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G.R. No.

111174

March 9, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO V. SALUDARES, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 28, Lianga, Surigao del Sur, and HUNG MING KUK, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This special civil action for certiorari assails the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, Branch 28, dated March 19, 1993. At issue is the jurisdiction of the trial court over properties owned by Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc. (LBLC), but allegedly sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The facts on record show that on April 2, 1986, the PCGG issued a writ of sequestration, which reads: IN THE MATTER OF THE SEQUESTRATION OF LIANGA BAY LOGGING x-----------------------x TO: MR. ARISTIDES M. ESCOSORA Baganga, Davao Oriental WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION By virtue of the power vested unto this Commission and by authority of the President of the Philippines, LIANGA BAY LOGGING, with offices at 2nd Floor, Emerald Building, Emerald Ave., Ortigas Office Bldg. Complex, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby sequestered. Mr. Aristides Escosora is hereby appointed Fiscal Agent of this Commission and as such, he is hereby ordered to: 1. To implement this sequestration order with a minimum disruption of business activities. 2. To preserve and safeguard, as well as prevent the removal concealment of records and the disposition and dissipation of assets, funds and resources. 3. To prevent undue removal or withdrawal of funds, until further orders to the Commission. 4. To report to the Commission on Good Government within five (5) days. Further, you are authorized to request the Commission for security support from the Military/Police authorities only if necessary. xxx FOR THE COMMISSION: Originally Signed MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA Commissioner The writ of sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in LBLC owned by Peter A. Sabido formed part of "illegally acquired wealth." On July 27, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General filed before the Sandiganbayan 3 a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against, among others, Peter A. Sabido. On August 12, 1991, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the Sandiganbayan. On November 29, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the "Motion (to Lift Writs of Sequestration)" dated August 12, 1991, is granted. Accordingly, the Writs of Sequestration issued against the Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation on March 17, 1986, and Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc. on April 2, 1986, are declared to have been deemed automatically lifted upon the lapse of six months from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against PIMECO and Lianga. . . . (emphasis supplied) xxx SO ORDERED.
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On December 11, 1991, PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Sandiganbayan praying for the nullification of the order which lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC. In the meantime, on February 11, 1993, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk filed a complaint for sum of money against LBLC, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-defendant nor was the sequestration case referred to the RTC's proceedings.
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Thus, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, dated March 29, 1993, with the Supreme Court. This petition, docketed as G.R. No. 109314, was later on consolidated with other similar cases. Meantime, on February 15, 1993, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of PCGG, dated December 11, 1991. On February 17, 1993, the trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Hung Ming Kuk. Thereafter, Hung Ming Kuk filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to file responsive pleadings pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC of Lianga, acting on the motion of Hung Ming Kuk, issued an order dated March 4, 1993, declaring LBLC as in default. Consequently, on March 19, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment by default, and decreed thus: WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing evidences and findings, this court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant-Corporation to pay, as follows: 1. To pay plaintiff the principal amount of the accrued unpaid obligation in the total amount of P18,031,563.78, with interests at 14% per annum reckoned from July 1992 to February 1993 in the computed total of P1,250,666.66, the same to continue until said obligation is fully paid; 2. To pay plaintiff moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P150,000.00, plus Appearance Fee for the counsel in the sum of P5,000.00; 3. To pay plaintiff the total amount of P4,857,195.45 for Sheriff's Expenses, Attached Properties Guards' Fees, Filing Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Attorneys Fees computed at 25% of the principal obligation, or P4,507,890.95, or a total amount of P4,857,195.45; 4. To pay the costs of the suit. IT IS SO ORDERED.
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On August 11, 1993, petitioner filed this special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, raising the sole issue as follows: WHETHER, THE TRIAL COURT FAULTED IN DECIDING THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH INVOLVED THE PROPERTIES OF LIANGA BAY LOGGING CO. INC. In the meantime, on January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court en banc issued its decision in the consolidated cases of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 240 SCRA 376 (1995). The decision included the nullification of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC properties in G.R. No. 109314. Hence, the Court effectively confirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration over said properties. Peter A. Sabido's motion for reconsideration was denied. Finally, an entry of judgment was issued on April 22, 1997, in G.R. No. 109314. Petitioner contends that the RTC of Lianga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case inasmuch as the same are under sequestration by the PCGG. Citing Baseco vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181 (1987), petitioner asserts that the sequestered assets have been placed under custodia legis of the PCGG pending the final determination by the Sandiganbayan that said assets are in fact ill-gotten. Hence, the RTC has no jurisdiction to order the attachment of said sequestered properties. Private respondent, however avers that his original complaint was for a sum of money. It was a demand for payment of a valid obligation owed to him by LBLC. He adds that it would be unfair and unjust to declare the entire RTC proceedings regarding his claim for sum of money null and void. Private respondent further claims that the attachment order of the trial court was issued after the Sandiganbayan had lifted the writ of 8 sequestration against LBLC. But petitioner asserts that this order of the Sandiganbayan was reversed by the Supreme Court in a banc decision dated January 23, 1995, resolving several consolidated cases for which G.R. No. 109314 was included. Petitioner stresses that said reversal had become final and executory on April 22, 1997. In PAGCOR vs. CA, 275 SCRA 433-434 (1997), involving ownership by Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) over several gaming and office equipment during the time that PCOC was under a sequestration by PCGG, the Court ruled: We disagree with the RTC and the CA on the issue of jurisdiction. While there can be no dispute that PCOC was sequestered, the fact of sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of ownership of the subject gaming and office equipment. The PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly invoked. This is deducible from no less than E.O. No. 14, the "Pea" and "Nepomuceno" cases relied upon by both subordinate courts. Note that in Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 which provides: Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. it speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff. On the other hand, the PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in both the "Pea" and "Nepomuceno" cases. But here, the PCGG does not appear in either capacity, as the complaint is solely between PAGCOR and respondents PCOC and Marcelo. The "Pea" and "Nepomuceno" cases which recognize the independence of the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases, therefore, cannot be invoked in the instant case so as to divest the RTC of its jurisdiction, under Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, over PAGCOR's action for recovery of personal property. In the case at bar, the claim of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is for a sum of money arising from a debt incurred by LBLC. Under a contract, private respondent had extended cash advances and supplied LBLC hardware materials, auto spare parts, and rendered services, for cutting and

hauling logs. The total claim amounts to P18,031,563.78. Following Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, viz: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos. Petitioner relies, however, on the case of PCGG vs. Pea, 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and asserts that the controversy of LBLC or a sequestered company falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the trial court. In the Pea case, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order which prevented PCGG from enforcing the memorandum of then PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. Her memorandum denied complainant's authority to sign and manage the funds of the sequestered company. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over PCGG being a co-equal body, and therefore, the regional trial courts may not interfere with and restrain the PCGG or set aside the orders and actions of its Commissioner. In contrast, the case now before us concerns receivables of the private respondent arising out of a legitimate business contract to supply goods and services in favor of LBLC. When a collection suit was filed against LBLC by its supplier, Hung Ming Kuk, evidently PCGG could not be the proper party to defend against such claim. More so, because when PCGG had not taken over the LBLC's business operations. We note that PCGG is not an owner but a conservator. It can exercise only powers of administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. Even resort to the provisional remedies should entail the least possible interference with business operations or activities so that, in the event that the accusation that the business enterprise is "ill-gotten" be not proven, it may be returned to its rightful owner as far as 9 possible in the same condition as it was at the time of sequestration. The holding in Pea which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases cannot also be relied upon by petitioner in this case. We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint for payment of money allegedly averred by LBLC to private respondent. We now move to the ancillary issue of whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court in favor of the private respondent is valid. It bears recalling that when the Sandiganbayan ordered that the writ of sequestration be lifted, PCGG filed a special civil action for certiorari to contest that order. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PCGG when it granted the latter's petition to declare the lifting of the writ of sequestration by the Sandiganbayan null and void. The Court's en banc resolution pertinently reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: A. NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE: xxx 17) in G.R. No. 109314, its impugned Resolutions In the same en banc Resolution, the Court observed: II. Provisional Remedies in Pursuance of Policy Special adjective tools or devices were provided by the Revolutionary Government for the recovery of that "ill-gotten wealth." These took the form of provisional remedies akin to preliminary attachment (Rule 57), writ of seizure of personalty (Rule 60) and receivership (Rule 59). They were (a) sequestration and (b) freeze orders, as regards "unearthed instance of "ill-gotten wealth"; and (c) provisional takeover, as regards "business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos." A. Executive Orders Re Sequestration, Freezing and Takeover These special remedies were prescribed and defined in Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino in March, 1986. Their validity and propriety were sustained by this Court on May 27, 1987, against claims that they were unconstitutional as being bills of attainder, or as violative of the right against self-incrimination and the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the same case, the Court also set the parameters for and restrictions on the proper exercise of the remedies. In BASECO vs. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 182 (1987), sequestration is defined as the process, which may be employed as a conservatory writ whenever the right of the property is involved, to preserve, pending litigation, specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or liens and 11 privileges. The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership, on one hand, and sequestration, freeze order and provisional takeover on the other. The latter there are ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos regime. The Court observed that sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership.1wphi1
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dated November 29, 1991 and February 16, 1993.

By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment 12 that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action. When a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its 13 dissolution. This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration. Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a debtor. The attaching creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing and results in its virtual condemnation to pay for the owner's debt. The law does not provide the length of time during which an attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the judgment, and it must therefore continue until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued in the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the statement discharged or vacated in 14 some manner provided by law. In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when respondent Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga, because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final determination of the case or until its dissolution. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partially GRANTED. The default Order issued by the public respondent dated March 19, 1993, is AFFIRMED, but should be held in abeyance until the sequestration case involving LBLC before the Sandiganbayan is determined. The Order of Attachment issued by the public respondent is declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 119280 August 10, 2006 UNILEVER PHILIPPINES (PRC), INC., Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PROCTER AND GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the February 24, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 35242 entitled "Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. v. Honorable Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. and Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P&GP)" which affirmed the issuance by the court a quo of a writ of preliminary injunction against it. The writ enjoined petitioner from using and airing, until further orders of the court, certain television commercials for its laundry products claimed to be identical or similar to its "double tug" or "tac-tac" 2 key visual. Petitioner alleges that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) without any evidence of private respondents clear and unmistakable right to the writ. Petitioner further contends that the preliminary injunction issued against it already disposed of the main case without trial, thus denying petitioner of any opportunity to present evidence on its behalf. The antecedents show that on August 24, 1994, private respondent Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. filed a complaint for injunction with damages and a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner Unilever, alleging that: 1.5. As early as 1982, a P&G subsidiary in Italy used a key visual in the advertisement of its laundry detergent and bleaching products. This key visual known as the "double-tug" or "tac-tac" demonstration shows the fabric being held by both hands and stretched sideways. 1.6. The "tac-tac" was conceptualized for P&G by the advertising agency Milano and Gray of Italy in 1982. The "tac-tac" was used in the same year in an advertisement entitled "All aperto" to demonstrate the effect on fabrics of one of P&GPs products, a liquid bleach called "Ace." xxxxxxxxx 1.7. Since then, P&G has used the "tac-tac" key visual in the advertisement of its products. In fact, in 1986, in Italy, the "tac-tac" key visual was used in the television commercial for "Ace" entitled "Kite." 1.8. P&G has used the same distinctive "tac-tac" key visual to local consumers in the Philippines. xxxxxxxxx 1.10. Substantially and materially imitating the aforesaid "tac-tac" key visual of P&GP and in blatant disregard of P&GPs intellectual property rights, Unilever on 24 July 1993 started airing a 60 second television commercial "TVC" of its "Breeze Powerwhite" laundry product called "Porky." The said TVC included a stretching visual presentation and sound effects almost *identical+ or substantially similar to P&GPs "tac-tac" key visual. xxxxxxxxx 1.14. On July 15, 1994, P&GP aired in the Philippines, the same "Kite" television advertisement it used in Italy in 1986, merely dubbing the Italian language with Filipino for the same produce "Ace" bleaching liquid which P&GP now markets in the Philippines.
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1.15. On August 1, 1994, Unilever filed a Complaint with the Advertising Board of the Philippines to prevent P&GP from airing the "Kite" television 3 advertisement. On August 26, 1994, Judge Gorospe issued an order granting a temporary restraining order and setting it for hearing on September 2, 1994 for Unilever to show cause why the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue. During the hearing on September 2, 1994, P&GP received Unilevers answer with opposition to preliminary injunction. P&GP filed its reply to Unilevers opposition to a preliminary injunction on September 6, 1994. During the hearing on September 9, 1994, Judge Gorospe ordered petitioner to submit a sur-rejoinder. P&GP received Unilevers rejoinder to reply on September 13, 1994. The following day, on September 14, 1994, P&GP filed its sur-reply to Unilevers rejoinder. On September 19, 1994, P&GP received a copy of the order dated September 16, 1994 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and fixing a bond of P100,000. On the same date, P&GP filed the required bond issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. On September 21, 1994, petitioner appealed to the CA assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit: PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE, PARTICULARLY OF SEC. 3 (a), RULE 58 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT AND OF THE PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE. PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 16, 1994, HAD, IN EFFECT, ALREADY PREJUDGED THE MERITS OF THE MAIN CASE. PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAD ISSUED THE VOID ORDER ACCORDING RELIEF TO A NON-PARTY IN CIVIL CASE NO. 94-2434 WITHOUT JURISDICTION. PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN ISSUING THE VOID ORDER HAD DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; PUBLIC 4 RESPONDENT HAD FORECLOSED PETITIONERS RIGHT AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE PROCTERS WITNESSES ABAD AND HERBOSA. On February 24, 1995, the CA rendered its decision finding that Judge Gorospe did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order. The petition for certiorari was thus dismissed for lack of merit. After a careful perusal of the records, we agree with the CA and affirm its decision in toto: Petitioner does not deny that the questioned TV advertisements are substantially similar to P&GPs "double tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. However, it submits that P&GP is not entitled to the relief demanded, which is to enjoin petitioner from airing said TV advertisements, for the reason that petitioner has Certificates of Copyright Registration for which advertisements while P&GP has none with respect to its "double-tug" or "tac-tac" key visual. In other words, it is petitioners contention that P&GP is not entitled to any protection because it has not registered with the National Library the very TV commercials which it claims have been infringed by petitioner. We disagree. Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a work or intellectual creation subsists from the moment of its creation. Accordingly, the creator acquires copyright for his work right upon its creation. Contrary to petitioners contention, the intellectual creators exercise and enjoyment of copyright for his work and the protection given by law to him is not contingent or dependent on any formality or registration. Therefore, taking the material allegations of paragraphs 1.3 to 1.5 of P&GPs verified Complaint in the context of PD 49, it cannot be seriously doubted that at least, for purposes of determining whether preliminary injunction should issue during the pendency of the case, P&GP is entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its Complaint. The second ground is likewise not well-taken. As adverted to earlier, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction will not issue unless it is shown in the verified complaint that plaintiff is probably entitled to the relief demanded, which consists in whole or in part in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of. In view of such requirement, the court has to make a tentative determination if the right sought to be protected exists and whether the act against which the writ is to be directed is violative of such right. Certainly, the courts determination as to the propriety of issuing the writ cannot be taken as a prejudgment of the merits of the case because it is tentative in nature and the writ may be dissolved during or after the trial if the court finds that plaintiff was not entitled to it. xxxxxxxxx Obviously, the determination made by the court a quo was only for purposes of preliminary injunction, without passing upon the merits of the case, which cannot be done until after a full-blown hearing is conducted. The third ground is patently unmeritorious. As alleged in the Complaint P&GP is a subsidiary of Procter and Gamble Company (P&G) for which the "double tug" or "tac-tac" key visual was conceptualized or created. In that capacity, P&GP used the said TV advertisement in the Philippines to promote its products. As such subsidiary, P&GP is definitely within the protective mantle of the statute (Sec. 6, PD 49). Finally, We find the procedure adopted by the court a quo to be in order. The record clearly shows that respondent Judge followed the (procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 58, as amended by BP 224, and Paragraph A(8) of the Interim Rules). In fact, the court a quo set the incident for hearing on September 2, 1994, at which date petitioner was ordered to show cause why the writ should not be issued. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the application for preliminary injunction. The same incident was again set for hearing on September 9, 1994, during which the parties made some manifestations in support of their respective positions. Subsequent to such hearing petitioner filed a Reply to P&GPs Rejoinder to its Opposition. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is absurd to even suggest that petitioner was not given its day in court in the matter of the issuance of the preliminary injunctive relief. xxxxxxxxx

There was of course extreme urgency for the court a quo to act on plaintiffs application for preliminary injunction. The airing of TV commercials is necessarily of limited duration only. Without such temporary relief, any permanent injunction against the infringing TV advertisements of which P&GP may possibly succeed in getting after the main case is finally adjudicated could be illusory if by then such advertisements are no longer used or aired by petitioner. It is therefore not difficult to perceive the possible irreparable damage which P&GP may suffer if respondent Judge did not 5 act promptly on its application for preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the 6 pendency of the principal action. Thus, Section1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard 7 compensation. As correctly ruled by the CA, there was an extreme urgency to grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by P&GP considering that TV commercials are aired for a limited period of time only. In fact, this Court takes note of the fact that the TV commercial in issue the Kite TV advertisement is no longer aired today, more than 10 years after the injunction was granted on September 16, 1994. The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A writ of 9 preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. Thus, it was impossible for the court a quo to fully dispose of the case, as claimed by petitioner, without all the evidence needed for the full resolution of the same. To date, the main case still has to be resolved by the trial court. The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest 10 abuse. There was no such abuse in the case at bar, especially because petitioner was given all the opportunity to oppose the application for 11 injunction. The fact was, it failed to convince the court why the injunction should not be issued. Thus, in Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary injunction where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 181930 January 10, 2011
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MILAGROS SALTING, Petitioner, vs. JOHN VELEZ and CLARISSA R. VELEZ, Respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97618. The factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant petition are as follows: On October 7, 2003, respondents John Velez and Clarissa Velez filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Milagros Salting involving a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38079. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2524. On March 28, 2006, respondents 4 obtained a favorable decision when the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch LXXIV, of Taguig City, Metro Manila, ordered petitioner to vacate the subject parcel of land and to pay attorneys fees and costs of suit. The decision became final and executory, after which respondents filed a motion for execution which was opposed by petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 153, for Annulment of Sale of the Property covered by TCT No. 38079, with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondents, Hon. 5 Ma. Paz Yson, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto G. Raymundo, Jr., Teresita Diokno-Villamena, and Heirs of Daniel B. Villamena (Heirs of Villamena). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70859-TG. Petitioner claimed that she purchased the subject parcel of land from Villamena as evidenced by a notarized document known as Sale of Real Estate. She further explained that respondents were able to obtain title to the subject property through the fraudulent acts of the heirs of Villamena. Finally, she averred that the decision in Civil Case No. 2524 had not attained finality as she was not properly informed of the MeTC decision. Petitioner thus prayed that a TRO be issued, restraining respondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf from executing the MeTC decision dated March 28, 2006. She further sought the declaration of nullity of the sale by the heirs of Villamena to respondents involving the subject parcel of land, and, consequently, the cancellation of the title to the property in the name of respondents. Finding that petitioner would suffer grave and irreparable damage if respondents would not be enjoined from executing the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision while respondents would not suffer any prejudice, the RTC, in an Order dated October 26, 2006, granted the writ of preliminary injunction 6 applied for. Aggrieved, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the execution of a judgment for ejectment.
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In a Decision dated November 29, 2007, the CA resolved the issue in the affirmative. The CA noted that the principal action in Civil Case No. 70859TG is the annulment of the deed of sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena, while the subject of the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction is the execution of the final judgment in a separate proceeding for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2524. The appellate court concluded that petitioner had no clear and unmistakable right to possession over the subject parcel of land in view of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision. Hence, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC, the CA opined that petitioner was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction. The CA thus set aside the October 26, 2006 Order of the RTC. Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that: In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals has decided in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. (Section 6 (a), Rule 45, 1997 Rule[s] of Civil Procedure). The Court of Appeals disregarded the rule that service of decision to a deceased lawyer is invalid and that the party must be duly served by the final judgment in order that the final judgment will become final and executory. The Court of Appeals, likewise, disregarded the existence of a clear and existing right of the petitioner which should be protected by an injunctive relief and the rule that the pendency of an action assailing the right of a party to eject will justify the suspension of the 8 proceedings of the ejectment case. Petitioner claims that she was denied her right to appeal when the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision was declared final and executory despite the fact that the copy of the decision was served on her deceased counsel. She further claims that the MeTC decision had not attained finality due to improper service of the decision. Moreover, petitioner avers that she has a clear and existing right and interest over the subject property which should be protected by injunction. Finally, petitioner argues that jurisprudence allows the suspension of proceedings in an ejectment case at whatever stage when warranted by the circumstances of the case. In their Comment, respondents allege that the petition is already moot and academic in view of the execution of the MeTC decision. They claim that it is not proper to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision as the case instituted before the RTC was for the annulment of the sale executed between respondents and the heirs of Villamena, and not an action for annulment of judgment or mandamus to compel the MeTC to entertain her belated appeal. Respondents add that the finality of the ejectment case is not a bar to the case instituted for the annulment of the sale and the eventual recovery of ownership of the subject property. The actions for ejectment and for annulment of sale are two different cases that may proceed independently, especially when the judgment in the ejectment case had attained finality, as in the instant case. Finally, respondents fault the petitioner herself for not informing the MeTC of the death of her former counsel the moment she learned of such death. We find no merit in the petition. We first determine the validity of the service of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitioners counsel who, as of that date, was already deceased. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless 10 service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Thus, when the MeTC decision was sent to petitioners counsel, such service of judgment was valid and binding upon petitioner, notwithstanding the death of her counsel. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a 11 case, whether the law firm or partnership continues to exist lawfully, the partners are still alive, or its associates are still connected with the firm. 12 Litigants, represented by counsel, cannot simply sit back, relax, and await the outcome of their case. It is the duty of the party-litigant to be in 13 contact with her counsel from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of her case. It is likewise the duty of the party to inform the court of the fact of her counsels death. Her failure to do so means that she is negligent in the protection of her cause, and she cannot pass the blame to the court which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsels. It is noteworthy that when petitioner came to know of the death of her counsel and upon obtaining the services of a new counsel, petitioner instituted another action for the annulment of the deed of sale between her and the heirs of Villamena, instead of questioning the MeTC decision through an action for annulment of judgment. Obviously, the annulment case instituted by petitioner is separate and distinct from the ejectment case filed by respondents. She cannot, therefore, obtain relief through the second case for alleged errors and injustices committed in the first case. With the foregoing disquisition, we find that the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision had, indeed, become final and executory. A final and executory decision can only be annulled by a petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or by a petition for relief 14 from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or to 15 make nunc pro tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final judgment except to execute it. In the present case, the finality of the March 28, 2006 decision with respect to possession de facto cannot be affected by the pendency of the 16 annulment case where the ownership of the property is being contested. We are inclined to adhere to settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of the enforcement of the final decision in an ejectment suit. The rationale of the rule has been explained in this wise: This rule is not without good reason. If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated through the simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over the property subject of the controversy. This would render nugatory the underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment which is to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves 17 entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties opposing claims of 18 juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. Finally, as aptly held by the CA, petitioner is not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the MeTC decision. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction, viz.: SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
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(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. And as clearly explained in Ocampo v. Sison Vda. de Fernandez 3/4 To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicants right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. A clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the applicant that there exists a right to be protected and that 20 the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right. In this case, the enforcement of the writ of execution which would evict petitioner from her residence is manifestly prejudicial to her interest. However, she possesses no legal right that merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Her right to possess the property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondents in the ejectment case in the MeTC decision which has 21 become final and executory. 1avvphi1 In any event, as manifested by respondents, the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision has already been executed. Hence, there is nothing more to restrain. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 29, 2007 and Resolution dated February 27, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97618 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 175145 March 28, 2008
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SPOUSES ALFREDO and SHIRLEY YAP, Petitioners, vs. 1 INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK, SHERIFF RENATO C. FLORA and/or OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95074 dated 11 July 2006 which dismissed petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yaps petition for certiorari 3 which questioned the Order of Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68088 recalling and dissolving the Writ of 4 Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001, and its Resolution dated 9 October 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The factual antecedents are as follows: Respondent International Exchange Bank (iBank, for brevity) filed a collection suit with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go in the RTC of Makati. The case was raffled to Branch 150 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-791. On 7 October 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent iBank and found Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to pay the amount of ninety-six million pesos (P96,000,000.00), plus penalty. A Writ of Execution on the judgment against Mr. Looyuko was implemented. Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued against Mr. Go for his part of the liability. Thereupon, respondent Renato C. Flora, Sheriff of Branch 150 of the RTC of Makati City, issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale on 12 May 2000 notifying all the parties concerned, as well as the public in general, that the following real properties, among other properties, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. PT-66751, No. PT-66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No. 36489 of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be 5 sold at public auction on 15 June 2000. Said public auction did not push through. On 13 June 2000, petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 67945 and was raffled to Branch 158 thereof. Petitioners sought to stop the auction sale alleging that the properties covered by TCTs No. PT-66751, No. PT-66749, No. 55469 and No. 45229 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, TCT No. 36489 of the Registry of Quezon City, and TCTs No. 4621 and No. 52987 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong 6 City, are already owned by them by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor. They further alleged that respondent sheriff disregarded their right over the properties despite their execution of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to prove their claim over the properties and the publication of a Notice to the Public warning that various deeds had already been issued in their favor evidencing their right over the same.
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A second Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated 30 June 2000 was issued by Sheriff Flora scheduling a public auction on 24 July 2000 for the aforementioned properties. The public auction did not happen anew. Thereafter, a third Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated 21 July 2000 scheduling a public auction on 22 August 2000 was issued. On 21 August 2000, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 158, issued an Order in Civil Case No. 67945 denying petitioners application for a writ of 7 preliminary injunction. As scheduled, the public auction took place on 22 August 2000 for which respondent sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale stating that the subject 8 properties had been sold at public auction in favor of respondent iBank, subject to the third-party claims of petitioners. Petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasig City the instant case for Annulment of Sheriffs Auction Sale Proceedings and Certificate of Sale against iBank, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, and Sheriff Flora. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 68088 and was raffled to Branch 264. The Complaint was amended to include a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary 9 Injunction. Engracio M. Escarias, Jr., Clerk of Court VII and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC Makati City, filed his Answer while respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed an Omnibus Motion (Motion to Refer the Complaint to the Office of the Clerk of Court for Raffle in the Presence of Adverse Party and Motion 10 to Dismiss) dated 17 October 2000. In an Order dated 20 February 2001, Hon. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Respondents iBank and Sheriff 12 Flora filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001. A hearing was held on the application for preliminary injunction. On 18 July 2001, an Order was issued by Judge Janolo granting petitioners application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Order reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, and defendants and their representatives are enjoined from proceeding further with the execution, including consolidating title and taking possession thereof, against plaintiffs real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. PT-66751, PT-66749, 55469, 45229, 4621, 52987 and 36489. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon plaintiffs posting of a bond executed to defendant in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to the effect that plaintiffs will pay defendants all damages which the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if it be 13 ultimately decided that the injunction is unwarranted. On 13 August 2001, upon posting a bond in the amount of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00), Judge Janolo issued the Writ of Preliminary 14 Injunction. Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed on 29 August 2001 a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction 16 which the trial court denied in an Order dated 21 November 2001. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, 17 Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction praying that it: (a) issue immediately a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Janolo from taking any action or conducting any further proceeding on the case; (b) annul the Orders dated 18 July 2001 and 21 November 2001; and (c) order the immediate dismissal of Civil Case No. 68088. In its decision dated 18 July 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It explained that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by Judge Janolo in promulgating the two Orders. It emphasized that its ruling only pertains to the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the preliminary injunction and has no bearing on the main issues of the case which are still to be resolved on the merits. The Very Urgent Motion for 19 Reconsideration filed by respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora was denied for lack of merit. Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora thereafter filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari which we dismissed. The Courts Resolution dated 7 March 2005 reads: Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the petition for being a wrong remedy under the Rules and evidently used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Besides, even if treated as a petition under Rule 65 of the said Rules, the same would be dismissed for failure to sufficiently show that 20 the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court certifying that the resolution dismissing the case had become final and 21 executory on 30 July 2005. Subsequently, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that their pending Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 which 22 seeks for the dismissal of the case be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. On 9 February 2006, petitioners filed their Comment thereon with Motion to Cite in Contempt the counsel of respondents. They pray that the pending Motion for Reconsideration be denied for being devoid of merit, and that the Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction be also denied, it being a clear defiance of the directive of the Supreme Court which ruled with finality that the injunction issued by the trial court was providently issued and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They further ask that respondents counsel be cited in contempt of court 24 and be meted out the appropriate penalty. Respondents filed a Reply dated 20 February 2006. In a Manifestation dated 24 March 2006, respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora submitted an Affidavit of Merit to emphasize their resolve and willingness, among other things, to file a counter-bond to cover whatever damages petitioners may suffer should the trial court decide to dissolve
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the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Counter-Manifestation with Second Motion to Cite Respondents Counsel in Direct Contempt 26 27 28 of Court to which respondents filed an Opposition. Petitioners filed a Reply thereto. In an Order dated 29 April 2006, the trial court recalled and dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001, and ordered respondents to post a counter-bond amounting to ten million pesos. It directed the Branch Clerk of Court to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction upon the filing and approval of the required counter-bond. The dispositive portion of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, this Courts writ of preliminary injunction dated August 13, 2001 is recalled and dissolved. Defendants are hereby ordered to post a counter-bond amounting to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) to cover the damages plaintiffs would incur should a favorable judgment be rendered them after trial on the merits. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to issue a Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction upon the filing and approval of defendants counter-bond. The trial court explained its ruling in this wise: In our jurisdiction, the provisions of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow the issuance of preliminary injunction. This court granted plaintiffs prayer preliminary injunction in the Order dated July 18, 2001 and the corresponding writ issued on August 13, 2001. Defendants in this case, however, are not without remedy to pray for dissolution of preliminary injunction already granted because it is only interlocutory and not permanent in nature. The provisions of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court allow dissolution of the injunction granted provided there is affidavit of party or persons enjoined; an opportunity to oppose by the other party; hearing on the issue, and filing of a bond to be fixed by the court sufficient to compensate damages applicant may suffer by dissolution thereby. A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them. x x x. When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. x x x. In the case at bar, plaintiffs deed of sale was purported to be not duly notarized. As such, the legal right of what the plaintiffs claim is still doubtful and such legal right can only be threshed out in a full blown trial where they can clearly establish the right over the disputed properties. Moreover, defendants are willing to post a counter bond which could cover up to the damages in favor of plaintiffs in case the judgment turns out to be adverse to them. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, this is perfectly allowed and the dissolution of the writ of injunction can accordingly be issued. In the case of Lasala vs. Fernandez, the highest court has enunciated that "a court has the power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by it. The issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the court." (G.R. No. L-16628, May 23, 1962). The defendants had shown that dissolution of the writ of injunction is just and proper. 31 It was duly shown that great and irreparable injury would severely cause the defendants if the writ of injunction shall continue to exist. On 5 May 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals asking that the trial courts Order dated 29 April 2006 be set 32 aside. During the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari, petitioners filed before the trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings to which 34 respondents filed a Comment. On 11 July 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss outright the Petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioners to file a motion for 35 36 37 reconsideration of the Order dated 29 April 2006. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied. After being granted an extension of thirty days within which to file a petition for certiorari, petitioners filed the instant Petition on 14 December 2006. They made the following assignment of errors: I THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DATED 13 AUGUST 2001. 1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS RESOLVED WITH FINALITY THAT YOUR PERITIONERS WILL "SUFFER IRREPARABLE INJURY" (C.A.s emphasis) IF NO INJUNCTION IS ISSUED. 2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HON. SUPREME COURT RULED WITH FINALITY THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ABUSE ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE INJUNCTION DATED 13 AUGUST 2001, THUS, SUSTAINING THE REGULARITY OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. II THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY FIXING THE PHP10,000,000.00 COUNTER-BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION OR COULD NOT BE QUANTIFIED.
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III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING YOUR PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-GR SP NO. 95074, AS IT FAILED TO APPLY EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH WHERE THE CONTROVERTED ACT IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL OR WAS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AS HELD IN HAMILTON VS. LEVY, (344 SCRA 821) IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CLEARLY POINTING OUT TO THE COURT THAT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, THE REQUIRED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH. At the outset, it must be said that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001 issued by the trial court has not yet been actually dissolved because respondents have not posted the required counter-bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The dissolution thereof is primed on the filing of the counter-bond. Petitioners argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the dissolution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the propriety of its issuance having been affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. There being an Order by this Court that the injunction issued by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the dissolution of said writ is a clear defiance of this Courts directive. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial court has the authority and prerogative to set aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They add that since petitioners Deed of Sale was not duly notarized, the latters application for preliminary injunction is devoid of factual and legal bases. They assert that, not being public documents, the subject deeds of sale are nothing but spurious, if not falsified, documents. They add that the continuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction would cause them irreparable damage because it continues to incur damage not only for the nonpayment of the judgment award (in Civil Case No. 98-791 before the RTC of Makati City, Br. 150), but also for opportunity losses resulting from the continued denial of its right to consolidate title over the levied properties. There is no dispute that both the Court of Appeals and this Court have ruled that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents tried to undo the issuance of said writ but to no avail. The Resolution on the matter attained finality on 30 July 2005 and an entry of judgment was made. This, notwithstanding, respondents filed with the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 264, an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Motion to Dismiss Complaint and/or Dissolve Injunction) dated 31 January 2006 praying that their Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 February 2001 of the trial courts denial of their Motion to Dismiss which the trial court failed to resolve, be resolved and/or the Writ of Preliminary Injunction previously issued be dissolved. With this Omnibus Motion, the trial court issued the Order dated 13 August 2001 recalling and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction conditioned on the filing of a P10,000,000.00 counter-bond. The question is: Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial court recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings of the Court of Appeals and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion? We hold that the trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it previously issued.1avvphi1 We do not agree with petitioners argument that the trial court may no longer dissolve the preliminary injunction because this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove the presence of any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding that this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of Rule 58 reads: Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or restraining order. The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied, upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified. Under the afore-quoted section, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two conditions must concur: first, the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter39 bond. The Order of the trial court dated 29 April 2006 is based on this ground. In the case at bar, the trial court, after hearing, found that respondents duly showed that they would suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second condition, the trial court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns out to be adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the required
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counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been posted. The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or, otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. By the same token, the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances 40 may warrant. In the case on hand, the trial court issued the order of dissolution on a ground provided for by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with the rules, we find no reason to disturb the same. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred and gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright their Petition for Certiorari by failing to apply existing jurisprudence that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondents urge the Court to deny the Petition for Review, arguing that the Court of Appeals properly applied the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non in order that certiorari will lie. We find petitioners contention to be untenable. The rule is well settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for 41 certiorari. It must be stressed that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should be filed only as a last resort. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is intended to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any actual error attributed to it by way of re-examination 42 of the legal and factual issues. By their failure to file a motion for reconsideration, they deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify any error it committed, if there was any. Moreover, a perusal of petitioners petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals shows that they filed the same because there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law except via a petition for certiorari. When same was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Order, they argue that while the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for certiorari is instituted, the same is not entirely without exception like where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It was only when the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition did they argue that exceptions to the general rule should apply. Their invocation of the application of the exceptions was belatedly made. The application of the exceptions should be raised in their Petition for Certiorari and not when their Petition has already been dismissed. They must give their reasons and explain fully why their case falls under any of the exceptions. This, petitioners failed to do. Petitioners argument that they filed the Petition for Certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration because there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law except via a Petition for Certiorari does not convince. We have held that the "plain" and 43 "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution. The mere allegation that there is "no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy" is not one of the exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may be filed. All told, we hold that the act of the trial court of issuing the Order dated 29 April 2006 was not patently illegal or performed without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing outright petitioners Petition for Certiorari for failing to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Order. Our pronouncements in this case are confined only to the issue of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction and will not apply to the merits of the case. WHEREFORE, all considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 95074 dated 11 July 2006 and 9 October 2006 are AFFIRMED. The Order dated 29 April 2006 of Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68088 recalling and dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 13 August 2001 is AFFIRMED. Upon the posting by respondents of the counterbond required, the trial court is directed to issue the Writ Dissolving Preliminary Injunction. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 164459 April 24, 2007

LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO YALUNG, and ATTY. ROY MANUEL VILLASOR, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside: (1) 1 The Decision, dated 16 September 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73463 entitled, Limitless Potentials, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel D. Victorio, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141, Crisostomo Yalung, and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor, which dismissed herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of merit, and 2 (2) The Resolution, dated 8 July 2004, of the appellate court in the same case which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration because the issues and arguments raised therein had already been passed upon and judiciously resolved in the Decision dated 16 September 2003. The controversy of this case stemmed from the following facts: On 12 October 1995, Digital Networks Communications and Computers, Inc. (Digital) and herein petitioner Limitless Potentials, Inc. (LPI), a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, entered into a Billboard Advertisement Contract whereby petitioner was

to construct one billboard advertisement for Digitals product for a period of one year, with an agreed rental of P60,000.00 per month plus Value Added Tax (VAT). It was agreed, among other things, that Digital will make a three-month deposit in the following manner, to wit: (a) P60,000.00 plus VAT upon the signing of the contract, and (b) P120,000.00 plus VAT upon completion of the billboard. Digital complied with the aforesaid agreement. The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons. In view thereof, the contract between Digital and the petitioner was considered terminated. Digital demanded for the return of their rental deposit for two months, but the petitioner refused to do so claiming that the loss of the billboard was due to force majeure and that any cause of action should be directed against the responsible persons. Thus, on 18 April 1997, Digital commenced a suit against herein petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, presided over by then Judge 3 Estela Perlas-Bernabe (Judge Perlas-Bernabe) , for the return of Digitals deposit, which was equivalent to two months rental inclusive of VAT and attorneys fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 55170. On 18 June 1997, consistent with its defense against Digitals Complaint, petitioner filed a ThirdParty Complaint against Macgraphics Carranz International Corporation (Macgraphics) and herein private respondents Bishop Crisostomo Yalung (Bishop Yalung) and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor (Atty. Villasor) alleging that it had entered into a contract of lease with Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM), as represented by the private respondents, over a space inside San Carlos Manor Seminary in Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, where petitioner erected the subject billboard. Petitioner further averred that despite its full compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease contract, herein private respondents, together with their cohorts, maliciously dismantled and destroyed the subject billboard and prevented its men from reconstructing it. Thereafter, petitioner learned that Macgraphics had "cajoled and induced" RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the subject billboard to enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard and advertising signs. Thus, by way of affirmative defenses, petitioner claimed that: (a) the destruction of the subject billboard was not of its own making and beyond its control, and (b) Digitals cause of action, if any, should be directed against the private respondents and Macgraphics. Hence, petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor and to hold private respondents liable for the following: (a) moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; (b) exemplary, temperate and nominal damages amounting to P300,000.00; (c) P300,000.00 as attorneys fees; (d) P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and (e) costs of suit, allegedly suffered or incurred by it because of the willful destruction of the billboard by the private respondents. In response, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforesaid Third-Party Complaint based on the following grounds: (1) litis pendentia; 5 (2) lack of cause of action; (3) forum shopping; and (4) lack of privity of contract. The MeTC, in an Order dated 25 August 1997, denied the said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint. Again, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party 6 Complaint. However, the MeTC also denied the Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint in an Order dated 10 October 1997. On 9 December 1997, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, assailing the Orders dated 25 August 1997 and 10 October 1997 of the MeTC of Makati City denying their Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint and Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint, respectively, in Civil Case No. 55170. The RTC issued an Order on 6 February 1998, granting private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, conditioned upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P10,000.00. Thus, the MeTC was enjoined from hearing the Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The pertinent portion of the aforesaid Order reads, as follows: When the application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was heard this afternoon, [herein petitioner] who did not file comment on the petition appeared thru counsel Emmanuel Magnaye. It was brought out to the attention of this Court that respondent judge is poised on pursuing the hearing of the case before her despite the pendency of this petition. It appeared that the case was set by respondent judge for hearing ex-parte for the reception of *herein petitioners+ evidence on 23 February 1998. It also appeared that [herein private respondents] were declared in default despite the fact that they have filed their answer and the motion to lift such order of default and for admission of the answer was denied by respondent judge. Upon consideration of the allegations in the petition and the oral manifestations and admissions of both parties, this Court hereby resolves to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in order to preserve the status quo as well as not to render the issue herein raised moot and academic. WHEREFORE, the motion for preliminary injunction is granted. Accordingly, upon the filing by [herein private respondents] of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining respondent judge, or her successor, from hearing the [T]hird [P]arty 8 [C]omplaint against [herein private respondents] in Civil Case No. 55170 until further orders from this Court. Subsequently, however, the RTC rendered a Decision on 28 April 2000, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 6 February 2000 (sic) is hereby dissolved. Costs against [herein private respondents].
11 10 9 7 4

Disgruntled, private respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 26 June 2000. Petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Against the Bond, and in compliance with the directive of the RTC, the petitioner filed a pleading specifying its claims, thus: (a) attorneys fees in the sum of P74, 375.00; and (b) moral damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
14 13

12

The RTC, in its Order dated 3 April 2002, denied petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the Bond declaring that the preliminary injunction was not wrongfully obtained; therefore, the claim for damages on the bond is untenable. Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, which was also denied by the RTC in its Order dated 6 August 15 2002.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 3 April 2002 and 6 August 2002 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. On 6 November 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for failure to show proof that a certain Quirino B. Baterna has been duly authorized by the petitioner to file the Petition for and in its behalf. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid 17 Resolution, which was granted by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 24 January 2003 thereby reinstating the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner. On 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition filed by the petitioner for utter lack of merit. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds: I. The dismissal of the petition and dissolution of the injunction amount to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained. II. The petitioner suffered damages by reason of the issuance of the injunction. III. The damages claimed by the petitioner are covered by the injunction bond. The Court of Appeals through a Resolution dated 8 July 2004, denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition. Petitioner pointed out two basic legal issues wherein the appellate court committed serious and reversible errors, to wit: I. Is malice or bad faith a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond? II. Are attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction covered by the injunction bond? Petitioner argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction immediately accrues to the defendant. The petitioner maintains that the attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction are proper and valid items of damages which can be claimed against the injunction bond. Hence, having proven through testimonial and documentary evidence that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the writ of injunction, and since malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the injunction bond, petitioner asserts that it can properly collect such damages on the said bond. Private respondent Bishop Yalung on the other hand, prays for the outright dismissal of the present Petition due to the alleged failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. According to him, it is not sufficient for Mr. Baterna to make the undertaking that "I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in the Supreme Court, etc." inasmuch as such undertaking should have been made by the principal party, namely, the petitioner. He underscores that the verification/disclaimer of forum shopping executed by Mr. Baterna on behalf of the petitioner is legally defective for failure to enumerate with particularity the multiple civil and criminal actions, which were filed by him and the petitioner against the private respondents. Private respondent Bishop Yalung also avers that the petitioner is not entitled to collect damages on the injunction bond filed before the court a quo. Primarily, as the appellate court mentioned in its Decision, the preliminary injunction was directed not against the petitioner but against the MeTC. The petitioner was not restrained from doing any act. What was restrained was the hearing of the Third-Party Complaint while the Petition 18 for Certiorari was pending, "in order to preserve the status quo and not to render the issue therein moot and academic." Also, the fact that the decision is favorable to the party against whom the injunction was issued does not automatically entitle the latter to recover damages on the bond. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the writ of injunction. Private respondent Atty. Villasor shares the same argument as that of his co-respondent Bishop Yalung that it was the MeTC which was enjoined and not herein petitioner. Private respondent Atty. Villasor further alleged that in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari, the action is principally against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, private respondents Petition for Certiorari before the RTC principally pertains to the MeTC and not to herein petitioner. Additionally, private respondent Atty. Villasor argues that it was petitioner who was benefited by such writ of preliminary injunction, because the injunction left Digital unable to prosecute Civil Case No. 55170 against herein petitioner. Lastly, private respondent Atty. Villasor claims that petitioner did not oppose their application for a writ of preliminary injunction at the hearing wherein petitioner was duly represented by counsel. Simply stated, the threshold issues are: I. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond? II. Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages? Quite apart from the above, there appears to be another question concerning the alleged violation by the petitioner of the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum shopping. In the case at bar, petitioner repeatedly argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the injunction bond. In answering this issue raised by petitioner, this Court must initially establish the nature of the preliminary injunction, the purpose of the injunction bond, as well as the manner of recovering damages on the said bond.
16

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the 19 pendency of an action. It is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary, 20 subject to the final disposition of the principal action. It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, which is the last actual, peaceful, and 21 uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy, in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do the act which the plaintiff is seeking the court to restrain. This 22 will make ineffectual the final judgment that the court may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff. The status quo should be existing ante litem motam, or at the time of the filing of the case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the 23 parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
24

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary 25 injunction shall be issued. Thus, the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued. The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. Its 26 principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. The damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction bond which is required to be 27 28 deposited with court. Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similarly applicable to preliminary injunction, has outlined the procedure for the filing of a claim for damages against an injunction bond. The aforesaid provision of law pertinently provides: SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. - An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court. Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient 29 or fail to fully satisfy the award. Now, it can be clearly gleaned that there is nothing from the aforequoted provision of law which requires an enjoined party, who suffered damages by reason of the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prove malice or lack of good faith in the issuance thereof before he can recover damages 30 31 against the injunction bond. This Court was very succinct in the case of Aquino v. Socorro, citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on Elections, thus: Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless formality. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the dissolution of the injunction because of petitioners main cause of action provides the actionable wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the bond. We, therefore, agree with the petitioner that indeed, malice or lack of good faith is not a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the injunction bond. With respect to the issue raised by the petitioner regarding the coverage of the injunction bond, this Court finds it necessary to quote once again the provision of Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit: Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. The aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that the injunction bond is answerable for all damages. The bond insures with all practicable 32 certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally be dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit for all damages, or costs and reasonable counsels fees, incurred or 33 sustained by the latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued. Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction does not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for damages that the writ may

thereby cause. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse 34 against either the applicant or his surety or against both. The contention of the petitioner, thus, is tenable. Attorneys fees, litigation costs, and costs of delay can be recovered from the injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses were sustained by the party seeking recovery by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction, which was later on determined as not to have been validly issued and that the party who applied for the said writ was not entitled thereto. The case of Aquino 35 36 v. Socorro, citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on Elections, holds that the dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction bond immediately accrues. It is also erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not entitled to claim damages from the injunction bond simply because the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages from the injunction because it has no interest or stake in the Petition pending before it. Damage or loss is suffered by the party whose right to pursue its case is suspended or delayed, which in this case, is the petitioner. Upon issuance of the writ of injunction, it is the petitioner who will stand to suffer damages for the delay in the principal case because, had it not been for the injunction, the petitioner would not have incurred additional expenses for attending the separate hearings on the injunction, and the RTC can already decide the main case and make a prompt determination of the respective rights of the parties therein. Hence, even if the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the petitioner, it is the latter which has the right to recover from the injunction bond the damages which it might have suffered by reason of the said injunction. As to the second main issue in the present case, although we do recognize that the petitioner had a right to recover damages from the injunction bond, however, we agree in the findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that the petitioner did not sustain any 37 damage by reason of the issuance of the writ of injunction. In the petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the Bond, petitioner stated therein, thus: 5. There can be no serious debate that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary injunction, all at the instance of [herein private respondents], resulted in actual and pecuniary damages on the part of [herein petitioner] in the amount more than the value of the bond posted by [private respondents+. The attorneys fees for expenses in litigation alone expended by *petitioner+ to defend itself in this proceedings, not to mention 38 other pecuniary damages, amounts to P10,000.00. In the case at bar, petitioner is claiming attorneys fees in the sum of P74,375.00 it allegedly paid to defend itself in the main case for certiorari, which it would not have spent had the private respondents not filed their nuisance Petition and secured a writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise, 39 by reason of the unfounded suit, the good will of the petitioner was brought to bad light, hence, damaged. It is noteworthy to mention that the undertaking of the injunction bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. Apparently, as the appellate court pointed out in its Decision dated 16 September 2003, the damages being claimed by the petitioner were not by reason of the injunction but the litigation expenses it incurred in defending itself in the main case for certiorari, which is definitely not within the coverage of the injunction bond. Thus, this Court is not convinced that the attorneys fees in the amount of P74,375.00 as well as the moral damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00 were suffered by the petitioner because of the issuance of the writ of injunction. Furthermore, this Court will not delve into the sufficiency of evidence as to the existence and amount of damages suffered by petitioner for it is already a question of fact. It is settled that the factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on 40 41 the Supreme Court. Although this rule is subject to exceptions, the present case does not fall into any of those exceptions which would have allowed this Court to make its own determination of facts. This Court upholds the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to establish that petitioner actually suffered damages because of the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. Now, on the matter of proper certification on non-forum shopping. The requirement of a Certification on Non-Forum Shopping is contained in Rule 7, Section 5, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that: The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. Private respondent Bishop Yalung might have overlooked the Secretarys Certificate attached to the petitioners Petition for Review, which authorized Mr. Baterna, President of herein petitioner LPI, to represent the latter in this case. According to the Secretarys Certificate, the Board of Directors of petitioner LPI, at a special meeting held on 12 August 2004 at its office at No. 812 J.P. Rizal St., Makati City, during which there was a quorum, the following resolutions were approved, to wit: RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the corporation reiterates the authority of its President, Mr. Quirino B. Baterna, to represent the corporation in all cases by and/or against the corporation vis--vis the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila/Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Villasor/Digital Netwrok (sic) Communications and Computers, Inc., and/or MacGraphics Carranz International Corporation, to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 164459 to assert/protect LPIs rights and interests in connection with C.A.-G.R. No. 73463, entitled "Limitless Potentials, Inc., vs. Hon. Manuel Victorio, et al.," Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila. RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that any and all acts of our President, concerning the above-referenced subject matter are hereby affirmed, confirmed 43 and ratified by the corporation for all legal intents and purposes.
42

Private respondent Bishop Yalung further argued that Mr. Baterna failed to enumerate in the Certification against Forum Shopping the multiple cases filed by him and the petitioner against private respondents. This is also erroneous. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for 44 45 the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case 46 will amount to res judicata in another. It may be resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, 47 in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. As the RTC correctly found, there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping. The cause of action in petitioners case for consignation and 48 damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1559, is different from the cause of action in its Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The damages sought in the first case were those suffered by petitioner by reason of the alleged breach of the contract of lease by the RCAM; whereas the damages sought in the Third-Party Complaint were those allegedly suffered by petitioner owing to the destruction of its billboard by the private respondents, thereby terminating the Billboard Advertisement Contract between petitioner and Digital. Digital also sued petitioner for recovery of the rental deposits it had already paid under the same contract. Consequently, petitioner had to engage the services of counsel and incurred litigation expenses in order to defend itself in the case filed against it by Digital. Thus, the two actions are completely different and distinct from each other so much so that a decision in either case could not be pleaded as res judicata in the other. Hence, there is no forum shopping that would necessitate the outright dismissal of this case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 September 2003 and 8 July 2004, respectively, affirming the Decision of the RTC dated 28 April 2000, denying herein petitioners motion to recover damages against the injunction bond, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 167745 June 26, 2007

MIGUEL M. LLAMZON, petitioner, vs. ALMA FLORENCE LOGRONIO, NESTOR HUN NADAL and NICANOR OLIVAR constituting the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY CENTRAL BOARD OF INQUIRY, INVESTIGATION AND DISCIPLINE (PEZA-CBIID), PEZA Special Prosecutor NORMA CAJULIS and PEZA Director General LILIA DE LIMA, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: The instant petition for review stems from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874 promulgated on 10 June 2004, and 7 April 2005, respectively which annulled and set aside the status quo order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 3 4 5 Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, dated 2 December 2002, and affirmed the order dated 11 December 2002 denying respondents motion to dismiss. The antecedents follow. Petitioner Miguel M. Llamzon is an Enterprise Service Officer III at the Industrial Relations Unit, Bataan Economic Zone. He was formally charged 6 with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service for having billed Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation overtime fees for unloading of fuel for the dates 28 February 2000 and 20 March 2000, despite knowledge that the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) had discontinued billing registered locator/enterprises for overtime fees since 17 December 1999. Petitioner filed his answer denying the charges against him and requested a formal investigation and the transfer of the venue of the case to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. This request was however denied, and the investigation was conducted by the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline (PEZA-CBIID). While investigation was on-going, petitioner requested the PEZA-CBIID to allow the PNP Crime Laboratory to examine the written contents of the billings for overtime fees. The request was denied by PEZA-CBIID considering that the National Bureau of Investigation had already issued a finding that the signatures appearing in the billings are those of the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint on 17 September 2002 for damages against respondents, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction, for allegedly depriving him of his right to present witnesses for himself and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in the administrative investigation. On the same date, Judge Benjamin Vianzon, presiding judge of RTC, Branch 4, Balanga, Bataan, issued a TRO for twenty (20) days "for the maintenance and preservation of the status quo," and 7 scheduled the hearing for preliminary injunction. Respondents moved to lift the TRO on the ground of non-holding of a summary hearing and failure of petitioner to show extreme urgency for the 8 issuance of said TRO. Respondents motion was denied by Judge Vianzon. Respondents filed before the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint for incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice against Judge Vianzon. They also filed a motion for his inhibition in Civil 9 Case No. 565-ML which Judge Vianzon granted in his Order dated 21 October 2002. Respondents moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 565-ML but petitioner opposed the motion. In the interim, petitioner filed a motion to 10 maintain the status quo, which Judge Vianzon granted through an Order dated 2 December 2002 (status quo order). Petitioner, on the other 11 hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition dated 21 October 2002, and a motion to cite petitioner in contempt for resuming the administrative investigation upon the expiration of the TRO.
1 2

Confused with the orders of Judge Vianzon, respondents filed a manifestation seeking clarification whether the judge had recalled his earlier order 12 of inhibition. In his Order dated 15 November 2002, Judge Vianzon clarified that he had indeed recalled his order of inhibition and would proceed to try the case, considering that Branch 4 is a single-sala court and the matter of inhibition would have to be referred to the Supreme Court, and it would take months before a new judge is designated. Meanwhile, respondents motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 565-ML was denied by Judge Vianzon in his Order dated 11 December 2002.
13

Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in: (i) his conduct of the proceedings before him; (ii) vacating his earlier order of inhibition; (iii) issuing the status quo order dated 28 November 2002; and (iv) issuing the 11 December 2002 Order denying their motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals found the petition partly meritorious. It ruled that Judge Vianzon failed to observe Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning applications for preliminary injunction and TRO. According to the appellate court, Judge Vianzon granted a TRO for 20 days 14 instead of only 72 hours, and he did not conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine whether the TRO should be extended. The status quo order was issued also in violation of the aforementioned Rule, specifically the portion which provides that the TRO shall not exceed 20 days and is deemed vacated if the application for preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day period and that no court has the 15 authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for which it was issued. In addition, the Court of Appeals considered moot the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in recalling his order of 16 inhibition. It found that the judge had already inhibited himself from hearing Civil Case No. 565-ML via an Order dated 24 February 2003. The appellate court also found that respondents were unable to show that the issuance of the 11 December 2002 Order denying their motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. They likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the said order of denial, and were unable to show that the filing thereof was unnecessary. In the end, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the 2 December 2002 status quo order, but dismissed the petition with respect to the order 17 dated 11 December 2002 denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the decision, arguing for the propriety of the 20-day TRO and the status quo order of Judge Vianzon, 18 and pointing out alleged defects in respondents petition. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Petitioner now proposes that the Court of Appeals erred when it: (i) ruled that the TRO and status quo order were wrongfully issued; and (ii) did not dismiss respondents petition despite several defects which should have merited the outright dismissal thereof. According to petitioner, the TRO and status quo order were made in compliance with Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, he claims that a 20-day TRO can be issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant. On the other hand, he justifies the status quo order by saying that it was issued on a ground different from that for which the earlier 19 TRO was made. He adverts to several infirmities in respondents petition which the Court of Appeals disregarded when it gave due course to the petition. As for the alleged defects in respondents petition before the Court of Appeals, petitioner claims that respondents (i) failed to attach the certified true copies of the assailed Orders; (ii) omitted the discussion on the denial of the motion to dismiss; (iii) failed to state the date of receipt of the third assailed Order; (iv) questioned the issuance of the 20-day TRO embodied in the 17 September 2002 Order when it was not even among those included in the Orders assailed in their petition; (v) failed to file a motion for reconsideration of all the assailed orders; (vi) filed a defective certificate against forum shopping; (vii) failed to include an 20 affidavit of service; and (viii) are politically motivated when they filed the charges against petitioner. For their part, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that an ex-parte TRO is issued only in extremis, and has a lifetime of only 72 hours. In the instant case, the trial court issued the TRO ex-parte for a full term of 20 days, and despite there being no clear showing that the applicant had a clear legal right that should be protected by the writ being sought. Furthermore, respondents see the status quo order issued 21 by Judge Vianzon as very much akin to a writ of injunction, forbidding respondents from prosecuting the case against petitioner. Anent Judge Vianzons order of inhibition, respondents state that while the matter of inhibition is within the sound discretion of the judge concerned, that same discretion could not be invoked by the same judge in determining whether or not to recall or vacate his earlier order inhibiting himself. There must be good and valid legal grounds for such recall, otherwise, it becomes grave abuse of discretion and an indication of 22 bias and partiality for a judge to recall his earlier order of recusation. The petition must be denied. At the onset, it must be emphasized that the propriety of the 20-day TRO is a non-issue. It was never raised as an issue in the petition before the Court of Appeals, nor squarely ruled upon by the appellate court. Instead, it was discussed in conjunction with the propriety of Judge Vianzons issuance of the status quo order dated 2 December 2002. But in any case, the Court will delve into the mechanics of issuing TROs, if only to provide the proper perspective to the discussion of the related issue. Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, the rule authorizes the court to which an application for preliminary injunction is made to issue a TRO if it should appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that "great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be 24 heard on notice," but only for a limited 72-hour period.
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The second paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 58 was actually lifted from paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95, which aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of extreme urgency in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Such TRO shall be issued only by the executive judge or single-sala station judge and shall take effect only for 72 hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be extended for another period 26 until a hearing on the pending application for preliminary injunction can be conducted. The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard in a summary hearing first, after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such circumstance, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during which the case should be raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended for another period until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which period shall in no case exceed 20 days 27 including the original 72 hours. It thus becomes apparent that Judge Vianzon erred in issuing a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so without conducting beforehand a summary hearing, and without showing that it falls under the exceptional circumstances enumerated by the Administrative Circular No. 20-95 where a TRO may be issued by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a summary hearing. Now on to the real issues of this case. The status quo order dated 2 December 2002 reads: Considering the "[M]otion to Maintain Status Quo" filed by plaintiff, through counsel Atty. Francisco Flaminiano, Jr., and finding the same to be in order, and considering further that the hearing on the propriety on the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still pending hearing and no subsequent order has been issued after the issuance of the courts order dated September 17, 2002, let the existing status quo be maintained restraining and enjoining defendants from continuing with the hearing of Administrative Case No. 2002-01 until further orders from this court. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) The above Order was improperly issued by Judge Vianzon. It was, for all intents and purposes, a mere continuation of the 20-day TRO erroneously 28 issued. Indeed, this Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has "the nature of a temporary restraining order." A TRO shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the TRO would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; in fact, as stated in the Order, "the hearing on the propriety on the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still pending," hence, the TRO earlier issued, assuming arguendo that it was indeed validly issued, automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court. The 2 December 2002 Order which directed that the "existing status quo be maintained restraining and enjoining defendants from continuing with the hearing" was, for all intents and purposes an indefinite extension of the first TRO, or "a renewed or second temporary restraining order 29 proscribed by the rule and extant jurisprudence." The status quo order is in fact, worse than a second TRO since unlike an ordinary TRO which has a lifetime of only 20 days, Judge Vianzon directed the maintenance of the status quo for an indefinite period, or "until further order from this court." It was not a writ of preliminary injunction, because as previously mentioned, the hearing on the application for the writ is still pending. Besides, in the event of an injunctive writ, an 30 injunction bond is required, unless exempted by the Court. Another important factor which militates against the correctness of the issuance of the status quo order is the fact that Judge Vianzon no longer had authority to do so because he had already inhibited himself from hearing the case as early as 21 October 2002, or more than a month before he issued the 2 December 2002 status quo order. It appears that Judge Vianzon did not even forward his order of inhibition to this Court, nor waited for the Court's resolution, but instead immediately recalled his order of inhibition and proceeded to try the case. Now, to the alleged infirmities of respondents petition before the Court of Appeals which petitioner claims should have merited its outright dismissal. Most of the alleged defects are connected with Judge Vianzons 15 November 2002 Order which recalled his earlier order of inhibition. Petitioner submits that respondents did not attach a certified true copy of the said Order, neither did it indicate the date of receipt of the same, nor filed a motion for its reconsideration. The other remaining issues are: (i) the alleged failure to file a motion for reconsideration of, and failure to discuss, the 11 December 2002 Order of denial of respondents motion to dismiss; (ii) the failure to state in the certificate on non-forum shopping that they filed administrative complaints against Judge Vianzon; and (iii) the failure to attach the affidavit of service to the petition. As explained by the Court of Appeals, the order of recall of Judge Vianzons inhibition is already moot and academic, since he had already issued an 31 Order dated 24 February 2003 inhibiting himself once again from the proceedings. Besides, a new judge has already been assigned to hear the 32 case. Thus, the fact that only a photocopy of the 15 November 2002 Order was attached to the petition cannot justify the dismissal of the entire petition, especially since respondents attached the certified true copies of the other assailed Orders (2 December 2002 status quo order and 11 December 2002 denial of the motion to dismiss) to the petition. For the same reason, respondents failure to state the date of receipt of the 15 November 2002 Order will not justify the dismissal of the petition. Even the purported absence of a discussion on the order denying respondents motion to dismiss cannot be a ground of the petitions outright dismissal, since the other issues raised therein were sufficiently discussed. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, it is because of this failure to

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show that the denial of motion was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and that respondents failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the denial, that the petition was dismissed for lack of merit insofar as it assailed the validity of the 11 December 2002 Order. While the general rule is that before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must have filed a motion for reconsideration of the act or order complained of, the Court has dispensed with this requirement in several instances. Thus, a previous motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari is necessary unless: (i) the issue raised is one purely of law; (ii) public interest is involved; (iii) there is urgency; (iv) a 33 question of jurisdiction is squarely raised before and decided by the lower court; and (v) the order is a patent nullity. In the instant case, respondents stated that they did not file a motion for reconsideration of the status quo order because it would be a useless exercise considering Judge Vianzons predilection for issuing orders without stating or specifying his basis therefor. In any case, the Court of Appeals found the status quo order to be a nullity, since it was made in violation of the Rules of Court. Petitioner maintains that respondents submitted a defective certificate against forum shopping when they failed to declare the administrative complaints they filed against Judge Vianzon. The Court finds that the omission of the administrative cases against Judge Vianzon is not fatal to respondents petition. Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. The administrative cases against Judge Vianzon pending before the Office of the Court Administrator will not affect the outcome of the civil case a quo. Finally, on the alleged failure to attach an affidavit of service, the Court defers to the finding of the Court of Appeals that an affidavit of service was "attached to the petition stating that copies thereof were sent to respondents by registered mail on January 14, 2003, as evidenced by registry 35 receipts nos. 494 and 495." WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals of 10 June 2004 and Resolution of 7 April 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74874 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
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