Categories of Culpability

Case: Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (1877 - Ireland) [p. 198-200]

Facts: Sailor on board a ship went to steal some rum. While doing so, he lit a match, and the rum caught fire,
which spread, and destroyed the ship. Δ had no intention of burning the ship, only of stealing rum. Still, he was
convicted of both arson and theft, b/c Court reasoned that he is responsible for anything that might happen,
foreseeable or not, when Δ was committing or attempting to commit a felony.

Issue: Whether a Δ who intends to commit one crime, but by mistake and unintentionally commits another,
should be held guilty of the second crime. -No.

Reasoning: The Δ needs to have intended the act that he is charged, or that it was a necessary consequence of
some other criminal act that he was engaged in, or that the result was a foreseeable result of committing the
original crime. The point here was that the Court did not address whether or not the fire was a foreseeable
consequence, and he acted recklessly, but said it didn’t matter, and these instructions were bad.

RULE: You have to have a separate mental state for each element of the act.
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Class Notes
• Reasons (mental state) in burning down the ship
o Purposefully - they meant to burn down the ship
o Knowingly - not the purpose, but he knew that it would happen and did it anyway
o Recklessly - doesn’t know it would happen to a substantial certainty, but know there's a risk, and
does it anyway
o Negligently - should have known about the risk. But didn’t and acted.
• What is Faulkner's mental state with respect to the arson?
o Not purposeful
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Notes: [p.200-206]

• General and specific intent. (Bishop)

o A "general" intent to commit some crime sufficed to make the offender criminally responsible for
any harm caused. As long as the intended result was roughly as bad as the result produced, the
unlawful intent would "transfer" to the actual, but unintended result.
o "Specific" intent - where you need the intent for the specific harm caused. There are certain
crimes that require proof of "specific" intent, b/c they are only crimes b/c of the intent to do
harm.
 These crimes are:
• All tentative crimes involving an unfulfilled purpose, such as attempts, larceny,
burglary, or the wounding with intent to disfigure
• All other crimes for which common law courts or statutes had defined an intent
element
o Different versions of the distinction:
 Specific intent may also refer to the mental state of any crime, while general intent to the
broader question of Δ's blameworthiness or guilt. Here, a fact that negates "specific
intent" negates the mental element of the offence. A fact that negates "general intent" is
an excuse or affirmative defense.
  General intent is an intention to do the act. Specific is an unexecuted intention to
accomplish some further result. For example, an unexecuted intention to kill turns the
general intent of trespass into the specific intent of burglary (trespass with intent to
commit felony).
 General intent where the actor intends the "natural and probable results" and the "legal
consequences" of his conduct. Specific intent when actor intended a particular result or
that actions would have a particular legal consequence.
 Specific intent is with a purpose, while general intent is with knowledge or recklessness
or negligence.
• Criticisms of specific and general intent
o Ambiguous
 General - An offense who acted with general intent may have acted with (a) no excuse,
(b) a proven intent to achieve the actual results of her conduct only, (c) a presumed
(rather than proven) intent to achieve the actual results of her conduct, or (d) recklessness
or negligence.
 Specific - an actor who acted with "specific intent" may have acted with (a) the culpable
mental state required by the definition of an offense, (b) a proven intent to achieve some
result beyond that actually achieved, (c) a proven (rather than presumed) intent to achieve
the actual results of her action, or (d) intent (rather than recklessness or negligence).
o Not very useful for an offense with more than two elements. - which of the elements must the
offender intend?
o The terminology wrongly implies that intent is the only kind of mental culpability possible.
o "General intent" is often a misleading euphemism. An offense that conditions liability on having
reasons to expect a result or know of a circumstance is a crime of negligence, not intent. If the
term "general intent" means culpability for undesired results, it is too imprecise: it does not
distinguish btwn results the actor actually expected and those the actor merely had reason to
expect. Also doesn’t distinguish among results that seem certain, probable or possible.
o Even though the phrase "general intent" need not mean "presumed intent," it is best avoided
because of historic association with unconstitutional presumptions.
• Normative and descriptive terminology
o All legal terminology has ambiguity in its definitions. Malice, intent - may mean diff things
depending on who is saying it. Point is - make sure you read the definition provided by statute.

Class Notes
• § 2.02(3)
o Silence = at least recklessness
• § 2.02(4)
o If statute provides one standard of culpability, that standard applies to ALL material elements
(unless contrary legislative intent plainly appears)
• MPC § 2.02(1)
o Δ must have acted
 Purposefully
 Knowingly
 Recklessly, or
 Negligently
o As the law may require, with respect to EACH material elements (no SL)