IX: OTHER TORTS

A. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Art. 27, CC. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. AMARO V SUMANGUIT G.R. No. L-14986 MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962 NATURE: Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS - October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay - The following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized" -In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime " - Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the assailant - Having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime." - Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay. Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs, that the action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code.The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the court below on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ISSUE WON the case should have been dismissed HELD NO Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity, indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but rather for a bill of particulars according to Rule 16. Reasoning - The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code, which states that Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. - That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged

that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen. - All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a right and that such right has been violated by the defendant. - Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too generally Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against appellee.

B. UNFAIR COMPETITION
Art. 28, CC. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

C. VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND PRIVACY

Art. 26, CC. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL AQUINO; November 14, 1984 FACTS - St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then below the photograph was the following write-up: "Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HELLS [note: thats not MY typo ha]. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HELLS [again, not MY typo]. With thrift and determination, they bought a lot and built their dream house . . . for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS [whew, there you are, no typo at last]... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for wholesome family living." - The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U.E. Ramon Magsaysay

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Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty a letter of protest. - The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published. - On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error. - On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15,1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches: "This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times issues of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowners the Arcadio family. The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the background, as was intended all along." - Judge Jose Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as allomey's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed. The CA affirmed. The CA reasoned that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under Articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that. ISSUE WON the CA erred by ignoring certain facts and resorting to surmises and conjectures hence its decision is contrary to law and the rulings of the SC HELD: NO. Reasoning - St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered by Article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts, " "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief." - The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. [NOTE: see Art 2219 for the list of cases where moral damages may be granted.] The acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article 26. - St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification." Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his

residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. CONCEPCION V CA (Sps. Nicolas) GR. 120706, Jan 31, 2000 Bellosillo 324 SCRA 84 FACTS: Florence Concepcion was the lessor of the Nicolas spouses (Nestor and Allem). She was also a contributor of capital to the latters business. One day, Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. In front of Nestors children and friends, Rodrigo shouted Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pakaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing. Worse, Rodrigo hurled the same accusation when he and Nestor confronted Florence. Because of said incidents, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital. Consequently, the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem started to doubt Nestors fidelity resulting in frequent bickering and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to separate. Nestor was then forced to write Rodrigo, demanding public apology and payment of damages. Due to the latters inaction, the spouses filed a civil suit for damages. Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered payment of moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N there is legal basis for the award of damages. Petitioner: The alleged act imputed to him does not fall 1 2 under Art. 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He only desired to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family, which was why he sought an appointment with Nestor through Florences son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter.
1

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
2

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3)Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. THE VIOLATIONS MENTIONED IN ARTS. 26 AND 2219 ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE BUT ARE MERELY EXAMPLES AND DO NOT PRECLUDE OTHER SIMILAR OR ANALOGOUS ACTS. Damages are allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language.

PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285 SCRA 438 ROMERO; January 29, 1998 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the RPC. FACTS - The information alleged that the accused with the use of firearms caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino. - The Supreme Court upheld the RTCs decision as to the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will focus on the RTCs award of damages which is relevant to our recitation. - As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755, with interest; 2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the total amount of P61,785, with interest; 3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of P10,000, with interest; 4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of P5,000 each, with interest. 5. The costs. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to the victims heirs HELD: NO Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission. Reasoning - In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper. - However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. - As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter. Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to cost.

Petition DENIED. Court of Appeals decision AFFIRMED.

IX: DAMAGES
A. DEFINITION AND CONCEPT
AQUINO, PP 842-843 Damages : The detriment, injury, or loss which are occasioned by reason of fault of another in the property or person. (Escriche, Diccionario Razonda de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia) Of whatsoever nature the damage be, and from whatsoever cause it may proceed, the person who has done the injury ought to repair it by an indemnity proportionate to his fault and to the loss caused thereby. ( 1 Cushing, Domats Civi Law) The pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or violation of some rights. (People v Ballesteros, 285 SCRA 438) A complaint for damages is a personal action and may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides at the election of the plaintiff. Baritua vs CA, 267 SCRA 331 In actions for damages, court should award an amount to the winning party and not its equivalent in property. The damages that should be awarded should be the money value of such damages. Heirs of Simeon Borlado v CA, 363 SCRA 753

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CUSTODIO V CA G.R. 116100, Feb 9, 1996 Regalado 253 SCRA 483 FACT Original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse. Plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon. Said property was surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants therein. As an access to P. Burgos St. from plaintiffs apartment, there are two possible passageways. When plaintiff purchased the property, there were tenants occupying the premises and were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. When on the tenants vacated the apartment, plaintiff saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway, making it narrower in width. Said adobe wall was constructed by defendants Santoses along their property, which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. It was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Plaintiff Mabasa filed a civil case of easement of right of way, which was granted by the trial court. Not satisfied with the decision because it did not award damages, plaintiff represented by his heirs raised it to the CA, which affirmed the trial court decision. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of damages is in order? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL LEGAL BASIS. The decision of the CA which awarded damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiffs suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are oftencalled damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which hecomplains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff, a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff, and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. The act of petitioners

constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which anaction will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.

Art. 2195, CC. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157. Art. 1157, CC. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a) Art. 2197, CC. Damages may be: (1) Actual or compensatory; (2) Moral; (3) Nominal; (4) Temperate or moderate; (5) Liquidated; or (6) Exemplary or corrective. HEIRS OF BORLADO V CA ( VDA DE BULAN) GR. 114118. Aug 28, 2001 PARDO 363 SCRA 753 FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan. The original owner of the lot in question Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners. On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00). After the death of Francsico on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children, sold it to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954. Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of the lot was with the vendeesspouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco Bacero from them in December 1947. Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for taxation purposes. Salvacion and her co-defendantsappelleespossession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them. On 23 November 1972, respondents filed complaint for ejectment against petitioners. The ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their agents, tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate and deliver possession to the respondents together with all improvements and standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand Pesos as reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights; and, the costs of suit.

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ISSUE: W/N the court erred in their decision. HELD: Petition was denied because Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration. Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in question. The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines. LAZATIN V TWANO AND CASTRO 2 SCRA 842 PAREDES JULY 31, 1961 FACTS: In an original case entitled Angel C. Twao and Gregorio T. Castro, plaintiffs, versus F. L. Lazatin, et al., defendants, Dionisio P. Tanglao, Intervenor," for the recovery of P35,000.00, plus interest, realized in connection with the purchase by them (plaintiffs and defendants) from the U.S. government, they were declared co-owners in the business of buying and selling surplus auto-trucks, and ordered the defendants (one of them Lazatin) to pay to the plaintiff s therein, the sum of P10,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint. The said decision became final; it was executed, with the levy of the properties of defendant Lazatin and their subsequent sale at public auction, wherein the plaintiffs Twao and Castro were the purchasers. Before the expiration of the redemption period, on August 2, 1952, defendant Lazatin, deposited with the Sheriff of Pampanga the sum of P13,849.88, redemption price. On August 9, 1952, the same Francisco Lazatin, filed the present action, to recover from the same Twao and Castro the sum of P19,676.09, supposedly a balance of the proceeds of auto-trucks, sold directly to purchasers by said defendants. On the same date, plaintiff Lazatin, alleging that "there is no security whatsoever for the payment of the amount claimed in the complaint and that the defendant defendants are removing or are about to remove or dispose of their property with intent to defraud their creditors, particularly the plaintiff," secured a writ of attachment on the amount he deposited, and pursuant thereto, the Sheriff of Pampanga refused to deliver the sum of P13,849.88, which should have been paid to the herein defendants. Defendants filed a Motion to lift the writ and counterclaimed that the plaintiff has filed a clearly unfounded civil action against the defendants as a result of which the latter had suffered actual or compensatory damages by way of attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000.00. That as a result of the wrongful attachment the defendants have suffered moral damages to the amount of P10,000.00 and actual damages On October 28, 1955, the trial court rendered judgment, ordering the estate of Lazatin to pay the defendants therein the following sums: (1) P3,000.00 for the fees of Attorney Manuel O. Chan;(2) P,500.00 for moral damages to each of the defendants;(3) Six percent (6%) interest on the amount of P13,849.88 from August 6, 1952 until said amount is actually delivered to and receipted by the defendants; and(4) To pay the costs.

ISSUE: Was the award of damages correct? HELD: It should be observed that Sec. 4 of Rule 59, does not prescribe the remedies available to the attachment defendant in case of a wrongful attachment, but merely provides an action for recovery upon the bond, based on the undertaking therein made and not upon the ability arising from a tortious act, like the malicious suing of an attachment. Under the first, where malice is not essential, the attachment defendant, is entitled to recover only the actual damages sustained by him by reason of the attachment. Under the second, where the attachment is maliciously sued out, the damages recoverable may include a compensation for every injury to his credit, business or feelings (Tyler v. Mahoney 168 NC 237, 84 SE 362; Pittsburg etc. C 73, 47 SE 234). And considering the fact that the rules of court are of older vintage than the new Civil Code, the matter of damages in the said rules should be encompassed within the framework Of the Civil Code (Art. 2196 Civil Code). It is quite true that said section 4 employs the expression "all damages", but this should be understood to refer to the damages resulting from the undertaking itself, the recovery of which is subject to "the principles of the general law on damages", earlier discussed. ATTORNEYS FEES: YES Withal, and considering the fact that defendants-appellant lees were drawn into this litigation by plaintiff-appellant and were compelled to hire an attorney to protect and defend them, and taking into account the work done by said attorney, as reflected in the record, throughout the proceedings, we deem it just and equitable to award at attorney's fees for defendants-appellees. The sum of P3,000.00 adjudicated by the trial court, is reasonable under the circumstances. MORAL DAMAGES: NO The decision does not make any finding that the defendants-appellees did in fact suffer mental anguish or injury to their credit or reputation. Moreover the dissolution of the writ was due to a technicality. No moral damages can be inferred from the mere act that the redemption price to which defendants were entitled, had been retained by the provincial sheriff for a period of 38 days.

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA AQUINO, PP 843-845 In some cases, there is no liability even if there damage because there was no injury. The conjunction of damages and wrong is absent there can be no actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. Thus, if the damage resulted because a person exercised his legal rights it is damnum absque injuria. DAMAGES Loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury. Recompense or compesation INJURY Legal invasion of legal right.

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Related to the maxim qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit one who exercises right does no injury.

BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V KALAW 20 SCRA 987 (1967) SANCHEZ AUG 14 1967 MINI DIGEST ON LOCUS STANDI OF BOL: By EO 372, the sole stockholder, the govt, abolished NACOCO and placed its assets in the hands of the Board of Liquidators which became the trustee on its behalf. It was an express trust with the legal interest becoming vested in the Board while the beneficial interest remained with the govt as sole stockholder. Since the dissolution of the NACOCO falls under the 2nd method of winding up its affairs: re: conveyance to trustees who will settle its affairs, then it is clear that there is no limit to the lifeterm of the Board of Liquidators. ON DAMAGES: FACTS: Maximo M. Kalaw was the General manager and board chairman of NACOCO NACOCO, after the passage of Republic Act 5, embarked on copra trading activities. Amongst the scores of contracts were executed by general manager Kalaw . An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling these contracts. Nature supervened. Four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines: the first in October, the second and third in November, and the fourth in December, 1947. Coconut trees throughout the country suffered extensive damage. Copra production decreased. Prices spiralled. Warehouses were destroyed. Cash requirements doubled. Deprivation of export facilities increased the time necessary to accumulate shiploads of copra. Quick turnovers became impossible, financing a problem. The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of the claims were settled except for one buyer, Louis Dreyfus & Go. All the settlements sum up to P1,343,274.52. In this suit started in February, 1949, NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176, new Civil Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. ISSUE: W/N the directors are liable for damages. HELD: The directors are not liable. Four typhoons wreaked havoc then on our copra-producing regions.The typhoons were known to plaintiff. In fact, NACOCO resisted the suits filed by Louis Dreyfus & Co. by pleading in its answers force majeure as an affirmative defense and there vehemently asserted that "as a result of the said typhoons, extensive damage was caused to the coconut trees in the copra producing regions of the Philippines and according to estimates of competent authorities, it will take about one year until the coconut producing regions will be able to produce their normal coconut yield and it will take some time until the price of copra will reach normal levels;" and that "it had never been the intention of the contracting parties in entering into the contract in question that, in the event of a sharp rise in the price of copra in the Philippine market produce by force majeure or by caused beyond defendant's control, the defendant should buy the copra contracted for at exorbitant prices far beyond the buying price of the plaintiff under the contract

A high regard for formal judicial admissions made in court pleadings would suffice to deter us from permitting plaintiff to stray away therefrom, to charge now that the damage suffered was because of Kalaw's negligence, or for that matter, by reason of the board's ratification of the contracts. Indeed, were it not for the typhoons, NACOCO could have, with ease, met its contractual obligations. As the trial court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting.

CUSTODIO V CA Supra (Damages: Definition and Concept)

B. KINDS OF DAMAGES 1. ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY

Art. 2216, CC. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case. Art. 2199, CC. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Art. 2200, CC. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106) Art. 205, CC. Indemnities that must be paid by either spouse on account of a crime or of a quasi-delict shall be paid from the common assets, without any obligation to make reimbursement.

ALGARRA V SANDEJAS 27 Phil 284 TRENT; March 24, 1914 NATURE Civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with the defendants automobile due to the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car. The negligence is not questioned and this case involves only the amount of damages which should be allowed. FACTS - The accident occurred on July 9, 1912. - Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the hospital. The first 4-5 days he couldnt leave his bed. After being discharged, he received medical attention from a private practitioner for several days. - Plaintiff testified that he had down no work since the accident, that his earning capacity was P50/month - He described himself as being well at the end of July; the trial took place September 19 - Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20 regular customers who purchased in small quantities, necessitating regular, frequent deliveries

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- It took him about 4 years to build up the business he had at the time of the accident, and since the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers. - The lower court refused to allow him any compensation for injury to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom. ISSUE How to determine the amount of damages to award plaintiff HELD Reasoning - Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of the Civil Code: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another where there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in considering the indemnity imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must rationally include the generic idea of complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code." - Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which may have been suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles. - Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and which may be a necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment. - The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined: The Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or negligence. No distinction is made therein between damage caused maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence in so far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more than repair the damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position, so far as pecuniary compensation can do so, that he would have been in had the damage not been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference between the two systems. Under the Anglo-SAxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause the damage is an element of the defendant's act, it is quite generally regarded as an aggravating circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than mere compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no provision is made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code. - article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage done. There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined from the evidence submitted to the court. The complexity of human affairs is such that two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough discussion of each case may permit of their more or less definite classification, and develop leading principles which will be of great assistance to a court in determining the question, not only of damages, but of the prior one of negligence. As the Code is so indefinite (even though from necessity) on the subject of damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench and bar should have access to and avail themselves of those great, underlying principles which have been gradually and conservatively developed and thoroughly tested in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application of these principles should have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the evidence offered, and should assist in determining damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity - The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion of his business. As

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to the damages resulting from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question. They are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this case, is P50 per month. the difficult question in the present case is to determine the damage which has results to his business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element of an award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty. That this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed above, but by many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any actual damages in cases f torts because they are of such a nature a cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is not the law." - As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has the following to say: It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecure it. - The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All the profits derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages confined to the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily or monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus compensated and who completely recover from their injuries, the rule may be said to be that their damages are confined to the duration of their enforced absence from their occupation. But the present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same profit he was making when the accident occurred. He had built up an establishing business which included some twenty regular customers. These customers represented to him a regular income. In addition to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular in their purchases. - But he could figure on making at least some sales each month to others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly income from his business was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but four of his regular customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically able to attend to his business, he found that would be necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and either win back his old customers from his competitors or else secure others. During this process of reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be less than he was making at the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of course, if it could be mathematically determined how much less he will earn during this rebuilding process than he would have earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to his business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any amount whatever. - When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued producing this average income "so long as is usual with things

of that nature." When in addition to the previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the accident, but we also have its value to him after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos during the two months that he was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga., 404) - We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in calculating his damages as to his item. That evidence has been properly elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We are of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business is credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough upon which to base a judgment for damages. Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those he was receiving when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250. Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following damages; ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.

P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. - Lower court, on November 18, 1989 disposing of Civil Case No. C-9457, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the plaintiff: a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum; b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and c. The costs of suit. - The lower court concluded: Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. - Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992. On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. ISSUE WON respondent courts award for damages is appropriate HELD: NO Ratio A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. Reasoning - Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasidelicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and

a. KINDS
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION) 297 SCRA 402 ROMERO; October 8, 1998 NATURE: Petition for certiorari on a decision of the CA. FACTS - In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) but then subsequently transferred to PNOC, causing the former to sink. - Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of

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the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). - Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, - If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill - What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the loss. - Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. - Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. - Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns." - Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case. - Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss

for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims. Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order. INTEGRATED PACKING V CA 330 SCRA 170 PARAS NOV 11, 1987 Petitioner Integrated Packing Corporation (IPC) and respondent Fil-Anchor Paper entered into an agreement whereby Fil-Anchor bound itself to deliver 3,450 reams of printing paper to IPC, to be paid within 30 to 90 days from delivery. Later, IPC entered into a contract with the Philippine Appliance Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of Philacor Cultural Books. However, IPC encountered problems paying Fil-Anchor and became heavily indebted to the latter. This led to FilAnchor suspending deliveries of paper to IPC. Thus, out of the agreed upon 3,450 reams, only 1097 were delivered., despite demand by IPC for Fil-Anchor to deliver the balance. Meanwhile, IPC entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor. Unfortunately, IPC failed to fully comply with its contract for the printing of Philacors books and thus Philacor demanded compensation for delay and damage suffered. Because IPC also not able to fully settle its indebtedness to Fil-Anchor, the latter filed a collection suit against it. In its counterclaim, IPC alleged that because Fil-Anchor was only able to deliver 1097 reams of paper it was unable to fulfill its contract with Philacor and thus failed to realize expected profits. Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the loss suffered, that is to say actual damages (damnum emergens), but also profits which the obligee failed to obtain (lucrum cessans).

b. EXTENT
Art. 2201,CC. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a) Art. 2202, CC. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

c. CERTAINTY
DBP V CA (CUBA) DAVIDE JR; January 5, 1998 FACTS - Plaintiff Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement. She obtained loans from DBP. As security for said loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights. - Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure proceedings, DBP appropriated the leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question. After which defendant DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of plaintiff Lydia Cuba over the same fishpond. - In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan City thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed to CUBA. - After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba, a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food . - Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale. After which she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale, plaintiff Lydia Cuba promised to make certain payments as stated in temporary Arrangement. - DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act and which was received by Cuba. After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question; - That after defendant DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant Agripina Caperal. - Thereafter, defendant Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. - CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in appropriating to itself CUBA's leasehold rights over the fishpond in question without foreclosure proceedings. TC ruled in favor of petitioner and granted actual damages in the amount of P1,067,500 representing lost equipment and dead fish due to DBPs forecloseure of fishpond and ejectment of laborers. - CA regarding damages granted ruled that CUBA was not entitled to loss of profits for lack of evidence, but agreed with the trial court as to the actual damages of P1,067,500. It, however, deleted the amount of exemplary damages and reduced the award of moral damages from P100,000 to P50,000 and attorney's fees, from P100.00 to P50,000 ISSUE WON the damages granted to CUBA are valid HELD: NO - Article 2199 provides: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages - Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.

- In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house. - We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was no "inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other persons." Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented. - in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as among the damages resulting from DBP's takeover of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for "losses of property," having been made before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages. - With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss - The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis. - In view however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 - Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. 20 There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable

FUENTES V CA 323 PHIL 508 BELLOSILLO; February 9, 1996 FACTS - 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair. Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. After muttering that Fuentes stabbed him, he died. - Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina. He said that his cousin directly told him that he stabbed the victim out of grudge. - The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs. CA affirmed

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ISSUE 1. WON appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgnment of conviction 2. WON CA erred in holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim HELD 1. NO - Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest - There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. - we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule - One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accusedappellant had every motive to prevaricate 2. NO - Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. - This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delict's, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. - The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina - However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted

account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. HOSAKA) 321 SCRA 584 KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains she felt. - She and her husband, Rogelio E. Ramos, met thru a mutual doctor friend, Dr. Orlino Hosaka, one of the defendants on June 10, 1985. The scheduled operation would be on June 17, 1985 9AM at Delos Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). When asked for an anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get a good one without giving a name. - At around 7:30AM of June 17, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center, was there and was allowed to be in the operating room to give moral support. Cruz saw 2 or 3 nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, another defendant, who administered the anesthesia. At 9:30AM, Dr. Hosaka was not yet in. Erlinda Ramos was getting impatient. It was at almost 12NN when Dr. Hosaka arrived. At 12:15AM when the operating room was very busy, final preparations for the operation were done. - When the patient was being intubated, Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez say Aang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. These remarks made her look at what the Dr. was doing. She then noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. Dr. Hosaka then ordered someone to call for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. Dr. Calderon came and was also trying to intubate the patient. The patient was placed in a tredelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patients brain. - Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating room then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into the O.R. At almost 3PM of that day, the patient was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). - Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four months later, the patient was released from the hospital. She has been brain damaged ever since, and comatose. - Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages in Jan. 1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. Respondents claimed that the damage was Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Penthonal). RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. RTC awarded a total of P632K (should be P616K) in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated" covering

d. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION)

SUPRA (Damages: Kinds) e. PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH

Art. 2206, CC. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on

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the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of the patient estimated at P8K. CA overturned the decision. Hence, this appeal. (NOTE: See Crim Law 2 Digest re discourse on Res ipsa loquitur and the negligence of Dr. Gutierrez, and Dr. Hosaka. It was ruled in here that the surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy or surgical excision of the gall bladder) ISSUE WON the damages awarded by lower court was inadequate HELD YES - The amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil Code on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties. Actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are 3 those suffered by him as he has duly proved. (A1299 CC ) - Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. But these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Other damages discussed: - In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. - Moral damages: the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner which would be virtually impossible to quantify. The husband and the children will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. - Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages are awarded considering the length and nature of the instant suit. Disposition Decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the ff: 1) P1.352M as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8K up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2M as moral damages, 3) P1.5Mas temperate damages; 4) P100K each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
3

PANG-LINGO NG WIKA: (Ramos etc. vs. Court of Appeals et. al. 380 SCRA 467). WAHIHIHIHI MATAPOS ng konsultasyon sa isang pribadong ospital, naitakda na alisin ang bato sa apdo ni Rita. Iminungkahi sa kanya ni Dr. Noli, isang surgeon. At dahil walang kakilalang anesthesiologist si Rita at ang asawa nitong si Randy, inirekomenda ni Dr. Noli ang serbisyo ni Dr. Gemma, isang anesthesiologist na walong taon nang tumutulong sa kanyang mga operasyon. Ginarantiya ni Dr. Noli ang mag-asawa sa kakayahan ni Dr. Gemma. Sa araw ng operasyon, hindi dumating si Dr. Noli sa oras na 9:00 ng umaga. Maaga pa lamang, 7:30 ng umaga ay inihanda na si Rita sa operasyon. Kaya halos limang oras na itong hindi kumakain, masakit ang ulo, nagsusuka, nahihilo, nanlalabo na ang mga paningin at natatakot sa nalalapit na operasyon. Dumating si Dr. Noli ng bandang alas-dose na ng tanghali. Samantala, nagkamali si Dr. Gemma ng pagkakabit ng endotracheal tube kung saan sa lalamunan ito nailagay at hindi sa lalagukan. Kaya, ang hangin ay tumuloy sa kanyang tiyan at hindi sa baga na nagresulta ng kawalan ng hangin, abnormalidad sa kanyang dugo at paglaki ng kanyang tiyan. Humingi ng tulong si Dr. Noli sa isa pang anesthesiologist subalit ang kondisyon ni Rita ay hindi nagbago. Ang pagpapabaya ni Dr. Noli sa kapakanan ni Rita ay lalo pang nadagdagan nang magsagawa pa ito ng dalawang operasyon sa dalawa pang ospital. Sanhi ng pagbaba ng suplay ng dugo sa utak ni Rita, nawalan ng hangin ito at siya ay na-comatose at hindi na gumaling pa. Kaya sinampahan nina Randy, Rita at mga anak nito ang ospital, si Dr. Noli at Dr. Gemma para sa bayad-pinsala. Kahit na iginiit ni Dr. Noli na si Dr. Gemma ang dapat managot dahil nagpabaya ito sa pagsasagawa ng anesthesia, nahatulan pa rin ng Korte si Dr. Noli ayon sa "Captain of the Ship" doctrine. Ayon sa Korte, pinamahalaan at inirekomenda ni Dr. Noli si Dr. Gemma base sa halos walong taong magkatulong sa mga operasyon. Ang pagdating din ni Dr. Noli sa oras ng kanyang operasyon ay labag sa sinumpaang tungkulin bilang manggagamot. Hindi naging makatarungan ang ginawang kapabayaan ni Dr. Noli batay na rin sa Artikulo 19 ng Kodigo Sibil. Samantala, iginiit naman ng ospital na wala itong pananagutan sa naging pinsala kay Rita dahil sina Dr. Noli at Dr. Gemma ay hindi nito empleyado kundi mga consultants na direktang binabayaran ng mga pasyente. tama ba ang ospital? TAMA. Tanging sina Dr. Noli at Dr. Gemma ang may pananagutan. Hindi sila empleyado ng ospital dahil sila ay medical consultants lamang. Ang serbisyo ng mga medical consultants ay kinikilala at pinaniniwalaan ng mga ospital kaya isa itong pribilehiyo na maaaring bawiin sa anumang oras. Ang kinikita ng mga consultants ay mula sa mga pasyente at hindi sa ospital. Ang pagbibigay ng preskripsyon at paraan ng paggamot ay desisyon ng consultant at hindi ng ospital. Ang kontrata sa pagitan ng mga consultants at pasyente ay hiwalay at kaiba sa kontrata sa pagitan ng pasyente at ng ospital. Kaya sina Dr. Noli at Dr. Gemma ay parehong may pananagutan na bayaran sina Randy at mga anak nito.

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GATCHALIAN V DELIM 203 SCRA 126 FELICIANO; October 21, 1991 NATURE: Appeal from a decision of CA FACTS - In July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus and on the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken the hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. - While injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. She also had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things: That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries. - Despite this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. Respondents defense was that vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him and his driver, when Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit. - TC ruled in favor of respondents because of the waiver. CA reversed but affirmed TC in denying petitioners claim for damages. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON there was a valid waiver to effect relinquishment of any right of action on the oart of the petitioner 2. WON private respondent Delim was able to prove that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap 3. WON damages may be awarded petitioner Gatchalian HELD 1. NO Ratio A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. Reasoning [1] Under the circumstances petitioner was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only 3 days, when the waiver/Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading it, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read it in its entirety. There is substantial doubt whether petitioner fully understood it [2] because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly

against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. Such waiver is offensive to public policy. 2. NO Ratio A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in A1733 and A1755. To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary. Reasoning - When a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers cried out, "What happened?" The driver replied, "That is only normal". The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This meant that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Force majeure is no defense. 3. YES - Compensatory and moral damages may be awarded. [1] A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. Hence, compensatory damages is awarded, especially to cover the petitioners expenses for the plastic surgery. [2] Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still Disposition CFI and CA decisions reversed and set aside. Respondent ORDERED to pay petitioner Gatchalian the ff. sums: 1) P15K as actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30Kas moral damages; and 3) P1K as atty's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof.

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f.

ATTORNEYS FEES

Art. 2208, CC. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

QUIRANTE V IAC REGALADO; January 31, 1989 NATURE: Appeal by certiorari seeking to set aside the judgment of the IAC which found the petition for certiorari therein meritorious FACTS - Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN before the CFI of Manila for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for indemnification. - The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees; ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. In the meantime, on November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors. - Herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which was allegedly confirmed in writing

by the widow and the two daughters of the deceased. The trial court granted the motion for confirmation despite an opposition thereto. ISSUE WON petitioner may claim his attorneys fees HELD: NO Ratio Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Reasoning - Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the CC, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. We take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court. Disposition The decision of the respondent court is hereby AFFIRMED. g. INTEREST
Art. 2209, CC. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108) Art. 2210, CC. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. Art. 2211, CC. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. Art. 2212, CC. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a) Art. 2213,CC. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty.

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CRISMINA GARMENTS V CA
G.R. No. 128721. Panganiban March 9, 1999 FACTS Crismina Garments entered into a contract for a piece of work for 20,762 girls denim pants with D Wilmar Garments, through its sole proprietress Norma Siapno (PR). The contract amounted to Php76,410. From Feb 1979- May 1979, PR sent 13 various deliveries to comply with the Petitioners orders. The delivery receipts are accepted and acknowledged to be in good order condition. Later, Crismina informed PR of the defective pants delivered. PR offered to take delivery of the defective pants, however Crisminas rep said the goods were good and PR just have to send back her check for P76,410. Because PR was actually then unpaid, PR sent a demand letter for the P76,410 and payment within 10 days from receipt of such notice. Crismina countered that PR was liable for the value of the 6,164 damaged pants amounting to P49,925.51. PR filed a collection suit against Crismina. RTC favored PR. CA affirmed RTC order but deleted the Attys fees. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N it is proper to impose interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI INTEREST RATE for obligation not involving a loan or forbearance of money is 6%. nterest rates: I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on Damages of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum (pa) to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded MAY be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated

claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be xxx the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work,not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year. CA decision modified . 6 % interest (pa ) from filing of complaint and 12 % legal interest (pa ) after the judgment has become final and executory until satisified .

h. MITIGATION LIABILITY
Art. 2203.CC. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. Art. 2204,CC. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Art. 2214,CC. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. Art. 2215,CC. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract; (2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract; (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel; (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; (5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

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CERRANO V TAN 38 Phil 392 FISHER; August 1, 1918 NATURE An action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been caused by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a casco. FACTS - During the month of January, 1916, Tan (defendant), who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to Cerrano (plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70. Delivery was made in Manila. - Some time during the month of May, 1916, the Tan notified Cerrano that in the following month it would be necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano then informed Tan that he would like to rent the casco again after the repairs had been completed. Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it. - There was no agreement between the parties concerning the length of time for which the hire of the casco was to continue. - One week before the end of the repair period Tan sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man who had been employed by Cerrnao as patron of the casco while it was in his possession, upon hearing that it had been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went to the office of the latter in Manila, and asked for employment in the same capacity. - Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the possession of the casco under his contract with Tan regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco. - After the casco had been in possession of Santos for three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the court for decision upon a written stipulation in which it was admitted that the casco was the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. in the sum of P457.98. - Cerrano testified his average profit from other cascos rented by him was P60 a month for each casco (P600 for 10 months supposedly). Petitioners Claim > It was agreed that he was to take the casco at the increased rental. > A contract for the rental of a casco, when made by the owner, is deemed in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, to run from the date of the contract until the casco has to be docked for its annual overhauling and repair (ten months). Defendants Comments > His offer to lease it at the higher rate was never accepted. > In the absence of an express stipulation regarding the duration of the hire, duration is deemed to be from month to month when a monthly rental is agreed upon. > Cerranos claim of P60 profit does not furnish the proper measure of damages, and that plaintiff's right is limited to the recovery of the difference between the contract price at which the casco was hired by him and such higher rate as he might have been compelled to pay for the hire of a similar casco in the open market to take its place. > It Cerranos responsibility to rent another casco seeing that the one owned by Tan was already sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. (thus mitigating his liability to pay damages). ISSUES 1. WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that the casco was to be leased to the former again after it had been repaired

2. What is the duration of the term 3. WON there is liability for damages, and to what extent (mitigation of liability) HELD 1. YES, there was an agreement for the subsequent rental. Reasoning - It was understood between the parties that Cerrano was to have it again at the increased rental as soon as the contemplated repairs had been completed. That such was the understanding is shown by the fact that plaintiff paid for the towage of the casco to the dry dock at Malabon; that he left his equipment in it; and that his patron stayed with the casco in Malabon during the time it was on the dock. - The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of contract between the Cerrano and Tan. 2. The period was for a monthly rental. Ratio The reasonable presumption that one who agrees to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of each month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties. Reasoning - When no definite agreement has been made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from day to day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be paid. 3. YES, there is liability for damages, and there is no mitigation of the liability. Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages for the breach of the contract by the defendant, the profit which he would have been able to make had the contract been performed. HOWEVER, It is a well-recognized principle of law that damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of a contract or other legal duty are not recoverable. It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of another to take such measures as prudent men usually take under such circumstances to reduce the damages as much as possible. Reasoning - By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan broke his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for the damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff possession of the casco for the term of one month. - Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered as damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. - The injured party must produce the best evidence of which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover. - It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages. In this case the defendant has made no effort whatever to show that any other similar cascos were in fact available to plaintiff, or the price at which he would have been able to obtain the use of one. In the absence of evidence it will not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured another casco at the same price had he looked for one. Disposition It is decreed that Cerrano recover from Tan P50 as damages, and his costs in the Court of First Instance.

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