CategoriesAre for Talking

On the Cognitive and Discursive Basesof Categorization Derek Edwards

LoucHsonoucH UNrvensny

ABsrRAcr. This paper_begins drawing a distinction between cognitive by and discursiveapproaches linguistic categorization,and it is arguddthat to gognitive approacheshave ignored the prime importance of d'iscourse. Rather than attempting to reject or refute the cognitive orientation in favour of a social alternative, it is argued that talk enlists cognition as a powerful element in the rhetoric of description and reality constructiofl. Important features of categorization, such as prototype structures, indefinitenessof membership, indexicality of applicati6n and contrastive organizationare shownto make senseasfeaturesdesignedfor the situated rhetoric of talk, rather than for displaying a persontsabstractedunderstandingof the world. It is arguedthat cognitive theories, while providing important insights into semanticorgani2ation,manage to suitain the explanatory primacyof perceptionand cognitiononty through the useof methods that systematicallyremove from view the flex'ibilitiesand action orientation of talk, while using imaginations situatedtalk as a of basisfor semanticanalvsis.

It is a widely held view in cognitive and sociar psychorogy that the ways in which people understand the world, act upon it and react to it depend upon how they categorize it. This implies that the study of categorization is capable of revealing some of the most fundamental organizing principles of human thought and action. The aim of this paper is to discusssome major recent work in categorization theory, including prototype theory (Rosch, 1978; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976)and especially George Lakoff's (1987) seminal study, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. The main thrust of these recent developments is to emphasize the basis of finguistic categorization in the nature of bodily and perceptual experience, including its metaphorical extensions. Experientially rooted

'cognitive models' provide a basis upon which categories,including linguisticones, are comprehended and used. While recognizing many the

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important insightsof this work, I argue that it distorts our understandingof human categorization by removing it from contexts of social action. Although admitting the importance of perceptualexperiencein the semantics of categories, I argue that the explanatory status of that experiential basisis.subjectto principles of discursiveconstructionand deployment. By examining categorizationas a social practice, the explanatory significance of individual cognition and perception is recognized but diminished, becoming part of a range of topics, devices and resources that participants can use in the performance of communicative acts. While other significant critiques of category theory have been offered from the perspective of discourseanalysisand rhetoric (e.g. Billig, 1985, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and I draw upon these, they antedatethe more recent studies, especially Lakoff's. They also focus mainly upon categorization in social psychology (particularly theories of stereotyping and prejudice), and argue againstits cognitive and experiential basis.For many cognitive psychologists,the cognitive-experientialbasis of semantic categories in particular, especially in the wake of Lakoff's and Rosch's research, is simply too well documented, too plausible and too well entrenched in accepted paradigms of method and explanation for these critiques to have much effect. One of the aims of this paper is to develop the discursive perspective on categorization while recognizing 'obvious' experiential referentiality of the well-documented and even categories. Lakoff's work on the experiential basis of categories(Lakoff, 1987; cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) is a detailed and sophisticatedtreatment of the prototype and cognitive model approaches set in the context of a refutation of'classical' category theory. Classicalcategory theory is identified as a tradition dating from Aristotle, underlying computational models of mind and based upon notions of categoriesas sets of equivalent members, upon which logical operations can be performed. Lakoff's is a superb demolition of the relevance of classicaltheory to the explanation of ordinary human sense-making,especiallythe nature of categoriesin natural languages,but also other less likely conceptual systemssuch as scienceand mathematics, In particular, it provides an extended demonstration of the pervasiveness of bodily experiential imagery in the metaphorical generation and application of human categoriesin languageand in how worldly phenomena are understood. Insofar as this work deals with the semanticcontent of categories,it is by no means obvious that it must conflict with the principles of discursive and rhetorical psychology: for . . . people draw upon knowledgeof the organizationof categories (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, producing . . . intelligibleconversation. p. 127\

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. . discourse manufactured of pre-existing is out linguisticresources with propertiesof their own, much like a bridge is put togetherwith girders, concrete and so on. (McKinlay,Potter,& Wetherell,in press) It is tempting to put the two approachestogether, in a kind of division of labour. while the discursiveapproach sayslittle about how words come to have systematic semantic properties, the cognitive approach fails to explicate how actual categorizations, things that are said, function as actions fitted for their occasions. Thus, Lakoff might be seen as explicating the nature and origins of these 'linguistic resources' from which people construct discourse.This idea has much to recommend it. However, things are not quite so easy. The discursive approach requires categories to be flexible, not merely in the senseof containing non-central members and having fuzzy boundaries, but in the senseof taking meaning indexically, and in indefinitely many specificways, from contexts of situated use: 'the building blocks of our many versions of the social world . . . have to be moulded in discourse for use in different accounts'(Potter & wetherell, 1987, p. 137; cf. Heritage, 1984). We need to explore the relationship between 'resources'and situated talk, and, indeed, this is the major point at issue. It is a matter of how the burden of explanation is to be shared. The cognitive approach tends to take discourse as a realization of, and therefore as evidence of, underlying processesand structuresof knowledge, which themselvesderive from innate structures,and from perception and action. Discourse is assumedto be driven by cognition, being a processof assembling categorizations for making sense of experience. Although linguistic categoriesmay be recognizedas culturally variable, the emphasis is upon their psychologicalorigin, their cross-cultural and universalproperties, and their mental representation.culture itself tends to be seen as a kind of socially shared cognitive organization (Tyler, 1969; D'Andrade, 1990). In contrast, the discursive approach treats talk and texts llot as representationsof pre-formed cognitions, even culturally provided ones, but as forms of social action. Categorization is something we do, in talk, in order to accomplish social actions (persuasion, blamings, denials, refutations, accusations,etc.). From this perspective, we would expect language's 'resources' not to come .ready-madefrom a process in which people are trying their best to understandthe world (whether as individuals or together), but rather, or at least additionally, to be shaped for their functions in talk, for the businessof doing situated social actions. Rather than starting with the abstractedcontent of categoriesand then theorizing about how they are used, discursive psychology recommends starting with situated usage,and the aim of analysisis to explicate 'what is being done'. This has a seriesof implications: 1. We are always dealing empirically with indexicality, with a specific

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2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

thing, event, property, or group of things being referenced, not the entire possible set. Categorization will always be encountered as part of an utterance, text, argument, description, account, etc. It is therefore encountered as part of the accomplishment of some social action: a reporting, blaming, defence, justification, excuse,etc. Situated categorizations therefore perform moral work on the world described, and indexically, on the current interaction and participants who are producing and receiving the description (cf. Edwards & Potter, in press). It seems reasonable to assume that this is what linguistic categories are for, to do these kinds of things in talk. Category terms (their semantic content, etc.) might fruitfully be examlned, therefore, in terms of the kinds of discursivework they are functionally designed for, rather than how well they correspond to cognitively natural or perceptually derived organizationsof experience.

The remainder of this paper will gdopt the view that language is primarily a medium for the accomplishment of social actions, such that whatever cognitive or perceptual statuslanguagehas, and whatever role it has in representing psychologicalexperience or worldly reality, these are secondaryto and predicated upon that essentialand primary social nature. The idea is to explore the implications of this view for the cognitive psychology of categories. It is argued that the experiential basis of categories is itself designed for talk, rather than for realistic knowledge representation.It is an important element in how descriptionsand versions of the world are not only intelligible, but capable of performing interactional work. I shall argue that explorationsof the semanticsof categories has involved imagining situated usage while employing methods that remove it from view. Circularities of definition and theorizing could be avoided by raising that imaginative process to the level of systematic empirical study.

Categories and Categorization The cognitive psychology of categories includes two kinds of cognitive organization. There is the linguistic notion of categorization, the kind of study associatedwith Whorf (1956) and Lakoff (1987), which recognizes that just about all words, as well as grammatical' and phonological structures, are categories.A sentencesuch as'the cat sat on the mat'can be an4lysed for how a// of its words categorize objects, events, time, definitenessand spatial location, and how grammar puts them all together in a categorizeddescription of the world. We shall concentratehere upon

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word meanings, what we might call semantic categorization. The second kind of categorization is propositional, of the form 'dogs are animals'. 'Socrates is mortal', etc., where a (named) entity is explicitly placed into a named category. Clearly, propositional categorization,since it useswords, presupposes semantic categorization. While propositional categorization might be assumedto be intentional, under the speaker'scontrol, semantic categorization is assumed by cognitive theorists to be unconscious and automatic, and therefore to provide an unconscious, automatic kind of cognitive basis even for overt propositions. Lakoff, like Whorf (1956), is especially interested in categorizations which are 'built into grammar . . used in thought, not just as objecn of thought' (Lakoff , 1987, p. 335; original emphasis); 'much of our conceptual systemis used unconsciouslyand automatically, in ways that we don't even notice' (p. 337). So linguistic categoriesfunction like schemata,'autonomous and automatic----once set in motion they proceed to their conclusion' (Casson, 1983, p. 431). While grammatical and semantic categories are 'built into' language, neither Rosch nor Lakoff see categorization as essentially linguistic. Rather, language is just one, albeit important, domain in which categorizationcan be studied. There is a deeper psychological process: 'language makes use of our general cognitive apparatus' (Lakoff, 1987, p.58). This apparatus is of a sort that we share with other animals (categorizationis 'one of the most basicfunctions of all organisms'; Rosch et al., 1976, p. 382), and originates in characteristics perception of and action. Each species has its own perceptual and behavioural capacities, and so the specifically human basis of categorization is assured. It is similarly d principle of cognitive anthropology, and its intersectionswith cognitive science, that while cultures clearly vary in their actual classificatory systems,the basic classilicatoryprocesses are considered universal (Gardner, 1985). The notion of automatic, schema-driven cognitive processing has drawn critical attention from proponents of discursive and rhetorical psychology.Potter and Wetherell (1987; cf. Edwards and Potter, in press) draw upon studiesin ethnomethodologyand conversationanalysisto argue that talk is action-oriented, that the deployment of descriptive categories is organized in ways that are consequentialand implicative, and treated as accountablyso by participants (cf. Schegloff ,1972,1989; Wooffitr, 1990). This is not to make claims about speakers'volition or motivation, any more than a semantic analysis does, but about the functional organization of talk. The rhetorical approach is also directed against cognitive automaticity:
Categorization does not provide the basis of thinking in a simple sense. The automatic applicationof categoriesis the negation of thinking, in that it is essentiallya thoughtlessprocess.(Billig, 1987, p. 140)

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Billig concentrates his critique upon the cognitive notion of categorization as a basic and inevitable feature of the biological need to simplify perceptual experience. This is a virtually universal claim of cognitive 'shortcuts for organizing theories, that categorization provides necessary p. 87), such that 'without any incoming information' (Taylor, 1981, categorization an organism could not interact profitably with the infinitely distinguishableobjects and events it experiences'(Mervis & Rosch, 1981, p . 9 4 ) . I n s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c atlh e o r i e st h i s i d e a h a s l e d t o t h e w i d e l y h e l d conclusion that social stereotyping and prejudice are inevitable outcomes of normal mental functioning (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Hamilton, 1979; Taylor, 1981; Wilder, 1981) in which perceptual factois such as salience, availability and distinctiveness are important (Taylor & Fiske, 1979; cf . Attribution Theory, and its discursive critique; Edwards & Potter, forthcoming). Billig's responseto these rather pessimistictheories is to point to 'one-sided' nature, in that people do not only place things into their 'particularize' things, distinguishing and differgeneral categories, but also entiating them. However, in order to perform such particularizations,it is necessaryto deploy words, and these words carry further, though contrasting, categorical judgements. Particularization is therefore a feature of propositional categorization, rather than of semantic categorization, because it relies upon the discursive deployment of verbal categories. To the extent that drawing attention to particulars is done with words, it uses categories. 'an Billig defines categorization propositionally, as the act of placing entity-whether object, action or person-into a wider or general category', as in'this cup is red','Socrates was Greek','Germans are efficient', etc. (Billig, 1987,p. 121). He showsthat even stereotypicalsocial categorizationsare frequently, and in a rhetorically organized way, sustained by appeals to the distinguishingcharactersof individual members: to the exceptions that prove the rule. While Billig's arguments are a powerful corrective to ideas of cognitive automaticity in categorization, and to the notion that categorizationsare perceptually natural generalizations that inevitably lead to social stereotyping, they leave the semantic contentof verbal categories,especiallyones not obviously to do with social 'built stereotypes,largely untouched. But it is semantic categories, ones into grammar', that are the prime focus of much of the linguistically orientated work on the cognitive bases of categorization. Nevertheless, if we take the course I have recommended, and start not with abstracted category content but with situated usage, then the rhetorical approach can be seen as providing a principled approach to semantic categories as well. It suggeststhat semantic content will be organized preciselyso as to allow for rhetorical work to be done; I shall return to this idea later.

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Categories and Their Deployment In the previous section, I have argued that a distinction between semantic and propositional categorization,despite not being a distinction we would want to maintain for long., allows us to see how the discourse and rhetoric versus cognitive approaches can easily pass each other by. Their relative strengths appear to be in different realms. The cognitive perspective explores the meanings of semantic categories, while the discursive perspective concentrates on the rhetoric of social stereotyping. We shall now examine how even the basic semantics of categories is subject to discursiveconsiderations. It is Eleanor Rosch's major achievement to have shifted interest in categorization from artificial 'classical'sets of equivalent members, like large red triangles and small blue squares, towards the study of 'natural categories' (Rosch, 1978). Natural categories include natural language categories(words), and the everyday objects that they label, as well as the categorical properties of perception and action that are thought to underlie language. Natural categories are defined in terms of objects' physical uses or functions, rather than the communicative uses of words. Words are treated not as functional things, but as names for functional things. The root of meaning is in bodily action and experience, which in turn link concepts to the structure of the physical world. 'Basic level' categoriesare determined by principles of perception and action, coupled with 'cognitive economy' . Chairs and tables are basic level , while furnitrzre is superordinate, and dining chair subordinate. Basic level categories are the ones that are used most frequently, and learned first and most readily, and which correspond to distinctive bodily actions: we sit on chairs, but do not do similar things with all kinds of furniture (Rosch, 1978). Roger Brown, in an early and influential paper, similarly remarks that 'flowers are marked by sniffing actions, but there are no actions that distinguish one speciesof flower from another' (1965, p. 318). Basic level categories re thus a . . human-sized. They dependnot on objectsthemselves, independent of people,but on the way peopleinteractwith objects:the way they perceivethem, image them, organizeinformation about them, and behave towardthem with their bodies.(Lakoff, 1987, 51) p. Prototypes are defined as best examples. Given any natural category, whether basic level or not, people are able to judge that some instancesor members of that category are more typical or centr4l than others. For example, chairs and tables are more central members of the category furniture than are table lamps and filing cabinets.Sparrows and robins are

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more typical members of the basic category birds than are chickens, ostriches and penguins. These intuitions are well supported by a large number and variety of empirical studies that use rating scales,free recall, recognition reaction times, developmental observations,and other methods. Rosch (1978, pp. 40-41), unlike many cognitive and social psychologists who have taken up these ideas, has been parsimoniousin her interpretation of what prototypes imply about cognition, limiting the notion to an important empirical discovery, rather than claiming it as a direct model of mental representation. Lakoff develops this idea in some detail, arguing 'prototype effects are superficial phenomena which may have that (1987, p. 56). Lakoff identifies the major sources as many sources' 'idealized cognitive models' (ICMs). ICMs are kinds of schemata based upon bodily or perceptual experiencb, and its metaphorical extension to things in the world While discourse orientated theorists have been critical of prototype theory (Billig, 1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), it does possesssome attractions. It could be said to meet discursivepsychologyhalf way, in that, despite its treatment of categories in a decontextualized and idealized fashion, it portrays word meanings in a way that lends them to situated, rhetorical practices. It makes for opportunities to define things 4s more or less central, to construct and organize descriptions so 4s to centralize, marginalize or mark as exceptional whatever is described.In other words, precisely because things and events do not automatically call for single, unique descriptions(indefinitely multiple descriptionsare always possible: Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984), typicality can be imposed upon talk's topics via the choice of categorical descriptions; and prototype theory can be seen as articulating how words typicalize the world. However, it is not merely,the case that discourse deploys natural categoriesand prototypes ready-made. Centrality of membershipis itself a participants' concern: that is to say, something that participants orientate to in their talk, rather than just leing an analyst'sexplanatory idea. It may be dealt with indexically, or as a matter of disputation, and this is true even for birds and chairs:
. . . if, in a pencil and paper test situation, I am asked to'name some typical birds', I may vcry likely mention robins and sparrows. . . . But neither is at all likely to come to mind when I am greetedat the door with: 'I've just put the bird in thc oven'. (Heritage, 198a, p. 149)

And
With imagination one could envisage a situation where the choice 'armchair' and 'chair' misht be keenlv contested: between terms such as

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this could be a situation involving law courts and allegations broken of contractualagreements betweenfurniture manufacturers wholesalers and . . . . ( B i l l i g ,1 9 8 7 p . 1 3 6 ) , The idea that semantic categories have fuzzy membership boundaries, inequities of membership and permit multiple and even contrasting possibilities for description suggeststhat language's category system functions not simply for organizing our understanding of the world, but for talking about it in ways that are adaptable to the situated requirements of description, and to differences of perspective, and to the need to put words to work in the pragmatics of social interaction. Further, becausecategorical descriptions involve choice, and are rhetorically consequential,they also potentially display the speakeras positioned, interestedand accountablein a loosely moral sensefor how things are described, and for the interactional consequencesof descriptions. As conversation and discourse analysis have shown (e.g. Schegloff, 1972; Watson, 1978; Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Sacks, 1979; widdicombe and wooffitt, in press), participants will deploy categorical descriptions accordingly, reflexively, on that interactional basis. One of the things that people do in talk is not merely to deploy categories prototypically, but to make typicality the topic of talk, and make it problematical. For example, Barrett (1990) discusses conversations in which referencesto 'typical feminists' are flexibly and rhetorically used, both subscribedto and also treated ironically by participants.Their use of the category is then not so much as an element in thought, but more like that of social psychologists themselves, for whom it may be a problematical category with a controversial and provisional descriptive and explanatory status: not just a way of seeing,but a way of constructingseeing.Indeed, it is tempting to consider 'prototype' itself as a participants' topic, a researcher'sconcept, itself to be explained by theory. Most of the work on the flexibility and action orientation of categoriesin tafk (e.g. Sacks, 1979; Jayyusi, 1984; Billig, 1985; potter, 19gg) has been done on social categories. Lakoff (1987, p. 86) suggests that social stereotypesare 'usually consciousand subject to public discussion',but in contrast to this, 'the use of typical categorymembers is usually unconscious and automatic'. Apart from being a largely unsupported presumption about what happens in ordinary conversation, this is surely a distinction too strongly drawn. First, there is no clear line to be drawn, a priori, between social stereotypes and mere descriptions of people and human events. Rather, what counts as mere description or as stereotyping is the point a/ issuefor participants. For example, watson (197g) shows how the mere invocation of social categories (white, black, Jewish, protestant, etc.), quite apart from any propositional stereotyping, servesto bolster a speaker'sself-portrayalas blamelessvictim, while simultaneously providing

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for a discrediting of his or her talk as interested, biased and racist. The issue of social stereotyping and prejudice is at stake in the interaction, rather than available in semantic categories,and is rhetorically played out in ostensibly mere description and counter description. Second, as Billig (1987, p. 136) notes with regard to disputes about furniture (in the example cited earlier), much of the discussion of the cognitive basis of non-social categories deals with what are, especially 'typical outside of any context of use, uncontroversial propositions, like the 'Robins and sparrowsare typical birds. Apples examples'that Lakoff cites: and oranges are typical fruit. Saws and hammers are typical tools' (p. 86). 'apples and People do not go around uttering abstracted propositions like oranges are typical fruit', but then people do not say anything out of context. Maybe it would make senseto say it in an afgument with someone who exhorts the benefits of eating fruit but refuses to touch apples and oranges. So the categorization of physical objects becomes a means of implying social categorizations, such as the fruit eater's fussiness or irrationality. Controversy and the pos5ibility of disagreement, or of competing explanations, are the occasion for statements of typicality, for physical objects as well as for social stereotypes,in science as well as in ordinary talk (Latour. 1987). Rather than typicality (even for furniture and fruit) being thought of as simply a given fact of worldly experience, and as structuring talk in an automatic manner, it can be studied in conversationfor how it is constructed and deployed, where the extent of flexibility in such matters is a conversationally accountable matter. Predictably, unexpected claims for typicality will be orientated to as controversial, as occasions for, and occasioned by, disputation, requiring arguments and accounts. The study of conceptual and descriptive typicality then becomes the study of how conversationists construct typicality in talk for things and events in the world, via the flexibilities of description. It is highly likely that such an approach will reveal a great deal in common with the findings of prototype studies.But it placesthe statusof cognitive categorieson a lessautomatic, lessindividualistic explanatory footing, and one less reducible to the properties of semantic systemsand cognitive structures. Sacks(1974)provides a celebratedanalysisof the normative background 'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up'. His discussion of stories like has much in common with Lakoff's notion of ICMs (Idealized Cognitive Models); it involves how we make senseof the text in terms of the typical kinds of things that mothers and babies are thought to do. But it is not simply that talk realizes the structure of an underlying cognitive model. Rather, it referencesthat structure in a way that allows the speaker to have something to say. Normatively shared assumptions about mothers and 'I don't even want babies are similarly the backdrop of statements like babies; I think they're horrible, smelly, dirty little things'. This is extracted

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from a young woman's talk studied by Barrett (1990,p. 260). It is part of a discussionthat disagreedwith a suggestionthat mothers should stay home to look after their children. It by no means refutes Lakoff's notion of ICMs. Indeed, the status of such models as 'idealized' allows them to operate normatively in just this way. But it is only by studying how such normative assumptionsare oriented to in talk, in the adoption of rhetorical positions, that we can make sense of how particular categorizationsare constructed on occasions,so that idealized cognitive models do not slip into becoming idealized models of cognition. The idea of cognitive schemata, derived from processes of embodied, realistic perception, providing meaning to language, has the explanatory traffic going too much in one direction. There is another arena of meaning, just as primary as perceptual experience, and as far as language is concernedpossiblymore so: the arena of social action. While talk is clearly orientated to a backdrop of normative knowledge and expectation, it also evokes and acts constructivelyupon that background, altering, challenging and recruiting it for the accomplishmentof social actions. Further, these are not sustainablefor long as distinct 'arenas' of meaning. The nature of taken--for-granted, normative knowledge can itself be studied as a topic and outcome of talk, where appeals to perceptual reality and direct experienceare part of talk's persuasiveness, amongst the devicesdeployed in producing convincing descriptionsand versions.

Indexicality and Rhetoric Having broken down any sharp division between the cognitive characteristics of verbal categories and their situated deployment, we can now explore the implications for categorization theory of two important features of situated talk: indexicality and rhetoric. Approaching categorizationas a practice, rather than as a semantic/ait accompli, means dealing with talk's situatedness(indexicality) and with its interactional and argumentative organization (rhetoric). Indexicality concerns how situational and linguistic context are invoked: . . . hearers mustperform activecontextualizing work in order to seewhat descriptions mean, and speakers performingsuchwork rely upon hearers in order that their utterances make definitesense. will (Heritage,1984, pp. 147-148) Since part of talk's indexicality includes the person who speaks, talk reflexively indexes the speaker and makes availablea range of implications and inferences concerning the speaker's interests, knowledge, thoughts and feelings, efforts at accomplishingparticular social actions, and so on.

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These indexicalities of talk are available and responded to as such by other participants, and so are amongst the considerations that are orientated to in talk's production. The notion that talk displays a rhetorical organization (Billig, 1987) also recognizes that versions and descriptions (including categorizations) perform social actions, that they are organizedpersuasively with regard to what other people say or think, or are assumed to think, or might think. p. Lakoff (1.987, 308) complains that: professorhas to suffer at the Possibly the most boring thing a linguistics is discussion the 22 (or of handsof eagerundergraduates the interminable however many) words for snow in Eskimo. This showsalmost nothing about a conceptualsystem. . . . When an entire culture is expert in a It's and it's domain . . . they havea suitablylargevocabulary. no surprise, than that . . . Americanshavelots of no big deal. It is no more surprising namesfor cars. The essaysmay be boring, but the issue need not be. It may well be that examining the range of kinds of snow, or of American cars, for their perceptually distinct and behaviourally consequential characteristicswould be a psychologically trivial exercise. But the various makes and marques of motor cars carry powerful semiotic significances,over and above perceptual distinctiveness and bodily use, and it is no,great insight to suggestthat it is precisely for such significances, for what it means to own and drive a Porsche, a safety-consciousVolvo or the top-of-the-range nrodel within a fleet of company cars, that the different models are produced, badged and marketed. For motor cars, the categoriesmay well exist, in just the way they exist, and are named, so that they can be socially deployed, such that it is only the fact of their perceptual distinctivenesswhich is trivial. Perhaps even the linguistic categories of snow, apart from being perceptually and behaviourally consequential, are also shaped for description and accountability, not merely to reflect reality (whatever that would be!). Sacks (1979) provides a brief but revealing study of some naming practices of American car users: specifically,a group of 1960steenagers. 'hotrod' and 'Pontiac station wagon' He shows how the choice of terms like are opposed, and operate as alternative descriptions that indexically display social positions and identities, both for the objects and persons described, and, through that, for the producers of those descriptions. 'hotrodder' and 'teenager' are contrasted as adults' versus Similarly, members' categories, applied to the same sets of persons, invented and used in order to make distinctions in the world, to define membership in ways that are relevant to the accountability of actions. They do not reflect distinctions that are already there. Category terms, for both objects and persons, are used in ways designed to perform social actions, not only in current talk, but in a historical sense, being invented precisely for such

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uses. It would not be possibleto establishthe existenceof named objects, bodily actions and significancesin the physical world, or in behaviour, prior to the construction of such naming practices, since it is essentially through and for those practices that the categories are brought into 'distinguishexistence. This does not deny that named objects have to be able, whether they are motor cars or focal areas of the colour spectrum (Berlin & Kay, 1969; Heider,1972). It is not just the definitional, abstractly definable content of words or categoriesthat we have to consider, therefore, nor even their conventional metaphorical extensions,but also their situated deployment. political talk provides a rich vein of rhetorically organized categorizations, and often these are managed not by overt categorical name calling but, rather, indirectly via indexically provided implications (cf. wowk, 19g4). It is worth examining one such casein some detail, since it is details that show how background knowledge and expectationsmay be invoked in relation to situated categorical descriptions, and also the interactional work that such descriptionsperform. one of the issuesconcerning the British prime Minister John Major, following his assumption of the leadership of the conversative Party, was his claimed lack of decisiveness.The ways in which accusations indecisiveness of were made were sensitiveto considerations of what they might imply about the accuser, both for fellow conservatives, against whom a charge of disloyalty might be levied, and for opposition politicians, who could be expected to hive an .interest' in such criticisms. Accusations also had to be made against the specific background of how Major got to be Prime Minister; his predecessoi, Mrs Thatcher, was widely consideredto be authoritarian, and this was available to be constructed either as fault (and cause of her downfail), or as virtue (a device for rebuking her critics). Thatcher's eventuar removal had been preceded by the resignations, on issuesthat included rhatcher's alleged high handednesswith them, of senior government ministers, including the Foreign Secretaty Sir Geoffrey Howe, and earlier the chancellor Nigel Lawson. Lawson's resignation was made on the basis (he claimed) that Thatcher was undermining economic decisions, having appointed an independent economic adviser (Professor Alan walters) whose views of economic policy were publicly at odds with Lawson's (see Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, forthcoming). This is a partial background, and of course I cannot claim it as disinteresteddescription, for reading what is going on in the following statements: I think it was Pierre Mendes-France who said that to govern was to choose.I agree with that. And to appear to be unable to chooseis to appearto be unable to govern.(Lawson in parliament,30 March 1990) I believeit's said of one very distinguished cabinetmember very unkindly . . . and I don't wish to imply this to . . . John Maior, but it,s

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ARE cATEGoRIES Fo1 saidhe . . waslike a cushion,he bore the imprint of the last personthat BBC1' April 1990) had sat on him. . . . (Alan Walters,Panorama,

Lawson's and Walter's categorizationsof Major cannot be taken as mere indications of how they think or interpret the world. There is a clear rhetorical and indexical organization to them that sets aside any such assumptionsof relations between thought and word. undoubtedly, background understandings(ICMs) of what it ideally or normatively means to be a democratic political leader are being invoked, including the expectation that such a person should be decisive. But, as happened with Thatcher, decisivenesscan be rhetorically reversed as authoritarianism, and what counts as an example is just what is at stake. It hinges upon how successfully one side or the other can bring off such a categoriCal attribution as a matter of disinterested description. And interest is crucial, becausea self-servingversion of events merely indexes the speaker, not the world. Lawson offers (in the above extract) no overt description of Major, but rather allies himself with some distant and disinterestedspeaker who is quoted as making a pithy generalization. Its application to Major and the iisues at hand are indexically achieved, having to be done implicationally by the hearer, who is thus recruited to the accomplishment of Lawson's rhetoric. By overtly merely citing someone else, Lawson achieves an ostensibly neutral footing (cf. Goffman,1979). Similarly, Walters' use of experiential imagery (the imprint on the cushion) is.an example of the tinds of metaphorical categorizations that Lakoff (1987) analyses; it depends upon our knowledge of anatomy, cushions and sitting, and the exiension of this to the realm of thought, social influence and personality. But again, the operation of the metaphor is via its status as a description of John Major, and this is contextually achieved and carefully managed, like Lawson's version, via quotation and hedged with denials, so that Walter's own categorical status as an interested and thus discountable describer is rhetorically countered. Both Lawson and Walters can be understood as performing categorical work on themselves and on Mrs Thatcher as well as bn John Major. Indeed, the discussionof Major could plausibly be seen as an opportunity for doing just that. It would clearly be ingenuous to take such versions as indications of the speakers' cognitive theories of government, or their theories of the Prime Minister's personAlity. Political discourse might be considered a soft test for a rhetorical theory of categorical descriptions. But studies of the discourse and rhetoric of scientifii knowtedge (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984;Woolgar, 1988)display this also as an argumentative competition for description and explanation' at least for sciencein the making:
When we approach the places where facts . . are made, we get into the midst of controversies. The closer we are, the more controversial they

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become.when we go from 'daily life' to scientific activity,from the man in the streetto the men in the laboratory,from politicsto expertopinion, we do not go from noise to quiet, from passion reason,irom heat to to cold. we go from controvergies fiercercontroversies . when debates to . are so exacerbated that they becomescientific (Latour. and technical. 1 9 8 7p . 3 0 ) .

Even the term phenomena possesses interestinghistory. Its invention an is due to Kant, who distinguished between noumenq, the real world beyond the senses, and phenomena, the sensory appearances of things. with exemplary rhetorical irony, the term has been adopted in ordinary talk to refer to the objects of worldly reality. I shall argue in the next section that it is a pervasive process in ordinary talk to deploy the terms of perceptual experience to construct an effect of obiective realitv independent of talk.

Perception and Reality I have argued that indexicality and rhetoric are key features in the deployment of categorical descriptions. one of their effects is that of connecting categorizations to the specifics of experience, to the context in which categorizations are deployed, and to the rhetorical force of a perceptually available real world. we turn now to an examination of the status of bodily experience in discursive constructions of reality, and to the status of science as a criterion of reality and as a benchmdrk for the identification of cognitive processes. Lakoff's thesisis that 'reasonis made possibleby the body' (1987,p. xv), a position he calls 'experiential realism' or 'experientialism'.The 'realism' element is the assumption of 'the existenceof the real world' (p. xu); human categorizations are based upon, or metaphorical extensions of, bodily experience, which is in turn constrained by reality. Thus, metaphorical conceptions of anger, for example, are based upon the subjectiveexperience of autonomic nervous system physiology, coupled with the operation of appropriate cognitive models to do with heat, pressure, agitation, and so on. Mother is a category that invokes a cluster of ICMs, based upon the different criteria of genetics, birth, nurturance, marriage and genealogy. Experientialism is Lakoff's basis for rejecting the doctrine of 'metaphysical realism' (p. 260), in which reality is independent of human embodiment; on the other hand, the'realism'component rescueshim from the solipsism of 'total relativism'. Experiential realism is a position that is well placed rhetorically for defence from attack on both sides. But rhetoric can operate like the martial art of judo, using inversions and reversals to turn strength into weakness. Being bolstered against both sides, experiential realism is neither one nor

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a topic for explanationsof children's cognitive development (Bruner, 1974; can be Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983).In rhetoric, perceptualappearance discursively deployed both as a warrant, and also as a noticeable feature of things or events that figures as a preface to their denial. In conversation, people sometimes warrant accounts, or pursue rhetorical aims, via positing a distinction between superficial appearance, and an underlying reality 'Appearance' which representsthe true situation, or a preferred version. will often be couched as a perceptual metacognition: what things look, sound or seem like. The appearance-reality distinction is rhetorically effective in that it recognizes the obviousness of appearances, and so acknowledges the basis for one's own or the other person's (possible) understanding-that it is accountable in terms of appearance. At the same time, it subverts that version in favour of a purportedly more insightful and adequate analysis (cf. Eglin, 1979; Potter, 1987, 1988). Like experiential realism, the contrary distinction between appearance and reality functions in ordinary talk as a rhetorical resource. In discourse, therefore, people deploy what we might call referential experientialism,which means that bodily experienceoffers a basisfor a set of images, metaphors and other devicesby which things are described.This is what Lakoff provides in his summary of work such as Brugman's on bodily imagery in the semantics of Chalcatongo Mixtec, a language of Western Mexico (Lakoff, 1987, p. 313), and in most of his analysesof metaphors in English. Evidence for referential experientialism, which is abundant as Lakoff shows, demonstrates something about the basis on which claims to knowledge are made, sustainedand defended. It does not constitute a case for realism; not unless we go outside of descriptive practices and disputations, and are willing to settle the matter of reality over the heads of participants. This is exactly what Lakoff does, by appealing to science. Lakoff recognizes that science is a human practice in which bodily experienceplays a shaping role, as for example in the caseof Linnaeus and the taxonomy of plants, where the defining taxonomic characteristics are shown to be closely referenced to what could be seen and done with them (p 35). But what happens when scientists disagree? Lakoff's position allows no legitimate room for debate, only for difference and error. When people disagree or offer inconsistent versions of the world they are simply applying different cognitive models. Argument, despite the fact that Lakoff's entire text is couched as one, appears to be a residual, unnecessary and futile pursuit. Lakoff's realism can be sustained only by appeal to some criterion that is capable of transcending the experiential and metaphorical domain of folk understandings: science itself. But in order to serve such a purpose, scientific argument has to be quietened and reduced to cognitive 'cold' (Latour, 1987). d i f f e r e n c e ,m a d e

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Cognitive Models, Folk Theories and Variability I have argued that categorizations can fruitfully be studied as situated discursive practices, subject to the workings of indexicality and rhetoric, and that their experiential statusis not so much a guaranteeof realism as a resource and topic for intelligible and convincing talk. This is the case for scienceas much as for common sense.One of the linchpins of the cognitive approach to categorization is the idea that categories and categorizations are shared properties of minds, shared either as cultural or folk models or universally. This means that variability between persons in how they categorize things, and especially variations within persons at different times, are matters that require further cognitive explanations, or else methodological procedures that remove them from view. What psychologists call 'within-subject variability' has provided grounds for critiques of objectivist versions of science (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Mulkay, 1985), and also of cognitive and social psychology, including categorization theory (Billig, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Lakoff (1987, p. 118) appears to avoid the impact of such critiques by recognizing that not only different people,'but also the same people, will offer different categorizations of the same phenomena. This is because cognitive models are idealized, not specific to actual instances. But he offers no basis upon which people might vary in that way, except as a result of their best efforts to understand the world, via the application of different cognitive models. Variability is de-socialized, in a world apparently populated by a lot of Robinson Crusoes,each imbued with culture, trying to solve problems. We are given no sense of why one cognitive model rather than another is applied, in this situation or that, apart from the notion that different problems need different solutions. Discursive psychology suggests that, in order to understand variability, we have to look at the pragmatics of situational usage. And doing that brings us into conflict with any ideal that categorization as something people do can be handled by appeal to categories as merely reflecting speakers' understandings. The study of situated descriptions leads us directly into examining categorizations terms of the rhetorical ends they in accomplish. The same white New Zealanders could say of Maoris that 'they're proud' and 'they've lost their pride and dignity', describethem as a 'lazy race' and 'such hard working people', possessing 'lack of greed' anci a 'qrlite selfish being and greedy' (Potter & Wetherell , 7987, pp. 124-125). k is only by replacing such categorizationswithin their specific discursive settingsthat orderliness returns; and the order is that of discursiveaction, rather than perceptual sense-making. Again, it is not that there is no order of a cognitive sort. If words did not carry categoricalimplications, if we did not know what greedy means, thev would be unable to serve rhetorical

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purposes. The argument is that it is only through examining the pragmatics bf situated talk that we can discover what those categorical implications are, their scope and flexibility, and the principles of their deployment. we need to begin with distinctions between language and knowledge, and language and reality, in order to start to see their relationships. ti Latoffs theory, the structures that mediate between language and reality, and which underlie the principles of categorization,are experiential ICM;. These are allied to other proposals for interpretative cognitive structures. such as frames (Minsky, 1'975), scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977), schemas (Rumelhart , 1975) and cognitive grammar (Langacker, 1986); see Lakoff (1987, p. 68).They operate not as direct representations of actual things or events, but as idealizations of them, defining what is prototypical, exceptional, and expected. In this regard they are also allied .folk theoriesl (Lakoff, 1987, p. 118), which are the large set of often with incompatible principles and explanations for objects, people and events that members of cultures supposedlyhold in common, and which they use f o r i n t e r p r e t i n ge x P e r i e n c e . One of the problems for ICMs and folk theories is that, since they are abstractecland idealized, it is not clear how actual objects and events are 'may or apprehended.Indeed, ICMs are sourcesof error. Idealized models 'conflict . . . with some piece of knowledge may not fit the world well', may thai we have'(Lakoff, 1987, pp. 13G-134),and will not precisely'fit the actual worlds of the objects being categorized' (D'Andrade, 1990, p. 93). There appears to be another kind of knowledge at work, by which an actual and real world, which the ICMs and folk theories do not fit, is known, and according to which the degree of fit is calibrated. But if cogrritivemodels are not themselvesthe means of calibration, how exactly that we need: dJwe know what the world is like? Lakoff suggests .twocognitivemodelsoneneedstheconceptof.fitting'one's of ICMs to one'sunderstanding a givensituationand keepingtrack of the (1987.p' 7l) in respects which the fit is imperfect. But on an individualist, perception and action orientated view of cognition, one has to wonder, if this secondform of cognition is available, *liich grasps and keeps track of the world in finer detail and serves as the n]"aruie of ICMs, why we need ICMs at all. It seemsof little value to have in devices that simplify and codify reality, when they can only be applied that still has to perform all that specific reality company with a process that apprehending *oit anyway. It would appear reasonable-to suggest categorizations are designed for the social semantic and propositional psychoactions of talking, describing,taking positions, etc. In a discursive no process of'reality checking' that is independent of logy there can be in descriptions, except as a rhetorical device in itself, deployed both

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science and in ordinary talk, for 'externalizing' descriptions as mere reflectionsof reality (Woolgar, 1980). Another device for escaping from this cognitive conundrum is, as we have seen, to appeal to scienceas not only the revealer of the real nature of cognitions (cognitive science), but also as criterion and supplanter of folk theories of the world (physics,biology, etc.: cf. the contrast between 'folk taxonomies'and'true scientifictaxonomies', D'Andrade, 1990,p. 87). But this assumesa relationship between scienceand the world that transcends human sense-making and discursive practices, and a relationship between discourse and knowledge such that when people produce versions of the world, these are primitive efforts at what scientists are supposed to be doing when they produce generalized explanations (Churchland, 1988; Stich, 1983). These assumptions are probably false, both about science and about folk explanations, in that they ignore the contextualized,constructive and rhetorical dimensions in how all versions of the world are produced, and most obviously 'folk' versions. Variability is an important cue to the rhetorical organization of versions (Potter & Wetherell, 198'7),rather than an indication of multiple perspectives, the inconsistency folk theories or of of methodological difficulties. The analytic methods used by Lakoff and other cognitive theorists for defining ICMs and folk theories exclude whatever rhetorical sensevariable categorizationsand versions may have when examined in their discursive contexts. Far from being an interesting and revealing feature of discursive practices,as we see in Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) analysisof consensus in science,variability may instead be cast as a methodological nuisance: problemsin cognitiveanthropology individual is One of the persistent surveyed, there is variability. . . when humangroupsare systematically disagreement aboutmost itcms. . . One way to avoidthis considerable problemis to treat the mostfrequentlyheld items-the modal items-as if p. they were /he cultureof the group. (D'Andrade,1990, 118) little The worry that this might result in a statisticalartifact possessing 'persons who are psychological reality is assuagedby an assurancethat on more likely to give modal responses a task are more likely to be reliable, if that is, to give the same responses the task is presented at a later time . . . [And] are more likely to give responsesthat are consistentwith each are other' (D'Andrade, 1990,p. 119). So different measuresof consistency taken as warrants for each other. But it turns out that the consistent 'better educated . . . judged more informers are also those who are intelligent . . . and tend to have more experience in that task domain' (p. 120). D'Andrade seemsoblivious to the circularity of such task-related judgements of intelligence, and to the possibility that these subjects are precisely those who are more sophisticatedwhen it comes to liguring out

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what sorts of answers the questioner wants. Rather, it is simply concluded that 'those who give the more modal responses display the behavioral characteristics of an expert' (p. l2l), so that all the rich variation in the data, all those other voices, can be discarded in favour of a selected set of 'representative' and consistent responses. The abstracted, cognitive and discursively disembedded nature of conceptual knowledge is therefore a product of assumptions and methods that prevent it from looking any different (cf. Lave, 1988). It is not that an analysis of language that ignores situated talk will fail to take it into account. What happens is that assumptions about situated talk are made, and these intuitions then form an unexplicated basis for analysis. Much of the discussion of ICMs is set in an implicit discursive context in which they figure as ways of talking. This means that it is sometimes unclear what cognitive theorists are theorizing about. Discussion about language shifts from lexical categories (chair, stool, sofa, etc.) to groupable items such as things to sit on (Lakoff, 1987, p. 52), to more linguistically conventionalized terms like kitchen chair, to Barsalou's (1983) things to take on a picnic. What makes this,'or things to sit on, a category in the sense that chair is one? Are linguistic categories to be the infinitely many things 'the infinitely many we can describe with however many words, such as things we can describe with however many words'? In situated usage, something to sit on might include a tree stump, or carpet, or table. But for Lakoff, it appears to be an abstracted categorical level somewhere inbetween furniture and chair. It is perfectly reasonable to claim that categorizations such as things to sit on and things to take on a picnic will have prototype properties, with typical and central members, etc. Discursively, one can imagine being blamed for leaving behind the drinks or the bottle opener, more reasonablythan the newspaper or the dictionary. But these are intuitions that draw upon imagined social practices. Without some principle by which such descriptive categorizations are located within, and are themselves, social practices (categoriesthat people actually and intelligibly use and do things with), then it is easy to glide between studies of language and theories of knowledge, between looking at bits of language,imagining them as bits of talk, and treating them as telling us what the speaker understandsabout the talk's topic. Folk theories are analytically abstracted from imagined discursivepractices,and treated as a separateexplanatory realm. It is then easyboth to overextend and to underestimatethe range of phenomena that a cognitive theory has to account for. Asking how people ordinarily categorize things is not the same as asking how they make abstracted judgments of category membership. It is decontextualizationfrom situated practices that makes culture look like grammar, discourselike cognition, v e r s i o n sl i k e t h e o r i e s .

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Conclusion I have argued that cognitive theories of categories and categorization have assigned too great an explanatory weight to the experiential basis of the process, and to what it tells us about how and what people think, or how people make senseof the world. Cognitive theorists need to consider how linguistic categories are designed for talking, for addressing differences of perspective,for arguing and persuadingand blaming, and whatever other interactional functions are servedby the constructionof reality in talk. This means taking talk seriously,rather than methodically inventing, idealizing and deleting it. Developments in the cognitive psychology of categories are not as far removed from situated practices as might be feared. Experientialism and ICMs, once placed in the context of situated descriptions,begin to allow for the kinds of flexibilities of situated categorization that discursive psychology requires. Lakoff (1987, p. 96) emphasizesthat ICMs provide for the senseof particular semanticcategorizations,rather than predicting what these shall be: 'There is a big difference between giving principles that motivate or make sense of, a system, and giving principles that generate. or predict, the system.' While Lakoff's focus is upon cognitive and semantic 'systems', his approach speaks also to the requirements of situated practices. Setting realism aside, and metatheoriesof the perceptual nature of human understandings in general, the kinds of evidence that Lakoff cites are quite compatible with the idea of bodily experience, and normative expectations, as issues referenced and orientsted to in talk. Referencing bodily experience is a rhetorically powerful descriptive resource. This is becausethe non-arbitrarinessof experiential referencing can easily, for theorists as well as for conversationalparticipants. seem to provide a guarantee for how the world is being described. On the other hand, the fact that indefinitely many alternative categorical descriptions are possible for any event or situation is also important rhetorically. It is not only a feature of how we understandthe world, but the major platform upon which categorizationsare able to perform social actions (Heritage, 1984).Category featuressuch as fuzzy boundariesand prototype structures permit flexibilities of situated description. Categorieshave to be like that in order to do talk's business, not simply to reflect how the world is, or how minds work. Similarly, cognitive models, or folk theories, are likely to be not only variable and inconsistent, but organized contrastively. Indeed, this is recognized, though not accorded significance in this way, by cognitive theories: 'categoriesare organized into systemswith contrastingelements' (Lakoff, 1987, p. 56), providing 'contradictory ways of understanding s i t u a t i o n s ' ( o . 1 3 3 ) , s u c h t h a t t h e s a m e s p e a k e r sw i l l d r a w u p o n ' t w o

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different and inconsistent understandings of one real-world situation' 'contrast sets', and Quinn, 1987, on (p. 213; cf. D'Andrade, 1990, on cbntradictions in folk models of marriage). The organization of semantic categories and of folk models in terms of contrasts and oppositions seems arbiirary on perceptual grounds, but very plausible as a design feature for the construciion of alternative and contrasting versions, for disagreeing, arguing and accomplishing social actions: in other words, for rhetoric (cf' niitig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988,on dilemmas 1987, on discursive in ideological thinking; Potter & wetherell, between categorization repertoires). There is indeed a close relationship and perceptual experience, but it is a two-way relationship. While bodily provides for the sense of verbal categories, experientialism is "^p"ii"n." also one of talk's topical concerns.It functions, ironically, as a persuasive device for offering versions of a reality that is beyond experience. It is a major basis for displaying objectivity and error, and for undermining such claims in others. There are features of semantic categories, folk models and ICMs that are problematical for a perceptual-cognitive metatheory. They are too generalized to account for specific referential practices, requiring the addition of another kind of cognition that deals with specifics; they seem to be inconsistent and contradictory, not only by accident, but by design; culture is conceived of as shared mental representations, ignoring its basis in social practices; there is no senseof why we even have language. since perceptual sense-making, removed from social practices, seemsnot strictly to require it; and the logic of rooting categorizations in bodily experience would in itself argue for homogeneity of human concepts, were it not for the abundance of evidence to the contrary. It also seemsto require some version of realism, since again, outside of social practices, it needs a principle of mapping perceptions and descriptions onto the world' In contrast, the study of categorization as situated discursive practice recognizesthe perceptual referentiality of languagewhile insisting on the 'motivational' basis (in Lakoff's primacy of communication. It provides a iense), in terms of function and rhetoric, for experiential referentiality, and also for inconsistency and contradiction; and it places a central emphasis upon the specifics of situated, indexical meanings. Further, discursive psychology makes no claims for realism, placing no such requirement either upon perception or upon science (which can also be studied as a culturally embedded social practice: Lynch, 1985; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987). What is real, out there beyond the socially organized practices of knowledge, talk and disputation, is precisely what all the talk is about. we cannot, as psychologistsand linguists, look at reality over the heads of participants and resolve it for them;we can only of join in the debate. That such talk is then couchedin the semantics bodily experience, and makes appeals to perceptual experience and evidence,

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does not stop the argument about reality, but, rather, is one of the bases for its continuation.
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I AcxNowr-EocEMENTS. am grateful to David Middleton and Jonathan Potter for helpful comments on an earlier version. Denex Etwenos is Senior Lecturer in Social Psychologyat Loughborough University (Loughborough, Leics LE11 3TU, UK). His research is into the relations between discourse and cognition. He is co-author of Common Knowledge (Routledge, 1987), Ideological Dilemmas of Everyday Thinking (Sage. 1988) and Discursive Psychology (Sage, in press).