CMFR Legal Competency Training Manual

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL
Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
Copyright 2011 Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) Legal Competency Training Manual was made possible with a grant from Freedom House. Melinda Quintos de Jesus and Luis V. Teodoro edited this training manual. The presentations of Atty. Jose Manuel I. Diokno and Atty. Theodore O. Te of the Free Legal Assistance Group at the CMFR Legal Competency Training held last May 2011 were used to complete it. CMFR staff member Kathryn Roja G. Raymundo provided research and editorial support. Photos by Lito Ocampo. Cover and layout design by Design Plus.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................5 CHAPTER I. LAW AND JOURNALISM ETHICS .....................................9 CHAPTER II. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL/JUDICIAL SYSTEM ........... 17 CHAPTER III. BASIC LEGAL TERMS ...................................................... 36 CHAPTER IV. THE PRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS ........................................................................... 50 CHAPTER V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL WRITS: Extraordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Offenses ..... 59 CHAPTER VI. PRESS COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, SUB JUDICE AND CONTEMPT ................... 72 CHAPTER VII. LIBEL: Parameters and Perimeters .......................... 87 CHAPTER VIII: COVERING THE AMPATUAN MASSACRE TRIALS .......................................................................... 95 ANNEXES ....................................................................................................... 99 In Re: Jurado Case .......................................................................... 99 In Re: Macasaet Case ..................................................................163 Re: Petition for the Live Coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre Trial ..................................................215
INTRODUCTION
As early as the 1990s, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) had recognized the importance of covering the judiciary and its role in national affairs. The press has to provide the stories that will help citizens understand how government works, particularly the strengths and weaknesses of its institutions. But journalists do not always report on the judiciary, the courts and trials, as much as it does on the executive and legislative branches of the government. There is relatively little coverage on how the courts make the decisions that constitute case law and which become part of the law of the land. CMFR launched its program to improve journalists understanding of the courts and the legal system. The persistence of the culture of impunity was also a major factor why CMFR revived the program and explored other areas of concern in the dispensation of justice in the Philippines. As part of this program, in cooperation with the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), CMFR organized a legal competency training on which this manual is based. CMFR has been working with FLAG because of shared concerns, among them the continuing attacks and threats against journalists and media practitioners in the country. The CMFR database, which monitors attacks on the Philippine press, shows that 121 journalists and media practitioners have been killed in the line of duty since 1986. Of these, only 10 cases have resulted in convictions. The weaknesses of the investigative capacity of the police and delays in the court system contribute to the failure of the rule of law and the culture of impunity, among other problems. Not all the suspects in the killing of journalists, not
to mention the masterminds, end up in court, while the few who do often escape punishment either through legal technicalities or the sheer length of judicial procedures.
CMFR notes a general weakness of press coverage of these cases and others involving human rights. The result is a low level of public awareness of the violations of the right to freedom of expression. Some violations are reported but are soon forgotten, because no follow-up reports track whether the charges have gone to court. There is generally poor understanding of litigation as an instrument to counter impunity in this area even in the journalism and media community. A review of the reportage of the court hearings of suspects in the massacre of 58 people (32 were journalists and media practitioners) in Ampatuan town, Maguindanao in Mindanao on November 23, 2009 shows the lack of appreciation by the media of the systemic problems in the judicial system, among them the rules of court that allow undue delays such as lengthy bail hearings for even those accused of heinous crimes. For some time now, traffic difficulties in Metro Manila have also limited media options in the coverage of events. Some reporters have been assigned to cover the trial of the suspects in the
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Ampatuan Massacre only because they cover beats in Quezon City where the trial was initially held. Unlike those assigned to the justice beat, most of these reporters are unfamiliar with the basics of court proceedings and the implications of legal motions and complaints. Even in those instances when newsrooms assign a reporter with some knowledge of the legal system and judiciary, most of the cases involving media defense that are prosecuted in court require more experience and more knowledge of the constitutional framework. CMFR has also noted that the media do not follow cases of media killings, when these languish in the courts. One reason is obviously the lack of preparation for the generalist reporters in the provincesor the community-based pressto report on trials. It is evident that there is a need to create greater public awareness of the problems of impunity and the protection of free expression. The CMFR legal competency training program combined knowledge-building for both the public and the media as the basis of continuing counter-impunity campaigns. The training was intended to provide journalists with an understanding of their rights and obligations, how the legal system works, and how to cover court trials meaningfully. Because the abuse of press power sometimes figures as the motivation for violent reprisals against critical reporters, chapters on media ethics are included in this manual to emphasize ethics and law as separate instruments in the furtherance of press freedom and media development. This manual has been put together primarily to enable journalists as well as the trainers of journalists to pass on the knowledge gained so as to develop a well-informed and pro-active press which will report to the public the progress or failure of the prosecution of suspects in the killing of journalists more fully. But it could very well serve journalists covering the prosecution of those accused of involvement in extra-judicial killings, whether as killers or masterminds.
As more court cases indicate how the flaws and weaknesses of the legal system result in the poor protection of human rights, especially those involving freedom of expression and press freedom, the training of journalists on the legal system, both to arm them with a better understanding of their own rights as well as to enhance their reporting, analysis and comment, should be a continuing program for the media.
CHAPTER I. LAW AND JOURNALISM ETHICS
Are they the same?

There is confusion even among some media practitioners, and among teachers of journalism and communication, about law and journalism ethics. Some think they are one and the same, or that the law mandates ethical behavior in journalism, meaning what is ethical is dictated by what is legal. Adding to the confusion, the Commission on Higher Education journalism curriculum mandates only one subject on both media law and journalism/communication ethics. In recognition of the difference, the University of the Philippines mandates for journalism and communication students separate courses in ethics and media law. But, again in apparent confusion over what is needed in encouraging ethical practice and what the law requires, most media organizations in search of ombudsmen or readers, viewers advocates almost always require that the ombudsman should be a lawyer.
The connection
Law and journalism ethics are in theory separate areas, but overlap in practice. What the law says and allows is usually among the first things editors worry about when considering whether they should publish controversial stories, or opinion pieces that could offend their subjects, or even the media audience. The reason is clear enough: they fear lawsuits, convictions for which could mean fines or even jail terms. Only later do they fret over ethical issues, if at all, among other reasons because non-compliance with ethical principles is not subject to any penalty except peer and/or public disapproval and censure. What is clear is that the legal environment helps shape the conditions for media practice by setting the parameters of what
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is legally allowed, in the sense of what acts or statements are actionable and the perpetrator sanctioned with fines or prison terms upon conviction. Law is coercive and demands obedience through sanctions (fines, jail time). The law, for example, could require a media organization to publish the reply of someone who has been criticized in a column or a news report on pain of imprisonment or fines. Such a law would restrict the editorial prerogative to decide what could be published or broadcast, and would constitute a chilling effect on the publication of investigative reports, no matter how fair, in the sense of providing space or time to all the sides involved, the reports would be. Law and ethics overlap in some cases. For example, there are ethics issues that are at the same time legal issues. Libel and slander; wiretapping; extortion; invasion of privacy; and trial by publicity, for example, are ethical issues in journalism practice. But they are at the same time prohibited by law, and could earn the offender fines and/or prison terms. Libel, for example, is an ethical issue but is a criminal offense under Philippine law. Trial by publicity, which journalism ethics prohibits, can earn the offender a citation for contempt and jail time. These offenses being both ethical and legal is based on their impact on the individuals targeted. In every case the assumption is that they are entitled to protection: in the case of those subjected to trial by publicity, for the sake of a fair trial; in the case of those libeled, for the sake of preserving their reputation; in the case of those whose privacy is invaded, for the sake of their right to be left alone. Ethical compliance is voluntary; one complies because it is the right thing to do; but it does not mean that sanctions cannot be imposed by media organizations and self-regulatory bodies.
The difference
The demands of journalism ethics and those of the law do not always coincide and can even conflict. In 1997, for example,
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journalists Deedee Sitangco and Luchi Cruz Valdes revealed during a television program that they had succeeded in registering twice as voters in an attempt to find out whether Commission on Elections (Comelec) safeguards against flying voters were working. Because registering twice is illegal under Philippine law, the Comelec threatened to file charges against them. Expressed in various terms, negative reporting was banned during the Marcos dictatorship, but was ignored by some journalists, among them the late Jose Burgos and Armando Malay, who, as a result, were arrested and detained, in some instances several times. In both cases, the journalists concerned believed that the ethics of journalism, which puts public interest as the priority responsibility of journalists, compelled them to violate the law. In both instances, however, the journalists concerned were prepared for the legal consequences of being charged in court and possibly sentenced to imprisonment of one to six years and disqualification from holding public office in the first case, and an unspecified period of detention in the second. Any journalist who, in furtherance of compliance with the ethical demands of the profession, violates the law should in fact be similarly prepared to suffer the consequences.
Self-regulation
A press freedom regime is legally mandated in the Philippines by the Constitution of 1987, specifically in Article III Section 4, which mandates that No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Although there is government regulation of some mediafor example, of film and videogramsthis provision prohibits government regulation through legislation of the press and other vehicles of expression. The absence of government regulation raises the question of how media abuseevery right has the potential to be abused
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may be addressed. The answer is through self-regulation, the basic expression of which is compliance with the ethical and professional standards of journalism. Apart from making self-regulation necessary, the absence of government regulation also makes it possible. Obviously if the behavior and professional standards of journalists were mandated by law, there would be no need as well as no possibility of voluntary ethical compliance. In the Philippine setting, the mechanisms of self-regulation include: Media organizations The employers of journalists, whose editors and owners may impose internal rules of behavior as well as sanctions (suspension, fines, dismissal); Press councils Organizations composed of representatives of media organizations and civil society/peoples organizations to which complaints of abuse as well as unethical and unprofessional behavior by journalists or media organizations may be addressed and acted on; Journalists organizations Purely journalist organizations which may impose penalties on erring members, among them suspension of membership; Media monitoring publications Publications that monitor and evaluate media performance on the basis of the ethical and professional standards of journalism; and Media ombudsmen Readers advocates who accept complaints about the reporting/commentary of their media organizations.
These mechanisms are charged with dissemination among journalists of the professional and ethical standards of journalism as well as encouragement of, and voluntary compliance with those standards.
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Some current ethical problems: Corruption Sensationalism Deception Bias Invasion of privacy Conflict of interest Stereotyping Pack/Cartel journalism
Corruption in the Philippine setting consists of the following acts: Bribe solicitation and bribe-taking Soliciting money or other favors in exchange for favorable reporting; AC-DC (Attack Collect-Defend Collect) The practice of attacking a news subject and then defending the same once payment has been made; and ATM Journalism A form of corruption in which money is deposited in the journalists account through the automatic teller machine.
Corruption compromises the journalists autonomy and distorts facts in favor of the journalists patron. Sensationalism Sensationalism is first of all a form of exaggerating the importance of certain news events or aspects of those events, and of focusing on its most prurient or violent details. A focus on sex and violence both through lurid headlines and detailed descriptions is a common form of sensationalism. Sensationalism misleads the public as to the relevance and importance of events, and adversely affects truth-telling.
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Bias Editorializing in the news through selective use of data, using judgmental words and phrases, reporting only one side of an issue, or providing minimal space and time to one side of an issue are among the most common manifestations of bias in the news. Bias compromises truth-telling. Deception Deception refers to a number of practices that include concealing ones identity as a journalist or assuming a different identity in pursuit of a story, and using hidden cameras and microphones. Deception can lead sources into committing wrongful acts or into incriminating themselves. Invasion of privacy Invasion of privacy usually consists of digging up information about the subjects past, and/or using various devices to listen in on or to photograph news subjects. Invasion of privacy can damage reputations and denies news subjects the right to be left alone. Conflict of interest Usually consists of taking on other jobs that conflict with journalisms public interest role. Conflicts of interest compromise ones autonomy through personal and other commitments or even romantic attachments to sources. Also among its manifestation is the use of information obtained as journalist for ones personal benefit.
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Stereotyping Consists of attributing to individuals qualities falsely associated with a group that shares a common gender, sexual preference, or ethnic, religious, or political characteristics. Stereotyping panders to common prejudices towards minority and other groups. Pack or cartel journalism A common practice in many beats, pack or cartel journalism is a practice in which beat reporters assign someone to cover and write a story that everyone in the same beat will then submit to their media organizations with their respective bylines. The person so assigned is called the Ponenteparodying the Supreme Court practice of assigning someone to pen a decision.
Relevant ethical and professional issues in covering the justice system, trials, and the courts
Lack of fairness and balance Stereotyping Deception Inaccuracy Bias Sensationalism Trial by publicity Invasion of privacy Plagiarism Lack of context Libel and slander Incompleteness
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While ethical problems do occur in the coverage of every beat and issue of public concern, the more relevant ethical issue in the coverage of crime, courts and trials are trial by publicity and invasion of privacy. Trial by publicity refers to the practice of prejudging the guilt or innocence of any person or group accused of wrongdoing. If the issue is in court, trial by publicity can lead to a finding of contempt of court under the sub-judice principle, which makes it unlawful to report on a case under trial in such a manner as to influence its outcome. The penalty for contempt includes prison terms and/or fines, at the discretion of the court.
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CHAPTER II. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL/JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The Philippine courts

According to Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
The Supreme Court has the following powers: 1. To exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. To review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm, on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: a. All cases where the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
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2.
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases where the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such assignments cannot exceed six months without the judges consent.
4.
Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
5.
6.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. Other courts are: Municipal Trial Courts Metropolitan Trial Courts
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Regional Trial Courts Sandiganbayan A special court on the same level as the Court of Appeals possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice. Section 1, Republic Act 8249 Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution describes it as a court with jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction: 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over annulment of RTC judgments; 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments and decisions of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies (except those falling within the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction).
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HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND EXPANDED COURT SYSTEM

SUPREME COURT COURT OF APPEALS
COMELEC/COA
- other tribunal/board/officer - w/o or in excess of jurisdiction - no appeal or plain, speedy & adequate remedy
SANDIGANBAYAN
* Including Sharia District Courts * * Including Sharia Circuit Courts LEGEND: Appeal (Rule 41,44) Petition for Review (Rule 42,43) Appeal by Certiorari (Rule 45) Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) Automatic Appeal (Death Penalty)
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS*

(Including the Family Courts, Special Criminal Courts, and Intellectual Property Courts)
Quasi-Judicial Agencies
NLRC ERB LRA SSC NEA CSC DAR BOI CAB NTC IC GSIS ECC (CTA) OP CIAC Voluntary Arbitrators
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS*

(Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts**)
COMELECCommission on Elections; COACommission on Audit; NLRCNational Labor Relations Commission; ERBElection Regulation Board; LRALand Registration Authority; SSCSocial Security Commission; NEANational Electrification Administration; CSCCivil Service Commission; CABCivil Aeronautics Board; GSIS Government Service Insurance System; OPOffice of the President of the Philippines; DARDepartment of Agrarian Reform; NTCNational Telecommunications Commission; ECCEmployees Compensation Commission; CIACConstruction Industry Arbitration Commission; BOIBoard of Investments; ICInsurance Commission; CTACourt of Tax Appeals
Other government bodies that participate in the criminal justice system

The Office of the Ombudsman Powers, duties and functions under the 1987 Constitution (Section 13, Article XI): 1.
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Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any

act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 2. Directany public official or employee, or any government subdivision, agency or instrumentality, and any GOCC with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. Direct the officer concernedsubject to such limitationsprovided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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The Department of Justice Section 1. It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation Executive Order No. 292, Title III - Chapter I, Section 1 on the Department of Justice: of crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; implement the laws on the admission and stay of aliens, citizenship, land titling system, and settlement of land problems involving small landowners and members of indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free legal services to indigent members of the society. The DOJ has four distinct functions: 1. Principal law agencythe Governments legal counsel and prosecution arm; Administers the criminal justice system; Implements the laws on: a. The admission and stay of aliens b. Citizenship c. Land titling system d. Settlement of land problems involving small landowners and members of indigenous cultural minorities; and 4. Provides free legal services to indigents.
2.
3.
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The Office of the Solicitor General Section 34, Chapter 12, Executive Order No. 292 states that: The OSG shall be an independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice. The OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
The Administrative Code of 1987 in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 34 declares that: The Solicitor Generalis the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. The powers of the OSG are: To represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; To represent the Government and its officers in the SC, CA, and all other courts in all civil actions and special proceedings where the Government or its officer/s are a party in their official capacity. To investigate, initiate court action, or in any manner proceed against any corporation, person, or firm to enforce any contract, bond, guarantee, mortgage, pledge or other collateral executed in favor of the Government. Where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines the Solicitor General may employ counsel to assist in the[case]. To appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment
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his intervention is necessary or when requested by the Court. To appear in all proceedings involving the acquisition or loss of Philippine citizenship. To represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. To institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution. To preparerules and guidelines for government entities governing the preparation of contracts, making investments, undertaking of transactions, and drafting of forms or other writings needed for official use, with the end in view of facilitating their enforcement and insuring that they are entered into or prepared conformably with law and for the best interests of the public. To call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government for such service, assistance and cooperation as may be necessary in fulfilling its functions and responsibilities and for this purpose enlist the services of any government official or employee in the pursuit of his tasks. To represent, upon the instructions of the President, the Republic of the Philippines in international litigations, negotiations or conferences where the legal position of the Republic must be defended or presented. To act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceedings which, in his opinion affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; and To perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
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The Philippine National Police Section 2, Philippine National Police Law, Republic Act 6975 mandates that: The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The National Bureau of Investigation Was established in 1936 upon approval of Commonwealth Act No. 181. Is now governed by Republic Act 157, Executive Order 94 and Executive Order 292, as amended. Was patterned after the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Is civilian in character.
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Simplified flowcharts of a typical criminal and/or civil case

1. Simplified Flowchart of a Criminal Case A. Preliminary Investigation / Warrant of Arrest
FILING OF COMPLAINT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
FILING OF INFORMATION IN COURT

Dismissal of complaint
RAFFLING OF CASE
CASE RECORD GOES TO SALA OF SELECTED JUDGE
JUDGE DETERMINES EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
JUDGE ISSUES WARRANT OF ARREST

If none, dismisses the case
ACCUSED IS ARRESTED
ACCUSED IS ARRAIGNED (ARRAIGNMENT)

Pleads Guilty
DISCOVERY AND PRE-TRIAL

Sentence imposed (judgment promulgated)
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TRIAL
PROSECUTIONS CASE-IN-CHIEF
DEFENDANTS CASE-IN-CHIEF
PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT
ACQUITTED
ACCUSED MAY APPEAL IF CONVICTED
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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1. Simplified Flowchart of a Criminal Case B. Warrantless Arrest / Inquest

WARRANTLESS ARREST
INQUEST
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CASE DISMISSED
FILING OF INFORMATION IN COURT
RAFFLING OF CASE
CASE RECORD GOES TO SALA OF SELECTED JUDGE
JUDGE DETERMINES EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
JUDGE ISSUES COMMITMENT ORDER

If none, dismisses the case
ACCUSED IS ARRAIGNED (ARRAIGNMENT)

Pleads Guilty

Sentence imposed (judgment promulgated)
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TRIAL
PROSECUTIONS CASE-IN-CHIEF
PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT
ACQUITTED
ACCUSED MAY APPEAL IF CONVICTED
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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Two Kinds of Civil Actions Ordinary civil actions: Damages Injunction Specific performance
Special civil actions: Certiorari Prohibition Mandamus
2. Simplified Flowchart of a Civil Case A.Ordinary Civil Action

FILING OF COMPLAINT
ANSWER
TRIAL
PLAINTIFFS CASE-IN-CHIEF
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JUDGMENT
APPEAL
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
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2. Simplified Flowchart of a Civil Case B. Special Civil Action

FILING OF PETITION COMMENT
HEARING (ORAL ARGUMENT) OR MEMORANDUM DECISION APPEAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
Court Personnel
The Clerk of Court is an officer of the court who keeps its records and court seal, issues process, enters judgments and orders, and issues certified true copies of court papers. The Court interpreter Translates the questions of the lawyers and the court to the witness into Tagalog, and the answers of the witness into English; Administers the oath to witnesses; Marks and keeps the exhibits; and Prepares the minutes of the court session.
The Court stenographer takes stenographic notes of everything that takes place during court hearings and transcribes them. The Process server is a person authorized by law or by a court to
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formally deliver process to a party to the case. The Sheriff serves and executes writs and processes and reports his actions taken to the Court. Court record The folder, prepared by the clerk of court, containing the record of the case. Called the expediente in the trial courts; Called the rollo in the Supreme Court.
All papers pertaining to the case are kept here, except transcripts of stenographic notes (t.s.n.s) and exhibits.
The Court calendar The Clerk of Court, under the direct supervision of the Judge, shall keep a calendar of cases for pre-trial and trial...and those with motions to set for hearing... [Rules of Court] The calendar for the day is usually posted beside the entrance to the courtroom.
Entry of appearance This is standard in all court hearings. Lawyers must enter their appearances when their cases are called. Those who do not will not be recognized by the court or allowed to participate in the proceedings.
The Prosecutor prosecutes an accused for a crime in the name of the Government. The burden of proving the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt rests on the prosecutor.
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In the Philippines, there are two types: 1. Public prosecutor: a public officer. 2. Private prosecutor: a private lawyer. Private prosecutors are always under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
The Defendant or Accused is the person accused of a crime. S/he enjoys the presumption of innocence. S/he is protected by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. S/he has The right to remain silent. The right to due process of law. The right to a fair trial. The right to equal protection of the laws. The right against self-incrimination.
The Defense Counsel May be a public officer (a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office or PAO); or A private lawyer.
The Subpoena Subpoena ad testificandum: To appear and testify.
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Subpoena duces tecum: To appear, bring documents requested and testify.
An Affidavit is a written declaration of facts. It is Based on personal knowledge; Voluntarily made; Signed by affiant; and Made under oath.
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CHAPTER III. BASIC LEGAL TERMS
Ignorantia lexis neminem excusat (Ignorance of the law excuses no one.) Law is a discipline, like others, that has a language and context of its own. It has both technical and culture language. There is a need for those in other fields to understand many of the terms used so that law becomes clearer as well as less mystifying. For journalists, the need to understand what the legal terms mean also arises out of the journalists duty to be accurate, complete, and truthful. Among the terms often confused are Life imprisonment and Reclusion perpetua, which are thought to be the same. They are not. Life imprisonment Reclusion perpetua
LIFE IMPRISONMENT is a penalty prescribed by special laws. It has no specific duration and is dependent on the law providing for it. RECLUSION PERPETUA is a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code. It has a SPECIFIC DURATION of 20 years and one day to 40 years. It also has accessory penalties like civil interdiction for life, perpetual absolute disqualification.
It does not have accessory penalties. Some statutes set a 40-year period, others prescribe a longer penalty.
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A Complaint is understood in two sensesa civil complaint and a criminal complaint. A civil complaint is a document where a person states, under oath, his/her CAUSE OF ACTION and the RELIEF s/he prays for from the court. This is filed with the court directly and will result in the issuance of SUMMONS from the court. A criminal complaint is a document under oath where a person charges another with the commission of a FELONY/ CRIME. This is filed with the prosecutors office who will then conduct a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION to determine PROBABLE CAUSE if an INFORMATION should be filed. The Cause of action is the basis for a civil complaint to be filed. Its elements are: a. A right protected by law, b. An act/omission that violates the right, and c. An injury that arises from the act/omission. A complaint can have more than one cause of action but one cause of action cannot result in more than one civil complaint. A Summons is a notice that is given by the court to the defendant directing the defendant to answer the complaint within a period of 15 days from receipt of the summons. The issuance of the summons is automatic on the part of the court. When summons is sent out, this process is called service of summons. This may be done by personal service or by substituted service (leaving copies). The effect of service is that the period of 15 days starts to run.
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Information An Information is the charge filed in court as a result of the finding of PROBABLE CAUSE made by the investigating prosecutor after a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. PROBABLE CAUSE is the basis for finding that a crime has been committed; consists of facts of personal knowledge. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION is the procedure provided by the Rules of Court for the determination of probable cause; it is conducted by the prosecutor, not by the court, and results in either a dismissal of the complaint or the filing of an Information. A Counter-affidavit is a SWORN STATEMENT that contains the defense of the respondent. It is submitted during a preliminary investigation. This is dispensed with during an INQUEST. An Inquest is different from a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. An inquest is conducted when there is a warrantless arrest. The FIRST DUTY of the inquest investigator is to determine if there has been a VALID warrantless arrest. If there is none, then the person arrested should be released. If there is a valid warrantless arrest, the inquest investigator must then determine if there is PROBABLE CAUSE to charge the person. How is it different from a preliminary investigation? In an inquest, the determination is based on the complaint alone, without submission of counter-affidavits. If the person arrested wants to submit a counter-affidavit, he must ask for a P.I. but he must WAIVE the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons).
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Felony/Crime A FELONY is an act or omission that is committed either through malice or through negligence that is penalized by either imprisonment or fine or both by the Revised Penal Code. The essential requirement for a felony is CRIMINAL INTENT. A CRIME is an offense that is made unlawful by law (not the Revised Penal Code) and which does not require proof of criminal intent.
Example: Murder is a felony (Article 248) while Drug Dealing is a crime (Republic Act 9165). The Pre-trial is the stage of the TRIAL PROCESS where some facts and issues are agreed upon (stipulated) and a possible compromise agreement may be reached. All other matters that would result in a more expeditious process can be considered. It is mandatory for both civil and criminal cases. This is also the part of the process where DISCOVERY may be resorted to. This would be a process where the parties are requested/compelled to disclose material facts to each other so as to prevent unfair surprise. A Warrant of arrest is an order issued by a trial court for the arrest of a person charged with a crime. It can only be issued after the judge personally determines that there is probable cause and only for one specific offense. The warrant of arrest must contain the name of the person to be arrested and cannot be issued against a john doe or an alias unless a description* is included. An arrest warrant is not time-bound, i.e., it does not become ineffective after a period of time. It becomes ineffective only when the person named in the warrant is arrested.
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It is issued by a judge after preliminary investigation and upon filing of an Information. Warrantless arrest The GENERAL RULE is that a person may only be arrested if a warrant has been issued. The EXCEPTIONS are the following: a. The offender has just committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense; b. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c. When the person to be arrested is a fugitive. In all three instances, the person who can arrest is a peace officer or a private person. (Citizens Arrest) An Alias warrant is not a second warrant for the same offense already covered by an arrest warrant. It is the same warrant except that it is re-issued by the court after the original warrant is returned to the court after 10 days from issuance without the person named therein being arrested. The significance of an alias warrant is that it can be issued without the process of determining probable cause again. A Search warrant is an order issued by a court for the search of a place specifically stated in the warrant and the seizure of goods specifically enumerated in the warrant. Similar to an arrest warrant, it is issued by a judge after his personal determination of probable cause. Unlike an arrest warrant, a search warrant is not issued after a preliminary investigation as it may be issued after a separate and independent proceeding. Unlike an arrest warrant, a search warrant expires after 10
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days from its issuance. It cannot be extended. There are also no alias search warrants. A search warrant need not state the name of a person but must state the exact address of the place to be searched and the listing of the things to be seized. Plain view exception If the objects to be seized are contraband, i.e., prohibited by law, they may be seized even if they are not specified in a search warrant if they are found IN PLAIN VIEW. IN PLAIN VIEW means that no search is conducted and that the contraband is visible without the authorities needing to do anything to obtain it. Search incident to a lawful arrest The only exception provided to the Search Warrant requirement is a SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST. The FIRST AND INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT must be a LAWFUL ARREST. The search must be limited only to the immediate vicinity of the person arrested and only for objects of the offense and/or dangerous weapons on the person of the offender. Stop and frisk One of the exceptions to the Search Warrant requirement established by case law. The situation is that the person searched has been STOPPED by a peace officer on the basis of probable cause and subjected to a SEARCH OF HIS/HER PERSON. The indispensable requirement is PROBABLE CAUSE. An Appeal is the means to question a decision of the trial court to the next higher court. Usually done through a Notice of Appeal.
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From the Regional Trial Court, the decision is appealed to COURT OF APPEALS, which can further be appealed to the SUPREME COURT. What is in question in the appeal is the CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION. A Certiorari is a special writ of review which is different from an appeal. It is not filed by a Notice of Appeal but by a Petition. The question raised is not the correctness of the decision but the jurisdiction of the court and the manner by which the decision was rendered. The usual ground for the petition for certiorari is GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION which results in lack of jurisdiction. DISCRETION indicates that a court may take more than one action and still be correct, although the action may not be sound. An Interlocutory is an order that does not decide the case on the merits but puts to an end an incident or a part of the case and leaves nothing else for the court to do. An interlocutory order is not appealable. For instance, an order granting a motion to dismiss does not result in a decision on the merits but disposes of the case, leaving nothing for the court to do. A Final judgment is one that disposes of the case on the merits. It may partake of a conviction or acquittal in a criminal case or a judgment granting or denying the plaintiff s claim in a civil case. It results in a ruling on the issues raised and defines the rights of the parties in relation to each other. A final judgment of conviction is appealable but a judgment of acquittal is not appealable because of the DOUBLE JEOPARDY prohibition.
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A final judgment in a civil case is always appealable. The Offer of evidence is the means by which the evidence presented by each party (documents, testimonies, and objects) are formally presented to the court for its consideration. It comes at the end of each sides presentation of evidence. After the offer, the opposing party is given the opportunity to COMMENT/OPPOSE, after which the court rules. The ruling of the court is to either admit the evidence or deny admission. A Mandamus is a special writ directed to a person, entity, or body with ministerial (no discretion) functions for the person, entity or body to perform a specific act which, if not performed, would cause injury to the person seeking the writ. It must be based on a right that is not disputed or disputable. Prohibition Similar to certiorari and mandamus, it is a special writ directed to a person or entity to STOP the performance of a specific act because of GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and which, if not stopped, would cause injury to the rights of the petitioner. Different from an injunction in terms of the ground for granting the writ but the same in the effects in that both result in a specific act being stopped.
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Injunction/TRO
Injunction is an order directed against a person/entity STOPPING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT that, if continued, will cause grave and irreparable injury to the applicant. It can only be issued if there is proof of a CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT and a GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY. It cannot be issued without a hearing. The lifetime of an injunction is the duration of the case. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) is an interim order issued before an injunction application can be heard. A court may issue a TRO immediately upon application for 72 hours; within this period, the court must hear the application for TRO and if warranted, continue the TRO for 17 more days. The maximum period of a TRO is 20 days. It cannot be extended.
A Motion is a means by which a party asks for relief from the court other than through a complaint or a petition. A motion can be filed in both criminal and civil cases. A motion must be set for hearing unless it prays for a relief that is not subject of controversy (e.g., extension of time). A motion that is not set for hearing is usually referred to as a mere scrap of paper and may be denied outright.
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Motion to Quash/Motion to Dismiss

Both have the same purpose: To stop the case before it reaches trial. A Motion to Quash (MTQ) is filed in criminal cases and the subject is the Information. The grounds for a MTQ are found in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. A Motion to Dismiss (MTD) is filed in civil cases and the subject is the complaint. The grounds for a MTD are found in Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
Demurrer to the evidence It is a MOTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT based only on the evidence presented by the prosecution/plaintiff BEFORE the defense starts to present his/her evidence. It is based on the theory that the burden of proof has not been discharged, i.e., the party has not presented enough evidence to convict or to prove his/her claims. If granted, the case is dismissed; in criminal cases, a granted demurrer results in an acquittal. Motion to intervene is a means by which a party who is not part of the original case seeks to become part of the case. The proposed intervenor must show a legal interest in the subject of litigation that the court needs to protect. Intervention is a matter of discretion, not right. It may be denied by the court if the grounds for it are not clear or beyond dispute. Motion for reconsideration The relief prayed for in a Motion for Reconsideration (MFR) is to reverse the judgment already rendered without the court having to do anything more in terms of receiving evidence.
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It is different from an appeal which is done by the next higher court; a MFR is filed with and decided by the same court that rendered the decision. It must be filed within 15 days from receipt of the decision. As a general rule, only one MFR is allowed; in exceptional cases, a second MFR in the SC is allowed. Burden of proof It is the OBLIGATION that the law imposes on a specific party to prove his/her allegations. In a criminal case, the prosecution always has the burden of proof. The burden is to prove the guilt of the accused. The accused is never made to prove his/her innocence because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the one who alleges a fact. Proof beyond reasonable doubt refers to the degree of evidence required to convict an accused of a crime/felony. Proof beyond reasonable doubt refers to a situation where there is a moral certainty, not absolute certainty, on the part of the judge that the accused is guilty and that no other explanation other than guilt is acceptable. It is the highest degree of proof. Preponderance of evidence refers to the degree of evidence required to grant a claim in civil cases. A preponderance of the evidence refers to a situation where the judge considers all the evidence presented as sufficient to convince him/her that the claim should be allowed. It does not refer only to the number of witnesses but also the quality of the other types of evidence presented, all of which should lead to the degree of belief of the judge that all things being considered, the claim should be granted.
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Leave of court is simply asking for the courts permission. It is necessary in certain specified instances, for instance, intervention or the filing of a reply. It is done through a motion. Plea bargain is a plea to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. Necessarily included means that the elements of the offense charged would include the offense to which the plea is given. Arraignment and Plea
Arraignment is the READING OF THE CHARGE to the Accused. It must be read in a language known to the accused. It is the process by which the court obtains jurisdiction over the person of the accused. It places the accused in FIRST JEOPARDY. After the Information is read to the accused, s/he is asked how s/he pleads. The OPTIONS are: 1. GUILTY, 2. NOT GUILTY or 3. NO PLEA. In the case of No Plea, the court will enter a plea of NOT GUILTY.
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Examinations
DIRECT The process by which the proponent of the witness presents the witness. It is done in a step-bystep manner through a series of questions that are intended to elicit the facts to prove the case. CROSS The process by which the opponent will contradict or rebut the evidence presented during direct examination. Usually done through leading questions.
Hearsay is evidence that is NOT BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE is determined by the senses. If a fact is not based on personal knowledge, it is considered hearsay and is not admissible subject to exceptions. Bail/Non-bailable The GENERAL RULE is that an accused is entitled, by right, to bail except in cases where the offense is punished by reclusion perpetua and where the evidence of guilt is strong. In the latter instance, bail is a matter of discretion. In instances where bail is not a matter of right, the accused must file a PETITION FOR BAIL and the court must hear it. The court will direct the prosecution to PRESENT EVIDENCE to show that guilt is strong in order to deny bail. If evidence is found to be strong, bail will be denied. The Chain of custody is the step-by-step accounting of the IDENTITY, NATURE, AND WHEREABOUTS of a particular piece of evidence, usually object evidence.
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It is done by testimonies of persons who have encountered the evidence and can describe the identity of the evidence and relation of the evidence they handled to the evidence being presented in court.
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CHAPTER IV. THE PRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS
Framework
Article II, Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. Article III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging* the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
*making less meaningful or diluting, diminishing
Judicial mindset
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000 Freedom of expression is a preferred right. (F)ree speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint. Prior restraint is not to be presumed valid; the burden to show its validity is on the State. A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The test
Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974. October 18, 1957
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The case involved the right to petition the government for redress of grievance, not freedom of the press but because the right to petition for redress is found in the same section of the Constitution, the court referred to the rights in that collection interchangeably. The Court discussed two theoretical formulas for resolving the dispute: the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST and the DANGEROUS TENDENCY TEST. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. (Cabansag) The question in every case,..., is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. (Cabansag) The dangerous tendency rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the
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press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt. This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Cabansag) JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983 Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Anatomy of restrictions
Chavez v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338. February 15, 2008 Three types of restrictions: a. Prior restraint,
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b. Content-based restrictions, and c. Content-neutral restrictions
Four aspects of freedom of the press

1. Freedom from prior restraint; 2. Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; 3. Freedom of access to information; and 4. Freedom of circulation. Prior restraint Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts. (Chavez) Content-neutral and content-based restrictions A content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, is one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; A content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. (Chavez)
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The test to determine validity of the restriction depends on the nature of the restriction. Content-neutral restrictions When the speech restraints take the form of a contentneutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. (Chavez) The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner: (a) governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Chavez) Content-based restrictions On the other hand, governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down. With respect to content-based restrictions, the government
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must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. As formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. (Chavez) Subsequent punishment JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. In Re: Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995 Emil Jurado, a lawyer and a columnist, was investigated by an ad hoc committee created by the then Chief Justice (Andres Narvasa)
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to investigate alleged corruption in the judiciary for his columns on the so-called Magnificent Seven. The matter was docketed as an administrative manner, which is usually justified when the Court acts pursuant to its administrative function to oversee courts and lawyers. The charge against Jurado was for contempt. In disposing of the arguments of Jurado invoking press freedom, the Court relied on a Civil Code provision on abuse of rights under Article 19 and on that basis ruled that (f )reedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths this would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may not be used to insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. this would not be to act with justice or give everyone his due. In Re: Macasaet A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008 Amado Macasaet wrote a series of columns about a lady justice who apparently was the subject of a bribe attempt without naming the lady justice or the court to which she belongs. Acting on its own, without a named complainant, the Court investigated Macasaet for indirect contempt of court. The Court, writing through former Associate Justice Ruben Reyes, started its Decision with this line: FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaanngpamamahayag at kalayaangpanghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for indirect contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other. From this sentence, it appears that the Court would now use a
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Balancing of Interests test instead of the Clear and Present Danger test. In resolving the case, the Court did not apply the Clear and Present Danger test in relation to the invocation of the right of press freedom. Instead, it used a new test: We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary. Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. The test of redeeming value was a test applied by the United States in obscenity cases and not in freedom of the press cases. It has, however, already been rejected as a constitutional standard. (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 [1973]) Justice Reyes did not apply the Clear and Present Danger test to the columns of Macasaet which would have merited the strictest scrutiny because it would involve a content-based restriction. He chose instead to apply a very subjective test of redeeming value which had already been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. The Court, through Reyes, also indicated that it would, in the future, take direct action against a press that does not produce quality journalism which, according to Reyes, freedom has not ensured. The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence
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of clear voluntary codes developed by the press, as its selfregulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and popular pressure. (Macasaet)
Conclusion
The Courts recent deviations from the Clear and Present Danger standard to more liberal application of the contempt rules are inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of non-abridgment of the freedom of the press. The strict scrutiny demanded by the Clear and Present Danger standard, which would have made censorship (or prior restraint) extremely difficult has now been replaced by a more liberal standard of balancing of interests (as shown in Jurado and Macasaet) where the Court uses its contempt power as subsequent punishment.
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CHAPTER V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL WRITS: Extraordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Offenses
The evolution of human rights in international law

2nd World War: 1939 to 1945 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1948 Economic Rights and Duties of States: 1974 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 1976
The following is an excerpt from A Nation for Our Children (1987) by Jose W. Diokno, which explains what individual and collective human rights are: First. None of us asked to be born. And regardless of who our parents are and what they own, all of us are born equally naked and helpless, yet each with his own mind, his own will and his own talents. Because of these facts, all of us have an equal right to life, and share the same inherent human dignity. The right to life is more than the right to live; it is the right to live in a manner that befits our common human dignity and enables us to bring our particular talents to full flower. So each of us individually has three basic rights: the right to life, the right to dignity, and the right to develop ourselves. These are traditionally known as the rights of man. Second. Even if we may not know our parents are, we are never born without parents, and never live outside society, a society with its own peculiar culture, history and resources. So besides our rights as persons, we have rights as society, rights which belong to each of us individually but which we can exercise only collectively as a people. These rights are known as the rights of the people[Like] the rights of
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man, [they] comprise three basic rights: to survive, to selfdetermination, and to develop as a people. Third. Once a society reaches a certain degree of complexity, as almost all societies have, society can act only through government. But government always remains only an agent of society; it never becomes society itself; it never becomes the people themselves. It is always and only an instrument of the people. Moreover, since government is composed of men, each with his own interests and his own frailties, it usually happens in fact, it happens all too often that government does not seek the peoples welfare: on the contrary, it oppresses the people. These facts lead to two conclusions: First, when we speak of national security, what we refer or should refer to is the security of the people, not of the governors; and when we speak of economic development, what we are talking about or should be talking about is the improvement of the standard of living of all the people, not the enrichment of the governors. [And second], since government is merely an agent of the people, people have the right to change both the men who run the government and the structure and system of government itself; and when the people cannot do so peacefully, they have the right, in the language of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.
What is a writ?
According to Blacks Law Dictionary, a writ is A precept in writing...from a court of justice...requiring the performance of a specified act, or giving authority to have it done.
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Writs in the Philippines

Writs were introduced in the Philippines first by Spain and then by the United States. We incorporated most of the ordinary and extraordinary writs as integral parts of our legal procedure. Ordinary writs: Writ of Attachment Writ of Execution Writ of Injunction Writ of Replevin
Extraordinary or prerogative writs: Those issued by the exercise of the extraordinary power of the crown (the court, in modern practice) on proper cause shown. Blacks Law Dictionary Writ of procedendo; Writ of mandamus; Writ of prohibition; Writ of quo warranto; Writ of habeas corpus; Writ of certiorari; and Writ of amparo. The writ of amparo partakes of the nature of a prerogative writ Azcuna, J., Annotation, The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
What is the writ of procedendo? A remedy under early English common law and chancery practice to compel an inferior tribunal to proceed to judgment in a given case where the judge of such court was delaying the proceedings, but without directing any particular judgment. Ballantines Law Dictionary
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The writ of procedendo is not a recognized writ in the Philippines. What is the writ of mandamus? The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the writ of mandamus as: An extraordinary writ, sometimes referred to as the highest judicial writ known to law, which may issue only when the court unlawfully neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty resulting from the office or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. Buenaventura v. Bautista, SP-13007-SCA, September 15, 1981. The writ will issue only when there is a clear legal right sought to be enforced. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use. It is available also to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of either. Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) v. Philippine Airlines Inc., SP-00543, June 10, 1986. The remedy provided for in the law to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. Valdez v. Santiago, 54 OG 98. What is the writ of prohibition? The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the writ of prohibition as: A preventive remedy whose function is to restrain the doing of some act about to be done. Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil 517. An extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from further proceedings in such tribunal,
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corporation, board, or person are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Delfin v. Court of Appeals, 121 Phil 346. What is the writ of injunction? A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to final judgment, requiring a party or a court, agency or person to refrain from doing a particular act or to require the performance of a particular act. A final or permanent injunction is issued as part of the decision of a case, to perpetually or permanently enjoin the party or person. What is the writ of certiorari? The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the writ of certiorari as: A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Zamoranos v. People, G.R. 193902, June 1, 2011
Amparo and Habeas Data: The newest Philippine writs

The Writ of Amparo A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC Was promulgated on September 25, 2007. Took effect on October 24, 2007.
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What is the Philippine writ of amparo? The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. Section 1, Rule on the Writ of Amparo Whats the difference between the issuance of the writ of amparo and the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo? The writ [of amparo] is issued as a matter of course when on the face of the petition it ought to issue... If the petitioner is able to prove his cause of action after the hearing, the privilege of the writ of amparo shall be granted, i.e., the court will grant the petitioner his appropriate reliefs. Azcuna, J., Annotation, The Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Salient features of the write of amparo: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Can be filed anytime; Can be filed in most courts; No filing and docket fees; Enforceable anywhere in the Philippines; Summary or shortened proceedings; Substantial evidence; General denials prohibited; Presumption of regularity in performing official duties not applicable; and 9. AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE, IDENTIFY, APPREHEND, PROSECUTE AND PUNISH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS. Basic procedure: Petition Issuance of writ
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Return Summary hearing Decision Justice Azcunas annotation: Contents of the Return. The section requires a detailed return. The detailed return is important, for it will help determine whether the respondent fulfilled the standard of conduct [extraordinary diligence for public respondents] required by the Rule. A detailed return will also avoid the ineffectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus, where often the respondent makes a simple denial in the return that he or she has custody over the missing person, and the petition is dismissed. The requirements under paragraph (d) (duties where the respondent is a public official) are based on United Nations standards. In Velasquez and Godinez, the [Inter-American] Court [of Human Rights] held that such [enforced] disappearances constitute crimes against humanity under international law; as a result, governments have an affirmative duty to investigate them and to prosecute and punish whoever may be responsible. The Rationale for the Writ of Amparo (Supreme Court) The Court also found that, because the purpose of a disappearance was to eliminate traces of the governments role in a serious crime, the standard of proof and burden of persuasion must, after an initial presentation by the Commission, shift to the government to demonstrate that it had done all in its power to redress the wrong. The Court based this reasoning on its dictum that states have an obligation to organize their whole apparatus so that human rights may be adequately protected.
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What interim reliefs are available to petitioner? Temporary Protection Order Inspection Order Production Order Witness Protection Order
Can respondent/s also ask for interim reliefs? Yes, but only inspection and production orders. What quantum of evidence is required for the parties to prove their claims? Substantial evidence (Section 17, Amparo Rule): That amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Rule 133, Section 5, Rules of Court What standards of diligence does the Rule impose on the respondent/s? Ordinary diligence for private respondents (Section 17, Amparo Rule) Extraordinary diligence for public respondents: That extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. [id.] Justice Azcunas annotation Public officials or employees are charged with a higher standard of conduct because it is their legal duty to obey the Constitution, especially its provisions protecting the right to life, liberty and security.
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Extraordinary Diligence . as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Article 1755, Civil Code of the Philippines What happens to the case if the privilege of the writ is denied? The court, instead of dismissing the petition, may archive it, if it determines that it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. Section 20, Amparo Rule The Writ of Habeas Data A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC Took effect on February 2, 2008.
The writ of habeas data, according to Chief Justice Puno, protects the right of informational privacy or what the Habeas Data Rule refers to as the right to privacy in life, liberty or security... What is habeas data? The writ of habeas data is a judicial remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
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Differences between Amparo and Habeas Data

AMPARO
No docket fees Extraordinary diligence for public respondents No presumption of regularity
HABEAS DATA
Usual rule but proof of indigency can come later Ordinary diligence Presumption of regularity applies
Differences between Habeas Corpus and Amparo

HABEAS CORPUS
Right to liberty Generally hard to secure relief in desaparecido cases Burden of proof > Petitioner Preponderance of evidence Ordinary diligence Presumption of regularity recognized General denial allowed
AMPARO
Life, liberty and security Designed for desaparecido cases Shifting burden of proof Substantial evidence Extraordinary diligence Pres. of regularity not recognized General denial prohibited
While habeas corpus has been regarded as the great writ of liberty, its effectivity in protecting human rights has been diluted by The rulings of the Supreme Court in several cases; General denials;
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The presumption of regularity; and The ruling that arbitrary detention is not a ground for release of an accused.
That is why an effective writ of amparo is so importantto fill the void that habeas corpus cannot fill. The practice of allowing civilians who consent to remain in military camps is unlawful and unconstitutional In several amparo cases before the trial courts, the military respondents admitted having custody over the aggrieved parties, but claimed that they had consented to remain in military custody. In one case, one of the aggrieved parties was released, while the other manifested his desire to remain in the military camp. The Court of Appeals dismissed, closed and terminated the case. In another case, one of the aggrieved parties was released while the others (a couple and their two-month old son) opted to remain at the military camp. The Court of Appeals closed and terminated the case. The practice of allowing civilians to be housed in military facilities, under the custody of military personnel, has no legal basis. Military personnel have no authority to take custody of civilians even if they consent to it. The use of public funds to feed, house, clothe or support civilians constitutes illegal disbursement of public funds. It also contravenes the constitutional mandate of civilian supremacy over the military at all times. The practice of taking custody over consenting civilians is different from using intelligence assets. The practice of placing consenting civilians in military custody encourages violations of human rights.
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Civilians in military custody are easy targets for physical and psychological torture and other methods designed to break their will and turn them into military assets or informants. The Court should impose an absolute ban on the militarys practice of taking custody over consenting civilians. Lack of mechanism for preserving testimonies of parties and witnesses dilutes the Amparo rule. Amparo cases involving enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are fraught with danger for the parties who initiate them and their witnesses. Like other human rights cases, witnesses in Amparo proceedings are easy targets for pressure, intimidation or compromise. Sometimes they themselves become the victims of enforced disappearances or extrajudicial killings. For the Amparo rule to truly meet its promise of vindicating human rights, a mechanism is needed that will allow the parties to preserve their testimonies and those of their witnesses. Without this mechanism, the Amparo rule may lose its vitality and be reduced into a mere paper remedy. The Free Legal Assistance Group proposes that the rule be amended to provide for perpetuation or preservation of testimonies of witnesses. Two important Amparo cases THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008; and GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR. v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009.
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Writs comparison chart

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS PREPOND. OF EVIDENCE BURDEN OF PROOF> P ONLY PET-DISMISSED IF P FAILS TO MEET BURDEN OF PROOF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PREPOND. OF EVID. BURDEN OF PROOF> P ONLY PET-DISMISSED IF P FAILS TO MEET BURDEN OF PROOF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WRIT OF AMPARO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BURDEN OF PROOF: P AND R PET-NOT DISMISSED BUT ARCHIVED IF... WRIT OF AMPARO WRIT OF HABEAS DATA SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BURDEN OF PROOF: P AND R PET-DISMISSED IF P FAILS TO MEET BURDEN OF PROOF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA ORDINARY DILIGENCE
ORDINARY DILIGENCE ORDINARY DILIGENCE PUBLIC Rs> EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE GENERAL DENIAL OK PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY GENERALLY OK CONSTLAND STATUTORY RIGHTS PROTECTED GENERAL DENIAL OK GEN. DENIAL PROHIBITED
GENERAL DENIAL PROHIBITED PRES. OF REGULARITY OK RIGHT TO INFORMATION IN LIFE, LIBERTY & SECURITY
PRES. OF REGULARITY NO PRES. OF OK REGULARITY RIGHT TO LIBERTY RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY & SECURITY
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CHAPTER VI. PRESS COVERAGE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, SUB JUDICE AND CONTEMPT
We do not want a press that is free, more or less, just as we should not tolerate trials that are almost fair The paradox is that neither value can be absolute, yet we cannot accept the diminution of either one. Alfred Friendly and Ronald Goldfarb, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967).
Press coverage of court proceedingsCompeting rights and interests

The State; The Accused; The Victim; The Public; The Press; The Witnesses.
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A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property. Craig v. Henry, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). The right of the accused to a public trial The Constitution guarantees thatthe accusedshall enjoy the righttoapublic trial. The words usedare clearand therefore should be given literal application. The trial must be open to public attendance. Anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in the courtroom is free to do so....His being a stranger to the litigation is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Electronic Media Live Coverage of Court Proceedings, Lawyers Review Magazine. The right to a public trial is a deterrent to arbitrariness The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that the accused is thereby afforded further protection that his trial will be conducted with regularity, and that it will not be tainted with any impropriety. Delegate Laurelsingled out its deterrence to arbitrariness. Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Electronic Media Live Coverage of Court Proceedings, Lawyers Review Magazine. The benefits of a public trial [P]ublic trial provides the assurance that the proceedings are conducted with fairness to all concerned; it discourages perjury, misconduct of the participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Electronic Media Live Coverage of Court Proceedings, Lawyers Review Magazine. Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo, The Press in Legal Proceedings, Lawyers Review, April 30, 1994 issue: It thus seems clear that members of the press, being part of the general public, should not, as a rule, be denied access to court proceedings. As statedinRichmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (448 U.S. 555 [1980]):
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xxx a trial courtroom is a public place where the people and the representatives of media, generally, have a right to be present, and where their presence has been historically thought to enhance the integrity and the quality of what takes place. Qualified privilege to report on legal proceedings Art. 354, RPC: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown to exist, except: xxx 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The right to public trial and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern Complementing the constitutional right of an accused to public trial is the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, so solemnly recognizes: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records and to documents, as well as government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression... goes hand in hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well [as] checking abuse in government. Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. 74930 (1989).
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The watchdog function of the press Theinvolvement [of the press] in the legal process as observer, commentator and critichascontributed immensely in exposing wrong-doing and corruption, in aiding the detection of the guilty and in throwing the limelight of publicity on matters affecting the government and its administration. The press serves as one of the instruments by which the right of the people to information on matters of public concern is actualized. For the public in general and litigants in particular, this watchdog function of the pressbecomes all the more important during the conduct of trials. As Chief Justice Castro put it, the judge while trying a case will be conscious that he is likewise under trial. John Lofton points out that, (a)part from its overt activity, the press exerts a considerable influence merely by existing, since officials are conscious of the possibility that at some point a reporter may be asking for an explanation of their conduct. Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo, The Press in Legal Proceedings, Lawyers Review, April 30, 1994 citing Arsenio Solidum, Trial by Publicity, U.E. Law Journal, Vol. I [October], p. 399, 1959
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A witness has the right: To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanour; Not to be examined except on pertinent matters; Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless provided by law; Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it is the very issue in the case; and To privacy.
Can the press air court proceedings live?

One view Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Electronic Media Live Coverage of Court Proceedings, Lawyers Review Magazine. The right of media, particularlythe electronic media, to cover live court proceedings is also within the protective mantle of Section 4 of the Bill of Rightsthat no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. In the Philippines, no serious move has been undertaken to explore the educative potential of live electronic coverage of court proceedings While we cannot rule out entirely the risk of media sensationalization and undue publicitythe responseshould not be the arbitrary ban of live TV and radio coverage of court trials, but to prescribe rules for the conduct of mediamenand to regulate the manner of reporting them to the public. But the Supreme Court saw it otherwise in A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC RE: REQUEST FOR RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
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AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, JUNE 29, 2001 Majority View Television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant: Prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses; May also affect the judges performance; Trial by publicity; and Carnival-like atmosphere instead of the judicial atmosphere and decorum required for a fair and impartial trial.
Citing its previous resolution in the libel case of the late President Corazon Aquino against Luis Beltran, the Majority held: A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC, citing ESTES v. TEXAS: Experiencehas established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of court influences which might affect their testimony.
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Telecasting not only increases the trial judges responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC, MAJORITY OPINION: Live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed because of: 1. The prejudice it poses to the defendants right to due process; 2. The danger it poses to the fair and orderly administration of justice; and also because 3. The freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means. The rule is: Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. Dissenting opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato Puno Live radio-TV coverage of a criminal trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right, but its absolute denial is also constitutionally suspect. The matter of whether or not the proceedings in a criminal trial should be televised, totally or partially, should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge on a case to case basis. The exercise of the judges discretion will depend on the facts of each case and will involve the delicate balancing of:
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The constitutional right to a fair trial;
Due process of law; The right of the press and the public of access to trials in criminal cases; The right of the state to prosecute crimes effectively; and The duty of courts to ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice.
...No witness, especially a witness for the accused, upon his written objection, should be compelled to have his testimony televised. In balancing the above rights, the judge should deny the motion to televise trial upon specific proof of prejudice and of reasonable likelihood that the right to a fair trial of the accused will be endangered. Additionally, it shall be the duty of the trial judge to provide and impose the necessary rules and regulations to assure that the televised trial will not detract from the solemnity, decorum and dignity of the court. Among others, the rules and regulations should insure that: 1. The television cameras and related equipment must: Be unobstrusive; Not produce distracting sounds; and Not in any manner interfere with the proceedings. The media representatives should: Present a neat appearance in keeping with the dignity of the proceedings; and Not move unnecessarily about the court while it is in session. No film, videotape, photography and audio reproductions may be used for advertising or commercial purposes; Only a single fixed camera set-up shall be installed in the courtroom and the audio-visual output of the fixed set-up will be fed only to broadcast stations to avoid too many
2.
3.
4.
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photographers and TV camera crew in the courtroom; and 5. That radio-television broadcasters should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense.
The trial judge should be given the power at any time to terminate the televised proceedings upon a showing that the right to a fair trial of the accused is being prejudiced by its continuance. Some thoughts on live coverage Radio and television are the primary source of news for our people. Excluding cameras from the courtroom deprives citizens of easily available first-hand knowledge of a fundamental expression of our democracy. Television can educate the public. Especially in a multi-cultural society, television can increase understanding of the legal system. Television opens trials to public scrutiny. Knowledge that a trial may be televised could encourage judges and lawyers to be better prepared, and witnesses to prepare and testify better. Potential witnesses viewing a trial might be encouraged to come forward to contradict misleading testimony. A televised trial could enhance the perception of the fairness of the trial and the judgment. Only a well-informed public can participate fully in the justice system. Live coverage Keeps court proceedings transparent, and judges and lawyers honest and better prepared;
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Promotes access to justice; Makes public officials accountable to the people; Actualizes the peoples right to information on matters of public concern, and Performs a valuable educative function, especially in our society where the legal system is a closed system.
We broadcast legislative hearings and executive proceedings, but not court proceedings. The courts are the last closed expression of democracy. Openness Television can provide a full record of proceedings; Citizens can watch the proceedings directly, without having to rely on the perceptions of others [reporters and other observers] who may be biased or have their own agenda.
Judge Ramon P. Makasiar, Electronic Media Live Coverage of Court Proceedings, Lawyers Review Magazine: The educative effect of public attendance is a material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which would never be inspired by a system of secrecy. To work effectively, it is important that societys judicial processes satisfy the appearance of justice and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing the people to observe it.... [O]pen proceedings enhance the performance of all involved, protect the judge from malicious imputation of dishonesty, and serve to educate the public.
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The constitutional recognition of the right of the people to information on matters of public concern serves to ban the government from denying to the people access to information which affect their lives, except in a few well defined and limited [situations]. Made to operate on judicial proceedings, this right will augment the confidence of the citizens in their justice system.
The Sub judice Rule

1. The Contempt Power 2. The Sub judice Rule, Past and Present 3. Leading case: People v. Godoy 4. The Great Divide between the Law and Practice of Sub judice Sub judice = Latin for under the law The Sub judice Rule limits comment and disclosure relating to judicial proceedings in order not to prejudge the issue, influence the court, or obstruct the administration of justice. Violation of the Sub judice Rule may make you liable for contempt of court. Lawyers, litigants, witnesses are covered by the rule. Media practitioners too, even if they never stepped into the courtroom. Applies not only to pending cases but even to cases that have already become final. [I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
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prejudice or sympathies. ROMERO v. ESTRADA, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009. PEOPLE V. GODOY, G.R. 15908-09, MARCH 29, 1995 RESOLUTION: The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: 1. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect, or... to scandalize the court; or 2. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. Complainant: Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. for indirect contempt against: Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times.
The complaint arose from an article written by Reynoso, Jr. in his column, On the Beat, and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of the Palawan Times. The judge in his complaint alleged that the article: Tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; Contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; Not only casts aspersions on his integrity and honesty as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively
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and impartially, but is also an imputation that he is biased and prejudges cases filed before him; and Is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr.s defense: The article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because it was published after complainant judge had already promulgated his decision; It will not affect or influence the Supreme Courts review of the case since the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; and It was written in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon: The article is no longer sub judice; it was published after the judge had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the case; The article is not contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; It is fair criticism; It constitutes a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; and De Leon also argued that she cannot be held liable because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or personal connection with, the authorship or publication of the allegedly contemptuous article as she had just returned from the United States when it was published.
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The Supreme Court held: No contempt, but merely fair criticism. Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal reasonable doubt burden and the civil fair preponderance burden. IN RE EMIL P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, appellant, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995. Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case..(S)currilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proceedings [are actionable]. The original doctrinein People v. Alarcon that there is no contempt if there is no pending case has been abandoned in subsequent rulings of this Court From the column of Atty. Emil Jurado: When lawyers speak of the Magnificent Seven, one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makatis Magnificent Seven are a bunch of Makati regional trial court judges who fix drug related cases. The Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court consists of a group of justices who vote as one. (T)here isnot a shred of proof [of this accusation]the volumes of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)for the year 1992 (January to December) and for January 1993 divulge not a single non-unanimous decision or resolution where
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seven (7) justices voted as one, nor any group of decisions or resolutions where the recorded votes would even suggest the existence of such a cabal. This is yet another accusation which Jurado is unable to substantiate other thanby invoking unnamed and confidential sources which he claims he considers highly credible and reliable and which would be imperiled by elaborating on the information furnished by them. He would justify reliance on those sources on grounds of necessity, custom and usage and claim the protection of Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477 from forced, revelation of confidential news sources except when demanded by the security of the state. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those sources. If the information is not verifiable, and it is derogatory of any third party, then it ought not to be published for obvious reasons. It would be unfair to the subject of the report, who would be without means of refuting the imputations against him. And it would afford an unscrupulous journalist a ready device by which to smear third parties without the obligation to substantiate his imputations by merely claiming that the information had been given to him in confidence.
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CHAPTER VII. LIBEL: Parameters and Perimeters
Definition
A method of defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs. In its most general sense, any publication that is injurious to the reputation of another. A false and unprivileged publication in writing of defamatory material. Blacks Law Dictionary A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Article 353, Revised Penal Code
Nature
CIVIL CRIMINAL If a person is prosecuted and found guilty of the crime of libel, s/he may suffer imprisonment of from six months one day to four years and two months (criminal liability) or be required to pay a fine (civil liability), or both.
Administrative Circular No. 08-2008

The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
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imperatives of justice. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
Essential elements
Defamatory Imputation An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Presumption Where the acts imputed concern the private life of the individual, this intent is presumed to arise from the publication of defamatory matter, because no one has a right to invade anothers privacy; but where the imputation is based upon public interest, the presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the mere publication of the defamatory matter. People of the Phil. vs Velasco [1941] Malice A term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted by personal ill-will or spite, and speaks merely in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. People v De los Reyes [1949] Malice or ill will must be proved malice in fact; or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation malice in law.
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Malice in Fact May be shown by proof of ill-will, hatred, or purpose to injure. Malice in Law Is presumed from a defamatory imputation. Presumption of Malice The law also presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation. Thus, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. Paragraph 2 refers to a qualifiedly privileged communication, the character of which is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the accused. Once it is established that the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. When this is accomplished the defense of privilege becomes unavailing. [Santos v. Court of Appeals, No. L-45031, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 110, 114]
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Made Public Publication Communication of the defamatory matter to some third person or persons; To make public, to make known to people in general, to bring before the public.
Identifiable victim Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article; Not necessary that the person be named.
Two types of libel Libel Per Se or on the face More direct; Libel comes from the words used or chosen; Usually characterizations or descriptions.
Libel Per Quod or by circumstance Less obvious; Usually hidden, though not always advertently; Words chosen or used are not libelous per se but their attachment to certain circumstances makes them defamatory.
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Examples Libel per se That man is a racist pig. That lawyer is a crook. She is ugly. Libel per quod John and Nancy were seen leaving the motel together. Jessica, who has a reputation, denied sleeping with Robert, but never denied sleeping with Bob.
Main defenses
Truth Is not an element of libel. Libel in general: Truth is not a defense; in cases of privileged communication, truth is not a defense either. Truth is not a defense if there is malice. Truth is a defense only if libel is against a public officer in the performance of his official duty based on Article 361.
Absolute privileged communication Not actionable even if malicious. Examples: Evidence given in court Statements made in a session of the legislature
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Qualified privileged communication Not actionable even if it contains defamatory imputations provided that it was made without malice or bad faith. Qualified privilege is lost by proof of malice
Public official/figure If any person seeks the `spotlight of the stage of public prominence then he must be prepared to accept the errors of the searching beams of the glow thereof, for only in such rays can the public know what role he plays on the stage of public concern. NY Times v. Sullivan
Other defenses
Doctrines related to privileged communication Doctrine of Fair Comment Privileged Fair Criticism Neutral Reportage
Retraction Doctrine of fair comment Comment to be fair must attack only actions and not the person. Elements: Relate to public interest; Must relate not to a person but to his acts; Must be based on facts truly stated;
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Must be the honest expression of the writers opinion on the facts which appear in the publication.
Effects of Mere Errors Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. Baguio Midland Courier v CA [2004] Neutral reportage Involving matters of public interest or public figures; A republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republishers subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation; Privilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an existing controversy, and a party to that controversy makes the defamatory statement. Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. v AMEC [2005]
Retraction published to correct a mistake does not wipe out the responsibility arising from defamatory publication but it mitigates the amount of damages Lopez v. CA 34 SCRA 117 [1970]
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Prescription
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel or other similar offense shall prescribe in one year. This period of one year will commence to run under Article 91 from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,or their agents.
Venue
The venue of printing and first publication, or place of residence of the private offended party or place where the public officer holds office, at the time of the commission of the crime, vests jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in libel cases. If the Information for libel does not establish with particularity any of these two venue requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal case. Francisco Chavez et al., v C.A. et al [2007]
Persons liable
Author Editors Publishers
Chilling effect
Any practice or law that has the effect of seriously dissuading the exercise of a constitutional right, such as freedom of speech.
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CHAPTER VIII: COVERING THE AMPATUAN MASSACRE TRIALS
Journalism stories do not fall from the sky, and neither are they the products of imagination. Because journalism is about literal truth, the stories journalists produce must always have a factual basis. Unlike the writer of fiction, the journalist cannot present as a living person an imagined character that is a composite of people he has known. The people he reports on must be real, as should the things that happen to them, when they happened, where, why and how. The five Wsthe what, who, when, where and whyas well as the Hthe howin journalism are the basic questions any story has to answer in affirmation of the fact that what journalism is about are real people and real events. To write about real people and real events, the journalist is assigned to a regular place of assignment, or a beat, where, through a press conference, a media advisory, a speech or some other source, s/he may obtain the information that can be the basis of a story, whether a news report, a feature story, an investigative or explanatory report, a news analysis, or a column, editorial and other commentary. S/he can also be given an assignment by his or her editors, who, while following the news, had noted an aspect of an event that has not been written on, and which s/he thinks can be of interest and relevance to readers (or viewers and listeners). But the journalist need not always look to the usual sources in the beat or wait for assignments. His/her own knowledge and experience in covering the beat and a particular issue, personality, organization, or agency could lead him to the pursuit of stories. A reporter whos been covering the Ampatuan Massacre trials, for example, could on his own be led to look into the phenomenon of warlordism in the Philippines, or the privatization of governmenttrained and -funded paramilitary groups. To develop this skill, of which whats known as the nose for news is a basic part, the reporter must be familiar with the news values, of which there are five: timeliness, significance,
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prominence, proximity, and human interest. A word of caution, however. Among the conventional news values the emphasis on prominence, proximity, and human interest can overwhelm the more critical value of significance or relevance.
Why cover the Ampatuan Massacre?

The Ampatuan Massacre of November 23, 2009 was the worst incident of its kind in Philippine press and media history: 32 journalists and media workers out of the 58 victims were killed in that one incident alone, boosting the number of journalists killed in the line of duty in the Philippines from 82 at the time of the incident to 114. The Massacre occurred in the context of the culture of impunity, or the exemption from punishment of most of the killers and masterminds in the killing of journalists and media workers. The number of journalists killed in the Massacre was significant: If the killers and masterminds were to elude punishment, it would send a very strong signal that the killings can continue without the killers and masterminds fearing punishment. In addition, the Massacre implied that certain areas under warlord rule, where government-funded and-trained security forces have been privatized, are beyond the national governments control. The outcome of the trial could therefore indicate whether that assumption is correct, and could reestablish national government authority in warlord dominated areas.
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Aware of the significance of the Massacre and the trial of the alleged perpetrators, journalists need to bring to public attention the limitations and problems of the justice system both the Massacre and the trial have uncovered. These issues have an impact not only on the progress of the Ampatuan Massacre trial, but on the entire justice system. Among these issues is the slow pace of the trial, despite the hearings being held twice a week. The crucial role of witnesses in either convicting or exonerating individuals accused of certain crimes including mass murder, and the importance of the governments Witness Protection Program as a result, has also been highlighted, and together with it, the need for forensics training among the countrys law enforcement agencies. The extent to which the pursuit of justice has been compromised by technical issues has also emerged as a major issue, as has the extent of warlord power and influence not only in their respective turfs but even in the justice system itself, including the conditions of certain suspects detention. Already well known is the role of local politics as a major factor in the killing and harassment of journalists, in addition to its being a major source of corruption in the communities.
Areas of Coverage
The day to day progress of the trial and related events are of course the primary reportorial responsibility. The testimonies of witnesses, the pleas of guilt or innocence, the motions of both the defense and the prosecution, the judges rulings on various issues brought before the court, the slain journalists relatives reactions, etc., need to be reported after every hearing. In addition, however, in depth articles can also be generated. Explanatory articles, for example, can discuss the meaning of the judges rulings, or the strategies of the prosecution and the defense, or explain the judicial process as well as the meaning of certain legal terms. Equally important is the contextualization of
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both the Massacre itself, and the most recent developments in the trial. A story on the antiquated rules of court, the shortfall of prosecutors in the prosecutorial services, and the ensuing heavy case loads of the courts and government prosecutors would also be helpful in deepening public understanding of why the trial has been proceeding slowly. Other story topics could include: Predicting what comes next; Possible consequences of trial outcome; Judicial reforms; and Strengthening the Witness Protection Program.
Taking precautions
The journalist covering trials can easily fall into committing ethical and even legal lapses. It is important for the journalist to keep in mind such legal pitfalls as sub judice, which could subject him or her to a contempt of court citation, or libel. It is equally important for the journalist to keep ethics in mind, among the more pertinent points being: The presumption of innocence. The journalist should not rush to judgment by declaring a suspect or accused person guilty. S/he must presume them innocent until or unless proven otherwise; It is also necessary for the journalist to be fair and balanced in his reporting; and Neither should s/he mix opinion with news. If commenting on events in the news, the journalists must at least forewarn listeners and viewers that what follows is opinion.
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ANNEXES
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC
IN RE EMIL [EMILIANO] P. JURADO EX REL.: PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY [PLDT] PER ITS FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, MR. VICENTE R. SAMSON, Appellant, A. M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995 NARVASA, C.J.: Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading and derogatory of the courts and individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar that which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order. 1. Basic Postulates To resolve the issue raised by those facts, application of fairly elementary and self-evident postulates is all that is needed, these being: (1) that the utterance or publication by a person of falsehood or half-truths, or of slanted or distorted versions of facts or accusations which he made no bona fide effort previously to verify, and which he does not or disdains to prove, cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be deemed an activity shielded from sanction by that
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constitutional guaranty; (2) that such utterance or publication is also violative of The Philippine Journalists Code of Ethics which, inter alia, commands the journalist to scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis, and makes it his duty to air the other side and to correct substantive errors promptly;1 (3) that such an utterance or publication, when it is offensive to the dignity and reputation of a Court or of the judge presiding over it or degrades or tends to place the courts in disrepute and disgrace or otherwise to debase the administration of justice, constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such after due proceedings; and (4) that prescinding from the obvious proposition that any aggrieved party may file a complaint to declare the utterer or writer in contempt, the initiation of appropriate contempt proceedings against the latter by the court is not only its prerogative but indeed its duty, imposed by the overmastering need to preserve and protect its authority and the integrity, independence and dignity of the nations judicial system. 2. Antecedents This proceeding treats of Emiliano P. Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally happens to be a lawyer, remarking that while he values his membership in the law profession, such membership is neither a critical nor indispensable adjunct in the exercise of his occupation as a newspaperman.2 His column in the Manila Standard is entitled Opinion. Jurado had been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months [from about October, 1992 to March, 1993]. Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same
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time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. In light of these abnormal developments, the Chief Justice took an extraordinary step. He issued Administrative Order No. 1193 dated January 25, 1993, Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary,3 reading as follows: WHEREAS, the Courts attention has been drawn to the many and persistent rumors and unverified reports respecting corruption in the judiciary, said rumors and reports not only having been mentioned by media and in anonymous communications, but having also been adverted to by certain government officials and civic leaders. NOW, THEREFORE, by authority of the Court, an Ad Hoc Committee is hereby constituted composed of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and former Justices of the Court, Hon. Lorenzo Relova and Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as Members, which shall seek to ascertain the truth respecting said reports and statements, and to this end, forthwith interview at closed-door sessions or otherwise, such persons as may appear to it to have some knowledge of the matter and who may be appealed to, to share that knowledge with the Court, and otherwise gather such evidence as may be available. The Committee is hereby authorized to use such facilities and personnel of the court as may be necessary or convenient in the fulfillment of its assigned mission, and shall submit its report to the Court within thirty [30] days. Material to the present inquiry are Jurados published statements from late 1992 to the middle of February, 1993. 1. In his column of October 21, 1992, he wrote of [j]udges in a number of Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila [who] have become so notorious in their dealings with litigants and lawyers that they are now called the Magnificent Seven.
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He stated that [i]t has come to a point where lawyers and litigants try their darndest to stay away from these judges. The answer, of course, is obvious. 2. In his February 3, 1993 column, he adverted to another group, also named Magnificent Seven, which, he said, should be distinguished from the first. He wrote: When lawyers speak of the Magnificent Seven, one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makatis Magnificent Seven are a bunch of Makati regional trial court judges who fix drug-related cases. The Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court consists of a group of justices who vote as one.4 3. Aside from the Magnificent Seven, he also wrote about a group which he dubbed the Dirty Dozen. In his column of October 21, 1992, he said that there are 12 judges who have acquired such reputation for graft and corruption that they are collectively known as the dirty dozen. These judges, I am told, are not satisfied with accepting bribes; they actually sell their decisions to the litigants and solicit their bids for what is clearly an auction for the judges decision. According to him, the most corrupt judges now are Makatis Dirty Dozen judges, supplanting some of those from Pasay, Pasig and Quezon City; corruption in lower courts had been admitted by an Executive Judge in a Metro Manila Regional Trial Court [column of November 9, 1992]; and because the Dirty Dozen had given Makati the reputation of having the most corrupt RTC in the country, multi-nationals and financing institutions explicitly stipulate in their agreements that litigation in connection with these contracts may be held anywhere in Metro Manila except in Makati; and lawyers confirm that Makati Judges, including some persons in the sheriff s office, are the most corrupt, where before, Pasay and Quezon City had that dubious distinction [column of December 1, 1992]. 4. In his November 9, 1992 column, he wrote about a former appellate justice [who] holds office at a restaurant near the Court of Appeals building. He is known as the contact man
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of five CA divisions. Lawyers say that this former jurist really delivers. In his column of January 29, 1993, he adverted to the same unnamed former Justice as being known for fixing cases for five CA divisions [that is what he tells lawyers and litigants] for a fee. And if the price is right, the lawyer of the litigant paying can even write his own decision using a CA justice as ponente. This ex-justice holds court at the mezzanine of a restaurant owned by the wife of a former Marcos cabinet member and which has become a meeting place for judges, CA justices, practicing lawyers, prosecutors and even Supreme Court justices. The former CA justice also has his own Chinese contact. After I exposed this last year, the habitues became scarce. But they are back again, and the ex-justice is still-doing brisk business. 5. In his column of March 24, 1993, he made the claim that one can get a temporary restraining order from a regional trial court in Metro-Manila by paying the judge anywhere between P30,000.00 and P50,000.00. Other columns of Jurado refer to: (a) a police from the South Capital Command [to the effect] that 8 Makati judges were paid for decisions favoring drugtraffickers and other big-time criminals, naming the judges and giving detailed accounts of the bribery [January 30, 1993]; (b) a bank, later identified by him as the Equitable Banking Corporation [Ermita Branch] which had hosted a lunch at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners [January 12, 1993];5 (c) the lady secretary of an RTC Judge in Makati who allegedly makes sure, for a fee of P10,000.00 or more, depending on how much money is at stake, that a case is raffled off to a Judge who will be extremely sympathetic, and can arrange to have the Court issue attachments or injunctions for a service fee of 1% over and above the regular premium of the attachment or injunction bond; a Chinese-Filipino businessman who paid this miracle worker P300,000.00 on top of the regular premium on the attachment/injunction
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bond [October 27, 1992]; (d) Executive Judge de la Rosa, who has unilaterally decided to discard the rule that cases seeking provisional remedies should be raffled off to the judges, thus, violating the rule that no case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without a raffle [January 28, 1993]; (e) the Secretary of the Judicial and Bar Council [JBC] who had supposedly gotten that body to nominate him to the Court of Appeals; and a son and a nephew of JBC members, who were also nominated to the Court of Appeals, contrary to ethics and delicadeza [January l6, 1993; and January 29, 1993]; (f ) what he denominates a major determinant of promotion, i.e., having a relative in the JBC or the Supreme Court, or having a powerful politician as sponsor, citing specifically, the following nominees to the Court of Appeals Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and namesake of the Ombudsman and brother of the head of the Presidential Management Staff; Rosalio de la Rosa, nephew of Justice Relova and cousin of Chief Justice Narvasa; and the fact that nomination of some worthy individuals was blocked because they incurred the ire of the powers that be, e.g., Judge Maximiano Asuncion, Quezon City RTC, and Raul Victorino, closely identified with former Senate President Salonga [January 25, 1993]. 3. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar What may be called the seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992 in the so-called controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. [ETPI], G. R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.6 A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed in respondents behalf on September 16, 1992, which has recently been resolved. In connection with this case, G. R. No. 94374, the Philippine
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Daily Inquirer and one or two other newspapers published on January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. [ETPI], to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel;7 As might be expected, the Yerkes revelations spawned more public discussion and comment about the judiciary and the Supreme Court itself, much of it unfavorable. There were calls for impeachment of the justices, for resignation of judges. There were insistent and more widespread reiterations of denunciations of incompetence and corruption in the judiciary. Another derogatory epithet for judges was coined and quickly gained currency: Hoodlums in Robes. It was at about this time and under these circumstances, particularly the furor caused by the Yerkes opinion that the PLDT decision was authored by a PLDT lawyer, that Jurado wrote in his column on February 8, 1993, an item entitled, Who will judge the Justices? referring among other things to[a] report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren [a total of 36 persons] spent a vacation in Hong Kong some time last year, and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a pubic utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm.8 This was the event that directly gave rise to the proceeding at bar. a. Letter and Affidavit of PLDT For shortly afterwards, on February 10, 1993, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, First Vice President of the PLDT [Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company], addressed a letter to the Chief Justice,
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submitting his sworn statement in confutation of the item in the column of Mr. Emil P. Jurado of the Manila Standard on a vacation trip supposedly taken by six Justices with their families last year, and requesting that the Court take such action as may be appropriate. In his affidavit, Samson made the following averments:9 xxx xxx xxx While the name of the public utility which supposedly financed the alleged vacation of the justices in Hongkong has not been disclosed in the Jurado column, the publication thereof, taken in relation to the spate of recent newspaper reports alleging that the decision of the Supreme Court, penned by Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case involving the PLDT and Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was supposedly ghost-written by a lawyer of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or unfair inference that Emil Jurado is alluding to PLDT in the said column; and this, in fact, was the impression or perception of those who talked to me and the other officers of the PLDT after having read the Jurado column; 4. In as much as the PLDT case against Eastern Telecommunications Philippines is still sub-judice, since the motions for reconsideration filed by the losing litigants therein, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. and NTC are still pending before the Court, we have tried to refrain from making any public comments on these matters, lest any statement we make be interpreted to be an attempt on our part to unduly influence the final decision of the Supreme Court in the above-described case. However, in the interest of truth and justice, PLDT is compelled to emphatically and categorically declare that it is not the public utility firm referred to in the Jurado column and that specifically, it has never paid for any such trip, hotel or other accommodations for any justice of the Supreme Court or his family during their vacation, if any, in Hongkong last year. It is not even aware that any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred to in the Jurado column; 5. I further state that neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor anyone in his
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behalf has ever spoken to me or any other responsible officer of PLDT about the matter quoted in Par. 2 hereof; 6. PLDT further emphatically and categorically denies that it had ever talked to or made arrangements with any travel agency or any person or entity in connection with any such alleged trip of the justices and their families to Hongkong, much less paid anything therefor to such agencies, fully or in part, in the year 1992 as referred to in Par. 2 hereinabove; 7. The travel agencies which PLDT patronizes or retains for the trips, hotels or other accommodations of its officers and employees are: a. Philway Travel Corporation M-7 Prince Tower Cond. Tordesillas St., Salcedo Village Makati, Metro Manila b. Citi-World Travel Mart Corp. Suite 3-4 Ramada Midtown Arcade M. Adriatico Street Ermita, Manila. The records of these travel agencies will bear out the fact that no arrangements were made by them at the instance of PLDT for the trip referred to in the Jurado column. b. Affidavit of Atty. William Veto The Samson affidavit was followed by another submitted to the Court by Atty. William Veto, the In-house counsel of Equitable Banking Corporation since 1958, subscribed and sworn to on February 10, 1993, in relation to another article of Jurado.[10] Veto deposed that on Tuesday, January 5, 1993, he had hosted a lunch party at the Officers Lounge, 7th Floor of the Equitable Banking Corporation Building, Ermita Branch upon prior permission obtained; that the expenses for said party were exclusively from my personal funds and the food was prepared in my house by my wife and served by my house help and four [4] waiters hired from the nearby Barrio Fiesta Restaurant; that among the
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invited guests were members of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who were my friends of forty years since our days in law school; and that the party was held in the lounge of the bank instead of in my residence unlike in former years because my birthday happened to fall on a working day and my friends from the Equitable Banking Corporation suggested that I hold it there [at the lounge] for their convenience because my residence is far from downtown. However, this birthday luncheon of Atty. Veto was reported in Jurados column [in the Manila Standard issues of January 12 and 28, 1993] as having been hosted [by the Equitable Bank] at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners. And upon this premise, Jurado indulged in the following pontification: When those in the judiciary fraternize this way, what chances before the courts do other lawyers, who are not batang club, have against others who belong to the fraternity? In the case of prosecutors and fiscals, what chances do opposing counsels have against those in the fraternity? [column of January 12, 1993]. c. Information from Ad Hoc Committee At about this time, too, the Court received information from the Ad Hoc Committee [created by Administrative Order No. 11-93] to the following effect: (1) that by letter dated February 1, 1993, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee extended an invitation to Atty. Emiliano Jurado to appear before it at 2 oclock in the afternoon of February 4, 1993 to give the Committee information that will assist it in its task, i.e., to definitely and accurately determine the facts as regards the published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary; (2) that despite receipt of this letter by a responsible individual at the business address of Jurado, the latter failed to appear at the time and place indicated; that instead, in his column in the issue of Manila Standard of February 4, 1993, Jurado stated that he was told he was being summoned by the Ad Hoc Committee, but there is really no need to summon me. The committee can go
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by the many things I have written in my column about corruption in the judiciary. Many of these column items have been borne out by subsequent events. (3) that another letter was sent by the Chairman to Jurado, dated February 5, 1993, reiterating the Committees invitation, viz.: It is regretted that you failed to respond to the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee to appear at its session of February 4, 1992. All indications are that you are the person with the most knowledge about corruption in the judiciary and, hence, appear to be best positioned to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its function of obtaining evidence or leads, on the matter. You have, I believe, expressed more than once, the laudable desire that the judiciary rid itself of the incompetents and the misfits in its ranks, and we believe you will want to help the Court do precisely that, by furnishing the Committee with competent evidence, testimonial or otherwise. Clearly, the purging process cannot be accomplished without proof, testimonial or otherwise, as you must no doubt realize, being yourself a lawyer. We would like you to know that the Ad Hoc Committee created by Administrative Order No. 11-93 is simply a factfinding body. Its function is evidence-gathering. Although possessed of the authority to maintain and enforce order in its proceedings and to compel obedience to its processes, it is not an adjudicative body in the sense that it will pronounce persons guilty or innocent, or impose sanctions on the basis of such proofs as may be presented to it. That function is reserved to the Supreme Court itself, in which it is lodged by the Constitution and the laws. Thus, at the conclusion of its evidence-gathering mission, the Ad Hoc Committee will submit its report and recommendations to the Court which will then take such action as it deems appropriate. The Ad Hoc Committee has scheduled hearings on the 11th and 12th of February, 1993. Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. will preside as Chairman at these hearings since I will be unable to do so in view of earlier commitments. We reiterate
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our invitation that you come before the Committee, and you may opt to appear either on the 11th or 12th of February, 1993, at 2 oclock in the afternoon. (4) that notwithstanding receipt of this second letter by a certain Mr. Gerry Gil of the Manila Standard, Jurado still failed to appear. 4. Statement of the Case: Resolutions and Pleadings a. Resolution of the February 16, 1993 After considering all these circumstances, the Court by Resolution dated February 16, 1993, ordered: (1) that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the PLDT herein mentioned be duly docketed and hereafter considered and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Atty. Emil Jurado herein specified are true; (2) that the Clerk of Court send copies of the PLDT letter and affidavit, and of the affidavit of Atty. William Veto to Atty. Emil Jurado, c/o the Manila Standard, Railroad & 21 Streets, Port Area, Manila; and copies of the same PLDT letter and affidavit, to Philway Travel Corporation, M-7 Prince Tower Cond., Tordesillas St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila; and Citi-World Travel Mart Corp., Suite 3-4 Ramada Midtown Arcade, M. Adriatico Street, Ermita, Manila; (3) that within five [5] days from their receipt of notice of this Resolution and of copies of the PLDT letter and affidavit, the Philway Travel Corporations and the Citi-World Travel Mart Corporation each FILE A SWORN STATEMENT affirming or denying the contents of the PLDT affidavit; and (4) that within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of notice of this Resolution and of copies of said PLDT letter and affidavit and of the affidavit of Atty. Veto, Atty. Emil Jurado file a comment on said affidavits as well as the allegations made by him in his columns, herein specified, in which he shall make known to the Court the factual or evidentiary bases of said allegations.
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b. Jurados Comment dated March 1, 1993. As directed, Jurado filed his comment dated March 1, 1993. He explained that he had not snubbed the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee, it being in fact his desire to cooperate in any investigation on corruption in the judiciary as this was what his columns have always wanted to provoke. What had happened, according to him, was that the first invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee was routed to his desk at the Manila Standard office on the day of the hearing itself, when it was already impossible to cancel previous professional and business appointments; and the second invitation, if it was ever received by his office, was never routed to him; and he had yet to see it.11 If the impression had been created that he had indeed snubbed the Ad Hoc Committee, he sincerely apologizes. He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and reflect his beliefs, and there was no need to elaborate further on what he had written. He expressed his firm belief that justice can be administered only by a judicial system that is itself just and incorruptible, and the hope that this Court would view his response in this light. He also made the following specific observations: 1. The affidavit of Antonio Samson of the PLDT dated February 9, 1993 was an assertion of the affiants belief and opinion and he [Jurado] would not comment on it except to say that while Mr. Samson is entitled to his beliefs and opinions, these bind only him and the PLDT. 2. Atty. William Vetos affidavit substantially corroborated what he had written in vital details; hence, further substantiation would be a surplusage. In fact, the Supreme Court had confirmed the story in its press statement quoted by him [Jurado] in his January 30, 1993 column. His column about the Veto party constitutes fair comment on the public conduct of public officers. 3. The column about Executive Judge Rosalio de la Rosa
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merely summarized the position of Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores on the actuations of Judge de la Rosa and called the attention of the Court thereto. Judge Flores complaint, a copy of which had been sent to the Court Administrator, being meriting its attention. 4. The factual and evidentiary basis of his column of January 30, 1993 was the police report on seven [7] Makati judges authored by Chief Inspector Laciste Jr., of the Narcotics Branch of the RPIU, South CAPCOM, PNP, addressed to VicePresident Joseph E. Estrada, a copy of which he had received in the news room of the Manila Standard. The existence of the report had been affirmed by a reporter of the Manila Standard, Jun Burgos, when he appeared at the hearing of the Ad Hoc Committee on January 11, 1993. 5. His observations in his columns of January 6 and 29, 1993 regarding the nominations of relatives in the Judicial and Bar Council echo the public perception and constitute fair comment on a matter of great public interest and concern. 6. His columns with respect to the RTCs Magnificent Seven [October 20, 1992]; the RTC-Makatis Dirty Dozen [October 2, 1992, November 9, 1992, and December 1, 1992]; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court [February 3,1993];12 the lady secretary of an RTC Judge [October 27, 1992]; and the former Court of Appeals Justice fixing cases [January 29, 1993] were all based on information given to him in strict confidence by sources he takes to be highly reliable and credible; and he could not elaborate on the factual and evidentiary basis of the information without endangering his sources. By necessity and custom and usage, he relies, as a journalist, not only on first-hand knowledge but also on information from sources he has found by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot compromise these sources. He invokes Republic Act No. 53, as amended by R. A. No. 1477, exempting the publisher, editor or reporter of any publication from revealing the source of published news or information obtained in
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confidence, and points out that none of the matters subject of his columns has any bearing on the security of the state. c. Resolution of March 2, 1993 Subsequent to the Resolution of February 16, 1993 and before the filing of Jurados comment above- mentioned, the Court received the affidavits of the executive officials of the two travel agencies mentioned in the affidavit of PLDT Executive Vice-President Vicente R. Samson in relation to the Jurado column of February 8, 1993: that of Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr., President of the Citi-World Travel Mart Corporation, dated February 22, 1993, and that of Mrs. Marissa de la Paz, General Manager of Philway Travel Corporation, dated February 19, 1993. Both denied ever having made any travel arrangements for any of the Justices of the Supreme Court or their families to Hongkong, clearly and categorically belying the Jurado article. By Resolution dated March 2, 1993, the Court directed that Jurado be given copies of these two [2] affidavits and that he submit comment thereon, if desired, within ten [10] days from receipt thereof. d. Jurados Supplemental Comment with Request for Clarification In response, Jurado filed a pleading entitled Supplemental Comment with Request for Clarification dated March 15, 1993. In this pleading, he alleged that the sworn statements of Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr. and Mrs. Marissa de la Paz are affirmations of matters of their own personal knowledge; that he [Jurado] had no specific knowledge of the contents of these, let alone their veracity; and that the affidavits bind no one except the affiants and possibly the PLDT. He also sought clarification on two points as to the capacity in which he is being cited in these administrative proceedings whether as full time journalist or as a member of the bar, and why he is being singled out, from all his other colleagues in media who had also written about wrongdoings in the judiciary, and required to comment in a specific administrative matter before the Court sitting En Banc so that he might qualify his comment and/or assert his right and privileges.
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e. Resolution of March 18, 1993 Through another Resolution dated March 18, 1993, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to inform Jurado that the Resolutions of February 16 and March 2, 1993 had been addressed to him [according to his own depiction] in his capacity as a full-time journalist who coincidentally happens to be a member of the bar at the same time, and granted him fifteen [15] days from notice to qualify his comment and/or assert his rights and privileges in an appropriate manifestation or pleading. f. Jurados Manifestation Dated March 31, 1993 Again in response, Jurado filed a Manifestation under date of March 31, 1993. He moved for the termination of the proceeding on the following posited premises: 1. The court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist. 2. The present administrative matter is not a citation for (a) direct contempt as there is no pending case or proceeding out of which a direct contempt charge against him may arise, or (b) indirect contempt as no formal charge for the same has been laid before the court in accordance with Section 3 [Rule 71] of the Rules of Court. 3. His comments would be more relevant and helpful to the Court if taken together with the other evidence and reports of other journalists gathered before the Ad Hoc Committee. He perceives no reason why his comments should be singled out and taken up in a separate administrative proceeding. It is against this background of the material facts and occurrences that the Court will determine Jurados liability, if any, for the above mentioned statements published by him, as well as such action as may be appropriate in the premises, as the PLDT asks.
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5. Norms for Proper Exercise of Press Freedom a. Constitutional Law Norms In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez (166 SCRA 316 [1988)], the Court underscored the importance both of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the reality that there are fundamental and equally important public interests which need on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and the other. There, the Court stressed the importance of the public interest in the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The Court said:13 The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest. Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.
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The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. (Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 354-356 [1946]). Mr. Justice. Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms: The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the court. (In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930]). b. Civil Law Norms The Civil Code, in its Article 19, lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.14 It parallels too the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and
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which are expressed in three familiar Latin maxims: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere [to live honorably, not to injure others, and to render to every man his due].15 Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths this would not be to observe honesty and good faith; it may not be used to insult others; destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. this would not be to act with justice or give everyone his due. c. Philippine Journalists Code of Ethics Also relevant to the determination of the propriety of Jurados acts subject of the inquiry at bar are the norms laid down in The Philippine Journalists Code of Ethics. The Code was published in the issue of February 11, 1993 of the Manila Standard, for which Jurado writes, as part of the papers Anniversary Supplement. The first paragraph of the Code,16 and its corresponding annotations, read as follows: I. I shall scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by improper omission or emphasis. I recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly. 1. Scrupulous news gathering and beat coverage is required. Relying exclusively on the telephone or on what fellow reporters say happened at ones beat is irresponsible. 2. The ethical journalist does not bend the facts to suit his biases or to please benefactors. He gathers all the facts, forms a hypothesis, verifies it and arrives at an honest interpretation of what happened.
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3. The duty to air the other side means that the journalist must contact the person or persons against whom accusations are lodged. A court proceeding provides for this balance by presenting the prosecution and then the defense. A news story or editorial column that fails to present the other side is like a court that does not hear the side of the defense. 4. Correcting substantive errors is the mark of mature newspapers like the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune and some of Manilas papers. d. Right to Private Honor and Reputation In the present proceeding, there is also involved an acknowledged and important interest of individual persons: the right to private reputation. Judges, by becoming such, are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons.17 Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having thereby forfeited any right whatsoever to private honor and reputation. For so to rule will be simply, in the generality of cases, to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect as a human being in society, from becoming judges, with obviously grievous consequences for the quality of our judges and the quality of the justice that they will dispense. Thus, the protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free speech. Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges [and for that matter, all other public officials] in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly
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defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines.[17a] 6. Analysis of Jurado Columns a. Re Public Utility Firm Now, Jurados allegation in his column of February 8, 1993 that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren [a total of 36 persons] spent a vacation in Hong Kong some time last year and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip reportedly was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm, supra, is in the context of the facts under which it was made, easily and quickly perceived as a transparent accusation that the PLDT had bribed or rewarded six [6] justices for their votes in its favor in the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. [ETPI], G. R. No. 9437,18 by not only paying all their expenses i.e., hotel accommodations and all other expenses for the trip, but also by having one of its own travel agencies arrange for such a trip. As already stated, that allegation was condemned as a lie, an outright fabrication, by the PLDT itself, through one of its responsible officers, Mr. Vicente Samson, as well as by the heads of the two [2] travel agencies patronized by it, Ermin Garcia, Jr. and Marissa de la Paz, supra. That categorical denial logically and justly placed on Jurado the burden of proving the truth of his grave accusation, or showing that it had been made through some honest mistake or error committed despite good faith efforts to arrive at the truth, or if unable to do either of these things, to offer
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to atone for the harm caused. But the record discloses that Jurado did none of these things. He exerted no effort whatever to contest or qualify in any manner whatever the emphatic declaration of PLDT Vice-President Samson that While the name of the public utility which supposedly financed the alleged vacation of the Justices in Hongkong has not been disclosed in the Jurado column, the publication thereof, taken in relation to the spate of recent newspaper reports alleging that the decision of the Supreme Court, penned by Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., in the pending case involving the PLDT and Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. was supposedly ghost-written by a lawyer of PLDT, gives rise to the innuendo or unfair inference that Emil Jurado is alluding to PLDT in the said column; and, this in fact was the impression or perception of those who talked to me and the other officers of the PLDT after having read the Jurado column. The record shows that he made no effort whatsoever to impugn, modify, clarify or explain Samsons positive assertion that: The PLDT has never paid for any such trip, hotel or other accommodations for any justice of the Supreme Court or his family during their vacation, if any, in Hongkong last year. It is not even aware that any of the justices or their families have made the trip referred to in the Jurado column; Neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor any one in his behalf has ever spoken to me or any other responsible officer of PLDT about the matter; PLDT never talked to or made arrangements with any travel agency or any person or entity in connection with any such alleged trip of the Justices and their families to Hongkong, much less paid anything therefor to such agencies, fully or in part, in the year 1992 as referred to in Par. 2 hereinabove; What appears from the record is that without first having made an effort to talk to anyone from the PLDT or the Supreme Court
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to ascertain the veracity of his serious accusation, Jurado went ahead and published it. His explanation for having aired the accusation consists simply of a declaration that Samsons affidavit as well as the affidavits of the heads of the two travel agencies regularly patronized by it, were just assertions of the affiants belief and opinion; and that he [Jurado] would not comment on them except to say that while they are entitled to their beliefs and opinions, these were binding on them only. This is upon its face evasion of duty of the most cavalier kind; sophistry of the most arrant sort. What is made plain is that Jurado is in truth unable to challenge any of the averments in the affidavits of PLDT and its travel agencies, or otherwise substantiate his accusation, and that his is a mere resort to semantics to justify the unjustifiable. What is made plain is that his accusation is false, and possesses not even the saving grace of honest error. If relying on second-hand sources of information is, as the Journalists Code states, irresponsible, supra, then indulging in pure speculation or gossip is even more so; and a failure to present the other side is equally reprehensible, being what in law amounts to a denial of due process. b. Re Equitable Bank Party Jurado is also shown by the record to have so slanted his report of the birthday luncheon given by Atty. William Veto [the Inhouse counsel of Equitable Banking Corporation since 1958] as to project a completely false depiction of it. His description of that affair [in the Manila Standard issues of January 12 and 28, 1993] as having been hosted by the Equitable Bank at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law practitioners, carries the sanctimonious postscript already quoted, putting the rhetorical question about how such fraternization affects the chances in court of lawyers outside that charmed circle. When confronted with Vetos affidavit to the effect that the party was given by him at his [Vetos] own expense, the food having been prepared by his wife in his house, and served by his house help and waiters privately hired by him; that he had invited many persons including friends of long standing, among them Justices
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of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals; and that the party had been held in the Officers Lounge of Equitable Bank, instead of his home, as in years past, to suit the convenience of his guests because his birthday fell on a working day, Jurado could not, or would not deign to, contradict any of those statements. He merely stated that Vetos affidavit substantially corroborated what he had written in vital details, which is obviously far from correct. Most importantly, the record does not show that before he published that story, Jurado ever got in touch with Veto or anyone in Equitable Bank, Ermita Branch, to determine the accuracy of what he would later report. If he did, he would quickly have learned that his sources, whoever or whatever they were, were not to be relied upon. If he did not, he was gravely at fault at the very least for disregarding the Journalists Code of Ethics in failing to exert bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of his information. In either case, his publication of the slanted, therefore misleading and false, report of the affair is censurable. His proffered explanation that the justices having confirmed their presence at the luncheon, thus corroborating what he had written in vital details and making further substantiation unnecessary, and that his report constituted fair comment on the public conduct of public officers, obviously does not at all explain why a party given by Atty. Veto was reported by him as one tendered by Equitable Bank. The only conclusion that may rationally be drawn from these circumstances is that Jurado, unable to advance any plausible reason for the conspicuous divergence between what in fact transpired and what he reported, again resorts to semantics and sophistry to attempt an explanation of the unexplainable. Paraphrasing the Code of Ethics, he failed to scrupulously report and interpret the news; on the contrary, his failure or refusal to verify such essential facts as who really hosted and tendered the luncheon and spent for it, and his playing up of the Banks supposed role as such host have resulted in an improper suppression of those facts and a gross distortion of the truth about them. c. Re Other Items Jurado disregarded the truth again, and in the process vilified
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the Supreme Court, in the item in his column of February 3, 1993 already adverted to,19 and more fully quoted as follows: When lawyers speak of the Magnificent Seven, one has to make sure which group they are referring to. Makatis Magnificent Seven are a bunch of Makati regional trial court judges who fix drug-related cases. The Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court consists of a group of justices who vote as one. About the last [italicized] statement, there is, as in other accusations of Jurado, not a shred of proof; and the volumes of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated [SCRA] in which are reported the decisions of the Supreme Court En Banc for the year 1992 [January to December] and for January 1993, divulge not a single non-unanimous decision or resolution where seven [7] justices voted as one, nor any group of decisions or resolutions where the recorded votes would even suggest the existence of such a cabal. This is yet another accusation which Jurado is unable to substantiate otherwise than, as also already pointed out, by invoking unnamed and confidential sources which he claims he considers highly credible and reliable and which would be imperiled by elaborating on the information furnished by them. He would justify reliance on those sources on grounds of necessity, custom and usage and claim the protection of Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477, from forced revelation of confidential news sources except when demanded by the security of the state.20 Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman may escape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish before hand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his
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profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those sources. Jurados other writings already detailed here are of the same sort. While it might be tedious to recount what has already been stated about the nature and content of those writings, it is necessary to do so briefly in order not only to stress the gravity he makes, but also to demonstrate that his response to the call for their substantiation has been one of unvarying intransigence: an advertance to confidential sources with whose reliability he professes satisfaction and whom fuller disclosure would supposedly compromise. There can be no doubt of the serious and degrading character not only to the Court of Appeals, but also to the judiciary in general of his columns of November 9, 1992 and January 29, 1993 concerning an unnamed former justice of the Court of Appeals who had allegedly turned fixer for five of the Courts divisions and who, for the right price, could guarantee that a partys lawyer could write his own decision for and in the name of the ponente; and of his column of March 24, 1993 to the effect that anywhere from P30,000 to P50,000 could buy a temporary restraining order from a regional trial court in Manila. The litany of falsehoods, and charges made without bona fide effort at verification or substantiation, continues: (a) Jurados column of January 30, 1993 about eight [8] Makati judges who were handsomely paid for decisions favoring drug-traffickers and other big-time criminals, was based on nothing more than raw intelligence contained as confidential police report. It does not appear that any part of that report has been reliably confirmed. (b) He has refused to offer any substantiation, either before the Ad Hoc Committee or in this proceeding, for his report of
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October 27, 1992 concerning an unnamed lady secretary of a Makati RTC Judge who, besides earning at least P10,000 for making sure a case is raffled off to a sympathetic judge, can also arrange the issuance of attachments and injunctions for a fee of one [1%] percent over and above usual premium for the attachment or injunction bond, a fee that in one instance, amounted to P300,000. (c) His report [columns of January 16 and 29, 1993] that the Judicial and Bar Council acted contrary to ethics and delicadeza in nominating to the Court of Appeals a son and a nephew of its members is completely untrue. The most cursory review of the records of the Council will show that since its organization in 1987, there has not been a single instance of any son or nephew of a member of the Council being nominated to the Court of Appeals during said members incumbency; and in this connection, he mistakenly and carelessly identified RTC Judge Rosalio de la Rosa as the nephew of Justice [and then Member of the Judicial and Bar Council] Lorenzo Relova when the truth, which he subsequently learned and admitted, was that the person referred to was Judge Joselito de la Rosa, the sonin-law, not the nephew, of Justice Relova. Had he bothered to make any further verification, he would have learned that at all sessions of the Council where the nomination of Judge Joselito de la Rosa was considered, Justice Relova not only declined to take part in the deliberations, but actually left the conference room; and he would also have learned that Judge Rosalio de la Rosa had never been nominated. Indeed, to this date, he has not been nominated to the Court of Appeals. (d) He has recklessly slandered the Judicial and Bar Council by charging that it has improperly made nominations to the Court of Appeals on considerations other than of merit or fitness, through the manipulations of the Councils Secretary, Atty. Daniel Martinez; or because the nominee happens to be a relative of a member of the Council [e.g., Judge Joselito de la Rosa, initially identified as Judge Rosalio de la Rosa] or of the Supreme Court [he could name none so situated]; or has powerful political sponsor [referring to RTC Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr., son and namesake of the Ombudsman].
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Acceptance of the truth of these statements is precluded, not only by the familiar and established presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, but also, and even more conclusively by the records of the Judicial and Bar Council itself, which attest to the qualifications of Atty. Daniel Martinez, Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Judge Joselito de la Rosa and Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr., for membership in the Appellate Tribunal; (e) Equally false is Jurados report [column of January 25, 1993] that nomination to the Court of Appeals of some worthy individuals like Quezon City RTC Judge Maximiano Asuncion, and Atty. Raul Victorino [who was closely identified with former Senate President Salonga] had been blocked because they had incurred the ire of the powers that be, the truth, which could very easily have been verified, being that a pending administrative case against Judge Asuncion had stood in the way of his nomination and since Mr. Victorino had been sponsored or recommended by then Senate President Salonga himself, the fact that he was not nominated can hardly be attributed to the hostility or opposition of persons in positions of power or influence. (f ) Jurado was similarly unfair, untruthful and unfoundedly judgmental in his reporting about Executive Judge Rosalio de la Rosa of the Manila Regional Trial Court as: (1) having been nominated to the Court of Appeals by the Judicial and Bar Council chiefly, if not only, by reason of being the nephew of Justice Relova and the cousin of Chief Justice Narvasa, the truth, as already pointed out, being that Judge Rosalio de la Rosa had never been thus nominated to the Court of Appeals, the nominee having been Judge Joselito de la Rosa, the son-in-law [not nephew] of Justice Relova; and (2) having discarded the rule that cases seeking provisional remedies should be raffled off to the judges [column of January 28, 1993] and adopted a system of farming out applications for temporary restraining orders, etc., among all the branches
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of the court; here again, Jurado is shown to have written without thinking, and made statements without verifying the accuracy of his information or seeking the views of the subject of his pejorative statements; the merest inquiry would have revealed to him that while Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 requires that no case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without raffle [for purposes of disposition on the merits], Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975 [Sec. 15, Par. IV],21 empowers Executive Judges to act on all applications for provisional remedies [attachments, injunctions, or temporary restraining orders, receiverships, etc.], or on interlocutory matters before raffle, in order to balance the workload among courts and judges, [Sec. 1, par. 2, id.] and exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may in his judgment be necessary or incidental to the performance of his functions as a Court Administrator [Sec. 7, par. 1, id.], these provisions being broad enough, not only to authorize unilateral action by the Executive Judge himself on provisional remedies and interlocutory matters even prior to raffle of the main case, but also to delegate the authority to act thereon to other judges. Jurado does not explain why: [1] he made no effort to verify the state of the rules on the matter; [2] he precipitately assumed that the views of Judge Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, whose complaint on the subject, he claims, he merely summarized, were necessarily correct and the acts of Judge de la Rosa necessarily wrong or improper; and [3] he did not try to get Judge de la Rosas side at all. Common to all these utterances of Jurado is the failure to undertake even the most cursory verification of their objective truth; the abdication of the journalists duty to report and interpret the news with scrupulous fairness; and the breach of the laws injunction that a person act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith both in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties.
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7. Jurados Proffered Excuses and Defenses The principle of press freedom is invoked by Jurado in justification of these published writings. That invocation is obviously unavailing in light of the basic postulates and the established axioms or norms for the proper exercise of press freedom earlier set forth in this opinion.22 Jurado next puts in issue this Courts power to cite him for contempt. The issue is quickly disposed of by adverting to the familiar principle reiterated, inter alia, in Zaldivar v. Gonzales:23 The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court [In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 [1916]; In re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923); and In re Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949)]. The power to punish for contempt is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice, (i)t is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant [Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112 (1985); Andres v. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 (1984); Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1 (1971); Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 (1967); Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 (1946)]. Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case. Philippine jurisprudence parallels a respectable array of English decisions holding contumacious scurrilous attacks against the courts calculated to bring them into disrepute, even when made after the trial stage or after the end of the proceedings. The original doctrine laid down in People vs. Alarcon24 that there is no contempt if there is no pending case has been abandoned in subsequent rulings of this Court which have since adopted the Moran dissent therein,25 viz.: Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes
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criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the allimportant duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. [12 Am. Jur. pp. 416-417]. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed. The foregoing disposes of Jurados other contention that the present administrative matter is not a citation for direct contempt, there being no pending case or proceeding out of which a charge of direct contempt against him may arise; this, even without regard to the fact that the statements made by him about sojourn in Hongkong of six Justices of the Supreme Court were clearly in relation to a case involving two [2] public utility companies then pending in this Court.26 His theory that there is no formal charge against him is specious. His published statements about that alleged trip are branded as false in no uncertain terms by the sworn statement and letter of Vice President Vicente R. Samson of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company which: (a) emphatically and categorically deny that PLDT had made any arrangements with any travel agency, or with the two travel agencies it patronized or retained, or paid anything, on account of such alleged trip;
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(b) positively affirm (i) that PLDT was not even aware that any of the justices or their families had made the trip referred to in the Jurado column, and (ii) that neither Atty. Emil P. Jurado nor anyone in his behalf has ever spoken to said Mr. Samson or any other responsible officer of PLDT about the matter; and (c) beseech the Court to take such action [on the matter] as may be appropriate. As already stated, the Court, in its Resolution of February 16, 1993: [a] ordered the subject of Samsons letter and affidavit docketed as an official Court proceeding to determine the truth of Jurados allegations about it; and [b] directed also that Jurado be furnished copies of Atty. William Vetos affidavit on the luncheon party hosted by him [which Jurado reported as one given by Equitable Bank] and that Jurado file comment on said affidavits as well as allegations in specified columns of his. Jurado was also furnished copies of the affidavits later submitted by the two travel agencies mentioned in Samsons statement, and was required to comment thereon. It was, thus, made clear to him that he was being called to account for his published statements about the matters referred to, and that action would be taken thereon against him as may be appropriate. That that was in fact how he understood it is evident from his submitted defenses, denying or negativing liability for contempt, direct indirect. Indeed, as journalist of no little experience and a lawyer to boot, he cannot credibly claim an inability to understand the nature and import of the present proceedings. Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon
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all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication. Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as ajournalist.27 This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability. At any rate, what was said about the matter in that earlier case is equally cogent here: Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in question in his capacity as a member of the bar, not as a journalist. The distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his actuations in either capacity, and there is no question of the Courts authority to call him to task either as a newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judge them only as those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his actions cannot be put into such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a persons acts are determined by, and reflect, the sum total of his knowledge, training and experience. In the case of respondent in particular the Court will take judicial notice of the frequent appearance
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in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing legal language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a journalist he calls upon his knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers and enhance his credibility. Even absent this circumstance, respondent cannot honestly assert that in exercising his profession as journalist he does not somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor perhaps even possible, to come to fair, informed and intelligent judgment of respondents actuations by divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well as a newspaperman, even supposing, which is not the case that he may thereby be found without accountability in this matter. To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even were the Court to lend ear to his plea that his actions be judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law profession of which he is also a member. 8. The Dissents The eloquent, well-crafted dissents of Messrs. Justices Puno and Melo that would invoke freedom of the press to purge Jurados conduct of any taint of contempt must now be briefly addressed. a. Apparent Misapprehension of Antecedents and Issue Regrettably, there appears to be some misapprehension not only about the antecedents directly leading to the proceedings at bar but also the basic issues involved. The dissents appear to be of the view, for instance, that it was chiefly Jurados failure to appear before the Ad Hoc Committee in response to two [2] letters of invitation issued to him, that compelled the Court to order the matter to be docketed on February 16, 1993 and to require respondent Jurado to file his Comment. This is not the case at all. As is made clear in Sub-Heads 3 and 4 of this opinion, supra, the direct cause of these proceedings was not Jurados refusal to appear and give evidence before the Ad Hoc Committee. The direct cause was the letters of PLDT and Atty. William Veto,
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supported by affidavits, denouncing certain of his stories as false,28 with the former praying that the Court take such action as may be appropriate. And it was precisely the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the PLDT that this Court ordered to be duly DOCKETED, and hereafter considered and acted upon as an official Court proceeding; this, by Resolution dated February 16, 1993; the Court also requiring, in the same Resolution, that the Clerk of Court SEND COPIES of the PLDT letter and affidavit, and of the affidavit of Atty. William Veto to Atty. Emil Jurado, and that Jurado should comment thereon as well as (on) the allegations made by him in his columns, herein specified because of explicit claims and indications of the falsity or inaccuracy thereof. There thus also appears to be some misapprehension of the basic issues, at least two of which are framed in this wise: [1] the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations; and [2] their right not to reveal confidential sources of information under R. A. No. 53, as amended which are not really involved here in respect of which it is theorized that the majority opinion will have an inhibiting effect on newsmens confidential sources of information, and thereby abridges the freedom of the press. (1) No Summons or Subpoena Ever Issued to Jurado The fact is that no summons or subpoena was ever issued to Jurado by the Ad Hoc Committee; nor was the issuance of any such or similar processes, or any punitive measures for disobedience thereto, intended or even contemplated. Like most witnesses who gave evidence before the Committee, Jurado was merely invited to appear before it to give information in aid of its assigned task of ascertaining the truth concerning persistent rumors and reports about corruption in the judiciary. When he declined to accept the invitations, the Ad Hoc Committee took no action save to inform the Court thereof; and the Court itself also took no action. There is thus absolutely no occasion to ascribe to that investigation and the invitation to appear thereat a chilling effect on the by and large hard-boiled and self-assured members of the media fraternity. If at all, the patience and forbearance of the Court,
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despite the indifference of some of its invitees and projected witnesses, appear to have generated an attitude on their part bordering on defiant insolence. (2) No Blanket Excuse Under R. A. 53 From Responding to Subpoena Even assuming that the facts were as presented in the separate opinion, i.e., that subpoena had in fact been issued to and served on Jurado, his unexplained failure to obey the same would prima facie constitute constructive contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. It should be obvious that a journalist may not refuse to appear at all as required by a subpoena on the bare plea that under R. A. No 53, he may not be compelled to disclose the source of his information. For until he knows what questions will be put to him as witness for which his presence has been compelled the relevance of R. A. No. 53 cannot be ascertained. His duty is clear. He must obey the subpoena. He must appear at the appointed place, date and hour, ready to answer questions, and he may invoke the protection of the statute only at the appropriate time. b. The Actual Issue The issue, therefore, had nothing to do with any failure of Jurados to obey a subpoena, none ever having been issued to him, and the Ad Hoc Committee having foreborne to take any action at all as regards his failure to accept its invitations. The issue, as set out in the opening sentence of this opinion, essentially concerns liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading and derogatory of the courts and individual judges. Jurado is not being called to account for declining to identify the sources of his news stories, or for refusing to appear and give testimony before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to guarantee the truth of what he publishes, but to exercise honest and reasonable efforts to determine the truth of defamatory statements before publishing them. He is being meted the punishment appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and defamatory of the judiciary stories that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being
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denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable, to substantiate. c. R. A. 53 Confers No Immunity from Liability for False or Defamatory Publications This opinion neither negates nor seeks to enervate the proposition that a newsman has a right to keep his sources confidential; that he cannot be compelled by the courts to disclose them, as provided by R. A. 53, unless the security of the State demands such revelation. But it does hold that he cannot invoke such right as a shield against liability for printing stories that are untrue and derogatory of the courts, or others. The ruling, in other words, is that when called to account for publications denounced as inaccurate and misleading, the journalist has the option (a) to demonstrate their truthfulness or accuracy even if in the process he disclose his sources, or (b) to refuse, on the ground that to do so would require such disclosure. In the latter event, however, he must be ready to accept the consequences of publishing untruthful or misleading stories the truth and accuracy of which he is unwilling or made no bona fide effort to prove; for R. A. 53, as amended, is quite unequivocal that the right of refusal to disclose sources is without prejudice to liability under civil and criminal laws. R. A. 53 thus confers no immunity from prosecution for libel or for other sanction under law. It does not declare that the publication of any news report or information which was related in confidence to the journalist is not actionable; such circumstance [of confidentiality] does not purge, the publication of its character as defamatory, if indeed it be such, and actionable on that ground. All it does is give the journalist the right to refuse [or not to be compelled] to reveal the source of any news report published by him which was revealed to him in confidence. A journalist cannot say, e.g.: a person of whose veracity I have no doubt told me in confidence that Justices X and Y received a bribe of P1M each for their votes in such and such a case, or that a certain Judge maintains a mistress, and when called to account for such statements, absolves himself by claiming immunity under R. A. 53 or invoking press freedom.
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d. A Word about Group Libel There is hardly need to belabor the familiar doctrine about group libel and how it has become the familiar resort of unscrupulous newsmen who can malign any number of anonymous members of a common profession, calling or persuasion, thereby putting an entire institution like the judiciary in this case in peril of public contumely and mistrust without serious risk of being sued for defamation. The preceding discussions have revealed Jurados predilection for, if not his normal practice of, refusing to specifically identify or render identifiable the persons he maligns. Thus, he speaks of the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families. This resort to generalities and ambiguities is an old and familiar but reprehensible expedient of newsmongers to avoid criminal sanctions since the American doctrine of group libel is of restricted application in this jurisdiction. For want of a definitely identified or satisfactorily identifiable victim, there is generally no actionable libel, but such a craven publication inevitably succeeds in putting all the members of the judiciary thus all together referred to under a cloud of suspicion. A veteran journalist and lawyer of long standing that he is, Jurado could not have been unaware of the foregoing realities and consequences. e. Substantiation of News Report Not Inconsistent with R. A. 53 It is argued that compelling a journalist to substantiate the news report or information confidentially revealed to him would necessarily negate or dilute his right to refuse disclosure of its source. The argument will not stand scrutiny. A journalists source either exists or is fictitious. If the latter, plainly, the journalist is entitled to no protection or immunity whatsoever. If the source actually exists, the information furnished is either capable of
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independent substantiation, or it is not. If the first, the journalists duty is clear: ascertain, if not obtain, the evidence by which the information may be verified before publishing the same; and if thereafter called to account therefor, present such evidence and in the process afford the party adversely affected thereby opportunity to dispute the information or show it to be false. If the information is not verifiable, and it is derogatory of any third party, then it ought not to be published for obvious reasons. It would be unfair to the subject of the report, who would be without means of refuting the imputations against him. And it would afford an unscrupulous journalist a ready device by which to smear third parties without the obligation to substantiate his imputations by merely claiming that the information had been given to him in confidence. It is suggested that there is another face to the privileged character of a journalists source of information than merely the protection of the journalist, and that it is intended to protect also the source itself. What clearly is implied is that journalist may not reveal his source without the latters clearance or consent. This totally overlooks the fact that the object of a derogatory publication has at least an equal right to know the source thereof and, if indeed traduced, to the opportunity of obtaining just satisfaction from the traducer. 9. Need for Guidelines Advertences to lofty principle, however eloquent and enlightening, hardly address the mundane, but immediate and very pertinent, question of whether a journalist may put in print unverified information derogatory of the courts and judges and yet remain immune from liability for contempt for refusing, when called upon, to demonstrate their truth on the ground of press freedom or by simply claiming that he need not do so since [or if ] it would compel him to disclose the identity of his source or sources. The question, too, is whether or not we are prepared to say that a journalists obligation to protect his sources of information
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transcends, and is greater than, his duty to the truth; and that, accordingly, he has no obligation whatsoever to verify, or exercise bona fide efforts to verify, the information he is given or obtain the side of the party adversely affected before he publishes the same. True, the pre-eminent role of a free press in keeping freedom alive and democracy in full bloom cannot be overemphasized. But it is debatable if that role is well and truly filled by a press let loose to print what it will, without reasonable restraints designed to assure the truth and accuracy of what is published. The value of information to a free society is in direct proportion to the truth it contains. That value reduces to little or nothing when it is no longer possible for the public to distinguish between truth and falsehood in news reports, and the courts are denied the mechanisms by which to make reasonably sure that only the truth reaches print. a. No Constitutional Protection for Deliberately False or Recklessly Inaccurate Reports It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme Court,29 while asserting that under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea, and that however pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas [citing a passage from the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson], nonetheless, made the firm pronouncement that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, and the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection [although] nevertheless inevitable in free debate. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error, it said, materially advances societys interest in unhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US, at 270, 11 L Ed 2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412. They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
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social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Chaplinsky v, new Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572, 86 L Ed 1031, 62 S Ct 766 [1942]. The use of calculated falsehood, it was observed in anothercase,30 would put a different cast on the constitutional question. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth do not enjoy constitutional protection. Similarly, in a 1969 case concerning a patently false accusation made against a public employee avowedly in fulfillment of a legal, moral, or social duty,31 this Court, through the late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that the guarantee of free speech cannot be considered as according protection to the disclosure of lies, gossip or rumor, viz.: Defendants civil duty was to help the Government clean house and weed out dishonest, unfit or disloyal officers and employees thereof, where there is reasonable ground to believe that they fall under this category. He had no legal right, much less duty, to gossip, or foster the circulation of rumors, or jump at conclusions and more so if they are gratuitous or groundless. Otherwise, the freedom of speech, which is guaranteed with a view to strengthening our democratic institutions and promoting the general welfare, would be a convenient excuse to engage in the vituperation of individuals, for the attainment of private, selfish and vindictive ends, thereby hampering the operation of the Government with. administrative investigations of charges preferred without any color or appearance of truth and with no other probable effect than the harassment of the officer or employee concerned, to the detriment of public service and public order. b. No Chilling Effect
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The fear expressed, and earlier adverted to, that the principles here affirmed would have a chilling effect on media professionals, seems largely unfounded and should be inconsequential to the greater number of journalists in this country who, by and large, out of considerations of truth, accuracy, and fair play, have commendably refrained from ventilating what would otherwise be sensational or high-visibility stories. In merely seeking to infuse and perpetuate the same attitude and sense of responsibility in all journalists, i.e., that there is a need to check out the truth and correctness of information before publishing it, or that, on the other hand, recklessness and crass sensationalism should be eschewed, this decision, surely, cannot have such chilling effect, and no apprehension that it would deter the determination of truth or the public exposure of wrong can reasonably be entertained. The peoples right to discover the truth is not advanced by unbridled license in reportage that would find favor only with extremist liberalism. If it has done nothing else, this case has made clear the compelling necessity of the guidelines and parameters elsewhere herein laid down. They are eminently reasonable, and no responsible journalist should have cause to complain of difficulty in their observance. 10. Afterword It seems fitting to close this opinion with the words of Chief Justice Moran, whose pronouncements have already been earlier quoted,32 and are as germane today as when they were first written more than fifty [50] years ago.33 It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that public confidence should be a tribute to judicial worth, virtue and intelligence. But compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying the courts the power to vindicate themselves when outraged is another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes with impunity a discontended citizen to unleash, by newspaper publications, the avalanche of his wrath and venom upon courts and judges. If he believes that a judge is corrupt and that justice
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has somewhere been perverted, law and order require that he follow the processes provided by the Constitution and the statutes by instituting the corresponding proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. xxx xxx xxx It might be suggested that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in an action for libel. This suggestion has, however, no rational basis in principle. In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a private individual but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge, as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively to the discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force [Hamilton v. Williams, 26 Ala. 529; Busteed v. Parson, 54 Ala. 403; Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130; Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580; 134 N. E. 194]. Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive, at all times, to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling. Clearly unrepentant, exhibiting no remorse for the acts and conduct detailed here, Jurado has maintained a defiant stance. This is a fight I will not run from, he wrote in his column of March 21, 1993; and again, I will not run away from a good fight, in his column of March 23, 1993. Such an attitude discourages leniency,
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and leaves no choice save the application of sanctions appropriate to the offense. WHEREFORE, the Court declares Atty. Emil [Emiliano] P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one thousand pesos [P1,000,00]. IT IS SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Quiason, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., took no part. ________________________________________ Separate Opinions MELO, J., Dissenting: In making a choice between the preservation of liberties and freedom, on one hand, and the attainment of a better ordered society, on the other, men have not stopped debating. The balance, the point of the weighing scale, has moved hither and thither depending on the needs of the times and on the kind of government involved. But in democratic governments, there must at all times be due regard for the preservation of constitutional rights even to the extent, at times, of seemingly sacrificing, as in the case at hand, accurate and truthful media comment. To be sure, fair, accurate, truthful reporting by the press is the hallmark and badge of a healthy and self-assured society. But such ideal must not be purchased or achieved at the cost of press freedom itself but rather by caring for and nurturing, cultivating, and promoting the growth of said freedom, impressing upon its practitioners due regard for the truth and the entitlement of the public they serve to accurate reporting instead of the publication or airing of private biases and jaundiced views.
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It is thus even as I am personally disturbed by fallacious, specious, and at times downright false and deceitful reporting and comments, meant only to promote private and selfish interests, I must extend my concurrence to the well-written opinion of Justice Puno. For, as was said of old, when one rows through a sea of conflict between restraint and freedom, one should hold both oars steadily, but always with the oar of freedom in the stronger hand, lest an errant course be laid. ________________________________________ PUNO, J., Dissenting: The case at bench resolves several issues of critical importance to freedom of speech and of the press, thus: [1] the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations; [2] the right of newsmen not to reveal confidential sources of information under R. A. No. 53, as amended; and [3] the test, to be followed before a false or slanted report by a journalist can be adjudged as constitutive of contempt of court. It is my humble submission that the majority opinion, even while heavily laden with wisdom, has too much of an inhibiting effect on our newsmens pen as to abridge their freedom of speech and of the press. I, therefore, dissent. The facts are amply stated in the majority opinion. In 199293, unsavory news and commentaries about malpractices in the judiciary, some of them outrightly vicious, appeared in the print and broadcast media. In reaction, Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa issued Administrative Order No. 11-93, dated January 25, 1993, Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary. Its text reads: WHEREAS, the Courts attention has been drawn to the many and persistent rumors and unverified reports respecting corruption in the judiciary, said rumors and reports not only having been mentioned by media and in anonymous communications, but having also been adverted to by certain government officials and civic leaders. NOW, THEREFORE, by authority of the Court, an Ad Hoc
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committee is hereby constituted composed of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and former Justices of the Court, Hon. Lorenzo Relova and Hon. Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as Members, which shall seek to ascertain the truth respecting said reports and statements, and to this end, forthwith interview at closed-door sessions or otherwise, such persons as may appear to it to have some knowledge of the matter and who may be appealed to to share knowledge with the Court, and otherwise gather such evidence as may be available. The Committee is hereby authorized to use such facilities and personnel of the Court as may be necessary or convenient in the fulfillment of its assigned mission, and shall submit its report to the Court within thirty (30) days. (Emphasis supplied). The member of the Committee was immediately constituted.1 From February 2, 1993 to April 16, 1993, the Committee held twenty-four [24] closed-door sessions and interviewed seventyone [71] witnesses who appeared to have some knowledge of the subject of inquiry.2 Among the persons invited by the Committee to appear was respondent Jurado. His first invitation was to appear on February 4, 1993 to give the Committees information that will assist it in its task, i.e., to definitely and accurately determine the facts as regards the published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary. Respondent Jurado failed to honor the invitation. On February 5, 1993, the Committee reiterated its invitation, couched in the following language: xxx xxx xxx It is regretted that you failed to respond to the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee to appear at its session of February 4, 1993. All indications are that you are the person with the most knowledge about corruption in the judiciary and hence, appear to be best positioned to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its function of obtaining evidence, or leads, on the matter. You have, I believe, expressed more than once the laudable desire that the judiciary rid itself of the incompetents and the misfits in its ranks, and we believe you will want to help
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the Court to do precisely that, furnishing the Committee with competent evidence, testimonial or otherwise. Clearly, the purging process cannot be accomplished without proof, testimonial or otherwise, as you must no doubt realize, being yourself a lawyer. We would like you to know that the Ad Hoc Committee created by Administrative Order No. 11-93 is simply a factfinding body. Its function is evidence-gathering. Although possessed of the authority to maintain and enforce order in its proceedings, and to compel obedience to its processes, it is not an adjudicative body in the sense that it will pronounce persons guilty or innocent, or impose sanctions, on the basis of such proofs as may be presented to it. That functions is reserved to the Supreme Court itself, in which it is lodged by the Constitution and the laws. Thus, at the conclusion of its evidence-gathering mission, the Ad Hoc Committee will submit its report and recommendations to the Court which will then take such action as it deems appropriate. The Ad Hoc Committee has scheduled hearings on the 11th and 12th of February, 1993. Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., will preside as Chairman at these hearings since I will be unable to do so in view of earlier commitments. We reiterate our invitation that you come before the Committee, and you may opt to appear either on the 11th or 12th of February, 1993, at 2 oclock in the afternoon. (Emphasis supplied). Again, respondent Jurado did not appear in the scheduled investigations. The Court ordered the matter to be docketed on February 16, 1993 and respondent was asked to file his Comment on the PLDT letter and affidavit of Mr. Vicente Samson and the affidavit of Atty. William Veto, the contents of which are related in the majority opinion. Respondent Jurado submitted his Comment on March 1, 1993. By then, the Court has also received the affidavits of Mr. Ermin Garcia of the City World Travel Mart Corporation and of Mrs. Marissa de la Paz of Philway Travel Corporation traversing the column of February, 1993 of the respondent. On Orders of the Court, the respondent then submitted a Supplemental Comment
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with Request for Clarification on March 15, 1993. Among other defenses, respondent invoked R. A. No. 53,3 as amended by R. A. No. 1477, which reads: AN ACT AMENDING SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FIFTY-THREE, ENTITLED AN ACT TO EXEMPT THE PUBLISHER, EDITOR, COLUMNIST OR REPORTER OF ANY PUBLICATION FROM REVEALING THE SOURCE OF PUBLISHED NEWS OR INFORMATION OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: Sec. 1. Section One of Republic Act Numbered FiftyThree is amended to read as follows: Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the Court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State. Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, June 15, 1956. [Emphasis supplied]. Upon these facts, the majority would hold respondent guilty of contempt of court. In adjudging respondent in contempt of court, the majority attempted to establish an equilibrium between the importance of a free press and the need to maintain the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice, the civil law duty to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, and the right to private honor and reputation.
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The majority tilted the balance against freedom of the press and respondent Jurado after finding that some of his columns were either false or slanted as he made no effort to verify them before their publication. How to strike a balance that will accommodate equally compelling yet competing State interests has divided men of stratospheric intellect. Until the fast decibel of time, and while man continues to be bereft of infallibility, the best of minds will continue with their search for the elusive variables that will correctly tilt the balance between press freedom and other freedoms. Thus, with high respect to my learned colleagues in the majority, I beg to differ with their conclusion on where to fix the elusive balance in the case at bench. A brief revisit of the history of the struggle to protect freedom of the press ought to be enlightening. It will remind us that freedom of speech and freedom of the press4 are preferred right5 for they are indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.6 Their status as the cornerstone of our liberties followed the shift of sovereignty from monarchs to the masses, the people.7 For the people to be truly sovereign, they must be capable of rendering enlightened judgments and they cannot acquire this capability unless they have an unclogged access to information, the main pipeline of which is the press. Early enough, Madison had the prescience to warn that a popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both.8 The history of press freedom will also reveal that while its importance has been given lip service, its unabridged exercise was not won without a costly struggle. Ironically, the attempts to restrict the newsmens pen came from government itself. The attempts were disguised in different insidious forms.9 They came as sedition laws which sent newsmen behind bars. They came as tax laws which impoverished newspaper publishers. Through long, difficult years, the press survived these assaults. Nonetheless, the struggle to preserve press freedom is distinct for it is a story with a first but without a final chapter. In the decade
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of the 60s and onwards, a new weapon against press freedom was unsheathed by government. It was the sword of subpoena. In Congress as in the courts, it was wielded to pry open newsmens secret sources of information often derogatory to government. The unbridled use of the subpoena had its silencing effects on the exercise of press freedom. Common law denied newsmen the right to refuse to testify concerning information received in confidence.10 The press has to go to the legislature for protection. The protection came to be known as shield statutes and their scope varied. In the United States, they were of two [2] types: (1) laws that shield the identities of newsmens informants from disclosure;11 and (2) laws that shield not only the identities of news sources but also the content of the communication against disclosure.12 Test cases also filed in courts seeking a ruling that a newsmans right to gather news is constitutionally protected, and hence, cannot be impaired by subpoenas forcing disclosure of the identities of their sources of information.13 To date, the American case law on the matter has yet to jell. In the Philippines, the shield law is provided by Republic. Act No. 1477, approved on June 15, 1956 which prohibits revelation of the source of any news-report or information related in confidence . . . unless the court or a House or Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State. R. A. No. 1477 amended R. A No. 53 by changing the phrases interest of the State to security of the State The change limited the right of the state to share with newsmen their confidential sources of information. Prescinding from these premises, let me now slide to the constitutional balancing made by the majority. I wholeheartedly agree that except for a more overriding consideration, the Court should uphold the importance of an orderly administration of justice. It appears that respondents reliance on his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press failed to impress the majority as an overriding consideration. Among the reasons that obviously swayed the majority in submerging the significance of freedom of speech and of the press below that of an orderly administration of justice were: failure of respondent to obey the
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invitation to appear made by the Ad Hoc Committee, his refusal to reveal the sources of his information, and the falsity and slants of his columns. In registering this dissent, I wish to address these reasons and I respectfully posit the following postulates: First. It should be stressed that respondent Jurado was initially invited to appear before the Ad Hoc Committee tasked to investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary. The Ad Hoc Committee is only a fact-finding body as its ordained duty is to ascertain the truth respecting reports on corruption in the judiciary. As an administrative fact-finding body, its power to compel newsmen to appear and disclose their secret sources of information is less compared with the same power of Congress while making laws or the power of courts when litigating actual controversies. Jurisprudence holds that the power to compel testimony inheres in the power to legislate for a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.14 Case law similarly holds that courts can compel newsmen to testify where it is necessary to avoid miscarriage of justice.15 The majority should not take to task the respondent for his failure to appear before the Ad Hoc Committee. His failure to honor its invitation had only a slight adverse effect on the work of the Committee. It does not justify imposing on respondent the severe order of contempt of court. The majority, however, holds that the respondent was not cited for contempt for his non-appearance before the Ad Hoc Committee where he did not explain his other writings in the Manila Standard but his false report on the alleged Hongkong trip of some justices and his slanted report on the birthday party of Atty. Veto attended by some appellate justices. A close look at the flow and totality of the proceedings against respondent will, however, belie the stance of the majority. In his March 1, 1993 Comment, respondent explained the bases of all his reports regarding corruption in the judiciary which, among others, assailed Judge Rosalio de la Rosa, Executive Judge of Manila, Makatis Magnificent Seven, the Magnificent, Seven in
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the Supreme Court, the JBC, etc. The majority did not consider this explanation as immaterial on the ground that he was not being asked to account for said reports. On the contrary , the explanation of the respondent, was minutely dissected in the majority opinion, and thereafter, it was condemned as a litany of falsehoods. Indeed, no less than four [4] pages of the majority opinion written in single space were devoted to the discussion of these writings of the respondent. Neither does it materially matter that no summons or subpoena was issued to the respondent by the Ad Hoc Committee. According to the majority, only an invitation to appear was extended to the respondent. This thin semantical distinction, however, cannot deflate the fact that an invitation from a Committee of this Court carries as much a compulsion as a summons or a subpoena. The February 5, 1993 letter of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to the respondent tells it all when it stated that said Committee has authority to maintain and enforce order in its proceedings, and to compel obedience to its processes. Second. The letters of invitation to respondent misappreciated the proper function of the press. The first letter dated February 1, 1993, ordered respondent to give the Committee information that will assist it in its task, i.e., to definitely and accurately determine the facts as regards the published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary.The second letter dated February 5, 1993 stated, inter alia, we believe you will want to help the Court by furnishing the Committee with Committee competent evidence, testimonial or otherwise. Clearly, the purging process cannot be accomplished without proof, testimonial or otherwise, as you must no doubt realize, being yourself a lawyer. I submit that the press is not an adjunct of the judiciary, any more than is it an annex of the two [2] other branches of government. As the press is not an extension of the judiciary, it cannot be used as an investigatory instrument to purge courts of misfits especially when the use of the press will compel it to compromise its role as critic of government. Again, it should be stressed that the judiciary is not without resources to investigate and reform itself. It can purge its ranks without compelling the involvement of the press.
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Third. The protection of R. A. No. 53, as amended by R. A. No. 1477 to newsmen should not be diminished as much as possible. Under this law, there is only one but one clear ground which can force a newsman to reveal the source of his confidential information when demanded by the security of the State. It is instructive to remember the case of In re: Angel J. Parazo,16 where the Court adjudged newsman Parazo in contempt of court for refusing to divulge the source of his story regarding leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations. It was contended by Parazo that under R. A. No. 53, he could only be compelled to reveal the source of his information when the revelation is demanded by the interest of the State Parazo argued that interest of the State meant security of State. The Court rejected Parazos argument as it held that the two [2] terms are not synonymous, the first being broader than the second. It then ruled that the maintenance of high standard of the legal profession qualifies as an interest of the State the promotion of which is a good ground to compel newsmen to break the confidentiality of their sources of news. The Court ruling did not sit well with Congress. On June 15, 1956, Congress enacted R. A. No. 1477 which amended R. A. 53 by changing the phrase interest of the State to security of State. Respondent invoked R. A. No. 53, as amended, as an additional defense in his favor. The majority opinion, however, shunted aside respondents submission as it held that said law does not protect a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth.There is no disagreement that R. A. 53 as amended, does not provide immunity against a blatant falsehood just as the Constitution does not protect a vicious lie. Precisely, section 1 of the law starts with the categorical caveat without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist, cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any newspaper report of information. But well to note, the case at bench is not a libel or a damage suit where we can properly decide, among others, the kind of falsehood and the proper stage of the proceedings when the Court could compel a newsman to reveal the source of his information without violating his freedom of speech and of the press. To my mind, the case at bench should be and can be
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resolved by simply determining whether respondents columns, given their falsity and slant, posed a clear and present danger to our administration of justice. My humble submission is that the evidence on record failed to prove this clear and present danger, and hence, there is no need to task respondent to reveal the sources of his information in order to prove that his reports about judicial corruption are not patent falsehoods. The Court should always adopt an approach that is less destructive of freedom of speech and of the press. I reserve my full view on the longtitude and latitude of a newsmans right not to reveal the sources of his information in a more appropriate case. Fourth. The majority stubbornly stresses that it gave respondent an option and did not compel him to reveal the sources of his information. Indeed, he was not compelled but he paid a high price for not revealing the sources of his information. It was held that he failed to disprove the falsity and slant of his column, hence, was liable for contempt. My thesis is that the affidavits on the PLDT affair and Atty. Vetos party may have proved the falsity or slant of respondents columns. But mere proof of falsity or slant is not proof that the falsehood or slant was made knowingly or with reckless disregard of truth, to use the New York Times test. Likewise, proof that respondent did not verify his facts from the PLDT and travel agency officials and from Atty. Veto is not proof that he did no verification at all. Indeed, the evidence does not show that Messrs. Samson, Garcia, and Veto and Mrs. de la Paz wrote to respondent to give him an opportunity to correct his errors. In the absence of such an opportunity, it is difficult to impute malice against respondent. Without proof that respondent knowingly or recklessly disregarded truth, he should not have been called upon to disprove the falsity or slant of his columns. He need not have been given these so-called option to reveal or not to reveal the sources of his information. There is another aspect of freedom of the press which the majority failed to consider. The sanctity of a newsmans source of information is not only intended to protect a newsman but also the source of his information. When a person transmits confidential
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information to a newsman, he is exercising his freedom of speech on condition of anonimity. In Talley v. California,17 an ordinance which penalized the distribution of any handbill which did not identify its author was struck down as unconstitutional. It was held that identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.18 It is thus arguable that a newsman by himself does not have the option to reveal or not to reveal the identity of his source of information. His source may have an independent right to the protection of his anonymity in the exercise of freedom of speech. This issue, however, need not be resolved in the case at bench but in a more appropriate setting. Be that as it may, I bewail the precipitate majority ruling that a newsman has an unqualified option to reveal the confidential source of his information for its inevitable effect is to discourage people from giving confidential information to the press. Again, the impairment, of the flow of information to the public will suffer an irreparable harm. Fifth. The majority punishes respondent for publishing stories shown to be false stories that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable to substantiate. The undue weight given to the falsity alone of respondents columns is unsettling. For after finding respondents columns as false, the majority did not go any further to determine whether these falsehoods constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. This libertarian test was originally espoused by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States19 where he ruled the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has a right to prevent. We have adopted this libertarian test as early as 1948 in Primicias v. Fugoso20 and which we reiterated, among others, in the leading cases of Navarro v. Villegas21 and the companion cases of Reyes v. Bagatsing, and Ruiz v. Gordon.22 In the case at bench, I cannot perceive how the respondents column on the alleged Hongkong trip of some justices could have brought about the substantive evil of subverting our orderly
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administration of justice. The affidavits of Mr. Samson, First Vice President of PLDT, of Mr. Ermin Garcia, Jr., President of City-World Travel Mart Corporation, and of Mrs. Marissa de la Paz, General Manager of Philway Travel Corporation merely established the falsity of respondents report. There is nothing in the record, however, showing the degree how respondents false report degraded the administration of justice. The evidence from which this conclusion can be deduced is nil. The standing of respondent as a journalist is not shown. The extent of readership of respondent is not known. His credibility has not been proved. Indeed, nothing in the record show that any person lost faith in our system of justice because of his said report. Even the losing party in G. R. No. 94374. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc., [ETPI] does not appear to have given any credence to the said false report. I submit that it is not every falsehood that should incur the Courts ire, at least it runs out of righteous indignation. Indeed, gross falsehood, vicious lies, and prevarications of paid hacks cannot deceive the public any more than can they cause this Court to crumble. If we adopt, the dangerous rule that we should curtail speech to stop every falsehood, we might as well abolish freedom of speech for there is yet to come a man whose tongue tells only the truth. In any event, we should take comfort in the thought that falsehoods cannot destroy; only truth does but only to set us free. In a similar vein, I reject the conclusion that respondents report about the birthday party of Atty. Veto attended by some justices and judges seriously eroded our administration of justice. Again, there is not an iota of empirical evidence on record to sustain this irrational fear. There is less reason to punish respondent for contempt for his report on Atty. Vetos party. Unlike respondents report about the justices Hongkong trip, his report on Atty. Vetos party is not false but only slanted, to use the own description of the majority opinion. Also, unlike respondents report about the justices Hongkong trip which was made while the Court has yet to resolve Eastern Telephones Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 94374, his report on Atty. Vetos party does not concern any pending litigation in this Court. Given these material differences, there is no way to conclude that respondents report on Atty. Vetos party degraded our administration of justice. In citing respondent
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in contempt for slanting his report on Atty. Vetos party, the majority betrays its flaccid respect for freedom of speech and of the press. Respondent is a columnist and he does not only write straight news reports but interprets events from his own distinct prism of perception. As a columnist and like any other columnist, he has own predilections and prejudices and he bends his views in accord with his own slant of faith. I see no reason to penalize respondent for the slants in his views, however unpleasant and irreverent they may be to the court. When we start punishing a columnist for slants in his views, we shall soon be seeking slits to look for witches among them. Ironically, the majority cites in support of its non-too-liberal stance the cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan23 and Garrison v. Louisiana.24 These cases, however, are ground-breaking in importance for they expanded the protection given to freedom of speech and of the press. New YorkTimes25 restricted the award of damages in favor of public officials in civil suits for damages arising out of libel precisely because of their chilling effects on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. To be entitled to damages, the public official concerned was imposed a very difficult, if not impossible, burden of proof. He was required to prove that the defamatory statement was made with not only false but was made with actual malice26 This means he has to prove that the defamatory statement was made with knowing falsity or with a reckless disregard for the truth.27 On the other hand, Garrison did not only reiterate but even extended the New York Times rule to apply to criminal cases. Mr. Garrison, a District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana was convicted of criminal defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute. In a press conference, he assailed eight [8] judges for their inefficiency, laziness, excessive vacations and for refusing to authorize disbursements to cover the expenses of undercover investigations of vice in New Orleans. Impugning their motives he said: This raises interesting questions about the racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges. The Louisiana State courts rejected Garrisons defense anchored on freedom of speech. In reversing the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the United States Federal Supreme Court, thru Mr. Justice Brennan, held
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that the New York Times rule under which the constitutional guaranty of free speech limits state power in a civil action brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct, to award of damages for a false statement made with actual malice, that is with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, likewise limit estate power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials. It struck down as unconstitutional the Louisiana statute which permitted punishment of false statements made with ill will, even though they are not made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of whether they are true or not. It further held that lack of reasonable belief in the truth of the statements is not the equivalent of reckless disregard of truth. To quote exactly the ruling: Even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood. The public official rule protects the paramount public interest in free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which on an officials fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance or improper motivation. The majority opinion in the case at bench certainly did not follow the New York Times rule which was reiterated and even expanded in Garrison. The majority halted after finding that the respondents columns are false or slanted. As aforestated, the affidavits of Messrs. Samson, Garcia, Jr. and Veto and Mrs. de la Paz merely condemned as false, respondents report but did not prove that respondent wrote his report with knowing or reckless disregard of truth. Yet, the majority was satisfied that this was enough evidence to punish respondent for contempt. It ruled: That categorical denial logically and justly placed on Jurado the burden of proving the truth of his grave accusation, or showing that it had been made through some honest mistake or error committed despite good faith efforts to arrive at the truth, or if unable to do either of these things, to offer to atone for the harm caused. The shift in the burden of proving reckless disregard of truth to respondent Jurado patently violates the New York Times rule. The New York
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Times rule fixed this burden of proof on complainants against newsmen. If the New York Times rule has any value to freedom of speech and of the press, it is because it made the burden of proof in this kind of cases extremely difficult to discharge on the part of a complainant against a newsman. In contrast, the majority opinion made it too easy in favor of a complainant. Sixth. The majority opinion also failed to consider that the columns of respondent dealt with the sensitive subject of corruption in courts. It cannot be gain said that corruption in government is a matter of highest concern to our citizenry. Yet it is a problem that defies solution primarily because it is a subject where people in the know maintain the countenance of a clam. Thus, the prosecution of corruption in government has not hit a high note and what now appears as the most effective restraint against corruption in government is the fear of the light of print. If the light of print continues to be a strong deterrent against government misdeeds, it is mainly because newsmen have an unimpeded access to information. On many an occasion, these confidential sources of information are the only leads to government malfeasance. To fashion a rule derogatory of the confidentiality of newsmens sources will result in tremendous loss in the flow of this rare and valuable information to the press and will prejudice the State s policy to eliminate corruption in government. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly foisted a falsehood to degrade our administration of justice, we should be slow in citing him for contempt. The New York Times rule correctly warned us that occasional erroneous statements are inevitable! in free debate and must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that they need, to survive. Seventh. I appreciate the genuine concern of the majority against certain abuses committed by some members of the press. Be that as it may, the abuses of some newsmen cannot justify an overarching rule eroding the freedom of all of them. Indeed, the framers of the Constitution knew that these abuses will be committed by some newsmen but still, they explicitly crafted section 4, Article III of the Constitution to read: [N]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
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press. Madison stressed that some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press 28 There is an appropriate remedy against abusive press newsmen. I submit, however, that the remedy is not to be too quick in wielding the power of contempt for that will certainly chain the hands of many newsmen. Abusive newsmen are bad but laundered news is worse. Eight. Again, with due respect, I submit that the majority misappreciates the role of the press as a critic of government in democratic society. The Constitution did not conceive the press to act as the cheer leader for of government, including the judiciary. Rather, the press is the agent29 of the people when it gathers news derogatory to those who hold the reins of government. The agency is necessary because the people must have all available information before they exercise their sovereign judgment. As well observed: The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrument of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment the suppression of abridgment of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.30 As agent of the people, the most important function of the press in a free society is to inform and it cannot inform if it is uninformed. We should be wary when the independent sources of information of the press dry up, for then the press will end up printing praise releases and that is no way for the people to know the truth. In sum, I submit, that the equation chosen by the majority has the pernicious effects of hobbling the writing hand of newsmen and of chilling the sources of information of the press. The majority can snicker against the bleeding heart liberalism but this is a vain attempt to use a fig leaf to conceal its niggardly regard for freedom of speech and of the press. In a large measure, I fear that the majority opinion will weaken the press as an informed and informative source of information of the sovereign people. In so doing, it will unwittingly erode the peoples right to discover the truth. The protection we give to the sanctity of the sources
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of information of the press is for the benefit of the people. It is designed to benefit all of us, keep us above the cloud of ignorance. Democracy cannot bloom where sovereignty is rooted on the top soil of an ignorant mass. I vote not to hold the respondent in contempt of court. Padilla, J., concurs. ________________________________________ Endnotes
1 2 3
See [Endnote] 16, infra. Jurados Supplemental Comment, March 15, 1993. An additional paragraph was added by a subsequent Administrative Order [No. 11-93-A, Feb. 1, 1993] to the effect that in the event that the Chairman or any member of the Ad Hoc Committee be unable to take part in its proceedings at any session or hearing thereof, or should inhibit himself or herself therefrom, and to the end that the proceedings before the Ad Hoc Committee be not thereby delayed, Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo and retired Justice Irene R. Cortes are, by the Courts authority, designated Alternate Members of the Committee, to serve thereon for such time or at such sessions or hearings as the Chief Justice may determine. See [Endnotes] 12 and 19, infra. See [Endnote] 10, infra. 213 SCRA 16. ETPI counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and former Law Dean Eduardo de los Angeles, have since declared that none of the lawyers or officers of the corporation had ever authorized the release of the Yerkes affidavit. In any event, Mr. Justice Gutierrez has since made public his own affidavit in indignant traverse of the Yerkes document; and two [2] other experts commissioned by the PLDT have submitted studies and reports impugning the Yerkes conclusions. Emphasis supplied. Emphasis supplied. See [Endnote] 5, supra.
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
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N.B.: However, in his column of Feb. 4, 1993, he had written: there is really no need [for the Ad Hoc Committee] to summon me. The Committee can go by the many things I have written in my column about corruption in the judiciary. See [Endnotes] 4, supra, and 19, infra. 166 SCRA at 353-355; Emphasis in the original. Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, 1983 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 71, citing 1 Cammarota 159. Op. cit., at p. 63; citing Borrell Macia, pp. 87-89. See [Endnote] 1, page 2, supra. E.g., Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 [1991]; Patricia T. Juinio v. Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr., A. M. No. MTJ-91-565, Aug. 30, 1993; Media v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457 [1988]; Office of the Court Administrator v. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508 [1992]; Vistan v. Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524 [1991]; NISA v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 [1991]. See, e.g., Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 [1988]. See [Endnote] 6, supra. See [Endnotes] 4 and 12, supra. See p. 10, supra. Said Sec. 15, Par. IV, supersedes the provision in Circular No. 7 that the Executive Judge shall have no authority to act on any incidental or interlocutory matter in any case not yet assigned to any branch by raffle. Subhead 1. Basic Postulates, at pages 1 and 2; and Sub-head 5. Norms for Proper Exercise of Press Freedom, at pp. 12 to 15, supra. 166 SCRA 316 [1988]. 69 Phil. 265 [1939]. Id., at p. 273, 274-275; See In Re Brillantes, 42 O.G. No. 1, p. 59; and In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 595-596. The case is, as indicated earlier in this opinion [Sub-Head No. 3, pp. 5-6],G. R. No. 94374 [Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Telecommunications Commission and Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)], decided by the Court En Banc on August 27, 1992; and the signed Resolution disposing of the respondents motion for reconsideration of said Decision of August 27, 1992, was promulgated on February 21, 1995.
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15 16 17
17a 18 19 20 21
22
23 24 25
26
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Adm. Matter No. 90-5-2373. In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado. Jr., a.k.a. Emil Jurado, Extended Resolution, July 12, 1990. Specially that concerning an alleged Hongkong vacation of six [6] unnamed Justices of the Supreme Court and their families which had been paid for by a public utility firm and arranged by a travel agency patronized by the latter; and that relative to an alleged party by a bank for certain unnamed Justices and judges [See Sub-Head 3, a and b]. In Gertz v. Robert Welch., 418 U.S. 323, 340. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75. Orfanel v. People, 30 SCRA 819, 828-829. See [Endnote] 24, supra. 69 Phil. 265, 277, 279.
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________________________________________ PUNO, J., Dissenting:

1
Named alternate members were Associate Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Josue M. Bellosillo, and Irene R. Cortes [Retired]. Report and Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee created under Adm. Order No. 11-93 dated May 7, 1993, pp. 1-2. Enacted on October 5, 1946. Sec. 4, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press. But see Justice Frankfurters concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 US 77, 90-99 [1949]. Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US 130, 145 [1967]. Sec. 1, Article II of the Constitution provides: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. 6 Writings of James Madison 397 [Hunt Ed. 1906]. L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression, [1960]. 8 Annot. 7 ALR 3rd 591, 592-596 [1966]; J. Wigmore, Evidence, S. 2286 [McNaughton ed., 1961]; Garland v. Torre, 259 F2d 545 [2nd Cir., 1958]; People Ex Rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 1991 N.E. 415 [1936].
3 4
6 7
8 9 10
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E.g. Laws of Alabama, Arizona, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, and Ohio. E.g. Laws of Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. Garfand v. Torre 259 F2d 545 [2d Cir]; In Re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P2d 472 [1961]; State v. Buchanan, 205 Ore 244, 436 P2d 729 [1968]. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US 135, 175 [1927]. See Garland v. Torre, supra, [Endnote] 13. 82 Phil. Reports 230 [1948]. 362 US 60 [1960]. Ibid at p. 65. 80 Phil. 71. 31 SCRA 731 [1970]. 125 SCRA 553 [1983]. 126 SCRA 233 [1983]. 376 US 254. 379 US 64. See also Time, Inc., v, Hill, 150 US 374; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts; and Walker v. Associated Press, 388 US 130. 376 US 254, 279-80. Id. 4 Elliots Debates on the Federal Constitution 571 [1876] as cited in 48 Fordham Law Review 694, 701 [1980]. See dissenting opinion of Justice Powell in Saxbe v. Washington Post. Co., 417 US 843, 863 [1974]. Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 US 233, 250 [1938].
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26 27 28
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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC August 8, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20 AND 21, 2007. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at kalayaang panghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for indirect contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other. The Antecedents The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, reproduced as follows: September 18, 2007 Bribery in the Court A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week. Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans.
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Believing that the gift might be something perishable, she opened the box. Indeed, it was a gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead. She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did. The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or her did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal with money a boxful of it. The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached. The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves. Heres the clue The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady justice. My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he wont confide to me the identity of the jurist. Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should as a matter of duty we will never know who
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this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices. The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals. Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth. That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? September 19, 2007 The Bribe Giver I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged. It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect. The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes. Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court. I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The
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late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. September 20, 2007 Cecilia, please save the court I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas. The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake. Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls. More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss. Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution. The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them. September 21, 2007 Wrong date, same facts On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady
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justice of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported. It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March. She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the Court. She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not report for work on that day. Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She was fired. Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands. Where is Cecilia? I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court. Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en banc. Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know up to now.
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It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way. The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who she is. It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.1 The September 18, 2007 article, the first of the series of articles, caught the attention of Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief of the Supreme Court Public Information Office, in the course of his monitoring the daily news reports and columns in major newspapers. However, since it was vague about which court was being referred to, whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals,2 ACA Marquez opted to merely note it.3 The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery happened in the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his September 19, 2007 article, wrote, among others, that I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court x x x. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Also on September 20, 2007, at around 6:00 p.m., Marites Daguilan-Vitug, Editor in Chief of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago asking for three things 1. In (sic) April 13, 2007, you concurred with a decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse
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of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. However, five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration, you reversed yourself and ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. Please explain the circumstances that led to this reversal. 2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million after you issued the decision early September. Please comment. 3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this incident that you removed her.4 Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez, showed him the letter of Daguilan-Vitug, and requested him to tell Daguilan-Vitug that she (Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a giftwrapped box containing money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back to his office, called up Daguilan-Vitug and told her what Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.5 That same evening, at around seven, Daguilan-Vitug faxed the corrected version of the earlier letter 1. On April 13, 2007, you dissented against the decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. The vote was 3-2 in favor of Callejas (sic) decision. Five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration (by that time, Callejo had already retired), you ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. I understand the exchanges were bitter and the deliberations long. Please explain the contentious issues. 2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million in March 2007 in the midst of
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deliberations on the case. Please comment. 3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this incident that you removed her in March 2007.6 The following day, September 21, 2007, respondent Macasaet, in his column, named the supposed secretary who was forthwith x x x fired allegedly after opening the box of money: It turns out that Cecilia Muoz Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March. From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million in five different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis who was forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes. Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA Marquez to have the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st September 2007 Business Circuit columns of respondent Macasaet included in the September 25, 2007 agenda of the Court En Banc,7 which case was docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC. (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007). On September 24, 2007, Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis, accompanied by the Clerk of Court En Banc, Hon. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, went to see Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago and gave the latter copies of her letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis, in her letter to respondent Macasaet, described his articles as baseless reports. In other words, she wrote respondent Macasaet, the scenario you painted and continue to paint is improbable and could only have emanated from a polluted source, who, unfortunately, chose me to be a part of this fictional charge. She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer, and not a secretary as the articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned from office and was
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not fired; that as a matter of procedure, she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty assigned to their utility personnel; that it was highly unlikely for something as blatant as [a] bribery attempt to have been done right in the doors of the Court.8 Delis ended her letter to respondent Macasaet with a plea My family and I have been suffering ever since your article came out last Tuesday, because I was being alluded to. This suffering has increased because the name of my beloved aunt x x x has been drawn into a controversy that should not have involved me or any member of my family in the first place. And so, I ask you, Sir, to please cease from mentioning my name or any of my relatives, living or deceased, in order to promote your tabloid journalism. If your source is as reliable as you believe, I suggest you practice better judgment and journalistic responsibility by verifying your data before printing anything and affecting the lives of innocent people. If this is some kind of war you are waging against the lady justice, we do not want to be collateral damage.9 In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery,10 and that she executed her affidavit to allow Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago to defend her honor,11 and for the purpose of correcting the erroneous information of Mr. Macasaet.12 That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez and Daguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written by Danguilan-Vitug herself and Aries Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled Supreme Court Justice Suspected of Accepting Payoff (update)13 with the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago We pieced the story of the alleged bribery from accounts of various sources within and outside the Supreme Court who have requested not to be named because of their sensitive disclosures.
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In March this year, Ynares-Santiago fired her staff member, Cecilia Delis, supposedly after the latter opened a giftwrapped box delivered to their office, thinking that it contained perishable items. Delis, however, found wads of peso bills instead. The amount, two sources say, is estimated at P10 million.14 Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and gave him copies of her written statement categorically deny(ing) the accusations and insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak; and underscoring that these are blatant lies clearly aimed at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now.15 Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to Mme. Justice YnaresSantiago earlier that morning.16 In the afternoon of September 24, 2007, ACA Marquez held a press conference and released to the media copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet, her affidavit, and the written statement of Mme. Justice Santiago.17 On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet in the September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that certain statements and innuendoes therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.18
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The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article entitled Supreme Court Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a banner headline, This is not meant to chill the media. On October 16, 2007, the Court En Banc noted respondent Macasaets Explanation dated October 1, 2007,19 and directed the Clerk of Court to include in the records of the case the affidavit of Delis dated September 24, 2007. The High Court also created an investigating committee composed of retired Supreme Court justices, namely, Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson; and Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., as members, to receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The Committee may, on its own, call such persons who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed with all the powers necessary to discharge its duty. The Committee was likewise directed to submit its report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from the start of its hearing.20 Retired Justices Mendoza and Callejo, however, both begged off and were eventually replaced by retired Supreme Court Justices Jose C. Vitug21 and Justo P. Torres.22 The Investigation From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned. The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as their testimonies on direct examination.23 They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Daguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively. According to the Committee
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AMADO P. MACASAET testified on January 10, 2008 but, as expected, he invoked his right under R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477 to refuse to disclose the source/s of his story regarding the rumored bribery of a Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Consuelo YnaresSantiago) of a high court (later revealed as the Supreme Court) who allegedly received Php 10 million contained in a gift-wrapped Carnation carton box (later changed to five [5] gift-wrapped boxes), for deciding a criminal case in favor of a rich Chinese-Filipino businessman. (Pls. see columns of September 18 and 19, 2007) The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia MuozDelis (not the Lady Justices secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential Electoral Tribunal) who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, allegedly opened the last box (according to his column of September 21, 2007 titled Wrong date same facts); but the first (according to his testimony on January 10, 2008, pp. 71, 89, 92, 125, tsn). By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on different dates because I dont think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the same time (87, tsn, January 10, 2008). Macasaet testified that his source is not a relative of his, nor a government employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he (Macasaet) has known him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn, January 10, 2008). Significantly, in his column of September 19, 2007, Macasaet revealed that he did not have only one source, but several sources, i.e., some lawyers, who told him that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged. He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source with my heart and soul and believes his word as coming straight out of the Bible (94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008; 14, tsn, January 17, 2008). But because this source did not have direct knowledge of the bribery (26, tsn, January
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10, 2008), he allegedly tried to verify from other sources the information he had received, but I could not get confirmation (29, tsn, January 10, 2008). Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet believes that the bribery had actually taken place because I trust my source with my heart and soul (93-94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008). He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he thought that eventually my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that (was) what really happened (29, tsn, January 10, 2008). He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated September 21, 2007 from Cecilia Muoz-Delis, the Cecilia mentioned in his columns, denying any knowledge of the alleged bribery or boxes of money for she had already resigned (not dismissed) from the Court on March 15, 2007, six (6) months before the alleged bribery supposedly occurred a week before Macasaet wrote about it in his column of September 18, 2007. (Annex A, Letter dated September 21, 2007 of Cecilia Delis to Macasaet) So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in his first column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift-wrapped box of money was delivered to the office of the Lady Justice, a day last week when the Lady Justice did not report for work. That must have been sometime on September 10-14, 2007 the week before September 18, 2007. However, the next day, September 19, 2007, he wrote in his column that the delivery of five boxes (not just one box) of money, coincided on the day that the Lady Justice, acting as ponente, dismissed the criminal case against ChineseFilipino businessman Henry T. Go in the Sandiganbayan. That must be September 3, 2007 because the Resolution
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in G.R. No. 172602 Henry T. Go versus The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, et al. was promulgated on that date. This he affirmed when he testified on January 10, 2008 (46, 74, tsn, January 10, 2008). However, when he returned to the witness chair on January 17, 2008, after going back to his informant (on his own request) to ascertain the dates when the boxes of money were delivered to the Office of Justice Santiago, so that the Investigating Committee could subpoena the relevant logbooks of the Security Services of the Court to verify the truth of the alleged deliveries, Macasaet again changed his earlier testimonies on date/dates of the deliveries. He informed the Committee that, according to his informant, the deliveries were made between November 2006 and March 2007; before Cecilia Delis resigned or was dismissed from the Court.24 On March 11, 2008 the Investigating Committee submitted to the Office of the Chief Justice its March 10, 2008 Report and Recommendation,25 with the following findings of facts on the subject columns The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme Court to be innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 1) From the column of Tuesday, September 18, 2007 The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are rotten. That makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicion that they are thieves. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this
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case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or, is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? 2) From the column of Wednesday, September 19, 2007 The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. 3) From the column of Thursday, September 20, 2007 Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as Macasaets snide remarks about the courts, particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices being suspected as thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the rumored bribery in the Court, the Investigating Committee was constrained to find out how true the accusations were and whether the columnist had exercised due care and diligence in checking out the credibility of his informant and the veracity of the derogatory information fed to him before he published it in his columns in the Malaya.26 Additional observations and conclusion were submitted, like the following The Committee finds that neither Macasaets columns in Malaya, nor Ms. Vitugs story in Newsbreak, about the pay-off of Php 10 million to Justice Consuelo YnaresSantiago for rendering a Resolution favorable to Henry T. Go in his petition against the Sandiganbayan (according to Macasaet), or, a decision favoring Barque against Manotok in a big land case (according to Ms. Vitug), have a leg to stand on. As Justice Vitug has observed during the last hearing before the Committee, everything that has been heard thus far would appear to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted there is no paper trail to support the charge of bribery against Justice Santiago, for although her sources had pointed to Cecilia Muoz Delis as the root source of the story, the information she received was second-hand or may be third-hand because none of her sources had talked with
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Delis herself (70, 72 tsn Jan. 17, 2008). Delis had refused to be interviewed by her, and had emphatically denied in her letter and affidavit any knowledge of the alleged bribery because she was no longer working in the Court when it supposedly happened. Macasaets sources likewise fed him double hearsay information from a source that refused to reveal the identity of the Lady Justice nor a high court but alleged that the Php 10 million bribe was discovered by her secretary named Cecilia, a niece and namesake of the late Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, who was fired from her job on account of it. The Committee observed that Macasaets story about the bribery and of Cecilias role in supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before giving it publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict on the reputation of a member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was happy that he wrote the columns (103 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the bribery, one day sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny it. He did not care that he smeared the whole Judiciary to fish her out, because after she is fished out, the suspicion on the rest would be removed (29-30 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).27 (Emphasis supplied) The Committee likewise noted the inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying lack of veracity of the alleged bribery 1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story given to him by his source. Later, he said that his sources told me they had personal knowledge but would not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65, tsn, January 10, 2008). 2. His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did not report for work last week, i.e., the week before his first column came out on September 18,
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2007, was refuted by the Courts Public Information Officer (PIO) Atty. Midas Marquez, who testified that no Lady Justice was absent that week. 3. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by Cecilia is also uncertain because of Macasaets conflicting allegations about it. Macasaets first column of September 18, 2007, stated that it happened last week, i.e., sometime in the week of September 10-14, 2007. The next day, September 19, 2007, he, however, wrote in his column that the five boxes (not one) of money were delivered on the day (September 3, 2007) when the Lady Justice, acting as ponente, acquitted the accused Henry T. Go. But again, because his story about Cecilias role in the discovery of the bribery in September 2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilias resignation from the Court on March 15, 2007 (Annexes D and D-1, Cecilia Delis Letter of Resignation & Clearance), Macasaet, after consulting his source again, changed his story when he testified on January 17, 2008. He said that, according to his source, the boxes of money were delivered, not any one time in September 2007, but on different dates in November 2006 up to March 2007, before Cecilia resigned or was fired from the office of Justice Santiago (5-6, tsn, January 17, 2008). That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services for the period of November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of the alleged deliveries of boxes of money to the office of Justice Santiago. Danilo Pablo, head of the Courts Security Services affirmed that in his ten (10) years of service in the Court, he has not received any report of boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices (45-46, tsn, January 22, 2008).28 The Committee further wondered which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded money. It found 1. x x x In his column of September 21, 2007, Macasaet alleged that Cecilia picked up the five boxes of money several times
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in March (not last week as I mistakenly reported), and she never opened the first four boxes x x x she opened the last and saw the money because the Lady Justice was absent on that day. But when he testified before the Committee on January 10, 2008, Macasaet alleged that it was the first one that was opened according to his source (71, 89, 92, 125, tsn, January 10, 2008). 2. Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered on the day the Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the investigation that they were delivered on different occasions according to my source (70, tsn, January 10, 2008). But no sooner had he attributed that information to my source than he admitted that it was only my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver of the money is not so stupid as to have them delivered all in one trip. As a matter of fact, I even wondered why said boxes were not delivered in the home of the Lady Justice (72, tsn, January 10, 2008). 3. The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift was estimated at Php 10 million, he later testified on January 10, 2008 that the amount was my own calculation because I talked to people, I said this kind of box how much money in One Thousand Pesos bills can it hold, he told me it is ten (million). So that was a calculation (77, tsn, January 10, 2008). He also merely assumed that the money was in one thousand pesos bills (78, tsn, January 10, 2008). No one really knows their denomination. He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was this milk called carnation in carton (79, tsn, January 10, 2008). But, at the final hearing on February 1, 2008, he denied that said that, I never said carnation boxes; I said milk boxes that should make a lot of difference
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(84, tsn, February 1, 2008). 4. Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted that he has no knowledge of whether the four (4) other boxes were also opened, when and where they were opened, and by whom they were opened (90, tsn, January 10, 2008). Therefore, no one knows whether they also contained money. That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another assumption of Macasaets. It is a calculation based on estimates obtained from friends and how much five boxes can hold in one thousand peso bills, more or less ten million, he explained (91, tsn, January 10, 2008). The sin of assumption which is a cardinal sin in Newsbreaks Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct was repeatedly committed by Macasaet in writing his story about the bribery of a Lady Justice of the Supreme Court. (Annex E, page 1, Newsbreak Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct).29 Consequently, the Committee concluded In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaets columns of September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitugs Newsbreak issue of September 25, 2007, unbelievable. Why should five boxes supposedly containing a total of Php 10 million as bribe money be delivered to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme Court, where it would have to pass examination by the security guards and the quizzical eyes of her own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some agreed meeting place outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her bank account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the presumably agreed date for the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for dismissing the information against Henry Go in the Sandiganbayan, why was it paid prematurely in November 2006-March 2007 when the case of Henry Go was still up in the air and, in fact, was decided against him on April 13, 2007? The favorable resolution on his motion for reconsideration, penned by Justice Santiago, was promulgated on September 3, 2007, almost one year
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after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-off? xxxx The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of expression by media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great circumspection so as not to destroy reputations, integrity and character so dear to every individual, more so to a revered institution like the Supreme Court. Everyone deserves respect and dignity.30 Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the Committee recommended The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P. Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his Business Circuit columns in the September 18-21, 2007 issues of the newspaper Malaya, maligning and degrading the Supreme Court and tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, to be utterly unjustified. WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.31 (Emphasis supplied) Our Ruling IN view of respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a defense, it is essential to first examine the nature and evolution of this preferred liberty, together with the countervailing interest of judicial independence, which includes the right to due process of law, the right to a fair trial, and the preservation of public confidence in the courts for the proper administration of justice. Nature and History of Press Freedom Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of
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the press, is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. It has been recognized as such for centuries. The history of press freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in 1215, which established the principle that not even the lawmaker should be above the law. Through the years, many treatises on press freedom arose in reaction to various measures taken to curtail it. In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical defense of the right to free speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order of June 14, 1643, which declared that no book, pamphlet, paper, nor part of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed, bound, stitched or put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be first approved of and licensed under the hands of such person or persons as both, or either of the said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same. Milton advocated that a written work should not be suppressed before publication. Writers of treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous materials should first be tried according to law. Only after it has been established that their writings are of a treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous nature should they be subsequently punished for their wrongful acts. Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist, in his still widely cited historical and analytical treatise on English common law, aptly described the twin aspects of press freedom: x x x Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the
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preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.32 (Emphasis supplied) In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the First Amendment to its Constitution, declaring that Congress shall make no law x x x abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. This set in stone the basis for virtually all contemporary laws and jurisprudence on the subject of press freedom. Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution, which in part provides that [n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press x x x x, is a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.33 Media and Its Multiplying Roles in Democracy Due to their preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press have progressed dramatically. As early as 1942, even before the advent of television, the distinguished U.S. appellate court Judge Learned Hand had already observed that [t]he hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine, rules the country. He concluded that medias power was an unchangeable fact of life: Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. There is much truth today in those statements. One of the notable features of recent years is the accelerated development of the media. They have grown from strength to strength, and have substantially influenced people, either favorably or unfavorably, towards those in government. The use of information technology has firmed up the media networkshold on power. Traditional media for mass communication newspapers,
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magazines, radio, and standard television have been joined by satellite and cable television, electronic mail, short messaging and multi-media service, and the internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic news and information companies to even intensify their influence over the general public. Studies show that people rely heavily on the media for their knowledge of events in the world and for impressions that form the basis for their own judgments. The media exert a strong influence on what people think and feel. Certainly, the power of Philippine media is of no small measure The power of the press to influence politics is proven. Policy issues and the implementation of government programs requiring greater public discussion are sometimes displaced in the government agenda by matters that have been given more importance in the news. Public officials are obliged to attend to media queries even if these are not necessarily the most important questions of the day. Nowhere in Southeast Asia are government officials so accessible to the press. Cabinet ministers are available from the earliest hours to answer questions from radio show hosts on the news of the day involving their responsibilities. Furthermore, television news programs have spawned media celebrities whose popularity with the masses has catapulted their entry into politics. Medias focus on celebrity has infected the political culture with exaggerated concern for personality and color, and the kind of impact associated with sports and entertainment. Political parties have tended to recruit popular figures from these fields to assure they have winners in the race for seats in Congress.34 The reach of Philippine media is quite extensive In the Philippines radio has the biggest audience among all the mass media (85 percent), followed by television at 74 percent, and print, 32 percent. Print, however, has an 82 percent reach in Metropolitan Manila, which has a population of some 10 million and is the countrys business, political, and cultural center. Print may thus be surmised
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to be as influential in the capital as television, which has a reach of 96 percent among residents.35 The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens with relevant information to help them make informed decisions about public issues affecting their lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the necessary exchange of ideas through fair and open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the years, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of being the freest and liveliest in Asia.36 Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been protective and assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials and agencies. They have been adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of government. They uphold the citizens right to know, and make public officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or misdeeds. Through their watchdog function, the media motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the citizens right to an effective, efficient and corrupt-free government. Open Justice and Judicial Independence Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize and criticize government. The freedom to question the government has been a protected right of long-standing tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over 200 years ago, American judges have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.37 This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public,
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this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice.38 While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.39 Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The debate over the independence of the judiciary is nothing new. More than 200 years ago, the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution engaged in heated arguments, both before and after the Constitutional Convention, focusing on the extent and nature of the judiciarys role in the newly-formed government.40 The signers of the Declaration of Independence, well aware of the oppressive results of the unchecked political power of the King of England who established absolute tyranny over American colonies, recognized the importance of creating a stable system of justice to protect the people. Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure that the rule of law shall rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-tiered system of government, so structured that no branch holds limitless power. The judicial branch is described as the least dangerous branch of government.41 But it holds a special place in the tripartite system, as it is primarily responsible for protecting basic human liberties from government encroachment. It completes the nations system of checks and balances. It serves as an arbiter of disputes between factions and instruments of government. In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial power, which includes the duty x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
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excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.42 The present judicial system allows the people to rely upon our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather than on the streets. To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.43 One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits public attention. Public awareness, debate, and criticism of the courts ensure that people are informed of what they are doing that have broad implications for all citizens. Informed discussion, comment, debate and disagreement from lawyers, academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of a great legal tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the law.
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But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the peoples confidence in the courts.
Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government. Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable consequences.44 First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy. Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy. Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,45 this Court ruled that [f ]rom the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom
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of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.46
In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales,47 it was held that while the right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is when it hits the nose of another. Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be overridden by important countervailing interests, such as state security, public order, safety of individual citizens, protection of reputation, and due process of law, which encompasses not only the right to a fair trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the proper administration of justice. As early as 1930, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George Malcolm, declared that [a]s important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.48 In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez,49 the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
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words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it: x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.50 Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil and political rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),51 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),52 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),53 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)54 protect both freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which guarantees the right of individuals to be equal before the courts and tribunals and be entitled to a fair x x x hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, where [t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the Parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in
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the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x. Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied) Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who obstruct their processes. The judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own independence. The respect accorded to judges is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for impartial judges in the creation of a civil society. In the words of the great political philosopher John Locke The great and chief end, therefore, for mens uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property, to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting x x x there wants an established, settled, known law x x x there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law x x x there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.55 (Emphasis supplied) A Survey of Philippine Jurisprudence The very first case decided by the Supreme Court, In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the
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Court of First Instance of Pampanga,56 was a contempt proceeding. Before, as it is now, this Court had to use this power to impress upon contemnors the legal theory and constitutional premises of judicial legitimacy complementing popular sovereignty and public interest. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice James Smith stated that contempt proceedings against a contemnor were against someone who had done an act or was about to do such act which was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.57 Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of offenses that have attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the administration of justice. In 1916, Amzi B. Kelly was fined P1,000 and sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court after he published a letter to the editor of The Independent criticizing the Court for its decision to hold him in contempt for having published a book stating that various government officials, including the members of the Supreme Court, were guilty of politically assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was executed for the killing of a political rival in 1915.58 In 1949, Atty. Vicente Sotto was fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in the Manila Times objecting to one of the High Courts decisions, citing that such decision by the majority was but another evidence of the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members and called for the resignation of the Courts entire membership in the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years.59 In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,60 in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to four (4) Justices of the Supreme Court (all members of the First Division), stated among others It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of (case cited) by an untenable minute-resolution x x x which we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.
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We consider the three minute-resolutions x x x railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the SC under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot. For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated x x x. Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question x x x. In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid having injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. x x x If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.61 The letter to one of the Justices further stated We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation x x x. Please do not take this matter lightly. x x x The moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.62 These letters were referred by the First Division en consulta to the Court en banc. True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Ilustre filed on December 16, 1986 an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging, among others, some Justices
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of both the Supreme Court and the CA with knowingly and deliberately rendering unjust resolutions. On January 29, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc required Ilustre to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her foregoing statements, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the justices concerned which, unless satisfactorily explained, transcended the permissible bounds of propriety and undermined and degraded the administration of justice. In her answer, Ilustre contended, inter alia, that she had no intention to affront the honor and dignity of the Court; that the letters to the individual justices were private in character; that the Court was estopped, having failed to immediately take disciplinary proceedings against her; and that the citation for contempt was a vindictive reprisal against her. The Supreme Court found her explanation unsatisfactory. The claim of lack of evil intention was disbelieved in the face of attendant circumstances. Reliance on the privacy of communication was likewise held as misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial records and are a matter of public concern for the entire Court. (Underscoring supplied) The Court likewise stated that it was only in the exercise of forbearance that it refrained from immediately issuing a showcause order, expecting that she and her lawyer would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Neither was there any vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. In resum, the Court found that Ilustre had transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice: (a) in her letters addressed to the individual Justices, quoted in the show-cause Resolution,
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particularly the underlined portions thereof; (b) in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted in the same Resolution; (c) in her statement, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned and her description of improper motives; and (d) in her unjustified outburst that she could no longer expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letter was not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.63 Ilustre was fined P1,000.00 for contempt, evidently considered as indirect, taking into account the penalty imposed and the fact that the proceedings taken were not summary in nature. In Perkins v. Director of Prisons,64 the Court had an occasion to examine the fundamental foundations of the power to punish for contempt: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.65 The Court there held that the exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself, and has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Being a common-law power, inherent in all courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into existence they became vested with it. It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so far as we know, has been universally admitted and recognized.66 After World War II, this Court reiterated it had an inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court.67 This power to punish for contempt is
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necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice x x x. It is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties-litigant.68 These twin principles were to be succinctly cited in the later case of Zaldivar v. Gonzales.69 Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must be caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible exercise of his awesome prerogative presents itself. The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,70 should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. But when called for, most especially when needed to preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this principle bears importance. In the 1995 case People v. Godoy,71 the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto,72 had the opportunity to define the relations of the courts and of the press. Quoting the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. v. Sullen,73 the Court said: The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not hesitate to exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.74 (Emphasis supplied)
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Thus, while the Court in Godoy agreed that our Constitution and our laws recognize the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press, these two constitutional guaranties must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Quoting Godoy further Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.75 Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui,76 the Court en banc in a unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty. Romeo Roxas for making unfair and unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for allegedly being part of the wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice. We found the letter of Atty. Roxas full of contemptuous remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. We also said that his invocation of free speech and privacy of communication will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Accordingly, Atty. Roxas was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would warrant a more severe penalty. Application of Existing Jurisprudence to the Case at Bar In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the conflicting constitutional considerations
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respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of a just society. The apparently conflicting constitutional considerations summed up by a distinguished former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice H.R. Khanna, bears a hand in resolving the issue There are one or two matters to which I would like to make pointed reference in the context of the freedom of the press. One of them relates to the danger of trial by the press. Certain aspects of a case are so much highlighted by the press that the publicity gives rise to strong public emotions. The inevitable effect of that is to prejudice the case of one party or the other for a fair trial. We must consider the question as to what extent are restraints necessary and have to be exercised by the press with a view to preserving the purity of judicial process. At the same time, we have to guard against another danger. A person cannot x x x by starting some kind of judicial proceedings in respect of matter of vital public importance stifle all public discussions of that matter on pain of contempt of court. A line to balance the whole thing has to be drawn at some point. It also seems necessary in exercising the power of contempt of court x x x vis--vis the press that no hyper-sensitivity is shown and due account is taken of the proper functioning of a free press in a democratic society. This is vital for ensuring the health of democracy. At the same time, the press must also keep in view its responsibility and see that nothing is done as may bring the courts x x x into disrepute and make people lose faith in these institution(s). One other matter which must not be lost sight of is that while comment is free, facts are sacred.77 We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and
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efficient judiciary. Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable media practitioners, respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible tale, adorned it with some facts to make it lifelike, but impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which, when digested entirely by an unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles that bribery occurred in the High Court, based on specious information, without any regard for the injury such would cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective administration of justice. Nor did he give any thought to the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled allusions would have on a member of the Court. The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found respondent feigning his highest respect for this Court Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest respect for this Court (10, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); his declaration that he has always upheld the majesty of the law as interpreted by the Court (96, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that his opinion of the Court has actually been elevated ten miles up because of its decisions in the cases involving Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and the Peoples Initiative (97, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that he has done everything to preserve the integrity and majesty of the Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008); that he wants the integrity of the Court preserved
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because this is the last bastion of democracy (32, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008). These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and injury that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have wrought upon the institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, nowhere in his columns do we find a single word of respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of the Court. On the contrary, what we find are allegations of pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves, that the Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme Court has a sagging reputation. He admitted that the rumor about the courts being dirty referred specifically (to) the Supreme Court (100, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008) and was based on personal conclusion which (was), in turn, based on confidential information fed to me. It is in that respect that I thought that I have (a) duty to protect and keep the Honor of this Court (98, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008). He unburdened his heretofore hidden anger, if not disgust, with the Court when he clarified that the word dirty x x x is not necessarily related to money (101, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008). It is my belief that lack of familiarity with the law is x x x kind of dirty referring to then Associate Justice Artemio Panganibans support for, and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.s act of swearing into office then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Acting President of the Philippines even while then President Joseph Estrada was still in Malacaang, which Macasaet believed to be quite a bit of dirt (102-106, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008).78 To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech.79 To allow respondent to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of this liberty.
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Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice. We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or not.80 Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which he swears with his heart and soul81 was found by the Investigating Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.82 Respondent Macasaets wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the number of boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own admission founded on personal assumptions. This nonchalant attitude extended to his very testimony before the investigating committee Justice Aquino: You did not endeavor to verify the information given by your source before publishing the story about the bribery? Mr. Macasaet: I tried, I could not get confirmation, I thought that eventually my effort at consistently trying or exposing the alleged bribery one day sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny.
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xxxx Justice Vitug: Do you confirm the fact of authorship of the columns of September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007? Mr. Macasaet: On a stack of Bible, I confirm it. Justice Vitug: Does that mean that you also confirm the accuracy of those information that were said? Mr. Macasaet: I am not confirming the accuracy of the information and I think that is precisely the reason for this hearing, I must repeat that the purpose is to fish [the Lady Justice] out so that the rest of the Lady Justices in all the Courts suspicion can be removed from them. I failed in the sense that one denied, she felt alluded to and said she is not involved.83 Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.84 That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate date when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the persons involved, or any other important detail, before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that he did not care whether or not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go on a fishing expedition to see if someone would confirm or deny his now clearly baseless accusations. This practice of fishing for information by publishing unverified information in a manner that leads the reading public to believe such is true cannot be tolerated. Aggravating respondents affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before
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the Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published the instant articles, he replied that he was happy in the sense that [he] did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the investigating panel].85 However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied by the fact that he could have caused the creation of an investigating panel to look into such allegations in a more rational and prudent manner. In the words of the Investigating Committee If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his columns was to save the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and could, have reported the rumored bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked for its investigation. He should have refrained from calling the Court names, before giving it a chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to investigate the matter. Since he knew the name of the Court employee who allegedly discovered the bribe money, the Court could have begun its investigation with her to ascertain the identity of the nameless Lady Justice and the veracity of the rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about the Court and jurists in conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were totally uncalled for and unjustified.86 It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept the findings of the Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of responsible journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable people who serve it. Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which partly states that x x x members of the Supreme Court x x x may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x x x bribery x x x and Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that [t]he House of
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Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case of impeachment. We cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no impeachment complaint has been filed against Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, his cited constitutional provisions do not come into play. Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his articles were published, no formal charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed, by an order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be punished for contempt. Our Resolution dated September 25, 2007 satisfies the Rule. He cannot validly claim that such resolution is vague. He cannot feign ignorance of the contents of his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles in the Malaya. Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides: SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt. xxxx (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; xxxx SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand
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pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x (Underscoring supplied) We are not unaware of the vigorous dissent of then Associate Justice, now our Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno, in an earlier case,87 in which he so lucidly argued for the right to journalistic shield, behind which the Dissenting Opinion of an esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Carpio, and respondent Macasaet, take full refuge. While we hold his thesis in high regard, the case at bar does not fall within his erudite defense of press freedom. The critical issues then were the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their confidential sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand. Be that as it may, elementary decision-making teaches that we cite the majority opinion as precedent, not lonely dissenting opinions.88 In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally defective for patent denial of due process89 because when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right.90 He continues to say that [w]ith the procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize.91 We disagree on triple grounds. First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee. Suffice it to say that the Dissenting Opinion which cites People v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a contempt proceeding,92 fails to state what Godoy likewise instructs Strictly speaking however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved
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is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.93 Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to crossexamine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was violated. The right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face,94 can be waived when not timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite the opportunity to do so. During the entire course of the proceedings in the Committee, respondent was vigorously represented by counsel de parte. Respondent or his counsel could have moved to cross-examine the adverse witnesses. Respondent had every opportunity to do so. Lamentably, he failed to exercise the said right. Interestingly, during the last hearing date, counsel for respondent requested that respondent be allowed to say something, which the Committee granted. Respondent then proceeded with a lengthy discourse, all of 45 pages, on everything and anything, except his right to cross-examination.95 Verily, it cannot be validly claimed now that his right to cross-examine was violated. Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to
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cross-examine the witnesses against respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel, which is absurd. Just a Word More A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold government officials and agencies including an independent judiciary accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press has become an important actor a judicial watchdog in the ongoing judicial transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function. Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government. Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of the law and judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw faulty conclusions which they pass on to their readers as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of judges as the public is fed with partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured to decide in accordance with the public opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined when judges rule against the expectations of the public which has been brainwashed by dramatic reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked rumors or allegations of irregularities are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to verify the information, or are
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simply eager to break the news and attract a wider readership. The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes developed by the press, as its selfregulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and popular pressure. Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential part of the checks and balances in our republican system of government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its constitutionally-mandated duties. As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:96 Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve. xxxx But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. x x x97
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All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which cross the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be avoided. They do a great disservice to the Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of the judiciary. While all citizens have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too important line. Senator Ernesto Maceda, the seasoned politician who has graced both the executive and the legislative departments in various capacities, in a Privilege Speech, once appealed for voluntary selfrestraint with respect to this Court There are proper procedures for dealing with instances of official misdemeanor without setting an entire institution on fire. Arson is not the best means for pest-control. In case of possibility of corruption in the Supreme Court, one possible means is the initiation of impeachment proceedings against specifically identified justices. A move for impeachment, of course, requires much sobriety and solid evidence. Whatever charges are brought forward must be substantiated. Those who dare prosecute must come into the open and append their names to the accusations they make, with courage and conviction. This is the manner civil society conserves its civility x x x. The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by crude insinuation or by irresponsible reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by those who choose to throw rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The institutions of our liberty are never enriched by the irresponsible accusations of the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic are not reinforced by those who evade responsibility under the veil of freedom.98 During interpellation, he went on to say x x x And in the context of what I have just said, I think that all newspapers, all media are welcome to do their worse, criticize the members of the Executive Department, Members
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of the Senate, and any other agency of the Government. But I am just suggesting that when it comes to the judiciary, and specifically to the Supreme Court, that a different policy, one of more caution, should be adopted precisely because x x x people may lose faith in the Executive or the President; they may lose faith in Congress, the Congressmen and the Senators, but as long as they have their faith unshaken and complete in the last bulwark of democracy x x x which is the Supreme Court, then our democracy will survive.99 Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional democracy. We, judges, will continue to discharge our judicial functions with fairness. We urge all and sundry to abide by theirs. We need to respect each other. As the golden rule goes let us not do to others what we do not want others to do to us. Igalang natin ang isat-isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang ayaw nating gawin nila sa atin. Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the recalcitrant manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, in accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago *, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de-Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.
_____________________________________________ Footnotes
1 2 3 4 5
Rollo, pp. 2-6. Id. at 138; affidavit of ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, par. 4, p. 1. Id. Id. at 146; faxed letter of Marites Daguilan-Vitug to Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago dated September 20, 2007. Id. at 139-140; affidavit of ACA Marquez, pars. 7-9, pp. 2-3.
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Id. at 147; corrected faxed letter of Marites Danguilan-Vitug to Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago dated September 20, 2007. Id. at 141; affidavit of ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, par. 14, p. 4. Id. at 9-10; letter of Ms. Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis to Mr. Amado P. Macasaet, dated September 21, 2007, pp. 1-2. Id. at 10-11; id. at 2-3. Id. at 7; affidavit of Ms. Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis dated September 24, 2007, par. 8b, p. 1. Id.; id., par. 9, at 1. Id.; id., par. 10, at 10. Id. at 101-103; id. at 1-3. Id. at 101; id. at 1. Id. at 149. Id. at 141; Marquez, par. 15, p. 4. Id. at 141; Marquez, par. 14. Id. at 13; Min. Res. A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007), dated September 25, 2007. Id. at 14-43. In his sworn explanation, Macasaet, assisted by counsel, argued on the following points: 1. His statements were precisely a call for an investigation to preserve the integrity of the Supreme Court and the administration of justice pursuant to the Courts crusade in curbing perceived corruption in the judiciary; 2. In light of revelations not sourced from him, the subject of the statements is already demonstrably under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress; 3. The proceedings for indirect contempt stifles freedom of the press; 4. There was no reckless disregard by the publication of the subject statements and he exerted bona fide efforts to ascertain the truth of such statements; and 5. Under the circumstances, continuation of the proceedings constitutes an unconditional denial of his right to due process of law and equal protection.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19
On November 6, 2007, Macasaet submitted his affidavit practically reiterating his sworn explanation dated October 1, 2007. (Id. at 160-174.)
20 21 22
Id. at 133. No known relation to Ms. Marites Daguilan-Vitug. Rollo, pp. 223-229. Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza resigned from the Committee upon finding out that the allegations of bribery involved an executive of PIATCO, a party to an international arbitration case in which he is an expert witness for the Philippine Government, and he did not wish to burden the legal panel of the Philippine Government in the arbitration cases with the task of explaining or justifying his participation in the Investigating Committee. Retired Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., on the other hand, requested to be relieved, as he was the ponente of Go v. Sandiganbayan promulgated on April 13, 2007, while retired Justice Arturo Buena had likewise requested to be inhibited from the investigating committee. These requests were approved by the Court En banc in a Resolution dated November 13, 2007. (Id. at 232.) TSN, October 30, 2007, p. 18. TSN, January 17, 2008, p. 6. Rollo, pp. 326-347; Report and Recommendation (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007), pp. 1-22. Id. at 333; id. at 8. Id. at 340-341; id. at 15-16. Id. at 341-342; id. at 16-17. Id. at 342-343; id. at 17-18. Id. at 343-346; id. at 18-21. Id. at 346-347; id. at 21-22. Blackstone, W., Commentaries, 145 (1876).
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26 27 28 29 30 31 32
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Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates (1987), p. 758. De Jesus, M.Q., Overview, Press Freedom in the Philippines (2004). Teodoro, L.V., Survey of Media, Press Freedom in the Philippines (2004). Guidebook for Journalists Covering the Courts: Strengthening Judiciary-Media Relations, Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication (2004), p. 13. Jacobson, M.K., Assault on the Judiciary: Judicial Response to Criticism Post-Schiavo, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 931 (2007). Attorney-General v. Leveller Magazine, Ltd., AC 440 (1979); Scott v. Scott, AC 417 (1913). Coker, H.C., Responding to Judicial Criticism, 73 Fla. B.J. 10 (1999). Blatz, K., The State of the Judiciary, 62 Bench & B. Minn 26, 27 (2005). The Federalist No. 78. Constitution (1987), Art. VIII, Sec. 1. See Abrahamson, S.S., Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson before the American Bar Association Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Washington, D.C., December 13, 1996, 12 St. Johns J. Legal Comment. 71 (1996). Kelson, S., Judicial Independence and the Blame Game: The Easiest Target Is a Sitting One, 15 Utah B.J. 15-16 (2002). G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, id. at 858. G.R. No. L-32066, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 476. In Re: Lozano, 54 Phil. 801 (1929). G.R. Nos. 79690-707 & L-80578, October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316. Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, id. at 354, citing the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US 331, 354-356 (1946). Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966, entered into force on January 3, 1976. E.T.S. No. 5, adopted November 4, 1950, entered into force on September 3, 1953. Adopted at San Jose, Costa Rica, November 22, 1969, entered into force on July 18, 1978. Adopted at Nairobi, Kenya, June 26, 1981, entered into force on October 21, 1986. Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government (1689), 124-126, reprinted in Locke, J., Political Writings 325 (1985 ed.). 1 Phil. 1 (1901). In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, id. at 2. In Re: Amzi B. Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916). In Re: Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949). In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and of Contempt Proceedings Against Eva Maravilla-Illustre in G.R. No. 68635, entitled Eva Maravilla-Illustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 68635, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382. Id. at 390-391. Id. at 392-393. Id. at 421. 58 Phil. 271 (1933). Perkins v. Director of Prisons, id. at 274, citing Ex parte Terry, 128 US 225, 32 L Ed., 405; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; State v. Magee Publishing Company, 38 ALR 142, 144. Id. at 274-275, citing 4 Lewis Bl. Com., Sec. 286, p. 1675; Oswald, Contempt, Canadian ed., pp. 1-3, 6 RCL 489; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 390; State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 23 ALR 491, 187 NW 830; and People ex rel. Brundage v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223; 26 ALR 16, 137 NE 118. In Re: Vicente Sotto, supra note 59. Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-24864, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 112.
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44 45 46 47 48 49 50
51
52 53 54 55 56 57
58 59 60
61 62 63 64 65
66
67 68
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69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
Supra note 49. 39 Phil. 778 (1919). 312 Phil. 977 (1995). Supra note 59. 36 F. 2d 220. People v. Godoy, supra note 71, at 1003. Id. at 1004. G.R. Nos. 152072 & 152104, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 446. Khanna, H.R., Freedom of Expression with Particular Reference to Freedom of the Media, 2 SCC (Jour) 1 (1982). Rollo, pp. 344-345; Report and Recommendation (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007), pp. 19-20. Id. at 346; id. at 22. See notes 26 and 27. TSN, January 10, 2008, pp. 92-93, 113. See note 28. TSN, January 10, 2008, pp. 28-40. The five Ws and one H: Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How are generally known as the basic information that all news stories should contain. Rollo, p. 103; TSN, January 10, 2008. Id. at 346. In Re: Emil P. Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 299. Then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Puno was joined by Justice Padilla in his Dissenting Opinion in the Jurado case where the Court voted 10-3, with two justices taking no part. Dissenting Opinion, p. 8. Id. Id. at 9. Id. at 7. Supra note 71, at 1001. Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 14 (2). TSN, February 1, 2008, pp. 84-129. G.R. No. 27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562. In Re: Almacen, id. at 578-580. Maceda, E.M., In Defense of the Supreme Court, Privilege Speech delivered on the Senate Floor, February 2, 1993. Id.
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89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
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EN BANC RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., x ----------------------------------- x RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE TO WITNESS THE TRIAL OF THE DECADE TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, x ---------------------------------x RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL. A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC Present: CORONA,* C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and
215
SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: June 14, 2011 A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC ____________________ * On official leave. x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x * On official leave.
RESOLUTION CARPIO MORALES, J.: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City. Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the
216
victims,1 individual journalists2 from various media entities, and members of the academe3 filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.4 The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines5 (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag 6 (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. 7 The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 20108 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial.The President expressed earnest hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic deliberation, attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition merits. 9 The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
1 2
4 5 6 7 8 9
Ma. Reynafe Momay-Castillo, Editha Mirandilla-Tiamzon, and Glenna Legarta. Horacio Severino, Glenda Gloria, Mariquit Almario Gonzales, Arlene Burgos, Abraham Balabad, Jr., Joy Gruta, Ma. Salvacion Varona, Isagani De Castro, Danilo Lucas, Cecilia Victoria Orena Drilon, Cecilia Lardizabal, Vergel Santos, Romula Marinas, Noel Angel Alamar, Joseph Alwyn Alburo, Rowena Paraan, Ma. Cristina Rodriguez, Luisita Cruz Valdes, David Jude Sta. Ana, and Joan Bondoc. Roland Tolentino, Danilo Arao, Elena Pernia, Elizabeth Enriquez, Daphne Tatiana Canlas, Rosalina Yokomori, Marinela Aseron, Melba Estonilo, Lourdes Portus, Josefina Santos, and Yumina Francisco, Vide rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 95. Represented by its president, Jerry Yap. Represented by its president, Benny Antiporda. Vide rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC), p. 19. Rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC), pp. 1-2. Id. at 2.
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By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010,10 the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC. Meanwhile, various groups 11also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters. The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011. On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case 12 and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada13 which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
10 11
Rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC), p. 3; rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 186. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City endorsed Resolution No. 484 of November 22, 2010 which resolved to strongly urge the Supreme Court of the Philippines to allow a live media coverage for public viewing and information on the court proceedings/trial of the multiple murder case filed against the suspects of the Maguindanao massacre. The Court noted it by Resolution of December 14, 2010. Rollo, (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), pp. 429-431, 434. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cebu City Chapter passed Resolution No. 24 (December 7, 2010) which resolved, inter alia, respectfully ask the Supreme Court to issue a circular or order to allow Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes to concentrate on the case of the Maguindanao massacre, unencumbered by other cases until final decision in this case is rendered. The Court noted it by Resolution of January 18, 2011. Rollo, (A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC), pp. 90-91, 97. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City also carried Resolution Nos. 10342-2010 and 10343-2010, both dated November 23, 2010, which resolved to support the clamor for speedy trial and that the hearing of the Maguindanao massacre be made public with a request to consider the appeal to air live the hearings thereof. The Court noted it by Resolution of December February 1, 2011. Rollo, (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), pp. 671-674, 676. En Banc Resolution of October 22, 1991. A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 248; Perez v. Estrada, 412 Phil. 686 (2001).
12 13
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Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution. The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter14 to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge SolisReyes replied, however, that matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion. 15 Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court. The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly. Putts Law16 states that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not understand. Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom. A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the
14 15 16
Rollo, (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 121. Id. at 122. Based on the 1981 book entitled Putts Law and the Successful Technocrat which is attributed to the pseudonym Archibald Putt.
219
Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights. The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information. The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations. In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases. The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that [m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands. The Court concluded in Aquino: Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendants right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration
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of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. Accordingly, in order to protect the parties right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.17 The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed: The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.18
17 18
Supra note 20 at 6-7. Perez v. Estrada, 412 Phil. 686, 711.
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In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions: x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f ) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law. 19 Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas20 which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence21 and statistical figures
19 20 21
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 62, 70. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
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revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness. Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and sometimes broadcast.22 The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet. 23 On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos. Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.24 and Estrada v. Desierto,25 that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice
22 23 24 25
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/did-you-know.html> (Last accessed: May 25, 2011). Vide <http://livestream.xs4all.nl/icc1.asx> (Last accessed: June 7, 2011). G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54. G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
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from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders. One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.26 (underscoring supplied) Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
26
Perez v. Estrada, supra note 26 at 706-707.
224
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada: (a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting. (b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court. (c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number
225
of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment. (d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities. The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches. If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted. (e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
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Court27 applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both. (f ) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded. (g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court; (i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
27
Exclusion of the public. The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.
227
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities. (k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology. (l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines. Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined. SO ORDERED.
228
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice WE CONCUR: (ON OFFICIAL LEAVE) RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice
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LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

CHAPTER I. LAW AND JOURNALISM ETHICS

Are they the same?

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

CHAPTER II. THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL/JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Philippine courts

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND EXPANDED COURT SYSTEM

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS*

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS*

Other government bodies that participate in the criminal justice system

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

Simplified flowcharts of a typical criminal and/or civil case

FILING OF INFORMATION IN COURT

CASE RECORD GOES TO SALA OF SELECTED JUDGE

JUDGE DETERMINES EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

JUDGE ISSUES WARRANT OF ARREST

ACCUSED IS ARRAIGNED (ARRAIGNMENT)

DISCOVERY AND PRE-TRIAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

ACCUSED MAY APPEAL IF CONVICTED

JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

1. Simplified Flowchart of a Criminal Case B. Warrantless Arrest / Inquest

FILING OF INFORMATION IN COURT

CASE RECORD GOES TO SALA OF SELECTED JUDGE

JUDGE DETERMINES EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

JUDGE ISSUES COMMITMENT ORDER

ACCUSED IS ARRAIGNED (ARRAIGNMENT)

DISCOVERY AND PRE-TRIAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

ACCUSED MAY APPEAL IF CONVICTED

JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

Special civil actions: Certiorari Prohibition Mandamus

2. Simplified Flowchart of a Civil Case A.Ordinary Civil Action

DISCOVERY AND PRE-TRIAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

2. Simplified Flowchart of a Civil Case B. Special Civil Action

HEARING (ORAL ARGUMENT) OR MEMORANDUM DECISION APPEAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL

The Subpoena Subpoena ad testificandum: To appear and testify.

LEGAL COMPETENCY TRAINING MANUAL