COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ________________________________________________ ) Investigation of the Department of Public Utilities on its ) own

motion into the preparation and response of ) Western Massachusetts Electric Company to an October ) 29th, 2011 snowstorm. ) ________________________________________________) D.P.U. 11-119-C

REPLY BRIEF OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

Donald H. Wells, Jr., Esq. Western Massachusetts Electric Company 100 Summer Street, 23rd Floor Boston, MA 02110 617-345-1366

July 17, 2012

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES ________________________________________________ ) Investigation of the Department of Public Utilities on its ) own motion into the preparation and response of ) Western Massachusetts Electric Company to an October ) 29th, 2011 snowstorm. ) ________________________________________________) D.P.U. 11-119-C

REPLY BRIEF OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY I. INTRODUCTION On July 10, 2012, the Office of the Attorney General (Attorney General), Department of Energy Resources (DOER), and the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 455 (IBEW or the Union) filed their respective reply briefs with the Department. Pursuant to the procedural schedule, Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMECO or the Company) files this reply brief. The Attorney General described the October 29 snowstorm as a catastrophic event that simultaneously affect[ed] WMECOs affiliates, other utilities across the state, as well as those across a region. Exh. AG-MDC/PJL-1, p. 9. In the face of this catastrophe, the men and women of WMECO jumped into action, working diligently and with purpose to safely, efficiently and quickly restore essential services to its customers in western Massachusetts. Regardless of the outcome of this case, those who responded and left their own homes and families in order to fight the devastation caused by the forces of nature must be lauded and congratulated for their devotion to duty and service to the public. When regional catastrophic storms occur, it takes time to put back what Mother Nature has cast asunder. Recent events in the mid-Atlantic states once again demonstrate that
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when devastating storms occur, it takes time and patience to fix the damage. In the face of a regional catastrophe, WMECO and its crews and support personnel swiftly and safely restored power to its customers. Although WMECO has learned many lessons from this storm, penalties are neither called for nor necessary, and would merely tarnish the diligent efforts that the Companys men and women dedicated to serve the public. For the reasons stated below, which supplement the reasons contained in the Companys initial brief, the evidence shows that WMECO prepared for, and responded to, the largest storm in its history (the October Snowstorm) consistent with both the Companys Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and with utility practice that resulted in an effective service restoration. The penalties urged by the Attorney General are inappropriate and unnecessary, and are based on alleged ERP violations that are without merit and must be denied under the applicable legal standard. In this reply brief, the Company focuses on the arguments set forth by the Attorney General, DOER, and IBEW in their respective reply briefs. Silence as to any particular matter or point does not constitute agreement. II. ARGUMENT A. Each of the Attorney Generals arguments for assessing monetary penalties against WMECO is unsupported and contradicted by the record evidence.

The Attorney General seeks to justify her requested penalties against the Company based on three specific alleged ERP violations. Each of those arguments is addressed in detail below. In addition, certain more general allegations in her reply brief also merit a response. The Attorney General takes the position that because some customers and officials expressed dissatisfaction (Attorney General reply brief, pp. 3, 6) and the restoration period lasted for significant periods of time (Attorney General reply brief, p. 13), either there must have been
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violations of the ERP, or the ERP requires improvement, or both. Id. The record shows otherwise. The Companys storm preparation, response, and communications were compliant with its ERP, as well as effective and successful in the face of the regional catastrophe that amounted to the largest storm the Company has ever experienced. WMECO understands the inconveniences and hardships that customers face during extended periods of time without electricity. WMECOs business, and the jobs of its dedicated and selfless professionals, is to restore service as quickly as is safely possible. The Company also acknowledges the challenges faced by public officials, similar to those faced by WMECO, in managing natural disaster response and restoration of such epic scale. Such frustrations alone, however, cannot constitute the basis for a financial penalty under applicable law and regulations. See M.G.L. c. 164, 76, 220 C.M.R. 19.00 et seq. 1. WMECOs ERP worked well, and the Companys implementation of the ERP resulted in a safe and efficient restoration.

The Attorney General prefaces her call for penalties by stating that outages existed due to the storm for a total of twelve (12) days. See Attorney General reply brief, p. 14. This premise epitomizes the strained and contorted view of the record espoused by the Attorney General in her quest to impose penalties on WMECO (and possibly other utilities across the state). However, the record shows otherwise. WMECO had fewer than 100 customers out by November 6 a total of eight days 33% faster than the premise asserted by the Attorney General. Exh. WM-DPU-IR-1-8. The fewer than 100 customers remaining could not be reconnected by WMECO until they had completed necessary repair work on their properties. Tr., p. 185. Once those customers repairs were completed, WMECO crews were available to reconnect them to service immediately. Any doubts or aspersions regarding the speed of the Companys restoration effort are without merit; the restoration graph
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depicting Department of Energy norms for speed of restoration clearly evidences that WMECOs restoration performance exceeded national norms. Exh. WM-AG-IR-2-28. To bolster her demands for the imposition of monetary penalties, the Attorney General asserts that a utility (and presumably the state, municipalities, and others) Must Be Prepared for Storms that It has Not Before Encountered. See Attorney General reply brief, pp. 3-4. This assertion completely contradicts the Attorney Generals own testimony. The Attorney Generals witnesses unequivocally state, Most utilities base pre-event damage estimates on past experience with prior storms and similar factors listed by WMECO, and this is considered good utility practice. Exh. AG-MDC/PJL-1, p. 16 (emphasis added). The Company followed this good utility practice when it prepared for a storm of a magnitude that WMECO had never before experienced. See section II.A.4 below. The record shows that consistent with the view of the Attorney Generals expert witnesses, WMECO appropriately planned and prepared for the storm that was forecasted based on the Companys experience with prior storms, and when the storm delivered significantly greater damage than anyone expected, the Company successfully scaled its response to the higher levels of damage consistent with its ERP. In recent years, WMECO has successfully implemented its ERP in response to multiple storms in the Level 5 range. See Exh. WM-AG-IR-2-22. WMECO professionally and successfully responded to the tornados in Springfield and western Massachusetts, severe thunderstorms, and Tropical Storm Irene, all in 2011. Id. The October Snowstorm interrupted service to three times the number of customers affected by the next worst storm in Company history, the 2008 ice storm, and caused over twice as many trouble spots. Despite the unprecedented magnitude of damage caused to WMECOs system, as a result of lessons learned and the successful implementation of the ERP, WMECO restored service faster in the
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October Snowstorm than in the 2008 ice storm. As noted above, by November 6 only customers who needed to make their own repairs had yet to have service restored. Exh. WMDPU-IR-1-8; Exh. WM-DPU-IR-4-10; Tr., pp. 185-86. As noted in the Companys initial brief at pp. 34-36, WMECO uses every storm event to glean lessons learned to drive continuous improvement. Feedback from customers and public officials is key. However, in no way should the hindsight application of lessons learned or opportunities for improvement be equated with failures or mistakes. Tr., pp. 447, 477. The Attorney General relied heavily upon the comments of Springfield Mayor Sarno in her reply brief; however, the Company has already acted to develop the mapping tools that the City had expressed would be helpful. Tr. pp. 277-79. The Attorney General fails to note that there was in fact positive feedback from Springfield and other municipalities. Exh. WM-AGIR-4-32 (e.g., from Springfields survey, at pp. 21-22: responsive and good communication w/ V.P. Bob Coates, on-site work exceptional as always, Mr. Alejandro very receptive and very helpful during morning EOC meetings). WMECO was present at the daily Springfield EOC briefings and manually produced the outage map the City had requested. See id. WMECO has already incorporated the historic experience of the October Snowstorm by implementing additional capabilities, such as new mapping tools, that municipalities have told the Company that they want. Tr., pp. 276-79, 284; Exh. WM-BAY, pp. 9-10. WMECO agrees that lessons learned and future improvements are important, but financial penalties can be a result only of specific ERP violations, of which there were none. 2. Damage assessment was consistent with the ERP and the specifics of a large-scale, circuit-based restoration; ETRs were largely accurate.

The Attorney General argues that a penalty should be imposed because WMECO concedes that it did not complete its detailed damage assessment within 48 hours. Attorney
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General reply brief, p. 15. This argument is faulty on many fronts and misrepresents WMECOs statements on this issue. WMECOs damage assessment was consistent with its ERP and appropriate for the circuit-based restoration undertaken in the October Snowstorm. Recall that the Attorney Generals testimony noted that circuit-based restoration is the most efficient from a speed of restoration standpoint during major events. Exh. AG-MDC/PJL-1, p. 7. WMECO must point out that the Attorney Generals argument misstates the ERP requirement. WMECOs ERP provides that [d]amage assessment will continue with detailed estimates of damage and be relayed back to the work center. The information will be analyzed within 48 hours or sooner and the proper resources will be committed to the effort. Exh. WM-DPU-IR-4-1, Section V, p. 6 (emphasis added). Proper resources were committed before and after a high level damage assessment was completed. Further, WMECO devoted significant resources to detailed damage assessment. Tr. pp. 360, 370, 380-81, 404-05. There has been no evidence of record showing or even alleging that detailed damage assessment information was not analyzed within 48 hours as required by the ERP. WMECO refuted the Attorney Generals primary argument regarding damage assessment in the Companys initial brief (WMECO initial brief, pp. 38-40). Hence, she now attempts on reply to re-cast her damage assessment argument as simply the Company did not have enough damage assessors to be able to do a detailed-enough assessment within 48 hours so that it could provide reasonably accurate ETRs. Attorney General reply brief, p. 12, citing Company brief, p. 27. Ignoring the fact that the primary purpose of damage assessment is to secure the necessary crews, equipment and materials, and to execute the restoration as efficiently as possible, this statement again misrepresents the ERP requirement, as well as misquotes the Company. There is no ERP requirement for 48-hour ETRs, although if there
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had been such a requirement, WMECOs actions would have met it. Global ETRs were issued promptly in the immediate aftermath of the storm to provide WMECOs best estimate based on initial damage assessment while more detailed information was gathered. Tr., pp. 376-77; Exh. WM-DPU-IR-3-27. The subsequent initial District level ETRs were remarkably accurate, particularly given the many variables of extensive downed wires and trees, a circuitbased restoration, crew procurement from a wide area, and ongoing detailed damage assessment. See Exh. WM-DPU-IR-2-14. Again, recall the Attorney Generals own testimony which noted that although circuit-based restoration is the most efficient from a speed of restoration standpoint during major events, it may be sub-optimal from a communications standpoint because it disadvantages the quality and timing of information that a utility can provide. Exh. AG-MDC/PJL-1, pp. 20-21. Initial District ETRs were between 83 and 95 percent accurate, and the first update was between 95 and 99 percent accurate by District. Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 19; Exh. WM-DPU-IR2-14; Exh. WM-DOER-1-1. The Attorney General cites no evidence in support of her conjecture that WMECO may have had difficulty with damage assessment on a town-bytown basis from a communications perspective, or that the alleged inaccuracy of ETRs may be related to allegedly insufficient numbers of damage assessors. Attorney General reply brief, p. 13 (emphasis added). Such unsupported speculation cannot be the basis of any penalty. The record in fact shows that WMECO had the damage assessors necessary for the circuit-based restoration method. It was the fact that the more efficient, on a speed of restoration basis, circuit-by-circuit method was used, not a lack of damage assessors, that limited the granularity of ETRs. See Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 18; Tr. p. 298. See also Exh. AGMDC/PJL-1, p. 26. A detailed damage assessment was also impeded by road blockages due to downed trees, telecommunications and cable infrastructure. Exh. WM-DPU-IR-3-27.
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Moreover, as Company witness Coates testified, a detailed damage assessment would have delayed the restoration and was not necessary due to the circuit-based manner in which resources were deployed. Tr., pp. 363, 369 (So, said another way, theres no need to assess damage that the line crews already repairing.) The Attorney General ignores the evidence that WMECOs damage assessment was consistent with its ERP and with a large-scale circuit-based restoration. That the Attorney General may be confused (see Attorney General reply brief, p. 9) regarding ETRs does not negate the fact that ETRs were timely and accurate. See Exh. WM-DPU-IR-2-14. Based upon the evidence of record, WMECO has demonstrated that its actions with respect to damage assessment were consistent with its ERP and also aided in shortening the restoration; there is no cause for any penalty. 3. Life support customers were properly contacted pursuant to the ERP.

Next, the Attorney General argues for a penalty based on the ERP requirement that WMECO contact its life support customers (LSCs) before, during and after the event. Attorney General reply brief, p. 15, citing Exh. WM-DPU-IR-4-1, Section 5.5, p. 17. While the Attorney General acknowledges the fact that WMECO contacted its LSCs prior to the storm (Attorney General reply brief, p. 10), in order to support her quest for the imposition of penalties, she continues to ignore the direct evidence of record that WMECO also contacted its LSCs during and after the storm. Tr., p. 102 ([LSCs] specifically were targeted on the 28th and 29th and then received daily update calls through the storm, all the way through it would have been the followup calls to all customers on November 7th.), Tr., pp. 322-23 (We targeted our calls to life support customers on a daily basis, the life support customers who were affected, had outages). In fact, all customers with outages were contacted. Tr., p. 102; Exh. WM-AG-IR-6-8. Even the Attorney Generals own
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witness agrees that to the extent that [WMECO] determined that [LSCs] power was on, I agree, no further communication may have been required. Tr., p. 505. The relevant ERP provision, Exh. WM-DPU-IR-4-1, Section 5.5 at p. 17, requires that WMECO:
Contact, via automated dialer, all qualified customers when weather conditions may indicate a probability of widespread or sustained power outages. Contact should be made pre, during and post events. Refer LSCs to call public agencies / officials for assistance or answer questions.

The Attorney Generals witness, Ms. Alexander, and presumably the Attorney General herself, given her apparent insistence on direct contact (Attorney General reply brief, p. 10), plainly want the Companys responsibility with respect to LSCs to extend far beyond its current ERP requirement, and therefore they interpret the ERP accordingly.1 Again, such a recommendation for future ERP changes, which would require considerable vetting and is beyond the scope of this investigation, cannot be the basis for a penalty. WMECO fully complied with the letter and intent of the ERP requirement as it was in effect at the time of the October Snowstorm. Finally, the fact that WMECO also chose to call non-LSC customers whose power was out during the storm, thus going above and beyond its ERP requirements, in no way diminishes the Companys compliance with regard to contacting LSCs during and after the storm. See Tr., pp. 323-24. To find otherwise also would send an absurd message to utilities that they should strictly limit themselves to their ERP requirements. WMECO did
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See Tr., p. 506 (Q: [I]s that assertion based on the companys ERP or on something else? A: I interpret the companys ERP) (emphasis added). See also Tr., pp. 505-06 ( I think they have an obligation and should have continued a specific outreach to determine the health and safety conditions for those customers and to again communicate with them about their special needs and perhaps in an affirmative way reach out to put them in contact with medical or shelter or other needs that they may have required.) (emphasis added). Clearly such aspirations are far afield from the ERP requirement itself of autodialer calls pre-, during- and post-storm, and referring LSCs to public agencies, however liberally interpreted.

follow its ERP and contacted LSCs before, during, and after the event as required by the ERP; no penalty is justified. 4. Pre-storm communications with customers fulfilled the ERP requirement and were appropriate given the uncertain forecasts.

Finally, the Attorney General argues that WMECO did not properly inform customers of the severity of the outage situation on October 28, 2011 or 29, 2011 or alert customers to the potential for a weeklong restoration of service that would be expected for a Level 5 event of this magnitude. Attorney General reply brief, p. 15, citing Exh. WM-DPUIR-1-11. What the Attorney General is insisting on in this critique is not ERP compliance, but rather nothing short of clairvoyance, which is not only an unreasonable standard, but one which could cause unjustified panic. There was no widespread outage situation, or a Level 5 event declared, until overnight on October 29-30. Tr., p. 340. The Company adequately communicated its best analysis of how it expected the weather as forecasted to affect service to customers leading up to the storm. See Exh. WM-DPU-IR-1-11, pp. 2-5. The simple fact, documented on the record, is that the October Snowstorm greatly exceeded all forecasts. WMECO constantly monitored the forecasts (Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 8; Tr., p. 531), and its preparations and communications were appropriate for those forecasts. As the storm approached, there was no consensus as to its probable impact. As late as Wednesday, October 27, Telvent noted that [t]he latest computer models differ considerably as to just how much the region will be affected, thus confidence is quite low at this time Exh. WM-AG-IR-323, p. 42. Also, slight shifts to the right or left could make huge differences in the forecast. Id., p. 3. Still, as late as Thursday, October 28, the forecasts were neither dire nor confident as to what would transpire; neither Telvent nor the National Weather Service (NWS) had yet
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to escalate the forecast from a winter storm watch to a winter storm warning, and NWS had only put a 50% probability on eight inches or more of snow in the WMECO service territory area. Exh. WM-RSC-3. Meanwhile, outages earlier in the week in the Pittsfield area had been minor. Id. Nonetheless, WMECO continued to increase its preparations pursuant to the forecasts, securing all local line and tree contract crews and requesting an additional 30 line crews via NU Mutual Aid.2 Id. On October 28, WMECO appropriately communicated the possibility of a significant weather event. Exh. WM-IR-DPU-1-11, pp. 2-3. As the forecasts escalated on October 29, WMECO increased the severity of its messaging appropriately to specifically advise customers to prepare for the possibility of a multi-day outage. Exh. WM-IR-1-11, p. 4. Still, on October 29, snow totals of only between 6 and 13 inches were predicted for the WMECO territory. Exh. WM-RSC-6, p. 6. No one predicted that on that same night much of the WMECO service territory would receive upwards of two feet of heavy, wet snow. Exh. WM-RSC-4, p. 12. In the immediate aftermath of the massive storm, with a preliminary damage assessment showing the significant devastation to WMECOs infrastructure, the Company promptly issued an appropriate message to customers on October 30 that some customers may be without power for up to a week. Exh. WM-DPU-IR-1-11, p. 6. While the Attorney Generals witness, Ms. Alexander, takes the general position that pre-storm messaging could have been more dramatic (Tr., p. 504), WMECO does not agree that it should exaggerate or dramatize its messaging. See Exh. WM-RSC-7, pp. 16-17.

The Attorney General alleges WMECO was not at Irene staffing levels until the Commonwealth recommended it. This is not correct. The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency call where Irene staffing levels were recommended began at 8:30 a.m. on October 29. Exh. WM-AG-IR-3-25. The email referenced by the Attorney General shows that prior to that call WMECO increased its crew request to Northeast Utilities Mutual Aid at 8:30 a.m. October 29. Exh. WM-AG-IR-1-2.

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Again, the record evidence dispels rather than supports any proposed penalty based on the Companys customer communications on October 28 and 29. B. DOER misunderstands the contractual provisions with phone companies.

DOER incorrectly states in its reply brief that WMECO claims it has no ability to enforce its contractual agreement with the telephone and cable companies. DOER reply brief, p. 2, citing Company reply [sic] brief, p. 49. The agreement between WMECO and Verizon predecessor New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, dated February 1, 1993 (Agreement), provides that the phone company will contribute 25 percent of the cost of routine tree trimming when both parties agree that there is a benefit from and need for tree trimming. Exh. WM-DPU-IR-1-24, p. 42; Tr., p. 389. The phone company has indicated that it does not have a need for maintenance trimming (hence does not agree), and on that basis it has not contributed to preventive maintenance trimming. Tr., pp. 39394. Per the Agreement, storm-related tree trimming costs are allocated 50/50 between WMECO and the phone company. Tr., p. 150. WMECO has in fact determined what to bill the phone company for its portion of storm-related tree trimming costs, and the netting process will occur once the phone company determines what it will bill WMECO. See Tr., p. 150. WMECO is in discussions to engage both phone and cable companies with regard to wires down clearing. Exh. WM-RSC-2, p. 9. As indicated in the Companys initial brief, regulators may be able to assist in promoting coordination from phone companies with respect to maintenance trimming and wires down, but contrary to DOERs argument there is no failure by WMECO to enforce provisions of the Agreement.

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C.

IBEW inappropriately seeks a role for the Department in WMECO labormanagement relations.

IBEWs reply brief makes clear that it seeks that the Department take action to pursue the Unions interests in increasing IBEW membership and pay, claiming these actions would improve customer service. With respect to staffing, WMECO maintains a workforce which is sufficient to meet the Companys day-to-day needs. Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 26. The pay issue relates to the Unions desire to have its members routinely work schedules greater than 16 hours in length during storms. Recall that the Attorney Generals testimony noted that WMECOs work practice is consistent with widely accepted best practices in the industry. Exh. AG-MDC/PJL-1, p. 38. The IBEW has not contested that this issue is tied to the collective bargaining process. See Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 27. WMECO announced during negotiations that the Company was discontinuing any work schedule practice associated with storm response where employees are scheduled for less than eight hours off between shifts, and the IBEW subsequently ratified its contract with that knowledge. Tr., pp. 213-14; Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 27. The IBEW now seeks to categorize its interests as part of WMECOs ongoing study and implementation of lessons learned in a statewide forum. IBEW reply brief, pp. 3-5. IBEWs issues, however, do not belong in such a broad forum. The only matters that the Company suggests may benefit from statewide attention are mutual aid procurement and wires down coordination with phone and cable companies. See Company initial brief, p. 36, citing Exh. WM-RSC-7, p. 23, Tr., p. 534, and Exh. WM-IR-DPU-4-32. WMECO disagrees that IBEWs issues of lineworker staffing, scheduling and pay belong in or could benefit from this or any statewide forum.

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III.

CONCLUSION Once again, it is imperative that the hard work and long hours of all the men and

women who worked diligently to safely and efficiently restore electrical service to WMECOs customers be recognized and lauded. Based upon the evidence of record in this proceeding and for all the reasons stated herein and more fully in the Companys initial brief, it is clear that WMECO successfully implemented its Emergency Response Plan in the October Snowstorm. WMECO personnel and record numbers of mutual aid and contractor crews increased the Company to ten times its normal size to allow the Company to safely and expeditiously restore service to over 140,000 out of WMECOs 215,000 customers. WMECO has demonstrated its compliance with the standards set forth in regulations, guidelines and the ERP itself. Based on an accurate and objective view of the record evidence, no other party has shown any violations of the ERP or other standards that would justify any penalties, let alone stringent penalties at the maximum levels as recommended by the Attorney General. WMECO successfully implemented its ERP in response to the October Snowstorm, a regional catastrophe that was the most severe weather event in Company history. WMECO has and will continue to implement the lessons learned from this historic storm in order to promote continuous improvement for future weather events. Respectfully submitted, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY

_______________________________________ Donald H. Wells, Jr., Esq. 100 Summer Street, 23rd Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02110 July 17, 2012
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