Scrutiny of Arms Exports-Business, Innovation and Skills, Defense, Foreign Affairs and International Development - Vol. 1

House of Commons
Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues
First Joint Report of Session 201213
Volume I
HC 419-I
House of Commons
Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees
Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues
First Joint Report of Session 201213

Second Report from the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 201213 Fourth Report from the Defence Committee of Session 201213 First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 201213 Second Report from the International Development Committee of Session 201213
Volume I
Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 2 July 2012
HC 419-I Incorporating HC 1697-i and -ii, Session 2010-12
Published on 13 July 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited 0.00
The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees are appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and any associated public bodies. Current membership BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS: Mr Adrian Bailey*, Mr Brian Binley, Paul Blomfield, Katy Clark*, Julie Elliott, Rebecca Harris, Margot James*, Simon Kirby, Ann McKechin*, Mr David Ward, Nadhim Zahawi* DEFENCE: Rt Hon James Arbuthnot, Mr Julian Brazier, Thomas Docherty, Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson*, John Glen*, Mr Dai Harvard, Mrs Madeleine Moon, Penny Mordaunt,* Sandra Osborne, Sir Bob Russell, Bob Stewart*, Ms Gisela Stuart FOREIGN AFFAIRS: , Rt Hon Sir John Stanley* (Chair of the Committees concurrent meetings), Richard Ottaway, Rt Hon Mr Bob Ainsworth, Mr John Baron, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, Rt Hon Ann Clwyd*, Mike Gapes*, Mark Hendrick, Andrew Rosindell, Mr Frank Roy, Rory Stewart*, Mr Dave Watts* (left Committee 25/6/2012) INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce*, Hugh Bayley, Richard Burden*, Mr Sam Gyimah, Richard Harrington, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy, Mr Michael McCann, Alison McGovern, Fiona ODonnell*, Chris White* * Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report Chair of a participating Committee Powers The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committees (including news items) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/othercommittees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/. Committee staff The current staff of the Committees are Keith Neary (Clerk), Vanessa Hallinan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer) Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2420; the Committees email address is caecom@parliament.uk
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 1
Contents
Report
Summary Glossary of Acronyms Conclusions and recommendations
Extension of the Review to authoritarian regimes and to countries of concern worldwide
Page
5 9 10
25
Introduction
26
2 The Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (HC 1402) 28 3 The Committees Report of 2010-11 (HC 686)
The Committees Report and the Governments Response (Cm 8079)
30 30
4 The Committees questions on the Governments quarterly information on arms export licences 32 Errors in export controls to Somalia 33 5 Arms export control legislation and procedures
Extra-territoriality Brass Plate Companies A pre-licence register of arms brokers EU dual-use controls EU end-use control of exported military goods Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment Re-export controls and undertakings Licensed production overseas The Consolidated Criteria
34 34 37 38 40 42
44 48 50 51
Organisational and operational issues

Export Control Organisation (ECO) Charging for processing arms export licences Performance Review of the ECO Transparency of arms export licensing Priority markets for UK arms exports Trade Exhibitions Enforcement Compound penalties Crown Dependencies Combating bribery and corruption International Development
54 54 54 56 59 60 64 66 70 73 77 79 81
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012
International arms control and co-operation
84
UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 84 UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty 88 The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU 90 Cluster Munitions 91 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 94 The negotiation process 94 The UK Governments role and policy 95 Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons 99 Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 100 The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 20122015 102
Arms export control policies
Arms exports and human rights Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance Surveillance technology and equipment Export of Tasers Arms exports and internal repression The Governments Arab Spring arms export policy review Arms export licence revocations Countries of concern Bahrain Egypt Libya Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Yemen Argentina China Extension of the Review to authoritarian regimes and to countries of concern worldwide 168
103 103 103 105 106 106 109 118 122 122 134 146 148 150 152 156 160 161
Annex 1: The Committees quarterly licence questions and the Government answers (2010 Q3 & 4, 2011 Q1, Q2, & Q3) 171
The Committees 2010 Quarter 3 (July September) questions and the Governments answers 171 The Committees 2010 Quarter 4 (October December) questions and the Governments answers 178 The Committees 2011 Quarter 1 (January March) questions and the Governments answers 186 The Committees 2011 Quarter 2 (April June) questions and the Governments answers 194 The Committees 2011 Quarter 3 (July September) questions and the Governments answers 202
Annex 2: Extra-territoriality (Offences) Annex 3: The Consolidated Criteria
212 215
Annex 4: EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP)
221
Annex 5: The Governments arms export licence revocations since 1 January 2011 228 Annex 6: Selected arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression for the period 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 245 Annex 7: Selected arms export licence approvals to FCO countries of concern of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression for the period 1 January until 31 December 2011 249 Annex 8: Extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa for goods which might be used to facilitate internal repression253 Annex 9: Arms export licences to Argentina for the period 1 April 2010 until 31 December 2011 260 Annex 10: The Committees correspondence with Ministers 264
Annex 11: The Committees questions and the Governments answers to the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 267 Annex 12: National Counter Proliferation Strategy 20122015 Formal Minutes 338 344
Witnesses List of printed written evidence List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
347 347 348
Summary
For this years Report the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) have scrutinised in unprecedented detail the Governments latest (2010) Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, the Governments quarterly information on individual export licence approvals and refusals, and the Governments policies and performance on arms export controls and on arms control generally. The Committees have also given intensive scrutiny to the Governments review of the export of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression, contrary to the Governments stated policy, in the Middle East and North Africa. The Committees have extended the same scrutiny to the Countries of Concern named in the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices 2012 Report on Human Rights as detailed in paragraph 269 and Annex 7. We conclude that the Government was right to accept the Chairman of the CAECs representations on behalf of the Committees that to a substantial degree the Governments answers to the Committees questions on the Governments Quarterly arms export reports could be declassified and thereby made available to Parliament and the wider public in this Report as from Q3 2010 for the first time. On extra-territoriality, the Committees continue to conclude that there is no justification for allowing a UK person to conduct arms exports overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out by any person within the UK. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it is still the UK Governments policy that it does not intend to prepare draft UK national legislation on torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment, and, if so, to explain why not. The Committees conclude that the Governments commitments to introduce greater transparency into the export licensing system are welcome. The Committees conclude that the Governments supervision of the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) Exhibition in September 2011 to ensure strict adherence by the organising company Clarion Events of the terms and conditions of its Open Individual Trade Control Licence from the BIS was inadequate, as was the supervision by the company itself. The Committees conclude that the Governments unqualified confirmation that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will take appropriate action under the provision of the Bribery Act 2010, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or reexport under Criteria 7, is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out what steps it will take in relation to UK-based financial institutions who may be financing, directly or indirectly, or investing in manufacturers of cluster munitions. The Committees also conclude that the Governments decision to resist attempts to weaken the Convention on Cluster Munitions
with draft Protocol 6 was welcome. The Committees conclude that the Government has put at risk the UKs previously leading role in the drafting and negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty by failing to maintain continuity of FCO staff at a senior level with this responsibility. The Committees also conclude that the Governments commitment to achieving an Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition, is welcome. The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights. The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretarys statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present Governments policy being: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. The Committees conclude that the Governments repeated use of the phrase crowd control goods in the context of its arms export review is misleading given that crowd controls goods are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase crowd control goods in this context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk in doing so. The Committees conclude that the Governments review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as an internal review and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Governments stated policy of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Governments introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Committees conclude that whilst the Governments revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence that the initial judgements to approve the applications were flawed. The Committees recommend that the Government should apply
significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy. The Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy and to make public promptly any further revocations that it makes. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97 extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain 124 extant UK arms export licences to Egypt 24 extant UK arms export licences to Libya 288 extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia 9 extant UK arms export licences to Syria 47 extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia 11 extant UK arms export licences to Yemen
now contravene the Governments stated policy that The longstanding British position is clear: we will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to tighten controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking), controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states what steps it is taking to get the US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments of other countries who export military goods, military technology and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government. The Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil and political rights in China, the Governments support for the EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees conclude that the Governments stated policy is to refuse arms export licences which might be used to facilitate internal repression and not merely to await internal repression becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide.
Glossary of Acronyms
ATT BIS CAAT CAEC DFID DSEi ECO Arms Trade Treaty Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Campaign Against Arms Trade Committees on Arms Export Controls Department for International Development Defence and Security Equipment International (Trade Exhibition) Export Control Organisation (within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) EGAD Export Group for Aerospace and Defence EU European Union FAC Foreign Affairs Committee FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty ICT Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU MoD Ministry of Defence OGEL Open General Export Licence OIEL Open Individual Export Licence OITCL Open Individual Trade Control Licence OPTs Occupied Palestinian Territories OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSJA Overseas Security and Justice Assistance SIEL Standard Individual Export Licence SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SITCL Standard Individual Trade Control Licence SITL Standard Individual Transhipment Licence UKTI DSO United Kingdom Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation UKWG United Kingdom Working Group on Arms
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Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction 1. The Committees recommend that, given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Governments trade, defence, foreign and international development polices, Oral evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by the Secretaries of State. (Paragraph 4)
The Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (HC 1402) 2. We recommend that the Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report continues to be presented to the House of Commons by the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and International Development. (Paragraph 6) We further recommend that the Secretaries of State should include in their Annual Report information, not already published by the Government, that will assist Parliament and the wider public in understanding the Government arms export and arms control procedures, legislation and policies. (Paragraph 7) The Committees conclude that the extensive information provided by the Government to the Committees questions on the Governments United Kingdom Export Controls Annual Report 2010 will be of considerable benefit to Parliament and the wider public. The Committees, however, recommend that the Government needs to eradicate the administrative error that led to the Governments answers being significantly delayed. The Committees further recommend that in future Annual Reports the Government should publish Case Studies of licence applications that are of genuine policy difficulty, such as the previous Governments 2008 Case Study of an application to export armoured personnel carriers to Libya. The Committees also recommend that the Government include in its Annual Report not only its information required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms but also the information submitted by the UK Government for the EUs Annual Report of exports of military technology and equipment. Finally, the Committees also recommend that, following the Foreign Secretarys decision to update sections of the FCOs annual Human Rights report on the FCOs website quarterly, the Government should state in its Response to this Report what quarterly website updating it will carry out on the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. (Paragraph 10)
3.
4.
The Committees Report of 2010-11 (HC 686) 5. We conclude that the Governments responses to the Committees have been unevenvarying from timely, to somewhat delayed, to unacceptably delayed. We recommend the Government reviews its internal organisation and procedures for responding to the CAEC so as to ensure that the Committees always receive timely and substantive responses to their recommendations and questions. (Paragraph 15)
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The Committees questions on the Governments quarterly information on arms export licences 6. We conclude that the Government was right to accept the Chairman of the CAECs representations on behalf of the Committees that to a substantial degree the Governments answers to the Committees questions on the Governments Quarterly arms export reports could be declassified and thereby made available to Parliament and the wider public in this Report as from Q3 2010 for the first time. The Committees recommend that both in the Governments Quarterly arms export reports and in its answers to the Committees questions on those reports, the Government should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a nonclassified basis consistent with safeguarding the UKs security and trade interests. (Paragraph 18)
Errors in export controls to Somalia 7. The CAEC concludes that the Government was correct in informing the Committees of a potential breach by the UK Government of UN sanctions relating to three export licences issued for Somalia after 1 January 2009. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government provides an assurance to the Committees that they will be informed, and informed promptly, of any future actual or potential breaches of arms export controls by the UK Government, whether in relation to embargoed countries or in relation to any or all UK strategic export controls that are in place. (Paragraph 21)
Extra-territoriality 8. The Committees conclude that the distinction made by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his letter of 2 February 2012 between activities that are prohibited and activities that are subject to licensing is not valid in the context of arms exports and extra-territoriality. The export of all Category A and Category B military goods (as detailed in Box A) by any person within the UK, or a UK person anywhere in the world, without a licence from the Secretary of State is already prohibited and is a criminal offence. The Committees continue to conclude that there is no justification for allowing a UK person to conduct arms exports overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out by any person within the UK. On enforcement the Committees continue to conclude that the enforcement of extraterritoriality legislation has already been accepted by successive UK Governments in relation to all Category A and Category B military goods. We further conclude that there is no reason why enforcement should prove any more difficult in relation to Category C military goods than in relation to all other areas detailed in Annex 2 to our Report where extra-territoriality legislation already applies. The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is further extended to the remaining Military List goods in Category C. (Paragraph 29)
12
Brass Plate Companies 9. The Committees conclude that the Government has failed to provide a substantive response to its recommendation in its 2011 Report regarding Brass Plate companies in the UK trading in arms from overseas locations with virtual impunity. The Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government states in its response to this Report what precise action it will take, including the results of its exploration of the possibility of using the Companies Act, to dissolve a company which is operating against the public interest. (Paragraph 33)
A pre-licence register of arms brokers 10. The Committees conclude that the Government should consider very carefully whether it should do more to protect access to the UKs arms export licensing system by those arms brokers whom the BIS Minister, Mark Prisk, described to the Committees as the kind of rogues we are trying to deal with here. We, therefore, repeat our previous recommendation that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers, that its review includes a public consultation and is concluded with a Ministerial decision within four months of the start of the consultation. (Paragraph 38)
EU dual-use controls 11. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to make public its response to the EU Commissions Green Paper on the EUs dual-use export control system was welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report, and subsequently, informs the CAEC as to which of the UK Governments proposed changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation have been successfully achieved, and also as to the outcome on the EU Commissions proposed changes which the UK Government does not support. (Paragraph 43)
EU end-use control of exported military goods 12. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the reasons as to why it has no plans to bring forward amendments to UK legislation necessary to implement a national military end-use control when the Government has stated in its response to the European Commissions Green Paper on the EU dual-use export control system that the current military end-use control is too narrow. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether the European Commission has accepted the British Governments proposals for an expanded Military End-use Control as set out in the Foreign Secretarys letter to the CAEC of 30 September 2011 and in the Governments response to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, and if not what further steps the Government will now take. (Paragraph 48)
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Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment 13. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out the specific changes it has made since coming into Office in the UKs export control procedures and legislation either to prohibit the export altogether, or to make subject to export licensing and end-use control, items of torture equipment, including items used to carry out capital punishment, detailing the specific items concerned, the countries to which their export is now prohibited or is subject to export licensing and end-use control, and any expiry time limits set on the relevant procedures and legislation; b) provides the CAEC with the outcome of the EU Commissions review of the content of the Annexes of Regulation 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2011 and the UK Governments view as to whether this outcome is satisfactory or requires amendment; c) provides the CAEC with a copy of the UK Governments submission to the EU Commission for the Commissions broad review of the EU Torture Goods Regulation being carried out in the first half of 2012; and d) states whether it is still the UK Governments policy that it does not intend to prepare draft UK national legislation on torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment, and if so, explains why not. (Paragraph 55) Re-export controls and undertakings 14. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response details the controlled goods, for which either the previous Government or the present Government approved licences for export, that it believes were subsequently reexported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations, stating in each case the country to which the goods were originally exported and the eventual undesirable use or undesirable destination. (Paragraph 58)
Licensed production overseas 15. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states what breaches of UK arms export control policies it believes have occurred under both the previous and the present Government as a result of the export of UKdesigned goods from licensed production facilities overseas, specifying in each case the description of the goods concerned, the country in which they were produced and the country to which they were subsequently exported. The Committees further recommend that the Government sets out in its Response what steps it will take to prevent UK arms export policies being breached as a result of the export of UKdesigned goods from licensed production facilities overseas. (Paragraph 60)
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The Consolidated Criteria 16. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government explains why its updating of the wording of the Consolidated and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria before the end of 2011, as stated in its previous Response (Cm 8079), was not achieved by that date and that it provides the updated wording in its Response to this Report. The Committees further recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states whether it considers that the UK Government is fully compliant with each of the Articles in the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing controls of exports of military technologies and equipment, and, if not, to specify in which respects it is non-compliant. The Committees also recommend that as the EU Common Position is to be reviewed three years after its adoption, on 8 December 2008, the Government sets out in its Response the changes to the EU Common Position to which it will be seeking agreement. Finally, the Committees recommend that where the UKs arms export policies are arguably more stringent than those set out in the EU Common Position, for example in the light of the Foreign Secretarys Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012 with regard to exports which might be used to facilitate internal repression, the UK Government should adhere to its own policy. The Committees wish to be assured by the Government in its Response that this will be the case (Paragraph 65)
Charging for processing arms export licences 17. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision not to introduce charging for the processing of arms export licences is welcome as a charging system would, at least in the public perception, have compromised the independence of the Export Control Organisation from the arms export industry. The Committees recommend that such policy decisions by Ministers are made known to the CAEC wherever possible when they are made and not in the course of Oral evidence by Ministers. (Paragraph 72)
Performance 18. We recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out the specific steps it is taking to achieve its 20 and 60 working day targets for both processing and determining appeals for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs); and b) states whether it will be setting processing and determining appeals targets for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and Open General Export Licences (OGELs) and, if so, what these targets will be. The Committees further recommend that the Government in seeking to meet its arms export licence processing and appeal targets must comply in all cases and at all times with its arms export control policies as stated in the relevant legislation and in the Consolidated Criteria, and the Committees wish to be assured by the Government in its Response to this Report that this will be done. (Paragraph 80)
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Review of the ECO 19. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out what specific aspects of the ECOs performance it is reviewing, what conclusions it has reached in respect of each aspect being reviewed and what specific action it is taking as a result; and b) states when it will be providing the Committees with a further report on its review of the OGEL system previously promised to be available at the end of 2011. (Paragraph 84) Transparency of arms export licensing 20. The Committees conclude that the Governments commitments to introduce greater transparency into the export licensing system are welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government keeps the CAEC fully informed of the specific changes that will be made to achieve greater transparency of the export licensing system following the responses it receives to the Governments Discussion Paper on Transparency in Export Licensing. (Paragraph 91)
Priority markets for UK arms exports 21. The Committees conclude that, notwithstanding the fact that the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the BIS Secretary of State on 21 November 2011 specifically requesting that the UKTI DSOs final list of Priority Markets for 2011/2012 be made available to the Committees before Ministers gave Oral evidence on 7 February 2012, the Government was remiss in failing to ensure that the final Priority Markets list reached the Committees before Ministerial Oral evidence was given. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government sets out fully the reasons why Libya and Saudi Arabia remain within the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisations Priority Markets list for 2011/2012 when both countries are also listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its latest Human Rights and Democracy Annual Report as being Countries of Concern. (Paragraph 95)
Trade Exhibitions 22. The Committees conclude that the Governments supervision of the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) Exhibition in London in September 2011 to ensure strict adherence by the organising company Clarion Events of the terms and conditions of its Open Individual Trade Control Licence from the BIS was inadequate, as was the supervision by the company itself. The Committees further conclude that it is a matter of much concern that the information that certain Category A items were being promoted on the Beechwood Equipment stand and that cluster munitions were being promoted on the Defence Export Promotion Organisation of Pakistan and the Pakistan Ordnance Factories stand was discovered by visitors to the exhibition and not by either the exhibitions organisers or by the Government. The Committees recommend that the Government takes all steps
16
necessary to ensure that no breaches of the terms and conditions of the BIS licence to the organisers of the next DSEi event in 2013 occur. The Committees further recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states: a) whether or not it considers the law in this area is satisfactory with particular reference to Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008, and; b) whether there is any mismatch in the Governments interpretation of the relevant law between that set out in the BIS Guidance on the Impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs and that set out by the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, in his letters to the Committees of 13 February and 26 March 2012. (Paragraph 102) Enforcement 23. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Annual Strategic Export Controls Report provides the same information on compliance for holders of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) as it already provides in its Annual Report for holders of Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs). The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report: a) in how many of the 134 cases of the Governments seizures in 201011 of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods subject to sanctions because of breaches of licence requirements have the cases been referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, and in how many of these cases have prosecutions been initiated; and b) what it considers to be the main points of difficulty the Government has, including under present legislation, in achieving compliance with, and enforcement of, its arms export controls. (Paragraph 105) Compound penalties 24. The Committees recommend that now the present compound penalty regime in relation to arms exports has been in operation for two years, the Government in its Response to this Report provides an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses as shown to date, and details the improvements it wishes to implement. (Paragraph 112)
Crown Dependencies 25. The Committees conclude that the MS Thor Liberty incident revealed how ships registered in the Crown Dependencies could provide a means whereby shipments of arms could occur that would be in breach of UK Strategic Export Controls if carried out by a vessel registered in the UK. The Committees recommend the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it will give consideration to bringing the Crown Dependencies within the ambit of UK Strategic Exports Control legislation. (Paragraph 117)
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Combating bribery and corruption 26. The Committees conclude that the Governments unqualified confirmation that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export under Criteria 7, is welcome. (Paragraph 120) The Committees conclude that an examination of the EUs Common Position on arms exports, the text of which is set out fully in Annex 4 of this Report, shows that there are numerous grounds in the Common Position on which Member States should refuse an arms export licence based on the perception of the destination country, for example where the arms might be used to facilitate internal repression, where there have been serious violations of human rights, or where sustainable development would be seriously hampered. The Committees, therefore, do not accept the Governments view that: It would not be appropriate to base an assessment [of an arms export licence application] merely on the perception of corruption in the destination country. The Committees continue to recommend that the Government gives full consideration to proposing the insertion of an additional Criterion into the EU Common Position on arms exports obliging Member States to assess the risk of bribery and corruption before approving an arms export licence to any country. (Paragraph 122)
27.
International Development 28. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether the methodology it uses in relation to Criterion 8 has been changed from that at Annex C of the United Kingdom Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2007, and, if so, to provide the Committees with the complete text of the changed methodology. (Paragraph 125) The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report the outcome of the Department for International Developments consideration of its role in the UKs arms export control system, including which are the most appropriate Criteria in the Consolidated Criteria on which it considers it should be consulted. (Paragraph 127)
29.
UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 30. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) states when it will be providing the further note to the Committees as to whether the Treaty processes are robust and effective following completion of the Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials; and b) sets out the latest position on the Governments development of a Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for use by UK members of the Approved Community. (Paragraph 132) 31. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/US Defence
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Trade Cooperation Treaty will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to the US, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public. (Paragraph 135) UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty 32. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to France, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public. (Paragraph 139)
The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU 33. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states precisely what legislative and procedural changes the Government will be making to its arms export controls in order to implement and comply with the EU Directive on Intra-Community Transfers of defence-related products. The CAEC further recommends that the Government monitors compliance with the Directive by other EU Member States and reports back to the Committees on any breaches of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a result of this Directive of which it becomes aware. (Paragraph 143) Finally, the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the EU IntraCommunity Directive will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to EU Member States, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public. (Paragraph 144)
34.
Cluster Munitions 35. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what steps it will take in relation to UK-based financial institutions who may be financing, directly or indirectly, or investing in manufacturers of cluster munitions. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to resist attempts to weaken the Convention on Cluster Munitions with draft Protocol 6 was welcome. The Committees further recommend that the Government continues to strive strenuously for, as the Minister for Europe David Lidington has stated, a world free of cluster munitions. (Paragraph 155)
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 36. The Committees conclude that the Government has put at risk the UKs previous leading role in the drafting and negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty by failing to maintain continuity of FCO staff at a senior level with this responsibility. The Committees also conclude that the Governments commitment to achieving an Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition, is welcome. The Committees further conclude that the Governments statement that it
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is supportive of an Arms Trade Treaty addressing the issue of corruption is welcome, though in stark contrast to the Governments refusal to accept the Committees recommendation that the EU Common Position on arms exports should also include the issue of corruption (see paragraph 122). The Committees recommend that the Government deploys the staffing resources required at a sufficiently senior level, necessary to achieve a comprehensive and effective Arms Trade Treaty. (Paragraph 165) Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons 37. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response whether it wishes to see any change in NATOs policy of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and whether it is taking any steps to facilitate multilateral reductions in US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons. (Paragraph 168)
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 38. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what policies it is pursuing to break the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva over the drafting of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and whether it supports the transfer of responsibility for the drafting of this Treaty to the United Nations in New York. (Paragraph 172)
The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-2015 39. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) details the conditions that the Government considers need to be fulfilled to ensure a meaningful outcome to a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Free Zone; b) sets out what precise steps the Government is taking to establish a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; c) details the Governments planned expenditure, and on what projects, under the G8 Global Partnership delivering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security improvements on the ground; d) details the specific provisions in existing obligations and export control regimes which the Government considers needs to have their enforcement strengthened; and e) details any areas in which the Government considers that the UKs domestic security practices and export controls need to be strengthened. (Paragraph 174)
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Arms exports and human rights 40. The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Governments statement that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications is welcome, those considerations do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has made since the Arab Spring the stated reason for revocation being in every single case that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3. Criteria 2 is headed The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination, and Criteria 3 is headed The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions, or armed conflicts. (Paragraph 176)
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance 41. The Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights Guidance is amended to make it prominently and unequivocally clear that if military or security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance programme, the decision as to whether or not to approve such exports must be made solely and wholly in accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria and procedures. The Committees further recommend that the requirement on officials in the current guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such export cases should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures. (Paragraph 181)
Surveillance technology and equipment 42. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report: a) what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights; and b) what action the Government is taking to prevent such exports from EU Member States generally. (Paragraph 183) Export of Tasers 43. The Committees recommend that the Government informs them promptly of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers may be exported under limited circumstances from the UK as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement made by
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the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Alistair Burt, on 9 February 2012. (Paragraph 185) Arms exports and internal repression 44. The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretarys statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present Governments policy being: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. The Committees recommend that the Government adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications. (Paragraph 191)
The Governments Arab Spring arms export policy review 45. The Committees conclude that the Governments repeated use of the phrase crowd control goods in the context of its arms export review is misleading given that crowd control goods are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees further conclude that the Governments use of the phrase crowd control goods to include shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition, armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles is not one that would be acceptable to Parliament or to the wider public. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase crowd control goods in this context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk in doing so. (Paragraph 197) The Committees conclude that the Governments review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as an internal review and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Governments stated policy of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Governments introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Committees recommend that the Government in its response to this Report sets out whether the revised risk categorisation proposed by the Foreign Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October 2011 will, or will not, be applied to arms export licence applications when initially made, and whether he will make public the revised risk categorisation and explain fully how it would be applied to arms export licence decisions. (Paragraph 207) The Committees conclude that whilst the Governments revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence that the initial
46.
47.
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judgements to approve the applications were flawed. The Committees further conclude that there were no significant changes in the repressive regimes concerned between the British Governments approval of the arms export licences in question and the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010, and that the Arab Spring simply exposed the true nature of the repressive regimes which had been the case all along. The Committees recommend that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy. (Paragraph 208) Arms export licence revocations 48. The Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy and to make public promptly any further revocations that it makes. (Paragraph 213)
Countries of Concern Bahrain 49. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97 extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for assault rifles, sniper rifles, body armour, gun silencers, shotguns, small arms ammunition, pistols, weapon sights and equipment employing cryptography. (Paragraph 222)
Egypt 50. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 124 extant UK arms export licences to Egypt now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for body armour, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for semiautomatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, combat shotguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, pistols and cryptography . (Paragraph 228)
Libya 51. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 24 extant UK arms export licences
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to Libya now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for allwheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . (Paragraph 233) Saudi Arabia 52. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it applies different or the same considerations in deciding whether or not to approve arms export licences to Saudi Arabia to those applied to other countries in the region and, if different, what those considerations are. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 288 extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for: Components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, armoured personnel carriers, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for water cannon, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles. (Paragraph 239) Syria 53. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 9 extant UK arms export licences to Syria now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for allwheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . (Paragraph 244)
Tunisia 54. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 47 extant UK arms export licences
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to Tunisia now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms ammunition and cryptography . (Paragraph 249) Yeman 55. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 11 extant UK arms export licences to Yemen now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for allwheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components and equipment for military cameras and cryptographic equipment and technology. (Paragraph 255)
Argentina 56. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to tighten controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking), controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report: a) what are the exceptional circumstances in which the Government is still willing to consider approving export licences for military or dual-use goods being supplied to military end users in Argentina; b) what licences for military goods to Argentine armed forces have been revoked; c) what UK strategic export control licences for Argentina remain extant; and d) what steps the Government is taking to get the US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments of other countries who export military goods, military technology and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government. (Paragraph 258) China 57. The Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil and political rights in China, the Governments support for the EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report an explanation as to why, according to the EUs latest Report, the UK Government in 2010 gave a larger number of arms export licence approvals to China than any other EU Member State notwithstanding the EU Arms Export Embargo on China. (Paragraph 265)
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58. The Committees conclude that the Governments stated policy is to refuse arms export licences which might be used to facilitate internal repression and not merely to await internal repression becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide. (Paragraph 270)
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1 Introduction
1. The four House of Commons Select Committees that comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)1 are: the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee. All members of the four Select Committees are entitled to attend committee meetings of the CAEC, although for practical purposes each of the four Committees usually nominates four members to serve on the CAEC. 2. The CAECs task throughout the year is to scrutinise the UK Governments arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UKs role in international arms control agreements. To achieve this, the Committees have scrutinised in unprecedented detail the Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (HC 1402)2 presented to the House of Commons in July 2011 by the four Secretaries of State. The Committees questions on the Annual Report and the Governments answers are reproduced in full in Annex 11. The Committees have also scrutinised in detail the Governments all important information placed quarterly on the website of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) on individual arms export licence decisions; the Committees questions on those decisions and the Governments answers for the period Q3 2010 until Q3 2011 are reproduced in full in Annex 1. The Committees were, in addition, able to scrutinise the Government policies and performance on arms export controls as a result of information received in the Committees informal meetings and from a range of other sources and reports. We were grateful to those who submitted formal written evidence to our latest inquiry; these memoranda are reproduced in full in the evidence to this Report at Ev 3362. A great deal of important written Ministerial evidence was also submitted in the course of the inquiry, mostly in response to questions from the Committees. This is listed at Annex 10 and reproduced in full in the evidence to this Report at Ev 62183. A debate on the CAECs last Report was held in the House of Commons on 20 October 2011 during which a number of key issues were raised.3 3. The Committees scrutiny for this Report culminated with two Oral evidence sessions held first with the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)4 and the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD)5; and, second, with the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (FCO), William Hague. The complete texts of the Committees questions and the witnesses answers in the Oral evidence sessions can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 132.
From April 1999 until March 2008 the Committees were known as the Quadripartite Committee
2 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, 18 July 2011 3 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, cols 337-370WH
4 The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence, Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld 5 EGAD are representatives from defence and aerospace industries
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4. The Committees recommend that, given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Governments trade, defence, foreign and international development polices, Oral evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by the Secretaries of State.
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2 The Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 (HC 1402)
5. In the Committees 2011 Report we pointed out that the Government had apparently downgraded the status of its Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. We noted that the previous Government had produced more substantial Reports and they had been presented to the House of Commons by the four Secretaries of State. In contrast the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report in 2009 had been presented to the House of Commons in July 2010 by four junior Ministers and was less substantial than previous Reports. When Ministers were questioned on this matter last year they argued that the Report was shorter than previous Reports because it was more concisely written. We recommended that the Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports should in future be presented to the House of Commons by the four Secretaries of State rather than by junior Ministers.6 We were glad to note that following our recommendation, the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2010 was presented to Parliament in July 2011 by the four Secretaries of State.7 Additionally, we analysed the content of the last four Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports; two of which had been produced by the previous Government and two by the present Government. This analysis showed that the Reports produced by the present Government, while not having as many pages as the Reports produced by the previous Government, did have approximately the same content in the main body of the Report, but had significantly less information in the Annexes. 6. We recommend that the Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report continues to be presented to the House of Commons by the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and International Development. 7. We further recommend that the Secretaries of State should include in their Annual Report information, not already published by the Government, that will assist Parliament and the wider public in understanding the Government arms export and arms control procedures, legislation and policies. 8. The Committees decided to scrutinise the Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 in unprecedented detail. The Committees questions were submitted by the Chairman of the Committees with his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 19 October 2011 requesting the answers no later than 30 November.8 In the event the answers were not received until the Foreign Secretarys letter to the Committees Chairman of 7 January 2012.9 The Foreign Secretary said that this delay was due to administrative
6 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, paras 5-6 7 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402 8 9 Ev143 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 19 October 2011 Annex 11 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012
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error, for which he expressed regret. One of the Committees questions was why the Case Studies detailed in the Governments Annual Reportbody armour and night vision goggles to Afghanistan, a single armoured personnel carrier to Nigeria, and shields and body armour to Kyrgyzstan10were all relatively non-controversial and insubstantial, compared to the previous Governments 2008 Case Study of the decision to approve an export licence for armoured personnel carriers to Libya.11 The complete text of the Committees questions and the Governments answers can be found in Annex 11. 9. In his Foreword to the FCOs annual Human Rights Report for 2011, published in April 2012, the Foreign Secretary said that the FCO would in future be updating sections of the report quarterly on the FCOs website.12 10. The Committees conclude that the extensive information provided by the Government to the Committees questions on the Governments United Kingdom Export Controls Annual Report 2010 will be of considerable benefit to Parliament and the wider public. The Committees, however, recommend that the Government needs to eradicate the administrative error that led to the Governments answers being significantly delayed. The Committees further recommend that in future Annual Reports the Government should publish Case Studies of licence applications that are of genuine policy difficulty, such as the previous Governments 2008 Case Study of an application to export armoured personnel carriers to Libya. The Committees also recommend that the Government include in its Annual Report not only its information required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms but also the information submitted by the UK Government for the EUs Annual Report of exports of military technology and equipment. Finally, the Committees also recommend that, following the Foreign Secretarys decision to update sections of the FCOs annual Human Rights report on the FCOs website quarterly, the Government should state in its Response to this Report what quarterly website updating it will carry out on the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report.
10 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, pp 1416 11 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Cm 7662, pp 1314 12 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012, p 7
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3 The Committees Report of 2010-11 (HC 686)

The Committees Report and the Governments Response (Cm 8079)
11. Government Departments agreed in 1978, following recommendations by the Select Committee on Procedure, that replies should, if possible, be made within two months of the publication of a Report.13 This principle was re-affirmed by the then Government in its response to the First Report of the Liaison Committee in the 19992000 Session: The Government agree that Departments should respond [to Select Committee Reports] within two months, if possible and, if not, that they should warn Committees if delays are likely, and explain the reason for delay.14 A longer delay may be considered permissible in some circumstances when those circumstances have been explained to the Committee concerned.15 12. We published our Report of last year on 5 April 2011. The Governments Response in Command Paper Cm 8079 was published on 7 July, three months rather the two months after the Committees had reported. 13. The Chairman of the CAEC wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 July 2011 putting to him a series of questions from the Committees arising from the Governments Response and requesting the answers no later than 30 September.16 The Foreign Secretary provided the Governments answers with his letter to the Chairman of 30 September.17 The letters containing the Committees questions and the Governments answers, which include information of interest to Parliament and the wider public are produced in full in the evidence to the this inquiry.18 14. The Governments response to each of the Committees recommendations on Brass Plate companies, the Pre-licence registration of arms brokers and Extra-territorial arms export controls was: We are giving careful consideration to the CAEC recommendations in the light of recent events and will revert later this year. In the Chairmans letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July the Committees asked when the Government would revert to the Committees on these three recommendations.19 The Foreign Secretary in his reply of 30 September stated in respect of each of the three recommendations where the Government had said that it would revert back to the Committees, that; The Government (the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) will update the Committees regarding developments on these issues before the Committee start taking
13 Select Committee on Procedure, First Report of Session 197778, HC 588-I, pp lxxii - lxxiv 14 President of the Council and Leader of the House, The Governments Response to the First Report from the Liaison Committees on Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive, Cm 4737, May 2000, p 7 15 Erskine May, 24th edition (London 2011), p 837 16 Ev 63 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 17 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011 18 EV 63 and Ev 67 19 Ev 63 - Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011
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further evidence.20 In the event, no response was received to these three recommendations before the Committees took further oral evidence on 23 January 2012 and a response was produced only just before the Committees took evidence from both Secretaries of State on 7 February 2012, some ten months after the recommendations had been made. 15. We conclude that the Governments responses to the Committees have been unevenvarying from timely, to somewhat delayed, to unacceptably delayed. We recommend the Government reviews its internal organisation and procedures for responding to the CAEC so as to ensure that the Committees always receive timely and substantive responses to their recommendations and questions.
20 Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011
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4 The Committees questions on the Governments quarterly information on arms export licences
16. The Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, publishes details of the arms export licences that have been granted, refused or appealed for each Quarter. These are known as the Pivot Reports. The information in these Reports is of great importance, and the Quarterly Reports are subject to detailed scrutiny by the Committees. This invariably results in the Committees putting a series of detailed questions to the Government, to which the Government provides answers to the CAEC. 17. The Committees wish to see the maximum disclosure by the Government of information about UK arms exports that is consistent with safeguarding the UKs security and trade interests. The Chairman of the CAEC wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 24 October 2011 strongly resisting the Governments decision to classify as Restricted for CAEC eyes only the entirety of its answers to the Committees questions on the Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 Arms Export Licensing information provided by the Government.21 The Chairman, Sir John Stanley, proposed a substantial declassification of the information the Committees had received. The Chairman wrote a further letter to the Foreign Secretary on 16 December 2011 pressing for a reply to his letter of the 24 October.22 No reply having been received by the time the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012, the Chairman again pressed the Foreign Secretary for the outstanding reply.23 The reply was finally received in the Foreign Secretarys letter to the Chairman of 21 February in which the Foreign Secretary accepted in large part the disclosure proposals put to the Government by the Chairman on behalf of the Committees.24 The Committees questions on the Governments arms export licensing decisions and the Governments non-classified answers for Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 of 2010 and for Quarters 1, 2, and 3 for 2011 are set out in full in Annex 1 of this Report. This information is being made public in the Committees Report for the first time. 18. We conclude that the Government was right to accept the Chairman of the CAECs representations on behalf of the Committees that to a substantial degree the Governments answers to the Committees questions on the Governments Quarterly arms export reports could be declassified and thereby made available to Parliament and the wider public in this Report as from Q3 2010 for the first time. The Committees recommend that both in the Governments Quarterly arms export reports and in its answers to the Committees questions on those reports, the Government should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UKs security and trade interests.
21 Ev 148 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 24 October 2011 22 Ev 151 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 16 December 2011 23 Q 108 24 Ev 167 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 21 February 2012
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Errors in export controls to Somalia

19. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, Alistair Burt, wrote to the Committees on 6 February 2012 to inform the Committees that following their questions on the Quarter 2 2011 Report the Government had found that there had been a potential breach of UN sanctions relating to an export licence issued for Somalia.25 The licence was for body armour for a humanitarian de-mining organisation. When the application was initially assessed the export had been considered as temporary when it should have been considered as permanent. Due to this error an incorrect exemption under the arms embargo was applied and the UN Sanctions Committee was not notified of the proposed export. Following discovery of this error a review of all export licence applications for Somalia was undertaken and a further two cases in 2009 where the Sanctions Committee should have been notified were identified. Both of these licences authorised the export of armoured vehicles for the protection of UNICEF staff. 20. The Minister advised the Committees that a review of export licences for a number of other embargoed countries from 1 January 2009 onwards had been carried out. He stated in his letter that: I am satisfied that these three cases were isolated administrative errors and there is no wider systemic failure in our handling of export licence applications for embargoed countries.26 21. The CAEC concludes that the Government was correct in informing the Committees of a potential breach by the UK Government of UN sanctions relating to three export licences issued for Somalia after 1 January 2009. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government provides an assurance to the Committees that they will be informed, and informed promptly, of any future actual or potential breaches of arms export controls by the UK Government, whether in relation to embargoed countries or in relation to any or all UK strategic export controls that are in place.
25 Ev 164 Letter from Alistair Burt dated 6 February 2012 26 Ev 164 Letter from Alistair Burt dated 6 February 2012
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5 Arms export control legislation and procedures

Extra-territoriality
22. Extra-territorial legislation enables UK persons to be prosecuted in the UK for actions overseas which, if carried out in the UK, would constitute a criminal offence. A substantial body of extra-territorial legislation already exists on the statute book. A summary of the legislation, indicating the position taken by successive Governments on this matter, is reproduced as Annex 2. Successive CAEC Reports have taken the view that in the matter as important as arms exports extra-territoriality should be expanded to all types of arms exports and that it would be irrational and inconsistent to apply extra-territoriality to some types but not to others. 23. The Government's current position on extra-territoriality with regard to arms exports, is set out in secondary legislation, most recently in the Trade in Goods (Categories of Controlled Goods) Order 2008.27 The current system is based on a three-tier categorisation system where the full range of controls apply to Category A goods, but their scope is reduced for Category B and reduced still further for Category C. A summary of this system is set out below.
Box A Category A goods consist of cluster munitions, and specially designed components thereof; and certain paramilitary goods whose export the Government has already banned because of evidence of their use in torture, including electric shock batons, electric-shock belts, leg irons and sting sticks. Any person within the UK, or a UK person anywhere in the world, is prohibited from supplying or delivering, or doing any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of, Category A goods without a licence from the Secretary of State. These strict controls reflect the fact that the supply of many of these goods is inherently undesirable. Licences will not normally be granted for any trade in paramilitary goods listed because of evidence of their use in torture. However, as with physical exports of such goods, there will be rare circumstances in which one might be granted, (e.g. for the export of equipment for museum or exhibition display). Category B goods consist of Small Arms and Light Weapons (including ammunition); Long Range Missiles (LRMs) capable of a range of 300km or more (Note: this includes Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)), Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), specially designed production and field test equipment for MANPADS, and specialised training equipment and simulators for MANPADS, and specially designed components for any of the above. Any person in the UK, or a UK person anywhere in the world, is prohibited from transferring, acquiring or disposing, or arranging or negotiating a contract for the acquisition or disposal of Category B goods without a licence from the Secretary of State. Financing, insuring, advertising and promotion for Category B goods will not be controlled, but active or targeted promotional activities aimed at securing a particular business deal will be. Category C goods consist of all goods contained within Schedule 2 of the Export Control Order 2008 that do not fall into either of the two categories above, and certain substances for the purpose of riot control or self-protection and related portable dissemination equipment. Trading between two countries in Category C goods is only controlled if carried out from within the UK.
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Review of Export Control Legislation (2007) Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering") in Controlled Goods (in effect from 6 April 2009), January 2009 and Explanatory Notes to the Trade in Goods (Categories of Controlled Goods) Order 2008
27 Trade in Goods (Categories of Controlled Goods) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1805)
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24. The principle that extra-territoriality should be applied to arms exports was first conceded by the previous government when the Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 was given legal effect.28 That Order introduced new controls on trade in military equipment between overseas countries (including 'trafficking' and 'brokering').29 Under the Order any person within the United Kingdom, or a United Kingdom person anywhere in the world, was prohibited from supplying or delivering, or doing any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of, restricted goods without a licence from the Secretary of State. Extraterritorial controls (on the activities of United Kingdom persons anywhere in the world) were applied to trade to any destination in: long-range missiles (over 300 km) and their component parts; torture equipment the export of which had already been banned by the Government (including, for example, electric shock batons, and leg irons); and to any embargoed destination. 30 25. From 1 October 2008 cluster munitions were added to the list of goods to be treated as Category A goods and Category B controls were widened to include small arms and manportable air defence systems.31 26. The then Trade and Industry Minister, Ian Lucas, told our predecessor Committees in a letter dated 11 February 2010 that Anti-Vehicle Landmines would be added to Category B and therefore their trade by UK persons would be subject to extra-territorial controls.32 Our predecessor Committees had called for this change in their Report of March 201033 Additionally, as a first step towards targeted extensions, the letter detailed how NGOs had agreed to: consider whether there are any particular goods that ought to be moved from Category C to Category B, based on the risks associated with trade in those specific items; and to consider whether there are particular countries of concern such that
28 The Order was made under the Export Control Act 2002.The Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2765) 29 The Order covered not only companies or people trading between overseas countries on their own behalf, but also those negotiating contracts and arranging trade and related activities for a fee. The Order did not, however, control transportation, financial services, insurance or advertising-except where extra-territorial controls apply. 30 See Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2002-03, The Governments proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act, HC 620, Chapter 4 31 Trade in Goods (Categories of Controlled Goods) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1805) 32 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC202, Ev 63 33 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Ev 63. CAEC also called for anti-vehicle landmines to be added to the list of Category B goods, which prohibits any person in the United Kingdom, or a United Kingdom person anywhere in the world, from transferring, acquiring or disposing, or arranging or negotiating a contract for the acquisition or disposal of Category B goods without a licence from the Secretary of State. Anti-vehicle mines were added to Category B with the entry into force of the Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2010 on 31 August 2010.
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trading Category C goods to those destinations ought to be subject to extra-territorial control.34 Anti-Vehicle Landmines were added to Category B through entry into force of the Export Control (Amendment) (No.2) Order 2010, on 31 August 2010.35 27. The CAECs conclusions and recommendations on extra-territoriality in its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011 were as follows: We conclude it is disappointing that the Government's discussions with the industry and NGOs have not resulted in extra-territorial controls being extended to include specific items in Category C. We recommend that the Government re-engages with NGOs and industry groups on this important policy issue and lets us know of the progress being made in its response to this report. We further conclude, as did our predecessor Committees, that there is no justification for allowing a UK person to conduct arms exports overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK. We note that extra-territorial legislation already applies to a number of areas, including sexual offences against children and young people, war crimes, terrorism, torture, bribery and corruption and taxation. We conclude that there is no reason why enforcing extra-territorial controls in connection with arms export controls should be more difficult to enforce than in these areas. We recommend that the Government extends extra-territoriality to all items on the Military List in Category C.36 The Governments unacceptable delay of ten months in responding to the Committees recommendations on this issue is detailed in paragraph 14 above. 28. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in providing the Governments response to the Committees recommendation on extra-territoriality stated in his letter of 2 February 2012: On the specific question of extra-territorial law enforcement, I am always inclined to be wary of going too far down this route. I think extra-territoriality can be justified in the case of the most undesirable types of activity conducted by UK nationals overseas: in other words, normally activity that we would seek to prohibit, not activity that we would seek to license. I am not so far convinced that it would be right to extend the reach of UK law to cover all trade in defence goods, including the least sensitive, by UK nationals. But I am open to hearing your views on this point.37 29. The Committees conclude that the distinction made by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his letter of 2 February 2012 between activities that are prohibited and activities that are subject to licensing is not valid in the context of
34 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC202, Ev 63 35 Export Control (Amendment) (No.2) Order 2010 (SI 2010/2007) 36 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 57 37 Ev 156 letter from Vince Cable dated 2 February 2012, para 4
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arms exports and extra-territoriality. The export of all Category A and Category B military goods (as detailed in Box A) by any person within the UK, or a UK person anywhere in the world, without a licence from the Secretary of State is already prohibited and is a criminal offence. The Committees continue to conclude that there is no justification for allowing a UK person to conduct arms exports overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out by any person within the UK. On enforcement the Committees continue to conclude that the enforcement of extra-territoriality legislation has already been accepted by successive UK Governments in relation to all Category A and Category B military goods. We further conclude that there is no reason why enforcement should prove any more difficult in relation to Category C military goods than in relation to all other areas detailed in Annex 2 to our Report where extraterritoriality legislation already applies. The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is further extended to the remaining Military List goods in Category C.
Brass Plate Companies

30. Brass Plate companies are companies that do not have an operational presence in the UK but do have a UK-registered address. They have no presence in the UK other than the brass plate, employ no UK nationals and no part of their activity is actually conducted within the UK.38 Our predecessor Committees first raised the issue of Brass Plate companies in their 2009 Report following their visit to Ukraine, when they were given a document containing a list of UK-registered brokers to whom the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control had granted licences for strategic exports.39 The end-users on the list included countries for which there had been UK Government restrictions on the export of strategic goods. The CAEC was subsequently informed by the previous Government that four of the 12 UK-registered brokers on the list were Brass Plate companies. Our predecessor Committees raised the issue again in their 2010 Report when they recommended that the Government should explore ways in which it would be possible to take enforcement action against Brass Plate companies, including consulting enforcement agencies in other countries on their approach to this problem.40 31. The Conclusion and Recommendation of the current Committees on Brass Plate companies in their Report published on 5 April 2011 were as follows: We conclude that the Government's current examination of ways to tackle concerns about brass plate UK companies in the UK trading in arms from overseas locations with virtual impunity because of difficulties of enforcement is welcome. We recommend the Government tells us in its response what precise action it will take, including the results of its exploration of the possibility of using powers under the
38 Committees on Arms Export Controls, Government Response to the Committee Report, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008), Cm 7938, p 6 39 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200809, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC178, paras 20-22 40 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC202, para 47
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Companies Act to dissolve a company which is operating against the public interest.41 The Governments unacceptable delay of ten months in responding to the Committees conclusion and recommendation on this issue is detailed in paragraph 14 above. 32. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, in providing the Governments response to the Committees conclusion and recommendation on Brass Plate companies, stated in his letter to the Chairman of 2 February 2012: Looking forward, the main challenge that I see in the area of arms brokers and brass plates is one of enforcement. The Government has had some successes in recent years. But it is an ongoing challenge: the fact that a company may be flouting the law does not necessarily mean that we can always catch them, gather evidence and present a case that will convince a court.42 33. The Committees conclude that the Government has failed to provide a substantive response to its recommendation in its 2011 Report regarding Brass Plate companies in the UK trading in arms from overseas locations with virtual impunity. The Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government states in its response to this Report what precise action it will take, including the results of its exploration of the possibility of using the Companies Act, to dissolve a company which is operating against the public interest.
A pre-licence register of arms brokers

34. Article 4 of the EU Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the control of arms brokering does not require the creation of a pre-licence register, but says that in addition to licences, Member States may also require brokers to obtain a written authorisation to act as brokers, as well as establish a register of arms brokers.43 Such a register is considered best practice at EU and international level. At the international level, the Wassenaar statement on arms brokering44 and the guidelines of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also encourage states to develop registers.45
41 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 40 42 Ev 156 letter from Vince Cable dated 2 February 2012, para 5 43 EU Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP, 23 June 2003. Brokering is where someone arranges or negotiates contracts (or agrees to do so) between other parties for trade in arms or components. 44 The Wassenaar Arrangement is presently composed of 40 countries (including the UK) and was established to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. 45 The OSCE has established the Vienna Document which, among other things, requires the 56 participating states to share information on defence planning and budgets and exchange information on their armed forces, military organisation, manpower and equipment systems. http://www.osce.org/fsc/74528
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35. In the last Parliament, our predecessor Committees repeatedly recommended that the Government establish a pre-licence register of arms brokers.46 The then Government's repeated response was that it was not convinced of the benefits of such a register, especially when the electronic system for applying for licences (SPIRE) acted as a de facto register. However, the last Government also stated that it was not opposed in principle to the idea of a pre-licensing registration system under which traders can be vetted before they can be registered.47 In 2009, the then Government said it would be happy to look at whether to introduce a register after it had assessed the effectiveness of other initiatives such as focussing awareness activity on traders and clamping down on those who misuse open licences.48 The then Minister of State at the FCO, Ivan Lewis, told our predecessor Committees that the last review had been in 2007 and therefore it may be worth having a look at it at some point in the near future.49 In response to our predecessor Committees' 2010 recommendation for a pre-licence register, the present Government said: As things stand, the Government does not believe that the case for a pre-licensing register has been made. It is not clear that the extra layer of bureaucracy involved in a registration system would add to the effectiveness of the UK's trade controls. However, we will keep this under review in the light of any emerging evidence.50 We were informed by the BIS Minister, Mark Prisk, during last years inquiry, that the Government did not have a completely closed mind on this issue and that the question is whether it would make any difference to the kind of rogues we are trying to deal with here [...]51 36. The Committees recommendation on establishing a pre-licence register of arms brokers in its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011 was as follows: We recommend that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a prelicence register of arms brokers and that its review includes a public consultation and is concluded with a Ministerial decision within four months of the start of the consultation.52 The Governments unacceptable delay of ten months in responding to the Committees conclusion and recommendation on this issue is detailed in paragraph 14 above.
46 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 200708, Scrutiny of Arms Export Control (2008),HC255, para 36; CAEC, First Joint Report of Session (200809), Strategic Arms Export Control (2009), HC615, para 51; CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010), HC 202, para 42 47 Committees on Arms Export Controls, Government Response to Committee Report, Scrutiny of Arms Exports Controls (2009) Cm 7698, para 7 48 Committees on Arms Export Controls, Government Response to Committee Report, Scrutiny of Arms Exports Controls (2009) Cm 7698, para 7 49 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation), HC 202, Q 76 50 Committees on Arms Export Controls, Government Response to Committee Report, Scrutiny of Arms Exports Controls (2008).Cm 7938, p 5. 51 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Q 105 52 Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 46
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37. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, in providing the Governments response to the Committees recommendation on establishing a pre-licence register of arms brokers in his letter to the Chairman of 2 February 2012 stated: In terms of our overall approach to these issues, I think that the UK regulatory framework governing arms brokers is now broadly speaking in good shape. Those activities which should be licensable are licensable.53 38. The Committees conclude that the Government should consider very carefully whether it should do more to protect access to the UKs arms export licensing system by those arms brokers whom the BIS Minister, Mark Prisk, described to the Committees as the kind of rogues we are trying to deal with here. We, therefore, repeat our previous recommendation that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers, that its review includes a public consultation and is concluded with a Ministerial decision within four months of the start of the consultation.
EU dual-use controls
39. European Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009, the Dual-use Regulation, controls, at European Community level, the export, brokering and transit of dual-use items. The aim of the Regulation is to facilitate legitimate trade and to permit resources to be concentrated on the control of sensitive exports, transfers, brokering and transit of dual-use items, and the combat of fraud. The Regulation was adopted in May 2009 and is directly applicable to all Member States. End-use controls operate in relation to items or technology: for use in connection with the development, production, handling, operation, maintenance, storage, detection, identification or dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the development, production, maintenance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons; for military end-use in an embargoed destination; and as parts or components of an illegally exported military item. 54 40. In July 2011 the EU Commission issued its Green Paper The dual use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competiveness in a changing world.55 In the introduction to the Green Paper, the Commission stated that: Since 1995, it has been commonly accepted that dual-use export controls constitute an exclusive competence of the European Union and form an integral part of the EU's Common Commercial Policy.56
53 Ev 156 letter from Vince Cable dated 2 February 2012, para 3 54 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200910, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC202, para 52 55 European Commission Green Paper, The dual use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competiveness in a changing world, COM(2011) 393 final 56 European Commission Green Paper, The dual use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competiveness in a changing world, COM(2011) 393 final, p 2
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41. In January 2012 the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published its 20 page response on behalf of the UK Government to the EU Commissions Green Paper.57 In its response to the EU the Government highlighted the following changes it wanted to the proposals: The Government suggested that if there was to be harmonisation of the Criteria in Article 12 used by the Member States to assess dual-use licence applications that it would prefer to see it done in a manner consistent with the Common Position.58 The Government indicated that it thought that there was a current problem with delays in updating the EU control list which needs to be addressed.59 The Governments response on military end-use control is set out in paragraph 47 below. 42. The Government also indicated in its paper its opposition to or concern about the following proposals: The Government said that given that harmonisation is likely to result in compromise between existing practices it is important to ensure it does not produce more dis-benefits than benefits. For example, in the UK individual and global licences are generally valid for 2 and 5 years respectively while in other Member States validity periods of 1 and (up to) 3 years respectively are typical. The Government said that it would have difficulty supporting a compromise which reduced the validity period of UK licences.60 The Government indicated its opposition to the phasing out of National General Authorisation under the proposal to introduce a new EU export control model based on a network of existing licensing authorities operating under more common rules.61 The Government stated that it welcomed improved information exchange, however it would want to ensure that the amount and type of information was proportionate to, and justified by, the objectives outlined in the Green Paper. It said that the proposals should ensure that the volume of such information is not so great as to prevent its effective use (i.e. to avoid information overload).62
57 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012 58 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 14 59 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 15 60 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 11 61 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 16 62 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 17
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The UK Government does not support the phasing out of National General Authorisations as a whole.63 The Government said that it was not convinced that any of the proposed alternatives to intra-EU controls, e.g. notification rather than authorisation, post-shipment verification or certified end-users, would provide the same level of assurance as a licensing requirement.64 43. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to make public its response to the EU Commissions Green Paper on the EUs dual-use export control system was welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report, and subsequently, informs the CAEC as to which of the UK Governments proposed changes to the EU Dual-use Regulation have been successfully achieved, and also as to the outcome on the EU Commissions proposed changes which the UK Government does not support.
EU end-use control of exported military goods

44. In the Committees last Report published on 5 April 2011 (HC686) their conclusions and recommendations in relation to military end-use control were as follows: We conclude it is disappointing that the Government appears not to have continued the previous Government's work and pressed for an expanded Military End-Use Control. We recommend that the Government immediately re-starts work in producing specific policy proposals and to ensure that it has the requisite support for them at EU level in time for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation. We recommend that the Government provides us with an update on how this work is progressing when replying to this report. We further recommend that the Government in the meantime makes the necessary amendments to UK legislation to rectify the present deficiencies in military end use controls.65 45. In its response (Cm 8079), published on 7 July 2011, the Government said: We continue to support an expanded Military End-Use Control and we now have a UK proposal that we can take forward. As part of the preparations for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation the European Commission intend to publish a Green Paper in June of this year. This will be followed by consultations with Member States, exporters and civil society organisations with a view to producing legislative proposals next year. We believe that effective engagement in this process offers the best opportunity for gaining broad support at EU level. In the meantime
63 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 17 64 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 19 65 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 61
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we have no plans to bring forward the amendments to UK legislation necessary to implement a national military end-use control.66 46. The Chairman, in his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011, put the following further request for information to the Government from the Committees: Will the Government provide the Committees with details of the UK proposal for an extended Military End-use Control and of the EU Commissions Green Paper as part of the preparation for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-use regulation?67 The Governments answer, in the Foreign Secretarys reply of 30 September, was: The UK proposal would be for an amendment to Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 as follows: An authorisation shall be required for the export of dual-use items not listed in Annex I if the purchasing country or country of destination is subject to an arms embargo decided by a common position or joint action adopted by the Council or a decision of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or an arms embargo imposed by a binding resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations and if the exporter has been informed by the authorities referred to in paragraph 1, or has reason to believe, that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for a military end-use. For the purposes of this paragraph military end-use shall mean: Intended for military, paramilitary, security or police forces in a destination subject to an arms embargo or to an entity involved in procurement, manufacture, maintenance, repair or operation on their behalf. An authorisation shall not be required if the items in question are medical supplies and equipment, food, clothing and other consumer goods68 47. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in giving the UK Governments response in January 2012 to the European Commissions Green Paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, said in relation to military end-use control: Regarding the military end-use control our view is that the current control is too narrow. It currently only applies to transfers to embargoed destinations of unlisted items intended for a military end-use where military end-use is defined as: (i) incorporation into military-list items; (ii) use of production, test or analytical equipment for the development, production or maintenance of military items; or (iii) use of any unfinished products in a plant for production of military list items. In our view this means that we cannot prevent the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items. For example, we could prevent the export of an unlisted item
66 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, page 9 67 Ev 63 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 68 Ev 67 Letter from Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011
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intended to be used as a component in a military vehicle but we could not prevent the export of a complete civilian vehicle that was to be used by the military or internal security forces of the destination country even where that country is subject to arms embargo. It is also unclear whether the military end-use control permits us to prevent the export of an unlisted item that is to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination. We have come across a number of cases of this type. We would therefore like to see the Commission address this shortcoming when bringing forward proposals to amend the Regulation. We can provide draft text if necessary.69 48. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the reasons as to why it has no plans to bring forward amendments to UK legislation necessary to implement a national military end-use control when the Government has stated in its response to the European Commissions Green Paper on the EU dual-use export control system that the current military end-use control is too narrow. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether the European Commission has accepted the British Governments proposals for an expanded Military End-use Control as set out in the Foreign Secretarys letter to the CAEC of 30 September 2011 and in the Governments response to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, and if not what further steps the Government will now take.
Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment
49. In 2008 the previous Government stated: We will be asking the [EU] Commission to introduce a control where the exporter will be required to submit an export licence application where they have reason to believe, or have been informed, that the items could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.70 50. The Committees conclusion and recommendations in its Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011 were as follows: We conclude that the slow pace of progress towards an EU torture end-use control is very disappointing. We recommend that in its response to this report, the Government provides detailed information on the parameters of the torture end-use control it intends to propose to the EU. We further recommend that the Government simultaneously prepares draft UK legislation on this issue for public consultation.71
69 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Response from Her Majestys Government to the European Commission Green paper on the dual-use export control system of the European Union, January 2012, p 12 70 BIS, Export Control Act 2002: Review of Export Control Legislation (2007)Governments End of Year Response, Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, December 2008, page 6, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49301.pdf 71 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 65
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In its Response to the Committees Recommendation the Government provided detailed information on the parameters of the torture end-use control it intended to propose to the EU and said that it would continue to press the EU Commission to bring forward proposals in this area.72 However, when replying to the Committees request for draft UK legislation the Government responded: Given that we consulted on this issue in 2007 we see no reason to do so again now, and we currently do not intend to prepare draft legislation.73 51. UKWG expressed alarm that progress on torture end-use control had effectively stalled, despite first being announced four years ago. They were pleased that the Government had taken unilateral action to place export controls on sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride for the use in lethal injections, but were concerned that this only covered exports to the United States and not to other countries where the drugs could be used to carry out executions. It pointed out that if the Government had delivered on its 2008 commitments in this area it would have been able to control exports of these items as soon as it had become known that they were being used in executions.74 The Government introduced a Statutory Instrument that came into force on 16 April 2011 that prohibited the export of pancuronium bromide, potassium chloride concentrate or sodium pentobarbital to the USA in addition to the existing prohibition on the export of sodium thiopental to the USA. The Order was due to expire on 13 April 2012.75 52. On 12 April 2011 the BIS Minister, Mark Prisk, wrote to the EU High Representative Baroness Ashton as follows: I am writing to inform you of the UKs intention to introduce a control on the export of pancuronium bromide, potassium chloride and sodium pentobarbital to the US. This will complement our existing control on sodium thiopental. The UK Government calls on the Commission to propose an amendment to the Export of Torture Goods regulation to apply this control on an EU basis. As you may know, the UK introduced a control on the export of sodium thiopental to the US in November last year. This followed the revelation that correctional authorities in the US had been sourcing this drug from the UK to overcome a shortage in the US. The UK Government took the view, consistently with our stated policy of opposition to the death penalty, that we wished to prevent this trade. We also established that this measure would not hamper legitimate trade in sodium thiopental for medical purposes between the UK and the US: it was clear that there was none, nor any prospect of any. We took a deliberate decision to restrict the scope of this control
72 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 10 73 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-2, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 10 74 Ev 54 75 Export Control (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1127)
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only to exports to the US: sodium thiopental continues to be used as an anaesthetic in medical procedures in a number of developing countries, so we did not wish to disrupt supply of this essential medicine by placing any kind of restriction on exports from the UK. We have now, at the request of the campaigning group Reprieve, considered the case for extending this export control to cover the other drugs used in the US lethal injection process. Most US states that carry out lethal injection use a three drug cocktail consisting of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Furthermore, the state of Oklahoma has carried out one execution using the veterinary anaesthetic sodium pentobarbital, and we understand that more states are considering changing their execution protocols to allow the use of this drug as an alternative to sodium thiopental. Following a consultation with interested UK parties, we have again determined that a control on the export of these drugs to the US would not hamper legitimate medical trade. I have therefore decided to extend our control to cover these three additional drugs, and will shortly be laying the necessary Order before Parliament. The UK Government has felt obliged to act at national level because of the urgency of the situation. However, we recognise the desirability of action at EU level to ensure that the playing field is level and that the controls imposed by individual Member States cannot be circumvented by movement of these drugs within the Single Market. Our preferred solution would be for an EU-wide control on the export of these drugs to the US (and indeed to any other country that practices lethal injection) to be incorporated into Regulation 1236/2005 (the Torture Goods Regulation). My officials stand ready to discuss this with yours. We would also welcome the opportunity to explore the possibility of a horizontal end use control on the export of goods for the purpose of torture or capital punishment.76 On 14 September 2011 Baroness Ashton replied: Thank you for your letter. I would like to apologise for the delay in answering you but there have been a few developments on this issue. In your letter, you suggested that an EU-wide control on the exports of pharmaceuticals used in lethal injections to the US and other countries applying the death penalty through lethal injection should be incorporated into Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005. I would like to confirm that the Commission has started the process of reviewing the content of the Annexes of Regulation 1236/2005, which is expected to be finalised by the end of the year. Further examination of the need to review the scope of the Regulation will be undertaken shortly.77
76 Ev 142 letter from Mark Prisk to Baroness Ashton dated 12 April 2011 77 Ev 142 Letter from Baroness Ashton to Mark Prisk dated 14 September 2011
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53. When we asked the UKWG in the Oral evidence session on 23 January 2012 if they had received any information about the EU Commissions examination of the regulations on torture end-use controls Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) said that as he understood the situation, there had been no formal movement on the end-use provision. He continued: Remember that it is wider than just the death penalty; it is about torture, cruel and degrading treatment, and the death penalty. It is a catch-all clause that says that if you are aware that your products will facilitate those prohibited acts, you need to seek a licence to do that trade. We have often argued that if action is not forthcoming at EU level, and given that it has been a commitment of the UK Government since 2008 to do so, they should introduce it nationally. I think the very fact that national action in the UK on sting sticks and electro-shock devices has had an impact in influencing the EU position on these things is reason to do it.78 54. In the Oral evidence session with the Secretaries of State on 7 February 2012, we asked Vince Cable what the UK Government would be doing to get the EU to toughen up the rules on torture end-use control. The Secretary of State replied: We have got past the point of getting the principle accepted that there have to be tough end-use controls on torture equipment. The issue is now largely a technical one of definition and enforcement [...]79 The Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, Chris Chew, added that the EU Commission would be carrying out a broad review of the EU Torture Goods Regulation in the first half of 2012.80 55. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out the specific changes it has made since coming into Office in the UKs export control procedures and legislation either to prohibit the export altogether, or to make subject to export licensing and end-use control, items of torture equipment, including items used to carry out capital punishment, detailing the specific items concerned, the countries to which their export is now prohibited or is subject to export licensing and end-use control, and any expiry time limits set on the relevant procedures and legislation; b) provides the CAEC with the outcome of the EU Commissions review of the content of the Annexes of Regulation 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2011 and the UK Governments view as to whether this outcome is satisfactory or requires amendment; c) provides the CAEC with a copy of the UK Governments submission to the EU Commission for the Commissions broad review of the EU Torture Goods Regulation being carried out in the first half of 2012; and
78 Q 34 79 Q 69 [Vince Cable] 80 Q 69 [Chris Chew]
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d) states whether it is still the UK Governments policy that it does not intend to prepare draft UK national legislation on torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment, and if so, explains why not.
Re-export controls and undertakings

56. The previous Governments policy on no re-export controls and undertakings and its scrutiny by our predecessor Committees is summarised in paragraphs 7175 of our Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011.81 Our recommendations in the Report were: We recommend that the Government provides us with an assessment of how no reexport undertakings are working, and details of the Government's methodology for assessing their effectiveness. We also recommend that the Government provides us with information as to which other countries have no re-export clauses in their contracts, as opposed to in their undertakings, and the effects of such clauses.82 The Governments response was: The change to no re-export undertakings appears to be working well, in terms of end users being prepared to sign off the new undertakings. The current clause appears to have created no additional burdens on either exporters or end users alike and therefore there has been no resistance to the clause in its current form. It is not feasible for the Government to track all UK origin goods once they have been exported. We rely on reporting from our overseas posts and other sources regarding cases where UK origin goods have been re-exported in undesirable circumstances. Such reports are very rare. So far it is not possible to judge whether the introduction of the revised End User Undertaking has impacted on this. We interpret the word contracts in this question to mean export licences. From our discussions with other Governments, we do not sees a simple distinction between the use of licence conditions and the use of end-use undertakings. The primary focus of all European export licensing systems is the assessment, carried out at the point of export, of the risk of diversion, with an obligation on the exporter to declare any knowledge that the have that the goods are destined for re-export. To our knowledge, The United States is the only country that imposes legal penalties for reexport on an extra-territorial basis. To assess the effectiveness of this regime is a complex question: for example, it has been suggested that the extra bureaucracy of the US re-export regime may deter some overseas customers from buying controlled US goods.83
81 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, paras 7175 82 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 79 83 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp 1213
49
57. On 26 May 2010, Lord Alton of Liverpool introduced his Private Members Re-Export Controls Bill in the House of Lords. The purpose of the Bill is to make provision for the regulation of the re-export of military equipment and goods further to their original exportation from the United Kingdom. The Bill proposed an amendment to the Export Control Act 2002 under which the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills would be required to make an order to prohibit or regulate the re-export of controlled goods subsequent to their original export from the UK. The Bill completed its passage through the House of Lords on 12 January 2011 and moved to the House of Commons, where it received its First Reading on 27 January 2011. Lord Alton contacted us before the Oral evidence session with the Secretaries of State on 7 February 2012 informing us that the Government had declined to provide time for the progress of the Bill in the House of Commons and had opposed the use of the special Standing Committee procedure for the expedition of Second Readings of Private Members Bills. When we asked Vince Cable whether the Government business managers were blocking consideration of Lord Altons Re-Export Controls Bill, the Secretary of State replied that he hoped that the Bill was not being blocked, but that he did not know.84 In his letter of 8 March 2012 the Secretary of State said that the Government did not want goods originating from the UK, once exported, to be re-exported for undesirable uses, but believed that the Government controls re-exportation through the current export licensing system. He re-iterated that the risk of undesirable re-export is assessed in the licence application (Criterion 7 of the Consolidated Criteria). Where the risk of re-export to an undesirable country is high the licence would not be granted. He stated that: If a re-export of concern comes to light we can and do factor that in to our assessment of subsequent licence applications for similar goods to that destination. He continued: Once a good has left the UK, it is in practice under the jurisdiction of the destination country. We would be claiming that UK export controls applied, whereas in reality we would have no powers to enforce them. We are concerned that the effect of Lord Altons proposals would be to impose statutory obligations (backed by criminal penalties) on persons outside the UK, solely on the basis that they had purchased UK origin goods and technology. In our view such obligations would go against the UKs long-standing opposition to extra-territorial jurisdiction, and would in reality be unenforceable and therefore ineffective.85 58. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response details the controlled goods, for which either the previous Government or the present Government approved licences for export, that it believes were subsequently reexported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations, stating in each case the country to which the goods were originally exported and the eventual undesirable use or undesirable destination.
84 Q 88 85 Ev 56 - Letter from Dr Vince Cable dated 8 March 2012
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Licensed production overseas

59. Our predecessor Committees scrutinised the risk of breaches of UK arms export control policies occurring as a result of the export of UK designed goods from licensed production facilities overseas. They last addressed this risk in their Report (HC202) published on 30 March 2010 in which paragraphs 7577 read as follows: In previous Reports we have concluded that existing controls over licensed production overseas were inadequate and needed to be extended. We had considered the option that Government had set out in its 2007 Consultation Document that export licences for supplies to licensed production facilities or subsidiaries could be made subject to conditions relating to the relevant commercial contracts.86 We also recommended that the Government make export licences for supplies to licensed production facilities or subsidiaries subject to a condition in the export contract preventing re-export to a destination subject to UN or EU embargo.87 The Government rejected the case for enhancing controls on the export of controlled goods in relation to licensed production.88 In its Response to our 2009 Report, the Government explained that it considered enhanced controls unnecessary as the export of controlled goods to overseas Licensed Production Facilities already required an export licence, and exporters applying for a licence were asked to declare whether the export was for the overseas production.89 However, the Government acknowledged that there was a stronger case for enhancing controls on the export of non-controlled goods: The cases of overseas production where issues have arisen have all related to goods for military end use in embargoed or other destinations of concern, where the goods were not controlled when exported from the UK. The Government, therefore, considers that the most effective way of tightening controls on the export of non-controlled goods would be through an enhanced Military End-Use Control.90 60. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states what breaches of UK arms export control policies it believes have occurred under both the previous and the present Government as a result of the export of UK-designed goods from licensed production facilities overseas, specifying in each case the description of the goods concerned, the country in which they were produced and the
86 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200607, Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review, HC117, para 238 87 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200708, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC254, para 42 88 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200708, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 7485, pp 7-8 89 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200809, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 7698, pp 67 90 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200809, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 7698, p 7
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country to which they were subsequently exported. The Committees further recommend that the Government sets out in its Response what steps it will take to prevent UK arms export policies being breached as a result of the export of UKdesigned goods from licensed production facilities overseas.
The Consolidated Criteria

61. The Consolidated Criteria, announced on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, are the consolidation of the UKs national criteria and the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The Consolidated Criteria are set out in full in Annex 3, below. On 5 June 1998 the European Union adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Following a review of the 1998 Code of Conduct, it was replaced on 8 December 2008 with the EU Council Common Position defining common rules governing controls of exports of military technologies and equipment (2008/944/CFSP). The EU Common Position is set out in full in Annex 4 below. The UN states that the Commons Position constitutes a significant updated and upgraded instrument.91 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states on its website that the EU Code of Conduct and EU Common Position were aimed at harmonizing EU member states arms export policies in line with agreed minimum standards. They contain common criteria which member states agree to apply when issuing arms export licences as well as mechanisms of information exchange and consultation.92 62. Article 1 of the EU Common Position is as follows: Article 1 1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2. 2. The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include: applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of licensed production of military equipment in third countries, applications for brokering licences, applications for transit or transhipment licences, applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as electronic media, fax or telephone. Member States legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with respect to these applications.
91 UN Programme of Action Implementation Support System, http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/10.aspx 92 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/eu_common_position
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The wording of the Criteria One to Eight in Article 2 of the EU Common Position mirrors, but is not identical to, the wording of Criteria One to Eight of the UK Governments Consolidated Criteria, which also adds other factors. 63. The Committees Conclusions and Recommendations in its Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011 were as follows: We conclude that the Government's timetable of before the end of 2011 by which the wording of the UK's Consolidated Criteria will be updated to be wholly consistent with the EU Common Position is too protracted. We recommend that the Government sets itself a much shorter timetable in which to conclude this updating and to inform us of the revised timetable in its response to this report. We further conclude that, while the consolidated criteria appear robust their application seems to be less so. We therefore recommend that the Government ensures that the EU Common Position is rigidly and consistently applied.93 The Governments Response (Cm 8079) stated: The Government does not accept that there is any evidence that the application of the Consolidated Criteria is in anyway less robust that the EU Common Position. Nevertheless, it will update the wording of the Consolidated and National Arms Export Licensing criteria before the end of 2011 and this work will be completed as soon as practicable this year.94 Notwithstanding what was said in the Governments Response, the updating of the Consolidated Criteria was not completed by the end of 2011. 64. At the Oral evidence session on 7 February 2012 we asked the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, in terms of harmonising EU Member States arms export policies, what changes, if any, he would like to see to the Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position on arms exports. The Foreign Secretary replied: There is good co-ordination in Europe. There is a monthly meeting in Europe about the enforcement of the consolidated criteria. Of course, there are differences between the consolidated criteria and the EU common position. They principally relate to criteria in both documents concerned with respect for human rights, but the EU Council common position is fully applied in our export licensing process. The decisions we make are fully in accord with the provisions of the EU common position, so, from a policy point of view, I am satisfied with that. It does require regular, rigorous co-ordination to make sure that the effect of the policy is approximately the same across the whole European Union.95 65. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government explains why its updating of the wording of the Consolidated and National Arms
93 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 36 94 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 8 95 Q 154
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Export Licensing Criteria before the end of 2011, as stated in its previous Response (Cm 8079), was not achieved by that date and that it provides the updated wording in its Response to this Report. The Committees further recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states whether it considers that the UK Government is fully compliant with each of the Articles in the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing controls of exports of military technologies and equipment, and, if not, to specify in which respects it is noncompliant. The Committees also recommend that as the EU Common Position is to be reviewed three years after its adoption, on 8 December 2008, the Government sets out in its Response the changes to the EU Common Position to which it will be seeking agreement. Finally, the Committees recommend that where the UKs arms export policies are arguably more stringent than those set out in the EU Common Position, for example in the light of the Foreign Secretarys Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012 with regard to exports which might be used to facilitate internal repression,96 the UK Government should adhere to its own policy. The Committees wish to be assured by the Government in its Response that this will be the case.
96 See Paragraph 190 of this Report below
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6 Organisational and operational issues

Export Control Organisation (ECO)
Charging for processing arms export licences 66. In the Committees inquiry last year we asked whether the Government had any plans to introduce charging to companies for the processing of licences. At that time EGAD had said that a statement from the Government confirming that they had no intention of introducing charging for licences would be a great help to the industry, which is extremely worried about the rumours that there may be charges for licences."97 When the BIS Minister, Mr Mark Prisk, as part of the inquiry, was asked about the possibility of charging, he said: It is not the intention of the Government to do anything that would be any more than seeking to look at the possibility of charges for the costs of the service. This is not intended to be some sort of back-door charge over and above that, and we would want to consult industry. We must look at the balance of these issues to see whether, in fact, there is a different finance model which would make more sense.98 However, the Governments response to the Committees Report said: In the longer term, we are exploring an alternative model whereby ECO is funded by its customers. We consider that his might be the best way of ensuring a high quality licensing system in future as the volume of licensing activity continues to increase. We expect to hold a full consultation on this later in the year.99 67. During the Westminster Hall debate on 20 October it was stated that it could be attractive for the Government and the Treasury to change the funding system for ECO.100 The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, said that the Government was considering a proposal whereby that funding is taken out of public expenditure [...] and is made the responsibility of the arms exporting industry. There were possible risks and dangers in going down that route because a crucial feature of the ECO is its clear independence. The Minister was questioned whether a change in the charging mechanism might change public perception from seeing the ECO as an independent watchdog to seeing it instead as a poodle of the arms exporting companies. That would be detrimental to the perception of our UK arms export controls.101 68. In responding to the debate the BIS Minister, Mr Mark Prisk, said:
97 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Q 63 98 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Q 77 99 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, page 7 100 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 337WH 101 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 337WH
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Charging is an idea that we have explored with exporters, but only as part of the wider question of how we best reform the service to ensure we deliver the best kind of service without diminishing the quality of the controls that have been debated in this Chamber. What I would say is if and whenand I emphasise if and when that subject becomes a formal Government proposal with a timetable, we will launch a full public consultation. He accepted the point about the need to ensure that the consultation reflected the independence of ECO.102 69. We asked EGAD for its views on the prospect of ECO charging for the approval process for arms export licences. David Hayes (EGAD) said that it recognised the problems that ECO had, but that the proposals put forward by ECO would have been unworkable. He informed us that the figures being bandied about were 300 for a Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) and 3,000 for an Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL). However, this pricing structure did not take into account the value of the goods requiring the licence and that a situation could arise where the fee for the licence for a 10 widget could be 300. He commented that the economics of that just do not make sense. Mr Hayes suggested that such circumstances would drive the manufacturing of that type of product out of the UK as it would not be viable. He surmised that companies in the dualuse sector could arrange for the licence to be applied for in Italy or the Czech Republic when the goods were physically exported from the UK. He considered that the proposal had not been particularly thought out in terms of the impact or the feasibility. Mr Hayes also pointed out that applying a charge on companies that made licence applications would only affect companies that were compliant and would exclude rogue companies that were operating below the radar. This would encourage non-compliant companies to stay below the radar and get even lower. He said that: They would avoid the cost of compliance altogether and enjoy an increased competitive advantage over the companies that were complying. 103 Bernadette Peters (EGAD) suggested that a source of revenue for the Government could be gained through the fining of agents or exporters who made false or incorrect entries: this would also improve enforcement.104 70. When we asked the BIS Secretary of State whether consultation on charging for processing licences would be taking place, Vince Cable replied: We are not proceeding with this. We have decided not to introduce charging for the foreseeable future. The decision has been made, so the whole consultation process is not necessary. We may return to it, but for the foreseeable future we are not introducing charging.105 71. When we asked what had informed the policy decision, Vince Cable told us that there were pros and cons regarding charging. He said that there was a high administrative cost of processing licences and for the Department to maintain a high-quality level the user fee
102 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 363WH 103 Q 49 [David Hayes] 104 Q 49 [Bernadette Peters] 105 Q 77
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would have been a sensible way of doing so. However, there would have been an additional burden by introducing charging, particularly on small and medium-sized companies and the Government wanted to avert that.106 72. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision not to introduce charging for the processing of arms export licences is welcome as a charging system would, at least in the public perception, have compromised the independence of the Export Control Organisation from the arms export industry. The Committees recommend that such policy decisions by Ministers are made known to the CAEC wherever possible when they are made and not in the course of Oral evidence by Ministers. Performance 73. The Governments Response to the Committees 2011 Report (HC686) stated that an improvement in processing had taken place in the first quarter of 2011 with 72% of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) processed within the Governments target of 70% processed within 20 working days.107 However, the quarterly arms export licence reports produced by ECO show that performance since the first quarter of 2011 has fallen again.
Table1: SIELS processing performance quarterly within 20 days 2010 Q1 % of SIELs processed within 20 days 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 Q4 2011 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4
59
61
64
61
72
62
62
60
Source; BIS Quarterly Reports: 2010 Q1 2011 Q4
74. In his contribution to the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees 2011 Report Toby Perkins MP said: Given the extent of the cuts to UK defence budgets and the tremendous pressure they are putting on the UK defence industry, it is vital that licence applications be processed in a timely fashion when our defence industry attempts to trade with trusted nations that present no large-scale concerns. The defence industry reports that contracts have been lost in cases where there were no worries about the licence application, but the process simply took longer than it should have. Business vital to this countrys defence industry is being lost as a result of bureaucratic failure.108 75. The Minister responded by saying: The volume of licensing activity has increased significantly, which is partly because legitimate defence exporters have been getting their job right. At the same time, [...] the Export Control Organisation has made considerable
106 Q 80 107 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, page 7 108 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 359WH
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improvements in its efficiency. However, we are in a very tough public expenditure climate and efficiency savings can, of course, only take us so far.109 76. The Governments performance target for the processing of SIELs is to process 70% of applications within 20 working days and 95% within 60 working days.110
Table2: SIELS Processing Performance Annually 2006 Number processed Processed within 20 working days Processed within 60 working days n.a. 82% 2007 9,647 79% 2008 12,729 73% 2009 14,187 73% 2010 16,723 63%
99%
98%
95%
94%
94%
Source: United Kingdom Export Controls Annual Report 2010, United Kingdom Export Controls Annual Report 2009, United Kingdom Export Controls Annual Report 2007.
The Government has a target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 95% in 60 working days. These targets do not apply to appeals concerning goods that are controlled solely because of UN Sanctions.111
Table 3: SIELs Appeals Performance Annually 2006 Appeals processed within 20 working days Appeals processed within 60 working days 58% 2007 61% 2008 69% 2009 68% 2010 51%
83%
100%
90%
91%
93%
Source: United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007.
77. EGADs submission to this inquiry stated that: Whilst it is perceived that the current export control system, and especially the turnaround of licence applications, has recovered to a certain extent over the past year, we are concerned that this minor improvement has been due to efforts by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) and its advisory departments to put additional effort and resources into the processing of Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) applications. It believes that this limited improvement has been achieved to the detriment of other aspects of the wider UK export control system. EGAD said that some of the Open General
109 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 363WH 110 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, p 30 111 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, page 31
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Export Licences that had been issued have proven to be so unfathomable to interpret as to dissuade even expert export control practitioners from registering for them.112 78. When we asked EGAD about the deterioration in the processing of arms export licence applications at ECO David Hayes (EGAD) said that: It would be nice to think that part of the increase in licence applications is increased awareness, and that more people who should be applying for licences are applying. There is the problem that we have already spoken about, which is the large percentage of licence applications that really should not be licence applications at all and should be under some form of open licensing. Companies that either cant or wont, because of a lack of confidence in their ability to use these licences, go down that road and use them. He also mentioned that there had been staffing reductions in ECO. Mr Hayes highlighted staffing reductions in the technical assessment unit, which is the first step in the approval process following the initial check of the licence application. He pointed out that when new staff were taken on there was an initial deterioration in performance, because of the training demand of the new staff. He believed that these factors had led to the service deterioration.113 79. We asked the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, what steps were being taken to reverse the declining trend in the processing of applications and how ECO would deal with the increasing number of licences requiring processing. Vince Cable told us that [...] my understanding is that, although there are some major cases where there has been an argument about delay, performance has been improving. Something of the order of two thirds of all cases are cleared within the 20 days.114 Tom Smith, Head of ECO, confirmed that there had been a steady increase in the volume of export licences and that performance had suffered. He said that ECO had started turning this around. This was partly because ECO had finally managed to stem this inexorable increase in individual licence applications. There had been 9,600 applications in 2007; this had peaked at 16,700 in 2010 and then had reduced to 15,700 in 2011. He told us that: we actually managed to succeed in what we have been trying to do for a little while, which was to allow exporters to do more business under open licences. That is quite a positive trend. He informed us that ECO had various plans in train in terms of increased efficiency and increased customer focus. He was hopeful that performance in 2012 would be significantly better.115 80. We recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out the specific steps it is taking to achieve its 20 and 60 working day targets for both processing and determining appeals for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs); and
112 Ev 41 113 Q 51 [David Hayes] 114 Q 81 115 Q 82 [Tom Smith]
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b) states whether it will be setting processing and determining appeals targets for Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and Open General Export Licences (OGELs) and, if so, what these targets will be. The Committees further recommend that the Government in seeking to meet its arms export licence processing and appeal targets must comply in all cases and at all times with its arms export control policies as stated in the relevant legislation and in the Consolidated Criteria, and the Committees wish to be assured by the Government in its Response to this Report that this will be done. Review of the ECO 81. In its submission EGAD suggested that there was enormous scope for a review of the export control system in the UK. It believed that this would alleviate much of its current burden. It pointed out that the number of licence refusals continued to be extremely small at approximately 1% and said that there must be a large swathe of current SIELs which could be safely and responsibly removed from the scope of the current SIEL system, and could be placed within the ambit of the OGEL or OIEL systems, instead. EGAD considers that as the workload of ECO had increased, the need for such a review has become increasingly pressing. In calling for a review it said that it was not seeking the movement of SIEL cases where there is the remotest doubt, based on past experience, that a licence would be issued by Government, but merely the movement of those cases where a licence will inevitably be granted.116 In its 2011 Report (HC686) the Committees recommended the Government reviews the performance of the ECO and provide us with the results of this Review in its response to this Report.117 The Governments Response to our recommendation was: We are not conducting an overarching review of the performance of the ECO, but have been carrying out progressive and continuous improvements and reviews of aspects of the ECOs performance, and will continue to do so.118 82. In its Response the Government also said: Work has also started on the review of the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) system and we will report our findings to the Committees on completion of the review.119 In a further letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011, the Committees then asked by what date will the Government be reporting its findings following its review of the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) system and whether there will be consultation with outside bodies in the course of the review?120 The Foreign Secretary in his reply of 30 September 2011 answered:
116 Ev 41 117 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 31 118 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, page 7 119 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, page 7 120 Ev 63 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011
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The Government has conducted a first phase of the review of Open General Export Licences, which has concluded that there is scope for increasing the use of existing OGELs with benefits both for exporters and for the ECO through a number of measures, including: (i) creation of a plain English OGEL template; ii) standardisation of the terms and conditions of OGELs; (iii) improvements to the OGELChecker online self-help tool; and (iv) a study into ways of improving transparency in relation to the use of OGELs. A draft of the plain English OGEL has already been shared with industry representatives and their reaction was favourable. We will continue to consult industry and others on an informal basis during the course of the review. We will provide the Committees with a further report at the end of the year.121 83. In the Oral evidence session with the Secretaries of State we asked, in the light of our recommendation in 2011 and EGADs comments, whether there were any plans to carry out a review of the ECO. Tom Smith, Head of ECO, informed us that the Government was looking at the scope for increasing coverage of open licensing; which would address the request of EGAD. He said that it was very technical and adds to the scope of open licensing some technology which has been de-controlled by the international regimes, but where EU law has not quite caught up. He was hopeful that hundreds of export licence applications could be taken out of the system annually. However, he pointed out that there was a need to ensure that the right level of risk assessment was applied to each application. There was a balance between a quick answer for business and making sure that [ECO does] not cut corners.122 84. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out what specific aspects of the ECOs performance it is reviewing, what conclusions it has reached in respect of each aspect being reviewed and what specific action it is taking as a result; and b) states when it will be providing the Committees with a further report on its review of the OGEL system previously promised to be available at the end of 2011. Transparency of arms export licensing 85. The Governments review of its arms export policies and procedures is considered in paragraphs 175270 below. However, because it relates directly to the Export Control Organisation, a specific aspect of that reviewthe transparency of the export control systemis dealt with here. 86. In his Written Ministerial Statement of 7 February 2012, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, said: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced to the House on 13 October 2011 the conclusions of his review of defence and security export policy in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa.
121 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A 122 Q 83
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It concluded that there were no fundamental flaws with the UK strategic export licensing system. We share this view. However, the review did identify areas where our system could be further strengthened. To this end, he announced a package of proposals that included the introduction of a mechanism to allow the immediate suspension of pending licence applications to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability, and a commitment to continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis. We have worked closely in developing the suspension mechanism, and are pleased to report that this suspension mechanism is now in place. As a result of this change the Government have ensured that export licensing policy is now more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances overseas. The new suspension mechanism will allow the Government to quickly suspend the processing of pending licence applications to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Suspension will not be invoked automatically or lightly, but triggered for example when conflict or crisis conditions change the risk suddenly, or make conducting a proper risk assessment difficult. A case-by-case assessment of a particular situation will be necessary to determine whether a licensing suspension is appropriate. Any decision to suspend will be taken by the Licensing Authority based on advice from relevant Government Departments and reporting from our diplomatic posts. Parliament, industry and the media will be informed of any suspension. Suspension will be tailored to the circumstances in play and will not necessarily apply to all export licence applications to a country, but may instead be for applications for particular equipment (for example crowd control goods), or for applications for equipment going to a particular end-user. If a decision to suspend is made, work on licence applications in the pipeline will be stopped and no further licences issued pending ministerial review. Once the suspension is lifted, applications will not be required to be resubmitted. The Ministry of Defence will apply any licensing suspension decision to MOD Form 680 applications, for which it is the Government authority, and to the assessment against the consolidated criteria of gifting cases, which it co-ordinates on behalf of the Government. Suspension will be lifted (or partially lifted) where the Licensing Authority considers it appropriate to do so. Transparency is also crucial because confidence in the workings of the export licensing system needs to be shared by Parliament and by the public. The system should not just be working properly; it should also be seen to do so. I am therefore announcing today a number of proposals to improve the transparency of the export licensing system. These proposals build on my right hon. Friends
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review [the Foreign Secretary], and we intend to seek the views of interested parties, including the representatives of exporters and non-governmental organisations, on how they will work. The first proposal is to insert into all open export licences a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these licences. The Government will then publish this information. The second proposal concerns information contained in standard export licence applications. Currently all such applications are made in confidence, which makes it difficult to make public any more information than is already disclosed in the Governments annual and quarterly reports. The Export Control Organisation considers that certain additional information contained in licence applications could be made public without causing concern to exporters. I will explore ways of making this additional information public while protecting any sensitive material. The third proposal is to appoint an independent person to scrutinise the operation of the Export Control Organisations licensing process. The role of this independent person would be to confirm that the process is indeed being followed correctly and report on their work. In considering these proposals we intend to consult the various interested parties to reach an outcome which achieves the Governments objective of increased transparency while at the same time imposing the minimum additional burden on exporters. We will, simultaneously, be pursuing further changes to the strategic licensing system to make it more efficient and customer-focused, whilst maintaining the integrity of the process. Working together, my right hon. Friend and I remain committed to robust and effective national and global controls to help prevent exports that could undermine our own security or core values of human rights and democracy; to protect our security through strategic defence relationships; and to promote our prosperity by allowing British defence and security industries to operate effectively in the global defence market. I intend to make a further announcement to Parliament, setting out the Governments conclusions and plans for implementing any further changes, before the summer recess. 123 87. In March 2012 the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published a Discussion Paper Export Control Organisation: Transparency in Export licensing Discussion paper.124 The purpose of the paper was to: explain the background to the three transparency commitments made by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in his Written Ministerial Statement of 7 February 2012;
123 HC Deb, 7 February 2012, cols 79WS 124 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Export Control Organisation: Transparency in Export licensing Discussion paper, March 2012
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explain the key issues; and ask a number of questions about implementation.
The BIS Department said that responses to the Discussion Paper would be accepted up to 20 April 2012. 88. The BIS stated in the Discussion Paper that the ECOs published quarterly reports did not always meet the needs of readers and it therefore launched the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website in April 2009. This provided a searchable database of data from which users could create bespoke reports which can be in a variety of formats and could be downloaded and saved to users computers. The UK is recognised as having one of the most transparent export licensing systems in the world due to the level of detail and timeliness of the reports. However, the BIS identified a number of significant limitations to the information provided: i. ii. The information only covers individual licencesno information is provided for open general licences apart from the number of registrations. There is no information on the quantity and value of items licensed under Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and under Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs), since these licences are not limited by value or quantity and applicants do not have to provide this information in their licence applications. The reports only provide information on the items licensed for export, not on quantities/values actually exported. The reports provide no information on end-use or end-users for the items licensed for export or trade.
iii. iv.
BIS suggested that the simplest and most reliable method of collecting this data was to require exporters to report periodically on transactions under the licences they hold. It concluded that the key requirements of the reporting on the usage of open licences are that they must provide meaningful and timely data for publication, impose the minimum burden on exporters, and be operationally efficient for the ECO. 89. In considering making more routine licensing information available to the public the BIS was aware that it had taken measures to ensure confidentiality and commercial sensitivity. However, following a Freedom of Information ruling and after it became clear that not all information contained in licence applications is truly sensitive or confidential, the ECO considered that in many cases exporters would not object to its release. BIS will examine how to fulfil the Foreign Secretarys commitment in his 13 October 2011 Statement for enhanced transparency on routine export licensing decisions.125 BIS said that the key requirements are that the published material must improve public understanding of routine licensing decisions and not prejudice the legitimate interests of the entities concerned.126
125 HC Deb, 13 October 2011, col 42WS 126 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Transparency in Export Licensing Discussion Paper, March 2012, p 7
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90. The BIS considered that an element of independent oversight would help to increase public confidence in the Governments decision-making process on strategic export licences. It proposed that: The independent reviewer would review the operation of the ECO by examining specific cases and certifying that the processes and procedures had been properly followed (or not, as the case may be). The role would be part-time, not have statutory powers and would report to the Secretary of State. Reports of the independent reviewer would be published, either as part of the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report or laid before Parliament through a Written Ministerial Statement.127 91. The Committees conclude that the Governments commitments to introduce greater transparency into the export licensing system are welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government keeps the CAEC fully informed of the specific changes that will be made to achieve greater transparency of the export licensing system following the responses it receives to the Governments Discussion Paper on Transparency in Export Licensing.
Priority markets for UK arms exports

92. In response to a letter from the Committees Chairman,128 the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, provided the Committees, in a letter dated 8 December 2011, with a provisional list of Priority Markets for the UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation (UKTI DSO). The previous Priority List had been under review during 2011. He told the Committees that a final list would not be available before the early part of 2012, but promised to provide it to the Committees before the Oral evidence session with the Secretaries of State on 7 February 2012.129 The provisional list of Priority Markets was as follows: Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Brunei, India, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE and USA. Four of these countries, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, are included in the FCOs list of Countries of concern, in its most recent Annual Human Rights Report.130 93. Despite Vince Cables assurance that the Priority Markets final list would be provided to us before the Oral evidence session on 7 February 2012 the Secretary of States letter dated 6 February 2012 with this information was received only after the evidence session had taken place. Vince Cables letter informed us that following a review the UKTI DSO final list of priority markets was:
127 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Transparency in Export Licensing Discussion Paper, March 2012 128 Ev149 Letter from Chairman to Vince Cable dated 21 November 2011 129 EV 149 - Letter from Vince Cable, dated 8 December 2011 130 FCO Countries of Concern are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the OPTs, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe as listed in the FCOs, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 and Foreign Office gives update on human rights in countries of concern, FCO Press Notice, 16 January 2012
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Table 4: BIS UKTI DSO Priority Markets Australia Brazil Canada Europe/NATO/EU (as a collective market) Libya India Indonesia
Japan
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia South Korea
Kuwait
Malaysia
Qatar
Oman
Thailand
Turkey
UAE
USA
Source: Letter from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to the Chairman of CAEC, dated 6 February 2012, Ev 156
Two of the FCOs Countries of concern Libya and Saudi Arabiaremain within the list of UKTI DSOs Priority Markets. Algeria, Brunei, Iraq, Mexico and Pakistan were removed from the Priority Markets list following an assessment of the priorities of the UK industry.131 94. When we asked Vince Cable why countries listed amongst the FCOs Countries of concern remained in the UKTI DSOs list of Priority Markets and whether this illustrated a lack of joined-up government he replied that there was no absence of joined up government. He said that the BIS worked with the FCO in this area and that the vast majority of countries that the Government exports to are fully democratic; there is no question over human rights. He said that in countries where there are human rights issues the Government applied controls selectively.132 95. The Committees conclude that, notwithstanding the fact that the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the BIS Secretary of State on 21 November 2011 specifically requesting that the UKTI DSOs final list of Priority Markets for 2011/2012 be made available to the Committees before Ministers gave Oral evidence on 7 February 2012, the Government was remiss in failing to ensure that the final Priority Markets list reached the Committees before Ministerial Oral evidence was given. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government sets out fully the reasons why Libya and Saudi Arabia remain within the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisations Priority Markets list for 2011/2012 when both countries are also listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its latest Human Rights and Democracy Annual Report as being Countries of Concern.
131 Ev 156 - Letter from Vince Cable, dated 6 February 2012 132 Q 63
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Trade Exhibitions
96. The Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) exhibition took place in London Docklands from 1316 September 2011. The UK Working Group in its submission133 informed us that three stands at the DSEi exhibition were closed because of marketing Category A goods.134 One stand had promoted equipment that included leg cuffs, waist chains, lead chains and an enhanced transport restraint system that combined chains and cuffs. In 2007, the exhibition organisers expelled two companies, one British and the other Chinese, after they had found that the companies were promoting leg irons.135 UKWG had raised the issue of restraint equipment being promoted at British exhibitions in its submission to our predecessor Committees Inquiry in 2007.136 The current Committees were informed that at last years exhibition Caroline Lucas MP had discovered that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) and Pakistans Defence Export Promotion Organisation had both displayed promotional literature for cluster munitions.137 Similar concerns about both Pakistani weapons producers had been raised at the DSEi exhibition in 2009. UKWG had raised with us in its submission to last years inquiry that POF had advertised cluster munitions at DSEi in 2009 and were under investigation.138 UKWG said in its submission this year: It is not acceptable that such illegal products continue to [be] identified by NGO researchers, journalists and MPs and not compliance or enforcement specialists working for event organisers and the UK authorities. Yet again we are seeing evidence that enforcement of existing UK legislation and resources and capacity to monitor and police defence exhibitions are clearly not adequate.139 97. The Guardian reported that Thomas Nash, Director of Article 36 had said that: It was totally unacceptable when cluster bombs were promoted at DSEi in 2009, but it's frankly baffling that the DSEi can have made the same mistake two years later. DSEi were reported as saying that it was investigating the breaches and said that its robust and appropriate action showed its commitment to domestic and international law. Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) responded that: It is wrong that it falls to Amnesty International and other organisations to police the fair and that we have uncovered these materials after one quick cursory glance through the brochure, when they were missed by alleged vigorous scrutiny from both DSEi's compliance unit and the authorities." 140
133 Ev 52 134 Category A goods are those classified as requiring the most stringent controls (controls are exercised over all activities relating to the trade in such equipment). This category covers, inter alia, cluster munitions, equipment used in executions and torture equipment.(see Box A, page 42) 135 UK arms fair under scrutiny over cluster munitions stall, The Guardian, 18 September 2011. 136 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 200708, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC254, Ev 63 137 Ev 39 138 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Ev 53 139 Ev 52 140 UK arms fair under scrutiny over cluster munitions stall, The Guardian, 18 September 2011.
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98. In the Oral evidence session on 23 January, Oliver Sprague, when questioned whether the breaches were attributable to Government policy or administrative incompetence, said: I certainly do not think that it is Government policy to allow companies to exhibit torture equipment or cluster bombs. It is very clear from Government policy and cross-party support that these things are banned, illegal and should not be there. There is clearly a problem with the enforcement, policing and subsequent action that they are taking against transgressors, because they are doing it again, and it is not getting better.141 Roy Isbister, Saferworld, added: I can believe that it is just an administrative bungle if it is happening in the first place, but we have cases here where the law has been broken and there is documentary evidence that the law has been broken. As far as we are aware, there has never been a prosecution on the basis of this. Maybe if the Government policy got a little more active on prosecution for the next DSEi, it would make exhibitors a little more cautious about what they are willing to display.142 99. When, in the Oral evidence session on 7 February 2012, the Committees asked the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, why DESis compliance unit had not identified brochures advertising Category A material he said: If offences are being committed, it is up to the authorities to ensure that we jump on them quickly and take actions. He continued by saying that: Caroline Lucas and others had identified material that was highly offensive but that was not illegal to advertise. The Secretary of State said that: There is a lot of close observation of what happens at that exhibition. It is not run by the Government and we cannot therefore directly control what it displays.143 Tom Smith, Head of the Export Control Organisation, BIS, said: I also understand, [...]that it is not necessarily a criminal offence to display a brochure, even if it is clearly for something that we would never give an export licence to.144 Notwithstanding Mr Smiths statement, the items being advertised were Category A goods and therefore, according to the advice provided by the BIS in its document Guidance on the impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs the controls cover any act calculated to promote the movement of Category A goods with no exemption for general advertising or promotion.145 Any act calculated to arrange the supply of Category A goods from one third party to another does require a licence. The Guidance continues by stating that: Because the controls on Category A goods do not exempt general advertising or promotion, even the act of distributing brochures or marketing these products would require a licence if the goods were to be sourced from outside the UK and supplied to a third country.146
141 Q 27 [Oliver Sprague] 142 Q 27 [Roy Isbister] 143 Q 94 144 Q 95 [Tom Smith] 145 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Guidance on the impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs, April 2009, p 4.` 146 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Guidance on the impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs, April 2009, p 5
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100. Following his oral evidence on 7 February the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 13 February 2012 as follows: During my evidence session, The Committees asked about certain events at the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) Exhibition in September 2011. This exhibition is a commercial event organised by the company Clarion Events. My department issued an Open Individual Trade Control Licence to Clarion Events to cover any activities which might take place at DSEi which might fall under the heading of acts calculated to promote the supply or delivery of military goods from one overseas country to another and therefore require a licence. The terms and conditions of this licence made clear that no Category A goods which would include cluster munitions and torture equipment were to be exhibited at the exhibition. As has been the practice at past exhibitions, my Department and officials from other Government Departments worked closely with Clarion Events to assist them in ensuring that these conditions were adhered to. On 14 September 2011, it came to the attention of Clarion that the company Beechwood Equipment were displaying on their stand a brochure which included certain Category A items. Clarion closed the stand with immediate effect. On 15 September, Clarion were notified that literature promoting cluster munitions had been found in material from both the Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO) of Pakistan and also the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). Having consulted the relevant Government departments Clarion immediately closed the DEPO pavilion, which included the POF stand. Both cluster munitions and leg shackles are classified as Category A goods and are subject to control under the Export Control Order 2008. Under Article 21, it is prohibited for persons carrying out activities in the United Kingdom or United Kingdom persons anywhere in the world to ...(c) do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country. To successfully prove an offence has been committed, HMRC would need to show that the companys action will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country. Having an item listed in a catalogue may not in itself be sufficient to prove an offence has occurred. HMRC officers must make a judgement on the appropriate enforcement action to take based on the details of each case, including what action is proportionate and what is in the best interests of law enforcement. In these cases officers judged that the action taken by the organisers was proportionate and appropriate and there were not sufficient grounds to take further action. The Committees also asked whether allowing people to exhibit catalogues for equipment whose export was prohibited represented a loophole in the law. I have
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asked my officials to look into this and I will write to the Committees again with my conclusions.147 101. The Secretary of State wrote a further letter to the Chairman on 26 March as follows: In my letter to you of 13 February, which followed up on points made about Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) 2011 during my oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February, I said that I would write further on the issue of whether the fact that the display of brochures related to Category A goods was not necessarily illegal represented a loophole in the law. I have looked into the matter and would like to take this opportunity to report back to you. As things stand, I am not persuaded that the law should be changed. The Governments intention is to work through the organisers of the DSEi conference to make clear to all exhibitors, especially those who have displayed unacceptable material in the past, that we will not permit them to exhibit material relating to Category A goods. If unacceptable material is found on display, we will ensure that the exhibition stand in question is closed down. I think that this, and not criminal prosecution, is a fair and proportionate response. As I said in my previous letter, there are two issues: firstly, it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the brochure, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries; and secondly, the fact that HMRC must act in a way that is proportionate and in the best interests of law enforcement when deciding what, if any, action to take. In all the cases of this type that have come to light, HMRC have concluded that closure of the exhibitors stand by the event organiser was proportionate and that no further action was appropriate. We could legislate to widen the scope of the controls on advertising and promotion, in order to remove the link between the act of promotion and the movement of goods between overseas countries, but the additional test of whether a criminal prosecution was in the public interest would still need to be met, and I am not convinced that in practice it could be. It is important to consider the scale of the problem. DSEi attracts around 1300 exhibitors. Despite the best efforts of officials from several Departments and of the organisers in ensuring that exhibitors are aware of the relevant UK law, it is of course a matter of regret that one or two exhibitors simply do not get the message. But it must be emphasised that such infringements have been relatively limited, with only one or two incidents of this kind occurring at each event. As an alternative to regulation, I have however asked my officials in the Export Control Organisation to work even more closely, alongside colleagues in other Government departments, with the organisers of DSEi both in advance of, and during, the next DSEi event in 2013 in order to prevent such occurrences and to be even more diligent in our policing of the event.148
147 Ev 165 letter from Vince Cable dated 13 February 2012 148 Ev 180 letter from Vince Cable dated 26 March 2012
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102. The Committees conclude that the Governments supervision of the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) Exhibition in London in September 2011 to ensure strict adherence by the organising company Clarion Events of the terms and conditions of its Open Individual Trade Control Licence from the BIS was inadequate, as was the supervision by the company itself. The Committees further conclude that it is a matter of much concern that the information that certain Category A items were being promoted on the Beechwood Equipment stand and that cluster munitions were being promoted on the Defence Export Promotion Organisation of Pakistan and the Pakistan Ordnance Factories stand was discovered by visitors to the exhibition and not by either the exhibitions organisers or by the Government. The Committees recommend that the Government takes all steps necessary to ensure that no breaches of the terms and conditions of the BIS licence to the organisers of the next DSEi event in 2013 occur. The Committees further recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states: a) whether or not it considers the law in this area is satisfactory with particular reference to Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008, and; b) whether there is any mismatch in the Governments interpretation of the relevant law between that set out in the BIS Guidance on the Impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs and that set out by the Secretary of State, Vince Cable, in his letters to the Committees of 13 February and 26 March 2012.
Enforcement
103. Our predecessor Committees recommended that information on the number of seizures by HM Revenue and Customs and the trend and type of misuses of Open Licenses should be published in the Governments Annual Reports on United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls.149 In its Annual Report 2010 the Government has again provided the information we requested. The statistics provided show that the number of companies and sites holding Open Licences has continued to grow, from c.1600 in 2008 to c.1900 in 2010. A total of 273 misuses of Open Individual and Open General Licences were identified in 2010, slightly down from 290 in 2009. The number of unlicensed shipments more than halved from 55 in 2009 to 27 in 2010. 46 warning letters were issued informing Company Directors of the errors which had been found during visits. On two occasions companies had shown little or no improvement when they had been revisited and some of the OGELs the companies were using were suspended for a period of three months. Following improvements in their procedures the licences for these companies were re-instated following the suspensions. The number of HMRC seizures continued to grow, from 50 in 200809, to 115 in 200910 and 134 in 201011. There were nine successful prosecutions on export control and trafficking and brokering offences in 201011, and two cases of Conditional Discharge.150
149 CAEC, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008), Session 200708, HC 254, paras 50 and 57; Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010), Session 2009-10, HC 202, para 92. 150 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, pp 710
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104. Following the Governments publication of its Annual Report 2010 on UK Strategic Export Controls, the Committees put 3 questions on enforcement to the Government. The Committees 3 questions, with the Governments answers were as follows: a) Committee question: The ratio of errors found during compliance is relatively high. What steps are being taken to reduce the instances of compliance misuse? Government answer: The majority of compliance visits are first visits. The error rate on these visits is likely to be higher when a company is in its first year of using open licences. Although the number of misuses identified in each year appears high, occurring in around one third of all audits, it must be remembered that this includes all types of misuse including minor administrative errors such as failing to reference the licence on commercial documentation. The numbers of more serious errors, such as an unlicensed shipment (i.e. a shipment of items that was not permitted by the particular open general licence that was used), are much lower and have actually gone down by over 50% compared to 2009. We take all cases of misuse seriously. Persistent misuse of Open Licences was the principal reason we introduced the Warning Letter and suspension procedure. This appears to have had the desired effect because, as noted above, the proportion of serious errors has fallen. Following an audit, exporters are always informed of the findings and of any remedial action required. In the majority of cases when the company is re-audited the errors have been corrected. This illustrates very well the effectiveness of the compliance audit process and the overall robustness of open licences. We also encourage attendance at ECOs training and awareness seminars, and are able to provide company-specific on-site training. More generally we are looking at ways to improve the usability of OGELs in order to reduce the number of errors that occur through simple misunderstanding. b) Committee question: In how many of the 134 cases of seizure in 2010 of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements were prosecutions for strategic export offences initiated? Government answer: No prosecutions have yet been initiated involving seizures of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods subject to sanctions where the goods were seized during the financial year 20102011. However, this is not unusual, as cases require a thorough criminal investigation before they are referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. It then takes time to bring a case to a conclusion through the criminal justice system. The Governments policy is not to prosecute every offence, and each case is considered on an individual basis. The majority of cases where goods are seized at the border are of a less serious nature and are dealt with by way of a written warning and, where appropriate, a restoration penalty.
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However in more serious cases, criminal investigations leading to prosecution are initiated as a result of a seizure at the border. For example, two recent prosecutions involved cases where unlicensed goods had been seized at the UK border (F14 fighter jet parts destined for Iran and telescopic sights for sniper rifles, also destined for Iran). c) Committee question: Why were only 5 prosecutions successful? Government answer: A total of five criminal prosecutions were concluded during the financial year 20102011, and they all resulted in guilty verdicts. Four of the cases resulted in custodial sentences and one resulted in a suspended sentence. The cases involved a range of military, paramilitary and dual-use goods. There were no unsuccessful prosecutions. We expect that further prosecutions will be concluded during the current financial year. This is not an area where we ordinarily expect to see large numbers of prosecutions in any given year. The Governments policy is not to prosecute every offence, and the way we deal with a case needs to be proportionate to the offence. Since April 2010, HM Revenue and Customs has made greater use of its ability to offer compound settlements in lieu of prosecution for breaches of export licensing controls and trade controls. Fourteen compound penalties have been paid since April 2010, including one for unlicensed goods detected at the border. The compound penalties issued in these cases have ranged from 1,000 up to 239,000. An offer of a compound penalty is only made when the circumstances of the case justify an offer. HM Revenue and Customs, the UK Border Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service maintain an active intelligence-led enforcement effort targeted against the most serious proliferation threats including deliberate non-compliant businesses and individuals. HMRC also works with BIS to deliver a joint compliance and education programme that aims to prevent breaches of the controls by providing advice and guidance to exporters and improving their awareness of their legal obligations. This reduces the risk of breaches and helps to facilitate legitimate trade.151 105. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Annual Strategic Export Controls Report provides the same information on compliance for holders of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) as it already provides in its Annual Report for holders of Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs). The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report: a) in how many of the 134 cases of the Governments seizures in 201011 of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods subject to sanctions because of breaches of licence requirements have the cases been referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, and in how many of these cases have prosecutions been initiated; and
151 Annex 11 letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A
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b) what it considers to be the main points of difficulty the Government has, including under present legislation, in achieving compliance with, and enforcement of, its arms export controls.
Compound penalties
106. The BIS website describes compounding as the means by which HMRC can offer the exporter the chance to settle a case which would justify being referred to the CPS for prosecution, therefore saving the taxpayer and company time and legal fees. Compounding should not be viewed as a light option as there is no maximum compound penalty limit. The largest fine currently awarded for an export control related offence was for 575,000 in 2009.152 107. Compound penalties are now a significant element in the Governments enforcement of its arms export controls. 108. In its 2011 Report (HC686) the Committees concluded and recommended as follow: We conclude that it is too early to assess fully the effectiveness of the compound penalty regime since it has been in operation for barely one year. However, we further conclude that even at this early stage the penalty system seems to lack clarity and therefore fairness. We recommend that the Government considers the industry's concerns and makes public the criteria used for imposing compound penalties and how the amounts of such penalties are calculated.153 The Government in its Response (Cm 8079) replied: The Government notes the concerns raised by industry representatives and the Committees on the clarity of the compound penalty system. We will engage with the industry in order to further understand their concerns and to explore how best to address these.154 109. The Committees in their 2011 Report (HC686) also made a further recommendation as follows: We also recommend that as compound penalties are applied to cases which would justify being referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for consideration for prosecution, the Government holds open the possibility of making public the names of companies and individuals who have breached arms exports controls sufficiently seriously to attract compound penalties.155
152 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Compound Penalty Cases, http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/exportcontrol-organisation/eco-press-prosecutions/compound-penalties 153 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 86 154 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 13 155 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 87
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The Government in its Response (Cm 8079) replied: The Governments policy is not to make public details of companies and individuals subject to compound penalties as a matter of course. The circumstances in which HM Revenue and Customs will publish the names of persons who have agreed to pay compound penalties was set out in Hansard on 26 April 1989 (column 560) in a written answer by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Mr Peter Lilley. Where HMRC includes a publicity clause in a compounding agreement, the relevant information will be published accordingly.156 110. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011 the Chairman of the Committees put the following further question to the Foreign Secretary: The Governments Response fails to answer the Committees recommendation that the Government makes public its criteria used for imposing compound penalties and how the amounts of such penalties are calculated. Will it now do so?157 The Foreign Secretary in his reply of 30 September 2011 responded as follows: Section 152 of the Customs and Management Act 1979 allows the Commissioners to compound any proceedings under the customs and excise Acts. In effect this allows the Commissioners to enter into an agreement with an offender to settle the matter out of court as an alternative to initiating legal proceedings. An offer to compound proceedings is only made in cases where there is sufficient evidence that would support criminal proceedings with a reasonable prospect of success. When considering whether to offer a compound penalty, HMRC takes account of all factors including the seriousness of the offence and the best interests of law enforcement. For instance HMRC would be more likely to offer a compound settlement if the court was likely to impose a small or nominal penalty or the offence resulted from a genuine mistake or misunderstanding. However, a compound settlement would not normally be offered in case involving: assaults on, or obstruction of, officers; persistent offenders an offender who is subject to a suspended prison sentence or is on parole for a comparable offence; other related offences which are being considered by Customs, Police or other government departments.
HMRC cannot impose a compound penalty and the exporter is under no obligation to accept an offer. If an exporter does not believe that he should pay a compound
156 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp 1314 157 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman dated 18 July 2011
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penalty, or he does not agree that the amount of the penalty is fair or proportionate to the offence, then he can have his case heard in a magistrates court. Calculation of the offer to compound HMRC officers consider all relevant factors in each individual case when calculating the sum to be offered as a compound settlement. Although not exhaustive, the following factors are taken into account: the seriousness of the alleged offence; whether fraudulent intent can be proven; the extent of the offenders efforts to perpetrate the alleged offence; the type and value of any goods involved; the offenders previous history; and the level of penalties known to have been imposed by courts for similar offences.
No compound penalty can exceed the maximum monetary penalty laid down in law for the offence in question.158 111. The Chairman of the Committees put a second question on compound penalties to the Foreign Secretary in his letter of 18 July 2011 as follows: In how many cases to date involving breaches of arms export controls has a publicity clause been included in a compounding agreement?159 The Foreign Secretary in his reply of 30 September 2011 responded as follows: All compounding agreements for arms export controls have a standard publicity clause which sets out HMRCs policy on confidentiality and disclosure in such cases. HMRCs policy is generally not to publicise the names of individuals or companies accepting compound settlements. However, we reserve the right to publicise details where there is an over-riding public interest. This is a longstanding Government policy, the details of which are set out in Hansard in a written statement by the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Mr Peter Lilley on 26 April 1989 (Column 560). The text of this statement is reproduced below. Mr. Quentin Davies : To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on the circumstances in which the commissioners of Customs and Excise will disclose particulars of cases where proceedings for offences are compounded under section 152 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Mr. Lilley : Section 152 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 is the most recent re-enactment of the commissioners' long-standing power to compound proceedings, that is to offer an alleged offender the option of paying a penalty out of
158 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary 30 September 2011, Annex A 159 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman dated 18 July 2011, Annex A
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court rather than be prosecuted. This power is used to resolve the majority of customs or excise offences, and enables them to be dealt with efficiently and effectively without burdening the courts or tying up Customs staff in lengthy court hearings. Hitherto, details of compounded settlements have not usually been made public. The commissioners, having reviewed their policy on disclosure of compounded settlements, have decided that in respect of settlements made on or after 1 June 1989, details will be disclosed in the following circumstances : It will be the Commissioners' invariable practice to disclose details (a) to other Government Departments whose statutory responsibilities are directly affected ; and (b) to the courts for sentencing purposes after conviction, in cases where there has been an earlier compounded settlement for a similar matter within the time limits specified for offences by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The commissioners will also disclose compounded settlements under two other circumstances (c) to employers when it is apparent that (i) the nature of the employment has facilitated the offence ; or (ii) where drugs offences or indications of serious alcohol abuse are involved, the nature of the employment or duties requires a high degree of unimpaired judgement or faculties. (d) in response to enquiries from Parliament or the media about cases which have excited public attention, if disclosure is considered to be in the public interest. In all cases, persons considering an offer to compound for an alleged offence will be warned when the offer is made that details of the settlement may be disclosed in the circumstances set out at (a) to (d) above. The commissioners have considered the recommendation of Lord Keith of Kinkel's committee on the "Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments" (Cmnd. 9440), that the names of all persons making compounded settlements and particulars of the settlements should be published, subject to discretion to withhold the names of persons making full spontaneous voluntary disclosure of their offences. The policy now to be adopted reflects the commissioners' conclusion that, other than in the particular circumstances already described, it would not be equitable or make the best use of their resources or those of the courts to depart from the present general principle of non-disclosure. The commissioners' general policy of non- disclosure of details of their dealings in individual cases will therefore continue to apply to cases which do not come within the circumstances described above. I am satisfied with this outcome of the commissioners' review.160
160 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary 30 September 2011, Annex A
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112. The Committees recommend that now the present compound penalty regime in relation to arms exports has been in operation for two years, the Government in its Response to this Report provides an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses as shown to date, and details the improvements it wishes to implement.
Crown Dependencies
113. The Crown Dependencies are the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Isle of Man. The Bailiwick of Guernsey includes the separate jurisdictions of Alderney and Sark and is responsible for the administration of the islands of Herm, Jethou and Lihou. The island of Brecqhou is part of Sark.161 Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man are not part of the UK but are self-governing Dependencies of the Crown. This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, administrative, fiscal and legal systems and their own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament and UK legislation does not extend to them. 162 114. In December 2011 the MS Thor Liberty, a cargo ship registered in the Isle of Man with an Ukrainian crew, was detained in the Finnish port of Kotka. It had sailed from the North German port of Emden two days previously and was bound for China. Finnish officials found 160 tonnes of explosives (picric acid) and 69 Patriot surface-to-air missiles on board the vessel. The explosives and missiles were seized by Finnish authorities until it was determined that the missiles were an official shipment from Germany to South Korea and that the explosives were a legitimate shipment for China. However, Finnish police said the missiles lacked proper transit documents and the explosives were not safely stored. The Finnish military destroyed some of the explosives, while the rest was re-packed in more secure storage. The ship was cleared to leave Finland after a few days; however, the ships captain and first mate were detained by Finnish authorities.163 115. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 17 January 2012 as follows: I am writing in respect of the attached report in The Independent of 22 December 2011 and of all related information held by the Government. The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) would be grateful for your answers to the following questions before William Hague and you give Oral Evidence to CAEC on February 7. 1. On what date was the Thor Liberty registered as a British-flagged ship, was the company that made the registration a UK registered company, and, if so, on what date did this company last file its Annual Report at Companies House and in respect of which financial year?
161 The Department for Constitutional Affairs, Background briefing on the Crown Dependencies: Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, June 2006, p 2 162 The Department for Constitutional Affairs, Background briefing on the Crown Dependencies: Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, June 2006, p 2 163 See: Boat laden with surface-to-air missiles stopped in Finland on its way to China, The Guardian, 21 December 2011; Seized Patriot missiles are legal shipment, Germany says, CNN Online, 22 December 2011; andShip held after missiles discovery cleared to travel again, The Guardian, 26 December 2011
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2. Would the explosives and the surface-to-air missiles found on board the Thor Liberty in Finland when the ship was on its way to Shanghai constitute a breach of the EU arms embargo on China if exported from the UK? 3. Do the explosives and the surface-to-air missiles found on board the Thor Liberty in Finland when the ship was on its way to Shanghai fall within or outside the ambit of the current UK legislation on extra-territoriality relating to arms exports? 4. Does the Government consider in relation to this matter that any UK person(s) may have committed a breach of UK arms export controls legislation that may be indictable under the provisions of current UK legislation on extra-territoriality? 5. What discussions have taken place between the UK Government , the British police and the Crown Prosecution Service on this matter? CAEC will of course be glad to receive any additional information that the Government wishes to provide in its response to this letter. I am writing in the same terms to William Hague and am also copying this letter to the Director of Public Prosecutions for any comments he may wish to make to CAEC.164 116. The Secretary of State replied on 2 February 2012 as follows: Thank you for your letter of 17 January regarding a report in The Independent newspaper of 22 December 2011. The report alleged that a British-flagged merchant vessel the Thor Liberty had been impounded in Finland because it was suspected of carrying a cargo of explosives and surface-to-air missiles to China in breach of Finnish export control law and, as you suggest in your letter, in breach of the EU arms embargo on China. You also ask whether there has been a breach of UK trade controls. I am pleased to be able to set the record straight on this story. The Thor Liberty is registered in the Isle of Man but it is owned and operated by a Danish company, Thorco Shipping A/S. This company does not have an office in the UK and is not registered at Companies House. According to other media reports the ships captain and crew are Ukrainian. I have seen no reports suggesting that any UK person as defined in the Export Control Act 2002 was involved in any way in the transfer or supply of these goods. It follows that there can have been no breach of UK trade controls. Turning now to the vessels cargo, the 160 tonnes of explosives comprised a consignment of a substance called picric acid. While this is indeed used as an explosive it is not listed in any UK or EU strategic export control list. A licence is therefore not required under strategic export control legislation for the export of picric acid from the UK or the EU to any destination, and export of this substance to China would not be a breach of the EU arms embargo on China.
164 Ev 154 - Letter from the Chairman of CAEC to Vince Cable, dated 17 January 2012
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Surface-to-air missiles do of course require an export licence. However the 69 Patriot missiles were actually being exported from Germany to South Korea. The German government has stated that these missiles were the final consignment under a longstanding agreement between the two countries and while all necessary export licences had been obtained before the goods left Germany it seems that there was no transit licence in place to allow transit of the goods through Finland. The Finnish Government has confirmed that a transit licence has now been issued so that the missiles may be delivered to South Korea. I trust that this is sufficient to reassure you that there has been no breach of UK trade controls and no breach of the EU arms embargo on China. 165 117. The Committees conclude that the MS Thor Liberty incident revealed how ships registered in the Crown Dependencies could provide a means whereby shipments of arms could occur that would be in breach of UK Strategic Export Controls if carried out by a vessel registered in the UK. The Committees recommend the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it will give consideration to bringing the Crown Dependencies within the ambit of UK Strategic Exports Control legislation.
Combating bribery and corruption

118. In their 2011 Report (HC686) the Committees concluded and recommended as follows: We conclude that the Government has failed to demonstrate satisfactorily whether, and if so how, it assesses the risk that individual arms exports may be linked to bribery and corruption during the licence approval process. We recommend that the Government sets out fully in its response to this Report whether such an assessment is made for all arms export licence applications, and if so how.166 The Governments Response in Cm 8079 was as follows: The focus of the Governments scrutiny relating to bribery and corruption in the licensing process is the risk that goods might be diverted from their intended use. Criterion 7 requires consideration of The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. Corrupt contract awards and corrupt processes further down the chain can increase the risk of diversion and where there is credible evidence of such risks emerging, licence applications will be refused.
165 Ev 156 Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of CAEC, dated 2 February 2012 166 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 115
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Where the Government becomes aware of corruption in arms deals, it will take the appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010, which entered force on 1 July 2011.167 119. The Committees were concerned that the Governments Response appeared to be unduly limited in scope with the Government focusing its scrutiny of bribery and corruption predominately on arms exports which might be diverted or re-exported, notwithstanding the fact that bribery and corruption may occur in many other circumstances. The Chairman, therefore, wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 July 2011 putting the following question to the Government: Will the Government confirm that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export under Criteria 7, take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010?168 In his letter of 30 September 2011 the Foreign Secretary replied: Yes. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has lead responsibility for investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery. They decide whether or not to pursue an investigation, in collaboration with the City of London Polices Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit. The Government, civil servants and the public should report allegations of bribery and corruption by companies or individuals directly to the SFO (e-mail: OverseasCorruption@sfo.gsi.gov.uk). They are also able to discuss issues informally http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--corruption/the-sfod-response/where-should-ireport-corruption.aspx.169 120. The Committees conclude that the Governments unqualified confirmation that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export under Criteria 7, is welcome. 121. In their 2011 Report (HC686) the Committees also recommended as follows: We further recommend that, given that Criterion 8 applies only to developing countries and that bribery and corruption are not confined to such countries, the Government gives full consideration to proposing the insertion of an additional Criterion into the EU Common Position on arms exports obliging Member States to assess the risk of bribery and corruption before approving an arms export licence to any country.170 The Governments Response in Cm 8079 was as follows:
167 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 15 168 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011, Annex A 169 Ev 67 Letter from Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A, p 11 170 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 116
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As the Minister for Business made clear during the evidence session on 24 January 2011, the Government does not support the Committees recommendation. It would not be appropriate to base an assessment merely on the perception of corruption in the destination country. In order to refuse a licence under a corruption criterion, we would need to have firm evidence that the contract had been obtained by corruption and it is not feasible for the Government to investigate the circumstances of every contract. The Government therefore intends to maintain its focus on assessing the risks presented by the end-use or potential end-use of the goods, and the risks of diversion to undesirable end-use or end-users The new Bribery Act modernises the law on bribery and gives the UK some of the toughest anti-corruption laws in the world, Where there is evidence of bribery and corruption, the Government will address it through the provisions of the Act. We will also continue to support wider initiatives such as the defence industrys Common Industry Standards and Global Principle of Ethics.171 122. The Committees conclude that an examination of the EUs Common Position on arms exports, the text of which is set out fully in Annex 4 of this Report, shows that there are numerous grounds in the Common Position on which Member States should refuse an arms export licence based on the perception of the destination country, for example where the arms might be used to facilitate internal repression, where there have been serious violations of human rights, or where sustainable development would be seriously hampered. The Committees, therefore, do not accept the Governments view that: It would not be appropriate to base an assessment [of an arms export licence application] merely on the perception of corruption in the destination country. The Committees continue to recommend that the Government gives full consideration to proposing the insertion of an additional Criterion into the EU Common Position on arms exports obliging Member States to assess the risk of bribery and corruption before approving an arms export licence to any country.
International Development
123. Criterion 8 of The Consolidated Criteria, detailed in full in Annex 3, reads: CRITERION EIGHT The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources. The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the
171 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 16
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proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme. 124. In the Committees 2011 Report (HC 686) we recommended that the Government should provide us with a full statement of the methodology it uses in relation to Criterion 8 in deciding whether or not a specific arms export licence should be approved.172 The Governments Response was: The methodology that the Government uses in relation to Criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria was published as Annex C (page 71) of the United Kingdom Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2007 published in July 2008 and available on the FCO website.173 Annex C can be found on pages 7174 of the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007 on the FCO website at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/4103709/2007-ar-uk-strat-exp-conts 125. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether the methodology it uses in relation to Criterion 8 has been changed from that at Annex C of the United Kingdom Strategic Exports Controls Annual Report 2007, and, if so, to provide the Committees with the complete text of the changed methodology. 126. The Committees put 3 questions to the Government regarding the role of the Department for International Development following its consideration of the Governments United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010. The 3 questions and the Governments answers to them in the letter of 7 January 2012 sent by the Foreign Secretary to the Committees Chairman were as follows: Committees question: 1) Which strategic export licence applications, and for what goods and to which countries, were referred to DFID in 2010 for that Departments specific expertise and advice? Of those applications, which were granted and which were refused, and which were granted contrary to the advice of DFID? Government answer: DFID received 266 applications to review in 2010. Please see Annex 1 [Annex 1 can be viewed at Annex 11 to this Report] for a breakdown of the countries, goods and final licensing decision made for each of these applications. DFID reviews all licences for exports to World Bank International Development
172 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 107 173 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 15
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Assistance eligible countries. Although the attached spreadsheet highlights multiple destinations for OIELs and OITCLs, DFID comments only on those that fall within this criterion. This is made clearer in the final column. Of the applications seen by DFID, broken down by country, 178 were issued, 196 issued with proviso, 25 rejected, 14 refused and 83 stopped, withdrawn or remain outstanding. There were no instances of a licence being granted despite DFID recommending it be declined. 174 Committees question: 2) Which of the arms export licence applications to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1 of Cm 8079, were referred to DFID for that Departments specific expertise and advice, and what was DFIDs advice in each case? Government answer: None of the revoked licences listed in Annex 1 of report Cm 8079 were circulated to DFID.175 Committees question: 3) Why is the Department for International Development only consulted when assessing an arms export licence application against Criteria 8, and not when assessments are made against Criteria 2, 3 and 4? Government answer: The FCO, MOD and DFID act in a policy advisory capacity and provides the ECO with advice and analysis on the foreign, defence and international development policy aspects relevant to consideration of export licence applications against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As stated in Section 1 of the Governments Annual Report, DFID provide specific expertise and advice in considering applications to those developing countries eligible for concessional loans from the World Banks International Development Association (IDA) eligible countries against Criterion 8 and specifically, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the recipient countrys economy, and whether the export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The FCO is the advisory department on Criteria 2,3 and 4. The Department for International Development is currently considering its role in the UKs arms export control system, including the most appropriate criteria on which to be consulted.176 127. The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report the outcome of the Department for International Developments consideration of its role in the UKs arms export control system, including which are the most appropriate Criteria in the Consolidated Criteria on which it considers it should be consulted.
174 Annex 11 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A and Annex 1 175 Annex 11 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A and Annex 1 176 Annex 11 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A
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7 International arms control and cooperation

UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty
128. The Treaty on UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation aims to streamline defence export procedures between the two countries. The Treaty sets out a framework for arms trade and technology transfer between the UK and the US. The Governments Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Treaty states: The Treaty only covers defence articles listed on the United States Munitions List. It does not cover the export or transfer of defence articles for use by other nations, nor certain highly-sensitive technologies that will be specified in the implementing arrangements.177 Under the Treaty exports from the US to the UK will emulate the current practice for authorising UK defence exports to the US, that is, the majority will be undertaken through open, as opposed to individual, licensing arrangements. The existing export control system for the UK will remain in force together with the Treaty, and UK arms exports to the US under the Treaty will still need to meet the Governments export control criteria.178 129. The Treaty was initially signed in 2007 by the then-Prime Minister Tony Blair and then-US President George W Bush, and was ratified by the US Senate and House of Representatives on 29 September 2010, after a three-year delay by the United States. The Treaty was ratified by the UK in early 2008. 130. The Committees in their 2011 Report (HC686) recommended as follows: We recommend the Government sets out in its response to the Report what specific steps it is taking to ensure that UK exporters take full advantage of the potential benefits of the Treaty on US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation. We further recommend that the Government sets out the respective roles and responsibilities of the British Embassy in Washington and the British Consulate-General in New York in obtaining the maximum benefit for UK industry from the Treaty.179 The Government in its Response replied: The Government recognises that the Treaty, by strengthening the US and UK defence acquisition relationship and seeking to make defence and security trade between our countries simpler, has the potential to benefit both our Armed Forces and UK industry. The primary purpose of the Treaty is to improve the delivery of military capability to our Armed Forces by simplifying export licensing
177 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Explanatory Memorandum on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, September 2007, para 5 178 Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 200708, UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, HC 107, para48 179 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 23
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arrangements for eligible categories of equipment and information when these are destined for the end-use of either Government. As a consequence, the Treaty, once brought into force, should not only benefit UK companies exporting items to meet US Government requirements but, more importantly, UK firms undertaking work on behalf of Her Majestys Government, directly or as sub-contractors to US companies, where this requires the access to US sourced equipment and information. The UK Government, in close consultation with the US Administration and with UK industry through the Aerospace Defence Security (ADS) trade association, are currently working on the detailed implementation activities which need to be completed successfully before the Treaty can be brought into force which is planned in 2012. These include developing the detailed administrative processes and guidance, including those required to apply for membership of the Treaty Approved Community, assessing the application of the Treaty to joint US-UK programmes and UK projects and testing to ensure that the new arrangements are working effectively and to enable us to consider how and where the Treaty can best be applied to bring most value and benefit. It is essential that we ensure that the Treaty arrangements are operating effectively before the Treaty comes into force and we, and the US, plan to test all elements of the Treatys operation, including exports to the US, by using a number of pathfinder projects. These will be existing acquisition projects selected by UK and US Governments in consultation with our industries. We are negotiating the selection of individual projects with the US before formally approaching industry and plan for the first pathfinder trials to begin in the summer. The implementation activity includes those areas that are required to enable UK exports to be made to the US under the Treaty. Amongst these are the development of a Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for use by UK members of the Approved Community, reviewing how UK company facilities can join the UK Approved Community when such a facility is solely conducting work on behalf of the US Government and working with the US to understand the changes they are making to US procurement regulations that are required to enable UK companies to bid for, and secure, US contracts under the Treaty. In addition, we will also be participating in outreach activities with industry including workshops and other events. Officials recently spoke at an Aerospace Defence Security (ADS) trade association seminar in May. As stated above, the primary purpose of the Treaty is to improve the delivery of military capability to our Armed Forces. The British Embassy is supporting the UK through their relationships with the US Government (including State Department and Department of Defense). The Embassy is seeking to ensure, through these relationships, that the implementation of the Treaty simplifies export licensing arrangements for eligible categories of equipment and information. The DirectorGeneral of UKTI in the USA (within the British Consulate-General in New York) and the British Embassy in Washington are both seeking to further HMGs Prosperity Agenda. This is being taken forward by ensuring that UK industry has a level playing field to access US Government business and working to increase UK industry market access to the USA.
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We will provide a further note on the Treaty to the Select Committees as implementation progresses.180 131. The Chairman of the Committees in his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011181 put 2 further questions to the Government on behalf of the Committees to which the Foreign Secretary responded in his reply of 30 September 2011. The 2 questions and the Governments answers were as follows: Committees question: Will the Government provide the CAEC with the list of pathfinder projects to implement the Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation when agreed between the UK and US Governments? Government answer: Pathfinder projects will be used to test the efficacy and appropriateness of the full range of national processes, practice, guidance and training, which have been developed in consultation with the US, and to test the application and utility of the Treaty ahead of full implementation. There are seven jointly agreed Pathfinder projects; five nominated by the UK and two by the US. The UK Pathfinder projects are: Chinnok, Apache, RivetJoint (UK Air Seeker) and Bowman, with one Pathfinder nomination from Industry (a sale to the US Navy by Aish Technologies Ltd) to test the bilateral nature of the Treaty by exporting equipment from the UK to the US. The US Pathfinder projects are: F22 Raptor engines and V22 Osprey Tiltrotor. In addition, the clearance process required to enable facilities operated by the UK non-governmental entities to join the Approved Community will also be tested. Aish Technologies Ltd, Rolls Royce Ltd and Wiltshire Ballistics will provide Pathfinder facilities for the Approved Community process. Industrial participation in the Pathfinder process is key to ensuring that the UK MOD and US DoD industrial partners are similarly prepared for Treaty implementation. The UK MOD Implementation Team have worked with the Aerospace Defence Security Trade Association to ensure that Government plans for Treaty implementation are understood and that industrys views are taken into account. Committees question: By what date does the Government expect to provide the CAEC with its further note on the implementation of the Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence? Government answer: The Pathfinders were formally notified to the Defence Suppliers Forum ahead of the 1 September start date for the testing period and were discussed at the National Defence Industrial Associations annual Quadrilateral (UK, Canada, US and Australia) conference on 12 September 2011. Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials will conclude by November 2011, which will enable the UK and US Governments to determine whether the Treatys processes are robust
180 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp 56 181 Ev 63 Letter to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011.
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and effective. Upon completion of the Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials we will provide a further note to the Committee.182 132. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) states when it will be providing the further note to the Committees as to whether the Treaty processes are robust and effective following completion of the Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials; and b) sets out the latest position on the Governments development of a Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for use by UK members of the Approved Community. 133. In Oral evidence on 23 January 2012, the Committees asked EGAD about the effectiveness of the Treaty. Brinley Salzman (EGAD) said that: UK industrys viewpoint and US industrys viewpoint are both very critical of what has come out of it. We think that the treaty itself is a fantastic document. The problem is the implementation arrangements under the treaty, which underscore it and, to a major extent, undermine the treaty and the potential benefits that could have come out of it.183 In Oral evidence on 7 February 2012, the Committees asked the BIS Secretary of State about both UK and US industry concerns with how the Treaty would work in practice and the dissatisfaction on both sides about how the Treaty would be implemented. Vince Cable replied that the Government regarded the agreement as positive for the UK. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was holding a series of seminars with British companies to ensure that they understood the significance of the Treaty and how it would operate for the companies. Tom Smith (Head of the Export Control Organisation, BIS) said that the MoD was running a series of Pathfinder Projects to help UK companies. He pointed out that the specialist arrangements in the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty suited some companies more than others. Mr Smith went on to say that the Government was working closely with the US Government on President Obamas broader export control reforms. These reforms would involve moving some products out of the scope of international trade in arms regulations into the US Department of Commerce scrutiny. He stated that the combination of these measures would lead to a better working relationship between the UK and US systems.184 134. On 21 July 2011, the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary following correspondence received from Caroline Lucas MP. In his letter the Chairman said: I trust you will be able to assure me unequivocally that the US/UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty will not result in any reduction in the current disclosure both on the BIS and FCO websites and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls relating to exports of controlled goods from the UK to the US.185
182 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A 183 Q 52 184 Q 89 185 Ev 65 Letter from Chairman to Foreign Secretary dated 21 July 2011
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The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, replied to the Chairman on 5 August 2011 as follows: I can assure you that the Treaty will not lead to any changes in the level of disclosures about exports of controlled goods from the UK to the US on departmental websites or our regular information exchanges with the Committees on Arms Export Controls. Exports from the UK to the US under the Treaty will continue to be licensed and, as now, it is expected most such exports will be under Open General Export Licence (OGEL). The fact that we have committed to a Treaty-specific OGEL should only have minimal impact in this respect. The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills will of course continue to report on individual licences granted and to provide general information on OGELs in the same way and to the same extent that they do now, regardless of whether the exports or transfers are under the Treaty or not. In response to the points raised by Caroline Lucas, the Government will continue to provide information to the Chair of the Committees on Arms Export Controls in a transparent and timely manner, allowing then to continue their vital role examining the UKs strategic export controls.186 135. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to the US, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.
UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty

136. The Governments Explanatory Memorandum to the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty, which was signed by the Prime Minister and the then French President on 2 November 2010, states that the Treaty: provides an over-arching framework for defence and security consultation and cooperation, including for the long-term strengthening of operational co-operation between UK and French Armed Forces, sharing and pooling of material and equipment, building joint facilities, ensuring mutual access to each others defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation. The Explanatory Memorandum explains that the Treaty provides a legal framework for delivering the commitments made in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review for the UK to create stronger strategic defence relationships with our main allies whose security interests and military capabilities are closest to our own.187 137. Article 8 of the Treaty, relating to Transfer, Access to the Market and Export Licensing states:
186 Ev 66 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 5 August 2011 187 FCO, Explanatory Memorandum on the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty, page 1
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1. In implementing laws, regulations and any stated policies on the export of armament materials and technology, the Parties undertake to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the transfer of defence and security equipment and services between the Parties, consistent with their national licensing procedures. 2. Each Party undertakes not to hinder legitimate access to its markets and to its Government contracts in the field of defence and security. 3. The Parties agree to facilitate and promote the export of defence and security equipment jointly produced by French and United Kingdom entities to third parties, by agreement and within the framework of their respective national legislation. 4. The rights and obligations set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 above shall be subject to the European Union and other international rights and obligations of the Parties, and shall accordingly be given effect in a manner consistent with such rights and obligations.188 138. EGADs submission said that discussions had been held to determine how defence trade and co-operation could be further expanded upon. The discussions were continuing within the context of the EUs own proposals to make intra-community transfers of defence and security goods less bureaucratically-burdensome. It said that it fully support[ed] these efforts to reduce bureaucracy with France and other bi-lateral countries who are deemed not to be destinations of concern and also to have in place effective national export control systems and procedures to prevent potential diversion to undesirable third parties elsewhere.189 When we asked EGAD about how the discussions were progressing, Brinley Salzman told us that there had been a number of meetings and video conference calls between British and French parties to flesh out the implementation plans for the Treaty. A small gathering of experts from both sides had taken place in Paris on 17 October 2011 to look at the issues. EGAD had briefed the French on UK export controls and how they worked, and the French had briefed EGAD on French export controls and how those worked. Working Groups had then been formed to examine various aspects of what had been discussed. Proposals for possible changes to the practices of both sides had emanated from these workshops. It was planned that a further meeting would take place in London in April 2012 to discuss pursuing potential easing of the bureaucratic situation with regard to Anglo-French defence trade.190 139. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out in what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to France, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.
188 FCO, Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French republic for defence and Security Co-operation. Cm 7976, pages 7-8 189 Ev 42 190 Q 55
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The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU

140. In 2009 the Commission of the European Union adopted Directive 2009/43/EC. The Directives aims are to simplifying the terms and conditions of intra-Community transfers of defence-related products. The Directive promises to facilitate significantly certain types of intra-Community transfers of products listed in the Common Military List of the European Union. The arms trade within the EU is currently subject to 27 national licensing regimes, which diverge widely. Member States have acknowledged that these disparities may impede the movement of defence-related products and distort competition within the internal market. The ICT Directive requires Member States to facilitate intra-Community transfers of items listed in the Common Military List of the European Union by introducing systems of general and global licences. Member States may even exempt entirely certain intra-Community transfers from the licence requirement.191 The Directive is due to come into force in all EU countries in June 2012. 141. EGAD is disappointed at the slow progress that has been made towards the adoption of the new intra-Community transfer arrangements. It remains convinced that progress could have been faster. It pointed out the considerable potential benefits that the ICT presents in significantly reduced nugatory bureaucracy for companies across the EU. It believes adoption of the Directive will speed up the European supply chains for UK companies.192 Brinley Salzman said EGAD was very concerned. He told us that: We should have been in the forefront of trying to implement the intra-Community directive as speedily as possible, but then, I believe, the Export Control Organisation identified the fact that they hit a few potholes on route, so we are not actually in the forefront. We are still up with the leading group, but we are not in the forefront of introducing these new controls. He informed us that the ICT Directive was due to be implemented on 30 June 2012. He was hopeful that the UK would be able to catch up with the other countries and that the UK would be in the forefront of implementing the directive on time. Some of the proposals had caused problems to the industry, especially with regard to technical assistance. He concluded: There is going to be a measure of control over technical assistance in the military sector, which of course, under UK national regulations, we do not have at the moment, for the most part.193 142. When the Committees asked, at the Oral Evidence session with the BIS Secretary of State, whether the Government was disappointed with the rate of implementation of the EU Directive on intra-Community transfers Tom Smith, Head of the Export Control Organisation within the BIS, replied that the UK and others in Europe were well on course to implement the Directive by the deadline of June. He said it was important that the implementation was done correctly. He was confident as the Directive was very largely modelled on UK practice it would not require major changes to UK export controls.
191 Hammonds, Review: The European Union facilitates intra-Community transfer of defence-related products, June 2009 192 Ev 42 193 Q 57
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Nevertheless, there were some issues, such as the regulation of technical assistance, on which the Government wanted to consult very carefully with industry to ensure that the Government was not unwittingly creating unnecessary burdens.194 143. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states precisely what legislative and procedural changes the Government will be making to its arms export controls in order to implement and comply with the EU Directive on Intra-Community Transfers of defence-related products. The CAEC further recommends that the Government monitors compliance with the Directive by other EU Member States and reports back to the Committees on any breaches of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports as a result of this Directive of which it becomes aware. 144. Finally, the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what precise ways, if any, the coming into effect of the EU IntraCommunity Directive will reduce the UK Governments controls over arms exports from the UK to EU Member States, and the transparency of such exports to Parliament and the public.
Cluster Munitions
145. Cluster munitions are canisters that contain a number of smaller explosive bomblets or sub-munitions. When fired by artillery, or dropped by aircraft, the canister spreads the bomblets over a wide area. They are commonly used against soft targets such as troops, trucks and lightly armoured vehicles, or as area denial weapons to prevent the enemy from operating freely.195 Those that fail to explode constitute a potentially lethal danger to civiliansmen, women and childrenin the areas where cluster munitions have been used. 146. The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles. The Convention was adopted in Dublin by 107 states on 30 May 2008 and signed on 3 December the same year. By the end of 2011, less than two years after coming into force, the Convention on Cluster Munitions already had 111 signatory states.196 147. On 25 March 2010 Royal Assent was received for the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act. The main purpose of the Act was to create criminal offences in order to enforce the prohibitions set out in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions which was signed by the then Foreign Secretary in Oslo on 3 December 2008. Article 1 of the Convention prohibits States Parties from using, developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring cluster munitions; and from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone else to engage in these prohibited activities. The Article 1 prohibitions also apply to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft. Criminalising these prohibited activities is
194 Q 107 195 House of Commons Library Standard note: SN/1A/4339, Cluster Munitions, May 2007. 196 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012, p 92
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necessary because Article 9 of the Convention stipulates that: Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.197 148. Among the countries that have not signed the Convention is the United States and it has recently pressed for a Protocol (Protocol 6) to be added to the Convention that would have provided legal cover for the use of cluster munitions. The new Protocol would have permitted the use of cluster munitions manufactured after 1980 and with a failure rate of less than 1%. The US was reportedly supported by other cluster bomb manufacturers, including Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan.198 149. In his Adjournment debate in the House of Commons on 9 November 2011 Martin Caton MP said: There are three possible outcomes: adoption of the draft protocol, ending negotiations with no result, or the adoption of a political agreement that is not legally binding but allows interim steps. He continued: The draft protocol is not compatible or complementary with the Convention on cluster munitions. The latter bans these weapons; the former allows for their use, production and transfer. Martin Caton went on to say that: The draft protocol contradicts existing international humanitarian law and is not the best way to engage with existing states that have stockpiles of cluster munitions [...] It would be the first time in history that international humanitarian law has moved backwards.199 150. In his reply the Minister for Europe, David Lidington, said that the UK and the Government remain fully committed to the objective of ridding the world entirely of cluster munitions and that the Government are fully committed to seeking a global ban on cluster munitions. That is a Government priority, and we continue to promote the universalisation of the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions] during all relevant bilateral meetings, as well as in multilateral forums. He continued: The UK remains fully committed to the convention on cluster munitions and to a world free of cluster munitions. That is the standard we shall adhere to, that all states should aspire to and that we will continue to promote.200 151. At the conclusion of the 4th Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in Geneva from 1425 November 2011, it was reported that the attempt by the United States and other cluster bomb manufacturers, including Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan, to secure agreement to Protocol 6, which would have weakened the
197 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 198 US pushing UN to lift ban on cluster bombs, say campaigners, The Guardian, 22 November 2011 199 HC Deb, 9 November 2011, Cols 415- 416 200 HC Deb, 9 November 2011, Cols 417418
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existing Convention, had failed.201 The UK was part of a coalition of countries that defeated the US Protocol.202 152. In the Oral evidence session with the UK Working Group on 23 January 2012, Martin Butcher (Oxfam) said that the NGOs were very pleased that the Government stood up strongly for the cluster munitions ban and for the principle that these weapons should not be used. They were also very pleased that the Government had promoted the cluster munitions Convention to other members of the Commonwealth at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Perth, Western Australia, from 28 to 30 October 2011.203 153. In the Oral evidence session with the Ministers on 7 February 2012 the Foreign Secretary confirmed that the UK Government had resisted the attempt of the USA and other countries to insert a weakening Protocol into the Convention. William Hague said: Together with the vast majority of states, we engaged in the discussion aiming for a draft protocol 6, which would be complimentary to the convention and not undercut it or provide a permanent lesser commitment, with significant and demonstrable humanitarian benefit. We had the final negotiation in December, which failed to achieve consensus, so we have to keep working on it. We want to continue to take all possible opportunities to encourage universal adherence to the convention. It was disappointing that there was not sufficient consensus in December.204 The Foreign Secretary went on to say: Of course it was debatable whether we should go for or settle for something that fell short of that but could be agreed, or whether we should keep arguing for the gold standard. We thought about that long and hard, and decided that the position of the UK should remain that we wanted to go for the gold standard.205 154. In its written submission UKWG raised the issue UK-based financial institutions indirectly financing, and investing in, companies that manufacture cluster munitions. When in the Oral evidence session on 23 January 2012 the Committees asked the UKWG about their concerns Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) said: When the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Bill was going through Parliament last year, the Oppositionnow the Governmentintroduced a specific amendment in the Lords to put indirect finance into the Bill. They withdrew that amendment, I assume because they were satisfied with the previous Governments assertion that it would work with industry, with civil society and with the Government to develop a code of conduct or robust guidelines aimed at ending indirect finance, with a view to legislating if that process was not successful.
201 Cluster Munition Coalition, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/ccw/ 202 Britain unites with smaller countries to block US bid to legalise cluster bombs, The Guardian, 25 November 2011. 203 Q 29 204 Q 153 [William Hague] 205 Q 153 [William Hague]
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From my discussions with a number of high street banks and financiers who are caught up in this loophole, they are looking to the Government to start that process. It is my understanding that the Government have decided, for whatever reason, not to pursue that process. I think it would be very helpful if they were to do so.206 155. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what steps it will take in relation to UK-based financial institutions who may be financing, directly or indirectly, or investing in manufacturers of cluster munitions. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to resist attempts to weaken the Convention on Cluster Munitions with draft Protocol 6 was welcome. The Committees further recommend that the Government continues to strive strenuously for, as the Minister for Europe David Lidington has stated, a world free of cluster munitions.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The negotiation process 156. The process of the current negotiations, which are UN-based, on a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) began in 1997 following the call for a code of conduct on international arms transfers by a group of Nobel Peace Laureates. This was followed in 2003 by a campaign launched by NGOs to win support for the idea of an ATT. In 2004 the then Government explicitly backed the ATT. In 2006 it sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution calling for the establishment of a group of governmental experts to examine the feasibility, scope and parameters of an ATT. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 64/48 in December 2009, which mandated formal negotiation of an ATT by 2012.207 If an Arms Trade Treaty is successfully concluded it will the first time the trade in the generality of conventional weapons worldwide has become subject to an international treaty. 157. Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings have taken place in New York in July 2010, March 2011, July 2011 and February 2012. These were seen as a positive start to the negotiations. Following initial discussions between UN Member States, the Chair of the process released a series of papers on Treaty Elements, Principles and Goals and Objectives. Further discussion papers on Scope, Parameters and Implementation/Application were added. These papers formed the basis of negotiations moving forward.208 The key output from the July 2011 PrepCom was an informal Chairs Draft paper, which included many of the essential elements of a humanitarian and humanrights-focused ATT. The most recent Preparatory Committee meeting took place in New York between 13 and 17 February 2012 and the final UN Conference will take place between 2 and 27 July 2012.209
206 Q 33 207 House of Commons Library Standard Note: In Brief: The Arms Trade Treaty recent developments, November 2011 208 FCO website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/arms-control/arms-trade-treaty/ 209 UN. Arms Trade Treaty, http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/
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158. Following the conclusion of the Fourth PrepCom in February 2012 the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, said in a newspaper article: Internationally, we'll lead the charge for a robust, legally-binding treaty, covering all conventional weapons. Not only rockets and tanks, but also the landmines and AK47s that cause so much bloodshed. We'll press states who sign up to block sales that fuel conflict or fail to meet the treaty's obligations on human rights. And we want states to demonstrate they're meeting their commitments.210 The UK Governments role and policy 159. The Committees conclusions and recommendations on the Arms Trade Treaty in its 2011 Report (HC686) and the Governments Response (Cm 8079) were as follows: Committees recommendation: We conclude that the Government's statement that it is fully committed to securing a robust and effective Arms Trade Treaty is to be welcomed. We look to the Government to deliver on its commitment.211 Government response: The Government is committed to securing an effective, legally binding international Arms Trade Treaty. The UK continues to play a leading role in the UN process on the Arms Trade Treaty to this end.212 Committees recommendation: We conclude that the Government seems to have adopted a different policy from its predecessor; appearing to be prepared to weaken the Arms Trade Treaty in order to try to ensure that key arms exporting countries become signatories. We recommend that the Government continues to try to achieve the strongest possible Treaty, including exports of ammunition, with the maximum number of key countries including the United States, as signatories, but should not adopt a strict consensus or lowest common denominator approach which is likely to result in an Arms Trade Treaty being ineffectual.213 Government response: The Government is [sic] not weakened its approach. It is committed to achieving the strongest possible Treaty, which will need to be carefully balanced with the need for an Arms Trade Treaty to have the widest participation of states necessary for it to be truly effective. The Government remains committed to achieving an Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition, and will not sign up to a weak or ineffective Treaty.214
210 We can lead from the front in disarming, The Independent on Sunday, 19 February 2012 211 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 94 212 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 14 213 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 102 214 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 14
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Committees recommendation: We further recommend that the Government, in its response to this report, sets out its policy on including anti-corruption provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty with details of the provisions it would wish to see incorporated.215 Government response: The Government is supportive of an Arms Trade Treaty addressing the issue of corruption. There are a number of ways this could be achieved; through a stand-alone parameter, such as diversion, or through implementation mechanisms. The Government is still considering the most effective way this may be achieved through the Treaty.216 160. In his letter of 18 July 2011, the Chairman put 3 further questions to the Foreign Secretary on behalf of the Committees which the Foreign Secretary answered with his letter of 30 September 2011. The questions and answers were as follows: Committees question: In what specific ways is the UK continuing to play a leading role in the UN process on the Arms Trade Treaty so that an effective, legally binding international Treaty is secured?217 Government answer: The UK has maintained its leading international position on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in a number of ways; including bilateral outreach, active engagement in the Preparatory Committee meetings and through proactive multilateral interaction with the P5 and the EU. Significant funding for ATT related project has also been provided, covering areas such as capacity building in developing states and research into technical aspects of the Treaty. The UK will continue to play a leading role as efforts intensify ahead of the crucial Negotiating Conference in 2012.218 Committees question: Which of the other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council namely China, France, Russia and the US are, like the UK, also committed to achieving the strongest possible Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition?219 Government answer: The recent Preparatory Committee meeting in July saw the first joint P5 statement in support of the UN process on ATT. France and the US are firmly committed to securing a strong ATT, covering all conventional weapons. However, the US still has concerns about the inclusion of ammunition in an ATTs scope. Russia and China still have some significant concerns about an Arms Trade Treaty, and have different views on what should constitute the Treatys final scope.220
215 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 103 216 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp 1415 217 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011. Annex A 218 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A 219 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011. Annex A 220 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A
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Committees question: Will the Government provide a further note to the Committees on what it considers would be the most effective way in which the Arms Trade Treaty could address the issue of corruption? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence.221 Government answer: The Government is still considering the most effective way of addressing the issue of corruption in the context of an ATT. It may be that this could be achieved most effectively through the Treatys implementation mechanisms, by introducing a requirement for signatories to take necessary measures to combat corruption in relation to arms transfers covered by an ATT. However, the Government remains open to other suggestions regarding how an ATT could address this issue effectively.222 161. The Committees received significant evidence of insufficient continuity of leadership at official level in the FCO on the Arms Trade Treaty following the change of Government in the UK in 2010. The UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) told the Committees that: Since 2006, the UK has been widely perceived as the lead government on this Treaty process, which has the potential for significant positive humanitarian and human-rights impact. However, UK profile and activity has significantly reduced in recent months, with potentially negative results in the final Treaty... It stated that, in this vital stage in the runup to final negotiations, the resources devoted and priority accorded to the ATT in the FCO have been significantly reduced. UKWG has received feedback from other supportive States including UK allies that their impression is that the UK has rolled back in its leadership and activity on the ATT.223 In the Oral evidence session on 23 January 2012 Martin Butcher (Oxfam GB) said: [...] from the public pronouncements of the Government, you would not necessarily know that there has been a roll back. The public statements that are made are good statements, but behind the scenes there has definitely been a decrease in activity.224 162. In the Oral evidence with the Foreign Secretary, on 7 February 2012, the following exchange took place: Q147 Mike Gapes: Who is in charge now on the arms trade treaty? Mr Hague: Sarah can describe. We are restructuring the counter-proliferation department to increase the senior management resource working on the arms trade treaty, and on export control issues more generally. So there is not going to be a shortage of senior staff. Sarah, do you want to describe these personnel changes? Sarah MacIntosh: Jill Morrisas you knowthe former head of the counterproliferation department has moved to eurozone work temporarily. That job has been backfilled with two officials: one more senior, Peter Hayes, the former
221 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July2011. Annex A 222 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A 223 Ev 45 224 Q 4
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ambassador in Sri Lanka, and Martin Hill, the deputy high commissioner in Ottawa.225 Q148 Mike Gapes: Is that up until the conference in July or is that just for the interim? Sarah MacIntosh: That is an interim arrangement that is in place now. [...] The continuity throughout has been provided by me as the director, by Dave Hall, as the deputy head of the counter-proliferation department with responsibility for both those two issues and by Ambassador Adamson who has replaced Ambassador Duncan at the conference on disarmament.226 Q149 Mike Gapes: Do you agreeperhaps the Foreign Secretary could comment with the perception that, just at the key moment, the week before you have this meeting coming up, there is not a permanent person there and there is no continuity therefore? [...] Mr Hague: We have a lot of senior people dealing with this, and are upgrading this in the way that Sarah describes. I cannot promise you that we never move around in the Foreign Office, but this is going to receive a great deal of senior management time and attention, and ministerial time and attention. I can assure you that we are very strongly committed to this [...].227 163. On the content of the Treaty the Foreign Secretary told the Committees: We are very firmly committed to securing a robust, effective and legally binding Arms Trade Treaty. The last Government did a good job on this. I will regularly say that, and I think there is strong cross-party agreement on that. We are aiming for a treaty that covers all conventional weapons, including small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.228 164. In an impressively forthright and detailed speech on the Arms Trade Treaty on 17 May 2012 the Minister of State for International Development, Alan Duncan, said: To be effective and worthwhile the Treaty must be broad in scope, covering all elements from fighter jets to ammunition. Small arms and light weapons must be in the scope of the Treaty; if they are not, the opportunity to regulate a major contributor to conflict and suffering will have been missed. The UK, working hand in hand with most of the world's developing nations, will push to ensure small arms and light weapons are in the scope of the Treaty. Leaving them out would be an act of negligence. Alan Duncan went on to say that he would push for the Arms Trade Treaty to address the issues of corruption, bribery and the lack of transparency. 229
225 Q 147 226 Q 148 227 Q 149 228 Q 145 229 Speech by Alan Duncan, at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 18 May 2012, www.iiss.org/
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165. The Committees conclude that the Government has put at risk the UKs previous leading role in the drafting and negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty by failing to maintain continuity of FCO staff at a senior level with this responsibility. The Committees also conclude that the Governments commitment to achieving an Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition, is welcome. The Committees further conclude that the Governments statement that it is supportive of an Arms Trade Treaty addressing the issue of corruption is welcome, though in stark contrast to the Governments refusal to accept the Committees recommendation that the EU Common Position on arms exports should also include the issue of corruption (see paragraph 122). The Committees recommend that the Government deploys the staffing resources required at a sufficiently senior level, necessary to achieve a comprehensive and effective Arms Trade Treaty.
Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

166. On 30 January 2012 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, asking whether the UKs strategic deterrent, Trident, had a sub-strategic capability and, if so, whether this would be consistent with the terms of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty230 (INF) agreed between the USA and the then Soviet Union. The Foreign Secretarys reply of 20 February 2012 is reproduced in full below: Thank you for your letter of 30 January in which you posed questions relating to the sub-strategic capability of Trident. The term sub-strategic as it pertains to nuclear weapons has been used in NATO since the 1980s to refer to intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons. Between 1966 and 1998 the UK fulfilled this role principally through the WE177 air-launched bomb. Other systems included nuclear weapons aboard Royal Navy surface ships. These have now all been withdrawn, (the last WE177 was decommissioned in March 1998), and the Trident-based weapons system is now the UKs only nuclear weapons system. Since the Trident system came into service, we have had some flexibility in the scale of any use of our nuclear deterrent. This flexibility stems from an ability to vary the number of missiles and warheads which might be used and the ability to employ a reduced yield from our nuclear warhead. We plan to retain this since having a degree of flexibility in the potential scale of its use makes our deterrent more credible against the range of nuclear threats we may face in the future. What has changed is the way in which we describe this capability and this is where we currently differ slightly from NATO terminology. Since 2007 the British Government has ceased to refer to a sub-strategic capability in relation to Trident.
230 The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty is a bilateral ratified treaty between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which required the elimination of all missiles with ranges between 625 and 3,500 miles by June 1, 1991, and all missiles with ranges between 300 and 625 miles within 18 months. In all, 2,692 missiles were to be eliminated. In addition, all associated equipment and operating bases were closed out from any further INF missile system activity. Altogether it resulted in the elimination of 846 U.S. INF missile systems and 1,846 Soviet INF missile systems. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty15.shtml
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This is for the simple reason that we believe any use of our deterrent would be strategic in intent and in effect. Since the British Government no longer uses the phrase sub-strategic to describe this capability and there exists no internationally agreed definition of what comprises a sub-strategic nuclear capability, the British Government ascribes no specific range to the term sub-strategic. As regards your final question, we do not consider that any of the capabilities of Trident represent a potential breach to the terms of the intermediate-range nuclear forces Treaty (INF).231 167. The 1987 INF Treaty was the first nuclear arms control Treaty actually to eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, rather than to set numerical ceilings. Both the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to eliminate all their nuclear ballistic missiles with ranges between 625 and 3,500 miles by June 1 1991, and all missiles with ranges between 300 and 625 miles within 18 months. The remaining short-range or tactical nuclear weapons believed to be held by the US and Russia today are quoted as numbering in the order of 500 by the US and roughly 2,000 by Russia. Of the approximately 500 US tactical nuclear weapons, around 200 are deployed in five European NATO countries Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.232 168. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response whether it wishes to see any change in NATOs policy of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and whether it is taking any steps to facilitate multilateral reductions in US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

169. The control of fissile materialhighly enriched uranium and plutoniumis a key element in countering nuclear proliferation. In 1993 the UN General Assembly passed a Consensus Resolution which: i. Welcomed the significant progress in reducing nuclear-weapon arsenals as evidenced by the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the USA and their respective unilateral undertakings regarding the disposition of fissile material; Welcomed also the initiative of the USA concerning a multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for the nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Welcomed further the decision taken by the CD [Conference on Disarmament] on 10 August 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and fully endorsing the contents of that decision;
ii.
iii.
231 Ev 166 Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman dated 20 February 2012 232 What to do about tactical nuclear weapons, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/webedition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons
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iv.
Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, Recommended the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Requested the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority] to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as required; Called upon all states to demonstrate their commitment to the objectives of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-ninth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.233
170. There are currently nine countries with nuclear weapons, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America (collectively known as the P5) together with India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan.234 The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is a proposed international treaty to prohibit the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Agency produced a report to the UN Security Council recommending the prohibiting national manufacturing and possession of fissile materials. In 1957, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution to ban their production for weapons and in 1993 it called for the negotiation of a Treaty in the Consensus Resolution described above. 171. In 1995 the Conference on Disarmament adopted the Shannon Mandate (named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon) to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 235 The use of the word cut-off (i.e. preventing future production) has raised the question as to how the Treaty would also cover existing stocks of fissile material. The primary debate that surfaced during the Shannon discussions centred on the inclusion of rules that would cover both existing stockpiles and future production of fissile material.236 Pakistan has been the only country blocking the start of negotiations for more than three years because of a 2008 agreement by
233 Fissile Material Talks, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/unga93.htm 234 Nuclear Weapons: Who has what at a glance, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/ 235 International Panel on Fissile Materials, Banning the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, 2008, Pp 23 236 United Nations institute for Disarmament Research, A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues, 2010, p 2
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the worlds key nuclear technology suppliers to lift long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has maintained that a fissile material ban must cover existing stocks of fissile material instead of halting future production.237 172. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what policies it is pursuing to break the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva over the drafting of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and whether it supports the transfer of responsibility for the drafting of this Treaty to the United Nations in New York.
The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 20122015

173. The FCO Minister for Counter Proliferation, Alistair Burt, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley on 21 March 2012 on the Governments National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15, and attached the public version of the strategy. The Ministers letter and the public version of the strategy can be found in the evidence to this Report in Annex 12. 174. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) details the conditions that the Government considers need to be fulfilled to ensure a meaningful outcome to a conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Free Zone; b) sets out what precise steps the Government is taking to establish a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; c) details the Governments planned expenditure, and on what projects, under the G8 Global Partnership delivering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security improvements on the ground; d) details the specific provisions in existing obligations and export control regimes which the Government considers needs to have their enforcement strengthened; and e) details any areas in which the Government considers that the UKs domestic security practices and export controls need to be strengthened.
237 Pakistans Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT talks, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/
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8 Arms export control policies

Arms exports and human rights
175. In their 2011 report (HC686) the Committees stated: We recommend that the Government in its response to this report sets out how it intends to reconcile the potential conflict of interest between increased emphasis on promoting arms exports with the staunch upholding of human rights.238 In its Response (Cm 8079) the Government replied: The Government believes that its security, prosperity and values agendas are mutually reinforcing. The Government went on to say: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications.239 176. The Committees conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Governments statement that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications is welcome, those considerations do not appear to have weighed sufficiently heavily on either the present Government or on its predecessor given the unprecedented scale of arms export licence revocations that the Government has made since the Arab Spring the stated reason for revocation being in every single case that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3.240 Criteria 2 is headed The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination, and Criteria 3 is headed The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions, or armed conflicts.
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance

177. Giving overseas Governments assistance with improving their security and administration of justice may involve the UK Government supporting the commercial export or gifting of goods subject to export licensing. Table 2.4 of the Governments Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010 details equipment gifted by the Government in 2010.241
238 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 18 239 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p4 240 The arms export licence revocations in question and the reason for revocation in each case are detailed in Annex 5. 241 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, p 20
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178. On 15 December 2011 the Foreign Secretary in a Written Ministerial Statement announced the publication of the Governments Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance.242 179. The UK Working Group submitted additional written evidence to the Committees giving its views on the OSJA Human Rights Guidance. The UKWG said that the UK Consolidated Criteria should remain the sole basis on which decisions are made regarding arms transfers. It stated that in some cases security and defence equipment is sold or gifted as part of a package including other types of assistance, such as the provision of training in crowd control methods. Such training should, in the UKWGs view, in no way be seen as overriding the need to robustly implement the Consolidated Criteria. It pointed out that the OSJA guidance makes it clear that it currently applies only to the FCO, but that following a review in April 2012 will be applied to all Government Departments. The UKWG stated that currently the majority of UK overseas security and justice assistance is provided by DFID, MoD and the Stabilisation Unit, with only a minority of support provided by the FCO and was concerned that there did not appear to have been crossdepartmental guidance on the delivery of security and justice assistance until now. Saferworld (part of UKWG) said that it looked forward to the cross-departmental guidance and hoped that the review in April would be conducted in consultation with external actors.243 UKWG recommended that: The human rights guidance should be incorporated into a single operational toolkit which addresses the practical challenges of putting these many commitments into practice; The review of the OSJA, in April 2012, should make explicit what is meant by overseas security and justice, setting out the full range of interventions to which the guidance applies. Security and justice assistance should be conceived more broadly than just train and equip-type programmes. The UK Consolidated Criteria should remain the sole basis on which decisions about arms transfers licensing is made, regardless of whether other types of security and justice assistance are delivered alongside.244
180. When the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012, he was asked what impact he thought the OSJA Human Rights Guidance would have when considering applications for arms licences. The Foreign Secretary replied: This is about providing security and justice assistance, which can be related to arms for the reasons we were discussing earlier. I was describing how, in the case of Libya, there were licences that related to a training programme. So the linkage here is that the specific reference to the consolidated criteria is contained in checklist A, as it is called, of the guidance, which requires staff to consult the consolidated criteria where the provision of equipment is part of the assistance. So although it is intended that information sought under this guidance can be used to help make decisions relevant
242 HC Deb, 15 December 2011, Cols 123124 243 Ev 60 244 Ev 59
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to arms exports, the specific test set out in the consolidated criteria must apply when there is a question of exporting arms.245 The Chairman of the Committees then put the following proposal to the Foreign Secretary: [...]buried away in a microscopic footnote on page 14 of the guidance it does indeed say to officials conducting their checklist that it is not intended to cover the export of military or security equipment. If the provision of equipment is part of your assistance, you must consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria. I put it to you, Foreign Secretary, particularly as you have said specifically in front of the Committees that assistance is provided through the making available of equipment, which could include items within the arms export control area, that you should reconsider whether this crucial sentence should be promoted from being dismally put in microscopic print in a footnote to having very strong prominence in your human rights guidance.246 The Foreign Secretary replied: That may be a very good suggestion. We will have a look at that.247 181. The Committees recommend that the OSJA Human Rights Guidance is amended to make it prominently and unequivocally clear that if military or security equipment is being exported in an Overseas Security and Justice Assistance programme, the decision as to whether or not to approve such exports must be made solely and wholly in accordance with the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria and procedures. The Committees further recommend that the requirement on officials in the current guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria in such export cases should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.
Surveillance technology and equipment

182. It has been reported that surveillance technology and equipment is being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use it against human rights activists. The report also referred to a letter from 10 Downing Street to Privacy International saying that the Government was actively looking at this issue and was working within the EU to introduce new controls on surveillance.248 183. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report:
245 Q 142 246 Q 144 [Chairman of CAEC] 247 Q 144 [William Hague] 248 UK 'exporting surveillance technology to brutal regimes': Fears software is being supplied to repressive governments that use it to monitor dissidents, The Observer, 8 April 2012
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a) what changes it will make to UK export control legislation and procedures to prevent surveillance technology and equipment being exported from the UK to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights; and b) what action the Government is taking to prevent such exports from EU Member States generally.
Export of Tasers
184. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the FCO, Alistair Burt, wrote to the Committees Chairman on 8 February 2012 notifying him that the Minister would be making a Written Ministerial Statement the following day announcing a limited lifting of the ban on the export of Tasers (electric shock discharge guns) from the UK.249 In his Written Statement on 9 February, the Minister said that the Government would now consider applications for the grant of a licence for the export of Tasers, but only under the following limited circumstance: (i) Where the export of tasers is to the police service of a Crown dependency or UK overseas territory and where it has been specifically recommended by Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary that such a police service adopts the use of such equipment by trained officers as an alternative to the use of lethal firearms, and that the use of the equipment is in line with the accepted standards set for UK police officers; or (ii) Where tasers constitute officially issued equipment for use by suitably trained UK police officers who are being deployed in support of a police operation in a Crown Dependency or overseas territory, and where that deployment has been requested by the chief police officer of the Crown Dependency or overseas territory; or (iii) Where the equipment belonging to a UK police force, the police service of a Crown Dependency or UK overseas territory, or to an authorised agent working on their behalf, is being returned to the original manufacturer for repair, or replacement of faulty equipment, or as unwanted goods.250 185. The Committees recommend that the Government informs them promptly of any breaches of the conditions under which Tasers may be exported under limited circumstances from the UK as set out in the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Alistair Burt, on 9 February 2012.
Arms exports and internal repression

186. A central concern of the Committees has been whether or not there has been a change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that adopted by the previous Government. The question as to whether or not there had been a change of policy assumed key importance when the present Government, following
249 EV 164 Letter from Alistair Burt dated 8 February 2012 250 HC Deb, 9 February 2012, Cols 4647WS
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repressive violence against civilian demonstrators in the Arab Spring, revoked an unprecedented number of 158 extant UK arms export licences, stating that in every single case the licence now contravened Criterion 2, which reads that the Government will not issues an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. 187. The previous Governments complete policy on arms exports was set out by the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, in a Written Answer given on 26 October 2000.251 This Answer is reproduced in full in Annex 3 to this Report. In his summary of the then Governments policy in his Written Answer, Peter Hain said: An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...]concern that the goods might be used for internal repression [...]. Later in his Written Answer Peter Hain, when setting out Criterion Two, headed The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination, also said that the Government will: a. Not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. 188. The two policy tests to be applied as set out in Peter Hains 26 October 2000 Written Answer were faithfully and accurately reproduced by the present Governments FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.252 189. The policy importance of the two separate tests was highlighted by the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, in the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees last Report, when he said, referring to the 18 February 2011 statement of the FCO Minister Alistair Burt: That is absolutely correct wording and punctuation, from which hon. Members will see that there are in fact two separate tests. There is the clear risk test as to whether the proposed export could aggravate conflict. If we had just the clear risk test, we could probably end up justifying the sale of pretty well anything to any country. We could say, Well, theres a bit of a risk, but its not a clear risk, so we can sell. We would probably draw the line at Chairman Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and the Burmese military junta, but for everyone else, we could say, Well, the risk isnt clear. Lets get on and sell. That is why the second partthe remainderof the Ministers statement is critical: or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. I say very firmly to this Minister and to the House that the Committees on Arms Export Controls attach the utmost importance to that wording and to its retention by
251 HC Deb, 26 October 2000, Cols 199203W 252 FCO Press Notice, Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182#
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the British Government, so that we can be assured that British weapons and equipment will not be used for internal repression.253 190. However, it did not become unequivocally clear that the present Governments policy on arms exports and internal repression remained unchanged from that of the previous Government until the Foreign Secretary gave Oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. The key exchange was as follows: Chair: Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. We took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports. As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Governments position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt? Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The or, as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important. Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.254 191. The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretarys statement to the Committees that there has been no change of policy on arms exports and internal repression by the present Government from that stated by the previous Government is welcome, the present Governments policy being: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. The Committees recommend that the Government adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications.
253 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 244WH 254 Q 109
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The Governments Arab Spring arms export policy review

192. Shortly after the Arab Spring commenced, in Tunisia in December 2010, the Government announced it was conducting a review of arms exports from the UK. The first announcement of the review was made by the FCO Minister, Alistair Burt, in a Press Statement made on 18 February 2011, the full text of which was as follows: Commenting on a review of arms export in light of recent events, Minister for the Middle East and North Africa Alistair Burt today said: We are deeply concerned about the situation in Bahrain and the events which have led to the deaths of several protestors. Under the legislative regime set up in 2000, exports to Bahrain were governed by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which are administered by the Department for BIS. There has been no change to the Criteria since the general election. As a result of the changing situation in Bahrain, we have conducted an immediate and rapid review of UK export licences. With advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, the licensing authority has taken a decision to revoke 24 individual licences and 20 open licences for Bahrain. A separate decision has also been taken to revoke eight individual licences for Libya. The review of export licences to the wider region, including Yemen, is ongoing. This Government takes extremely seriously its export control responsibilities. Britain has some of the most rigorous export controls in the World. All export licence applications are considered on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and UK export licensing criteria and in the light of prevailing circumstances, paying particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses. The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression. We have no evidence of British equipment being used in the unrest in Bahrain. 255 193. The Committees on Arms Export Controls compiled a table, from the information on the BIS Departments and the FCOs websites, detailing selected arms export licences approved since January 2009 to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. The countries in the table to whom such arms export licences had been approved were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
255 FCO Press Notice - http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182#
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Emirates and Yemen. The table was published on 5 April 2011 as Annex 4 to the Committees First Report in the present Parliament (HC686).256 194. In their 5 April 2011 Report, the Committees made the following conclusions and recommendations in relation to the Governments arms export review: We conclude that both the present Government and its predecessor misjudged the risk that arms approved for export to certain authoritarian countries in the Middle East and North Africa might be used for internal repression. We further conclude that the Government's decision to revoke a considerable number of arms export licences to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is very welcome. We recommend that, in its response to this Report: The Government states what specific and systematic consideration of arms exports is carried out within the National Security Strategy and at meetings of the National Security Council; The Government states the outcome of its review of arms exports to the wider Middle East region as announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February; The Government states what changes it will make to improve both its arms export control procedures and its judgements about the risk of arms exported from the UK being used for internal repression by authoritarian regimes.257
195. The Governments Response to the conclusions and recommendations in Cm 8079 published in July 2011 was as follows: Countering the proliferation of conventional weapons is a major driver of conflict and instability and is an element of security support within the National Security Strategy. We are committed to effective implementation of export controls at national level, and will also assist other states to develop and implement the governance mechanisms needed to ensure tough controls on arms transfers, and we will continue to play a leading role in pressing internationally for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty. There have been to date no specific or systematic consideration of arms exports at meetings of the National Security Council. [...] The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close collaboration with the Department for
256 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4 257 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135
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Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.258 196. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011,259 the Chairman of the Committees put a further 4 questions to the Government on its arms exports review which the Foreign Secretary answered with his letter to the Chairman of 30 September 2011.260 The 4 questions and answers were as follows: Committees question: Why is the FCO not in close consultation with DFID as well as with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Ministry of Defence on its arms exports review? Governments answer: The FCO works closely with DFID on arms export controls. DFID was fully consulted on the FCO Review of Export Controls Policy. Committees question: By what date does the Government expect to have reported back to Parliament on its arms exports review? Governments answer: The Foreign Secretary provided an update on the review to Parliament on 18 July through a Written Ministerial Statement. He said that the review concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of our export controls. The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (who has responsibility for our export licensing operations) are considering how this should be done. Once the process is complete the Foreign Secretary will update the House on proposals, but we are unable to confirm exactly when this might happen at present. Committees question: The Government has now chosen to give a particular focus in its arms exports review to crowd control goods. What arms and categories of arms does the Government consider to be crowd control goods? Governments answer: There is no comprehensive list of crowd control goods but some equipment carries a risk a being used for internal repression (rather than legitimate public order needs or external defence); this includes: CS grenades, tear gas canisters, crowd control ammunition Water cannons Anti-riot shields Body armour Shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition Armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles
258 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp1819 259 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 260 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011
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Committees question: Why has the Government apparently restricted the scope of its review by giving it a particular focus on crowd control goods when no such restriction was made when the FCO Minister Alistair Burt first announced the review on February 18? Governments answer: The announcement of the review and its focus was made during the Foreign Secretarys appearance before the FAC on 16 March 2011. The focus on crowd control goods was a result of incidents during the Arab Spring, as well as the issues raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee about equipment being sold to Gulf states for external defence, and concerns about those states that use that equipment against their domestic populations. For example, Mr Baron MP sought a Government commitment to say: When it comes to specific arms that can be used against a domestic population, the Government will promise to undertake a full review to ensure that we dont make the mistakes of the past? Mr Hague confirmed that We will have a review. There is no doubt about that. The area to concentrate on is the one you are talking about. I will go that far to meet your request.261 197. The Committees conclude that the Governments repeated use of the phrase crowd control goods in the context of its arms export review is misleading given that crowd control goods are generally associated with non-lethal equipment. The Committees further conclude that the Governments use of the phrase crowd control goods to include shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition, armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles is not one that would be acceptable to Parliament or to the wider public. The Committees recommend that the Government discontinues the use of the phrase crowd control goods in this context, which as well as being misleading is also profoundly disrespectful to the thousands of unarmed civilians in the Arab Spring countries who have courageously demonstrated for human rights and fundamental freedoms and have put their lives at risk in doing so. 198. The Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 18 July 2011 following, what he said at the time, was the completion of the Governments arms export review. The complete Statement was as follows: The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 16 March 2011 that the Government would commission a thorough review of the UKs policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa and concerns in Parliament and the public about UK policy. This review has now been completed. It was conducted by Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials in close consultation with their colleagues across Whitehall, and it examined our policy on arms exports. Its purpose was to determine
261 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A
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whether improvements could be made to reduce further the risk of misuse of UKorigin controlled military goods and to increase confidence that goods exported from the United Kingdom would not be used for internal repression. It looked specifically at events in the middle east and north Africa region. The review concluded that there was no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom. There were some reports of the use of UK-origin crowd control vehicles in Libya, but these reports remain uncorroborated. Consultations with our overseas posts revealed no evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms used by Governments in north Africa or the middle east against their own populations during the Arab spring, were supplied from the United Kingdom. However, the review also concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of the controls. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility for our export licensing operations. The Secretary of State and I will consider how this should be done, and once that process is complete I will update the House on our proposals.262 No reference was made in the Statement to the UK Governments arms export licence approvals since 1 January 2009 for lethal and non-lethal equipment that could be used for internal repression in countries in the Middle East and North Africa as set out in Annex 4 of the Committees Report (HC686).263 199. On 13 October 2011, the Foreign Secretary made a further Written Ministerial Statement in which he said he was announcing the outcome of the Governments arms exports review. The full text of the Foreign Secretarys Statement was as follows: The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague): I am today announcing the outcome of a review of UK defence and security export policy in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa. On 16 March 2011, I told the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Government would review policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods, in the light of events in the middle east and north Africa. Government colleagues with responsibilities in this area, in particular the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills who has responsibility for our export licensing systems and operations, have been consulted in the course of this review. The review concluded that there are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system. But the review identified areas where our system could be further strengthened to enable Ministers to respond rapidly and decisively to the outbreak of conflict, instability or unpredictable events in other countries. Respect for human
262 HC Deb, 18 July 2011, Cols 7879WS 263 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4
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rights and fundamental freedoms is already a mandatory criterion for all export licence decisions. The changes announced today will increase our confidence that UK-origin goods will not be misused for internal repression, and that our controls are being applied in an orderly and systematic way, informed and influenced by our values and interests. This will complement the Governments efforts to build Britains prosperity by increasing exports and helping UK companies succeed in international markets. The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licences issued, pending ministerial or departmental review. We also propose the introduction of a revised risk categorisation, based on objective indicators and reviewed regularly, that keeps pace with changing circumstances; enhances our assessment against all export control criteria, including human rights violations; and allows specifically for ministerial scrutiny of open licences to ensure that the benefits of open licensing can be maintained while keeping the associated risks to acceptable levels. This will increase oversight by Ministers, including of individual licence applications. As a result of these changes the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will ensure that export licensing policy is more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances, particularly political instability; bring more structure and consistency to the gathering of export-related information, provide more information on the human rights situation in country, including through following new security and justice assistance guidance and undertake end-use monitoring of controlled military goods, bearing in mind both the practical and resource limitations. The Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis. We welcome the scrutiny of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and will continue to assist in their important work. The Government have also considered how we can strengthen our decision making when we provide security and justice assistance overseas. We must provide assistance to international partners to tackle threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime and conflict prevention. In doing so, we will ensure that this assistance supports our values, is consistent with our domestic and international human rights obligations, and seeks to promote human rights and democracy. To this end, guidance will be issued for all HMG officials on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security and justice assistance. We will make this guidance public later this year. We are committed to robust and effective national and global controls to help prevent exports that could undermine our own security or core values of human rights and democracy; to protect our security through strategic defence relationships;
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and to promote our prosperity by allowing British defence and security industries to operate effectively in the global defence market. The Government are determined to learn the wider lessons of events in the middle east and north Africa. I believe that this package of improvements is the proper response to the lessons of this year. This does not preclude additional measures or further strengthening of the system.264 200. The main outcome of the review was the Governments proposal to introduce a new mechanism to allow the immediate suspension of arms export licences that had already been approved if a sharp deterioration in security or stability took place in a given country. However, little or no consideration appears to have been given in the Governments review as to whether the initial judgements to approve export licences to repressive regimes in the Middle East and North Africa for arms and equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression were correct or not in the first place. The Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, highlighted this in the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees 2011 Report when he said: The Foreign Secretary stated:
The review concluded that there are no fundamental flaws with the UK export licensing system.
It mayor may notbe true that there are no flaws in the system, but I am not persuaded that the Government are addressing the key point about flawed judgments within the system. The inescapable fact is that judgments have been shown to be wildly over-optimistic and rose-tinted regarding the sale to authoritarian regimes of weapons that could be used for internal repression. The Foreign Secretary continued:
The Government propose to introduce a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability,
but that does not address the central problem, because suspension becomes relevant only after export licensed goods have moved out of the UK. Suspension means that a licence has already been granted and that the goods have left the UK and are out of the doorthe bullets have bolted and are in the hands of an authoritarian regime. Although a better system of suspension would provide a good safety net, it does not deal with the central issue of making a correct initial judgment about whether to grant an export licence.265 201. The limitations of a control policy relying on the suspension or revocation of existing arms export licences was acknowledged by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt in his Answer to a Written Question from the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, when the Minister said:
264 HC Deb, 13 October 2011, Cols 4142WS 265 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 341WH
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While we can, under certain circumstances, revoke export licences, we cannot recall equipment once exported [...]266 202. A further Ministerial Written Statement headed Strategic Export Licensing was made by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, on 7 February 2012. In his Statement Vince Cable provided more details about the Governments new mechanism for suspending arms export licences and about its proposals to improve the transparency of the export licensing system, which are considered in paragraphs 8591 above. The full text of the Secretary of States Statement is at paragraph 86 above. 203. When in the Oral evidence session on 7 February 2012 the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary about the outcome of the review he replied that there had been increased ministerial oversight, with a substantial increase in the number of applications overseen by Ministers in 2009 there had been 24 applications overseen by Ministers and in 2011 there would be 153. The Foreign Secretary added that there had been new requirements for more end-use monitoring, export licensing, specific training for desk officers, new security and justice guidance and more systematic use of many sources of information, including NGOs and other organisation to assess human rights situation by Foreign Office posts.267 204. In his Written Ministerial Statement on 13 October 2011 the Foreign Secretary said that: The Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis.268 However, the UK Working Group, commenting on the review process, stated that the review itself has been anything but transparent. It said that despite a statement made by the Director for National Security, Directorate for Defence and Strategic Threats in the FCO, during evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, that NGOs were consulted during the course of the first stage of the review, 269 there has been no consultation to date with external stakeholders (be they from civil society, industry or parliament).270 Civil servants gave an informal briefing to NGOs on progress in the review after the first set of recommendations had been sent to Ministers, but despite numerous requests, at no point were consultations held. 271 When the Committees asked the UKWG about the consultation Roy Isbister (Saferworld) told us that the NGOs degree of involvement had been minimal.272 Martin Butcher (Oxfam) said that NGOs had been requesting consultation meetings for some time and that their requests were not met.273 Later in the evidence session we asked EGAD about its involvement in the consultation process: Barry Salzman (EGAD) told us that it had no
266 HC Deb, 16 April 2012, Col 198W 267 Q 110 268 HC Deb, 13 October 2011 col 42WS 269 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2011-12, The FCOs Human Rights Work 2010-12, HC 964, Qq 101103 270 Ev 42 271 Ev 42 272 Q 12 273 Q 13
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meetings with Government officials before the review was concluded. He continued: We are now trying to catch up to set a date for a meeting where we can be briefed on the outcome of the policy and its implementation.274 UKWG concluded that the process had been deeply unsatisfactory and asked that a much wider and deeper review of the transfer licensing policy and its implementation should take place.275 205. In his Oral evidence the Foreign Secretary said that it had been an internal review. When he asked his officials to expand Sarah MacIntosh, Director of Defence and International Security, FCO, said: There was some consultation. The Head of the Counter-Proliferation Department met with NGOs on 14 November last year, and with industry on 15 November.276 David Hall, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO, added: Prior to that, there were informal consultations, giving information about how the review was going ahead. Prior to that, Jill Morris, the Head of the CPD at the time, met a number of NGOs. We meet a number of these NGOs on a regular basis on export control issues all the time. We are aware of and interested in their views on the system.277 206. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 21 November 2011 requesting a copy of the review.278 The Foreign Secretary wrote back to the Chairman on 9 December stating that the review of arms exports had been an internal FCO review and would, therefore, not be published.279 207. The Committees conclude that the Governments review of its policies and practices on arms exports following the Arab Spring should not have been carried out merely as an internal review and should instead have been the subject of public consultation in accordance with the Governments stated policy of transparency on arms exports. The Committees further conclude that whilst the Governments introduction of a new licence suspension mechanism is welcome, this is not sufficient to ensure that arms exported from the UK are not used for internal repression overseas because in many, if not most, cases the arms will have left the UK before suspension occurs. The Committees recommend that the Government in its response to this Report sets out whether the revised risk categorisation proposed by the Foreign Secretary in his Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October 2011 will, or will not, be applied to arms export licence applications when initially made, and whether he will make public the revised risk categorisation and explain fully how it would be applied to arms export licence decisions. 208. The Committees conclude that whilst the Governments revocation of an unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the Arab Spring is
274 Q 38 275 Ev 42 276 Q 113 [Sarah MacIntosh] 277 Q 113 [David Hall] 278 Ev 149 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 21 November 2011 279 Ev 150 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 9 December 2011
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welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable evidence that the initial judgements to approve the applications were flawed. The Committees further conclude that there were no significant changes in the repressive regimes concerned between the British Governments approval of the arms export licences in question and the start of the Arab Spring in December 2010, and that the Arab Spring simply exposed the true nature of the repressive regimes which had been the case all along. The Committees recommend that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy.
Arms export licence revocations

209. The Committee recommended in its 2011 Report (HC686) that: The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa started.280 The information requested was provided in the Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees Report and is set out in full on pages 21-45 of that Response.281 In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia. 210. With his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 18 July 2011, the Chairman asked a further 6 questions about the Governments arms export licence revocations for countries in the Middle East and North Africa and about the arms export licences that remained extant.282 The Foreign Secretary provided the answers with his letter of 30 September 2011.283 The Committees 6 questions and the Governments answers are as follows: (N.B. The tables referred to in the Government answers below can be found in the tables attached to the Foreign Secretarys letter of 30 September 2011 (see Ev 75141).) Committees question: Why does the Government consider that, notwithstanding the events this year, in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, that the arms and components of arms that could be used for internal repression and which have been approved for export to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as detailed in Annex 4 of the Committees Report, remain in line with the Criteria and have not therefore been revoked by the Government?
280 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135 281 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, pp2145 282 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 283 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Annex A
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Governments answer: Events of the Arab Spring have underlined the importance of ensuring that exports of UK defence equipment are subject to careful scrutiny. The Government takes its export responsibilities very seriously, and operates one of the most rigorous arms export control regimes in the world. All export licence applications are considered against the Consolidated EU and UK Export Licensing Criteria on a case by case basis, and in the light of prevailing circumstances. We pay particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses in our assessment. Each assessment takes into account the intended end use of the equipment, the behaviour of the end user, the risk of diversion and the prevailing circumstances in the country concerned. The Government reacted quickly to events of the Arab Spring, reviewing all licences to all countries affected, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. The Government moved swiftly to revoke licences where evidence existed that licences were no longer in line with the Consolidated Criteria. As the decisions to revoke licences demonstrate, our export licensing policy and process allow us to respond quickly and robustly to changing facts on the ground. Furthermore, one licence covering sporting gun ammunition for Syria was in fact revoked following introduction of sanctions. At review, each application was considered against the Consolidated Criteria on a case by case basis taking into account the circumstances in the country concerned, the end user, and the likelihood that the product could be used to support internal repression. Revocations are also dependent on the number and type of goods reviewed which vary from country to country reflecting the export applications received and approved. For some countries like Syria and Yemen a small number of applications are received, and pre-existing concerns led to there being very few extant licences to review. The reviews identified that there were significant differences between how Arab Governments reacted to the call for reforms. For example, the Syrian armys brutal repression of Syrian protestors differed markedly from the actions of the Saudi Arabian National Guard troops. We have no evidence that Saudi forces who were deployed to Bahrain as part of the Peninsula Shield Force, at the request of the Bahraini Government, did anything other than protect key installations. Where a review was prompted by the repressive actions of law enforcement officials policing demonstrations in a country, it was consistent with the Criteria that licences for end users who had no role in policing demonstrations and were unlikely to help police demonstrations in the future, should remain in place. The reviews also recognised that some types of equipment may be associated with far greater risks than others. For example machine guns could be deployed for internal repression far more easily that components for naval equipment. The Criteria were applied consistently, but the different circumstances, including in relation to the issues referred to above, meant that different conclusions were reached as regards different countries and end users. This result is inevitable given the case by case analysis we conduct.
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In line with our standard export licensing policy for all destinations the Government continues to monitor the situation across the Middle East, and will continue to take into account any changes in circumstances in its assessment of future export licence applications or further reviews of existing licences. Committees question: Since the Government announced its arms export licence review on 18 February 2011 into licences approving arms exports to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, how many (a) SIEL and (b) OGEL licences have been revoked in respect of each country; and what was the date of revocation in each case? Governments answer: a) Bahrain 23, Libya 61, Syria 1 b) Bahrain 14, Bahrain & Egypt 4, Egypt 3, Libya 7 See Table 1 and 2 for details of revocation dates. Committees question: In respect of each of the licences revoked what was the item of military goods and quantity of them that had previously been granted an export licence? Governments answer: See Table 1and 2 for details. Committees question: In respect of each of the licences revoked, what was the value of each order which has had its licence revoked? Governments answer: See Table 1 and 2 for details. Committees question: In respect of each country for which licences have been revoked, how many (a) single and (b) open licences remain unrevoked; and what (i) quantities of which military goods and (ii) military services are covered by each of those licences? In each case, what was the value of these goods and services? Governments answer: a) SIELs a) Bahrain: Total number of SIELs 51 (49 Permanent and 2 Temporary) Military SIELs 31 (None Temporary and 31 Permanent) b) Libya Total number of SIELs 18 (12 Permanent and 6 Temporary) Military SIELs 5 (5 Temporary and None Permanent) c) Syria Total number of SIELs 6 (6 Permanent and None Temporary) Military SIELs 0 (None Temporary and None Permanent) b) OIELs a. Total OIELs Bahrain 52 (29 Military OIELs) b. Total OIELs Egypt 63 (31 Military OIELs) c. Total OIELs Libya 9 (4 Military OIELs) d. Total OIELs Syria 8 (No Military OIELs)
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See Tables 3(a) and 3(b) for (i) and (ii) and (b) details of value of licences. Also, see Table 4 for details of OIELs Committees question: Having regard to the Governments information made public to date, why have no (a) individual and (b) open licences been revoked for exports to: a) Saudi Arabia b) Syria c) The Yemen In respect of each of the above countries what quantities of which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to them, and what is the value of these goods and services? Governments answer: Please refer to the answer to Annex 1 Paragraph 24 Q1 [See Ev 72 of this Report] for an explanation as to why licences to Saudi Arabia and Yemen have not been revoked. As referred to in the above answer, one licence for Syria has been revoked. Please refer to Tables 3 (a) and 3(b) (i) and (ii) for details of existing licences and their value, and Tables 4(a) and (b) for details of OIELs. 211. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 19 October 2011284 asking if the Government accepted that the scale and content of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa represented a serious failure by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, Her Majestys Revenue and Customs and the UK Border Agency to fulfil their first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Communitys Joint Mission Statement, namely: We shall implement effectively the UKs framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands [...]285 The Foreign Secretary replied on 7 January 2012 saying that the revocations showed how seriously the Government took the Guiding Principle. He continued: Given the significant changes in the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria.286 212. The Committees have scrutinised closely the Governments continuing approval of export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms and controlled goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression. An Annex setting out some of
284 Ev 143 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 19 October 2011 285 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, HC 1402, page 3 286 Annex 11 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 7 January 2012, Annex A
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these licence approvals from 1 October 2010 to 31 December 2011 is at Annex 6, and updates Annex 4 of the Committees last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011. 213. The Committees recommend that the Government continues to monitor all extant licences for arms exports to authoritarian regimes worldwide which might be used to facilitate internal repression in contravention of British Government policy and to make public promptly any further revocations that it makes.
Countries of concern
Bahrain 214. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government said that two arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar had been revoked because increasing tension in Bahrain put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). 215. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.287 The question and the Foreign Secretarys answer with his letter of 6 February 2012 are reproduced in full as follows: Committees question: In table 1 [of Foreign Secretarys letter to the Chairman dated 30 September 2011] , details are provided of arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b). Governments answer: The two licences which were revoked for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar included Bahrain as a destination and were revoked for this reason only. As there have been no reports of civil unrest in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar and we judged that licences for these countries would still be consistent with the Criteria, licences have not been revoked for these countries unless they are linked with another destination for which licences are being revoked.288 216. Bahrain is not listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.289 217. Following the Arab Spring Bahrain has witnessed essentially peaceful demonstrations which have been responded to by often violent internal repression with deaths,
287 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 288 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 289 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012
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imprisonments and torture. Trials in special security courts have taken place which, according to International Crisis Group, lacked even the semblance of due process of law, including of medical professionals who treated casualties of the protests. International Crisis Group reported that: More significant for the long term perhaps, the violence further polarised a society already divided along sectarian lines and left hopes for political reform in tatters, raising serious questions about the islands stability.290 218. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government said that 41 arms export licences to Bahrain had been revoked because increasing tension in Bahrain put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).291 219. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 4 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Bahrain.292 The 4 questions and the Foreign Secretarys 4 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012293 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Why are there arms export licences still extant for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)? Governments answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are still 11 extant licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography. Seven of these licences were granted for civil end use for telecommunications systems, internet/network connectivity and data connectivity. The remaining four licences are for Government end use to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet connectivity. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of export. Committees question: Why are there export licences still extant for small arms ammunition (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for small arms ammunition have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)? Governments answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are five extant licences for small arms ammunitions. These licences are for sporting shooting and vermin control. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.
290 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrains Rocky Road to Reform,International Crisis Group,16 March 2012, www.crisisgroup.org 291 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 292 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 293 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
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Committees question: Why are there arms export licences for body armour (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for body armour have been revoked (Table 2)? Governments answer: Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There is one extant licence for a small quantity of body armour for personal protection use only. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that this licence remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export. Committees question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Bahrain listed in Table 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELS now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3 this being the Governments Reason for Revocation for every revoked arms export licence listed in Annex 1 of the Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the CAECs last Report (HC 686)? Governments answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Bahrain. In line with normal practice, export licences for Bahrain are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. 220. In the Committees Oral evidence with Ministers on 7 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary was asked for further clarification of the Governments arms export policy towards Bahrain.294 The Foreign Secretarys reply in his letter of 28 February 2012 and attachment headed Export licences for Bahrain in 2011 were as follows: At the CAEC Evidence Session on 7 February I undertook to write with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain. I enclose lists of all the types of licences which have been approved and refused for both countries in 2011. All applications are assessed carefully against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As you will see from the lists we will only export equipment if we are satisfied that it will not be used for internal repression, taking into account the equipment and specified end user. I have included information for the whole of 2011 in order to ensure that the Committees have as full a picture as possible and in view of your request to receive this information quickly. Annex: Export licences for Bahrain in 2011 Three SIELs for Bahrain were refused in 2011 for: Communications equipment; Components for armoured personnel carriers Anti-riot/ballistic shields
294 Qq 123125 and Qq 130133
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These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export L:icensing Criteria). Equipment licensed for export to Bahrain in 2011: SIELs approved in 2011 Dual Use items corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use; communications equipment for civil end use; communications equipment for Government end use (to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet connectivity); inertial equipment for mapping civil end use; NBC detection equipment for chemical agent detection for the Government; air traffic control software for civilian aviation authorities; toxin test kit for the detection of toxins in food samples for civil end use; x-ray accelerators for border control screening purposes. Military rated Goods military aircraft ground equipment, aircrew breathing equipment, military training aircraft, military engines and components for Hawk aircraft for use by the Government; body armour for personal use by a named individual; small quantities of small arms ammunition, guns, rifles and silencers for sporting shooting and vermin control; military radars for Government end use; artillery and equipment for naval or coastal use by the Government; non-lethal training hand grenades for Government end use. They are designed as an aid to basic military training to produce a realistic loud report and a bright flash. They are not designed for use in crowd control. OIELs approved in 2011 Dual Use Items inertial equipment for mapping for use on civil aircraft; hydrophone arrays for the oil and gas industry; corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use; radioactive sources for civil end use. Military Rated Goods tyres and inner tubes for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, military surveillance aircraft, military training aircraft, military transport aircraft, military utility aircraft, military utility helicopters and tanker aircraft for Government end use;
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engines for installation onto trainer and combat aircraft for Government end use; military improvised explosive device disposal equipment and military utility vehicles for defusing devices for Government end use; electronic warfare equipment for naval intelligence gathering, threat warning and naval surveillance for Government end use; aircraft cannon to be used on aircraft for Government end use; small arms ammunition for sporting shooting; components for all wheel drive vehicles for the repair and replacement of parts for Government end use; general naval vessel components for Government end use; communications equipment for temporary export to support sales.
No OIELs for Bahrain were rejected in 2011. Since January 2011, 23 single licences and 18 open licences for Bahrain have been revoked.295 221. In a subsequent Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Bahrain are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed goods or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain will be placed in the Libraries of the House.296 The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Bahrain:
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL Annual Report Summary assault rifles (1), components for assault rifles components for military training aircraft components for military training aircraft equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment sporting guns (1) high performance air traffic control software cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography components for pistols, components for sporting guns, gun Goods Value () 3,620 6,585 630 12,198 4,600 100
SIEL SIEL
1,154,800 21,204
295 Ev 178 Letter and annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 28 February 2012 and Ev 183 Letter and Annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 1 May 2012 296 HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1136W
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Application Type
Annual Report Summary silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), sporting guns (1)
Goods Value ()
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
military aircraft ground equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment equipment employing cryptography components for military aircrew breathing equipment components for military radars artillery, components for artillery, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of artillery, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for artillery, technology for naval guns components for military training aircraft inertial equipment inertial equipment components for military training aircraft components for military aircrew breathing equipment components for military aero-engines small arms ammunition technology for equipment employing cryptography X-ray accelerators body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment technology for equipment employing cryptography corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment training hand grenades components for military training aircraft equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography components for military aircrew breathing equipment components for combat aircraft small arms ammunition
4,421 282,712 2,870,000 19,778 1,034
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
1,248,000 86,281 115,000 15,500 4,845 5,984 40,429 3,638 5,547 1,161,185
21,000 1,068 2,357,700 72,300 627
SIEL
233,080
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
6,108 759 253 76,320
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Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL
Annual Report Summary gun silencers, sporting guns (2), sporting guns (3) components for military aircrew breathing equipment components for military training aircraft equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment equipment employing cryptography components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions components for combat aircraft components for military training aircraft components for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for the use of chemical agent detection equipment components for military training aircraft components for combat aircraft components for military training aircraft components for military training aircraft general military aircraft components equipment for the use of aircraft cannons shotguns (2), small arms ammunition software for the use of military aero-engines components for military training aircraft components for military training aircraft
Goods Value () 19,900 4,443 692
SIEL SIEL SIEL
101,108 2,390 361,500
SIEL SIEL SIEL
1,232,387 15,840 5,123
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
20,339 1,510 6,724 404 552 1,937 1,875 1,840 100 426 6,390
Application Type
Annual Report Summary aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components
OIEL
129
Application Type
Annual Report Summary for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives inertial equipment components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment cryptographic software fibrous/filamentary materials components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment,
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OIEL
130
Application Type
Annual Report Summary components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets
OIEL
components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
131
Application Type
Annual Report Summary electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
132
Application Type
Annual Report Summary aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging countercountermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for airto-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems
133
Application Type
Annual Report Summary goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefore and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fusing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above equipment employing cryptography components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft inertial equipment heading sensors for hydrophone arrays technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles components for electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles general naval vessel components
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL
134
Application Type
Annual Report Summary command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines equipment employing cryptography aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment bomb suits, military helmets
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OITCL
Source: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain placed in the Libraries of the House in response to PQ from Sir John Stanley answered on 27 March 2012, see HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1136W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there is generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.297 222. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 97 extant UK arms export licences to Bahrain now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for assault rifles, sniper rifles, body armour, gun silencers, shotguns, small arms ammunition, pistols, weapon sights and equipment employing cryptography. Egypt 223. Egypt is not listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.298 224. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government said that 47 arms export licences to Egypt had been revoked because increasing tension in Egypt put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).299
297 HC Deb, 27 March 2012, col. 1136W 298 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 299 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1
135
225. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Egypt.300 The 2 questions and the Foreign Secretarys 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012301 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Why are there arms export licences still extant for military communications equipment (Tables 4 and 4(b)) when licences for military communications equipment have been revoked (Table 2)? Governments answer: Extant licences for military communications equipment Table A and 4 (b) identifies export licences (OIELs) that are still extant for military communications equipment (three in total). These permit i) temporary exports of software modules for use during exhibitions, demonstrations, consultancy and personal use by company employees ii) software for military equipment to authorised agents, value added resellers and area partners for marketing and support purposes in country iii) communications equipment and subassemblies for military use such as software for headsets. Following the review of licences for Egypt in February 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of export. Revoked licences for military communications equipment Table two identifies two applications for military communications equipment and software for military communications equipment. These two OIELs were revoked following the review of Egypt extant licences in February. We noted that the goods would offer capability for situational awareness, command and control. Furthermore the second OIEL contained goods for military helmets and components for an integrated helmet system. As the OIELs permitted export to government linked end users, which would in practice enable exports to the internal security forces and the police we judged that these applications were no longer consistent with the Criteria and the Government would request SIEL licences for exports of this nature. Committees question: Is the government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Egypt listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3? Governments answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Egypt. In line with normal practice, export licences for Egypt are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. 226. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Egypt are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the
300 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 301 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
136
licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Egypt will be placed in the Libraries of the House.302 The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Egypt:
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL Annual Report Summary machine tools explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military firing sets equipment employing cryptography Toxins cryptographic software, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment equipment employing cryptography components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection towed hydrophone arrays corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment anti-g/pressure suits submersible equipment submersible equipment components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment equipment employing cryptography inertial equipment body armour, military helmets Goods Value () 100,000 6,065 1,725 8,547
SIEL
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
200 57 1,900 1,698,300 6,896 1,540 120,500 90,300 5,639 21,540 28,710 10,038 1,225 3,427 1,884
302 HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1136W
137
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
Annual Report Summary components for military radars equipment employing cryptography machine tools inertial equipment chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes submersible equipment, submersible vehicles inertial equipment submersible equipment components for military helicopters components for military aero-engines submersible equipment equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography components for weapon control equipment components for targeting equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment components for targeting equipment equipment employing cryptography components for military combat vehicles weapon night sights, weapon sights components for military radars cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography towed hydrophone arrays cryptographic software submersible equipment components for marine location systems, inertial equipment, submersible equipment, underwater electronic imaging systems corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
Goods Value () 77,100 4,000 92,660 100,000 304 991,666 1,286,075 4,308 1,054 348,496 9,947 38,944 558 27,802 108,650 10,063 26,191 367,560 41,800 363,254 2,746 11,700 2,891,566 840 9,947
SIEL
248,000
SIEL
24,030
138
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
Annual Report Summary equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography pressure transducers numerical control software equipment employing cryptography machine tools corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment military aircrew protective equipment chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, training small arms ammunition cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography components for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment software for machine tools components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography inertial equipment toxic gas monitoring equipment submersible equipment submersible equipment submersible equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
Goods Value () 3,217 1,894 1,908 850 7,500 99,880 155,500 200 83,980 1,810 6,097 8,591
SIEL
26,582
SIEL SIEL
50,507 7,500
SIEL
49,703
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
112,748 18,100 1,699 15,500 334 32,300 97,940 64,620 63,522
139
Application Type SIEL SITCL
Annual Report Summary direct view imaging equipment promoting the supply of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
Goods Value () 100,000 135,000
Application Type OIEL
Annual Report Summary
software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment anti-friction bearings components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for military aeroengines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, software for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for the use of chaff equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for the use of fire control equipment, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of military aeroengines, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for the use of military containers, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
140
Application Type OIEL
equipment employing cryptography aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment components for launching equipment for torpedoes, components for mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, components for naval mines, components for torpedoes, components for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, equipment for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of naval mines, equipment for the use of torpedoes, equipment for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, launching equipment for torpedoes, mine countermeasures equipment, mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, software for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, software for the use of mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of naval mines, software for the use of torpedoes, software for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of naval mines, technology for the use of torpedoes, technology for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for launching equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for mine countermeasures equipment, test equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for naval mines, test equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, torpedoes, training equipment for mine sweeping equipment cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-tosurface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
141
Application Type
military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles OIEL components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of weapon control systems, test equipment for guided missile decoying equipment, test equipment for weapon control systems software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment equipment employing cryptography accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
142
Application Type
OIEL
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography inertial equipment components for military aero-engines cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped cutting charges, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems inertial equipment heading sensors for hydrophone arrays fibrous/filamentary materials inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment equipment employing cryptography components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems general naval vessel components towed hydrophone arrays components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment components for demolition devices, demolition devices body armour, components for rifles, military communications equipment,
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OITCL OITCL
143
Application Type
military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights OITCL OITCL body armour, combat shotguns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition assault rifles, body armour, machine guns, military helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights promoting the supply of assault rifles, promoting the supply of clips for assault rifles, promoting the supply of clips for rifles, promoting the supply of clips for sniper rifles, promoting the supply of clips for sporting guns, promoting the supply of combat shotguns, promoting the supply of components for assault rifles, promoting the supply of components for rifles, promoting the supply of components for sniper rifles, promoting the supply of components for sporting guns, promoting the supply of rifles, promoting the supply of small arms ammunition, promoting the supply of sniper rifles, promoting the supply of sporting guns, promoting the supply of weapon night sights, promoting the supply of weapon sights
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
Source: A list of the strategic export control licences that remain extant for Bahrain placed in the Libraries of the House in response to PQ from Sir John Stanley answered on 27 March 2012, see HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1136W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there is generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.303 227. On 26 April 2012 the FCO Minister Alistair Burt wrote to the Chairman of the CAEC, Sir John Stanley, as follows:
303 HC Deb, 27 March 2012, col. 1136W
144
Egypt and Arms Export Licensing The presidential elections in Egypt are due to take place next month. I thought it would be helpful to provide you with a view of the current political situation, together with information on how we are handling export licence applications to that country. Current Political Situation There continues to be frustration among the political class about the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) handling of the transition. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is increasing the pressure on the interim government and threatening to call for its replacement by one based on Parliamentary representation, through a vote of no-confidence. This reflects increasing public signs of tension between the MB and the SCAF. The parliamentary elections marked an important step in Egypts political transition. The MBs block, Democratic Alliance, secured about 47% of the sets in the Lower House and the Salafi alliance 24%. Secular/liberal groups have about 16%, former regime elements 3%, and other parties and independents the rest. Elections for the Upper House passed peacefully, and delivered another commanding Islamist performance: the MB secured 58% of the seats, and the Salafis 25%. Voting for the Presidential elections is scheduled for 23/24 May, final results on 21 June and handover to civilian rule by 1 July. The Supreme Presidential Election Committee (SPEC) announced on 14 April 12 that ten of the 23 Presidential candidates had been disqualified, including the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Khairat el Shater, and former Head of the Ghad party Ayman Nour. We understand that the SPEC has now upheld rulings disqualifying all ten candidates. On 24 March, both Houses of the Egyptian Parliament elected the Constitutional Assembly (CA) in charge of drafting Egypts new Constitution. Many of the liberal and secular parties walked out in protest at what they regarded as Islamist domination of the process and the nominees. On 10 April, an Egyptian court suspended the CA as a result of a lawsuit filed by activists and liberals. It now seems unlikely that the drafting of the new Constitution will be in place before the handover of power on 1 July. We believe it is important that the drafting of a new Constitution is completed through an inclusive process, and delivers a Constitution which represents the interests of all the Egyptian people. There are a number of areas where we have concerns about human rights in Egypt. These include limits imposed by the authorities on freedom of expression; the use of unacceptable violence against peaceful protesters; an increase in the number of prosecutions of bloggers and activists for criticising the authorities; increasing use of military trials for civilians; virginity tests on women and allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the security services. In May 2010 amendments had been introduced to limit the application of the Emergency Law to terrorism and drug crimes. However, on 11 September 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reinstated the full powers of the
145
Emergency Law, as a response to growing concerns about the security situation, including the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. Freedom of association has been progressively restricted over the past year, with some civil society groups, particularly those working on human rights and transparency, facing Government obstruction and harassment. This culminated in raids on 29 December against local and international NGOs accused of taking foreign funding illegally while not being properly registered. Employees of these NGOs were summoned to stand trial and placed under a travel ban. On 1 March, after intense negotiations and US lobbying, the Egyptians lifted the travel ban on some NGO staff, allowing US nationals to leave Egypt. However, broader NGO issues (registration requirements, harassment of Egyptian NGO staff) and wider concerns about commitment of the SCAF and Egyptian government to democracy remain. We continue to raise these and other concerns with the Egyptian authorities. Export Licences for Egypt You will already be aware that, as events unfolded in Egypt in February 2011, the Government urgently reviewed all existing export licence applications and those already issued. We started a revocation process within 3 days of the events unfolding. We revoked 36 individual licences and removed Egypt as a destination from eight open licences, with immediate effect. The goods included components for aircraft, components for armoured personnel carriers and secure communications equipment. Subsequently we have taken steps to ensure that export licence applications for Egypt are scrutinised very carefully. Applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the current political situation and other events on the ground, factoring in the latest information and analysis from our Embassy in Cairo. We pay particular attention to and make a full assessment of the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in the country (Criterion 3). Given the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Egypt, all applications for police and military end-users are scrutinised particularly carefully. Ministers have been and continue to be consulted on all applications for equipment where there is a potential risk that the goods could be used for internal repression. Taking into account the end user and the nature of the equipment, applications will only be approved where we are satisfied that there is not a clear risk that the goods might be used in contravention of Criteria 2 and 3. We are aware of the reports that UK-manufactured tear gas has been used in Egypt. No licences for the export of tear gas to Egypt have been granted since 1999. Since that time UK export controls have been radically overhauled including through the
146
passing of the Export Control Act 2002 and the adoption of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.304 228. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 124 extant UK arms export licences to Egypt now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for body armour, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, combat shotguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, pistols and cryptography . Libya 229. Libya is listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.305 230. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government said that 72 arms export licences to Libya had been revoked because increasing tension in Libya put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).306 231. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Libya.307 The question and the Foreign Secretarys answer with his letter of 6 February 2012308 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant licences for Libya listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3? Governments answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Libya. In line with normal practice, export licences for Libya are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.
304 Ev 181 Letter from Alistair Burt dated 26 April 2012 305 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 306 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 307 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 308 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
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232. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Libya are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Libya:
Application type SIEL SIEL SIEL Annual report summary Goods value () 272,023 32,579 77,093,000
neutron generators inertial equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment devices for initiating explosives, linear cutting explosive charges components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment bomb suits, components for bomb suits, military helmets components for military equipment for initiating explosives components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives Libyan bank notes and coins Libyan bank notes and coins all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
SIEL
77,093,000
SIEL SIEL
43,354 2,032,500
SIEL SIEL SIEL
210 3,122 102,725
SIEL
137,152
SIEL SIEL
94,490 2,500
SIEL
16,950
SIEL SIEL SITCL SITCL SITCL
1,088,560 31,000,000 163,500 145,000 233,170
148
Application type OIEL OIEL
Annual report summary
cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OITCL
Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 113637W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.309 233. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 24 extant UK arms export licences to Libya now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . Saudi Arabia 234. Saudi Arabia is listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.310 235. In Annex 4 to its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011, the Committees listed selected UK arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms that could be used for internal repression. Those listed as approved for Saudi Arabia in 2009 were: components for combat aircraft, CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, sniper rifles, small calibre artillery ammunition and small arms ammunition. Those listed and approved in 2010 up to 30 September of that year were: components for combat aircraft, sniper rifles,
309 HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 113637W 310 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012
149
armoured personnel carriers, small arms ammunition and components for combat aircraft.311 236. Following the Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report, the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 18 July 2011 asking why no individual or open licences had been revoked for exports to Saudi Arabia, and also asking which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to Saudi Arabia and the value of those goods and services.312 The Committees question and the Foreign Secretarys reply with his letter to the Committees Chairman of 30 September 2011313 as to why no arms export licences to Saudi Arabia have been revoked are reproduced in paragraph 210 above. Details of the extant licences to Saudi Arabia, including the values of extant Military SIELs, provided with the Foreign Secretarys reply to the Committees Chairman of 30 September 2011, can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 99121. 237. In the House of Commons debate on the Committees last Report, which took place on 20 October 2011, the Chairman of the Committees highlighted the possible use for internal repression of some of the UK arms exports approved to Saudi Arabia, as detailed in the Tables set out in Ev 75141. He said: [...]I intend to offer hon. Members the details of just one little box among the multitude of boxes relating to extant export licences to Saudi Arabia. It refers to assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition. That is just one little box among a multitude, and hon. Members will immediately see that each and every one of the items to which I have referred is usable for internal repression.314 238. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia.315 The question and the Foreign Secretarys answer with his letter of 6 February 2012 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report Ev 75141): Committees question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?
311 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, Annex 4 312 Ev 63 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 18 July 2011 313 Ev 67 letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, 314 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 343WH 315 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012
150
Governments answer: We are clear that the identified SIELs do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We examined extant licences following the unrest in Saudi Arabia and we were satisfied that licences remained and continue to remain consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government, In line with normal practice, export licences for Saudi Arabia are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.316 239. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it applies different or the same considerations in deciding whether or not to approve arms export licences to Saudi Arabia to those applied to other countries in the region and, if different, what those considerations are. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 288 extant UK arms export licences to Saudi Arabia now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for: Components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, armoured personnel carriers, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for water cannon, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles. Syria 240. Syria is listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.317 241. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Syria had been revoked.318 However, the Foreign
316 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 317 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012
151
Secretary in Table 1, SIEL revocations since 18 February 2011, provided details of one licence to Syria for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles that had been revoked.319 242. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Syria.320 The 2 questions and the Foreign Secretarys 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012321 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Is the figure of only one arms export licence revocation to Syria stated in Annex B, paragraph 1, this being for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles, correct given that a further licence revocation of small arms ammunition to Syria was detailed by the BIS Minister Mark Prisk in his Written Answer to Sir John Stanley on October 10 (Column 258W)? Governments answer: There has been one licence revocation for Syria for small arms ammunition. The licence for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles is in fact a licence that was revoked for Libya and not for Syria. Committees question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant licences for Syria listed in Table 4 with values for SIELs, including the licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, contravene Criteria 2 and 3? Governments answer: We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Table 4 contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Syria. In line with normal practice, export licences for Syria are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. 243. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Syria are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Syria:
Application type SITCL Annual report summary Goods value () 201,064
Promoting the supply of all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
318 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 319 Ev 67 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011, Table 1 320 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 321 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
152
Application type SITCL SIEL
Goods value () 201,064 137,737
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Components for general industrial production equipment Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes Personal protective equipment Equipment employing cryptography
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
10,000 10,200 13,454 199,209
Application type OITCL OIEL
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 col. 1137W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.322 244. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 9 extant UK arms export licences to Syria now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and cryptography . Tunisia 245. Tunisia is not listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.323 246. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that 2 arms export licences to Tunisia had been revoked because increasing
322 HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, col 1137W 323 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012
153
tension in Tunisia put them in contravention of Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict).324 247. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put 2 further questions to the Government about UK arms exports to Tunisia.325 The questions and the Foreign Secretarys 2 answers with his letter of 6 February 2012326 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Why were the arms export licence revocations to Tunisia detailed in the Governments response (Cm 8079) not included in Table 1 and/or 2? Governments answer: Tables 1 and 2 were produced in answer to a question which asked about revocations made since the Government announced its review of licences on 18 February 2011. The licences in question were revoked earlier. Committees question: The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Tunisia appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Tunisia in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b). Governments answer: As noted above the tables were produced in response to a question which excluded the Tunisia revocations and therefore we did not include details of the extant licences for Tunisia. Tables with details of the extant licences for Tunisia similar to those provided for other countries are enclosed with this reply. [The Tables are included in the evidence to this Report at Ev 160] 248. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Tunisia are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Tunisia:
Application type SIEL Annual report summary Goods value () 16,320
Components for control equipment for man portable air defence systems Equipment employing cryptography Components for aircraft radars
SIEL SIEL
4,200,000 58,232
324 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 325 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 326 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
154
Application type SIEL SIEL SIEL
Goods value () 2,568 7,381 15,058
Military helmets Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment Components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment Animal pathogens Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment Goods treated for signature suppression for military use Equipment employing cryptography Military support vehicles Components for equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Controlled atmosphere furnaces Equipment employing cryptography Civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Components for military support aircraft Components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas Goods treated for signature suppression for military use All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
10 320,000 544 20,854
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
3,114,000 270 25,000 170 750,100 825,000 9,570 28,591
194 268 1,867 720,170 480,127
SIEL SITCL
65,000 135,000
Application type OIEL OIEL
Cryptographic software Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment
155
Application type OIEL
Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays Components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft Cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped cutting charges, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems Inertial equipment Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays Components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars General naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components Components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment Fibrous/filamentary materials Inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment Components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aeroengines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OIEL
156
Application type
helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines OIEL Components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems Command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software Small arms ammunition Aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment Neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL OITCL
Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 cols. 113739W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there are generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.327 249. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 47 extant UK arms export licences to Tunisia now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms ammunition and cryptography . Yemen 250. Yemen is listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.328 251. In its Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees last Report (HC686) the Government indicated that no arms export licences to Yemen had been revoked.329
327 HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 113739W 328 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012
157
252. In his letter to the Foreign Secretary of 16 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees put a further question to the Government about UK arms exports to Yemen.330 The question and the Foreign Secretarys answer with his letter of 6 February 2012331 are reproduced in full as follows (The Tables referred to in the Governments responses can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141): Committees question: Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Yemen listed in tables 3(a), 3(b) and 4 with values for SIELs, . including licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour, contravene Criteria 2 and 3? Governments answer: We are clear that the identified extant SIEL licences for equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. In line with normal practice, export licences for Yemen are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. 253. In the Committees Oral evidence with Ministers on 7 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary was asked for further clarification of the Governments arms export policy towards Yemen.332 The Foreign Secretarys reply in his letter of 28 February 2012 and attachment headed Export licences for Yemen in 2011 were as follows: At the CAEC Evidence Session on 7 February I undertook to write with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain. I enclose lists of all the types of licences which have been approved and refused for both countries in 2011. All applications are assessed carefully against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As you will see from the lists we will only export equipment if we are satisfied that it will not be used for internal repression, taking into account the equipment and specified end user. I have included information for the whole of 2011 in order to ensure that the Committees have as full a picture as possible and in view of your request to receive this information quickly. Export licences for Yemen in 2011 We receive very few export licence applications for Yemen. Equipment licensed for export in 2011: SIELS approved in 2011.
329 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1 330 Ev 152 Letter from the Chairman dated 16 January 2012 331 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 332 Qq 123125 and Qq 130133
158
Dual Use Items A portable chemical identifier returned after repair in the UK to be used by the security authorities in Yemen.
Military Rated Goods Body armour and one vehicle to be used by UN personnel; Armoured vehicle for use by the UN; One engine for the C130 Hercules military transport aircraft used in Yemen to assist international partners. Two SIELS for Yemen were refused in 2011 for: body armour riot shields
These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria). Open Licences refused components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment to a civil end user.
No export licences for Yemen were revoked in 2011.333 254. In a Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees Chairman, Sir John Stanley, asked which UK strategic export control licences to Yemen are currently extant, and what the nature and quantity of the licensed or services are under each licence. The Business Minister, Mark Prisk, replied on 27 March 2012: The following strategic export control licences remain extant for Yemen:
Application type SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL Annual report summary Goods value () 70,000 43,288
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Body armour
Military aero-engines
819,930
Body armour
1,444
333 Ev 178 Letter and annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 28 February 2012and Ev 183 Letter and Annex from the Foreign Secretary dated 1 May 2012
159
Application type (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
Goods value ()
Components for military cameras, equipment for the use of military cameras, technology for the use of military cameras, test equipment for military cameras
85,858
Application type OIEL
Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography Heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
Source: HC Deb 27 March 2012 cols. 113940W
Values of items licensed for export have been provided for extant Standard Individual Export Licences. No values are given for extant Open Individual Export Licences because there no [sic] generally no limit to the quantities that may be exported under these licences and it is not possible for exporters to provide this information when they make a licence application.334 255. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it remains satisfied that none of the 11 extant UK arms export licences to Yemen now contravenes the Governments stated policy that: The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression including those licences for allwheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components and equipment for military cameras and cryptographic equipment and technology.
334 HC Deb, 27 Mar 2012, cols 113940W
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Argentina 256. Argentina is not listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.335 The Committees have compiled from the Governments quarterly arms export reports details of the arms export licences to Argentina that the Government approved from 1 April 2010 up to 31 December 2011. These are set out in Annex 9. 257. On 26 April 2012, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committees Chairman advising the Committees of a change in the Governments export controls to Argentina and of a Written Ministerial Statement being made by the Business Secretary that day.336 The Foreign Secretarys letter was as follows: I am writing to advise you about a change in our export controls to Argentina. The Business Secretary has today laid before the House a Written Ministerial Statement relating to a tightening of our export controls to Argentina. I enclose a copy. Since 1998 our approach has been to refuse exports which would allow Argentina to enhance her military capabilities but to approve licences for goods which maintained existing capability. As members of the Committees are aware from our response to questions on the BIS quarterly reports, our exports to Argentina have included components for aircraft and naval vessels for maintenance purposes. In view of recent Argentine actions aimed at the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders, the Government has concluded that it is now appropriate to review this policy. With effect from today we are introducing new restrictions on the export of licensable trade and brokering to the Argentine military. In future no licences will be granted for military or dual use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so. Extant licences will be reviewed with a view to revoking any which are not consistent with this new policy. The Business Secretarys Written Ministerial Statement was as follows: Export Control Policy The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable): I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.
335 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 336 Ev 181 letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 26 April 2012
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The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy. New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military will now be introduced with immediate effect. In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. We will review extant licences for military goods to the Argentine armed forces with a view to revoking any that are not consistent with the revised policy. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.337 258. The Committees conclude that the Governments decision to tighten controls on the licensing of, and trade in (trafficking and broking), controlled goods and technology to military end users in Argentina is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report: a) what are the exceptional circumstances in which the Government is still willing to consider approving export licences for military or dual-use goods being supplied to military end users in Argentina; b) what licences for military goods to Argentine armed forces have been revoked; c) what UK strategic export control licences for Argentina remain extant; and d) what steps the Government is taking to get the US Government, the Governments of EU Member States, and the Governments of other countries who export military goods, military technology and dual-use goods to Argentina to make the same change of policy as that announced by the British Government. China 259. China is listed as a Country of Concern in the FCOs latest Human Rights report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012.338 260. The EU arms embargo to China was adopted by the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.339 The arms embargo, was adopted in the form of a European Council Declaration (or Common Policy) prior to the creation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and so is not legally binding on Member States. Our predecessor Committees examined the arms embargo in
337 HC Deb, 26 April 2012, Col 43WS 338 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 339 EU Declaration on China Arms Embargo European Council: Madrid 2627 June 1989
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detail and concluded that it was of political importance in that it provided a strong message in relation to the promotion of human rights in China.340 261. The potential lifting of the embargo was first discussed at an EU-level in 2004, when both France and Germany argued that the reasons for first imposing the embargo (chiefly Tiananmen Square) were out-dated. The 2004 European Council "reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo" and recalled the importance of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries in preventing an increase in arms sales to China from EU Member States.341 Some in the EU, led by France and Spain, have again called for the lifting of the embargo.342 262. In its last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011, the Committees made the following recommendation with regard to the arms export embargo on China: We recommend that in view of the continuing serious human rights violations taking place in China, the Government maintains its position of fully supporting the retention of the EU arms embargo on China.343 In its Response (Cm 8079) the Government replied: There is a broad consensus within the EU that the time is not right to lift the EU Arms Embargo on China. We would need to see clear progress on the issue that necessitated the Embargo in the first place, namely civil and political rights.344 263. On 25 January 2012, the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows: The quarterly Arms Export Licence approvals published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the first three quarters for 2011 included the following licence approvals of arms exports to China: 1st January 31st March 2011 body armour equipment for the production of military communications equipment general military vehicle components small arms ammunition (2 licences) technology for military communications equipment weapon sights
340 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC 202, paras 114119 341 European Council, 1617 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions 342 The EU and arms for China, The Economist, 1 February 2010 343 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 120 344 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, p 16
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1st April 30th May aircraft military communications equipment (2 licences) components for combat aircraft (2 licences) components for combat naval vessels components for military aero-engines components for military patrol/assault craft unfinished products for military aero-engines (2 licences) st 1 July 30th September body armour technology for military communications equipment (2 licences) cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography aircraft military communications equipment components for combat helicopters components for military helicopters Please would you provide the Committees with an explanation of why licences were granted for the export of these arms to China notwithstanding the UK/EU Consolidated Criteria and the Declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 that established an arms embargo on China. The Committees have noted that the UK Governments interpretation of the embargo, as stated in the quarterly Arms Export licence approvals, is that the embargo applies to; lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components of these item and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; and any other equipment which might be used for internal repression.345 On 6 February 2012 the Foreign Secretary replied to the Chairmans letter. The Foreign Secretarys reply was as follows: Thank you for your letter of 25 January in which you raise concerns about the Arms Export licence approvals for China that were published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the first three quarters of 2011. All export licences for China are not only assessed against the terms of Consolidated Criteria and the EU Arms Embargo, including the possibility of diversion. Please be assured that we take the China arms embargo very seriously and are confident that it was not breached in the cases that you have highlighted. All export licences for China are not only assessed against Criteria One of the Consolidated Criteria which covers our commitment to the EU Arms Embargo, but also taking into account the remaining Criteria. A full assessment is carried out
345 Ev 154 Letter from the Chairman to the Foreign Secretary dated 25 January 2012
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covering a number of factors including the nature of the goods, the stated end-use and end-user, the risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user, the risk of the proposed export being used for internal repression, and the regional peace, security and stability. We receive a large number of licence applications for China and the majority are for end users in the commercial, low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and development fields. Some items are military rated but are not caught by the EU Arms Embargo, such as military rated items for non-lethal purposes i.e. industrial components or NBC equipment for use by environmental agencies. The UK interpretation of the China Arms Embargo covers: lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles Specially designed components of the above and ammunition Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapon platforms Any equipment which might be used for internal repression
Please note components of complete military platforms such as helicopters and aircraft are not covered by the Embargo. We have taken each of the general goods descriptions in your letter and have endeavoured to provide you with further details that will explain the nature of the goods and therefore the reasons for approval. These are attached in the Annex to this letter. I hope this addresses your concerns.346 The unclassified Annex was as follows: Annex A Breakdown of Licences Approved for China Body Armour
The goods were for use by a global technical textile manufacturing company with a site in China capable of producing low cost manufacturing. The armoured vests were sent for testing at a police facility. After testing they would be damaged to the point of destruction and sent back to the supplier in the UK for examination and study. There were no criteria 2 concerns in this case as there was no clear risk of internal repression. Equipment for the production of military communications equipment
346 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012
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The goods in this case (Multi Socket Connection Box and Frontier 1600 Cable Test Box) were Equipment Test Units to be used in the manufacture of cable assemblies which would then be incorporated into headsets for worldwide distribution by the exporter in the UK. There were no criteria concerns raised. General military vehicle components
The equipment exported under this licence was Lightweight Crew Seats to a University for research into whether the seats would be suitable for internal and military security vehicles but not for "military vehicle projects". There was no clear risk that the proposed export would be used for internal repression. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. Therefore, these seats were not covered by the embargo. Small arms ammunition
In the two cases highlighted, the equipment was for sporting and training purposes and for the sporting purpose of target shooting. In both cases, the equipment was supplied by a specialist manufacturer of sporting ammunition. The ammunition supplied were sports shooting cartridges, specially designed for training and sporting purposes. Sports ammunition is not caught under the arms embargo and as there was no clear risk of diversion, no criteria 2 concerns were raised. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed nonlethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. This product is not caught by the UK interpretation of the arms embargo on China. Technology for military communications equipment
In this case, the goods exported were technical drawings for use in the manufacture (moulding) of parts to be used on cable assemblies. The end user is a global electronics manufacturing services (EMS) provider that serves original equipment manufacturers in technology-related industries such as communications and computer hardware. Singapore is one of their manufacturing sites. The moulded parts would be returned to Singapore who will then integrate them into headsets. These headsets will be distributed globally by the exporter in compliance with UK Export Control. This was confirmed by the British manufacturer. There were no criteria concerns in this case as the moulds were due to be returned to Singapore. Weapon sights
These goods were telescopic sights originally designed for target shooting purposes (day time, not night vision). In this instance the goods were being returned to the original manufacturer in China as they were faulty. They were being returned for
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study and evaluation of defects and subsequent scrapping. The equipment was therefore deemed exempt from the China arms embargo. Aircraft military communications equipment
In one case, the applicant was returning the unaltered items (antennas) to the manufacturer as they were beyond economic repair. As such the parts were not expected to be fitted into any form of aircraft. As the goods were faulty and did not pose any risks, there were no criteria concerns. In the other case, the items were analogue aircraft band transceivers capable of working in Amplitude Modulation on both the Civilian 108 - 135 MHz Aircraft band and the Military 225 - 400MHz aircraft band. The transmitters were to be used by the end user for communication during construction and maintenance of a communications network and an EUU check confirmed they would not be used for military purposes. Open sources indicated that the end user is a provider of communication access equipment and network solutions. As the civil end use was considered legitimate, there were no criteria concerns raised for this application. Components for combat naval vessel /Components for Military patrol/assault craft
In both cases, the goods in question were propeller shaft seals and spares that do not fall under the arms embargo. We will allow non lethal equipment with a military end use to be exported. These parts were standard components originally designed for commercial cruise liners 40 years ago and had not been designed or modified for military use. They would not provide any enhancement of combat capabilities once fitted onto the vessels. As the parts have a degree of wear and tear these seals are routinely inspected and replaced once they have deteriorated. Unfinished products for military aero-engines
The products were spare parts for the aero-engine and Rear end Forgings for an Engine. The components were sent to China to be machined to a certain specification by the exporter in the UK and will be used for spares, with eventual incorporation into the engines by the ultimate end user, the exporter, based in the UK. . Despite the classification of military, this equipment is for industrial purposes only. The UK interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed, non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. These products did not fall under the categories listed above and is therefore not caught by the arms embargo on China as the current UK interpretation stands. Cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography
End users in these cases were consumer services and the products were dual use. Some examples are: In two cases the equipment would be used for patient monitoring and care in
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emergency rooms, intensive care and critical care units and incorporated into a wireless application for a portable medical device for use in hospitals. In some cases the equipment was used for a support system for smartcards based around a banking payment system, whilst other equipment was used to enable secure internet connectivity across communications networks. Components for combat and Military helicopters
These were for commercial and civilian end use. Some examples are: Two disposable filter elements that were exported for permanent exhibition use in China initially for a Heli Expo Show, whilst a Fan Assembly Unit exported for scientific research into the potential use on a commercial airship. Other goods exported were automatic reservoir bleed valves used to release entrapped air and/or other gases during repair and overhaul of components in aircraft. These valves were parts of a hydraulic system which the end user would use to release gas after carrying out tests and are therefore a maintenance tool. The goods were low specification and would not add to the capabilities of a military aircraft. The export of such components and any resulting military aircraft operations is too far removed in cases such as this, so there were no criteria 4 concerns. 347 264. The EUs 13th Annual Arms Export Report was published on 30 December 2011.348 Pages 348351 of the Report detail arms exports to China (Hong Kong), China (Macao) and China (Mainland) from EU Member States in 2010 notwithstanding the EU Embargo. The UK Government, according to the EU Report, in 2010 approved 180 out of the total 199 arms export licences to China (Hong Kong), 3 out of the total of 18 to China (Macao) and 349 out of the total of 550 to China (Mainland). On the EUs published statistics the UK Government appears to have approved more arms export licences to China than any other EU Member States. 265. The Committees conclude that given the lack of clear progress on civil and political rights in China, the Governments support for the EU Arms Embargo on China to continue is welcome. The Committees recommend that the Government provides in its Response to this Report an explanation as to why, according to the EUs latest Report, the UK Government in 2010 gave a larger number of arms export licence approvals to China than any other EU Member State notwithstanding the EU Arms Export Embargo on China.
347 Ev 156 Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 6 February 2012 348 Official Journal of the European Union, Thirteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, 30 December 2011
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266. The Committees scrutiny of the Governments arms export policy review for countries in the Middle East and North Africa, first announced on 18 February 2011, is set out in paragraphs 192208 above. 267. In their last Report (HC686), published on 5 April 2011, the Committees made the following recommendation: We further recommend that the Government extends immediately its review of UK arms export licences announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February 2011 to authoritarian regimes worldwide in respect of arms or components of arms which could be used for internal repression.349 The Government in its Response (Cm 8079) replied: The Foreign Secretary has commissioned a review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods. Although this review was originally commissioned in response to events in the Middle East and North Africa, any conclusions will apply to our procedures for arms exports to all countries. The FCO is leading this internal review in close consultation with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Government will be reporting back on the review to Parliament. This will take place once the Foreign Secretary has fully considered the findings of the review.350 As the Chairman of the Committees pointed out in the House of Commons debate on the Committees last Report on 20 October 2011, the Governments statement in its Response that any conclusions from its review would apply to its procedures for arms exports to all countries was a different matter from the Committees particular recommendation, which was whether the Government would extend its review to to authoritarian regimes worldwide.351 268. The Committees returned to their recommendation in the Oral evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012. The complete exchange was as follows: Chair: Foreign Secretary, we are going to move on to an important recommendation which we made in our last report, in which we recommended that you should extend your review of arms export policy to authoritarian regimes worldwide.
349 CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, HC686, para 135 350 Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010-12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Pp 1920 351 HC Deb, 20 October 2011, Col 343WH
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Q134 Chris White: Secretary of State, extending that, we were just thinking it should not just be the Middle East and North Africa, it should be to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why was this recommendation not implemented? Mr Hague: Our review covers our global policycovers the whole thing, whatever the nature of the regime. Of course, it is events in the Middle East and North Africa that have given rise to it. But this is a change to our procedures overall, including authoritarian regimes. As the Chairman has pointed out, such issues can arise in other countries as well. So for the purposes of this policy, we are not only concerned with authoritarian regimes. The change in procedures that I have announced and that Vince Cable has been talking about, are changes in procedures globally. Q135 Chair: Yes, Foreign Secretary, but that does not answer the particular question that the Committees have put to you. It is one thing to look at the global application of the results of your review. We put a different recommendation to you, that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why did you not accept that recommendation? Mr Hague: For this reason, Mr Chairman, this is a worldwide review. It is about our policy towards all regimes of any kind. If you are saying should we have had a particular study of authoritarian regimes Q136 Chair: That was the recommendation of this Committee. We asked you to extend your review not just to authoritarian countries in North Africa and the Middle East, but to authoritarian countries worldwide. That was our recommendation, and you chose not to accept it. Mr Hague: Yes, because it was not confined to the Middle East. If we implement thoroughly, as we certainly intend to do, the changes in procedures that I talked about earliermore systematic reporting of human rights risks, using a wider range of information, more systematic use of predictive tools and the requirement of enduse monitoring by overseas postsit will capture what is going on in authoritarian regimes, as well as the rest of the world. So, of course they are included; what is going on all over the world is included in these changes of procedures. Q137 Chair: The Committees understand that the outcome of the review is going to be applied globally by the Government, but the issue that the Committees put to you was that you should extend your review to authoritarian regimes worldwide authoritarian regimes in Africa, in Asia and conceivably in one or two countries in South Americaand ask yourselves the same questions that you have posed to yourselves on North Africa and the Middle East: do all the extant export licences that we have granted to these authoritarian regimes still comply with criteria 2 and 3? You have not done that. Why not? Mr Hague: It is a global review. I go back to the same answer. Really you are saying that there should be a bigger change in policy. Q138 Chair: No, we are saying that there should have been a bigger change in the geographical scope of the review that you carried out.
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Mr Hague: I am saying that there is no limit to its geographical scope. Every kind of regime and every kind of country is captured in this review. Clearly, we do not have a meeting of minds here, and I have not seen any other country where we should change our policy and revoke the licences, because the circumstances have not changed. We focused the review on practical change, and I have adopted all the recommendations of the review. I think I see what the Committee is getting at, but we chose to do it in a different way. I did not agree with the recommendation of the Committee.352 269. In its latest Human Rights Report, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, the FCO has listed a total of 28 countries of human rights concern. These are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The Committees have set out in Annex 7 examples of export licence applications approved by the Government from 1 January to 31 December 2011 to these countries of controlled goods that might be used to facilitate internal repression. 270. The Committees conclude that the Governments stated policy is to refuse arms export licences which might be used to facilitate internal repression and not merely to await internal repression becoming patently clear. The Committees therefore continue to recommend that the Government extends its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide.
352 Qq 134138
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Annex 1: The Committees quarterly licence questions and the Government answers (2010 Q3 & 4, 2011 Q1, Q2, & Q3)
Following the quarterly publication of the list of licence approvals, refusals and appeals by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills the Committees have compiled a series of questions to obtain more information about the licences approved, rejected or appealed. Following discussions between the Committees and Government Departments in 2011 it was agreed that the Committees would publish the Committees questions and the Governments non-classified answers as from Q3 2010. These are reproduced below. Note: The Committees questions are in normal type and the Governments answers are in bold italic type.
Note: OIEL: Open Individual Export Licence; SIEL: Standard Individual Export Licence; OITCL: Open Individual Trade Control Export Licence; SITCL: Standard Individual Trade Control Export Licence
The Committees 2010 Quarter 3 (July September) questions and the Governments answers
The Committees would be grateful for more information about why the following licences were granted or refused during the third quarter (July-September) of 2011: Angola: OIEL refused for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets. This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs due to potential Criterion 5c (risk of reverse engineering) and Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Argentina: SIELs issued for components for destroyers, components for military utility helicopters and products containing plutonium-239. a) The goods (components for destroyers) were components to complete repairs. The Government concluded at the time of approval that despite previous hostilities there were no Criterion 5 concerns. b) The goods in this application (components for military utility helicopters) were for helicopters used in civil search and rescue operations. Approval was therefore recommended in the absence of any sustainable reason under the Criteria to the contrary.
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c) The goods (samples containing plutonium-239) were for use in a worldwide environmental radioactivity proficiency (blind) test exercise. The countries who took part in this proficiency test were then granted the correct accreditation. The Government considered that no criteria thresholds were breached. Azerbaijan: OIEL refused for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Specifically, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why this OIEL was refused when two apparently identical OIELs were issued. This OIEL was rejected because of concerns related to the value of the goods proposed for export. The exporter was asked to apply for SIELs instead. Subsequently OIELs were approved as the values of the exports did not raise any Criterion 8 concerns, otherwise being similar to the previous OIEL. Bahrain: OIEL issued for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades. The application was approved in August 2010. On the basis of the evidence available at the time we concluded that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression or diverted to an undesirable end-use. The Government reviewed export licences to Bahrain in February 2011 in light of the changed circumstances in that country. As a result Bahrain was removed as an eligible destination from this OIEL. Bulgaria: OIEL issued for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets. This application was for equipment to be used by, or under the supervision or instructions of employees of, a private company in provision of oilfield production services. The application therefore presented no Criteria concerns. China: SIELs issued for technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment employing cryptography (33 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (9 licences) and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
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Licences for cryptographic software were granted for export to commercial telecommunications companies who supply secure communications, for example wireless network connectivity, secure broadband networks and business radio networks. These applications were in line with the Consolidated Criteria. The exports in question cannot be used to mount cyber attacks. The Committees would also be grateful for further information about why two SIELs were issued for China for computer analogue to digital equipment, given that two SIELs for identical equipment were refused. The two SIELs granted for computer analogue to digital equipment were for civil enduses such as provision of wireless communications & networking. These applications raised no concerns against the Consolidated Criteria. The two licences were rejected under Criteria 5 and 7 as the equipment was a high specification and there was a clear risk of diversion to the military. Colombia: OIEL refused for bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets. This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELS due to potential Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. This was based on the type of equipment to be supplied and the situation in Colombia at the time of the application. Hong Kong Administrative Region: SIELs issued for cryptographic software (8 licences) equipment employing cryptography (20 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (8 licences). A majority of these applications were for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography for communications companies who supply secure communications, for example to provide banks with secure network data transfer. Only one licence was issued for imaging cameras and one issued for semiconductor process equipment. Both were issued to Universities for civil research purposes into medical science and electronics. All these applications were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns for the stated end use and end users. India: SIELs issued for components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment (3 licences). a) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This was equipment to be used in manufacturing a chemical which is used as a fungicide and parasiticide. b) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. The application related to a part which was to be incorporated into equipment used in a steel manufacturing plant.
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c) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This was equipment to be used in an oil refinery. d) Components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This equipment was spare parts for other equipment exported for end use in an oil refinery. Iran: Given the existence of an extensive regime of international sanctions against Iran, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SIELs were granted, inter alia, for materials testing equipment and valves. The Committees note that other licence applications for these items were refused during this period. Some applications were for goods controlled on the UK national control list (PL9009 civil aircraft and equipment) Such civil aviation equipment is not caught by any of the sanctions regimes against Iran and we assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used for internal repression or being diverted to military end-use. Other licences granted related to exports where an export licence was required for normally noncontrolled goods under the WMD End-Use control. The licences were approved because in each case it was assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used in a programme of concern. Iraq: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography. The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As a result, and because there is still an arms embargo against Iraq, we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for this type of export. This is consistent with the approach we have taken for other such OIEL applications for Iraq for this kind of equipment. Israel: SIELs issued for components for naval electronic warfare equipment (2 licences), naval electronic warfare equipment, imaging cameras and nuclear grade graphite. Naval electronic warfare equipment These goods were for use in submarines. We have no evidence to suggest that the use of this class of submarine by the Israeli Defence Forces would cause concern under the Consolidated Criteria. Imaging cameras Applications included: a) equipment being returned to the Israeli manufacturer after demonstration in the UK. The unit was a demonstration unit which was originally manufactured in Israel and so would not supply Israel with additional capability it did not already have. Therefore the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. b) a camera intended for academic experimental research. Given that these goods were intended for use in a university for research purposes we had no concerns under the Criteria.
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c) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera for use by the applicant's distributor in Israel to be demonstrated in Jerusalem and compared to standard CCTV cameras. As the goods were to be returned to the UK the application did not raise concerns under the Criteria. d) a camera being returned to Israel after repair carried out by the UK manufacturer. The camera was to be used for research purposes by a scientific institute. Therefore the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. e) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera to be loaned for demonstration to potential clients for commercial applications. The goods were to be returned to the UK. Therefore the export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria. Nuclear grade graphite These goods are to be machined into consumable products (crucibles, dies etc) to be used in the metallurgical industry. Given the legitimate end-use of these goods this export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria. OIELs refused for: americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets; software for the use of test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems, test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems. Given the nature of the goods and the destination the applications for OIELs were rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs instead so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports. Kenya: Temporary OIEL issued for technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactors. This temporary OIEL application was made to cover the transmission of information (technology) to a number of overseas destinations including Kenya. The intended recipient of this information was an individual employed by a UK energy company. The purpose of the information transfers was to enable him to undertake work whilst travelling overseas and remain contactable. The licence was granted as there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns on this end use. Lebanon: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography.
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The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As there is a UN Arms Embargo on Lebanon we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for these exports. Libya: SIELs issued for crowd control ammunition (3 licences), small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition (2 licences), equipment employing cryptography and neutron generators. Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition These applications were approved with the proviso that the goods would not be released to Libyan control until after successful completion of a training programme. The training was audited by MOD police officials and our Post in Tripoli confirmed that the training was carried out successfully. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods would be used for internal repression in contravention of Criterion 2. All these applications have subsequently been revoked. Equipment employing cryptography This application was for equipment to be demonstrated at a defence and security exhibition. The equipment was to remain under the exporters control at all times whilst abroad. This temporary licence was subsequently revoked. Neutron generators The neutron generator was a tool to be used to gather geological data. The equipment was to remain under the control of the exporters (an international company) employees at all times. Malaysia: OIEL refused for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades. Given the nature of the goods and the destination the OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users. Russia: OIEL refused for components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for military utility vehicles, components for naval engines, components for patrol craft, components for tanker aircraft.
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Given the nature of the goods and the destination this OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users. Saudi Arabia: SIEL issued for components for combat aircraft. The goods were components for end-use by the Royal Saudi Air Force. In assessing the application we took all relevant information into account including the events during the Saudi-Yemen border conflict in 2009. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods might be used in internal repression, external aggression or diverted to an undesirable end-use. Turkey: SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft (2 licences), toxins and products containing plutonium-239. NB. When researching the answer to the above question we found 6 SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft. Details of all these applications can be found below. Applications included: a) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The proposed export did not raise any concerns against the Criteria. b) The export licence application was for parts to be used in a combat aircraft. The Government judged that the equipment would be used for legitimate national defence and NATO operation purposes only and therefore did not raise concerns under the Criteria. c) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. d) The goods exported were spare parts for a combat aircraft. The FCO considered that criteria thresholds were not met for this export licence application. e) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. f) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. g) The toxins were for use in the veterinary medicine department of a major university. The Government considered that they would be used for legitimate scientific purposes and there were no concerns under the Criteria.
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h) The products containing Plutonium-239 were for use in a worldwide environmental test exercise by an end-user who was assessed to be the competent national authority to handle these goods. The FCO considered that this sample would be used for legitimate scientific purposes and there were no concerns under the Criteria.
The Committees 2010 Quarter 4 (October December) questions and the Governments answers
Bahrain: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Anti-armour ammunition, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun silencers, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, small arms ammunition, sporting guns Of the licences issued in Q4, licences for the following goods have been revoked: components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, small arms ammunition. In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? If so, when, in each case, did this take place? Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. We revoked a temporary SIEL for equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts that had been originally issued in Q4 2010. It should be noted that for temporary SIELs exporters are obliged to return the goods within 12 months from the date of issue of the licence and they should contact us to inform us when the goods have been returned. It is not our practice to revoke temporary licences, as this potentially removes the obligation to return the goods to the UK, however in the case referred to above circumstances allowed us to do so. Have either of the two OIELs granted during this period been revoked? If so, please specify which ones and why the decision was taken. Neither of the two OIELs issued during this period have been revoked. Belarus: Why was a SIEL granted for imaging cameras, rather than (as were other items applied for during this period) refused under the terms of either or both Criteria 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria? The equipment in question was rated as dual-use and the licence was approved in January 2011. The stated end-user was a municipal fire department and the stated end-
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use was fire fighting for civilian use. The Government was satisfied that this was the intended purpose. Chad: Given the human rights situation in Chad and neighbouring countries, why was an OITCL granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, rather than refused under the terms of any, all or some of Criteria 2, 3 and 4 of the Consolidated Criteria? The vehicle and components were to be used for protection of staff of an international organisation. After considering all the information available, we judged the risk threshold under criterions 2, 3 and 4 was not met. China: Given the human rights record of the Chinese Government, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of either the EU Arms Embargo or Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition for a sporting end-use. Approval of this application was consistent with our previous advice and interpretation that sporting ammunition is not caught under the EU Arms Embargo. No clear risks were identified to suggest such sporting-gun ammunition would raise Criteria 2 concerns. Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? These goods are for use by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Djibouti. Egypt: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Body armour, components for military electronic equipment, components for military radars, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, military helmets and imaging cameras None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked. In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked. Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7 and then by extension, Criteria 2 -- of the
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Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for machine guns, machine guns, pistols and imaging cameras? Criterion Two and Criterion Seven are criteria of concern for licence applications for Hong Kong but for the SIELs referenced we were satisfied that the applications did not breach the Consolidated Criteria for the following reasons: a and b) The imaging cameras were for cameras for use at university and their proposed end use raised no criteria concerns. c) The body armour and related equipment were to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. d) This application for assault rifles was for out of service ex-Russian military equipment for use in the film industry. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. e) This application was for body armour and related equipment to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. f) This application was for the demonstration and onward sale of imaging cameras for the municipal fire and rescue services. There had been previous exports of this equipment direct to the Chinese fire services. Israel: Given the actions of the Government of Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in recent years, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles, military utility vehicles, small arms ammunition. Applications included: a) These goods were components for unmanned air vehicles for use in a UK military programme. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. b) This small arms ammunition was for use by athletes for training and competitions at national and international level. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. c) These all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection were to be used for the protection and safety of staff of an international media organisation. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns And the licence was granted.
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d) This military utility vehicle was a concept model for demonstration purposes only. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. Jordan: Given that there have been pro-democracy protests in Jordan since the beginning of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for further information about how end-use is being monitored regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for combat aircraft, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military utility vehicles, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for the use of military combat vehicles. The best means of ensuring that goods are not misused is to conduct a rigorous assessment at the licence application stage. This includes careful examination of the information on the proposed end use and end user of the goods. The primary purpose of any monitoring of equipment once it has left the UK is to generate information to assist the risk assessment of other current or future similar applications. UK Overseas Posts have standing instructions to report misuse of UKorigin defence equipment. We also take account of a variety of different reporting on end-use which includes reports coming from NGOs, human rights organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence reports. Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any misuse of UK-supplied equipment. Kazakhstan: Given the human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition intended for sporting end-use by civilian end-users. As such the proposed export did not raise Criterion 2 concerns. Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for air guns, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for pistols, components for rifles, military support vehicles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In asking this question, the Committees note that SIELs for components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols and technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols were refused on precisely these grounds. For the same reason, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period. All applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated Criteria. Consideration of the prevailing circumstances in the country, the human rights records of the end user and the risk of internal repression (Criterion 2) are prevalent in our assessments. But for the SIELs referenced below the decision to issue the licences
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(except for two licences referred to in the question that were refused) were reached after concluding that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and that none of the other Criteria were engaged. a) We received an application for military support vehicles intended for end use by an international organisation. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the application was therefore approved. b) We received an application for components for repairing ex-military vehicles for civil end use by a private company in the tourism industry. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the application was therefore approved. c-f) We received several applications for rifles, pistols and small arms ammunition that were for private individuals and intended for their own end use. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the applications were therefore approved. g) We received an application for components for training Aircraft for end use by the Air Force. There was no clear risk under the Criteria for this end use or end user. The application was therefore approved. h) We received an application for air guns and pistols for onward sale to police and military officers and other individuals authorised to possess firearms. The application was refused in part (pistols) under Criterion 2 because we judged that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used in internal repression if supplied to the Kenyan Police. The application was issued in part for air guns as there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 for use by private individuals for sporting purposes. i) We received an application for pistols for onward sale to police and military officers and other individuals authorised to possess firearms. The application was refused under Criterion 2 because we judged that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used in internal repression if supplied to the Kenyan Police. Why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period. This was a single licence for assorted types of ammunition intended for use by the military. There is no evidence of such goods being used against the civilian population and no clear risk identified under Criterion 2. Libya: For which of the items approved for permanent export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Body armour components for combat aircraft military equipment for initiating explosives cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts, weapon sights. All licences issued for body armour, components for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the
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use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were subsequently revoked. Some licences for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography remain extant as they were issued to civil end users for civil end use and raised no Consolidated Criteria concerns when all extant Libya licences were reviewed in Q1 2011. In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? Anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military parachutes, gun mountings, inert chaff, inert decoy flares, inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inert thunderflashes, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military utility vehicles, semi-automatic pistols, sniper rifles, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as forward observer/target recognition training equipment, software for software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, training small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, cryptographic software, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. The licences referred to were for temporary export for exhibition at the LibDex Exhibition which took place in Tripoli in November 2010 and was a trade show for the safety and security industry. All the above licences were either revoked or surrendered. All but one exporter has assured us that the goods have been returned. This exporter has been unable to confirm the current location of the equipment they exported for the exhibition. The Committees would also be grateful to know whether the OIEL granted during this period been revoked. The OIEL issued during this period has not been revoked. This OIEL was for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography. It was decided not to remove Libya from this OIEL (other destinations were covered by the licence) as the goods were dual-use products for onward supply to civilian and business end users. Mozambique: Given that the capital, Maputo, saw riots in September 2010 in which a number of civilians were shot dead, why was a SIEL granted for body armour and components for body armour, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
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The stated end user on this application was an organisation specialising in the clearing of land mines. The Government considered that as the goods would be used for humanitarian purposes the proposed export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. Oman: Given that there was some unrest in Oman during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Governments review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. How strong are the assurances received regarding enduse? Components for weapon sight mounts; components for weapon sights; equipment for the use of sniper rifles; gun mountings; gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles sniper rifles, technology for sniper rifles. The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items: Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights. The Committees raise the same issues with regard to the SITCL granted during this period for components for assault rifles. We examined all extant export licences for Oman following the limited unrest in the country, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Oman remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. In line with normal practice, export licences are kept under review and scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. Saudi Arabia: Given that there was some unrest in Saudi Arabia during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Governments review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. Why does the UK believe that the assurances relating to end-use will not be breached? Components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of bombs, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment , military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for bombs, weapon night sights, imaging cameras The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items:
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Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights. We examined all extant export licences for Saudi Arabia during the spring, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Saudi Arabia remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government. In line with normal practice, export licences are reviewed when there has been a significant change of circumstances on the ground. Sudan: The Committees would be grateful for further information about how the SIEL granted for military equipment for initiating explosives is consistent with the arms trade sanctions currently in place. The Committees raise the same issue regarding the OITCL granted for: Promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection and promoting the supply of tear gas/riot-control agents This SIEL was for military equipment for initiating explosives. As they are non-lethal items for humanitarian use they fall under the exemption set out in paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1556 (2004) which states that the arms embargo shall not apply to Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian, human rights monitoring or protective use, and related technical training and assistance. The OITCL was approved for the insurance of de-mining equipment for an NGO operating in Sudan. Tunisia: The Committees would be grateful for information about why two SIELs for equipment employing cryptography were granted. Both licences were granted for supply to commercial entities for civil end use and did not raise any concerns under the Criteria. United States: The Committees would be grateful for further information about the OIEL granted for toxins. We approved two OIELs with a stated civil end-use. We had no Criterion 1 concerns about these applications.
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Zimbabwe: The Committees note that this country entry appears to be missing from the pivot report. They would be grateful to receive this information and ask that the report be duly corrected. Unfortunately there was an error in the published report, for which we apologise. We are working to correct the error. However, the correct data may be obtained by creating a bespoke report from the searchable database. Finally, with regard to Open General Export Licences (OGLs), as per the table on pages 910 of the pivot report, please provide more information about the OGL named X, for which there were two registrations during this period; and give explanations for why a number of OGLs were revoked in full during this period. The OGEL X allows the export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the licence. Information about the licence and a copy of the licence is available on the export control pages of the BusinessLink website.353 The Table shows all Open General Licences in full, including those that have been revoked. The appearance of a revoked licence in this Table does not indicate that the licence was revoked in this period. We would welcome the Committees views as to whether fully revoked licences should be excluded from this Table completely or whether it would be helpful to include them with the date of revocation. Regarding the three revoked licences the reasons for revocation are as follows: Computers - revoked in September 2009 - this licence authorised the export of certain high performance computers. However, changes to the control parameters agreed in the Wassenaar Arrangement meant that the coverage of the licence was minimal and feedback from exporters indicated that the licence was not used. Therefore it was revoked. Vintage Military Vehicles - revoked November 2009 - was replaced by the Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery Pieces OGL in order to allow the export of a wider range of goods including artillery pieces and vehicles more than 50 years old where they are intended for historic re-enactment or commemorative events, private battlefield tours or private recreational purposes to all EU Member States plus Channel Islands and Norway, and providing they are returned to the UK within 3 calendar months. Open General Trade Control Licence (OGTCL) - revoked in April 2009 - replaced by the OGTCL (Category C goods) and OGTCL (Small Arms) following the changes in the trade controls introduced in the Export Control Order 2008.
The Committees 2011 Quarter 1 (January March) questions and the Governments answers
Bahrain: Given the large-scale unrest and human rights violations by the security forces
353 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?itemId=1084303254&r.l1=1079717544&r.l2=1084228483&r.l3=10 84228524&r.l4=1084287557&type=RESOURCES
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which occurred in Bahrain during this period, why were the SIELs granted for components for combat aircraft and small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of either or both Criterion 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria? The licence for components related to a jet trainer. The small arms ammunition was for the sporting use and personal protection of a private individual. When the applications were considered in January we took into account the nature of the equipment, the specified end users and the circumstances in the country at the time. We assessed the applications against the Consolidated Criteria and concluded that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression or to aggravate internal tensions. Bahrain requires combat aircraft for external defence purposes. Belarus: Why was a SIEL granted for imaging cameras, rather than refused under the terms of either or both Criteria 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria? The thermal imaging cameras in question are specifically designed for fire fighting operations with the stated end user being a municipal fire service. This approval was "made before the current EU embargo was adopted. We assessed the application against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns about the stated end use and end users. Had the embargo been in place at the time of the application, it may have been exempt on humanitarian grounds. China: Given the human rights record of the Chinese Government, why were SIELs granted for small arms ammunition and weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of either the EU Arms Embargo or Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In connection with the weapon sights that were approved for export, the Committees note that a SIEL for weapon night sights was refused under Criterion 1, which requires the UK, inter alia, to " uphold the EU Arms Embargo against China. Applications granted under "small arms ammunition" were for cartridges classified as sporting ammunition for the end use of sporting and training purposes. The goods were supplied to a sporting goods supplier. Sports ammunition is not caught under the Arms Embargo, however these applications were still assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns about the stated end use and end users. The application for weapon sights was for the return of goods to the original manufacturer as they were deemed faulty. They were being returned for evaluation of defects and subsequent destruction. It was considered that these particular goods did not fall under the EU Arms Embargo as they were faulty. This application was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns about the stated end use and end users. The application refused for weapon sights was assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and the items were deemed to be caught by the Arms Embargo as specially designed components of lethal weapons. There was therefore clear grounds for a refusal under Criterion 1. Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for military combat vehicles and military support vehicles, rather than refused under the terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
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This application was for Military Combat Vehicles and Military Support Vehicles for use in defence logistics, thus contributing to Djibouti's defence. We took into consideration that, although elections are due to take place in 2011, the previous election had passed without violence. We therefore judged there was not a c1e.ar risk that such items would be used in contravention of Criterion 2. Egypt: Given the large-scale unrest which occurred in the country during this period, in which the country's security forces played a major role, why was a SIEL granted for components for smoke projectors not subsequently revoked? This licence was considered during the review of all existing licences for Egypt in February 2011 following unrest in the country. The goods were components intended for use with safety smoke generators used by an electrical contact for leakage testing of grain silos, petroleum digging sites and for a factory producing fireworks. After considering the goods, end use, end user and prevailing circumstances in the country, we judged there was no clear risk that these goods might be used in internal repression and insufficient risk that the goods would aggravate existing tensions. The licence remained consistent with the Criteria and was not revoked. Equatorial Guinea: Given the human rights situation in the country, why was a SIEl granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, rather than refused under the terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? This application was for Personnel Protected Vehicles. It should be noted that delivery was requested in respect of the AU Summit in Malabo in July 2011. It is also intended that the vehicles be used to provide protection of VIP's when Equatorial Guinea cohosts the 2012 African Cup of Nations. There was an attack on a visiting national team during the last African Nations Cup in Angola and it was deemed reasonable to expect Equatorial Guinea would want to increase its capability to provide adequate security at such events. We were unaware of any Human Rights abuses being committed using this type of vehicle in Equatorial Guinea. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that these vehicles would be used in contravention of Criterion 2. The Gambia: Given the human rights record of the Government of the Gambia, why was an OIEl granted for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, rather than refused under the terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? The OIEL was for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography and technology for use of employing cryptography. This equipment was non-military and had a commercial/civilian end use. We judged this to be a legitimate end use. We had no other Consolidated Criteria concerns on the application and therefore recommended approval. Ghana: Why was Ghana refused as a destination for an OIEL granted during this period for ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets?
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The OIEL was for ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems and military helmets. All applications are assessed on a case by case basis which takes account of the prevailing circumstances in the country, human rights records of the end user and the risk of internal repression. Recent reports of the use of excessive force by Ghanaian Security Forces resulting in the deaths of several people. led us to conclude that, for this application, we would need to see a SIEL application detailing exact quantities and end user information. Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criterion 7 - and then by extension, Criterion 2 - of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for, inter alia, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers? The licence application refers to the export of a private weapons collection. The import of these items was approved by the Special Administrative Region Government of Hong Kong and completed End User documentation was seen. The application included 119 deactivated items in addition to 27 other items for which we were given a full listing. The application was assessed on its merits and we had no concerns under Criterion 7 or Criterion 2. India: The Committees would be grateful for an official public statement on the implications for the UK-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation Declaration, as signed on 11 February 2010, of the refusal during this period, under Criteria 1 and 7 of the Consolidated Criteria, of SIEl applications for accessories for materials testing equipment, instrumentation cameras, mass spectrometers, materials testing equipment, numerical control software, pumps, software for materials testing equipment. The joint declaration by the United Kingdom and India on civil nuclear cooperation set out our joint desire to promote cooperation in civil nuclear energy, recognised the importance of India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA and emphasised the importance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) statement on civil nuclear cooperation with the IAEA safeguarded Indian civil nuclear programme. The decisions to refuse the licences highlighted by the Committees were taken against the UK's international commitments as set out by the Guidelines of the NSG (Criterion 1) and in the light of the UK's policy on civil nuclear exports to India, which was restated in the Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) submitted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Alistair Burt MP on 29 November 2010. The WMS makes clear that; 'for an NSG dual-use list export, we will continue to take into account whether its export is for a nuclear-related end use, whether it is destined for a nuclear facility safeguarded by the IAEA and whether there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity." The UK is committed to promoting and enabling civil nuclear trade with India in line with our international commitments and obligations. Iran: Given the existence of an extensive regime of international sanctions against Iran, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SIELs were granted
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during this period for the following items: components for civil aircraft, components for filtration equipment, components for industrial gas turbines, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, electrical test equipment, filtration. equipment, general laboratory equipment, process control equipment, valves. With the exception of components for civil aircraft, these applications relate to uncontrolled goods which do not require a licence. These goods can only be refused if there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD or military programme. The applications were approved because we did not consider the goods to be of specific utility to a WMD or military programme or that there was a programmatic requirement for the goods, we considered the end users to be legitimate and did not consider that there was sufficient risk of diversion to justify refusal. The civil aircraft components are rated in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists. They require a licence for export to Iran but do not fall within any of the sanctions regimes against Iran. The equipment in this licence application comprises different types of aircraft tyres to be fitted to planes operated by a civilian airline. There is nothing to indicate these tyres will be used for anything other than civilian passenger aircraft. The decision to issue this licence was reached after concluding that there was no risk under Criterion 1 (UK'S international commitments) and Criterion 7 (diversion risk). Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over "Operation Cast Lead" in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during this period: components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, small arms ammunition. Many of the applications under reference were for components and goods whose end use was in third party countries where we assessed there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns. Details of other specific applications are found below. A licence was granted for components for use in the head up display of military training aircraft which is not front line aircraft. We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and recommended approval. Another licence related to 22 sporting cartridges manufactured in the UK. All the cartridges in the order were for use in preparation for the Olympic Games in London in 2012. These goods were destined for a legitimate sporting civil end use and the end user paperwork supported this. We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and recommended approval. Kazakhstan: Given the human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why were SIELs granted for, inter alia, sniper rifles and components for sniper rifles, rather than refused under the terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? This application was from a manufacturer of sports shooting & hunting rifles used by Olympians as well as military and police units around the world. This rifle was for a private collector/sportsman and was approved as we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns.
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Equipment/spare parts for sniper rifles were approved in late 2010 specifically for protecting international visitors when Kazakhstan hosted the OSCE Ministerial Council summit in Almaty in December 2010. The end user specified that these goods would be used for this purpose. We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and therefore approved this application. Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for, inter alia, small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? This licence application was for a SIG Pistol and Small Arms Ammunition. The goods are intended for target pistol shooting. There were no concerns with the end use or end user. The application covered a single weapon (including ammunition) and its use was deemed commensurate with the stated end purpose. This decision was consistent with the approach we had taken for previous applications for the same end use for Kenya. There were no grounds for refusal under the Consolidated Criteria. Lebanon: The Committees note that, inter alia, the following SIELs were granted during this period: components for assault rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, military communications equipment, sporting guns, technology for the use of military communications equipment, training small arms ammunition; We would be grateful to know whether any of these licence applications were approved on the grounds that they were authorised by the Government of Lebanon and so not covered by the prevailing arms embargo. If so, we would also be grateful to know which ones were so authorised. In addition, given that Prime Minister Hariri, an opponent of Hizbollah, stood down in January (a new Prime Minister, nominated by Hizbollah, was not appointed until June), on what basis was it decided that a Government of Lebanon continued to exist with which it was appropriate to carryon doing business? During the period January to March 2011, 3 licences were approved for Lebanon. The first two were approved on 4th January whilst Sa-ad Hariri's Government was in power. These were for components for assault rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition and sporting guns. The third licence was granted on 3rd March for communications equipment. The end user was a government ministry and therefore exempt from the terms of the arms embargo (UNSCR 1701) under the Government of Lebanon clause. Although there was no substantive Government in place, there remained a caretaker government led by PM Hariri, and therefore the licence was issued. Libya: While the Committees note that these licences were subsequently revoked, why were permanent SIELs initially granted during this period for components for military communications equipment and equipment for the use of military communications equipment, rather than refused under the terms of either or both Criteria-2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria? A licence for communications equipment was approved in January 2011. When this and
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similar licence applications for military communications equipment were initially considered we did not identify a clear risk under either Criteria 2 or 3 given the prevailing circumstances and evidence available at the time. When circumstances changed, we revised our risk assessment and revoked the licences accordingly. Macao: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were the concerns about diversion under Criterion 7 - and then by extension, Criterion 2 - of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIEL granted for small arms ammunition? This application was for 50,000 x 22 LR Sporting Cartridges. All cartridges were to be used for training and competitions in 2011 which is a very important year in terms of qualifying places for the Olympics in 2012. This ammunition does not fall under the EU China Arms Embargo. There were no concerns under Criteria 2 or 7. Saudi Arabia: The Committees would be grateful for more information about why an OIEL for technology for the use of weapon sights and weapon sights was refused? The assessment considered the goods, proposed end user and prevailing circumstances in the country. Weapon sights and technology weapon sights do carry Criterion 2 risks. We judged that there was insufficient information provided about the end user and specific end use to reach an assessment under the Consolidated Criteria and to satisfy the risk requirements for an open licence. The OIEL application was therefore refused and the exporter was advised to apply for SIELs. Serbia: Given the continuing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, which recently included armed border clashes involving armed Serbs, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why SIELs for small arms ammunition and technology for small arms ammunition were granted, rather than refused in terms of either or both Criteria 4 and 7 of the Consolidated Criteria? This application was from a well known and long established British manufacturer of sporting ammunition. This .22 calibre sporting ammunition was for use in the qualifying tournaments of the London 2012 Olympics. Therefore we assessed that there were no grounds for refusal under Criteria 4 (regional peace, security and stability) or 7 (risk of diversion). South Africa: Given the challenges that South Africa faces in terms of' promoting sustainable development, specifically with regard to poverty reduction and addressing what are currently the highest levels of income inequality in the world, the Committees would be grateful for an explanation of why over 3 million worth of military SIELs were granted during this period? In the same context, the Committees would also be grateful for more information about why 20 SIELs were granted for items covered by the Consolidated list category 5A5002 (described in the list as "information security systems, equipment and components therefore), given their high total value at 10,494,912.
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Licence applications for South Africa are not considered under Criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria as the Government only applies this criterion to World Bank International Development Association (IDA)-eligible countries. South Africa had a per capita GNI in 2010 of $6,100. To be IDA eligible a country's per capita GNI must be below $1,135. A list of the countries considered under Criterion 8 can be found in the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report at Annex B. All the SIELs under reference were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and there were no grounds for refusal. Thailand: Given rising tensions during the course of 2011 between Thailand and Cambodia over territorial issues along their mutual border, the Committees ask whether any of the military SIELs granted during this period might now justify being reviewed and possibly revoked - in terms of Criterion 4 of the Consolidated Criteria? If not, why not? If so, which ones and why? Three of these licences were for a small quantity of goods for demonstration purposes, which were to remain under the exporters' control and to be returned to the UK. One was for filter canisters for protection against chemical agents and does not pose a clear risk of increasing tensions on the Cambodian border. Two licences were for spare components for radar equipment already held and would therefore not constitute an increased capability that could escalate tensions. None of these applications therefore raised concerns under the Consolidated Criteria. Uganda: Given the human rights performance of the Ugandan Government since parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February, the Committees ask whether any of the military SIELs granted during this period might 'now justify being reviewed - in terms of Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? If not, why not? If so, which ones and why? Only 3 SIELs were granted during the period 1 January 2011 and 31 March 2011, all for non military use. One was for a Crane Truck and Turbo Diesel Engine to be used for supporting mineral exploration. We had no Consolidated Criteria concerns about this end use. One application was for Armour Systems Protective Vests, Level III Hard Armour Upgrade Plates and Ballistic Helmets. These items were for protection of international agency staff members travelling to insecure areas whilst delivering services to the Karamoja population. It was therefore concluded there was no clear risk under Criteria 2 and an insufficient risk of diversion under Criteria 7. One was for protective equipment for the police. This application was approved as part of a comprehensive programme to strengthen public
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order and community policing skills. It was considered that the lack of protective equipment limited the tactical responses open to local law enforcement agencies on crowd control. It was therefore concluded there was no clear risk under Criteria 2 and we had no other Criteria concerns.
The Committees 2011 Quarter 2 (April June) questions and the Governments answers
Bahrain: Given the large-scale unrest and human rights violations by the security forces which occurred in Bahrain immediately prior to this period, why were SIELs granted for components for military aero-engines, components for military training aircraft, small arms ammunition, training hand grenades, body armour, civil body armour and components for body armour and OEILs issued for Components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition and small arms ammunition rather than refused under the terms of either or both Criteria 2, 3 or 4 of the Consolidated Criteria? The Committees would also be grateful for information on why SIELs for small arms ammunition were issued when the same items were previously revoked, early in 2011, due to contravention of Criteria 2 and 3, according to Annex 1 of The Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees Annual Report (HC686). Further, the Committees would like information on why an OIEL was issued which included small arms ammunition when an OIEL including these items was revoked, early in 2011, due to contravention of Criteria 2 and 3, according to Annex 1 of The Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees Annual Report (HC686). A number of criteria concerns emerged for Bahrain following protests in the region, particularly Criterion Two internal repression. Export licences were reviewed on the 18th February 2011 and licences for equipment that could be used for internal repression were revoked. The revoked licences cover equipment that could be used for riot control: tear gas, crowd control ammunition, assault rifles, body armour, radio communications equipment, and components for military utility vehicles. We have continued processing licences for Bahrain on a case-by-case basis. The situation on the ground is being constantly reviewed. The cases in question relate to a variety of equipment and all were risk assessed individually. The components for military aero-engines and for military training aircraft were intended for maintenance purposes for training aircraft only. In one case the goods were being exported back to Bahrain after having been sent to the UK manufacturer for repair. The small arms ammunition consisted of sporting shotgun cartridges and sporting rifle cartridges. They were exported to a named individual who intended to use them for sports shooting. Since they were not intended for military end use and were not subject to any end user concerns it was assessed that the export of this ammunition did not constitute a clear risk under the Consolidated Criteria.
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A licence for training hand grenades was approved. Our assessment was that the training grenades (they give off a bang and a flash of light) did not have an aggressive end use. A licence for body armour was approved for a named individual end user. The licence was issued with a proviso that the armour not be re-sold, donated or loaned to any other entity in or external to Bahrain. The component for small arms ammunition and small arms ammunition consisted of sporting shotgun cartridges. It was assessed that the export of this ammunition did not constitute a clear risk under the Consolidated Criteria
The SIELs and OIELs revoked after the February review of Bahrain licensing included licences for small arms ammunition that was non-sporting. They included licences for small arms ammunition, crowd control ammunition, training ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, anti-armour piercing ammunition, and ammunition for automatic and semi-automatic weapons. The revoked licences involved military end users and some offensive ammunition whereas the approved licence involved sporting ammunition to a named individual end user. Whilst there was a clear risk that the offensive ammunition could be used contrary to the Consolidated Criteria, it could not be assessed that there was a clear risk of the sporting ammunition being used contrary to C2, C3 or C4. China: In connection with the SEILs for components for NBC detection equipment, NBC detection equipment and software for NBC detection equipment that were approved for export, the Committees note that SIELs for components for NBC detection equipment, NBC detection equipment and software for NBC detection equipment were refused under Criterion 1, which requires the UK, inter alia, to uphold the EU Arms Embargo against China. Why were some SEILs approved and others refused? The end users for all the SIELs approved were government environmental agencies apart from one which was for a centre for disease control. The UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo on China is that it does not include military-rated equipment for non-lethal purposes. The SIEL refused was not under Criterion 1 but under Criterion 5d. The company applying for the licence did not have the correct assurances in place. Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights and SITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? All of the items on this specific licence application were exported to a private company (rather than the Djibouti government) for the purposes of carrying out anti-piracy work. It was assessed that the company had a legitimate need for such items and that there was no evidence of human rights abuses by the end user. Accordingly, the Government deemed that there was no clear risk that the goods would be used in
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internal repression, diverted to an undesirable end use or aggravate existing tensions. Furthermore, approval of this application was in line with our approach to anti-piracy applications concerning Djibouti. Egypt: The Committees would be grateful for information on why a number of SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing software were issued when the same items were included in SEILS previously revoked, due to contravention of Criteria 2 and 3, in 2011, according to Annex 1 of The Governments Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees Annual Report (HC686). The licences in question that were approved, comprised of software upgrades and equipment for network security between office premises for a commercial bank. After consideration of the goods, end use and end user we judged there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under Criterion 3. As referenced above, a number of licences for secure communications equipment were revoked after a review of export licences for Egypt in February 2011. We monitored events in Egypt very closely during the uprising in January/February 2011. We judged that these licences were no longer in line with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7 and then by extension, Criteria 2 -- of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for anti-riot/ballistic shields and components for machine guns and OIELs for, inter alia, components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition, body armour and components for ballistic shields? Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment to anywhere in China require a licence. Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during this period: components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles and why these SIELs were granted. The Government considers all applications case by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israels right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks. In several instances electronic warfare equipment was exported to Israel for incorporation, after evaluation or repair, into an electronics system that was destined for ultimate end use in a third country. As the end user was not Israel, no criteria concerns for export to Israel were noted. In other instances, electronic warfare equipment was exported to end users within Israel for laboratory use only. Assurances were received that the goods would not be re-exported, sold or otherwise transferred. It was judged that, since the equipment was for testing purposes only, this did not breach the Consolidated Criteria.
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Several of the components for military aircraft head up/head down displays that were approved were to be incorporated in Israel into other parts being sent on to other ultimate end user countries. Since the end user was not Israel and there was documentation linking the equipment to third party end users outside of Israel, this equipment was approved for export. Other components for different military aircraft head up/head down displays were, however, destined for end use in Israel. These components were to be installed on decommissioned military aircraft that are now used exclusively for training purposes. Based on this assessment it did not breach the Consolidated Criteria. Several licences for equipment used to initiate explosives were also approved. The end user stated in both cases that the goods were to be used for defensive purposes in explosive ordnance disposal and destruction of improvised explosive devices within the Israeli state. Given the legitimate use of the goods in the disposal of explosive devices the decision was made to approve the export applications. In a further case, similar equipment was exported to Israel after it was returned to the exporter for repair. Again the stated end use is explosive ordnance destruction. Given its legitimate use, the export was approved. Equipment for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) was approved for export. In one instance the equipment was to be used solely by the commercial end user. Given that the goods were not going to be used in an operational manner and were destined for a commercial end user, the licence application was approved. Another application proved similar: the goods were being exported for test and evaluation purposes at the commercial end users facilities and were to be handled by the end users employees only. The goods in this case were for small surveillance UAVs which were unarmed. Jordan: Given that pro-democracy demonstrations which started in the beginning of 2011 and continued during this period, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why the SEILs, inter alia, were granted: assault, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the production of pistols, components for the production of rifles, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon sights and weapon night sights rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2. There were several pro-democracy demonstrations in Jordan at the start of 2011, the vast majority of them peaceful. The vast majority of licence applications were to known end users for whom no human rights concerns under the Consolidated Criteria currently exist. We therefore had no grounds to refuse any of the licences under Criterion 2 (internal repression) or Criterion 3 (human rights abuses). In other cases the licences were for temporary exports, and the goods were then returned to the UK. These goods were either exported for trial and evaluation purposes, or in one case, for use on a film set. Kazakhstan: Given the human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why were SIELs granted for sniper rifles, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? The Government continues to monitor the internal situation in Kazakhstan very closely. For this export licence application, a specialist single bolt-action rifle was
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approved for a private collector/sportsman known to the exporter and was intended for personal use. On this occasion the assessment was made that these goods did not meet the clear risk threshold under the Consolidated Criteria and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for, inter alia, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for rifles, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights and SITCLs issued for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? For the SIELs in question (as listed below) the decision to issue the licences was reached after concluding that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and that none of the other Criteria were engaged. An application for various components for assault rifles, machine guns and pistols, was approved for delivery to a government end user. We have regularly reviewed the actions of this end user concluding that we have no Criteria 2 concerns. Consequently this application was approved. An application for various ammunition and cartridges were approved for a nongovernment end user for sporting purposes and vermin control. Given that there are no concerns for this end use by private users, that we have confirmation that the nature of the ammunition is suitable for the end use of sporting/vermin control, and that there is no indication that these ammunition are intended for onward supply to military or security forces, this application was approved. An application for pistols to be used for sporting purposes, was approved for a nongovernment end user. The Government concluded that the application was to support a legitimate sporting end use and was therefore approved. Another application was for a single rifle for individual use. An end user undertaking was supplied including an import permit from the Kenya Police Central Firearms Bureau. Further information provided by the end user indicated that the goods were for his personal use for hunting small game. There were no Criteria concerns about this end use. Therefore we were satisfied there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 or risk of diversion under Criterion 7. Lebanon: The Committees note that, inter alia, the following SIELs were granted during this period: components for machine guns, components for pistols, components for rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights. We would be grateful to know whether any of these licence applications were approved on the grounds that they were authorised by the Government of Lebanon and so not covered by the prevailing arms embargo. If so, we would also be grateful to know which ones were so authorised. The single licence in question was approved because it was authorised by a body which is exempt from the prevailing arms embargo in Lebanon. Oman: Given that unrest in Oman continued until May 2011 the Committees would be grateful for information about why SEILs, inter alia, for assault rifles, combat shotguns,
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components for assault rifles, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights were granted, why an OIEL that included components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and technology for military support vehicles, an OIEL for components for small arms ammunition and small arms ammunition, an OIEL which included components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles and components for tanks and SITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for tanks and small arms ammunition were issued. The cases above relate to a variety of equipment and all were risk assessed individually. The components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts, small arms ammunition were exported for resale for hunting, target shooting and vermin hunting. Since they were not intended for military end use and were not subject to any end user concerns, it was assessed that the export of these goods did not constitute a clear risk under the Consolidated Criteria. A number of licences have been granted for a range of equipment including components for assault rifles, components for rifles, combat shotguns, weapon sights , assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights and weapon cleaning equipment. These are for use by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work (antipiracy) on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Gulf of Aden and authorised by the Government of Oman. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2. Additional conditions were applied to these licences to ensure that none of the items would be resold, donated or loaned to any entity in or external to Oman. An OIEL for components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles and components for military trailers was approved. , There was no specific evidence that the end user would use them to support activity resulting in internal repression. The components for assault rifles were spare parts. We assessed that as the end user has no involvement in crowd control operations and as they were not involved in the unrest there was not a clear risk that this could be used for internal repression.
A licence for components for tanks was approved. There is no specific evidence that the end user will use them to support activity resulting in internal repression. Pakistan: The Committees would be grateful for more information about why SEILs for dimensional inspection equipment, materials testing equipment and mechanical measurement equipment were refused. The various types of equipment in question were refused due to concerns that they might be used in a programme of concern.
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Saudi Arabia: Given that unrest continued in Saudi Arabia until June 2011 the Committees would be grateful for more information about why SIELs for components for sniper rifles, components for water cannons, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, hand grenades, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights and weapon sights were granted. We would like further information about why an OIEL which included ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for ballistic shields, components for body armour, components for bomb suits and components for civil body armour and an OIEL for components for small arms ammunition and small arms ammunition were refused given that an OIEL for ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets was issued in Quarter 1 of 2011. When we processed these applications, full consideration was given to the goods, their intended end use and the final end user against the Criteria, drawing from all information available to us and the prevailing situation not only in Saudi Arabia but the wider region. In all cases, we concluded that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under Criterion 3 to recommend refusal of the applications. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain. We concluded that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and insufficient risk under Criterion 3. Slovakia: The Committees would be grateful for more information about why an OIEL for gun silencers was refused. Occasionally OIELs are considered to be too broad for certain destinations and for certain types of goods when it is judged that a higher level of scrutiny may be required. This OIEL was issued for a number of other destinations but the company was asked to submit SIEL applications for these goods for Slovakia so that they could be assessed on a case by case basis. Somalia: Given that Somalia has been described as a failed state and is one of the poorest and most violent states in the world the Committees would be grateful for an explanation of why over 1.34m of SEILs were issued during this period, including SEILS for armour plate, body armour, components for body armour, military equipment for initiating explosives, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography. We would like more detailed information on the intended use of the military combat vehicles for which a SITCL was issued. Somalia is subject to an arms embargo and other restrictions as set out in various UN Security Council Resolutions. Certain exemptions under the embargo allow for the export of non-lethal military equipment for the UN and the supply of weapons and military equipment for the UN and the supply of weapons and military equipment intended for the sole use of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and supplies of non-military equipment
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intended solely for humanitarian or protective use. The applications referred to were approved for the following reasons: The items of body armour were intended for a humanitarian agency for the purposes of self-protection. Given that these items are noted as falling under the exemption in UNSCR 1356 which allows Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by UN personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only, this application was approved. The items of armoured plate were intended for a humanitarian agency acting under the auspices of AMISOM for the purposes of self-protection. Given that these items are noted as falling under the exemption in UNSCR 1772 which allows supplies of weapons and military equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by AMISOM, this application was approved. The items of military equipment for initiating explosives were intended for a humanitarian end user acting under the auspices of AMISOM for the purposes of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). Given that these items are noted as falling under the exemption in UNSCR 1772 which allows supplies of weapons and military equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by AMISOM, this application was approved. The various items of cryptographic equipment, including cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography, were intended for various humanitarian end users acting under the auspices of AMISOM. As dual-use items they are not subject to the arms embargo and were approved given the identity of the end-user and the stated end-use. The armoured shield items were intended for a humanitarian NGO for the purposes of self-protection. Given that these items fall under the exemption in UNSCR 1356 which allows supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, this licence was approved.
Thailand: Given that tensions continue between Thailand and Cambodia over territorial issues along their mutual border and that there were several deaths of troops in April 2011, the Committees would like more detailed information of the use of the military SIELs granted during this period. We continue to monitor the tensions on the Cambodian border. This factor is kept under review and considered in our recommendations in light of its implications for refusals under Criterion 4. Each of the licences referenced were assessed individually and there were no Criterion 4 refusals during the period under review The application for night vision tubes was for the maintenance of surveillance cameras already in operation with the end user and therefore did not grant any new capability that could escalate tensions. They were primarily to be deployed
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in the south of the country away from the border dispute, further reducing concerns. The application for a portable jammer system was for use in protection against remote detonated IED/EOD devices and has a wholly protective utility. Additionally there is no evidence of the end user presenting a clear risk under Criterion 4 The application for mask assemblies and filters was for protection against chemical and biological agents and does not pose a clear risk of increasing tensions on the Cambodian border. The application for batteries and chargers was for use in radio equipment already in operation by the end user and does not therefore grant any new capability that could escalate tensions. The EOD/IED protection and disposal equipment was intended as protection for law enforcement in detecting and neutralising IED/EOD threats and would not raise any concerns with the Cambodian border dispute. Two licences granted for aviation counter-measures were for an end user for whom there is no evidence of risk under Criterion 4 An application for equipment to maintain naval radar equipment currently in service was granted as they would not be deployed on the disputed Cambodian border and did not grant any new capability. A licence was granted for a lighting assembly for the maintenance of aircraft already in service as this did not represent an increase in capability and there is no evidence of concerns for the specific end user. Two temporary applications for weapon sights were granted as these were exported for demonstration, trial and evaluation purposes and were to be returned to the UK following these trials An aircraft insulator was approved for the maintenance of aircraft that were already in service therefore not adding any new capability that could escalate tensions.
The Committees 2011 Quarter 3 (July September) questions and the Governments answers
Australia: The Committees wish to have information on why SIELs for accessories for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device/decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment and military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment were refused.
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This application was refused under Criterion 5d: the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities, as the company intended to use a nongovernment agency for the shipment of explosive protective equipment. Government policy is not to release such sensitive equipment to non-government agencies. Bahrain: Given the large scale unrest and human rights violations by the security forces which occurred in Bahrain earlier in the year, why were SIELs granted for gun silencers, rifles and weapon sights rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2, 3 or 4 of the Consolidated Criteria? A review of export licences was held in February 2011 and licences for equipment that could be used for internal repression revoked. Since then we have continued processing licences for Bahrain on a case-by-case basis, carefully reviewing the situation on the ground. The SIEL for gun silencers, rifles and weapon sights relates to exports to a named individual who intended to use them in sporting shooting. Since they were not intended for military end use, were not subject to any end user concerns and no denial matches with EU Member States existed, we did not assess that there was a clear risk of these goods being used contrary to Criteria 2, 3 or 4. China: Given the human rights record of China the Committees request further information on why the SIELs for body armour, technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography; and OIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography were issued when the listed items could be used for internal repression. Given that the UK interpretation of the Madrid Council on 27 June 1989 states that the following items should not be licensed: lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components for these items and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapon platforms; any equipment which might be used for internal repression are embargoed to China, the Committees wish to have information on why SIELs for aircraft military communications equipment; components for combat helicopters and components for military helicopters were issued. All export licences for China are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria, which includes our international commitments under the EU embargo. We are satisfied that UK exports are in line with the terms of the embargo. We receive a large number of licence applications for China and the majority are for end users in the commercial, low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and development fields. Some items are military-rated but are not caught by the EU Arms Embargo, such as military-rated items for non-lethal purposes i.e. industrial components or NBC equipment for use by environmental agencies. The UK interpretation of Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, was to include: - Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.
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- Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms. Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.
Detailed information about some of these exports has already been given in a reply dated 6 February 2012 to Sir John Stanleys letter of 25 January 2012 on behalf of the CAEC. However, a summary of some of the licences approved is given below with further information about the goods exported: - Body Armour: The goods were for use by a global technical textile manufacturing company with a site in China capable of low-cost manufacturing. The armoured vests were sent for testing at a police facility. After testing they would be damaged to the point of destruction and sent back to the supplier in the UK for examination and study. We assess that there were no Criterion 2 concerns in this case as there was no clear risk of internal repression. - Technology for military communications equipment: In this case, the goods exported were technical drawings for use in the manufacture (moulding) of parts to be used on cable assemblies. The end user is a global electronics manufacturing services provider that serves original equipment manufacturers in technologyrelated industries such as communications and computer hardware. The moulded parts would be sent to Singapore who would then integrate them into headsets. There were no criteria concerns in this case as the moulds were due to be sent to Singapore. - Cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography: In all cases the equipment was for commercial end-use such as incorporation into a wireless application for a portable medical device for use in hospitals, a support system for smartcards for a banking payment system, or to enable secure internet connectivity across communications networks. As such we assess there was no clear risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression. - Components for combat and military helicopters: Although the components were originally designed for military applications, in these cases they were for commercial and civilian end-use. The exports were consistent with the terms of the embargo and therefore did not raise concerns against the Criteria. Congo, Democratic Republic of: Given that the Democratic Republic of Congo is one the FCOs countries of concern, as listed in the FCOs 2010 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees wish to have further information on why a SIEL for sniper rifles was granted. No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The Governments Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related to a list of military equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of that equipment) as well as the supply of sniper rifles. Sniper rifles were not part of the original application and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led to the Quarterly Report entry reading sniper rifles instead of promoting the supply of sniper rifles. An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly.
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Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms ammunition and OITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria. A number of Single and Open (OITCLs) licences have been granted for a range of equipment including weapons and ammunition. These are for use by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Djibouti but for use by commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies had confirmed that they were authorised by the Government of Djibouti to undertake such work and the equipment would be held in secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Djibouti. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons might be used for internal repression as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Djibouti. The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next destination. Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7 and then by extension, Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for components for assault rifles, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, hand grenades, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for assault rifles, technology for sniper rifles, weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights and weapon night sights? Why was an incorporated SIEL with the ultimate destination of China for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment approved? Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment to anywhere in China require a licence. Two of the licences in question were for temporary exports for demonstration purposes and the equipment will ultimately be returned to the UK. Three of the licences were destined for the Hong Kong Police Force and its various sub-sections, and as such, we assessed there were no Criteria concerns raised. The licence that was issued for the final destination of China was for equipment that would be used in search and rescue operations and we assessed it unlikely to be used for internal repression purposes. Israel: Given the controversy that occurred over Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which is part of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, in late 2008 and early 2009, the Committees wish to have further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted, inter alia, during this period: components for weapon sights, general military vehicle components and weapon sights and why these SIELs were granted.
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The Government considers all applications case by case against the Consolidated Criteria. We recognise Israels right to self defence but pay particular attention to risks. The components for weapon sights were intended solely for marketing and demonstration purposes to a range of customers. Any actual supply of product would require further licence applications which would be assessed fully against the Criteria, taking into account full end user details, specific end use, quantities and prevailing circumstances. The general military vehicle components were a protective seat designed to absorb blast shock in the event of a vehicle going over an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or mine. The licence was approved on the basis that the goods were for use in a development programme for a foreign government and were not for operational use by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Weapon sights were approved as they were for use by an individual for competitive target shooting and not for military use. Ivory Coast: Given the arms trade sanctions against the Ivory Coast, adopted by UN Security Council resolution 1572 and EU Council Decision 2010/656/CFSP, why was an OITCL for sniper rifles granted? No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The Governments Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related to a list of military equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of that equipment) as well as the supply of sniper rifles. Sniper rifles were not part of the original application and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led to the Quarterly Report entry reading sniper rifles instead of promoting the supply of sniper rifles. An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly. Jordan: Given that pro-democracy demonstrations took place immediately prior to this period, the Committees wish to have further information about why the SIELs, inter alia, were granted: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for military helmets and components for military support vehicles rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2. The majority of protests in Jordan passed peacefully. However, in one particular protest in March 2011, the gendarmerie used water cannon to disperse protestors. One man died during this protest, although it was later found that he died from a heart attack, and not directly from force used by the gendarmerie. We continue to look at all licence applications closely, and assess any offensive goods extremely carefully. The all-wheel drive vehicle with ballistic protection was to be used as a customer evaluation vehicle for test driving. As such, the end-use did not raise any concerns against the Criteria. The licence for components of military support vehicles was granted for a steering column. There is no information of the vehicles being linked to human rights abuses.
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Components for machine guns were to be used for the maintenance and repair of the end users existing weapon stock. The goods were intended for military use. The end user was not involved in policing the pro-democracy protests that took place in Jordan and we assessed that given there was no information giving rise to Criteria concerns these goods should be approved. Components for military communications equipment were spares to be used for repair and maintenance in military radios. The end user was not involved in policing the prodemocracy protests that took place in Jordan and it was assessed that there was no information giving rise to Criteria Concerns for these goods. The components for military helmets were for manufacture of helmets for the police and armed forces. The nature of the equipment and the identity of the end-users did not raise concerns against the Criteria. Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for, inter alia, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, small arms ammunition and weapon sights, an OIEL for components for military support vehicles and an OITCL for assault rifles and small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? For all export licence applications for Kenya we pay particular attention to Criterion Two following the post election violence and internal security operations that took place during 2007 and 2008. The combat shotguns and ammunition relate to a licence that was granted to a private security company undertaking maritime security work in the defence of commercial vessels whilst in international waters. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Kenya but for use by commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work who had further confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Kenya. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that the weapons might be used in contravention of Criterion 2 and the licence was approved. The components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection relate to a licence that was granted to UN Peace Keeping Forces operating under AMISOM. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Kenya but for use by the UN in furtherance of an authorised and legitimate peace-keeping mission. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that the equipment might be used in contravention of Criterion 2 and the licence was approved. The small arms ammunition relates to a licence for sporting cartridges, to be used by athletes in preparation for the African Championship, Olympic Games and other World Cup events. We assess the such an end use did not raise Criteria concerns and the licence was therefore approved. The open licence authorising the trading of goods between one overseas country and another relates to a licence for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, and weapon cleaning equipment to a private security
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company that is undertaking maritime security work in the defence of commercial vessels whilst in international waters. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Kenya but for use by commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Kenya; other provisos were also placed on this licence to ensure the safe storage of the items and the terms under which they can be used. We therefore judged there was no clear risk that the weapons might be used in contravention of Criterion 2 and the licence was approved. The open licence for components for military support vehicles relates to a licence granted to Government end users. The application was approved as there was no evidence to link the equipment with human rights violations in Kenya and we concluded that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2. Kuwait: Given the unrest in the country prior to and during this period, the Committees wish to have further information about why SIELs for hand grenades and teargas/irritant ammunition and OIELs issued for components for: military combat vehicles; and inter alia, components for weapon night sights, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria. The SIEL for hand grenades and teargas/irritant ammunition relates to goods exported to an end user who was not involved in the limited unrest which took place in Kuwait last year. Therefore, there was no clear risk that these goods might be used contrary to Criterion 2. The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for evaluation and demonstration purposes only. Therefore, there was no clear risk of these goods being used contrary to Criterion 2. The OIEL for weapon night sights is for goods exported to an end user who was not involved in the limited unrest which took place in Kuwait last year. Therefore, there was no clear risk of these goods being used contrary to Criterion 2. Lebanon: The Committees note that, inter alia, the following SIEL was granted during this period: sniper rifles. We wish to know whether this licence application was approved on the grounds that it was authorised by the Government of Lebanon and so not covered by the prevailing arms embargo. If not, why was the SIEL issued. No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The Governments Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related to a list of military equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of that equipment) as well as the supply of sniper rifles. Sniper rifles were not part of the original application and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led to the Quarterly Report entry reading sniper rifles instead of promoting the supply of sniper rifles. An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly. Oman: Given that unrest in Oman continued until May 2011 the Committees wish to have information about why: SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns,
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components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, gun silencers, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were granted; why an OIEL for components for military combat vehicles and military combat vehicles was granted; and OITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms ammunition issued? Criterion 2 concerns have emerged for Oman following the anti-government protests. The reports of clashes between security forces and protesters in Sohar have included allegations of the use of tear gas and rubber bullets. On the 2nd March 2011, in light of the protests, HMG reviewed export licences for Oman and in light of the information that subsequent protests were handled in a proportionate and reasonable manner by the security forces no revocations were made. The cases above relate to a variety of equipment and all were risk assessed individually. The SIEL for components for sniper rifles and weapon sight mounts is for goods exported for resale for hunting and target shooting purposes. Since they were not intended for military end use it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. The SIEL for weapon sight mounts and weapon sights is for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was not involved in the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was judges to have acted with restraint during the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. Other licences were granted for a range of equipment including weapons and ammunition which were to be used by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Oman but for use by commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Oman. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Oman. The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next destination. Criterion 2 concerns have emerged for Oman following the anti-government protests. The reports of clashes between security forces and protesters in Sohar have included allegations of the use of tear gas and rubber bullets. On the 2nd March 2011, in light of the protests, HMG reviewed export licences for Oman and in light of the information that subsequent protests were handled in a proportionate and reasonable manner by the security forces no revocations were made.
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The cases above (which post-dated the protests and the review of licences) relate to a variety of equipment and all were risk assessed individually. The SIEL for components for sniper rifles and weapon sight mounts is for goods exported for resale for hunting and target shooting purposes. Since they were not intended for military end use it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. The SIEL for weapon sight mounts and weapon sights is for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was not involved in the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. The OIEL for military combat vehicles was for goods for use by an end user in Oman who was judged to have acted with restraint during the unrest of last year. Therefore, it was assessed that there was no clear risk against the Criteria. Other licences were granted for a range of equipment including weapons and ammunition which were to be used by private security companies undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. The assessment was that this equipment was not for end use by the Government of Oman but for use by commercial organisations undertaking legitimate anti-piracy work. The security companies had confirmed that the equipment would be held in secure conditions whilst vessels were docked in Oman. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Oman. The OITCLs were approved for the named maritime and private security companies undertaking this anti-piracy work on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next destination. Sri Lanka: Given that Sri Lanka is listed as a country of concern, as listed in the FCOs 2010 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees wish to have more information on why SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and military support vehicles were granted and why SITCLs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles and small arms ammunition were approved. All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and military support vehicles were approved on the basis that the equipment was to be used by a well known international NGO whilst carrying out a humanitarian mine clearance programme. SITCLS for assault rifles were approved for the named maritime and private security companies undertaking anti-piracy work on the basis that the equipment was being moved between destination countries and would be held in secure conditions at each port after docking before being embarked onto vessels for their next destination. Sudan: Given the current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions imposed by the EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP,
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why was a SIEL for sniper rifles issued rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? No SIEL was issued for sniper rifles. The Governments Quarterly Report shows an OITCL for the provision of insurance related to a list of military equipment (as an act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of that equipment) as well as the supply of sniper rifles. Sniper rifles were not part of the original application and an error in entering a later amendment to the licence led to the Quarterly Report entry reading sniper rifles instead of promoting the supply of sniper rifles. An amendment to the Quarterly Report will issue shortly. South Sudan: Given the current tension on the border between Sudan and South Sudan and the sanctions imposed by the EU Common Positions 1994/165/CFSP and 2005/411/CFSP and the Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP which extended the arms embargo to South Sudan, why was a SITCL for military combat vehicles granted rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In line with our international obligations, all licence applications for South Sudan are processed in line with EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP. Under the terms of the arms embargo there is an exemption for the sale, supply, transfer or export of demining equipment and material for use in de-mining operations. The military combat vehicles were intended for a humanitarian organisation for use in mine clearance operations. The licence is therefore consistent with the terms of the embargo and did not raise any concerns against the Criteria. Syria: Given the current unrest and human rights violations by the security forces in Syria the Committees wish to know why SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptographic software were issued. Criteria 2 and 3 concerns have emerged for Syria. Protests began to spread in Syria during March 2011 after security forces used excessive force to suppress peaceful protests. The goods on this application for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptographic software are dual-use and intended for civil end-use by a commercial (non-governmental) end-user. There are no concerns relating to internal repression or aggravation of existing tensions linked to these goods and this end use. On this basis it was assessed that the risk threshold under Criteria 2 and 3 had not been met.
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Annex 2: Extra-territoriality (Offences)

The following is a list of offences committed overseas for which a British citizen could be prosecuted in this country. The list is based on Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2007: i. Sexual offences committed against children and young people under the age of 16 (Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996 and Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.72 and Schedule 2); Trafficking for sexual exploitation under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.5760; Offences of dishonesty and blackmail where property is despatched from, or received at, a place in England and Wales; or where there is a communication of information etc. sent by any means from a place in England and Wales to a place elsewhere, or from a place elsewhere to a place in England and Wales (Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss.1-6); Offences connected with aircraft (Civil Aviation Act 1982 s.92); Homicide (Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.9-10); Offences in connection with taxation etc. within the European Community (Criminal Justice Act 1993, s.71); Offences by servants of the Crown (Criminal Justice Act 1948 s.31(1); Offences in connection with the slave trade (Slave Trade Act 1873); Offences under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 ss.279-281) offences committed by British seamen (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s.282) and offences in the Admiralty jurisdiction; Offences on offshore installations (Petroleum Act 1998 s.10); Bribery and corruption committed outside the UK (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s.109) Torture (Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss.134-135); International Criminal Offences (International Criminal Court Act 2001); Offences against the Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Act 1957); Explosives offences (Explosive Substances Act 1883 ss.2-3); Treason Offences under the Terrorism Act 2000: Membership of a proscribed organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.11)
ii. iii.
iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix.
x. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv. xvi. xvii.
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Weapons training (Terrorism Act 2000 s.54) Directing a terrorist organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.56) Collecting information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000 s.58) Inciting terrorism overseas (Terrorism Act 2000 s.59) Terrorist bombing (Terrorism Act 2000 s.62) xviii. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2006: Encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications (Terrorism Act 2006 ss1-2) Preparation of terrorist acts (Terrorism Act 2006 s.5) Terrorist training and attendance at a place used for terrorist training (Terrorism Act 2006 ss.6, 8) xix. xx. xxi. xxii. xxiii. xxiv. xxv. xxvi. xxvii. xxviii. xxix. Offences against United Nations personnel (United Nations Personnel Act 1997) Offences against the safety of Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system (Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 [S.I.1994/570]) Offences against the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 Offences against the Official Secrets Acts 1920 and 1989 Fraudulent evasion of duty etc. (Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.170(2) (b)) Bigamy (Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.57) Offences covered by the War Crimes Act 1991 Offences involving the supply or delivery of restricted goods without a licence from the Secretary of State (Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 SI 2003/2765) Corporate manslaughter (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s28) Trafficking or labour and other exploitation under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, s.4; and Hijacking or endangering the safety of aircraft under the Aviation Security Act 1982, ss 13.
The report of the Home Office Steering Committee's Review of Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction includes the following list of criteria used by the Government in deciding whether or not to take extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of particular offences:
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Against this background, it is suggested that consideration should be given to taking extraterritorial jurisdiction only where at least one of the following tests was satisfied: Where the offence is serious (this might be defined, in respect of existing offences, by reference to the length of sentence currently available); Where, by virtue of the nature of the offence, the witnesses and evidence necessary for the prosecution are likely to be available in UK territory, even though the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction; Where there is international consensus that certain conduct is reprehensible and that concerted action is needed involving the taking of extra-territorial jurisdiction; Where the vulnerability of the victim makes it particularly important to be able to tackle instances of the offence; Where it appears to be in the interests of the standing and reputation of the UK in the international community; Where there is a danger that the offences would otherwise not be justiciable. The fact that an offence satisfied one or more of the above guidelines would not positively determine the extension of jurisdiction. But it would suggest that action might be justified, particularly if the practical enforcement issues did not appear to be insurmountable.
Source: This Note is supplied by the House of Commons Library
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Annex 3: The Consolidated Criteria

The Consolidated Criteria are the consolidation of the UK's national criteria and the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. In a Written Answer (dated 26 October 2000, cols 199203W) Peter Hain, the then Minister of State in the FCO, announced the establishment of the Consolidated Criteria: Laura Moffatt: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government have taken to consolidate the UK's national criteria against which the Government assess licence applications to export arms and dual-use equipment with those of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; and if he will make a statement. Mr. Hain: Licences to export arms and other goods controlled for strategic reasons are issued by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, acting through the Export Control Organisation of the DTI. All relevant individual licence applications are circulated by DTI to other Government Departments with an interest, as determined by those Departments in line with their own policy responsibilities. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development. In the Foreign Secretary's reply to my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Mr. Timms) on 28 July 1997, Official Report, column 27, he set out the criteria which would be used in considering advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence, applications for licences to export military equipment, and dual-use goods where there are grounds for believing that the end-user will be the armed forces or internal security forces of the recipient country. As my right hon. Friend said then, the Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence industry as part of our industrial base as well as of our defence effort, and recognise that defence exports can also contribute to international stability by strengthening collective defence relationships; but believe that arms transfers must be managed responsibly. We have since taken a range of measures designed to ensure the highest standards of responsibility in our export control policies. These include the adoption during the UK's Presidency of the EU of a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the publication of Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls which are among the most transparent of those of any arms exporting country; the ban on the export of equipment used for torture; the ratification of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines and the passage of the Land Mines Act; and our many efforts to combat illicit trafficking in and destabilising accumulations of small arms. Since the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on 8 June 1998, all relevant licence applications have been assessed against the UK's national criteria and those in the Code of Conduct, which represent minimum standards that all member states have agreed to apply. The criteria in the EU Code of Conduct are compatible with those which I announced in July 1997. At the same time there is a large degree of overlap between the two. It is clearly in the interests of Government Departments involved in assessing licence applications, British exporters and other interested parties that the criteria which are used should be set out as clearly and unambiguously as possible.
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With immediate effect, therefore, the following consolidated criteria will be used in considering all individual applications for licences to export goods on the Military List, which forms Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994; advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence; and licence applications for the export of dual-use goods as specified in Annexe 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP when there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country, or that the goods will be used to produce arms or other goods on the Military List for such end-users. The criteria are based on those in the EU Code of Conduct, incorporating elements from the UK's national criteria where appropriate. As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis, using judgment and commonsense. Neither the fact of this consolidation, nor any minor additions or amendments to the wording of the two sets of criteria used before, should be taken to imply any change in policy or in its application. An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks to regional stability or by other considerations as described in these criteria. CRITERION ONE a) Respect for the UK's international commitments, in particular sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the European Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. b) The Government will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: c) The UK's international obligations and its commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls; d) The UK's international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; e) The UK's commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement; f) The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; g) The UK's obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act; h) The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
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CRITERION TWO The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination. Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will: a) a. Not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression; b) Exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU. For these purposes equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. The nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary, arbitrary or extra-judicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major suppression or violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Government considers that in some cases, the use of force by a government within its own borders, for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals is legitimate and does not constitute internal repression, as long as force is used in accordance with the international human rights standards described above. CRITERION THREE The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts. The Government will not issue licences for export which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. CRITERION FOUR Preservation of regional peace, security and stability. The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused.
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When considering these risks, the Government will take into account inter alia: a) The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; b) A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; c) Whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient. The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension. CRITERION FIVE The national security of the UK, or territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries. The Government will take into account: a) The potential effect of the proposed export on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability; b) The risk of the goods concerned being used against UK forces or on those of other territories and countries as described above; c) The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer; d) The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities. CRITERION SIX The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law The Government will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to : a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
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c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One. CRITERION SEVEN The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or reexported under undesirable conditions. In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered: a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or peace-keeping activity; b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment; c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls. The Government will pay particular attention to the need to avoid diversion of UK exports to terrorist organisations. Proposed exports of anti-terrorist equipment will be given particularly careful consideration in this context. CRITERION EIGHT The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme. OTHER FACTORS Operative Provision 10 of the EU Code of Conduct specifies that Member States may where appropriate also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Code. The Government will thus continue when considering export licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:
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a) the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners; b) the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country; c) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners; d) the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base. In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.
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Annex 4: EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP)

COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof, Whereas: (1) Member States intend to build on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992, and on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998. (2) Member States recognise the special responsibility of military technology and equipment exporting States. (3) Member States are determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and equipment by all Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency. (4) Member States are determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability. (5) Member States intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (6) Complementary measures have been taken against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. (7) The Council adopted on 12 July 2002 Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Unions contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. (8) The Council adopted on 23 June 2003 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP (2) on the control of arms brokering. (9) The European Council adopted in December 2003 a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in December 2005 a strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, which imply an increased common interest of Member States of the European Union in a coordinated approach to the control of exports of military technology and equipment. (10) The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001. (11) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992. (12) States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter. (13) The wish of Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort is acknowledged.
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(14) The strengthening of a European defence technological and industrial base, which contributes to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the Common European Security and Defence Policy, should be accompanied by cooperation and convergence in the field of military technology and equipment. (15) Member States intend to strengthen the European Unions export control policy for military technology and equipment through the adoption of this Common Position, which updates and replaces the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998. (16) On 13 June 2000, the Council adopted the Common Military List of the European Union, which is regularly reviewed, taking into account, where appropriate, similar national and international lists. (17) The Union must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in accordance with Article 3, second paragraph of the Treaty; in this respect the Council takes note of the Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology, HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION: Article 1 1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2. 2. The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include: applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of licensed production of military equipment in third countries, applications for brokering licences, applications for transit or transhipment licences, applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as electronic media, fax or telephone. Member States legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with respect to these applications. Article 2 Criteria 1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations. An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia: (a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes; (b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
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(c) the commitment of Member States not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine; (d) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. 2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law. Having assessed the recipient countrys attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States shall: (a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression; (b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe; For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Having assessed the recipient countrys attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall: (c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. 3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts. Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination. 4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability. Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account inter alia:
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(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; (b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; (c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient; (d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way. 5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries. Member States shall take into account: (a) the potential effect of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of Member State and those of friendly and allied countries, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and on regional peace, security and stability; (b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries. 6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law. Member States shall take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to: (a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; (b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law; (c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in point (b) of Criterion One. 7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. In assessing the impact of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the recipient country and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered: (a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity; (b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use such technology or equipment; (c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls; (d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose; (e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists; (f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.
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8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments. Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They shall consider in this context the recipient countrys relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid. Article 3 This Common Position shall not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies. Article 4 1. Member States shall circulate details of applications for export licences which have been denied in accordance with the criteria of this Common Position together with an explanation of why the licence has been denied. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it shall notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning. 2. The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any military technology or equipment shall remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the Member State has refused to authorise the actual sale or export of the military technology or equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order. 3. Member States shall keep such denials and consultations confidential and not use them for commercial advantage. Article 5 Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked enduser certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination. When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end user.
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Article 6 Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country. References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology. Article 7 In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment. Article 8 1. Each Member State shall circulate to other Member States in confidence an annual report on its exports of military technology and equipment and on its implementation of this Common Position. 2. An EU Annual Report, based on contributions from all Member States, shall be submitted to the Council and published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union. 3. In addition, each Member State which exports technology or equipment on the EU Common Military List shall publish a national report on its exports of military technology and equipment, the contents of which will be in accordance with national legislation, as applicable, and will provide information for the EU Annual Report on the implementation of this Common Position as stipulated in the Users Guide. Article 9 Member States shall, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of exports of military technology and equipment from Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of this Common Position. Article 10 While Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above criteria. Article 11 Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this Common Position. They shall regularly exchange experiences with those third states applying the criteria on their military technology and equipment export control policies and on the application of the criteria.
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Article 12 Member States shall ensure that their national legislation enables them to control the export of the technology and equipment on the EU Common Military List. The EU Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States national military technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them. Article 13 The Users Guide to the European Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment, which is regularly reviewed, shall serve as guidance for the implementation of this Common Position. Article 14 This Common Position shall take effect on the date of its adoption. Article 15 This Common Position shall be reviewed three years after its adoption. Article 16 This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 8 December 2008.354
354 European Council, EU COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, December 2008
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Annex 5: The Governments arms export licence revocations since 1 January 2011
Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)
End User Country Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar Bahrain Annual Report Summary Reason for Revocation
Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, , military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights,
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Assault rifles (2), components for assault rifles, sporting rifles (2), semi automatic pistols (3), components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns (2), semiautomatic pistols (3), small arms ammunition, weapon sights, weapon cleaning equipment. Equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
Equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Bahrain
Non-sporting shotgun ammunition, small arms ammunition, training ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers.
Bahrain
Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment.
Bahrain
Crowd control ammunition, non-sporting shotgun ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall and door breaching projectiles.
229
End User Country Bahrain
Reason for Revocation
Cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
Artillery, components for artillery, equipment for the use of artillery, technology for artillery, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon mountings.
Bahrain
Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Bahrain
Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Small arms ammunition.
Bahrain
Tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.
Bahrain
Anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition.
Bahrain
NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment.
Bahrain
Components for assault rifles, components for machine guns.
Bahrain
Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Equipment for the use of sniper rifles.
230
End User Country Bahrain
Blank/inert ammunition.
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Components for military training aircraft.
Egypt
Components for military training aircraft.
Egypt
Components for armoured personnel carriers.
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Egypt
Egypt
231
End User Country Egypt
Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
Egypt
Egypt
232
Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Cryptographic software.
Egypt
Cryptographic software.
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
233
Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights, direct view imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, test equipment for weapon sights, technology for the use of test equipment for weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon sights, weapon sight mounts. Direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon nights sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights. Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. Tear gas/irritant ammunition
Libya
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and
Libya
Libya
Libya
Weapon cleaning equipment.
Libya
Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.
Libya
Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition. Components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.
Libya
Libya
Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.
Libya
Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.
Libya
234
End User Country
that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Libya Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition. Components for combat aircraft. Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Libya
Libya
Artillery computers, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the use of military communications equipment. Military helmets.
Libya
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now
Libya
Equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment.
Libya
Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.
Libya
Libya
Libya
Ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment.
Libya
Equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military
235
End User Country
containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment. Libya Direct view imaging equipment.
contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, command and control vehicles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, test equipment for military communications equipment. Cryptographic software.
Libya
Libya
Military cargo vehicles, military communications equipment, military containers, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military cargo vehicles, technology for the use of military containers. Components for multi-role missiles, components for surface-to-air missiles.
Libya
Libya
Optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, equipment for the use of optical target surveillance equipment, laser rangefinders, military cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment. Imaging cameras.
Libya
Libya
Components for combat aircraft.
236
End User Country Libya
Body armour.
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment.
Libya
Libya
Components for anti-armour missiles.
Libya
Libya
Software for the use of military communications equipment.
Libya
Components for military transport aircraft.
Libya
Libya
Technology for the use of naval communications equipment.
Libya
Radio jamming equipment, software for the use of radio jamming equipment.
Libya
Spacecraft.
Libya
NBC respirators.
237
Laser radar equipment.
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Laser radar equipment.
Libya
Components for optical target surveillance equipment.
Libya
Technology for the use of optical target surveillance equipment.
Libya
Optical target surveillance equipment.
Libya
Unfinished products for optical target acquisition equipment.
Libya
Components for airborne radars.
Libya
Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.
Libya
Components for airborne radars.
Libya
Components for optical target surveillance equipment.
Libya
Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.
Libya
Components for military cargo vehicles, military cargo vehicles.
238
Components for military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment. Components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for military parachutes, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment. Inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inter thunderflashes.
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Libya
Libya
Libya
Components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, military cameras, military communications equipment, military video recording equipment. Imaging cameras.
Libya
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Imaging cameras.
Libya
Anti-riot/ballistic shields.
Libya
Inert chaff, inert decoy flares.
Tunisia
Components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.
239
Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)

End User Country Bahrain Annual Report Summary Reason for Revocation
Body armour.
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
Ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets.
Bahrain
Technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights.
Bahrain
Technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights.
Bahrain
Rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights.
Bahrain
Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles,
Bahrain
Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights. Equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Bahrain
Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment. Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of
Bahrain
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and
240
End User Country
military utility vehicles, technology for the use of military utility vehicles. Bahrain Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights. Equipment employing cryptography.
that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
Bahrain
Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the production of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment. Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.
Bahrain
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
Software for military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment. Equipment employing cryptography.
Bahrain
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain
CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades. Ballistic shield, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military
Bahrain
Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now
241
End User Country
systems, military helmets. Bahrain/Egypt Technology for the development of software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the production of software for the use of military communications equipment, Technology for the use of software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the production of command communications control and intelligence software, command communications control and intelligence software. Test equipment for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military communications equipment, technology fir the use of components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of components of military communications equipment, military helmets, components for military helmets, technology for the use of military helmets, technology for the use of components for military helmets. Military distress signalling equipment, equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment. Components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment.
contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2&3
Bahrain/Egypt
Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2&3
Bahrain/Egypt
Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2&3
Bahrain/Egypt
Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2&3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment.
Egypt
Components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components. Military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, components for
Egypt
242
End User Country
military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, components for military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, military flying helmets. Egypt Components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, components for ejector seats, military parachutes, components for military parachutes, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment. Military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes. Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Egypt
Military flying helmets, aircrew protective masks, components for aircrew protective masks, components for military flying helmets, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military flying helmets, components for equipment for the use of military flying helmets, equipment for the use of aircrew protective masks, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communication equipment. Equipment employing cryptography.
Egypt
Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Components for military aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, software for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft. Artillery computers, bombing computers, command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment. Command communications control and intelligence software, components for military electronic equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use
Libya
Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
243
End User Country
of artillery computers, equipment for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment, equipment for the use of fire control equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of laser rangefinders, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, fire control equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun laying equipment, laser rangefinders, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military navigation equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of military operations scenarios, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Libya Software for military communications equipment , technology for the use of software for military communications equipment. Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya
Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment. Military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, communications equipment, military containers, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment. Mine clearing equipment, components for mine clearing equipment, mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of general military vehicle components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the sue of military
Libya
Libya
244
End User Country
field engineer equipment, military field engineer equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, general military vehicle components, minefield breaching vehicles. Libya Technology for the use of military communications equipment. Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3 Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Tunisia
Laser range finders, components for laser range finders, aiming devices, components for aiming devices, weapon sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders, military image intensifier equipment, components for military intensifier equipment, night vision goggles, components for night vision goggles, weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders.
Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)

End User Country Libya Annual Report Summary Reason for Revocation
Pepper sprays for self protection, tear gas for self protection.
Libya
Military utility vehicles.
Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 201012, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm 8079, Annex 1
245
Annex 6: Selected arms export licence approvals to countries in the Middle East and North Africa of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression for the period 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011
The Government conducted a review of arms exports following the Arab Spring in 2011 and announced the revocation of 158 arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as set out in Annex 5. The following table provides details of licences authorised by the Government in the period 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 for equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression in countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Annex 6 updates the equivalent AnnexAnnex 4of the Committees Report (HC686), published on 5 April 2011, which covered the period from 1 January 2009 to 30 September 2010.
Country Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 Cryptographic software, anti-riot/ballistic shields, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights. Equipment for the use of sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, training hand grenades, cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, components for allwheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, gun silencers, rifles, weapon sights, software for equipment employing cryptography, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, pistols. Components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target surveillance, imaging cameras, components for military electronic equipment, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, components for military combat vehicles, weapon night sights, weapon sights, cryptographic software, technology for armoured fighting vehicles, unfinished products for armoured fighting vehicles, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography. Assault rifles, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for semiautomatic pistols, equipment for the use of military communications
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran Iraq
246
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 equipment, general purpose machine guns, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, body armour, components for body armour, components for military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for military helmets, weapon night sights, combat shotguns, flash suppressers, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, smoothbore weapons, sniper rifles, weapon night sights. weapon sights, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment.
Jordan
Components for assault rifles, components for military support vehicles, weapon sights, equipment employing cryptography, armoured plate, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military combat vehicles, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for armoured plate, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for gun mountings, technology for military combat vehicles, assault rifles, components for pistols equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles, equipment for the use of gun mountings, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine guns, components for military helmets, equipment for the production of military helmets, components for weapon night sights, components for military combat vehicles, components for tanks, gun silencers . General military vehicle components, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military utility vehicles, components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for combat helicopters, components for military utility helicopters, general military vehicle components, assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights, ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets, components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, components for military combat vehicles, hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, military combat vehicles, components for weapon night sights, components for machine guns, components for sniper rifles, CS hand grenades, hand grenades, sniper rifles, teargas/irritant ammunition, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, weapon sight mounts. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military, communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, body armour,
Kuwait
Libya
247
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 components for body armour, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
Morocco
Command communications control and intelligence software, equipment employing cryptography, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, gun mountings, inert smoke canisters, machine guns, weapon sights, military support vehicles, assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles. Components for combat helicopters, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for tanks, equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, general military vehicle components, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, components for military communications equipment, components for mortars, components for tanks, general military vehicle components, assault rifles, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for military helicopters, components for military support vehicles, components for rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sight mounts, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for weapon sights, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military trailers, components for tanks, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of tanks, military helmets, pistols, rifles, cryptographic software, military combat vehicles, components for weapon night sights, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for assault rifles, technology for machine guns, technology for pistols, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, . Components for machine guns, assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights, ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, components for mortars, components for small arms training equipment, small arms training equipment, software for the use of small arms training equipment. Components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, flash suppressers, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, military helmets, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
248
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2010 until 31 December 2011 for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for water cannons, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, hand grenades, weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of machine guns, software for equipment employing cryptography, for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography .
Syria Tunisia
Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography. Equipment employing cryptography, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, components for equipment employing cryptography. Body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine guns. components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military helmets, weapon night sights, weapon sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, components for body armour, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights, ballistic shields, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, components for military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, combat shotguns, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of pistols, gun silencers, machine guns, technology for assault rifles, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military combat vehicles, components for mortars, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of mortars, gun mountings, weapon mountings, technology for machine guns. Body armour, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st October 2010 31st December 2010, Country Pivot Report 1st January 2011 31st March 2011, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2011 30th June 2011, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st July 2011 30th September 2011 and Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st October 2011 31st December 2011
249
Annex 7: Selected arms export licence approvals to FCO countries of concern of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression for the period 1 January until 31 December 2011
In its 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report355 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has identified 28 countries of concern where the FCO has the most serious wideranging human rights concerns.356 These countries are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the OPTs, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The following table provides details of licences authorised by the Government in the period 1 January until 31 December 2011 for equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression.
Country Examples of approved arms exports from 1 January until 30 September 2011 Body armour, components for body armour, components for military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military helmets, weapon night sights, assault rifles, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the use of assault rifles, small arms ammunition, technology for assault rifles, weapon sight mounts, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment . None. None. None. Body armour, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, small arms ammunition, technology for military communications equipment, weapon sights, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography. Equipment employing cryptography, body armour, components for assault rifles components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for pistols, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support
Afghanistan
Belarus Burma Chad China
Colombia
355 FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report, Cm 8339, April 2012 356 Foreign Office gives update on human rights in countries of concern, FCO Press Notice, 16 January 2012
250
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 January until 30 September 2011 vehicles, small arms ammunition.
Cuba Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Democratic Republic of Congo Eritrea Iran Iraq
None. None.
Components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.
None. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography. Assault rifles, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for semiautomatic pistols, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general purpose machine guns, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, body armour, components for body armour, components for military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for military helmets, weapon night sights, combat shotguns, flash suppressers, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, rifles, smoothbore weapons, sniper rifles, weapon night sights. weapon sights, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment. General military vehicle components, small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, military support vehicles, components for weapon sights, weapon sights, military communications equipment. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military, communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection. Body armour, components for body armour, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, flash suppressers, military helmets, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment.
Israel and the OPTs
Libya
Pakistan
251
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 January until 30 September 2011 Small arms ammunition, weapon sights, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, components for rifles, weapon sights. Components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, flash suppressers, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, military helmets, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for water cannons, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, hand grenades, weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, components for machine guns, components for military support vehicles, military combat vehicles, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of machine guns. Body armour, components for body armour, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, military combat vehicles, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military helmets, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection. Body armour, components for body armour, small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, antiriot/ballistic shields. Body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, sniper rifles. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography. None. Components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography. Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Body armour.
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
252
Country
Examples of approved arms exports from 1 January until 30 September 2011 Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
Zimbabwe
Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st October 2010 31st December 2010, Country Pivot Report 1st January 2011 31st March 2011, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2011 30th June 2011, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st July 2011 30th September 2011 and Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st October 2011 31st December 2011
253
Annex 8: Extant arms export licences to countries in the Middle East and North Africa for goods which might be used to facilitate internal repression
Details of the extant licences to Saudi Arabia, including the values of extant Military SIELs, provided with the Foreign Secretarys reply to the Committees Chairman of 30 September 2011, can be found in the evidence to this Report at Ev 75141. Bahrain
Application Type SIEL SIEL Goods Goods value 3,620 1,154,800
assault rifles (1), components for assault rifles cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography components for pistols, components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), sporting guns (1) equipment employing cryptography small arms ammunition technology for equipment employing cryptography body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment technology for equipment employing cryptography training hand grenades equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography small arms ammunition gun silencers, sporting guns (2), sporting guns (3) equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography shotguns (2), small arms ammunition cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL
21,204 2,870,000 3,638 5,547
SIEL SIEL SIEL
21,000 1,068 72,300
SIEL
233,080
SIEL SIEL SIEL
6,108 76,320 19,900
SIEL SIEL SIEL
101,108 361,500 1,840
OIEL
254
Application Type
Goods
Goods value
OIEL
cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment cryptographic software ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets equipment employing cryptography technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, technology for military support vehicles command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software equipment employing cryptography bomb suits, military helmets
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL OITCL
Source: HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Cols 1135-36W and information placed in the Libraries of the House
255
Egypt
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL Goods Goods value 1,725 57 1,900 1,225 1,884 4,000 1,054 38,944 558 27,802 10,063 26,191 367,560 41,800 2,746 11,700 840 3,217 1,894 1,908 99,880 8,591 26,582 1,699 63,522
equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection equipment employing cryptography body armour, military helmets equipment employing cryptography components for military helicopters equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography components for weapon control equipment components for targeting equipment equipment employing cryptography components for military combat vehicles weapon night sights, weapon sights cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, training small arms ammunition cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment
OIEL
256
Application Type
Goods
Goods value
OIEL
software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography body armour, components for rifles, military communications equipment, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights body armour, combat shotguns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, small arms ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition assault rifles, body armour, machine guns, military helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
OITCL
OITCL OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
257
Application Type OITCL
Goods
Goods value
body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights assault rifles, components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights
OITCL
OITCL
OITCL
Source: HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1136W and information placed in the Libraries of the House
Libya
Application Type SIEL Goods Goods value 77,093,000
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software components for military equipment for initiating explosives components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
77,093,000
SIEL SIEL
43,354 2,032,500
SIEL SIEL SIEL
210 2,500 16,950
SITCL SITCL SITCL OIEL
163,500 145,000 233,170
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
258
Application Type OITCL
Goods
Goods value
all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
Source: HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Cols 1136-37W
Syria
Application Type SITCL SIEL OITCL Goods Goods value 201,064 199,209
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Equipment employing cryptography All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
Source: HC Deb, 27 March 2012, Col 1137W
Tunisia
Application Type SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL Goods Goods value 4,200,000 2,568 320,000 544 270 25,000 170 750,100 9,570 194 268 1,867 135,000
Equipment employing cryptography Military helmets Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Military support vehicles Components for equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography Equipment employing cryptography All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Cryptographic software Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the
SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SIEL SITCL OIEL OIEL OIEL
259
Application Type
Goods
Goods value
function of military communications equipment
OIEL
Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Small arms ammunition All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL
OIEL OITCL
Yemen
Application Type SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) OIEL Goods Goods value 70,000 3,288
All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection Body armour
Body armour
1,444
Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL
OIEL
OIEL
260
Annex 9: Arms export licences to Argentina for the period 1 April 2010 until 31 December 2011
1 April 2010 30 June 2010 SIELs Military (total value 80,006) air guns (38) shotguns (1) (2 licences) shotguns (2) (3 licences) Other (total value 64,220) equipment employing cryptography (7 licences) imaging cameras software for the use of equipment employing cryptography towed hydrophone arrays OIELs hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays 1 July 2010 31 September 2010 SIELs Military (total value 205,100) components for destroyers components for military utility helicopters shotguns (1) (2 licences) shotguns (2) (3 licences) Other (total value 857,322) animal pathogens chemicals used for chemical/materials production equipment employing cryptography (5 licences) fibrous/filamentary materials products containing plutonium-239 Refused components for military electronic equipment (Criteria 5) 1 October 2010 31 December 2010 SIELs Military (total value 91,888) components for ejector seats components for military radars (6 licences) military radars
261
sporting guns (1) sporting guns (2) sporting guns (27) Other (total value 14,546) animal pathogens equipment employing cryptography (4 licences) 1 January 2011 31 March 2011 SIELS Military (total value 62,200) small arms ammunition sporting guns (1) (3 licences) sporting guns (2) Other (total value 6,078) equipment employing cryptography (2 licences) OIELs equipment employing cryptography 1 April 2011 30 June 2011 SIELs Military (total value 342,134) components for combat naval vessels (2 licences) components for military aero-engines (3 licences) components for military support aircraft components for military training aircraft sporting guns (1) sporting guns (1) sporting guns (2) (4 licences) OIELs animal pathogens heading sensors for hydrophone arrays inertial equipment 1 July 2011 31 September 2011 SIELs Military (total value 155,854) components for combat aircraft components for military aero-engines (2 licences) components for military aircraft ground equipment components for military support aircraft (3 licences) military aircraft ground equipment small arms ammunition (2 licences)
262
sporting guns (1) (2 licences) sporting guns (1) (2 licences) sporting guns (2) (7 licences) SIELs Transhipment Military (total value 29,915) components for body armour OIELs equipment employing cryptography 1 October 2011 31 December 2011 SIELs Military (total value 634,645) components for combat aircraft (4 licences) components for combat naval vessels components for military aero-engines components for military aircrew breathing equipment components for military guidance/navigation equipment (2 licences) components for military support aircraft (4 licences) components for military transport aircraft components for naval engines (2 licences) components for sporting guns general military aircraft components sporting guns (1) (2 licences) sporting guns (2) (3 licences) sporting guns (8) Other (total value 67,103) animal pathogens components for toxic gas monitoring equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography (2 licences) imaging cameras OIELs components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment technology for military communications equipment OITCLs body armour components for rifles military communications equipment military helmets rifles small arms ammunition
263
weapon night sights weapon sights

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Reports: 1st April 2010 30th June 2010; 1st July 2010 30th September 2010; and 1st October 2010 31st December 2010 1st January 2011 31st March 2011; 1st April 2011 30th June 2011; 1st July 2011 30th September 2011; and 1st October 2011 31st December 2011
264
Annex 10: The Committees correspondence with Ministers

The correspondence listed below can be read in full in Volume II of this Report at the evidence references shown, and constitutes the CAECs correspondence with Ministers since the last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011. Date
07/04/2011 14/07/2011 18/07/2011
From
Alistair Burt Chairman Chairman
To
Chairman Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary
Subject
The Committees 2011 Report HC686 Review of Arms Exports CAACs questions on the Governments Response Cm 8079 to the Committees 2011 Report HC686 US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty Review of Arms Exports US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty Anders Breivik CAECs questions on the Governments Response Cm 8079 to the Committees 2011 Report HC686, and questions on the Review of Arms Exports Review of Arms Exports The Governments Annual Report on Arms Exports 2010 HC 1042 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and answers Anders Breivik Priority Markets list Review of Arms Exports and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance Priority Markets list Review of Arms Exports and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and
Evidence reference
62 63
63
21/07/2011 30/07/2012 05/08/2012 05/09/2011 30/09/2011
Chairman Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary Chairman Foreign Secretary
Foreign Secretary Chairman Chairman Vince Cable Chairman
65 66 66 67
67
01/10/2012 19/10/2011
Foreign Secretary Chairman
Chairman Foreign Secretary
143 143
24/10/2011 08/11/2011 21/11/2011 21/11/2011
Chairman Vince Cable Chairman Chairman
Foreign Secretary Chairman Vince Cable Foreign Secretary
148 149 149
149 149 150
08/12/2011 09/12/2011
Vince Cable Foreign Secretary
Chairman
15/12/2011
Foreign Secretary
Chairman Chairman
150
16/12/2011
Chairman
Foreign Secretary
265
Date
From
To
Subject
answers
Evidence reference
151 151 151 Annex 11
16/12/2011
Chairman
Foreign Secretary
The Governments Annual Report on arms exports 2010 HC 1042 Guy Savage The Governments Annual Report on arms exports 2010 HC 1042 "Brass plate" companies, Pre-licensed registration of arms brokers, Extraterritoriality Internal repression Thor Liberty Guy Savage China "Brass plate" companies, Pre-licensed registration of arms brokers, Extraterritoriality Thor Liberty Internal repression Thor Liberty China Priority Markets list Embargo on Somalia Export of Tasers Trade Exhibitions Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance Trident Westminster Hall Human Rights debate follow-up Human rights, Consolidated Criteria, Bahrain 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and answers Bahrain and Yemen Lord Alton's Re-Export Controls Bill National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012 2015 Trade Exhibitions Bahrain and Yemen Argentina arms exports Egypt arms exports
16/12/2011 07/01/2012
Chairman Foreign Secretary
Vince Cable Chairman
10/01/2012
Chairman
Vince Cable
152 152 154 154 154
16/01/2012 17/01/2012 19/01/2012 25/01/2012 02/02/2012
Chairman Chairman Vince Cable Chairman Vince Cable
Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary Chairman Foreign Secretary Chairman
155 156 156 163 164 164 165 165 166 166
02/02/2012 06/02/2012
Vince Cable Foreign Secretary
Chairman Chairman
06/02/2012 06/02/2012 08/02/2012 13/02/2012 20/02/2012
Vince Cable Alistair Burt Alistair Burt Vince Cable Foreign Secretary
Chairman Chairman Chairman Chairman Chairman
20/02/2012 20/02/2012
Foreign Secretary Alistair Burt
Chairman Chairman
21/02/2012 28/02/2012 08/03/2012 21/03/2012
Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary Vince Cable Alistair Burt
Chairman Chairman Chairman Chairman
167 178 Ev 56 Annex 12
26/03/2012 16/04/2012 26/04/2012 26/04/2012
Vince Cable Chairman Foreign Secretary Alistair Burt
Chairman Foreign Secretary Chairman Chairman
180 181 181 181
266
Date
01/05/2012
From
Foreign Secretary
To
Chairman
Subject
Bahrain and Yemen
Evidence reference
183
267
Annex 11: The Committees questions and the Governments answers to the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010
The text of a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees dated 7 January 2012 relating the Committees questions and the Governments answers to the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2010 (HC1402) follows: Thank you for your letters of 19 October and 16 December 2011 about the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010. I apologise for the delay in responding which was due to administrative error, and I regret any inconvenience this has caused. I enclose a response which addresses the questions asked in Annex A of your letter of 19 October. The Government attaches great importance to the work of the Committees, and values their role in scrutinising strategic arms exports. We look forward to working closely and constructively with the Committees to address their concerns in a transparent, comprehensive and timely manner. I also look forward to giving Oral Evidence before the Committees on 7 February and to receiving the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 in due course. Annex A: Questions relating to the Government's Report - United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010- HC1402 The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's report. In order to assist the Committees, we have provided internet links to sources where available. Ministerial Foreword 2nd paragraph On what grounds does the Government consider that its commitment to increasing arms exports on the one hand, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad on the other, are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually conflicting, agendas? Increasing defence and security exports does not by definition mean ignoring the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. All countries have the right to an effective, secure defence and the Government will use its export licensing powers to ensure that the UK only permits responsible defence exports. Ministerial Foreword 2nd paragraph In what specific ways has the present Government extended transparency on arms exports data compared with the previous Government? The Government makes available data on all export licensing applications via the BIS Strategic Export Controls: Reports & Statistics website (link below). The Government now provides an unclassified, redacted version of its answers to the Committees questions based on BIS Quarterly Reports. This began with the response to questions covering the quarter January-March 2011.
268
Link: https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/eng/fox/sdb/SDBHOME Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.1 Does the Government accept that the scale and content of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries in North Africa and the Middle East as detailed in Annex 1 of the Government's Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees on Arms Export Controls Report published on 5 April 2011 represent a serious failure by BIS, FCO, MOD, DFID, HMRC and UKBA to fulfil the first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Community's Joint Mission Statement namely: "We shall implement effectively the UK's framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands?" Revocations, on the contrary, show how seriously we take this guiding principle. Given the significant changes in the region, it would seem entirely right and reasonable that risk assessments should be updated and, in some cases, lead to a change in decision where the licence is no longer consistent with the Consolidated Criteria. There is no suggestion that the original decisions were flawed in the context of the prevailing conditions at the time they were made. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.2 In respect of each of the extant arms export licences to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1of Cm 8079, which were, and which are not: a) referred to the FCO overseas post concerned for assessment against Criteria 2 and 3 before the licence was granted? b) referred to FCO Ministers for a final recommendation, and what was their recommendation in each case and the date of their recommendation? Risk assessments are made by the individual country officer in the Arms Export Policy Team, consulting as necessary with geographical desks and/or overseas Posts. The need to consult may be driven by a lack of specific information in relation to the equipment for export, or its intended use, or to obtain a more general update should the situation in a country change. A significant change in a country (e.g. because of upheaval) is likely to lead to an increase in advice being sought from desks and Posts because the situation on the ground is in a state of flux, or a review of licences to that particular country. Ministers are consulted about particularly difficult cases. We do not go into detail about this process, particularly in a document that is likely to be made public. The export licensing system is based on risk assessment. Information about how risk was assessed for individual countries could have a
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negative impact on our bilateral relations and therefore regional stability. Providing the level of detail requested could breach commercial confidentiality in some instances and place the UK defence and security industry at a disadvantage in a competitive market. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.2 a) Which strategic export licence applications, and for what goods and to which countries, were referred to DFID in 2010 for that Department's specific expertise and advice? Of those applications, which were granted and which were refused, and which were granted contrary to the advice of DFID? DFID received 266 applications to review in 2010. Please see Annex 1 for a breakdown of the countries, goods and final licensing decision made for each of these applications. DFID reviews all licences for exports to World Bank International Development Assistance eligible countries. Although the attached spreadsheet highlights multiple destinations for OIELs and OITCLs, DFID comments only on those that fall within this criterion. This is made clearer in the final column. Of the applications seen by DFID, broken down by country,178 were issued,196 issued with proviso, 25 rejected, 14 refused and 83 stopped, withdrawn or remain outstanding. There were no instances of a licence being granted despite DFID recommending it be declined. b) Which of the arms export licence applications to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1 of Cm 8079, were referred to DFID for that Department's specific expertise and advice, and what was DFID's advice in each case? None of the revoked licences listed in Annex 1of report CM8079 were circulated to DFID. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3 What steps will the Government take to inform the Committees on Arms Export Controls of any amendments to strategic exports control legislation it has decided to make by way of secondary legislation? Amendments to strategic export control legislation are laid before Parliament and we endeavour, as a matter of course, to provide the Chair of the CAEC with advance written notice of this. Amendments are also published on the legislation.gov.uk website, as well as being
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publicised directly to exporters via a Notice to Exporters or Awareness Bulletin and on the export control pages of both the BIS and Business Link websites: Link: http://www.legislation.gov.uk Link: http://www.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol Link: http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/exportcontrol Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3 Will the Government's relaxation of the UK's national controls on explosives-related items to bring them into line with EU controls increase the risk that such items exported from the UK may be used for internal repression or against the Armed Forces of the UK or those of other NATO and EU member countries? No. The items in question still require an export licence to be exported to any destination outside the EU or a country other than Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland or the USA. This change simply brought the controls into line with EU-wide controls on equipment having a higher specification. In doing so we corrected an anomaly whereby equipment of a lower specification was subject to national controls which were more restrictive than EU controls on equipment of a higher specification. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3 a) Is the Order introducing a control on the export to the USA of sodium thiopental used in some states in the USA in the process of execution by lethal injection going to be extended beyond the maximum of 12 months? b) What has been the European Commission's response to the British Government's request that sodium thiopental be added to the items in the EU's so-called "torture Regulation" for which export authorisation is required? The European Commission have brought forward proposals to add to Annex Ill of Regulation 1236/2005 (the so-called torture Regulation) certain "short and intermediate acting barbiturates", including sodium thiopental and pentobarbital. This means that a licence would be required for export of any of these drugs from the EU to any destination outside the EU. It is expected that this measure will come into force in December 2011. When it does we will revoke the existing UK controls on these drugs. The Commission have also indicated that in 2012 they will begin a broader review of the torture Regulation, including further revisions of the Annexes and
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consideration of the inclusion of "end-use", brokering and transit controls. These further measures will, however, require the approval of the Council (acting by a qualified majority of the Member States) and European Parliament and it is of course not possible to predict what the outcome of this review will be. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3 On 27 October 2010 a new EU Regulation imposing restrictive measures against Iran came into force - Council Regulation (EU) 961/2010 of 25 October 2010. Will the UK Government be introducing any new or amending any existing legislation in order to comply with the Regulation? The Export Control (Iran) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1297) was laid in Parliament on 23 May and came into force on 13 June this year. The Order set out the new offences and penalties in relation to the elements falling within the remit of BIS of Council Regulation (EU) No. 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran. A copy of the Order is available to view at legislation.gov.uk. Link: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1297/ contents/made Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.3 On 9 November 2010 Mark Prisk MP, Minister for Business, announced to Parliament that the Government would only issue licences for Annex IV items in the most exceptional circumstances. What would those circumstances be? It is hard to envisage many circumstances where we would issue a licence for Annex IV goods to Iran. But it is conceivable that, should some sort of humanitarian emergency (an earthquake for example) develop in Iran, we may require the flexibility to provide controlled goods to aid this humanitarian effort. To date we had no occasion to issue a licence for Annex IV goods, but the statement gives us the flexibility to do so should the need arise. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.4 a) The Government has made the policy change that from 1 July 2010 all applications for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) must contain a declaration from the end-user that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo. Why did the policy change apply only to Standard Individual Export Licence applications, and not all applications for strategic exports?
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The policy change only applies to applications for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) where an End User Undertaking is currently required. Open General Licences either already contain a specific no re-export condition or are otherwise constructed around a particular scenario (e.g. export for exhibition where the goods ultimately return to the UK) such that the question of re-export does not arise. The documentary and record-keeping requirements of each OGEL are set out clearly in the licence itself and are not affected by this new requirement. Open Individual Export licences (OIELs) are concessionary licences and therefore already have a condition on the licence prohibiting re-export to a destination not on the licence. b) From 1 July 2010 all End-User Undertakings must contain a declaration by the enduser that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo. How is this monitored and enforced? The risk of diversion to destinations subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargoes is minimised by completing a thorough risk assessment of each application received at the pre-licensing stage and this process includes careful examination of information about the proposed end use and actual end user of the goods. The risk of diversion is, of course, considered when assessing licensing applications under Criterion 7. The use of military equipment overseas in destinations of concern is also monitored by UK diplomatic posts, reporting on the equipment that has been supplied from the UK and how it is being used in that destination. We also take account of a variety of different reporting on end-use which includes reports from NGOs, human rights organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence reports. Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any misuse of UK-supplied equipment. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.6 Is the Department for Business intending to make any further developments to the ECO website in order to aid exporters? If so, what is envisaged? The ECO's main method of communicating with exporters is online and ECO is continually endeavouring to further develop and improve its website presence. This is achieved via a number of different websites rather than a single ECO website. A summary of the planned developments of each web area is summarised briefly
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below: www.businesslink.gov.uk - ECO's main practical guidance material is published on this cross-government portal. Businesslink are currently in the process of making some site-wide improvements including the launch of a business mentoring portal, a comprehensive resource for start up companies and a revamped events database as well as a project to simplify content across the site. ECO has input into the BL-wide content simplification project, although there not envisaged to be any significant changes to the export control pages. Recent improvements to the export control pages have included the addition of new guides on 'Exporting military goods to the United States'. ECO maintains a presence on the Department for Business website. All ECO's Notices to Exporters and training course information are published via this site. ECO is currently planning to make some changes to the training pages to better promote our courses and services. Checker tools database - www.ecochecker.co.uk - the ECO maintains two tools (Goods Checker and OGEL Checker) which are designed to help exporters to identify if their goods are controlled and if they might be able to register for an appropriate Open General Licence. In line with Cabinet Office web convergence guidelines, ECO is planning some changes to the Checker Tools homepage, to include clearer links and references to the ECO's other web platforms. SPIRE - www.spire.bis.gov.uk - ECO is in the process of testing a number of enhancements to its export licensing database which will be made in System Release 2.14. This includes the option for exporters to create templates from existing applications and to share templates across organisations, which has been requested by a number of stakeholders.
Longer term, the ECO is mindful of ongoing developments across government websites, including moves to create a single site and work on the www.alpha.gov.uk prototype. Developments in this area will necessarily impact on any changes to the ECO's website presence, given that the push is for more centralised rather than separate sites. ECO will keep the CAEC updated on any changes impacting on export control related content. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.7 The ratio of errors found during compliance visits is relatively high. What steps are being taken to reduce the instances of compliance misuses?
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The majority of compliance visits are first visits. The error rate on these visits is likely to be higher when a company is in its first year of using open licences. Although the number of misuses identified in each year appears to be high, occurring in around one third of all audits, it must be remembered that this includes all types of misuse including minor administrative errors such as failing to reference the licence on commercial documentation. The numbers of more serious errors, such as an unlicensed shipment (i.e. a shipment of items that was not permitted by the particular open general licence that was used), are much lower and have actually gone down by over 50% compared to 2009. We take all cases of misuse seriously. Persistent misuse of Open licences was the principal reason we introduced the Warning Letter and suspension procedure. This appears to have had the desired effect because, as noted above, the proportion of serious errors has fallen. Following an audit, exporters are always informed of the findings and of any remedial action required. In the majority of cases when the company is re-audited the errors have been corrected. This illustrates very well the effectiveness of the compliance audit process and the overall robustness of open licences. We also encourage attendance at ECO's training and awareness seminars, and are able to provide company-specific on-site training. More generally we are looking at ways to improve the usability of OGELs in order to reduce the number of errors that occur through simple misunderstanding. Section 1 Domestic Policy paragraph 1.9 a) In how many of the 134 cases of seizures in 2010 of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements were prosecutions for strategic export offences initiated? No prosecutions have yet been initiated involving seizures of military equipment, dual-use goods or goods subject to sanctions where the goods were seized during the financial year 2010- 2011. However, this is not unusual, as cases require a thorough criminal investigation before they are referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. It then takes time to bring a case to a conclusion through the criminal justice system. The Government's policy is not to prosecute every offence, and each case is considered on an individual basis. The majority of cases where goods are seized at the border are of a less serious nature and are dealt with by way of a written warning and, where appropriate, a restoration penalty. However in more serious cases, criminal investigations leading to prosecution are
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initiated as a result of a seizure at the border. For example, two recent prosecutions involved cases where unlicensed goods had been seized at the UK border (F14 fighter jet parts destined for Iran and telescopic sights for sniper rifles, also destined for Iran). b) Why were only 5 prosecutions successful? A total of five criminal prosecutions were concluded during the financial year 2010 2011, and they all resulted in guilty verdicts. Four of the cases resulted in custodial sentences and one resulted in a suspended sentence. The cases involved a range of military, paramilitary and dual-use goods. There were no unsuccessful prosecutions. We expect that further prosecutions will be concluded during the current financial year. This is not an area where we ordinarily expect to see large numbers of prosecutions in any given year. The Government's policy is not to prosecute every offence, and the way we deal with a case needs to be proportionate to the offence. Since April 2010, HM Revenue and Customs has made greater use of its ability to offer compound settlements in lieu of prosecution for breaches of export licensing controls and trade controls. Fourteen compound penalties have been paid since April 2010, including one for unlicensed goods detected at the border. The compound penalties issued in these cases have ranged from 1,000 up to 239,000. An offer of a compound penalty is only made when the circumstances of the case justify an offer. HM Revenue and Customs, the UK Border Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service maintain an active intelligence-led enforcement effort targeted against the most serious proliferation threats including deliberately non-complaint businesses and individuals. HMRC also works with BIS to deliver a joint compliance and education programme that aims to prevent breaches of the controls by providing advice and guidance to exporters and improving their awareness of their legal obligations. This reduces the risk of breaches and helps to facilitate legitimate trade. Section 2 International Policy Table 2.3 Why is the Department for International Development only consulted when assessing an arms export licence application against Criteria 8, and not when assessments are made against Criteria 2, 3 and 4? The FCO, MOD and DFID act in a policy advisory capacity and provides the ECO with advice and analysis on the foreign, defence and international development policy aspects relevant to consideration of export licence applications against the
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Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As stated in Section 1of the Government's Annual Report, DFID provide specific expertise and advice in considering applications to those developing countries eligible for concessional loans from the World Bank's International Development Association. DFID considers export licence applications destined to all International Development Association (IDA) eligible countries against Criterion 8 and specifically, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the recipient country's economy, and whether the export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. The FCO is the advisory department on Criteria 2, 3 and 4. The Department for International Development is currently considering its role in the UK's arms export control system, including the most appropriate criteria on which to be consulted. Section 2 International Policy paragraph 2.4 The Government produced in its Report case studies of export licence applications for: 1. body armour and night vision goggles that were to be used by Private Security Companies in Afghanistan, 2. a single armoured personnel carrier for demonstration/evaluation for the Nigerian Police Force, and 3. shields and body armour for use by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kyrgyzstan. Why has the Government selected as its Case Studies relatively insubstantial export licence applications compared with the previous Government which in its 2008 Report included as a Case Study an application for an export licence for Armoured Personnel Carriers and components for the Libyan Police? Cases studies for the 2010 report were selected to help illustrate the decision making process, and to represent accurately some of the issues considered during the course of the year, including areas of the world that threw up particular export control challenges. Afghanistan- The UK Government wants Afghanistan to become a stable, secure state that is able to suppress terrorism and violent extremism. Our troops and civilians are working with the Afghan Government to help them combat terrorism and extremism, including in support of our own national security. The long-term future of Afghanistan depends upon the revival of its economy and the UK is
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supporting this through increasing trade and investment. There are sanctions in place for Afghanistan (arms embargo) which apply to those individuals designated under UNSCR 1988 (the '1988 List'). We selected Afghanistan as a case study to provide more background on why and what type of equipment is exported. Nigeria - It is important that case studies reflect the worldwide nature of our assessments, and we chose Nigeria given that it is the UK's second largest market in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa. The value of exports has increased steadily from 535 million in 2000 to 1.3 billion in 2009. The UK is actively involved in human rights issues and has funded a number of human rights projects in Nigeria over the past few years, including supporting work aimed at bringing an end to torture and the death penalty. Human rights abuses often occur in Nigeria as a result of communal conflict, often between communities and security forces. In recent years, violence has claimed hundreds of lives in the Niger Delta, Kaduna, Plateau, Borno and Kano States. The export licence application was for a vehicle for evaluation by the Nigerian Police. Kyrgyzstan - Concern over civil liberties and increases in electricity tariffs led to growing discontent in Kyrgyzstan in 2010; President Bakiev was overthrown in April with ensuing civilian unrest and demonstrations being reported in the UK media. Ethnic unrest in June led to over 400 deaths, thousands being displaced and the Kyrgyz government declaring a state of emergency. The UK has a growing interest in a safe and stable Kyrgyzstan {also bearing in mind its proximity to Afghanistan). HMG has contributed almost 1 million since 2003 to support conflict prevention, criminal justice reform, election monitoring and human rights and democratisation in Kyrgyzstan and we signed a Defence Co-operation MOU in January 2006 to provide a framework for more effective support from the Kyrgyz for UK assistance in defence matters. The British All-Party Parliamentary Group on Central Asia visited Bishkek in March 2010 to sign a MOU on strengthening cooperation. The Foreign Secretary subsequently announced {11 May 2011) that the UK would open a new Embassy in Bishkek. Section 2 Arms Trade Treaty paragraph 2.5 When does the Government anticipate agreement to the Arms Trade Treaty? What are the main issues still to be resolved to enable a consensus to be reached? The Diplomatic Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty will take place at the UN in New York from 2 to 27 July 2012. The UK believes it is important for all UN Member States to work together at the Conference to achieve agreement on a robust and effective, legally binding ATI, and we will be striving for a successful conclusion
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to the Conference to this end. Much progress has been made at the Preparatory Committee meetings, and the Chair's papers provide a solid basis for the negotiations in July 2012. There are still a range of views on what equipment should fall under the Treaty's scope; including on the inclusion of ammunition and explosives. This is true of the ATT's parameters, on issues such as human rights and sustainable development. The Conference will also need to decide what national requirements the Treaty will introduce for particular activities and types of transfer. Section 2 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) paragraph 2.6 Which states attended the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States considering the implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects? 105 UN member states attended this meeting. Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, FYR of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia. link: http://www.poa-iss.org/BMS4/0utcome/BMS4-0utcome-E.pdf Section 2 Cluster Munitions paragraph 2.7 Which countries have now ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions? Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, BosniaHerzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, FYR of Macedonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
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Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia. link: http:1/www.clusterconvention .org/ratifications-and-signatures/ Section 2 Wassenaar Arrangement paragraph 2.8 a) Which states and international organisations participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement dealing with the accumulation and transfer of conventional weapons?
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Argentina, Republic of Korea, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovenia, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia and South Africa. link: http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html b) The report states that "the UK plans to play a full and leading role in the Assessment Year process" for the Wassenaar Arrangement. What actions will be or have been taken to fulfil this statement?
The UK has made a broad and multi faceted contribution to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Assessment process throughout 2011, and a wide range of cross Government expertise has been utilised to optimise impact and avoid duplication. The high quality UK engagement with WA Participating States during this process helped protect and promote UK interests across a number of key activities of the WA, and guide the WA towards more effective and modern practices. The UK contribution to the WA assessment has, and will, ensure that the Organisation's long term goals reflect HMG strategic objectives in the sphere of non proliferation. The UK role in the WA assessment process was focussed on contributing to discussions aimed at improving the efficiency of the Control List reviews and consistent interpretation amongst the Participants. Section 2 UN Register of Conventional Arms paragraph 2.9
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a) Which UN member states make reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms? 64 member states including the UK made reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms for the calendar year 2010. These member states were: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Switzerland, FYR of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Vietnam. Link: http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/ (Then select document A/66/127- 12 July 2011). b) What specific steps is the Government taking to try to ensure that more UN member states do so, and on an up-to-date annual and accurate basis, and also with the full details required by the UN? The UK encourages other UN member states by example, i.e. submitting its complete return in a timely fashion on an annual basis. The UK has co-sponsored UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the Register, for example Resolution 64/54 in December 2009. The UK has one of the most rigorous and transparent arms export control systems in the world and encourages other states to adopt similar regimes, for example by taking a leading role in negotiating an ATI that will be robust, effective and legally binding. Section 2 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) paragraph 2.10 a) Which are the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group seeking to reduce global nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapons development, and promoting effective safeguards and the protection of existing nuclear materials? Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. Link: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgrouo.org/Leng/03-member.htm b) The 2011Plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group took place in Holland. What were the main outcomes from this session? Within the framework of the NSG's mandate, concerns were shared about the proliferation implications of the nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran. The NSG reiterated its long-standing support for diplomatic efforts for a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and for a solution to the DPRK nuclear issue in a peaceful manner. The NSG also: agreed to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies; emphasised the importance of keeping its lists up to date with technological developments and took stock of the work done for a fundamental review of the trigger and dual use lists; continued to consider all aspects of the implementation of the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India and discussed the NSG relationship with India. link: http:1/www.nuclearsuppIiersgroup.org/Leng/PRESS/2011-06Public%20statement%202011%20NSG%20v7%20-%20final.pdf Section 2 The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) paragraph 2.11 a) Which are the Institutes of Higher Education (IHEs) in the UK participating in The Academic Technology Approval Scheme seeking to protect certain sensitive technologies relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery from possible misuse by proliferators? The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is a Tier 4 student visa requirement enshrined within the UK Immigration rules. It must therefore be adhered to by all UK Higher Education Institutes, which offer courses to international students from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland. b) Which are the "sensitive subjects" at each participating Institute of Higher Education for which foreign students seeking to study them must first obtain an ATAS certificate? The scheme covers postgraduate study in a variety of subject areas ranging from medical and biological science to engineering and computer science. A full list of
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subjects which apply to the scheme can be found on the ATAS website. Link: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/ what-we-do/services-we-deliver Iatas/ whoatas/ c) Why does the Government consider that the need to protect at UK Institutes of Higher Education certain sensitive technologies relating to WMD and their means of delivery from possible misuse by proliferators arises only in the case of foreign students? The ATAS scheme is designed to prevent those students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential WMD proliferation subjects. In order to give the broadest and most efficient coverage, ATAS is built into the Tier 4 student visa requirement. Section 2 Australia Group paragraph 2.12 Which are the current participants in the Australia Group to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological agents and dual-use manufacturing equipment? There are 41 participants in the Australia Group including the European Commission. These are: Argentina, Republic of Korea, Australia, Latvia, Austria, Lithuania, Belgium, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Malta, Canada, Netherlands, Croatia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Norway, Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, Portugal, Estonia, Romania, European Commission, Slovak Republic, Finland, Slovenia, France, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Switzerland, Hungary, Turkey, Iceland, Ukraine, Ireland, United Kingdom, Italy, United States and Japan. Link: http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html Section 2 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) paragraph 2.13 a) Which countries are Partners in the Missile Technology Control Regime coordinating their export licensing efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD capable unmanned delivery systems?
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
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Link: http://www.mtcr.info/english/partners.html b) What was the outcome of the Plenary held in Buenos Aires in April 2011? MTCR partners discussed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery that constitute a threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, partners reaffirmed the importance of addressing these challenges and the role the MTCR serves in this regard. Partners conducted extensive discussions on missile proliferation-related activities worldwide, including developments in missile programmes and their proliferation; procurement activities and techniques in support of such programmes; rapid technological change; the role of intangible technology, brokering, and transshipment in facilitating proliferation; and key technology trends in proliferation missile programmes. These discussions showed that additional export control efforts by MTCR countries could have an even greater impact. They also underlined the importance of addressing transit and transshipment issues and, in this context, the proliferation risk posed by countries with weak export controls. Partners exchanged information on concerns about the ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, Northeast Asia and South Asia, including Iran and North Korea, which could contribute to regional instability and supply missile proliferation activities elsewhere. Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council Resolutions, inter alia, 1874 and 1929, to MTCR export controls and expressed their determination to implement these resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law. Partners agreed to continue exchanging views on missile programme developments. Partners reaffirmed the critical importance of the MTCR's ongoing technical work. They noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward looking action to address these developments. They expressed their appreciation for the work of the Licensing and Enforcement Expert Meeting (LEEM), the Information Exchange Meeting (IEM) and the Technical Expert Meeting (TEM) in particular the decision adopted on amendments to the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex. Over the past year, the outgoing MTCR Chair (Brazil) conducted outreach with Belarus, China, India, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. The incoming MTCR Chair (Argentina) intends to conduct further outreach, including with additional countries, in order to increase transparency about the Regime and promote its
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objectives. Partners expressed their willingness to continue extensive outreach by individual MTCR Partners to a wide range of countries. Non-Partners activities in support of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR would also be welcome. Partners agreed to continue their individual and collective efforts to assist interested countries in implementing the missile-related export controls mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and to work with the 1540 Committee. Partners also reviewed a number of key aspects of the internal functioning of the Regime, including issues related to future membership. Partners exchanged views on their overall approaches, inter alia membership evaluation. Individual applications for membership also were thoroughly discussed, with no consensus being reached on the admission of new members at this time. The membership issue will continue to be discussed. link: http://www.mtcr.info/english/Press%20Release%20April%202011.html Section 2 Gifted Equipment paragraph 2.15 and Table 2.4 a) Does the Government attach the same controls and conditions to the equipment it gifts to overseas governments as it attaches to arms export licences it grants to commercial exporters? The Government may agree to requests from other governments to gift to them military equipment. All gifting proposals made by Government sponsors are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria by specialist licensing advisers. The Government can give provisos to the recipient of a gift where it is necessary. b) Is the Government requiring from governments to whom it is gifting equipment the same end-use declaration it introduced from 1 July 2010 for commercial exports as described in paragraph 1.4 of the Annual Report 2010? The Government does not currently ask for an end-user undertaking from a foreign Government recipient of gifted equipment. As the provider of the equipment, the Government would expect to have a relationship with countries to which we gift. .This allows us to understand their need and the end-use to which the equipment being gifted would be put. We would not agree to a gifting proposal where we assessed that the recipient intended to transfer the items to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo. However, we are content to consider whether there would be benefit in requiring
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end-user undertakings from recipients of gifts and will advise the Committee of our findings. c) Does the Government retain the right to require the return of equipment it gifts if the controls and conditions attached to the gift are not complied with? Once a gift has been delivered to the recipient we regard title to the item as having transferred. Were there to be evidence subsequently that the gifted equipment had been misused the Government would consider what representations it wished to make and the impact of the event on our future relationship. d) What were the functions of the Laboratory Equipment gifted to the Iraq Ministry of Interior in 2010? The laboratory equipment gifted to the Iraq Ministry of Interior was part of an ongoing Forensics and Criminal Justice Project to re-establish Iraqi police forensic evidence capability in Baghdad. The gift helped to re-equip the Karrada Laboratory in Baghdad following a bomb attack in January 2010. The gifted equipment restored the Iraq police capability to produce credible physical and forensic evidence to be considered as part of the criminal justice system. e) What were the functions of the Law Enforcement Equipment gifted to the Government of Yemen in 2010? The non-lethal equipment gifted to Yemen was part of a programme designed to reduce the use of lethal force in public order situations and address a source of grievance amongst Yemeni citizens by developing the capability to be able to deal with public order situations in an accountable and professional manner in accordance with human rights and law of armed conflict. The equipment was used to train the security forces in UK procedures and tactics so that in time the Yemenis would be able to continue their own training with UK adopting a monitoring role. However, this programme has been suspended as a result of the significant deterioration of the security situation within Sana'a since March 2011. Section 3 Background to export licence decisions paragraph 3.1 a) Why is the provision of technical assistance where the provider knows or has been made aware that the technical assistance will be used for "WMD Purposes" only controlled outside the EU, and not inside the EU also? These controls implement the UK's obligations under European Union Joint Action of 22 June 2000 concerning control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses (2000/401/CFSP). The Joint Action only provides for such controls where
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the end-use is in a destination outside the EU. b) Why is the rating given to items that the exporter has been told, knows or suspects are or may be intended for "WMD Purposes" described as "End-Use" and not "WMD End-Use"? This is merely convention. The rating for items where the exporter has been informed, knows or suspects that the items may be used for a "military end-use" in a destination subject to an arms embargo is "MEND". However the vast majority of "end-use" cases are WMD end-use rather than military end-use and so it is understood that "End Use" refers to WMD End-Use. c) Why is the transfer of technology by any means where the person making the transfer knows or has been made aware that the technology is for "WMD Purposes" only controlled outside the EU, and not inside the EU also? These controls implement the UK's obligations under European Union Joint Action of 22 June 2000 concerning control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses (2000/401/CFSP). The Joint Action only provides for such controls where the end-use is in a destination outside the EU. Section 3 General Note on Licensing Data paragraph 3.2 a) What are the "certain conditions" that have to be met if controlled goods being transhipped through the UK en route from one country to another pre-determined destination are made exempt from control? The conditions are set out in Article 17 of the Export Control Order 2008. In general, a transhipment licence is not required where: (a) the goods in question remain on board a vessel or aircraft for the entire period that they remain in the United Kingdom or are goods on a through bill of lading or through air waybill and in any event are exported before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the date of their importation; (b) the destination of the goods in question following exportation from the United Kingdom has been determined in the country from which they were originally exported prior to their original exportation in connection with the transaction which has given rise to transit or transhipment and has not been changed prior to their exportation from the United Kingdom, or the goods are being returned to that country; and
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(c) the goods in question were exported from that country in accordance with any laws or regulations relating to the exportation of goods applying there at the time of exportation of the goods. However, a transhipment licence will always be required for: (a) anti-personnel landmines and components specially designed for them; (b) Category A goods; (c) equipment, software or technology falling within entry ML18, ML21or ML22 in Schedule 2, specifically related to anti-personnel landmines or Category A goods; (d) controlled goods being exported to a destination specified in Part 1of Schedule 4; (e) military goods being exported to any country or destination specified in Part 2 or 3 of Schedule 4; (f) Category B goods being exported to any country or destination specified in Part 4 of Schedule 4. (g) any goods where the exporter has been informed, knows or suspects that the goods are or may be intended in their entirety or in part for WMD purposes. b) Why is there no Open Individual Transhipment Licence? There are very few transhipment licences issued in any one year. There has therefore never been a business need for an Open Individual Transhipment licence. c) Why do Trade Controls not apply to software and technology?
The powers to impose trade controls were introduced in section 4 of the Export Control Act 2002 in order to address specific concerns regarding the trafficking and brokering of military goods between overseas destinations. There is a separate power to impose controls on transfers of technology (including software) in section 2 of the Export Control Act 2002. Section 3 Information on SIELs. SITLs. OIELs. SITCLs and OITCLs paragraph 3.3 Why are the exporters holding Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) not asked to provide details of the value of goods that they propose to ship? OIELs are concessionary licences that are specific to an individual exporter and cover multiple shipments of specific items to specific destinations. Depending on the type of OIEL they can be valid for up to five years, have no quantity limits and are not usually restricted to specific end users. OIELs are usually only issued for low risk transactions and where the exporter has demonstrated a specific business need, for example to fulfil long-term maintenance contracts. Therefore it is not usually
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possible for exporters to gauge in advance the value of ongoing multiple shipments. If the Government had concerns about the quantity or value of goods to be exported we would reject the OIEL application and require SIELs instead. Section 3 paragraph 3.5 and Table 3.6 Reasons for Refusals and Revocations of SIEL and SITCL applications a) Will the Government state the number of revocations in this table, and the case of each revocation the goods concerned, the country of destination, and the Criterion (using the same 11 categories as in Table 3.6) under which the licence was revoked? There were no revocations in 2010. Tables 3.1 and 3.4 give a clearer breakdown of how applications were considered in 2010. b) Will the Government state in the case of each refusal in this table the goods concerned, the country of destination, and the Criterion (using the same 11 categories as in Table 3.6) under which the application was refused? More detailed information on refusals and revocations can be found within the Annual Report pivot report, under each destination. However, please find attached at Annex 2 a list of 'refusals and the Criterion they were refused under (in brackets). Link: https://www.exportcontroldb.berr.gov.uk/eng/retrieveByStoragelocation/5275 Stra tegic export con.pdf?thread id=B4hQU2R EmmBz2Pke&app mnem=sdb&module=SDBHO ME&storagelocation=SDBPUBLISHED-DOC-SlBlOB&wsiCacheKey c) Will the Government provide the same information for refusals and revocations of OIELs and OITCLs, and in the same format as that requested for SIELs and SITCLs in a) and b) immediately above? OIELs and OITCLs are concessionary licences and are therefore usually "rejected" rather than "refused". Rejection of an OIEL or OITCL does not mean that a Standard Individual licence would be refused. In many cases we need to give the proposed transaction greater scrutiny, and need information about end-users and quantities/values to be exported as well as requiring an end-user undertaking, before deciding whether or not to issue a licence. This can only be done if the application is for a SIEL or SITCL In these cases the reasons for refusing/revoking SIELs/SITCLs are not applicable to decisions to reject OIELs/OITCLs.
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Section 3 Open General Export Licences (OGELs) paragraph 3.7 and Table 3.7 a) What are the shipments and destinations that are eligible for OGELs and what are the "certain conditions" that have to be met for an OGEL? Each Open General Export licence has its own terms and conditions, with a list of permitted destinations for the goods described. The various OGELs available can be found on the ECO website. link: http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/OGELS b) Why are there a small number of Open General Transhipment Licences for which registration with BIS's Export Control Organisation is not required and what are the details of these licences? The main purpose of registration is to identify who is making use of the licence and to determine where records are to be kept so that ECO may conduct compliance audits. In the case of transhipment the goods simply pass through the UK en route from Country A to Country B. The exporter, and usually the shipping agent as well, will be established outside the UK. It is highly unlikely that we would be able to conduct audits of overseas companies and therefore registration serves no useful purpose in relation to transhipment. Section 3 Performance in processing licence applications paragraph 3.8 a) The number of SIELs processed within 20 working days fell significantly from the previous two years, resulting in missing the target. What was the reason for this fall and what steps have or are being taken to rectify the situation? In 2010, 63% of SIELs were finalised within 20 working days against a target of 70% compared with 73% in 2009 and 2008. There were two reasons for this fall. Firstly, in 2010 SIEL volumes were up 32% on 2008, and 18% on 2009. Secondly, ECO staff numbers reduced from 90 in 2008 to 79 in 2010 as a result of BIS restructuring. ECO has, therefore, had to adapt so that it can deal with a rapidly growing workload with shrinking resources but with growing customer expectations. Over recent years we have worked up ambitious programmes of change to take forward measures that can achieve major reductions in the overall administrative burden on business of the export licensing process by making significant improvements in ECO's own efficiency and risk management processes. This will continue. b) The target for the number of appeals to be completed within 20 working days was also not met and was significantly down from the previous two years. Why and
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what is being done to ensure that the target is met in the future? We recognise that performance on appeals was lower in percentage terms than the previous year, but this should be viewed in the context of a 25% increase in the total number of appeals. Naturally, any fall in performance is regrettable but as the Committees will appreciate appeals are particularly difficult cases to deal with. That said we continue to look for ways to improve efficiency across the board and are hopeful that this fall {in percentage terms) 2010 was a temporary phenomenon. The Committees will wish to be aware that in spite of the increase in appeals {in numerical terms), the number of successful appeals actually fell from 14.9% in 2009 to 3.4% in 2010. This statistic is testament to the rigour of the initial decision. Annex C Information Required for the UN Register of Conventional Arms Will the Government provide a revised copy of Annex C with all the explanatory notes that are currently missing, or unclear, included or clarified as necessary? The explanatory notes referred to in Annex C of the Annual Report are those notes attached to the standardised forms that the UN sends out annually for completion by member states. A copy of Annex C with the standardised form and its explanatory notes added is attached as Annex 3.
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Annex 1: Licences Processed by DFID Jan - Dec 2010 APPLICATION END USER TYPE COUNTRIES DFID RECOMMENDATION
GOODS ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY
FINAL DECISION FOR IDA COUNTRIES
OIEL
Nigeria
components for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment Issue
Nigeria STOPPED
OIEL
military devices for initiating explosives, demolition devices, demolition charges, signal flares, illuminators, tear gas/irritant ammunition, CS hand grenades, tear gas/riot control agents, stun grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, signal hand grenades, smoke canisters, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, training anti-aircraft ammunition, thunderflashes, training hand grenades
Proviso
Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Afghanistan Abu Dhabi, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dubai, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta,
shotguns, rifles, air guns, semi-automatic pistols, sporting pistols, weapon sights
Reject
Sri Lanka Reject
292
Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, United States
OIEL Issue
shotguns, sporting rifles, air guns, pistols, semi-automatic pistols, sporting pistols, weapon sights
Zambia Reject
OIEL
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Zambia Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Zambia Issue
equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Zambia Issue
OIEL
China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand
components for military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, military firing sets, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment
Issue
India Issue
293
OIEL
cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers
Issue
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia Issue with Proviso
OIEL
general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
Issue
India Issue
OIEL
Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Egypt, France, Fujairah, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Ras al Khaimah, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United States China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, South, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Dubai, Gibraltar, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela Issue India , Pakistan Issue with Proviso
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
294
OIEL
Andorra, Brazil, Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Republic of, GuineaBissau, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mayotte, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam Issue Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Dominican, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India ,Indonesia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Vietnam Issue
OIEL
India
technology for the development of aero-engine assemblies, technology for the production of aero-engine assemblies, software for the development of technology for the development of aero-engine assemblies, software for the production of aero-engine assemblies accessories for training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, accessories for training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, accessories for training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, components for training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, components for training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, software for the use of training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for nuclear radiation detection equipment, training equipment for biological agent detection equipment, training equipment for chemical agent detection equipment, training equipment
Issue
India Issue
295
for nuclear radiation detection equipment, training equipment for military improvised explosive device detection equipment, military electronic equipment
OIEL
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, United States Issue Issue India Stopped India Issue Proviso
components for combat helicopters, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft
OIEL
components for military aero-engines, components for military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components
OIEL
India Australia, Canada, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Qatar, United States
body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, military helmets, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, ballistic shields
Issue
India Stopped
296
OIEL
Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Falkland Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United States Issue Ghana Refused
components for military surveillance aircraft, technology for the development of military surveillance aircraft, technology for the production of military surveillance aircraft, technology for the use of military surveillance aircraft
OIEL
Brazil, India
bomb suits, civil body armour, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, military firing sets, non-military firing sets, mine detection equipment, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, military devices for initiating explosives
Issue
India Issue
297
OIEL Issue
components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Afghanistan Reject, Cambodia Issue, Laos, Sri Lanka, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Afghanistan, Belarus, Cambodia, Colombia, Laos, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sri Lanka, Vietnam Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, China, Croatia, Dubai, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia Issue India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan Issue Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lesotho, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, Zambia Stopped
general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
298
OIEL Issue Issue
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, France, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue India Issue with Proviso
components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility helicopters
OIEL
shaped charges, demolition charges, devices for initiating explosives, detonating cord, explosives
OIEL
India Abu Dhabi, Azerbaijan, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Spain, Thailand Issue Issue
Azerbaijan, Indonesia Reject Issue with Proviso
OIEL
command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the development of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems
OIEL
United States Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan, Korea, South, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey
technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military airborne cargo handling equipment
Issue
India Issue with Proviso
299
OIEL Issue
Sri Lanka
technology for the development of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use of nuclear reactors, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
OIEL Issue
components for military helmets, military helmets, components for body armour, body armour
Issue
OIEL
Austria, France, Italy, Kenya, Slovakia, United States Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Republic of, GuineaBissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sharjah, Somalia, Issue
non-military firing sets
Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Ethiopia, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Timor Leste, Zimbabwe STOPPED -
300
Sudan, Syria, Thailand, TimorLeste, Zimbabwe
OIEL Issue
Angola, Cambodia
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Angola, Cambodia Issue with Proviso
OIEL Issue, Reject
components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, high energy capacitors, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, components for submersible vehicles
Azerbaijan Reject - Angola, Iraq, Nigeria Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Macao, Nigeria Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam Issue
components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars
Nigeria, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore
general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, general military vehicle components, equipment for the use of general military vehicle components
Issue
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United States
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Issue
301
OIEL Issue
components for gun laying equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, gun laying equipment, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights, components for military image intensifier equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Nigeria Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Angola, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Macao, Nigeria Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Falkland Islands, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand Issue
components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, test equipment for military communications equipment
Indonesia, Malawi Reject
OIEL
Albania, Angola, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Turkey
components for military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment
Issue
Albania, Angola Issue with Proviso
302
OIEL
Pakistan
general naval vessel components
Issue
Pakistan Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Pakistan Issue
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan Issue
OIEL Issue
Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Vietnam
Vietnam Issue with Proviso
OIEL
India
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military training aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanks, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, components for military containers, military containers, technology for the use of military containers goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above Issue
303
OIEL Issue
equipment employing cryptography
Afghanistan, Pakistan Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Umm al Qaiwain, United States, Uzbekistan Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Congo, Dubai, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia Issue Afghanistan, Iraq REJECT Benin, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cameroon, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia ISSUE
OIEL
technology for the development of unmanned air vehicles technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of guidance equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles
Proviso Issue
Nigeria Issue with Proviso India Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Nigeria India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore
304
OIEL Issue
equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography India Issue with Proviso
OIEL
equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Issue
Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan Vietnam, Yemen STOPPED
OIEL
Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, South, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Dubai, Egypt, Fujairah, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macao, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Pakistan, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, Taiwan, Province of China, Umm al Qaiwain, Vietnam, Yemen Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Dubai, Egypt, Fujairah, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macao, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Mariana Islands, Pakistan, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, Issue Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan Vietnam, Yemen ISSUE
inertial equipment
305
Taiwan, Province of China, Umm al Qaiwain, Vietnam, Yemen
OIEL Issue Issue
components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft
OIEL Issue
components for military aero-engines
Burkina Refuse Dominican Issue with Proviso
OIEL
inertial equipment
Issue
India, Pakistan Issue
OIEL
Dubai, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Brazil, Burkina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, United States Australia, Belgium, Egypt, Germany, India, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Sweden, United Kingdom Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gambia, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela Issue Issue
components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft
Bangladesh, Dominica, Gambia, India, Kenya, Maldives Issue with Proviso India Issue with Proviso
OIEL
India
non-military detonators
306
OIEL Issue
heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
Albania, Azerbaijan, Senegal Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Faroe Islands, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United States Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Republic of, GuineaBissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo Issue Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Republic of, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Algeria, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia
components for military transport aircraft
Issue
Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia Issue with Proviso
307
OIEL Issue Issue
South Africa, United States - Afghanistan, Uguanda Afghanistan Reject Uganda Issue with Proviso India Issue with Proviso
components for biotechnology equipment, biotechnology equipment
OIEL
OIEL Issue
Nicaragua, Vietnam Issue with Proviso
OIEL Issue
India, Israel Brazil, Dubai, Greenland, Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam Bahrain, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Haiti, Korea, South, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Ukraine
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Burma, Cambodia, Haiti Issue with Proviso
OIEL
Congo, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Zambia
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Issue
Congo, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Zambia Issue with Proviso
OIEL
technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
Issue Issue
Angola Issue with Proviso India Reject
OIEL
Angola India, Israel, Korea, South, South Africa
weapon sights, technology for the use of weapon sights
308
OIEL Issue
general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components
Malawi Reject
OIEL
Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Brunei, Canada, Denmark, Dubai, Falkland Islands, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malawi, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States Issue Bangladesh, India - Issue with Proviso
309
OIEL Issue
components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
Application is outstanding
OIEL
Azerbaijan, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, TimorLeste, Turkmenistan Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Croatia, Dubai, Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Montenegro, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe Issue, Reject Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Indonesia, Montenegro, Nigeria, Serbia, Vietnam, ISSUE with Proviso Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, Yemen, Zimbabwe REJECT
components for aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons
310
OIEL Issue
fibrous/filamentary materials
India, Kenya Issue with Proviso
OIEL Issue
components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military training aircraft, components for military support aircraft
Azerbaijan, India Issue Proviso
OIEL
Abu Dhabi, Australia, Bahrain, Dubai, Finland, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, United States Abu Dhabi, Azerbaijan, Dubai, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Dubai, Finland, France, Fujairah, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kenya, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Ras al Khaimah, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Umm al Qaiwain, Issue Application is outstanding
components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition
311
United States
OIEL
equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, equipment for the use of general military vehicle components, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for military electronic equipment Issue
OIEL
Abu Dhabi, Alderney, Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Gibraltar, Guatemala, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Japan, Jersey, Korea, South, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United States Abu Dhabi, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dubai, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, South, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Issue
hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
312
Oman, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
OIEL Issue
OIEL
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Eritrea, French Guiana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Venezuela Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, South, Malaysia, Moldova, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Province of China, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam Issue
India, Indonesia, Moldova, Serbia, Vietnam Issue with Provision
OIEL
components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection, promoting the supply of tear gas/riot-control agents
Issue Issue Issue
OITCL
Azerbaijan, China, Nigeria, Tanzania Armenia, Lebanon, Sudan
promoting the supply of military goods
Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Tanzania Issue with Proviso Armenia, Sudan Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso
OITCL
Iraq, Lebanon
bomb suits, military helmets
313
OITCL Issue
all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia ,Vietnam - ISSUE - Pakistan, Sri Lanka REJECT
OITCL Issue
Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Macao, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam Afghanistan, Chad, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Dubai, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan REJECT - Chad, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Haiti ISSUE with Proviso - Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan REFUSE
fragmentation hand grenades, rifle grenades
OITCL
Congo, Democratic Republic of, Guinea, Republic of, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan Issue
components for armoured fighting vehicles
Congo, Democratic Republic of, , Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan ISSUE with ProvisoGuinea, Republic of, Sierra Leone REJECT
SIEL
Togo
bomb suits, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for military firing sets, mine detection equipment, military helmets, military devices for initiating explosives
Issue Issue Issue
Togo REFUSE Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Afghanistan
radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
SIEL
Iraq
technology for the use of unmanned air vehicles
314
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Afghanistan
naval gun mountings, naval light guns, weapon sights, optical target acquisition equipment, inertial equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, fire control equipment, components for naval light guns, components for naval gun installations, laser rangefinders, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun mountings, equipment for the use of naval light guns, technology for the use of naval gun mountings, test equipment for naval gun installations, equipment for the use of naval gun installations, software for the use of naval gun installations, software for the use of test equipment for fire control equipment, test equipment for fire control equipment, components for test equipment for fire control equipment, test equipment for naval light guns, inert ammunition, components for small calibre artillery ammunition, components for fire control equipment Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue Yemen Issue Iraq Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Nepal Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Ghana Issue with Proviso Ethiopia Issue Somalia Issue
SIEL
United States, Iraq
civil explosive detection/identification equipment
SIEL
Yemen
simulators for fire control equipment
SIEL
United States, Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Afghanistan
military helmets, body armour components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
SIEL
Nepal
test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment
SIEL
Iraq
components for military training aircraft
SIEL
United States, Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
Ghana
chemicals used for chemical/materials production
SIEL
Ethiopia
SIEL
Somalia
components for aircraft missile protection systems
315
SIEL Issue
Iraq
naval gun mountings, weapon sights, optical target acquisition equipment, inertial equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, fire control equipment, components for naval light guns, weapon control systems, laser rangefinders, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun mountings, equipment for the use of naval light guns, technology for the use of naval light guns, equipment for the use of naval gun installations, naval light guns, components for fire control equipment Iraq Issue with Proviso
SIEL
United States, Iraq
components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device disposal equipment Issue
Iraq Issue
SIEL Issue
Nepal
radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
Nepal Issue
SIEL Issue Issue Issue
Iraq
general purpose machine guns (38), gun mountings, heavy machine guns (20), launching equipment for anti-armour rockets, weapon sights, assault rifles (133)
Iraq Issue with Proviso
SIEL
military cargo vehicles
SIEL
Liberia Central African Republic
Liberia Issue Central African Republic Issue
SIEL
Kuwait
explosive ordnance disposal equipment, non-military firing sets, equipment for the use of explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Issue Nepal REFUSE Sudan Issue Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso Ethiopia Issue Chad Issue Afghanistan Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Nepal
SIEL
Sudan
cloth treated for signature suppression for military use
SIEL
Sri Lanka
components for simulators for small calibre artillery
SIEL
Ethiopia
gyroscopes, technology for the use of gyroscopes
SIEL
optical target acquisition equipment
SIEL
Chad Netherlands, Afghanistan
radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
SIEL
Iraq
316
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Yemen Issue Sudan WITHDRAWN Afghanistan Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso
components for NBC respirators
Issue
Somalia Issue
SIEL
Somalia Denmark, Afghanistan
technology for the use of military training aircraft
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Yemen
SIEL
Sudan
SIEL
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software
SIEL
Afghanistan Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
body armour, components for body armour military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment Issue
Iraq STOPPED Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue Ghana Issue with Proviso Ethiopia Issue
SIEL
Iraq Korea, South, Afghanistan
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
Netherlands, Ghana
components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
Ethiopia
SIEL
Ethiopia
SIEL
Zimbabwe
Ethiopia Issue with Proviso Zimbabwe Issue with Proviso Ethiopia Issue Ethiopia Issue
SIEL
Ethiopia
SIEL
Ethiopia
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military firing sets
SIEL
Yemen
bomb suits, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment
Issue Issue
Yemen Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Iraq
equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
317
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Iraq Issue
Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue with Proviso
SIEL
United States, Iraq
SIEL
Ethiopia
body armour, components for body armour, military helmets
SIEL
Afghanistan
Ethiopia Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Somalia Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Sri Lanka Issue
SIEL
Somalia
SIEL
Iraq
general military vehicle components
SIEL
Afghanistan
components for body armour
SIEL
Iraq
components for military utility helicopters
SIEL
Sri Lanka
military utility vehicles
SIEL
Pakistan
weapon sights, weapon sight mounts
SIEL
Afghanistan
body armour, components for body armour
Pakistan Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Yemen Issue Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue Afghanistan Issue
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Yemen
SIEL
Congo, Democratic Republic of
assault rifles (31), components for assault rifles, technology for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment
SIEL
Afghanistan
assault rifles (10), weapon cleaning equipment
SIEL
Iraq
Issue Issue Issue
Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue
SIEL
Iraq
command communications control and intelligence equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for military navigation equipment, military navigation equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military airfield vehicles
SIEL
Afghanistan
naval auxiliary vessels
318
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Iraq Issue Ethiopia Issue Afghanistan Issue
Issue
SIEL
Bangladesh Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
Bangladesh Issue with Proviso Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue
SIEL
Iraq
chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes
SIEL
components for combat aircraft
SIEL
Ethiopia United States, Afghanistan
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Proviso
Afghanistan
veterinary/tranquillising rifles, weapon sights, components for veterinary/tranquillising rifles, components for veterinary/tranquillising ammunition Issue
Afghanistan Issue Sri Lanka Issue Somalia Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Somalia Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Sri Lanka
bomb suits, military communications equipment, military helmets
SIEL
Somalia
military helmets
SIEL
Iraq
non-military firing sets
SIEL
Somalia
SIEL
Somalia
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
Azerbaijan
Somalia Issue Azerbaijan Issue with Proviso Issue
SIEL
China
assault rifles (330), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, components for general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (20), assault rifles (100), components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols (100), assault rifles (20), general purpose machine guns (15), small arms ammunition
Issue Issue Issue Issue Iraq Issue Zimbabwe REFUSE Iraq Issue
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Zimbabwe
SIEL
Iraq
equipment employing cryptography mechanical measurement equipment, electronic measurement equipment
319
SIEL
Burma
cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography Issue Burma Issue
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Congo, Democratic Republic of Proviso
civil NBC detection systems, civil explosive detection/identification equipment
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso Yemen Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue
SIEL
Yemen
decoy flares
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Afghanistan
rifles (120), small arms ammunition, components for rifles, weapon cleaning equipment cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Afghanistan Issue Nigeria Issue Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue Zimbabwe Issue Liberia Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Iraq WITHDRAWN
SIEL
SIEL
Nigeria Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
Zimbabwe
SIEL
Liberia
test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment
SIEL
Iraq
military cargo vehicles, military containers
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
United States, Iraq
SIEL
Afghanistan
direct view imaging equipment, technology for the use of direct view imaging equipment
Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Sudan REFUSE
SIEL
Sudan
SIEL
Afghanistan
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
Issue
Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue Issue Issue Somalia STOPPED
SIEL
Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
SIEL
Somalia
320
SIEL Issue Issue Nepal Issue
Afghanistan
small arms ammunition, stun grenades
Issue
Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Ghana Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Ghana
SIEL
Nepal
body armour, military helmets
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue
surface coating equipment, pumps
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso Iraq Withdrawn Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue Iraq Withdrawn Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Nepal Issue Sri Lanka Issue Sri Lanka Issue Afghanistan Issue
SIEL
Iraq
civil body armour, body armour, military helmets
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
Iraq
ground vehicle military communications equipment
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
Afghanistan
body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, NBC respirators
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
SIEL
Afghanistan
military helmets, components for body armour, body armour
SIEL
Afghanistan
sporting guns (1), small arms ammunition
SIEL
Nepal
chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes
SIEL
Sri Lanka
inertial equipment
SIEL
Singapore, Sri Lanka
SIEL
Afghanistan
321
SIEL Issue Afghanistan Issue
Afghanistan
anti-armour ammunition, exploding grenade ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns (50), small arms ammunition, assault rifles (2500), weapon cleaning equipment, components for machine guns, machine guns, components for pistols, pistols (200)
SIEL
Sierra Leone
weapon night sights, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, weapon sight mounts Refuse
Sierra Leone REFUSE
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Georgia
military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment Issue
Application is outstanding Nepal REFUSE Sri Lanka Issue Iraq, Issue Sri Lanka Issue Sri Lanka REFUSE Sudan issue with Proviso Sri Lanka Issue Iraq Issue Iraq Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Sri Lanka REFUSE Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Nepal
inertial equipment
SIEL
Sri Lanka
military aircrew protective equipment
SIEL
Germany, Iraq
chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production
SIEL
Sri Lanka
SIEL
Sri Lanka
components for sniper rifles equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
Sudan
inertial equipment
SIEL
Finland, Sri Lanka
SIEL
Ras al Khaimah, Iraq
SIEL
Ras al Khaimah, Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
technology for body armour body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for military helmets
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
imaging cameras
SIEL
Afghanistan
SIEL
Sri Lanka
SIEL
United States, Iraq
small arms ammunition
SIEL
Afghanistan
components for military support aircraft
322
SIEL Issue Somalia Issue
United States, Iraq
Issue
Iraq STOPPED
SIEL
Somalia
military helmets
SIEL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Iraq Issue India Issue Iraq Issue
Iraq
military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment
SIEL
Iraq
triggered spark gaps
SIEL
India
anti-riot/ballistic shields
SIEL
Yemen
chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production
Yemen REFUSE Sri Lanka Issue Mozambique Issue Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Iraq STOPPED Iraq Issue Iraq WITHDRAWN Iraq STOPPED
SIEL
Sri Lanka
inertial equipment
SIEL
Mozambique
SIEL
United States, Iraq
SIEL
Afghanistan
components for military equipment for initiating explosives
SIEL
Iraq
components for military communications equipment
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
Iraq
SIEL
equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography
SIEL
Afghanistan Dubai, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen
body armour, military helmets
Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso Sri Lanka Issue with Proviso
SIEL
Afghanistan
components for military combat vehicles
SIEL
Afghanistan
SITCL
Sri Lanka
body armour
SITCL
Sri Lanka
small arms ammunition, anti-structure rockets
323
SITCL
Iraq
Issue
Iraq STOPPED
SITCL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Iraq STOPPED
Iraq
anti-armour rockets, small arms ammunition small arms ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, components for small arms ammunition, components for heavy machine guns, heavy machine guns (81), sniper rifles (260), large calibre artillery ammunition, air-to-surface rockets Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue Ghana Issue Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue
SITCL
Afghanistan
weapon sights
SITCL
Afghanistan
armoured personnel carriers
SITCL
Ghana
SITCL
Iraq
launching equipment for anti-armour rockets, weapon sights
SITCL
Afghanistan
armoured personnel carriers
SITCL Issue
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue
body armour
Congo, Democratic Republic of Issue with Proviso Sri Lanka STOPPED
SITCL
Sri Lanka
components for body armour, body armour
SITCL
Iraq
fragmentation rockets, anti-armour rockets, anti-armour ammunition, small calibre artillery ammunition, large calibre artillery ammunition, artillery rockets
Issue Issue
Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq STOPPED
SITCL
Iraq
SITCL
Iraq
military transport aircraft artillery rockets, large calibre artillery ammunition, fragmentation rockets, anti-armour rockets, anti-armour ammunition, small calibre artillery ammunition
Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue
Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq Issue with Proviso Kenya Issue Uganda Issue with Proviso Pakistan WITHDRAWN Mauritania Issue
SITCL
Iraq
SITCL
Iraq
military communications equipment components for air-to-surface rockets, bombs, small calibre artillery ammunition, training small calibre artillery ammunition
SITCL
Kenya
body armour, military helmets, components for body armour
SITCL
Uganda
optical target tracking equipment, ground based radars
SITCL
Pakistan
military parachutes
SITCL
Mauritania
324
SITCL Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue with Proviso Afghanistan Issue Afghanistan Issue Iraq Issue Afghanistan Issue Iraq Issue with Proviso Iraq STOPPED
Afghanistan
weapon night sights
Issue
Afghanistan Issue
SITCL
Afghanistan
SITCL
Afghanistan
SITCL
Afghanistan
all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection components for mortars, equipment for the use of mortars, mortars, weapon cleaning equipment
SITCL
Afghanistan
military helmets
SITCL
Iraq
military helmets
SITCL
Afghanistan
military helmets, body armour, components for body armour
SITCL
Iraq
small arms ammunition
SITCL
Iraq
SITCL
Iraq
small arms ammunition military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, components for military combat vehicles, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military training equipment Issue
Iraq STOPPED
SITCL
Iraq
components for military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military support vehicles, military training equipment
Issue
Iraq Issue
325
Annex 2: Refusals 2010 with Criterion End Use Countries Argentina Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bangladesh Belarus Belarus Burma Application Type SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) Reason for Refusal 5 7 1 WMD (1) 1 2 2 7 2 MEND (7) Goods components for military electronic equipment global positioning satellite receivers airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for military utility helicopters capacitors test equipment for attack alerting/warning equipment cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment cryptographic software, radio jamming equipment vibration test equipment gun silencers, sniper rifles (12) telecommunications equipment components for radio equipment, radio equipment, technology for the use of radio equipment promoting the supply of small arms ammunition focal plane arrays imaging cameras imaging cameras imaging cameras components for civil NBC detection systems instrumentation cameras components for instrumentation cameras welding equipment semiconductor process equipment semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers imaging cameras imaging cameras semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers technology for the production of machine tools semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers controlled atmosphere furnaces, equipment for the use of controlled atmosphere furnaces semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers computer analogue to digital equipment, software for the use of computer analogue to digital equipment computer analogue to digital equipment electronic measurement equipment focal plane arrays focal plane arrays semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers imaging cameras components for general purpose machine guns, equipment for the use of general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (5), small arms ammunition, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, weapon sights anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition microwave components military helmets Rating ML11 7A105 ML10, ML11 END ML11 5A001, 5D002 5A001, 5D002 2B116 ML1 MEND
Burma Cameroon China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China China
SIEL (Permanent) SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
MEND (7) 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 WMD (1) 7 5, 7 5 7 5, 7 7 5, 7 7 7
MEND ML3 6A002 6A003 6A003 6A003 1A004 6A203 6A203 END 3B001 3C001 6A003 6A003 3C001 2E002 3C001 2B226 3C001
China China China China China China China
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
7 7 WMD (1) 7 5c, 7 7 7
4A003, 4D001 4A003 END 6A002 6A002 3C001 6A003
Equatorial Guinea Georgia Germany Guyana
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
2 2, 3 BM (1) 7
ML1, ML1, ML22, ML3, PL5017 ML3 END ML13
326
Hong Kong
SIEL (Temporary)
India India India India India India India Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
7, WMD (1) 7 WMD (1) WMD (1) 7 WMD (1) 7 1 1, WMD 7, WMD (1) WMD (1) 7 7 WMD (1) BM (1)
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 BM (1) 7 1 1 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 1 1 1
imaging cameras ballistic test equipment, equipment for the use of optical equipment, instrumentation cameras, optical equipment imaging cameras general laboratory equipment ferrous alloys instrumentation cameras general purpose integrated circuits imaging cameras gaskets chemicals, fibre prepregs machine tools controlled atmosphere furnaces marine vessels corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment ferrous metals components for valves, gaskets, seals components for environmental test equipment, environmental test equipment, sealing compounds, software for the use of environmental test equipment seals seals components for valves, gaskets, valves biotechnology equipment machine tools seals gaskets, seals frequency generators components for gas detection equipment seals gaskets, seals seals seals seals components for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment, software for the use of materials testing equipment, technology for the use of materials testing equipment seals components for pumps seals components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment accessories for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment, pumps accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment valves materials analysis equipment seals seals
6A003
6A003, END 6A003 END END 6A003 END 6A003 IRN END, IRN 2B001, END IRN PL9008 2B350 END END, IRN
END IRN IRN END 2B352 2B001 IRN IRN END END IRN IRN IRN IRN IRN
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) 1 BM (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1
END IRN END IRN END END END END END IRN IRN
327
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) BM (1) WMD (1) BM (1) 1 WMD (1) BM (1) WMD (1) BM (1) 1 BM (1) 1 1 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1)
corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment polymer materials fasteners/fixings accessories for inspection equipment, inspection equipment shock mounts sealing compounds environmental test equipment liquids processing equipment, seals corrosion resistant piping accessories for machine tools components for pressure monitoring equipment industrial handling equipment components for gas detection equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment valves corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment seals corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment accessories for inspection equipment, inspection equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment components for valves, gaskets, seals accessories for valves, seals accessories for inspection equipment, components for inspection equipment, electronic components, inspection equipment non-ferrous alloys gaskets materials processing equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment components for process control equipment seals components for process control equipment seals components for pumps accessories for inspection equipment, components for inspection equipment, inspection equipment non-ferrous alloys seals components for pneumatic systems, components for valves, gaskets, seals, valves components for digital computers, digital computers electronic components electronic components materials analysis equipment seals seals
IRN END END END END END END END, IRN IRN END END END END 2B350 END 2B350 IRN 2B350 END 2B350 END, IRN END, IRN
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) MEND (7) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1
END END IRN END 2B350 END IRN END IRN END END MEND IRN END, IRN END END END END IRN IRN
328
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 1 WMD (1) 1 1 1 1 WMD (1) 1 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 1 1 WMD (1) 1
seals electrical installation items components for petrochemical plant frequency changers, power supplies, process control equipment seals seals chromatographs electrical switching equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment seals seals vibration test equipment gaskets seals seals corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment process control equipment seals seals electronic components pumps non-ferrous alloys ferrous metals seals seals corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment seals electronic components components for nuclear radiation detection equipment, nuclear radiation detection equipment accessories for materials testing equipment, components for materials testing equipment, materials testing equipment seals materials testing equipment seals process control equipment accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for the use of materials analysis equipment sealing compounds/materials corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment liquids processing equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment components for civil vehicles, electronic components components for industrial gas turbines components for pumps corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing
IRN END END END IRN IRN END END 2B350 IRN IRN END IRN IRN IRN 2B350 END IRN IRN END IRN END END IRN IRN 2B350 IRN END IRN
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1)
END IRN END IRN END
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1
END END 2B350 END 2B350 END END END 2B350
329
equipment Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Temporary) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 7 5, 7 1, IRAN BM, WMD 5, 7 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1, IRAN 1, WMD 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1 1 1 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 1, IRAN accessories for valves components for steam systems components for process control equipment seals components for steam systems seals seals components for petrochemical plant technology for the use of gas processing equipment imaging cameras components for marine vessel equipment seals materials testing equipment marine vessel equipment, technology for the use of marine vessel equipment seals electronic components chemical mixtures materials testing equipment seals components for pumps materials analysis equipment components for steam systems personal protective equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, valves nuclear radiation detection equipment machine tools components for industrial generators seals fibrous/filamentary materials materials testing equipment components for general industrial production equipment fluid flow analysis software corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment chemicals, materials testing equipment materials testing equipment accessories for materials testing equipment fluid flow analysis software imaging cameras components for petrochemical plant components for inspection equipment, inspection equipment accessories for corrosion resistant piping seals seals imaging cameras non-ferrous alloys components for filtration equipment seals END END END IRN END IRN IRN END END 6A003 PL9008 IRN END PL9008 IRN END END END IRN END END END IRN 2B350, END IRN END END IRN IRN END IRN END 2B350 END END END END 6A003 END END IRN IRN IRN 6A003 END END IRN
330
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran
SIEL (Temporary) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) 1 1 WMD (1) 1
Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Iran Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Ivory Coast
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Temporary) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Transhipment) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 1, IRAN WMD (1) WMD (1) 1, IRAN 1 WMD (1) WMD (1) 2, 3 2, 3 2, 3 2, 3 2 2, 3 7 1
inspection equipment seals general laboratory equipment pumps gaskets, seals components for general industrial production equipment, general industrial production equipment components for environmental test equipment levelling devices lasers inspection equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment seals pumps inspection equipment inspection equipment components for helmet mounted display equipment components for helmet mounted display equipment components for ground vehicle military communications equipment explosives components for naval radars components for optical target acquisition equipment semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers military cargo vehicles, military containers, military engineer vehicles, tank transporters air guns (2), air guns (3), components for semiautomatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols (5), weapon sights components for semi-automatic pistols, semiautomatic pistols (2), technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols components for pumps network analysers machine tools military firing sets equipment for the use of explosive ordnance disposal equipment, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, non-military firing sets components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives armoured personnel carriers all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection components for general laboratory equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
END IRN IRN END IRN
END END END 6A005 END END IRN IRN END END ML11 ML11 ML6 ML8 ML5 ML5 3C001 ML17, ML6
Kenya
SIEL (Permanent)
ML1
Kenya Malaysia Malaysia Nepal Nepal
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
2 WMD (1) 7 2, 3 2
ML1, ML22 END 3A002 2B001 ML4
Nepal
SIEL (Permanent)
1A007, ML4, ML4, PL5017
Nepal Nigeria Nigeria Pakistan Pakistan
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
7 2 2 WMD (1) WMD (1)
ML4b1, ML4b2 ML6 ML6 END 2B350
331
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
BM (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) BM (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 7
accessories for dimensional measuring equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, software for the use of dimensional measuring equipment electronic measurement equipment gas detection equipment components for gas detection equipment components for petrochemical plant components for petrochemical plant accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment components for liquids processing equipment accessories for temperature measurement equipment, temperature measurement equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment accessories for corrosion resistant piping, components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant piping components for materials processing equipment machine tools electronic measurement equipment electronic measurement equipment, imaging cameras components for materials processing equipment small arms ammunition focal plane arrays military ambulances military cargo vehicles anti-armour ammunition, assault rifles (2500), components for machine guns, components for pistols, exploding grenade ammunition, grenade launchers, machine guns, machine guns (50), pistols (200), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment components for sniper rifles components for telecommunications equipment, power supplies, telecommunications equipment direct view imaging equipment, technology for the use of direct view imaging equipment components for general purpose machine guns, general purpose machine guns (20), small arms ammunition, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, weapon cleaning equipment components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment components for TV cameras and control equipment general laboratory equipment frequency changers materials processing equipment accessories for general laboratory equipment, general laboratory equipment
END END END END END END END END END 2B350
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Paraguay Russia Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
7, WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 7 7 1 1
2B350, END END END END END END ML3 6A002 ML6 ML6
Sierra Leone Sri Lanka Sudan Sudan
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
2, 3, 7, 8 3, 6 MEND (7) 7
ML1, ML2, ML3, PL5017 ML1 MEND 6A002, 6E101
Swaziland
SIEL (Permanent)
ML1, ML22, ML3, PL5017
Swaziland Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
5d BM (1) WMD (1) N (1) WMD (1) B (1)
ML4 END END END END END
332
Syria Syria Syria
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) WMD (1) WMD (1)
general laboratory equipment biotechnology equipment components for hydraulic systems, hydraulic systems, workshop tools accessories for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for the use of materials analysis equipment frequency changers general laboratory equipment digital computers pressure transducers machine tools components for combat helicopters components for combat helicopters software enabling equipment to function as periscopes sniper rifles (83), weapon sights components for combat aircraft armoured personnel carriers equipment employing cryptography military cargo vehicles
END END END
Syria Syria Syria Syria Turkey Turkey United States United States United States Vietnam Yemen Yemen Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent) SITCL SIEL (Permanent) SIEL (Permanent)
WMD (1) N (1) WMD (1) WMD (1) 7 7 2, 3 2, 3 2, 3 2 2, 3 2, 3 1 1
END END END END 2B230 2B001 ML10 ML10 ML21 ML1 ML10 ML6 5A002 ML6
Annex C
Standardized form for reporting international transfers of conventional arms (exports)a
EXPORTS
Report of international conventional arms transfers
(according to United Nations General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L and 58/54)
Reporting country:
National point of contact: (Organization, Division/Section, telephone, fax, e-mail) (FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE ONLY)
Calendar year: __________________________________________________
A Final importer State(s) Number of items State of origin (if not exporter) Intermediate location (if any) Description of item
Db
Eb
REMARKSc Comments on the transfer
Category (I-VII)
I. Battle tanks
II. Armoured combat vehicles
III. Large-calibre artillery systems
IV. Combat aircraft
V. Attack helicopters
VI. Warships
a)
VII. Missiles and missile launchersd
b)
National criteria on transfers:
a b c d
See explanatory notes.
The nature of information provided should be indicated in accordance with explanatory notes e and f.
333
Standardized form for reporting international transfers of conventional arms (imports)a
IMPORTS
Report of international conventional arms transfers
(according to United Nations General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L and 58/54)
Reporting country:
National point of contact: (Organization, Division/Section, telephone, fax, e-mail) (FOR GOVERNMENTAL USE ONLY)
Calendar year: __________________________________________________
334
A Exporter State(s) Number of items State of origin (if not exporter) Intermediate location (if any)
Db Description of item
Eb
REMARKSc Comments on the transfer
Category (I-VII)
I. Battle tanks
II. Armoured combat vehicles
III. Large-calibre artillery systems
IV. Combat aircraft
V. Attack helicopters
VI. Warships
a)
VII. Missiles and missile launchersd
b)
National criteria on transfers:
a b c d
See explanatory notes.
The nature of information provided should be indicated in accordance with explanatory notes e and f.
/. ..
335
a)
Explanatory Notes
(a) Member States that do not have anything to report should file a "nil report" clearly
stating that no exports or imports have taken place in any of the categories during the reporting period. (b) International arms transfers involve, in addition to the physical movement of equipment Member
into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the equipment.
States are invited to provide with their return a concise explanation of national criteria used to determine when an arms transfer becomes effective. (See paragraph 42 of the annex to document A/49/316.) (c) In the "Remarks" column Member States may wish to describe the item transferred by entering Member States may
the designation, type, model or any other information considered relevant.
also wish to use the "Remarks" column to explain or clarify aspects relevant to the transfer. (d) Multiple-launch rocket systems are covered by the definition of category III. Rockets
qualifying for registration are covered under category VII. MANPADS should be reported if the MANPAD system is supplied as a complete unit, i.e. the missile and launcher/Grip Stock form an integral unit. In addition, individual launching mechanisms or grip-stocks should also be reported. Individual missiles, not supplied with a launching mechanism or grip stock need not be reported. (e) Check any of the following provided as part of your submission: (i) (ii) Annual report on exports of arms Annual report on imports of arms Check __ __ __
(iii) Available background information on military holdings (iv) Available background information on procurement through national production (v) Available background information on relevant policies and/or national legislation (vi) (f) Other (please describe)
__
__ __
When reporting transfers, which of the following criteria,
drawn from paragraph 42 of the annex to document A/49/316, were used: (i) (ii) Departure of equipment from the exporter's territory Arrival of equipment in the importer's territory __ __ __ __ __
(iii) Transfer of title (iv) (v) Transfer of control Others (please provide brief description below)
336
Categories of equipment and their definitions

I. Battle tanks Tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicles with high cross-country weighing at mobility least 16.5 and a high-level tons of selfweight, protection, metric unladen
with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.
II.
Armoured combat vehicles Tracked, designed and semi-tracked equipped to or wheeled a self-propelled squad of four vehicles, or more
with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either: (a) transport infantrymen, or (b) armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 12.5 millimetres calibre or a missile launcher.
III.
Large-calibre artillery systems Guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, combining the
characteristics of a gun or a howitzer, mortars or multiple-launch rocket systems, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily above. indirect fire, with a calibre of 75 millimetres and
IV.
Combat aircraft Fixed-wing equipped or or variable-geometry to engage wing aircraft by designed, guided
modified
targets
employing
missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons or other weapons of destruction, including versions of these aircraft which perform specialized include electronic trainer warfare, The suppression combat unless of air defence does equipped or not or reconnaissance primary missions. term aircraft
aircraft,
designed,
modified as described above.
V.
Attack helicopters Rotary-wing aircraft designed, equipped or modified to engage targets surface, with an weapons, by employing guided or of or unguided and these anti-armour, weapons and which system air-toequipped these perform air-to-subsurface, integrated including fire versions air-to-air
control
aiming
for
aircraft
specialized reconnaissance or electronic warfare missions.
337
VI.
Warships Vessels or submarines armed and equipped for military use with a standard displacement of 500 metric tons or above, and those with a standard displacement of less than 500 metric tons, equipped for launching missiles with a range of at least 25 kilometres or torpedoes with similar range.
VII.
Missiles and missile launchers (a) missiles Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise capable to a of delivering of at not a warhead 25 or weapon of and I range least kilometres, by
destruction missiles category or
means designed or modified specifically for launching such rockets, if covered categories with through VI. For the purpose of the Register, this subincludes remotely piloted vehicles the characteristics for missiles as defined above but does not include ground-to-air missiles. (b) Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS).
338
Annex 12: National Counter Proliferation Strategy 20122015

The text of a letter and the attachment from the FCO Minister Alistair Burt to the Chairman of the Committees dated 21 March 2012 relating to the National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 20122015 follows: I write to inform you that the Government has agreed a National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 20122015. It flows from key risks identified in the National Security Strategy and formulates three overarching objectives: To deny access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise to terrorists; To prevent acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and To support, strengthen and extend the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organizations that underpins global security and prosperity.
It describes the actors on whom we focus our activities, the tools and resources we deploy, and our internal governance arrangements under the National Security Council. I attach to this letter the public version of the strategy, which will be released in the next few days. We are already using it to drive forward more coherent and focused work across government departments and with our international partners. In the last few months, we have: continued work alongside the United States in Libya to locate and secure stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons, including MANPADs; played a key role in the final preparatory conference on an Arms Trade Treaty held in February, which achieved consensus on the process for the negotiations in July, and the adoption of the Chairmans paper as a basis for these negotiations; as part of implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review Conference outcomes, and along with the US and Russia, supported closely the Finnish facilitator for the Middle East WMD Free Zone, as he prepares his strategy for a conference; kept up the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme by securing a strong EU sanctions package at Januarys Foreign Affairs Council, and a good E3+3 statement at the March meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.
339
The next key event will be the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 26-27 March, at which the deputy prime Minister will be leading the UK delegation. President Obama convened the first such summit in Washington in 2010, as part of his drive to secure vulnerable fissile material around the world within four years. The second summit will assemble 53 countries, and the UN, the EU, the IAEA and Interpol, to assess progress and reinvigorate commitment. The Deputy Prime Minister will be able to report significant achievements against our commitments from Washington, including helping to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union (not least, 775 bombs worth in Kazakhstan); hosting a successful IAEA security advisory mission to Sellafield and Barrow; and leading efforts to secure last years renewal of the G8-based Global partnership against the spread of WMD. I expect him to make new commitments for the two years up to the next summit in 2014, including further close partnership with the IAEA, the US, the EU and others on risk reduction programmes overseas; further development of plans for the future management of our inventory of separated civil plutonium; and implementation of the new UK/France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear security and emergency response. Our key contribution, and the summits most innovative element, will be our ground-breaking work on the security of nuclear information. Over the past year we have built consensus on the need for greater focus on protecting not just nuclear material but also the information that a terrorist would need to obtain the material, build it in to an improvised explosive device, and mount an attack. Such information ranges from maps of nuclear installations, to how to construct a bomb, to how to beat border security and emergency response plans. At the summit, I expect our work to be reflected in a dedicated paragraph in the communiqu, and an additional UK-led statement, in which at least 20 countries will join us, committing to specific national actions to improve the practice of information security. I look forward to engaging with you and your committee further on these and other matters in due course.
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 2012-2015
WHY DO WE NEED A NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY?

1. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems is a huge challenge which poses several serious risks to the UKs national security. These include a CBRN attack on the UK by terrorists or a threatening state, or an international military crisis. Conventional weapon systems also present the clearest threat to the UKs Armed Forces deployed on operations. Reducing these risks requires a comprehensive approach to counter proliferation.
340
2. The National Counter Proliferation Strategy sets the framework for this activity. Much of our approach is internationally focussed; in priority countries, with partners, or through the rules-based international system. Ensuring that we have the right controls and security in place domestically is also a key element. A risk-based approach 3. The National Security Strategy takes a risk-based approach to prioritise the Governments national security response. Counter proliferation work is critical to reducing several of the most serious national security risks identified: RISK 1: A terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack on the UK or its interests, including UK Armed Forces. 4. Al Qaeda has a long-held desire to obtain and use CBRN devices. Without continued global efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the security of material and information, there is a significant likelihood that terrorists will at some point acquire CBRN capability. RISK 2: An international military crisis 5. The proliferation of CBRN and conventional military technologies to countries, and the enhancement by countries of their existing capabilities, have the potential to increase instability and precipitate an international military crisis, or exacerbate the consequences of such a crisis, including for UK deployed forces. RISK 3: A state (or proxy) CBRN attack on the UK or its overseas territories 6. While there is currently a low threat of CBRN attack on the UK, it is still important that we retain our ability to monitor and where possible prevent CBRN weapons advancements by other countries, maintain our defences against attack, and lead global efforts to strengthen the rules-based international system that has helped to limit the number of CBRN possessor states thus far. Our objectives 7. We are working to reduce proliferation risks by: 1. Denying access to CBRN materials and expertise by terrorists; 2. Preventing acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and 3. Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organisations that underpins global security and prosperity.
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WHERE WE SEEK TO FOCUS

8. We are focusing activity on four broad groups of actors: states which may have vulnerabilities in the security of their CBRN information and materials; states which may have the capability or intent to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons; states which may actively or inadvertently supply or transit CBRN weapons, delivery systems and conventional weapons, or related technologies, to actors of concern; and partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can effect change, including the UN, G8, NATO and the EU. States with CBRN security vulnerabilities 9. Many countries possess significant quantities of CBRN material or expertise, or have a significant CBRN technological base; some countries have CBRN weapons. In several of these we assess that security weaknesses could make such capabilities easier for nonstate groups to acquire or exploit for malicious purposes. States with the capability or intent to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons 10. A number of states have active CBRN and advanced conventional weapons and delivery system programmes either to acquire a new capability or to improve an existing one. The existence of either can be destabilising for a region and can lead to an arms race or a military response by a regional or global power. This would increase the risk of a state threat to the UK and its overseas interests. 11. Despite Irans claims that its nuclear programme is peaceful, serious concerns about a military dimension remain as a result of Irans actions over recent years. We continue to follow the dual track strategy of engagement and sanctions. We also have continuing concerns about North Koreas proliferation activities. We continue to urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international community. 12. Alongside our commitment to prevent the spread of such weapons, we are promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the right to which is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. States which may supply or transit material and technologies which threaten security 13. Where states admit to, or are judged to, have a nuclear weapons capability, or chemical or biological technologies and materials, controls are essential to prevent more states from acquiring CBRN weapons. We want all states with these dual use technologies to have the will and ability to prevent leakage. 14. Globalisation has increased the flow of trade and knowledge making it harder to identify cargoes and technologies destined for weapons programmes of concern. We cannot stop this trade on our own, so we need to work with trading hubs to improve policing.
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Partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can effect change 15. We are working with our closest international partners and in the multilateral environment, including in the UN, G8, NATO and the EU, to effect change in both specific countries and the rules-based international system.
WHAT WE SEEK TO CHANGE

16. The rules-based international system is a network of organisations, ad hoc groups, treaties and regimes that has been built up over the last 80 years and has over that period successfully limited, and even helped to reduce, the number of states with or looking to acquire WMD or their delivery systems, or advanced conventional capabilities. In developing the rules-based international system, we seek to: Strengthen international commitments to non-proliferation treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention; Lead in groups such as the Nuclear Security Summit or G8 Global Partnership which are delivering CBRN security improvements on the ground; Provide financial, technical and diplomatic support to the international bodies that monitor and verify compliance against these commitments, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; Strengthen enforcement of existing obligations and export control regimes, and adoption of non-obligatory guidelines, while developing and implementing new ones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an Arms Trade Treaty, and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty; Lead by example internationally in terms of our own domestic security practices and export controls; Identify, and seek consensus to mitigate, any gaps in the international architecture. 17. To complement this, we are: Working to encourage states to improve nuclear and biological security, and ensure that sensitive science is not misused for hostile intent; Aiming to disrupt proliferation networks, through helping others to enforce sanctions and export regimes more rigorously; Supporting the international community in tackling proliferation finance by working with banks to identify front companies and freeze assets; Tackling the supply of delivery systems; Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
HOW WE ARE EFFECTING CHANGE

18. We are using the diplomatic network to increase our understanding of and influence on the drivers of policy in priority countries including government, industry and civil society.
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Our missions to international institutions and organisations especially in Vienna, New York, Geneva and the Hague are playing a crucial role in developing, strengthening and upholding the rules-based international system. 19. Our export controls and enforcement capability enable us to reduce the risks of material getting into the wrong hands. We are acting to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to improve international export controls. We are at the forefront of efforts to gather international support for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the global trade in conventional weapons. 20. We have prioritised our objectives to ensure that we make best use of available resources. We are providing technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials and know-how in partner countries; facilitating debate and delivering training to help build partners engagement and capacities; and maintaining our own technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and CBRN security. 21. The National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, ultimately oversees implementation of this strategy. We will measure, evaluate and report progress on its delivery at regular intervals, including through reports to Parliament on implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.357
357 National Counter Proliferation Strategy 20122015, FCO website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/
344 Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012
Formal Minutes
Monday 2 July 2012
The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees met concurrently, pursuant to Standing Order No. 137A. Members present: Business, Innovation and Skills Committee Mr Adrian Bailey Katy Clark Margot James Nadhim Zahawi Defence Committee Foreign Affairs Committee International Development Committee Sir Malcolm Bruce Richard Burden Fiona ODonnell Chris White
John Glen Penny Mordaunt Bob Stewart
Ann Clwyd Mike Gapes Sir John Stanley (in the Chair) Rory Stewart
Sir John Stanley was called to the Chair, in accordance with Standing Order No. 137A(1)(d). The Committees deliberated, in accordance with Standing Order No. 137A(1)(b). Draft Report: Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues Draft Report (Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Ordered, That the Chairs draft Report be considered concurrently, in accordance with Standing Order No. 137A (1)(c). Ordered, That the Chairs draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraphs 1 to 270 read and agreed to. Annexes 1 to 12 read and agreed to. Summary read and agreed to
BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE The Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees withdrew. Mr Adrian Bailey, in the Chair Katy Clark Margot James Nadhim Zahawis
Draft Report (Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Resolved, That the draft Report prepared by the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, be the Second Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 137A(2) be applied to the Report. Ordered, That Sir John Stanley make the Joint Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No.134 (Select committees (reports)). [Adjourned till Tuesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m.
DEFENCE COMMITTEE The Business, Innovation and Skills, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees withdrew. In the absence of the Chair, Bob Stewart in the Chair John Glen Penny Mordaunt
Draft Report (Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read Resolved, That the draft Report prepared by the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 137A(2) be applied to the Report. Ordered, That Sir John Stanley make the Joint Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No.134 (Select committees (reports)). [Adjourned till Tuesday 3 July at 2.00 p.m.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence and International Development Committees withdrew. In the absence of the Chair, Sir John Stanley, in the Chair Ann Clwyd Mr Mike Gapes Rory Stewart
Draft Report (Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Resolved, That the draft Report prepared by the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, be the First Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 137A(2) be applied to the Report. Ordered, That Sir John Stanley make the Joint Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No.134 (Select committees (reports)). [Adjourned till Tuesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees withdrew. Sir Malcolm Bruce, in the Chair Richard Burden Fiona ODonnell Chris White
Draft Report (Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Governments Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Resolved, That the draft Report prepared by the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, be the Second Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 137A(2) be applied to the Report. Ordered, That Sir John Stanley make the Joint Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No.134 (Select committees (reports)). [Adjourned till Tuesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m.
Witnesses
Monday 23 January 2012
Roy Ibister, Team leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, Oliver Sprague, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and Martin Butcher, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB David Hayes, Chairman of EGAD, David Hayes Export Controls, Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, Brinley Salzmann, Secretary of EGAD, ADS Group Ltd, and Barry Fletcher, Executive Committee Member of EGAD, Fletcher International Export Consultancy
Page
Ev 1
Ev 9
Tuesday 7 February 2012

Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the Board of Trade, Tom Smith, Head of the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation Rt Hon William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sarah MacIntosh, Director of Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and David Hall, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ev 16
List of printed written evidence

1 2 3 4 5 6 Dr Neil Cooper, Peace Studies, University of Bradford Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD)s UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) The Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Amnesty International UK Ev 56 Ev 56; Ev 57 Ev 33 Ev 36 Ev 40; Ev 54 Ev 43; Ev 58
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

The reference number of the Governments response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 201012 First Joint Report Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation HC 686 (Cm 8079)

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Scrutiny of Arms Exports-Business, Innovation and Skills, Defense, Foreign Affairs and International Development - Vol. 1

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House of Commons

First Joint Report of Session 201213

The Committees on Arms Export Controls

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 1

Organisational and operational issues

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

International arms control and co-operation

Arms export control policies

Annex 2: Extra-territoriality (Offences) Annex 3: The Consolidated Criteria

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 3

Annex 4: EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP)

347 347 348

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 5

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012 7

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Conclusions and recommendations

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Extension of the Review to authoritarian regimes and to countries of concern worldwide

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

3 The Committees Report of 2010-11 (HC 686)

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

20 Ev 67 - Letter from the Foreign Secretary dated 30 September 2011

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Errors in export controls to Somalia

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

5 Arms export control legislation and procedures

27 Trade in Goods (Categories of Controlled Goods) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1805)

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Brass Plate Companies

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

A pre-licence register of arms brokers

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Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

EU end-use control of exported military goods

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012

Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2012