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GINA M. TIANGCO and SALVACION JENNY MANEGO vs UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. and JIMMY GOW G.R.

No. 168697, 14 December 2009 FACTS: Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Inc. (UNIWIDE) was a domestic corporation under the presidency of Jimmy Gow. Gina Tiangco was employed as concession manager and was later designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care department (P45k salary). On the other hand, Salvacion Jenny Maego was initially employed as buyer and was later promoted as senior category head (P25k salary). Sometime in 2001, Tiangco and Maego filed separate complaints against UNIWIDE for illegal dismissal with money claims. Labor Arbiter then consolidated said cases and submitted the same for decision. UNIWIDE and Gow filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on said cases on the ground that UNIWIDE was placed under suspension of payments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a receivership has in fact been appointed. In 2002, LA then suspended the proceedings. Two years thereafter, Tiangco and Maego move to reopen the case for SEC already approved the second amendment to UNIWIDEs rehabilitation plan. UNIWIDE and Gow opposed said reopening. LA issued an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda. UNIWIDE and Gow filed a petition for certiorari on ground that LA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said order. CA granted the petition ad denied the motion for reconsideration of Tiangco and Maego. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened at this point of the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCIs rehabilitation. HOLDING: NO. The relevant law dealing with the suspension of payments for money claims against corporations under rehabilitation is Presidential Decree No. (PD) 902-A, as amended. Section 6 (c) thereof states: Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the [SEC][22] shall possess the following powers: xxx xxx c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the [SEC] in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: xxx Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (Emphasis supplied) The term claim, as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature.[23] It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money.[24] Here, petitioners have pecuniary claimsthe payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages. In Rubberworld, we held that a labor claim is a claim within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in 2000.[25] Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules defines claims as follows: Sec. 1. Definition of Terms - For purposes of these Rules: xxx xxx xxx xxx

JAGUAR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY vs RODOLFO A. SALES, CHAIRPERSON, JAIME L. MORON, MELVIN R. TAMAYO, JESUS B. SILVA, JR., AND DIONISIO C. CARANYAGAN, DANETH FETALVERO AND DELTA MILLING INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. No. 162420, 22 April 2008 FACTS: Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency ("Jaguar") is a private corporation engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is Delta Milling Industries, Inc. ("Delta"). Rodolfo Sales, Melvin Tamayo, Dionisio Caranyagan, Jesus Silva, Jr., Jaime Moron and Daneth Fetalvero were hired as security guards by Jaguar. They were assigned at the premises of Delta in Libis, Quezon City. Later, Caranyagan and Tamayo were dismissed, and the others claim for monetary benefits. Sometime in 1999, respondents instituted the instant labor case before the Labor Arbiter. LA favored the respondents. Jaguar appealed the decision for failure of the LA to consider its cross-claim against Delta. NLRC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, noted that Jaguar is the direct employer of the security guards and thus principally liable, and recommended that Jaguar should go to the courts for purposes of proving Deltas liability. Jaguar then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA, which dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES a. b.

PEOPLES BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO) PHILS., INC. vs THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN GR No. 179652, 8 May 2009 FACTS: Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against Peoples Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo) Phils., Inc. for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office VII, Cebu City. ON the basis of the complaint, DOLE conducted a plant level inspection, and found violation of non-diminution of benefits equivalent to P6,000. Petitioner was required to rectify/restitute the violations within five (5) days from receipt. No rectification was effected by petitioner; thus, summary investigations were conducted, with the parties eventually ordered to submit their respective position papers. DOLE Regional Director Atty. Rodolfo Sabulao ruled that Juezan was an employee of Bombo Radyo and is entitled to his money claims amounting to P203,726.30. Upon appeal, the DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner to post a cash or surety bond. The case was elevated to CA, which ruled that petitioner was not denied due process, and that DOLE Secretary had the power to order and enforcecompliance with labor standard laws irrespective of the amount of the claim (because RA 7730 repealed Article 29 of the Labor Code). Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether NLRC, not DOLE, has jurisdiction over the respondents claim. (Stated differently -- Does the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship?) HOLDING: Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7730, is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists. It also underscores the avowed objective underlying the grant of power to the DOLE which is to give effect to the labor standard provision of this Code and other labor legislation. Of course, a persons entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor laws presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the first place. The clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists signifies that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the emergence of the controversy. It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLEs primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists in Art. 128 (b). Necessarily, the DOLEs power does not apply in two instances, namely: (a) where the employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever existed. However, a mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship, as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power. Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been consistent in maintaining that respondent is not its employee. Certainly, a preliminary determination, based on the evidence offered, and noted by the Labor Inspector during the inspection as well as submitted during the proceedings before the Regional Director puts in genuine doubt the existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the prudent recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer respondent to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of his claims. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, even the evidence relied on by the Regional Director in his order are mere self-serving declarations of respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon as proof of employer-employee relationship. Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to to set aside the Regional Directors 27 February 2004 Order. A careful study of the case reveals that the said Order, which found respondent as an employee of petitioner and directed the payment of respondents money claims, is not supported by substantial evidence, and was even made in disregard of the evidence on record. PETITION is GRANTED. CAs decision is set aside, Orders of the Acting Secretary of Labor and DOLE Regional Director are annulled. Complaint against petitioner is dismissed.

Whether Jaguar has the right of reimbursement from Delta. Whether Jaguar may claim reimbursement from Delta through a cross-claim filed with the labor court.

Claim shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. Thus, labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations. Petitioners seek to have the suspension of proceedings lifted on the ground that the SEC already approved respondent USWCIs SARP. However, there is no legal ground to do so because the suspensive effect of the stay order is not time-bound. As we held in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose. We ruled in Sobrejuanite v. ASB Development Corporation[31] that the Interim Rules, under Section 1, Rule 1 thereof, are applicable although (as in this case) the petition for declaration of suspension of payments was filed prior to the effectivity of such rules In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his order. PETITION is DENIED.

HOLDING: a. NONE YET. There is no question as regards the respective liabilities of petitioner and Delta Milling. Under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, the joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor, petitioner in this case, is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. On the other hand, Delta Milling, as principal, is made the indirect employer of the contractor's employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers' performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. However, in the event that petitioner pays his obligation to the guard employees pursuant to the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and CA, petitioner has the right of reimbursement from Delta Milling under Article 1217 of the Civil Code. b. NO. In Lapanday Agricultural Development Corp. vs CA, SC held: It is well-settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an employeremployee relationship exists. In the present case, there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Delta Milling. In its cross-claim, petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees. There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling. Rather, the cross-claim involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's cross-claim is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. Moreover, the liability of Delta Milling to reimburse petitioner will only arise if and when petitioner actually pays its employees the adjudged liabilities. Payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. In this case, it appears that petitioner has yet to pay the guard employees. Consequently, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition and in affirming the NLRC Resolutions. PETITION is DENIED.

ATTY. VIRGILIO R. GARCIA vs. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and ATTY. SALVADOR C. HIZON. G.R. No. 173115; 16 April 2009 FACTS: Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia was the Vice President and Head of Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of the Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). In January 2000, he was placed under preventive suspension based on three complaints for sexual harassment. After due investigation and recommendation of the Committee on Decorum, Atty. Salvador Hizon (President of ETPI) terminated his services in April 2000. He then filed a complaint-affidavit against ETPI and Atty. Hizon for illegal dismissal. LA found that the preventive suspension and the subsequent dismissal of Atty. Garcia were illegal. Upon appeal, NLRC ruled that said dismissal partook the nature of an intra-corporate dispute not within the jurisdiction of the LA. Hence, this case. ISSUE: Whether the question of legality or illegality of the removal or termination of employment of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate controversy that falls under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court). HOLDING: YES. The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has decreed that a corporate officers dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy, over which the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] (now the Regional Trial Court) has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Before a dismissal or removal could properly fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC (now RTC), it has to be first established that the person removed or dismissed was a corporate officer. "Corporate officers" in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are those officers of the corporation who are given that character by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of the Corporation Code. These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these three. A corporation may have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vicepresident, cashier, auditor or general manager. We agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty. Garcias ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of ETPI, partakes of the nature of an intracorporate controversy, jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The Labor Arbiter thus erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.

U-BIX CORPORATION and EDILBERTO B. BRAVO vs VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO. GR No. 177647, 31 October 2008 FACTS: U-Bix Corporation (U-Bix) hired Valerie Anne H. Hollero initially as a management trainee at its Furniture Division, and later promoted the same as facilities manager. She was then sent to the US for a two-month training. Prior to her trip, she signed a 5-year contract with U-Bix and in case of non-completion she shall reimburse all expenses incurred by said company for her training abroad. Months after, U-Bix terminated her employment for loss of trust and confidence (because of her repeated pattern of tardiness, absence, neglect of duties and lack of interest). It later filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for the reimbursement of training expenses and damages. Hollero, on the other hand, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA found for U-Bix. Upon appeal, NLRC reversed said decision and awarded Hollero backwages and separation pay. CA also dismissed U-Bix petition for review on certiorari. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over U-Bixs complaint for reimbursement of training expenses. HOLDING: NO. With regard to U-Bix's complaint for reimbursement of training expenses, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction thereover. The legality of respondent's dismissal was, however, raised not by U-Bix's complaint but in respondent's Position Paper. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined from the allegations made in the complaint, and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters, as well as of the NLRC, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. U-Bix's complaint was one to collect sum of money based on civil laws on obligations and contract, not to enforce rights under the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or the collective bargaining agreement.

CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC) GR No. 141020, 12 June 2008 FACTS: Casino Labor Association filed consolidated cases before NLRC against PSSC, PCOC and PAGCOR. LA dismissed said complaint for lack of jurisdiction. NLRC likewise dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction over PSSC, PCOC and PAGCOR. CA also dismissed the petition against NLRC. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission has jurisdiction over employee-employer problems in PAGCOR, PCOC, PSSC. HOLDING: No. The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section 2(1) that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. The Court collectively referred to all respondent corporations, including PCOC and PSSC, and held that in accordance with the Constitution and jurisprudence, corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Labor Department." The Court stated further that P.D. 1869 exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law. PETITION is DISMISSED.

OKOL vs SLIMMERS WORLD (intra-corporate dispute fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts) Facts: Leslie Okol was the VP of Slimmers World. She was preventively suspended because of Customs confiscation of Precor elliptical machines and seven Precor treadmills belonging to or consigned to Slimmers World, placed under Okols name, for being undervalued. Her Suspension was extended for another month. She later received a memo from Slimmers world asking her to explain why she should not be terminated. She filed her explanation but the company was not satisfied, hence, on Sept. 22, 1999 she was terminated. Okol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration division of the NLRC. Slimmers world filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the NLRC as no jurisdiction since Okol was a corporate officer. Labor Arbiter- granted the motion to dismiss by Slimmers world (SW) NLRC- reversed the LA, sided in favor of Okol, SW appealed but was denied CA- reversed the NLRC and affirmed the decision of the LA Okols contention: that she was an employee, not a corporate officer, shown by the fact that the company had control over her, the company paid her salaries, deducted SSS and Philhealth, and she was terminated not by a board resolution but by a letter from the president. Issue: Whether Okol was a corporate officer. Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over her case. Ruling: Okol was a corporate officer and the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case. Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. In Tabang v. NLRC, we held that an office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an employee usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee. SW submitted the General Information Sheet (GIS) dated 14 April 1998, Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 14 April 1997 and Secretarys Certificate, and the Amended By-Laws dated 1 August 1994 of Slimmers World as submitted to the SEC to show that petitioner was a corporate officer whose rights do not fall within the NLRCs jurisdiction. The GIS and minutes of the meeting of the board of directors indicated that petitioner was a member of the board of directors, holding one subscribed share of the capital stock, and an elected corporate officer. The charges of illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes. The question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. The determination of the rights of a director and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an intracorporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the present case. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 18 October 2002 Decision and 22 September 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69893. This Decision is without prejudice to petitioner Leslie Okols taking recourse to and seeking relief through the appropriate remedy in the proper forum.

ALCANTARA and SONS vs CA Facts: C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc., (the Company) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and processing of plywood. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Companys rank and file employees. Also involved in the case are the Union officers and members who allegedly committed illegal acts during the strike. The CBA between the parties contain a no strike, no lockout provision during its lifetime. However, the workers started negotiating the economic provisions of the CBA to which the company did not agree hence the deadlock. The Union filed a notice of strike and after undergoing the legal processes finally went on strike. The company filed a petition for injunction, granted by the NLRC. It necessitated the help of law enforcement to enforce the injunction order. Union appealed the injunction with the CA, dismissed In the Labor Arbiter: 1. Company filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Board to declare the Unions strike illegal, impleading the union officers and union members who allegedly committed illegal acts during the strike. 2. Union file against the Company a counterclaim for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and damages 3. Labor Arbiter declared strike illegal; union members not guilty of illegal acts during the strike and ordered their reinstatement and backwages; denied the unions counterclaim. The company did not reinstate union members and filed appeal with the NLRC NLRC strike was illegal and member unions were guilty of the illegal acts during the strike Union filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and affirmed the decision of the LA. During the pendency of the case, Union members filed for reinstatement pending appeal with the LA. LA did not grant the reinstatement reasoning that the prolonged litigation severely strained the relations of the parties but ordered for payment of separation pay. On appeal with the NLRC, it set aside the decision of the LA for lack of factual and legal basis but ordered the payment of employees accrued wages and 13 th month pay considering the Companys refusal to reinstate them pending appeal. On motion for recon, NLRC modified its order, deleting the grant of payment. On motion for certiorari for the denial of the appeal for payment, CA, dismissing the petition, ruled that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplated illegal dismissal or termination cases and not cases under Article 263. Thus, the CA ruled that the resolution ordering the reinstatement of the terminated Union members and the payment of their wages and other benefits had no basis. Issue: Whether the strike was illegal. Whether the union members were guilty of the illegal acts during the strike that justified their termination. Whether the union members should be reinstated pending appeal. Ruling: 1. 2.

As to the CAs contention that reinstatement pending appeal is available only to employees terminated due to unfair labor practice and not to those terminated because of illegal strike finds no basis in law and hence erroneous. Article 223, which provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall immediately be executory pending appeal, cannot but apply to all terminations irrespective of the grounds on which they are based. While it is true that generally the grant of separation pay is not available to employees who are validly dismissed, there are, in furtherance of the laws policy of compassionate justice, certain circumstances that warrant the grant of some relief in favor of the terminated Union members based on equity. Bitter labor disputes, especially strikes, always generate a throng of odium and abhorrence that sometimes result in unpleasant, although unwanted, consequences. Considering this, the striking employees breach of certain restrictions imposed on their concerted actions at their employers doorsteps cannot be regarded as so inherently wicked that the employer can totally disregard their long years of service prior to such breach. The records also fail to disclose any past infractions committed by the dismissed Union members. Taking these circumstances in consideration, the Court regards the award of financial assistance to these Union members in the form of one-half month salary for every year of service to the company up to the date of their termination as equitable and reasonable.

3.

Yes the Strike was illegal because of the no strike no lockout provision in the CBA. Yes they are guilty of said acts. Joining illegal strikes are in itself not a ground for termination of employees but the commission of illegal acts during the strike is. Evidence, ranging from the testimony of the NLRC sheriff and non-striking employees, to photographs of the actual strike scene, showed and identified the union members, Cornelio Caguiat, Ruben Tungapalan, and Eufracio Rabusa, as the ones blocking the alley and coercin other employees into joining the strike. These facts are enough to validate their subsequent termination. Although the Labor Arbiter failed to act on the terminated Union members motion for reinstatement pending appeal, the Company had the duty under Article 223 to immediately reinstate the affected employees even if it intended to appeal from the decision ordaining such reinstatement. The Companys failure to do so makes it liable for accrued backwages until the eventual reversal of the order of reinstatement by the NLRC on November 8, 1999, a period of four months and nine days.

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