THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH GENERAL STAFF NOT A GREAT GENERAL STAFF?

(Talk to the Society for Army Historical Research, National Army Museum, Wednesday 28 May 1997) INTRODUCTION

I am greatly honoured to give this fourth and final talk in the series on the General Staff to the Society this evening, and I hope you will not feel short-changed by the late change of speaker. As I cannot pretend to be an academic, or a particular specialist in this field, my only claim to speak to you at all is that I am a middle-ranking practitioner. I am but a general staff officer serving in the General Staff, who has made a bit of a hobby (if not a hobby-horse) in studying some if its history.

You might suppose that the title "Not a Great General Staff" is in itself a play on words, if you were to think of a general staff in Prussian Great General Staff (Grosser Generalstab) terms. But I am not so sure whether this was intended when the talk was arranged. I'll return to the theme of the Great General Staff in a moment, but before I do so, by way of introduction, I would like to touch on some problems of interpretation. There is always a danger in using somebody else's vocabulary and, historically speaking, much of the General Staff terminology is German. All right, you might say, then get a good translator. But much of the difficulty lies in assuming the same meanings in like-sounding terms. Let me illustrate this by a few examples: We all know that a Captain in the Army is junior to a Captain in the Royal Navy. I think most of us would know that a British Army Adjutant is not the

same as a French one. But how many would know the difference between a British and a German G3? [Story of Bundeswehr Brigade G3] And I suppose only a few present would know what a G5 or a G6 does in any Army?

And what is meant by a Chief of Staff: and I am not referring here to the chiefs of staff which is subject enough for a series of talks? Has a British Chief of Staff the same responsibilities as his German or American counterparts? Not quite, I'm afraid, without giving you a value judgement yet.

Having posed some questions that I will attempt to answer let me outline what the main objects of my talk are: First, to summarise the evolution of the British General staff, comparing it with the model on which it was fashioned, the German General Staff. Secondly, to describe the introduction of the post of Chief of Staff in the British Army, and as we will see, almost entirely the result of Montgomery's efforts, as an example of the difficulty the British Army has had with the concept of a general staff. I will concentrate on the comparatively short period of 1942-1947. Finally I will attempt to draw some conclusions on the relevance of the general staff system today. [Unfortunately, time will not permit me to offer a view of perhaps where we failed to follow-through subsequently when we attempted to adopt NATO terminology in the staff system in the early 1980s.]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH GENERAL STAFF

Wellington's staff work was shared amongst a Military Secretary, the Adjutant General and the Quarter Master General, the rather curious sounding titles that we retain today. By the time of the Crimean War this system had been shown to be incapable of supporting the ever more complex demands of command in war. Despite the establishment of the Army Staff College in 1858, reform of the Regimental system and reorganisation of the War Office under Cardwell (186874), the Hartington Commission of 18901, and notwithstanding the writings of Spenser Wilkinson in the 1890s, progress in Britain towards a professional General Staff remained painfully slow. What had proved good enough for imperial policing was found seriously wanting in South Africa: the Boers who ran away "on their little ponies" - to quote Kitchener - required the deployment of 450,000 men - the largest ever British Army to put to the field until the First World War.

The creation of a high-level General Staff came after the recommendations of the Esher Committee in 1904.2 After a couple of years hard work the creature was born: Special Army Order 233 of 12 September 1906 set out the purpose of the General Staff:

1.

Lord Hartington's Royal Commission inquired into the administration of the national defence. Spenser Williamson published The Brain of An Army on the 11th of February, 1890, the day on which the Lord Hartington's report was signed.

2.

The inadequate performance of the British Army led to the "Report of His Majesty's Commissioners on the War in South Africa", published in 1903. It condemned aspects of the whole military machine from the Commander-in-Chief (Wolseley) downwards. From this sprang the Esher Commission, and the movement under Haldane to create an army better fitted for service in Europe against a modern opponent. See Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980) and John Gooch, The Plans of War The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

 advise on the strategical [sic] distribution of the Army, to supervise the To education of officers, and the training and preparation of the Army for war, to study military schemes, offensive and defensive, to collect and collate military intelligence, to direct the General policy in Army matters, and to secure continuity of action in the execution of that policy. However, this War Office General Staff (or Grosser Generalstab equivalent) was concerned only with intelligence, training and military operations; the old MS, A and Q branches survived at all levels. A fundamental question that split the War Office. remained unresolved: was it to be the man or the job that had General Staff status?3 Further, the opportunity, envisaged by Haldane, to modernise the staff across the Army was eclipsed by efforts of grander design. These included the creation of the post of the Chief of the General Staff (from 1907, Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and by the Army's belated attempts to impose a tactical doctrine (Field Service Regulations (FSR)) on the Field Army. Haldane envisaged the General Staff involved not only in the compilation and revision of manuals such as FSR, however. Its directors would also "test ideas in Staff Rides and advise or umpire at peacetime manoeuvres", "raise the intellectual standard of the army" and "through Staff Rides and tests, assess the aptitudes of officers for the duties of high command4 Many of these innovations [you may be . surprised] were followed through before the First World War. including Staff Tours, as the Rides were sometimes called then, and General Staff Conferences held at Camberley. Sadly, in the face of opposition from many vested interests, the pace of reform proved impossible to sustain; the Staff Rides and Conferences lacked the vigour of their German models. Sir Ian
3 4 Gooch, P. 8 1. Spiers, p. 116-118.

Hamilton. reporting on the [German] Imperial manoeuvres of 1909, "remarked upon the seriousness with which the Germans viewed their conferences with fewer speakers and lasting much longer than the British equivalents."5 Ideas like accelerated promotion for Staff College graduates provoked an outcry amongst the more traditional elements of the Army; so did internecine arguments over the status of psc (were all Staff College graduates to get one, or did it depend on performance?).6 Should we be surprised by any of this? The British Army remained an intrinsically conservative animal. let alone the nation, for we should not forget the times - an increasingly anti-German strategic outlook and with the gathering naval race, Britain hardly took to the idea of a professional German-style General Staff with any enthusiasm. Not invented here, I suppose. Haldane sometimes despaired: writing to Spenser Wilkinson he declared "I watch daily the people who ought to be thinking and teaching in the army being loaded with administrative details".7 Even in 1906, just prior to the launch of the General Staff, the "most explosive issue in military affairs was not the General Staff but the proposal made by Haldane as part of his reorganisation of the army to reduce the Brigade of Guards by two battalions. Tempers [you may imagine] grew heated over this issue, not least at Buckingham Palace."8 Montgomery was to burn his hands on a similar issue after the Second World War. Yet the General staff, as far as it was formed, was far better than anything that existed before as its doctrine, professional standard of field training and the

5 6

Gooch, pp 117-118. Including the Chief of the General Staff in 1906, Sir Neville Lyttelton. This example illustrates yet again the enormous damage a conservative and ineffectual CGS (or equivalent) can have on the army. [cf. The Duke of Cambridge, and others post WWI]

7 8

Spiers, p. 120. Gooch, p. 104.

smooth mobilisation and deployment of the BEF in 1914 clearly demonstrated. But the British version of a General Staff was no copy of the German system; furthermore it lacked 100 years of steady development and expert fashioning at the hands of von Moltke and Schlieffen. l have yet to determine whether British General Staff officers shared a common outlook with their German or French counterparts - I suspect not. That said, Haldane had much to be pleased with meanwhile in the immediate pre-war years; the efficiency of the Regular Army (at unit level at least) reached new heights and the Territorial Army was founded. However, much of the substantial progress made in doctrine, training and organisation before the First World War was lost in the bloody afterglow of victory: the General Staff was debased, its embellishments stripped and its function undermined. It could be unfair to single out only the lack of development of the General Staff as there was an Army-wide malaise as many other studies have shown. What about J.F.C. Fuller's views on the General Staff? He was no unthinking admirer of the German system. Looking back at the First World War he declared: Where the German system went wrong was that it superimposed a committee of irresponsible non-fighting officers on the general, creating a staff hegemony which virtually obliterated generalship. If the general was a tiger, his staff officers were selected from the lambs; if he was lamb-like, then they were chosen for their tigerishness.9 Time does not permit me to continue this quote as I would wish but suffice to say Fuller concluded: "No soldier can doubt the immense value of a general staff if it

Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, p. 64

is the general's servant, and not the general's gaoler."10 To move on, despite much valuable training conducted at Camberley and Quetta, the two principal staff colleges, the British Army of the Second World War lacked a "true" General Staff in the German sense. Staff training was just that - it lacked the two-year doctrinal foundation and Preparation for higher command that all German general staff officers received.11 The intellectual stimulus of von Seekt's Reichswehr years was likewise missing. (I challenge you to name a British CIGS with such an influence on an Army until Alanbrooke.) Whilst the German Army accorded both duties and some privileges to members of the General Staff - I should add that some Bundeswehr colleagues disagree with me on this - the British view of the Staff from top to bottom remained to some extent hostile. Staff work was for many a necessary evil: that which had to be done only for the sake of the troops. The enduring tradition that staff officers are only regimental officers employed temporarily on the Staff has proved impossible to break; and the idea of introducing a professional general staff being quite foreign, was quietly dropped whenever raised by the more visionary, or depending on your standpoint, revolutionary. You may ask for some evidence at this stage of the proceedings. The development of the role of the Chief of Staff at higher formation level - the principal General Staff officer - is instructive. Of our higher commanders in the Second World War, only Montgomery created a "true" Chief of Staff - witness Freddie de Guingand. This was rather odd as Montgomery tried otherwise to limit the role of the Staff into a strictly supporting

10 11

Generalship, p. 65. See Brian Holden Reid, 'The British Style of Command" in ADP-2 Command, p. 2-A-2.

one; it was not meant to initiate a plan or influence. 12 Montgomery made his innovation of a COS under the pressures of wartime command to free him, the higher commander, from meddling in the business of the staff. It allowed him "time to think" and to sleep.

Much of Montgomery's immediate post-war effort as CIGS (most would agree, an unhappy tenure for all concerned) was directed to instituting this in the Army, facing, as ever, opposition from the military establishment.13 That it was not properly followed through as Montgomery had wished was due in part, perhaps, to his successor as CIGS, Bill Slim , who would appear to have been less keen on the concept.14 Slim surely achieved more, having not made such a "nuisance of himself"15

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF As I intimated earlier, the formal introduction of the Chief of Staff to the British Army was the work of one man, and none other than Montgomery. At the first meeting of the Army Council he attended as the new CIGS in 1946, he presented a paper entitled "The Problem of the Post-war Army".16 Now I won't go into this paper at all except to say that it covered some enduringly topical matters. These included such old chestnuts as the "need for agreement on the shape of the Army for the next ten to fifteen years" and the "conception of modern war; a clear doctrine to be evolved from the lessons of the past and to be taught throughout the Army". The paper also enclosed two other documents: the

__________________________________________
12 13 14 16 [Quote from Montgomery's Memoirs to be inserted] [Quote from Montgomery's Memoirs to be inserted] See Defeat into Victory for details on this point. The background to this document is explained in Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, (Collins, London: 1958), p. 433. Hereafter referred to as "Memoirs".

first one was a set of notes on the "fundamental principles of war", the second, with which we will concern ourselves, was a memorandum on "staff organisation" in which Montgomery urged the introduction of the Chief of Staff system in the Army. Why was this so important, for as Montgomery later declared in his memoirs: if the Chief of Staff system was not introduced into the British Army, I ... would resign and the Prime Minister could get another CIGS . Well, Montgomery did not have to resign but was his intent matched by deeds of a long-term nature? Yet before we look at what Montgomery proposed and what was eventually introduced in 1947, perhaps we should look at the origins of Montgomery's characteristically firm convictions on the matter. As a staff officer serving in the First World War, Montgomery had experienced at first hand the problems of the British staff system. Much had to do with the difficulty of communications and this was a problem shared by all armies [cynics would say "and those of all ages"]. When serving as a brigade-major of an infantry brigade on the Western Front in 1916 during the battle of the Somme, Montgomery tells a story about a pigeon.

It was important that the Brigade Commander should receive early ... information of the progress of his forward troops since Us would affect the movement of reserves in the rear. ...Intense interest was aroused at Brigade HQ. when it was disclosed that a pigeon * would be used to convey the news. When the day of attack arrived the pigeon was given to a soldier to carry. He was to go with the leading sub units and was told that at a certain moment an officer would write a message to be fastened to the pigeon's leg; he would then release the pigeon which would fly back to its

loft at Brigade H.Q. The attack was launched and the Brigade Commander waited anxiously for the arrival of the pigeon. Time was slipping by and no pigeon arrived; the Brigadier walked feverishly about his H.Q. dug-out. The soldiers anxiously searched the skies; but there was no sign of any pigeon. At last the cry went up: "The pigeon," and sure enough back it came and alighted safely in the loft. Soldiers rushed to get the news and the Brigade Commander roared out "Give me the message." It was handed to him, and this is what he read: "I am absolutely fed up with carrying this bloody bird about France17

Montgomery survived the Somme - and the pigeon incident - and went on to be GSO2 (Operations) of - IX Corps, a very important staff position for a still relatively junior officer with no formal staff training. For the last six months of the war he was GSO1 of the 47th (London) Division under Major General Gorringe. This appointment, and Montgomery's view of it, is important to our story. Montgomery wrote at the time: Gorringe made me Chief of Staff of the Division, and not only head of the General Staff. It was under him that I learnt the value of the Chief-of-Staff system, which. I used so successfully in the Second World War. The significance of this is that Montgomery was put in charge of all the staff of the divisional headquarters, not just the G (General Staff) branch but A and Q as well. Gorringe, as Nigel Hamilton has remarked, laid down the policy, and

17 18

Memoirs, pp. 34-35. Quoted by Nigel Hamilton, Monty The Making of a General 1887-1942, p. 127.

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made whatever major decisions were necessary; the implementation he left to his Chief-of-Staff as was done in the German Army. Strictly speaking, however, this comparison of Hamilton's is not entirely accurate for the German Army in both the First and Second World Wars employed a Chief of Staff only at Army Corps level and above. But the spirit of the remark is true enough. The German 1a co-ordinated the work of all the staff and, as a professionally trained general staff officer serving in the Truppengeneralstab or Field General Staff, he could act on his superior's behalf. indeed he had a formal duty so to do and to participate in decision-making. During his time with the 47th Division Montgomery spent much effort in trying to improve the workings of the staff, including its communications. As wireless sets were beginning to replace the pigeons with greater success, Montgomery sent liaison officers forward with the leading battalions to report progress by wireless, which when the primitive sets of the day worked, was a system which began to show some promise.19 Timely and accurate information was, and remains, the key to effective decision-making. And this was the germ of the liaison officer system so successfully employed by Montgomery in the Second World War. As fundamentally, Montgomery was extremely critical of the workings of the higher staffs, who appeared, in his eyes and in the eyes of many others, to be out of touch with the troops at the front. Montgomery concluded with his characteristic clarity: war experience led me to believe that the staff must be the servants of My the troops, and that a good staff officer must serve his commander and the
20 troops but himself be anonymous.

19 20

Check radio sets of WW I. Memoirs, p. 35.

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There are, I suspect some subtle similarities to the German approach here. Take, for example, General von Schellendorf - a former CGS - who advised: forming a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only a In great professional knowledge and acquaintance with service routine, but
21 above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion.

It thus should not surprise us that the stock of "The Staff or specifically of the "Red-Tabs" fell after the First World War, and there was neither the will nor resources to reform the staff system, either at formation or command level let alone at the War Office. The pace of change at the Staff College at Camberley after the reforming years of Major General Ironside and Colonel J.F.C. Fuller in the 1920s slowed. Much of the focus of staff-work was "staff duties" - a term unheard of in the German military lexicon - in other words an emphasis on the tidy presentation of detail, rather than on acting on behalf of, or anticipation of, the higher commander's tactical intentions. Now I would not claim that the German model of a General Staff was the key influence on Montgomery and why he was so keen to make lasting changes to the staff system after the Second World War. Montgomery, I should stress, was never in the thrall of his staff and I suspect he would not have had much truck with the German General Staff Officer's direct influence on the commander's decision-making. That was not the British style: I can find no parallel to von Manstein, who as Chief of Staff to von Rundstedt (commanding Army Group A) in the late autumn of 1939 recommended the novel "Sichelschnitt" plan. Montgomery's principal

21

General Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff (Fourth Edition, 1905).

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contribution to the staff system was the introduction of the Chief of Staff, the chief function of which was to relieve the Higher Commander from all. the detail, including the co-ordination of the Staff. In his own words:

existing British system placed on the commander the responsibility for The co-ordinating the work of his staff, the experiences of World War 1 had convinced me that this system was out of date.22 Montgomery had begun to practise his methods in stressing the importance of the Chief of Staff during the Second World War. He had, of course, been extremely lucky with Major General "Freddie" de Guingand who served him so well through thick and thin from Alam Halfa, to the Lneburg Heath.

I draw here from some of Dr Holden Reid's own writing when we collaborated on the Army's Doctrine, Publication Command three years ago, who states that "Montgomery relied heavily on his Chief of Staff, and probably more so than any other British commander of his generation".
23

Not only where the majority of

administrative matters delegated to him - or, in turn, to his Chief Administrative Officer (Robertson) but de Guingand "had full authority to act in the name of his C-in-C, and represented him at conferences". So how did this remarkably effective system emerge?

Within two months of his victory at EI Alamein, Montgomery produced some notes in January 1943 entitled "High Command in War" which he subsequently circulated to a group of high-ranking British and American officers who attended a four-day conference in Tripoli early in February 1943 .24 Paragraphs 20 - 25 of
22 23 24 Memoirs, Ibid., p. 434. See Para 21 to Annex A to Chapter 2 to ADP Volume 2, Command. [Check origins of document]

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this seminal document dealt with the Staff. A short extract will give you a flavour for Montgomery's method: (20). A higher commander must work through a Chief of Staff., only in this way will he be able to keep himself free from constant interruptions, and have time to think out the real problems. On no account must he become involved in details; these are the province of his staff (21) It follows that the chief of staff (sic) must be a first-class officer, who will have the confidence of the whole staff and will be able to handle and co-ordinate the staff work of the headquarters... (22.) Heads of branches and departments should have the right of direct access to the army commander, and he should from, time to time send for them and obtain a first hand account of their activities. But all their minor problems should be handled by the Chief of Staff. In the 21st Army Group publication High Command in War of June 1945 Montgomery got de Guingand to write the section on the Chief of Stag, but behind the words of his faithful subordinate was Montgomery's influence sure enough. De Guingand wrote: [The Chief of Staff takes all detail and sufficient other work off his C-in-C's shoulders, and thus allows his Chief to devote the maximum time to exercise personal command, and for undisturbed thought... There must be complete mutual confidence and trust between the C-in-C and his Chief of Staff. In their discussions no subject should be banned, and the Chief of Staff must at all times be open and frank. Unpleasant

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facts must never be hidden from the Chief - although there are the right and wrong times to present them. So we return now to Montgomery's attempts to introduce the Chief of Staff system into the British Army. In good War Office tradition a committee was established to consider the matter in July 1946.25 Consisting of the Director of Staff Duties (D.S.D.), Major General L.O. Lyne, the Chairman, Mr A. Earl, Permanent Assistant Under Secretary of State (P.A.U.S.), Major General R. ST. (sic) G.T. Ransome, Vice Quartermaster General (V.Q.M.G.) and Major General J.A. Baillon, Director of Operations (D. of O.), the committee met four times before presenting its report for consideration by the Executive Committee of the Army Council on 1st November 1946. 26 After taking evidence mainly from the Home Commands, who were largely hostile to change due to difficulties in amending the financial responsibilities of the Major General Administration, the Committee was hardly radical in its report. It did not recommend the introduction of the Chief of Staff system in the home commands, but did propose its introduction into the Anti-Aircraft Command and in commands abroad) noting that a Chief of Staff already existed in the British Army of the Rhine.
27

After receiving a rather negative minute from D.C.I.G.S., Montgomery

was not at all amused by the Committee's findings. In his typically acid style, the CIGS declared:
25 Montgomery's CIGS paper on the Chief of Stall system (A.C./P(46)l 1) was presented to the Executive Committee of the Army Council (ECAC) who at their meeting on 12 July 1946 (Minute 156(y)) agreed that a Committee should be set up to examine and report.

26

PRO WO. 163/298. The committee met on 31 Jul 46, 3 Sep 46, 5 Oct 46, and on 15 Oct 46. The report was circulated on 29 Oct 46 for consideration on 30 Oct 46.

27

PRO WO.2161199. Executive Committee of the Army Council Report of Committee on Chief of Staff System. E.C.A.CIP(46)137 29th October, 1946.

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I disagree completely with this report [note thick underlining in original]. We cannot have two systems: one for peace and one for war (in the field). In peace time the bulk of the British Army will, eventually, be in England: and where the Report recommends there should NOT be the Chief of Staff system... Its introduction involves a complete turnover from many ancient and archaic customs; the sooner we become more modern, the better. I shall go into battle on this subject with all sails set, and with colours nailed to the mast. Although the subsequent discussions of the Amy Council were not minuted, not surprisingly the Committee was sent back to work and met once again .28 Finally, on 20 May 1947, the War Office promulgated the appointment of a Chief of Staff in the following Home and Overseas Commands: Eastern,, Northern, Scottish, Southern and Western Commands. Middle East Land Forces. British Army of the Rhine. South East Asia Land Forces. British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan. (A.A. Command had already received its Chief of Staff on 1st January 1947 as recommended previously in the Committee's first report). The letter of promulgation went on to state that the appointment of Chief of Staff be in the rank of Major General, with the exception of Palestine and will
21 On 13 Mar 47, minuted in the ECAC on 18 Mar 47. PRO WO. 1631298. There would appear to be a gap in the file dealing with the re-direction of the Committee's work.

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Transjordan where it will be in the rank of Brigadier."29 The letter went on to state that: The financial responsibilities as laid down in King's Regulations 1940 (Paragraphs 135 - 137), at present vested in the Major-General in-charge of Administration, will, with effect from 1st May 1947, be transferred to the Commander-in-Chief or the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. A point of interest here is that the separation of financial powers between the commander and the administrative staff would appear to have been reversed; this had been a direct result of the Esher committee forty years before which had attempted to free senior commanders from detailed administration. Finally, the letter set out the function of the Chief of Staff. is intended that the Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the coIt ordination and execution of all the staff work in the Headquarters to which they are appointed. The appointment carries with it no powers of deputising for as opposed to representing the Commander and the Chief Engineer and Deputy Director of Medical Services retain their right of access to the commander,, as laid down in King's regulations, 1940, Paragraph 145. The place of the Chief of Staff was later enshrined in the Army doctrine pamphlet High Command (1961). Here we hear the familiar tones of Montgomery and de Guingand: If a commander is to be free to carry out his own task properly he must
29 PRO War Office 3/Gen/824(SDI) dated 20 May 1947.

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have a Chief of Staff to relieve him of the direction of all the detailed work in relation to the preparation and conduct of operations.

The relationship between the commander and his Chief of Staff is a matter of vital importance to smooth working throughout the entire command. 30 And, most significantly, in echoing the German General Staff view of the role of the Chief of Staff, Higher Command went on to state: The Chief of Staff must be in the complete confidence of the commander. and each must be entirely free to discuss any matter with the other. They should be complementary to each other. It may well be that in his early examination of a problem the commander may not be aware of some of the difficulties and disadvantages of his proposed course of action. It is the duty of the Chief of Staff to ensure that the commander does not give direction in ignorance of these factors. 31 So, what were the effects of Montgomery's measures apart from a place in the slim doctrine pamphlets of the day? Where in the Army were chiefs of staff introduced? The "Theatre" level headquarters of United Kingdom Land Forces and of the British Army of the Rhine retained a "proper" two-star Chief of Staff in the Montgomery sense until 1993. One can remain puzzled why the Chief of Staff system did not feature in either the 1989 or 1996 editions of British Military Doctrine. More research is also needed into the Staff College prcis of the period embracing the 1960s and 1970s in order to understand what was taught in the absence of any doctrine on this
30 31 Higher Command, p. 9. Ibid., p. 9.

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subject apart from Higher Command." But the system was described in some detail in the far more recent doctrine publication Command (1995).

CONCLUSIONS

You may ask where do we stand now when the emphasis of command and staff work at all levels is increasingly joint, combined and multinational, and the role of the General Staff in the Ministry of Defence, one could argue, has diminished. Has Montgomery's chief of staff system survived in any form?

Where do we find Chiefs of Staff. Well we find them at all levels: at brigade, division and Corps (ARRC; in schools and arms directorates, surprisingly, however, not at the new Joint Services Command and Staff College! We find them at the three major commands: Land, AG and QMG. Not all are true Chiefs of Staff: some handle only G2/G3 business whilst Deputy Chiefs of Staff deal with GI/G4 matters.

What relevance does the General Staff approach have for today? I doubt many serving officers would subscribe to a General Staffethos, such is the scrabble to get aboard joint and combined trains of thought. But I leave you with one point: surely the quality of a joint or combined staff rests on the contributions from its single component members, whether, sea, land or air. If we wish to retain the quality of the land component we must continue to invest in the General Staff in formations, commands and in the Ministry of Defence, and in particular in its training wherever that may be: the fighting power of the Army depends on it. In looking at the past 90 years or so, we have much to be proud of in the British General Staff, and criticisms apart, including my own, if not a Great General Staff, not a bad one at that.
32 33 With the exception of The Land Battle Part 2 Command and Control (1961, WO Code No. 9637 (Part 2)). Gooch, pp 117-118.

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