that is incriminating or may produce incriminating evidence. Thus, requiring a suspect to participate in identification procedures such as giving handwriting or voice exemplars, fingerprints, DNA samples, hair samples, and dental impressions is not within the Miranda rule. Such physical or real evidence is non-testimonial and not protected by the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause. On the other hand, certain non-verbal conduct may be testimonial. For example, in Schmerber, if the suspect nodded his head up and down in response to the question "did you commit the crime" the conduct is testimonial, it is the same as saying "yes I did" and Miranda would apply. Chavez v. Martinez (2003) In Chavez v. Martinez, a suspect brought a Section 1983 action against a police sergeant, alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to coercive interrogation without being given Miranda warnings, a plurality of the Supreme Court opined that the sergeant's failure to read Miranda warnings to the suspect before questioning him did not independently violate the suspect's constitutional rights, and thus could not be grounds for a Section 1983 action. The plurality reasoned that judicially crafted prophylactic rulessuch as the Miranda safeguards, the exclusionary rule, and the rule allowing a witness to insist on an immunity agreement before being compelled to give testimony in noncriminal casesare meant to protect the basic constitutional right embodied in the self-incrimination clause. These protections do not expand the scope of that right itself, just as violations of those prophylactic rules do not contravene a person's constitutional rights. Furthermore, the absence of a "criminal case" in which the suspect was compelled to be a "witness" against himself defeated his core Fifth Amendment cause of action under Section 1983, which was grounded in the alleged severe compulsion or extraordinary pressure that was employed in attempting to elicit a statement.
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However, a majority of the Court concluded that the issue of whether the defendant may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand. Brief Fact Summary Martinez brought suit against police officers when he was shot during a struggle. Facts While riding his bicycle home from work, Martinez was stopped by police officers who were investigating narcotics violations. Whey they attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, during which Martinez was shot. The wound to Martinez resulted in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. Later, he sued the officers, arguing the search and use of deadly force was unconstitutional. At trial of that matter, in their defense, the officers introduced evidence of a taped confession, obtained while Martinez was at the hospital, in which he admitted grabbing the gun of one of the officers. Martina claimed the tape could not be used because he had not been Mirandized and both the trial and appellate courts agreed. The officers appealed. Issue Whether the right to be free from coercive question, as imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is violated when an individuals statements are used in a matter, other than a criminal case. Held Remanded. In a divided decision, the Court determined that Martinezs Fifth Amendment rights had not been violated; another panel of judges reasoned, however, that if he could show that his constitutional guarantee was placed at risk, he may show a violation of the right. All of the court agreed that whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a due process violation should be addressed on remand. Dissent Justice Stevens dissented, noting that the hospital interview was comparable to a confession obtained by torture. Concurrence: Justice Ginsburg and Kennedy wrote concurrences, noting that while the failure to give a Miranda warning does not, without more, establish a violation of Constitutional rights. These justices went on to argue, however, the time and place of coercion took place at the hospital, when defendant would have admitted anything so that his treatment would not be delayed. As such, remand is fair. Discussion At first glance, this case appears to be a true plurality, but the key to understanding it is finding the areas where the justices agree. All justices seem to feel that remand is appropriate, in light of the fact that it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove a violation of his rights. The justices go on to give the defendant ample proof that his rights have been violated, should he raise the issue of the hospital questioning. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) (You Have the Right to Remain Silent: A Bright-Line Rule) Facts Miranda was arrested for rape and taken into custody. He took him into an interrogation room where he was questioned by 2 officers, who later admitted that Miranda was not told that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. There was a typed paragraph on the paper that stated that Miranda had given the confession freely and voluntarily. Holding
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The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. o Custodial Interrogation: Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Court hinged its decision on the coercive nature of the interrogations, and seems to have crippled the old voluntariness test, and imposes a new rule upon law enforcement before a confession may be legally obtained. o Court discusses the history of the self-incrimination clause within the Constitution. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. The privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent in the unfettered excise of his own will. The 5th Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. o The accused must be adequately and effectively informed of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. If a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. This warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it. The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. o This will make the accused aware of the privilege and the consequences of forgoing it. Once warnings have been given, if the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
We hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege. THIS WARNING IS AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO INTERROGATION AFTER A PERSON IS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY!!! **This is not to be construed as changing the nature of the term accused within the 6th Amendment, but the Court reads a right to counsel into the 5th Amendment when there Is a custodial interrogation (i.e. even though there is no mention of counsel in the 5th Amendment). ***In the absence of certain safeguards or a valid waiver, then the confession may not be used against an accused.
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Illinois v. Perkins (1990) Brief Fact Summary: An undercover police agent was placed in jail with the suspect and got them to elicit incriminating statements. Rule of Law: Miranda warnings are not required when an undercover agent asks questions that could result in incriminating statements. Issue: Are Miranda warnings required when an undercover agent is asking questions that could elicit an incriminating result? Held: No. Reverse the appellate courts decision affirming the suppression of the statements. The Fifth Amendment privilege versus self-incrimination is not implicated when a suspect is not aware they are speaking to law enforcement, and then gives incriminating statements, thus admit the statements into evidence. There is no convergence here between custody and official interrogation, thus admit the statements made to the undercover agent. This is different from the situations where Miranda warnings are necessary since the suspect was motivated only by his desire to impress his fellow inmates, had no reason to think that the agent had legal authority to force the suspect to give testimony, and showed no signs of being intimidated. Sixth Amendment right to counsel concerns do not apply since no charges had been filed at the time of interrogation. Dissent: Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented on grounds that Miranda also included protections versus police deception, and thus the ignorance of the agents real identity did not eliminating the compulsive nature of the exchange. Also, he believed this clouded the doctrine of Miranda, and established a large loophole for law enforcement in infringing on suspects Fifth Amendment rights. Concurrence: Justice William Brennan agreed with the result, but believed that if the suspect had invoked Miranda on the unrelated charges, he might be able to challenge the statements coming into evidence. Also he may have invoked Sixth Amendment rights earlier had he been formally charged on the unrelated charge. There also may even have been a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim as a result of the polices deception. Discussion: The key factor for the majority in this case ending up with the result that it did was that there was not much that was coercive about this questioning. The dissent however, emphasizes that the intent of the officers is to be examined in a Miranda inquiry, even though here the majority focuses on the evaluating the resultant situation. Some commentators think that this case has been wrongly decided if the point of Miranda is to give suspects equivalent information and the opportunity to obtain counsel. 20 Miranda Applied: Custody and Interrogation
645 665
Wednesday, April 6, 2011 The Miranda rule applies to the use of testimonial evidenc e in criminal proceedings that is the product of custodial police interrogation. Therefore, for Miranda to apply six factors must be present: 1. evidence must have been gathered 2. the evidence must be testimonial a. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
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3. the evidence must have been obtained while the suspect was in custody a. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 4. the evidence must have been the product of interrogation a. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 5. the interrogation must have been conducted by state-agents and a. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); See also Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice, (Greenwood Press 1991) citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 6. the evidence must be offered by the state during a criminal prosecution. a. The Fifth Amendment applies only to compelled statements used in criminal proceedings. Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) (Custodial Interrogation) An initial non-custodial interrogation may become custodial as the circumstances change. In Oregon v. Mathiason, the Court ruled that a suspect was not "in custody" under Miranda, where the police had initiated contact with the defendant, who agreed to come to the patrol office, where the police conducted an interview after informing him that they suspected him of committing a burglary, telling him that the truthfulness of any statement that he made would be evaluated by the district attorney or a judge. The court noted that officer also falsely informed the defendant that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. After the defendant then admitted to his participation in the crime, the officer advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and took a taped confession, but released him pending the district attorney's decision to bring formal charges. The interview lasted for 30 minutes. In summarily reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision that the defendant was "in custody," the Court reasoned that Miranda will not apply to a noncustodial situation merely because a reviewing court concludes that, despite the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning occurred in a coercive environment. The Court explained that police are required to give Miranda warnings only if the person has had their freedom restricted severely enough to amount to custody. The Court relied on the principle that any interview of a suspect by a police officer will have some coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law-enforcement system that may ultimately charge the person with a crime. Facts A home was burglarized, and the owner was asked who she thought it may have been and she named Mathiason. The officer tried to contact Mathiason on 3 or 4 occasions with no success. The officer ultimately left his card at Mathiasons home, and Mathiason contacted the officer the next day and voluntarily came to the state patrol office was told that he was NOT under arrest. Within a few minutes of questioning, Mathiason said that he had taken the property. Procedural History Supreme Court of Oregon held that the interrogation took place in a coercive environment. Issue Whether Mathiason in custody, such that he should have received his Miranda warnings. Holding No.
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Custodial Interrogation: Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Mathiason came voluntarily to police station, was immediately informed he was not under arrest, and gave a half hour interview during which he confessed to burglary after which he left the police station without hindrance, was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, and it was not necessary that he be given the Miranda warnings prior to confession. There is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondents freedom to depart was restricted in any way. o Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a coercive environment. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a persons freedom as to render him in custody.
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) (Severity of the Offense Does NOT have an Effect on Miranda Warning) In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Supreme Court held that an initial traffic stop of a motorist's vehicle, by itself, did not render him "in custody," so that, in view of the failure to demonstrate that at any time between the stop and arrest, the motorist was subjected to restraints comparable to a formal arrest, the motorist was not deemed "in custody" until the officer arrested him. Accordingly, pre-arrest statements that the motorist made in response to roadside questioning were admissible against him. The Supreme Court ruled that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of Miranda procedural safeguards regardless of the nature or degree of the investigated offense. The Court explained that to create an exception to the Miranda rule when the police arrest a person for allegedly committing a misdemeanor traffic offense and then question him without informing him of his constitutional rights would substantially undermine the rule's simplicity and clarity and would introduce doctrinal complexities, particularly for situations when the police, in conducting custodial interrogations, do not know whether the person has committed a misdemeanor or a felony. The Court noted that the Miranda doctrine's purposes of ensuring that investigators do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, and avoiding the necessity of individualized court scrutiny of voluntariness, are implicated just as much in the interrogation of misdemeanor suspects as with felony suspects. Facts McCarty was observed to be swerving on the road, and the officer pulled him over. The officer noticed that he was having difficulty standing. The officer concluded that respondent would be charged with a traffic offense and would not be allowed to leave the scene, but respondent was not told that he would be taken into custody. When respondent could not perform a test without falling, the officer asked him if he had been using intoxicants, and he replied that he had consumed two beers and had smoked marijuana a short time before. The officer then formally arrested respondent and drove him to a county jail, where a blood test failed to detect any alcohol in respondent's blood. Questioning was then resumed, and respondent
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again made incriminating statements, including an admission that he was "barely" under the influence of alcohol. At no point during this sequence was respondent given the warnings prescribed by Miranda. Rule If the police take a suspect into custody and then as him questions without informing him of the rights enumerated [in Miranda], his responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his guilt. Issue 1. Whether or not the Miranda rights apply to a misdemeanor offense. 2. Whether or not there is a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda for roadside questioning. Holding Yes to #1. No to #2. - A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested. o Mathiasons statements made at the station house were inadmissible since he was "in custody" at least as of the moment he was formally arrested and instructed to get into the police car, and since he was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time. To create an exception to the Miranda rule when the police arrest a person for allegedly committing a misdemeanor traffic offense and then question him without informing him of his constitutional rights would substantially undermine the rule's simplicity and clarity and would introduce doctrinal complexities, particularly with respect to situations where the police, in conducting custodial interrogations, do not know whether the person has committed a misdemeanor or a felony. The purposes of the Miranda safeguards as to ensuring that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, relieving the inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, and freeing courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary, are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies. - The roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop does not constitute "custodial interrogation" for the purposes of the Miranda rule. o Although an ordinary traffic stop curtails the "freedom of action", they do not sufficiently impair the detainee's exercise of his privilege against selfincrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. A traffic stop is usually brief, and the motorist expects that, while he may be given a citation, in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. Moreover, the typical traffic stop is conducted in public, and the atmosphere surrounding it is substantially less "police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda
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and subsequent cases in which Miranda has been applied. However, if a motorist who has been detained. o In this case, the initial stop of respondent's car, by itself, did not render him "in custody," and respondent has failed to demonstrate that, at any time between the stop and the arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest. Since Mathiason was not taken into custody for the purposes of Miranda until he was formally arrested, his statements made prior to that point were admissible against him. o The evidence must have been obtained while the suspect was in custody. Custody means either that the suspect was under arrest or that his freedom of movement was restrained to an extent "associated with a formal arrest." A formal arrest occurs when an officer, with the intent to make an arrest, takes a person into custody by the use of physical force or the person submits to the control of an officer who has indicated his intention to arrest the person. In the absence of a formal arrest, the issue is whether a reasonable person in the suspects position would have believed that he was under arrest. Applying this objective test, the Court has held Miranda does not apply to roadside questioning of a stopped motorist or to questioning of a person briefly detained on the street. Even though neither the motorist nor the pedestrian is free to leave, this interference with the freedom of action is not considered custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) (Miranda Interrogation) (Reasonably Should Have Known an Incriminating Statement will be Made) Ruling that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected either to express questioning or to its functional equivalent, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that the term "interrogation" refers to any words or action on the part of the police, other than those normally attendant on arrest and custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Under this objective test, any knowledge that the police might possess about an unusual susceptibility of the defendant to a particular mode of persuasion might be an important factor in resolving whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Court explained that although this legal standard is grounded in the principle that the Miranda warnings were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police, the intent of the police is not irrelevant, as it may help to show whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from the suspect. Despite this broad understanding of "interrogation," however, the Court ruled that the defendant in the case at bar was not interrogated in violation of his right to remain silent. First, there was no express questioning. Second, the defendant was not subjected to the functional equivalent of questioning since the officers could not be said to have known that their brief conversation in his presence was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Third, according to the Court, the record did not suggest that the officers knew that the defendant
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would be susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of children and would respond by offering to show the officers where the shotgun at issue was buried. Facts Shortly after a taxicab driver, who had been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun, identified a picture of respondent as that of his assailant, a Providence, R.I., patrolman spotted Innis, who was unarmed, on the street, arrested him, and advised him of his rights under Miranda. When other police officers arrived at the arrest scene, respondent was twice again advised of his Miranda rights, and he stated that he understood his rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. Innis was then placed in a police car to be driven to the central station in the company of three officers, who were instructed not to question respondent or intimidate him in any way. While en route to the station, two of the officers engaged in a conversation between themselves concerning the missing shotgun. One of the officers stated that there were "a lot of handicapped children running around in this area" because a school for such children was located nearby, and "God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." Innis interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. Upon returning to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun was in progress, respondent was again advised of his Miranda rights, replied that he understood those rights but that he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the school," and then led the police to the shotgun. Issue Whether the respondent was interrogated by the police officers in violation of the respondents undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. Holding Respondent was not "interrogated" in violation of his right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. - The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. o The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. - Here, there was no express questioning of respondent; the conversation between the two officers was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between them to which no response from respondent was invited. o Moreover, Innis was not subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning, since it cannot be said that the officers should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from respondent. While Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion," it must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, which was not established here.
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Notes: Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) (routine booking question exception) In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Supreme Court concluded that a drunk-driving defendant's response to a booking question about the date of his sixth birthday constituted a testimonial response to custodial interrogation for purposes of the self-incrimination component of the Fifth Amendment. His response to the sixth birthday question was incriminating not just because of how he delivered his response, but also because the content of his answer tended to imply that he was in a confused mental state. The defendant's response was testimonial because he was required to communicate an assertion of fact by expressing a belief and, thus, was confronted with a "trilemma" of truth, falsity, or silence, which the Court considered to be the historical abuse that the Self-Incrimination Clause was intended to prevent. The Court reasoned that the custodial interrogation's inherently coercive milieu effectively precluded the possibility of remaining silent. The defendant was therefore faced with the two options. He could tell the truthand thus incriminate himselfby admitting that he did not then know the date of his sixth birthday, or he could inevitably answer falsely by simply choosing a date, an action that would also have been incriminating. - Routine booking questions may not be held to be testimonial, and thus are allowed in. o HOWEVER, LOOK TO THE NATURE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT TO SEE IF IT CROSSES A LEGITIMATE THRESHOLD. IF ANSWERS ARE NOT TESTIMONIAL, THEN THEY ARE ADMISSIBLE. 21 Miranda Applied: Waiver and Invocation 666 671 674 680 681 - 683
Monday, April 18, 2011 North Carolina v. Butler (1979) (No Explicit Waiver of Miranda Rights is Necessary) In North Carolina v. Butler, the Supreme Court held that an explicit statement of waiver by a suspect is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the right to counsel during an interrogation guaranteed by Miranda was waived. Instead, the issue of waiver must be assessed on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the individual case. To formulate an inflexible, per se rule that implicit waivers may never suffice would exceed the requirements of federal organic law, since a state court must conform to the strictures of the U.S. Constitution, the Court reasoned. The Court explained that although the Miranda case clearly established that mere silence is not a waiver, this principle did not mean that the defendant's silence combined with his understanding of his rights and a "course of conduct" indicating waiver may never justify a finding of waiver. While the courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights, and the prosecution bears a weighty burden to show otherwise, a waiver may nonetheless be clearly inferred in some cases from the actions and words of the person interrogated, even if the person remained silent. Explaining that the per se rule against implicit waivers, adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in the decision below, was not needed to satisfy the prophylactic rules created in Miranda, which were designed to prevent the inherently coercive atmosphere of an interrogation from overcoming the free will of the subject, the Court noted that the defendant was adequately and effectively advised of his rights. The only question was
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whether he had waived the exercise of one of those rights, the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, the Court reasoned. Facts Butler, while under arrest and after being advised of his Miranda rights made incriminating statements to the arresting officers. Butler refused to sign the waiver of his rights, but said that he would talk to the agents. His motion to suppress evidence of these statements on the ground that he had not waived his right to assistance of counsel at the time the statements were made was denied by a North Carolina trial court, and he was subsequently convicted. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that Miranda requires that no statement of a person under custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence against him unless, at the time the statement was made, he explicitly waived the right to the presence of a lawyer. Holding North Carolina Supreme Court erred. - An explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda case. o The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, and there is no reason in a case such as this for a per se rule, such as that of the North Carolina Supreme Court. By creating an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver can ever suffice, that court has gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law, and thus its judgment cannot stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates of the United States Constitution. There is no doubt that Butler was adequately apprized of his rights. Edwards v. Arizona (1981) Facts After being arrested on a state criminal charge, and after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda, Edwards was questioned by the police, until he said that he wanted an attorney. Questioning then ceased, but on January 20 police officers came to the jail and, after stating that they wanted to talk to him and again informing Edwards of his Miranda rights, obtained his confession when he said that he was willing to talk. The trial court ultimately denied petitioner's motion to suppress his confession, finding the statement to be voluntary, and he was convicted. The Arizona Supreme Court held that during the January 20 meeting he waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he voluntarily gave his statement after again being informed of his rights. Holding - The use of Edwards confession against him at his trial violated his right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, as declared in Miranda. o Having exercised his right on January 19 to have counsel present during interrogation, petitioner did not validly waive that right on the 20th. A waiver of the right to counsel, once invoked, not only must be voluntary, but also must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege.
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Here, however, the state courts applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver by focusing on the voluntariness of petitioner's confession rather than on whether he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights. o An accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Here, the interrogation of petitioner on January 20 was at the instance of the authorities, and his confession, made without having had access to counsel did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible. 22 Exceptions to Miranda 607 614 616 623 631 641
Wednesday, April 20, 2011 New York v. Quarles (1984) (There is a Public Safety Exception to the Miranda Warning) The evidence must have been obtained while the suspect was in custody. Custody means either that the suspect was under arrest or that his freedom of movement was restrained to an extent "associated with a formal arrest." In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court established a "public safety" exception to the Miranda requirements to govern cases in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. Here, the suspect, when detained and frisked by a police officer in a supermarket, was discovered to be wearing an empty shoulder holster, thus presenting the officer, who had been informed that the suspect was carrying a gun, with the immediate need to establish the whereabouts of the gun, which he had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his holster and discarded in the supermarket, where an accomplice might make use of it or a customer or employee might come upon it. The Court explained that the officer needed an answer to the question not simply to make a case against the suspect but to insure that danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area. The Court reasoned that imposing procedural safeguards that deter a suspect from responding were deemed in the Miranda decision to be an acceptable cost of protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege. When the primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda Court was willing to endure that cost. Here, however, if the Miranda warnings had deterred the suspect from responding to the officer's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the Court explained, the cost would not have been merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting the defendant, but also the failure to adequately protect the public from a dangerous situation. The Court stated that although the narrow exception to the Miranda safeguards recognized here will decrease somewhat its salutary clarity, the exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply, as officers will readily distinguish between
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questions that are necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions that are intended only to extract testimonial evidence. Facts A woman approached two police officers who were on road patrol, told them that she had just been raped, described the guy who had raped her, and told them that he had just entered a nearby supermarket and was carrying a gun. Officer Kraft entered the store and spotted Quarles, who began to run toward the rear of the store. Officer Kraft ordered him to stop and to put his hands over his head; frisked him and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, asked him where the gun was. Quarles nodded toward some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft then retrieved the gun from one of the cartons, formally arrested Quarles, and read him his Miranda rights. Quarles indicated that he would answer questions without an attorney being present and admitted that he owned the gun and had purchased it in Florida. Procedural History The trial court excluded respondent's initial statement and the gun because Quarles had not yet been given the Miranda warnings, and also excluded his other statements as evidence tainted by the Miranda violation. Both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Holding Reversed and Remanded. - This case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda. o On these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. The doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda do not require that it be applied in all of its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. In this case, as long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, it posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, or a customer or employee might later come upon it. o Miranda warnings were designed to protect the defendant, and thus did not really apply in this situation. - If Miranda warnings had deterred responses to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting respondent. o An answer was needed to insure that future danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.
Oregon v. Elstad (1985) (Failure to Give Miranda Warnings do NOT Necessarily Lead to Suppression) In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court ruled that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and
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confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. Thus, a defendant's initial inculpatory remark to the police, who had come to the 18-year-old defendant's home to arrest him for burglary, was voluntary even though the defendant might have been in custody, as neither the environment nor the manner of interrogation was coercive. Furthermore, the failure to then administer Miranda warnings did not preclude the admission of a written confession obtained shortly thereafter at the station house following a careful admonition of Miranda rights and an ensuing waiver of those rights. The Court was not convinced by the argument that the defendant could not give a fully informed waiver on the theory that the written confession was made only while the suspect might have been under the misapprehension that his prior statement could be used against him anyway, and thus any refusal to continue speaking would be pointless. The Court explained that to impose a requirement that the suspect should have been given an additional warning at the station house that his earlier statement could not be used against him was impractical and, in any case, not constitutionally required. Facts When officers of the Polk County, Ore., Sheriff's Office picked up Elstad at his home as a suspect in a burglary, he made an incriminating statement that he was present at the burglary without having been given his Miranda warnings. After he was taken to the station house, and after he was advised of and waived his Miranda rights, Elstad executed a written confession. Procedural History In his prosecution for burglary, the state trial court excluded from evidence his first statement because he had not been given Miranda warnings, but admitted the written confession. Elstad was convicted, but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the confession should also have been excluded. The court concluded that because of the brief period separating respondent's initial, unconstitutionally obtained statement and his subsequent confession, the "cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive impact" on respondent's confession, rendering it inadmissible. Holding The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of a confession, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the suspect. - Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion, requiring that unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment be excluded from evidence. o But the Miranda presumption does not require that fruits of otherwise voluntary statements be discarded as inherently tainted. Officers cured the prior failure to give Miranda warnings. - Absent any actual coercion or other circumstances that seem to undermine a suspects free will, Miranda does not extend to hold that a failure to administer the warnings so taints the process to a degree which warrants suppression of a later waiver of Miranda rights. Missouri v. Seibert (2004) (No Post-Miranda Admissibility when Miranda Warning is AFTER Confession) I n Missouri v. Seibert, the Supreme Court ruled that Miranda warnings given mid-interrogation, after the defendant gave an unwarned confession, were ineffective, and thus a second, postwarning confession made by the defendant after similar questioning, following a short break,
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was inadmissible at trial. The defendant had been afraid that she would be charged with neglect after her son, who was afflicted with cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. The defendant was present when two of her sons and their friends discussed burning her family's mobile home to conceal the circumstances of her son's death, and, in order to avoid the appearance that the son had been unattended, an unrelated mentally ill 18-year-old living with the family was left to die in the fire. Several days later, the police arrested the defendant but did not advise her of her rights under Miranda. At the police station, an officer questioned the defendant for 30 to 40 minutes, obtaining a confession that the plan was for the mentally ill boy to die in the fire. After a 20minute break in the interrogation, the officer returned to give her Miranda warnings and obtained a signed waiver. He resumed questioning, confronting the defendant with her prewarning statements and leading her to repeat the information. The defendant moved to suppress both her prewarning and postwarning statements. The officer testified that he purposely withheld the Miranda warnings, questioned the defendant first, then gave the warnings, and then repeated the question until he obtained the earlier answer. The state trial court suppressed the prewarning statement but admitted the postwarning one, and the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, applying the reasoning of a case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a suspect's unwarned inculpatory statement made during a brief exchange at his house did not make a later, fully warned inculpatory statement inadmissible. Justice Souter explained that the facts of this case "by any objective measure reveal a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings." He declared that the police had created a situation for the defendant, a woman suspected of murder, "in which it would have been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage what had been said before." Facts Respondent Seibert feared charges of neglect when her son, afflicted with cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. She was present when two of her sons and their friends discussed burning her family's mobile home to conceal the circumstances of her son's death. Donald, an unrelated mentally ill 18- year-old living with the family, was left to die in the fire, in order to avoid the appearance that Seibert's son had been unattended. Five days later, the police arrested Seibert, but did not inform her of her rights under Miranda. At the police station, Officer Hanrahan questioned her for 30 to 40 minutes, obtaining a confession that the plan was for Donald to die in the fire. He then gave her a 20-minute break, returned to give her Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed waiver. He resumed questioning, confronting Seibert with her prewarning statements and getting her to repeat the information. Seibert moved to suppress both her prewarning and post-warning statements. Hanrahan testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda warnings, question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question until he got the answer previously given. Procedural History The District Court suppressed the prewarning statement but admitted the postwarning one, and Seibert was convicted of second-degree murder. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. State Supreme Court reversed. Holding - The object of the question-first interrogation method is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed.
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If the warnings are given after a successful interrogation, then they are wholly ineffective in preparing the suspect for another following interrogation. In this case, a suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent. Court distinguished this case from Elstad by the relevant facts. o Here, Seiberts pre- Miranda confession flowed in continuity and in form to the post-Miranda confession, whereas the time and place elements in Elstad indicated two separate interrogations. In Elstad, there was mistake, and here there was an intention to deprive the Miranda warnings. Because the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart Mirandas purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted, and because the facts here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose, Seiberts postwarning statements are inadmissible. Miranda Revisited 623 641
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Dickerson v. United States (2000) Dickerson v. United States, expressly declining to overrule the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that because Miranda announced a constitutional rule, Congress could not constitutionally supplant the Miranda warnings with a case-by-case standard under 18 U.S.C.A. 3501, which would merely examine whether a confession was voluntary. Recognizing the Court's supervisory authority to prescribe procedural rules for the lower courts, the Court reasoned that, although Congress retains the authority to modify or annul any such judicially crafted rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution, Congress may not legislatively override the Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. Recognizing that the Miranda rules continue to govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts, the Court noted that the status of Miranda as a constitutional rule was shown most prominently by the fact that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied its rule to state court proceedings and that the Court has consistently done so ever since. The Court reasoned that it does not hold supervisory power over the state courts; its authority is restricted to enforcing the requirements of the Constitution. 24 6th Amendment / Confessions 696 - 716
Monday, April 25, 2011 Massiah v. United States (1964) (6th Amendment Trumps Government Setups to SelfIncriminate) Facts Massiah was indicted for narcotics violations, and he retained a lawyer, pled not guilty and was released on bail. A few days later, and without Massiahs knowledge, his buddy Colson decided to cooperate with the government in their investigation. He agreed to have a listening device installed in his car that would enable an officer in another car to hear statements.
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Massiah made incriminating statements when he was in the car with Colson. At trial these statements were brought before the jury through the cops testimony. Trial denied the objections of defense counsel that these should be excluded. Issue Should the elicited statements made by Massiah to Colson after Massiah had been indicted and retained counsel be excluded as fruits of a 6th Amendment violation of the right to counsel? Holding Yes. Massiah was denied the basic protections of the 6th Amendment guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. - If the 6th Amendment is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. - An individual against whom adversary proceedings have commenced has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him Dissent Massiah was not prevented from consulting with counsel as often as he wished. No meetings with counsel were disturbed or spied upon. Massiah had a right to counsels aid before and during the trial, his out of court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsels consent or presence. Brewer v. Williams (1977) (Application of the Massiah Waiver) (Fruits of 6th Amendment Violation Results in Suppression of Evidence) Facts Williams was arrested, arraigned, and committed to jail in Davenport, Iowa, for abducting a 10year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. Both his Des Moines lawyer and his lawyer at the Davenport arraignment advised Williams not to make any statements until after consulting with the Des Moines lawyer upon being returned to Des Moines, and the police officers who were to accompany Williams on the automobile drive back to Des Moines agreed not to question him during the trip. During the trip Williams expressed no willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney but instead stated several times that he would tell the whole story after seeing his Des Moines lawyer. However, one of the police officers, who knew that Williams was a former mental patient and was deeply religious, sought to obtain incriminating remarks from Williams by stating to him during the drive that he felt they should stop and locate the girl's body because her parents were entitled to a Christian burial for the girl, who was taken away from them on Christmas Eve. Williams eventually made several incriminating statements in the course of the trip and finally directed the police to the girl's body. Procedural History Williams was tried and convicted of murder, over his objections to the admission of evidence relating to or resulting from any statements he made during the automobile ride, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding, as did the trial court, that Williams had waived his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Williams then petitioned for habeas corpus in Federal District Court, which held that the evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at Williams trial on the ground, inter alia, that
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he had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and further ruled that he had not waived that right. Issue Was Williams deprived of his 6th Amendment right to counsel when Officer Leamings gave Williams a Christian Burial speech which he had hoped would elicit incriminating statements without the presence of his attorneys? Holding Yes. Williams was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. - The right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to a lawyer's help at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, and here there is no doubt that judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the automobile trip started, since a warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned, and had been committed to jail. o Since the police officer's 'Christian burial speech' was tantamount to interrogation Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel at the time he made the incriminating statements. The circumstances of record provide, when viewed in light of Williams's assertions of his right to counsel, no reasonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to the assistance of counsel, the record falling far short of sustaining the State's burden to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Johnson v. Zerbst)
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REMAINDER OF CLASS Wednesday, April 13, 2011: guest speaker Monday, April 18, 2011: Waiver and Invocation (no change from syllabus) Casebook 666-671 (up to note 6) Casebook 674-680 (up to n3), Supp. pages 5-18 Casebook 681 (begin at n4) to 683 (up to n6) Wednesday, April 20, 2011: Exceptions to Miranda Casebook 607-614; Supp. page 4 (note 5A) Casebook 616-623 Casebook 631-641 Monday, April 25, 2011: 6th Amendment/Confessions Casebook 696-716
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Miranda Revisited 6th Amendment / Confessions

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103 109 113 119 126 140

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No Warrant Arrest Warrant

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Arizona v. Gant (2009) (search of automobile incident to arrest)

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Plain View Consent

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Changes that make the exclusionary rule

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