National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine Author(s): Stephen Shulman Reviewed

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National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine
Stephen Shulman

Many have observed that the process of political reform in most postcommunist countries is particularly difficult given the multidimensional character of the transition these countries have been undergoing since the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition to the challenge of democratization, all post-Soviet states and several eastern European states must simultaneously deal with problems of marketization, state building, and nation building. Unfortunately, scholars of comparative politics generally and of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in particular have paid insufficient attention to the nexus between nation building on the one hand and marketization and democratization on the other. One prominent line of research into the reform process in the region focuses on the role played by political culture-the values, beliefs, and of the population-as it relates to questions of depolicy preferences mocratization and the construction of a capitalist economic system. Ever since the publication of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's The Civic Culture in 1963,1 many scholars have considered political culture an important factor in the consolidation of democracy in countries moving away from authoritarian or communist systems and in the successful implementation of market-oriented policies. Consequently, numerous studies have been conducted analyzing the degree of mass and elite support for liberal political and economic values and structures and the determinants of this support. Conspicuously absent in most of this research, especially that relying on mass public opinion surveys, is an assessment of how national identity conditions people's views toward the reform process. As used here, the term national identity refers to citizens' conception of the factors that do or should unite the population of a nation-state into a single community and that differentiate that community from others.2 Does this conception shape people's support for democracy and economic liberalization? This article seeks to answer this question with respect to mass public opinion in Ukraine. Independent Ukraine has made great progress in neither democratization nor marketization. In 2003, Freedom House ranked Ukraine seventeenth out of twenty-seven postcommunist countries on its democratization scale, and tied for sixteenth (alongside Russia and Georgia) on its rule of law scale, placing Ukraine under the rubric of "hybrid regimes."3 The Heritage Foundation's 2003 Index of Economic Free1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: PoliticalAttitudesand Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, 1963). 2. Ethnic groups, in addition to states, may claim to be nations. Here I discuss national identity only as it relates to nation-states. 3. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2003: Democratization East CentralEuropeand in Eurasia (Lanham, Md., 2003), http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2003/ Slavic Review64, no. 1 (Spring 2005)

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dom ranks Ukraine 131st out of 156 countries, behind the KyrgyzRepublic (104) and Kazakhstan (119), and ahead of Russia (135) and Belarus (151).4 In this context, investigating the nature and sources of the mass public's attitudes concerning political and economic reform is particularly worthwhile. One issue that may have a significant impact on these attitudes is the contentious debate over national identity in Ukraine. Two main versions of what I call a national identity complex exist in Ukraine-an Eastern Slavic national identity complex and an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex. Using a countrywide public opinion survey from 2001, I analyze whether people's support for one or another of these complexes influences their support for the reform process. Statistical analysis of the data suggests that the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex promotes support for liberal political and economic values, and weakens support for nondemocratic political systems. Public Opinion Concerning Reform in Postcommunist Countries Numerous studies have relied on mass survey data to uncover the degree and determinants of support for democratic and market-oriented values, structures, and policies in postcommunist countries. While the degree of support for reform differs according to country, the precise aspect of reform in question, and the measurements used, some regularities regarding sources of mass attitudes emerge from the extant literature. The most consistent findings relate to the importance of age, education, and residence on support for reform.5 In many studies, the young, the educated, and the urban tend to support reformist values and policies more than the elderly, uneducated, and rural. For example, David Mason's analysis of a 1991 survey from eight states in the region finds that in all of the countries except Estonia, education is the most important determinant of prosocialist economic attitudes, with income and gender next most important in most of the states.6 William Zimmerman finds in a survey from 1993 that age, education, size of community, and gender are all related to support for market democracy in Russia.7In a later study,Judith Kullberg and Zimmerman investigate the effect of what they called an "economic opportunity structure" on support for both economic and political liberalization. They find that sex, age, education, type of settlement, and oc2003table4.pdf (last consulted 27 October 2004). 4. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Edwin J. Feulner, Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Ana I. Eiras, and Brett D. Schaefer, 2003 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C., 2003), 14. 5. Frederic J. FleronJr. and Richard Ahl, "Does the Public Matter for Democratization in Russia?What We Have Learned from 'Third Wave' Transitions and Public Opinion Surveys," in Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann, and William M. TakeRootin Post-Soviet ReRussia?Explorations State-Society in Reisinger, eds., CanDemocracy lations (Lanham, Md., 1998), 305. 6. David S. Mason, "Attitudes Toward the Market and Political Participation in the Postcommunist States," Slavic Review 54, no. 2 (1995): 385-406. 7. William Zimmerman, "Markets,Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy,"Post-Soviet Affairs 10, no. 2 (1994): 103-26.

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that affect one's ability to prosper economicupational status-factors a strong effect on economic liberalization support and a cally-have weak, though significant effect on support for political liberalization.8 William Reisinger and his colleagues use regression analysis to test a "modernization thesis," according to which industrialization, urbanization, and education render states more open to democracy and the market. They find that in both Russia and Ukraine, the young, urban, and educated demonstrate less support for the economic doctrines of the Soviet Union, while support for democracy is associated with education in Russia and with urban residence in Ukraine.9 There is less agreement on the consequences of economic factors on support for reform. Some scholars find that subjective and objective measures of respondents' or the country's economic condition-either in the or future-do seem to influence reformist values and attipast, present, tudes. Thus, Arthur Miller, Reisinger, and Vicki Hesli present evidence that in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, the economic problems of respondents erode their support for democratic principles and economic liberalism.10 Likewise, Frederic Fleron argues that there is a strong positive relationship between assessments of both personal and countrywide economic well-being and support for democracy and the market in Russia." On the other hand, Raymond Duch asserts that economic assessments have little or no impact on support for democracy and economic reform in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1990 and 1991,12 while James Gibson demonstrates "few significant differences between economic pessimists and optimists in attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes" in Russia and Ukraine in 1990 and 1992 surveys.13 Finally, many studies show that an important predictor of support for democracy is support for the market, and vice versa. For example, one study found the correlation between support for democracy and the market was .21 in Hungary, .35 in Bulgaria, .13 in Poland, and .39 in Romania.14 Zimmerman and Kullberg present a correlation between economic liberalism and political liberalism in Russia of .36 in 1993 and .31 in
8. Judith Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy," World Politics51, no. 3 (1999): 323-58. 9. William Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and Kristen Hill Maher, "Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy," BritishJournalof PoliticalScience24, no. 2 (1994): 183-223. 10. Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview90, no. 1 (1996): 153 - 66. 11. Frederic J. Fleron Jr., "Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations," Europe-AsiaStudies48, no. 2 (1996): 247. 12. Raymond M. Duch, "Economic Chaos and the Fragility of Democratic Transition in Former Communist Regimes,"Journal of Politics57, no. 1 (1995): 121-58. 13. James L. Gibson, "A Mile Wide But an Inch Deep(?): The Structure of Democratic Commitments in the Former USSR," AmericanJournal of Political Science40, no. 2 (1996): 409. 14. Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele Mac Iver, Daniel G. Abele, and Dina Smeltz, "Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 1991-1993," Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994): 501n58.

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1995.15Reisinger and his colleagues used regression analysis to show that support for socialist economic values had a significant negative impact on support for democratic values in Lithuania, and in Ukraine and Russia it was the strongest explanatory variable.16Why there should be a relationship between these factors is an issue most studies do not address. One exception is the study of Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, who hypothesize that both economic and political reform "can be expected to benefit citizens with certain skills, backgrounds, or esteemed positions in society (and to hurt or be of little value to those without those skills, backgrounds, and backgrounds may assist someone in a capitalist economy, how those same skills and backgrounds lead to success in a democratic as opposed to authoritarian political system is not explored. Another possible explanation for congruence in attitudes toward democracy and market is that both economic and political liberalism are founded on the common principles of freedom and individualism in the context of stringent restrictions on the activities of the state.18 But political theorists have also argued that there are inherent contradictions between democracy and capitalism, the most prominent of which is the former's foundation on equality and the latter's promotion of inequality.19As will be argued later, national identity offers an alternative explanation for why pro-market and pro-democratic attitudes might tend to coincide in a country. For the most part, then, the survey-based literature on public opinion overlooks the possible impact of national identity on attitudes toward democratization and marketization in postcommunist states, including Ukraine. But the more descriptive or case-study approaches sometimes do make the claim that national identity plays a role in mass or elite support for reform, and indeed in the success of the reform process itself. For example, Taras Kuzio writes that "areaswith weak identities (e.g. eastern Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia) played no role in the national democratic movement in the late Soviet era and have been bastions of support for Sovietophile political parties. In contrast, areas that have robust national identities (e.g. western Ukraine and the three Baltic states) followed similar patterns to central-eastern Europe in removing communism at an earlier stage and endorsing political and economic reform."20 Similarly, in their study of "Sultanism" in Belarus, Steven Eke and Kuzio contend that the weak Belarus national identity explains the roots of the present authoritarian system in that country.21Furthermore, stud15. Kullberg and Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses," 350. 16. Reisinger et al., "Political Values," 215. 17. Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, "Understanding Political Change," 159. 18. Milton Freedman, Capitalismand Freedom(Chicago, 1963); Friedrich A. Hayek, TheRoad to Serfdom(Chicago, 1944). 19. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism: RenewingHistoricalMaterialism (Cambridge, 1995). 20. Taras Kuzio, "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?" Politics 21, no. 3 (2001): 172. 21. Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, "Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus," Europe-AsiaStudies52, no. 3 (2000): 508.

positions)."17 Still, this explanation

is unclear. While certain skills and

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ies of elite political opinion in Ukraine commonly find associations between national identity and views on reform. Andrew Wilson, for example, writes that "the Ukrainian left still inhabits the Soviet version of Ukrainian identity."22 Consistent with the argument that nationalism and reformist attitudes are related in Ukraine, Wilson in another work notes that since 1994 some in the left, particularly the Socialist Party of Ukraine, have simultaneously drifted toward a more national line and the center of the political spectrum.23 Likewise, many have stressed that a major ideological orientation in Ukraine is the so-called "national democrats," supporting liberal economic and political reforms and values and espousing ethnic Ukrainian nationalist ideas. But scholars of Ukrainian nationalism also note that there is a strain of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism at the elite level that is decidedly antidemocratic. Such organizations as the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Nationalist Union for Ukrainian State Independence are inheritors of an authoritarian, exclusionary "integral nationalism" that emerged in Ukraine in the 1930s.24 Thus scholars of Ukraine do not argue that ethnic Ukrainian nationalism is uniformly democratic in nature. Some scholars have asserted that ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainianspeakers, and residents of western Ukraine are more supportive of democracy and the market than ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and those living in the eastern and southern regions of the country. This assertion may be variously ascribed to the greater support for Ukrainian nationalism among the former group, to the alleged stronger democratic roots of Ukrainian culture in comparison with Russian, or to western Ukraine's stronger historical ties with Europe than eastern and southern Ukraine's. For example, Roman Solchanyk, after noting socioeconomic (urbanization and industrialization) and demographic (ethnicity and language) differences between western and eastern Ukraine, contends that easterners are "largely conservative on social and economic issues," while westerners are "more favorably disposed to Western models of political and economic development."25 Another example comes from Mykola Riabchuk, in his comparison of the "two Ukraines"-west and east: demonstrate that Western Ukrainians are for the most part "Opinion polls anti-communist and anti-Soviet; they believe Russia is the main enemy of Ukraine, while America is its main ally; they support radical economic reforms, private property, democratization, the revival of Ukrainian language and culture, and, of course, the entry of Ukraine into the EU and NATO. Eastern Ukrainians tend to prefer the opposite views. They support the entry of Ukraine into the Russia/Belarus union, reNation (New Haven, 2000), 190. 22. Andrew Wilson, Ukrainians:Unexpected 23. Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?"Europe-AsiaStudies49, no. 7 (1997): 1293-1316. 24. See Taras Kuzio, "Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994," Nationalities Papers 25, no. 2 (1997): 211-42; and Roman Solchanyk, "The Radical Right in Ukraine," in Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., TheRadicalRight in Centraland EasternEuropesince 1989 (University Park, 1999), 279-96. 25. Solchanyk, "RadicalRight in Ukraine," 286.

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establishment of a Soviet-style planned economy, [and] the strengthening of authoritarian presidential power."26 The polling data on this question actually are mixed. Using World Values Survey data, Kathleen Dowley and Brian Silver find that ethnic Russian minorities in several post-Soviet states, including Ukraine, are less supportive of democracy than the titular majorities in those states.27Also, a study by Valerie Khmelko and Andrew Wilson presents western Ukrainians as stronger advocates of market institutions and policies on the one hand, and democratic values on the other, than those living in the south and east.28But data presented by Arthur Miller and his colleagues show that Russians in Ukraine are somewhat more supportive of economic reform than Ukrainians, and that residence in the west versus east has no significant impact on pro-democratic or pro-market attitudes.29 Another study finds that western Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speakers, and ethnic Ukrainians have stronger "socialistvalues" (mostly defined as support for a socialist-type economy) and weaker support for politically "liberal values" than eastern Ukrainians, Russian-speakers, and ethnic Russians.30 In short, the quantitative literature does not analyze the direct impact of national identity on views toward democratic and market principles and institutions in postcommunist states. At the same time, the qualitative literature, particularly on Ukraine, makes assertions about the influence of national identity on ideological views without adequate evidence, particularly at the mass level. Moreover, scholars of Ukraine and other postcommunist countries who assert a link between national identity and democracy and capitalism do not clearly lay out the theoretical basis for such a link. This article aims to redress these lacunae. National Identity and Development Models Nationalism is a multifaceted phenomenon whose relationship to political and economic development depends on the precise aspect of nationalism in question. One influential conceptualization of nationalism states that it is an ideology that seeks to promote the autonomy, unity, and identity of the nation.31 Several political scientists have discussed how national
26. Mykola Riabchuk, "Dvoistist'chi dvoznachnist'? Ukraina iak politychna (de)konstruktsiia,"Suchasnist'11(2002): 54. 27. Kathleen M. Dowley and Brian D. Silver, "Social Capital, Ethnicity, and Support for Democracy in Post-Communist States," Europe-AsiaStudies 54, no. 4 (2002): 516-17. 28. Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, "Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Ukraine:Dynamics of Post-Soviet Cleavages in Ukraine," in Taras Kuzio, ed., Contemporary (Armonk, N.Y, 1998), 67, 69. Transformation 29. Arthur H. Miller, Thomas F. Klobucar, and William M. Reisinger, "Establishing Representation: Mass and Elite Political Attitudes in Ukraine," in Sharon L. Wolchik and The a Volodymyr Zviglyanich, eds., Ukraine: Searchfor NationalIdentity(Lanham, Md., 2000), 227, 225. 30. William L. Miller, Stephen White, and Paul Heywood, Valuesand Political Change in PostcommunistEurope (New York, 1998), 279-80. Western Ukrainians, Ukrainianspeakers, and ethnic Ukrainians are, however, about as supportive or slightly more supportive of elections and parties than their counterparts. 31. Anthony Smith, National Identity(Reno, 1991), 73.

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unity and national autonomy can contribute to democracy. For example, Ghia Nodia takes the position that nationhood provides the political cohesion necessary for democracy to work, and that oftentimes movements for democracy are simultaneously nationalist movements for independence (that is, for political autonomy).32 One of the founders of the "transitology" school of democratization, Dankwart Rustow, proposes that national unity is the sole "background condition" for democratization. For Rustow, national unity means that "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to."33 And political philosopher Margaret Canovan contends that democratic theory has implicitly assumed the existence of a bounded political community with a high degree of unity-a nation.34 Studies of the effect of national identity on democracy are often grounded on the distinction between civic and ethnic forms of national identity. In the former, living on a common territory, being subject to the same political institutions, sharing citizenship, and believing in the same political principles are the primary unifying and distinguishing characteristics of the nation. In the latter, sharing common ethnicity, race, language, religion, traditions, values, and so forth are the basis for the community. All national identities are founded on some combination of ethnic and civic elements, though the relative strength of each often varies from state to state. Scholars analyzing the connection between national identity and democracy tend to argue that civic national identities are inherently more democratic and liberal than ethnic national identities because they are more inclusive.35 But beyond this there has been little formal theorization of the link between national identity and democracy, to say nothing of the link between national identity and capitalism. I would like to introduce here a theoretical argument linking national identity and political and economic development. This analysis provides grounds for expecting that ethnic national identities can either promote or hinder democracy and capitalism. To understand the theoretical relationship between national identity and models of political and economic development, including democracy and capitalism, it is important to keep in mind that national identity has an inherently dualistic nature reflecting both the inward- and outward-looking dimensions of all social identities: there are features that people think do, can, or should unite most or all of the population of a state into political community, and features that simultaneously distinguish that population from other nations. Concerning the first component, ethnic national identity in a state is typically based
32. Ghia Nodia, "Comments on Nationalism and Democracy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Nationalism,Ethnic Conflict,and Democracy (Baltimore, 1994), 3-22. 33. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," ComparativePolitics2, no. 3 (1970): 350. 34. Margaret Canovan, Nationhoodand Political Theory(Cheltenham, Eng., 1996). 35. See, for example, Vladimir Pigenko and Cristina Novac, "Economic Reforms and Ethnic Nationalism in the Context of Transition to Democracy: The Case of Four Eastern 9, European Nations," Democratization no. 4 (2002): 159-72.

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on an ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural group (or in some cases, groups) that is deemed the "core" around which the nation is or should be built. Some group and its history and culture are thereby elevated to a special status in the nation-state. Importantly, people in a state often interpret the various ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural groups in a state as being associated-historically or culturally-with particular political and economic models, institutions, or values. Concerning the second component, a national identity articulates what other nations the nation is (or should be) different from and similar to. Members of the nation often associate foreign peoples-historically or culturally-with particular political and economic models, institutions, and values. Thus the process of constructing national identity takes place under circumstances where the internal group around which the nation coalesces and the external groups to which the nation is contrasted and compared have historical and cultural experiences and associations with particular modes of political and economic development. In this context, three specific mechanisms potentially link national identity and development models: symbolism, cultural diffusion, and instrumentalism. First, the adoption of a particular economic or political development model may symbolically reinforce a particular national identity. Internally, if an ethnic, religious, or cultural group is viewed by people in a nation-state as having a historical or cultural connection to a particular model of development, the state's adoption of such a model becomes a powerful symbolic statement elevating the status of this group and reinforcing its claims to be the core around which the nation is to be built. Externally, the adoption of development models associated with foreign groups that are perceived to be culturally similar to the core internal group symbolically reinforces both this cultural similarity and the elevation of the core group's internal status. Likewise, the rejection of development models associated with foreign groups that are perceived to be culturally different from the core internal group symbolically accentuates this difference and the elevated status of the internal group. Another mechanism that links national identity and developmental models is the diffusion of ideas and values that accompanies the adoption of a particular economic or political model. Internally, the adoption of a political or economic model associated with a core group for historical or cultural reasons works to reinforce and spread the values that to some degree or another already exist among group members and that accompany the particular political and economic model in question. Political and economic institutions reward and cultivate certain behaviors and values and punish and discourage others. In this manner, such institutions can work to strengthen the culture and worldview of groups that already manifest some level of support for the values that underlay these institutions. Externally as well, adoption of a model associated with a foreign people or nation deemed culturally similar to the core group also works to spread among the core group the values associated with these institutions and thereby make the foreign group and the internal group even more culturally similar. Alternatively, rejection of a development model associated

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with a foreign people or group perceived as culturally different helps to maintain the cultural distance between the internal core group and the foreign "Other." Whereas the first two mechanisms explain how adoption of political and economic models of development impacts national identity, the third mechanism involves the influence of national identity on political and economic development. Internally, adoption of a model that is historically or culturally associated with the preferred core group is more likely to lead to the success of that political and economic model than the adoption of a model with which the core group has no prior connection. Externally, a foreign model is more likely to be successfully implemented if the core internal group is culturally similar to the foreign group from which it is borrowed, and if the internal group already has some historical or cultural association with the model. Consequently, people in a nationstate may favor a particular development model because they see the national identity of their country as in some fundamental way compatible with this model and thus capable of instrumentally assisting the model to achieve its political and economic goals (stability, equality, wealth, justice, and so forth). Other models will be seen as functionally or instrumentally incompatible with the national identity of the state and thus are more likely to be rejected. In sum, development models will be more or less popular to the extent that they strengthen a preferred national identity through symbolism or cultural diffusion, or are seen as compatible with that identity and therefore more likely to "work." Therefore, national identities constructed around ethnic, religious, or cultural groups that are perceived to have some experience with democratic or capitalistic institutions or have values and beliefs perceived to be particularly democratic or capitalistic are likely to promote support for the adoption of democracy and capitalism. Additionally, if foreign nations that are perceived as culturally different from the preferred core internal group have historical or current experience with democratic and capitalistic models of development, then these models are likely to receive less support than they otherwise would. Alternatively, democracy and capitalism will be more popular to the extent that foreign peoples that are seen as culturally similar to the preferred core group around which national identity is built are themselves democratic and capitalistic. It must be stressed that the argument presented here is not that democracy and capitalism are likely to work in countries that are more westernized or have more democratic and capitalistic cultures, but rather that democracy and capitalism are more likely to receive mass and elite support if they symbolically or actually strengthen the favored national identity of the people in that country or are seen as instrumentally compatible with it. This is an argument based on perceptions and identities, not on "objective"cultural compatibility. How does this all apply to the Ukrainian case? Ukraine currently is witnessing a vigorous debate on the preferred national identity of the country. This is not so much a debate over civic versus ethnic national identity

68 Table 1 Alternative Ethnic National Identity Complexes

Ethnic Ukrainian National Identity Complex Ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Ukrainian culture, language

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in Ukraine
Eastern Slavic National Identity Complex

Component Basic Unifying Features

Eastern Slavs, Eastern Slavic culture, heritage

Basic Distinguishing Features Ukrainian and Russian history Ukrainian and Russian culture Ukrainian and European culture Compatibility of Multiple Ethnic/National Identities Ukrainian & Russian Identities/ Loyalties Domestic Policy

Basically dissimilar Basically dissimilar Basically similar

Basically similar Basically similar Basically dissimilar

Competitive Preference for Ukrainian language, culture, history, symbols Western orientation

Complementary

Equal treatment of Ukrainian & Russian language, culture, history, symbols Eastern orientation

Foreign Policy

but rather one between alternative versions of ethnic national identity. For the most part, this debate focuses on two primary ethnic national identities for Ukraine.36 One version may be called the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Here the nation is based around an ethnic Ukrainian core, with ethnic Ukrainian culture and language as the primary unifying and distinguishing features of the nation. Another version is the Eastern Slavic national identity. This identity provides for a fundamentally bicultural nation grounded in the perceived common heritage and culture of both Ukrainians and Russians. These visions of the primary unifying and distinguishing characteristics of the people of Ukraine are embedded in a larger set of beliefs and policy preference, thereby forming two "national identity complexes." Table 1 shows the key components of the national identity complexes. Elsewhere I have explained in detail the nature of these complexes and analyzed the pressures for and against their popularity,37 and have mea36. It is important not to confuse ethnic national identity at the level of a nation-state on the one hand with ethnic identity at the level of an ethnic group that may or may not claim to be a nation on the other. The discussion here pertains to the former. An individual's or group's ethnic identity may influence their preferences with respect to their country's ethnic national identity, but the conceptual distinction is vital. 37. Stephen Shulman, "Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine,"Journal Studiesand TransitionPolitics 18, no. 4 (2002): 1-30. of Communist

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sured their relative strength using mass survey data.38Here, I analyze the extent to which support for one or another version of ethnic national identity in Ukraine influences attitudes towards economic and political reforms at the mass level.39 The Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is based on the notion that ethnic Ukrainians are the core ethnic group, and that ethnic Ukrainians historically and culturally are a particularly individualistic and freedomloving people. Elite proponents of this identity typically contrast ethnic Ukrainians and Ukraine historically and culturally with Russians in Russia, a people and a country that are perceived to have strong collectivistic and authoritarian roots. At the same time, elite proponents of this identity argue that Ukrainians have much in common culturally and historically with Europe. Consequently, the theoretical analysis outlined above would predict that supporters of this identity are likely to favor democratization and marketization of Ukraine because the proposed core group is seen as having significant historical experience and cultural compatibility with democracy and individualism. Democracy and capitalism symbolically raise the status of ethnic Ukrainians, spread the values alleged to be associated with ethnic Ukrainian culture throughout the country, and are seen as more likely to function effectively in a country based on perceived ethnic Ukrainian values. Further, since the main "Other" of this identity, Russia, is seen as having a history and culture estranged from individualistic and freedom-based development models, rejection of nondemocratic and noncapitalistic models symbolically and actually maintains the perceived cultural distance between Ukraine and Russia and thereby reinforces the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Finally, precisely because European and ethnic Ukrainian culture are seen as close and Europeans are associated with democracy and capitalism, these models are likely to be favored because they symbolically and actually reinforce the cultural similarity between these two peoples and elevate the status of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine as a core group. Adherence to an Eastern Slavic identity, contrariwise, is likely to inhibit support for democracy and capitalism. Elite proponents of the identity argue that ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, whether in Ukraine or Russia, have extremely close and harmonious historical and cultural ties and that the worldview of these "brotherly"peoples is substantially different from that found in Europe, which is the primary "Other" for this identity. What might be called this identity's primary "Our"-the geographical region that is seen as most culturally similar to Ukraine-is Russia. Importantly, Russia has strong historical experiences with authoritarian and totalitarian governance and nonliberal economic institutions and is seen by elite supporters of this identity as having a basically collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic, culture. Consequently, we would expect
38. Stephen Shulman, "The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in
Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 1 (2004): 35-56.

39. Note that the qualitative studies discussed earlier on the relationship between "Ukrainian nationalism" and reform are actually referring to one version of such Ukrainian national identity-the Ethnic Ukrainian one.

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that advocates of the Eastern Slavic identity are less likely to support liberal democratic and capitalistic values and institutions, as they are allegedly historically and culturally estranged from both the preferred core internal group (Eastern Slavs: Ukrainians and Russians) and the key foreign nation with which this identity compares Ukraine (Russia). At the same time, Europe's close association culturally and historically with both capitalism and democracy, combined with the belief that Eastern Slavs and Europeans are quite culturally different, lessen the incentives for those favoring the Eastern Slavic national identity to support democratization and marketization of Ukraine. Having outlined the theoretical relationship between national identity and attitudes toward democracy and capitalism and deriving an empirical prediction for the relationship between these variables in Ukraine, I turn now to the testing of this prediction. Measuring Support for Democracy and Market in Ukraine In order to determine levels of support for democratic and economic reform in Ukraine, a nationally representative mass survey implemented by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies in May-June of 2001 was analyzed.40 One set of questions on the survey sought to measure political liberalism. Respondents were asked to register their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: Competition between various political parties strengthens our political system. It is better to live in an orderly society than to give people so much freedom that they become disruptive. In any society it is necessary to forbid the public expression of dangerous ideas. Individual rights should be defended even if sometimes guilty people remain free. Possible responses were "disagree fully," "disagree somewhat," "neither agree or disagree," "agree somewhat," and "agree fully," creating a fivepoint ordinal scale for each question. The second and third statements were reverse coded, so that all the statements measure increasing support for political liberalism. An index of political liberalism ranging from 1.00 to 5.00 was created from the four questions by averaging the answers for each respondent.41 The raw data for the survey respondents' answers and the index can be found in the Appendix.42 40. The surveyconsistedof 1,500face-to-faceinterviews respondentsin ten oblasts of of Ukraineplus the Republicof Crimeaand the cityof Kiev.The ten oblastswere Donets'k, and Kiev,L'viv,Odesa, Poltava,Rivne, Zakarpattya Vynnytsya. Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Respondents were chosen using a three-stage regionally stratified address sample. A was weightingvariableadjustingthe sampleto state-widedemographiccharacteristics apDetailsavailableupon request. plied to all analysis. 41. Respondentsneeded to answerat least three of the four questionsto be included in the index. 42. Unlessotherwisenoted, all the datain this articleexclude the smallportion of respondentswho could not or did not answerthe surveyquestions.

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A slightly different approach was used to measure economic liberalism in the survey. Here four pairs of conflicting statements were presented to respondents, who indicated which of these statements they supported most. The question read as follows: On this card you see several contradictory statements. Using the scale on the card, please indicate your opinion. "1" means that you fully agree with the statement on the left, and "5"means that you fully agree with the statement on the right. You can choose any number from 1 to 5 that best corresponds with your views.
Incomes should be more equal, so that there are not large economic inequalities in society. People should be responsible for their own welfare. State ownership of the means of production is the best way to organize firms. It is better to have many goods in the shops, even when prices are higher. Individual achievement should determine how much people earn: those who work better and more successfully should earn more. The state should be responsible for the welfare of its citizens. Private entrepreneurs are best able to run firms.

~1 2 3

~5

It is better when the state keeps prices low, even if there often are not enough goods in the shops.

Statements two and four were reverse coded so that the ordinal scales for all four questions measure increasing support for the market. As with the panel of questions on political liberalism, an index of economic liberalism was formed by averaging respondents' answers to the set of questions.43 Again, the raw data for this set of questions appear in the Appendix. Using the two indexes it is possible to create a two-by-two table that categorizes respondents as liberal democrats (economic and political liberalism indices - 3.0), market authoritarians (economic liberalism index 3.0, political liberalism index < 3.0), social democrats (economic liberalism index < 3.0, political liberalism index ' 3.0) and socialist authoritarians (economic and political liberalism indices < 3.0).44 As indicated in Table 2, the most numerous group in Ukraine are liberal democrats, comprising 32 percent of the sample, with market authoritarians close behind at 31 percent. Social democrats are the smallest group atjust 12 percent. Using the full index scores, the correlation (Pearson's r) between political and economic liberalism in Ukraine is .28. Thus, the Ukrainian case is
43. Again, respondents were included in the index only if they answered at least three of the four questions. 44. The terminology for the cell names of the two-by-two table follows that used by Kullberg and Zimmerman, "LiberalElites, Socialist Masses," 333.

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Table 2 of Respondents by Political and Economic Liberalism Categorization

Economically Liberal Politically Liberal Liberal Democrats 32%
(N = 427)

Economically Illiberal Social Democrats 12%

(N = 162)

Politically Illiberal

Market Authoritarians 31%

(N = 412)

Socialist Authoritarians 25%

(N = 337)

similar to several other postcommunist states in that support for the market and democracy tends to some degree to go together, though of course there are many exceptions. A final pair of questions measured respondents' support not for particular values but for particular nondemocratic political systems-communist and authoritarian: The current political system with elections and many parties is not the only system that has existed in this country. What do you think, would a return to a communist regime be much better, better, worse, or much worse than the current political system? How do you feel about replacing parliament and elections with a strong leader? Would this be much better, better, worse, or much worse than the current political system? As these questions asked respondents to assess a counterfactual, substantial numbers of respondents had difficulty answering. Thus, 19 percent of respondents said they did not know or otherwise could not answer the first question, and 27 percent did not or could not answer the second question. Because this uncertainty likely reflects a lack of strong or clearly developed views on the matter for those respondents, a five-point ordinal scale was created for each question with the following values: 1-much 5-much better. 3-don't know/no answer, 4-better, worse, 2-worse, 3 shows the distribution of responses. While 45 percent of the samTable ple thinks that a communist system would be worse to some degree than the present one, 36 percent think it would be better to some degree. Even more worrisome for observers favoring democratization of the country is the finding that 53 percent of the sample thinks that an unabashedly authoritarian system would be an improvement over the current one with elections and multiple parties, with just 20 percent thinking it would be worse to some degree. The mean support for a communist system on the the midway point of 3-while the mean five-point scale is 2.86-below for an authoritarian system is significantly stronger at 3.45. support Overall, the level of support for democracy and liberal political and economic values is mixed. Two of the measures of political liberalism show more support than not for liberal values, but two show more support for illiberal values, and the average index of political liberalism for the

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine Table 3 Views on Authoritarian and Communist Political Systems for Ukraine (Percentages)
Much Worse Communism 18
(N = 266)

73

Worse 27
(N = 407)

Don't Know/No Answer 19

(N = 288)

Better 23
(N = 350)

Much Better 13
(N = 189)

Mean on 5-pt. scale 2.86

Authoritarianism

5 (N = 78)

15 (N = 221)

27 (N = 410)

35 (N = 529)

18 (N = 262)

3.45

sample is in the illiberal range. As well, while a minority of the respondents thinks a communist political system is better than the current one, a majority thinks an authoritarian system would be superior. Finally, while the average index score for economic liberalism is above the midway point of the scale, signifying overall support for liberal values, three of the four individual measures are slightly or substantially below their scale's midpoint. Support for Reform in Ukraine: The Role of Ethnicity, Language, and Region Having outlined the levels of support for democracy and market in Ukraine, I now turn to the task of explaining these levels of support. In of national identity particular, what effect does one's conceptualization have on attitudes towards reform? To begin to answer this question, I first look at the bivariate relationships between these attitudes and demographic characteristics that are closely associated with culture and national identity in Ukraine-ethnicity, language, and region. Can it be shown that subpopulations most likely to have a strong Ethnic Ukrainian national identity (ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speakers, and westerners) are more democratic and market-oriented than those most likely to have a strong Eastern Slavic national identity (ethnic Russians, Russianspeakers, and those living in the east and south)? The 2001 survey asked respondents to identify themselves as either ethnically Ukrainian, ethnically Russian, or both. Also, respondents indicated whether at home they speak only or mainly Ukrainian, only or mainly Russian, or both equally.45 Additionally, the sample was divided into three major and two minor regions: west, center, south-east, Kiev city, and Crimea.46
45. The survey also permitted respondents to indicate other ethnicities or languages. The extremely few respondents that did were excluded from the analysis of ethnicity and language in Table 4 and from the regression analysis below. 46. The western region consists of Rivne, L'viv, and Zakarpattya oblasts; the central region of Kiev, Vynnytsya, and Poltava oblasts; and the south-eastern region of Donets'k, Kharkiv,Dnipropetrovs'k and Odesa oblasts.

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Economic Liberalism (mean on 5-pt. scale) Political Liberalism (mean on 5-pt. scale) 2.80 2.91 2.71 2.80 2.24

Variables

Authoritarianism Communism (mean on (mean on 5-pt. scale) 5-pt. scale) 3.35 3.57 3.41 3.40 3.71 2.42 2.96 2.95 2.69 3.32

Region West
(N = 251*)

3.05 3.05 3.07 3.17 2.85

Center
(N = 305)

South-East
(N = 648)

Kiev (N = 78) Crimea

(N = 76)

Ethnicity Ukrainian
(N = 982)

3.04 3.10 3.11

2.76 2.77 2.71

3.42 3.50 3.58

2.77 3.09 3.18

Ukr-Rus
(N= 110)

Russian
(N = 221)

Language Ukrainian
(N = 551)

2.98 3.06 3.14

2.74 2.75 2.76

3.44 3.57 3.40

2.76 2.98 2.91

Ukr-Rus
(N = 289)

Russian
(N = 505)

*Since sample size for each subgroup varies slightly for each question, the given figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

As Table 4 shows, the west, center, and south-east all demonstrate approximately equal support for economic liberalism. Crimea is somewhat less supportive, and Kiev somewhat more supportive than these three regions. For its part political liberalism is strongest in the center (average score = 2.91), though the west and (2.80) and south-east (2.71) are not far off. Crimea stands out for its relatively low level of political liberalism, with a score of 2.24. Of the three major regions, support for an authoritarian political system is strongest in the center (3.57), and weakest in the west (3.35), with the south-eastjust .06 point above the west. Crimea is the most authoritarian of all the regions with an average score of 3.71. Finally, Crimea is by a substantial margin the most desirous of a return to a communist system (3.32). The center and south-east are nearly identical in their support for communism, with the west (2.42) least supportive. Over-

National Identityand Public Support Reformin Ukraine for

75

all, the image of a democratic/liberal west counterposed to an illiberal south and east, with the center mixed, finds very patchy support at best. The west is only marginally more reformist than the south-east on measures of economic liberalism, political liberalism, and authoritarianism, where the differences in average scores range from just .02 to .09 point on the five-point scales. Only in relation to communism is the south-east substantially less reformist than the west. Further, only on the political liberalism measure is the center more reformist than the south-east. The west is the most reformist region on two measures only (authoritarianism and communism), though the Crimea is the least reformist region on all four measures. The data also give only partial support to the view that ethnic Ukrainians are more reform-minded than ethnic Russians. There is a positive relationship between increasing "Russianness" in ethnic selfidentification and support for authoritarian and communist political systems, though it is worth pointing out that the average score for ethnic Ukrainians' level of support for authoritarianism at 3.42 is above the midpoint of 3.0-suggesting that it is wrong to view ethnic Ukrainians overall as advocates of democracy. While Russians do demonstrate the lowest support for political liberalism (2.71), they are just .05 point behind Ukrainians (2.76), who in turn are virtually indistinguishable from mixed Ukrainian-Russian respondents (2.77). Finally, Russians (3.11) are if anything slightly more economically liberal than Ukrainians (3.04). The data show virtually no support for the idea that increasing "Russianness" in the linguistic sphere is associated with antireformist attitudes. Thus, Russian speakers are the least authoritarian of the three groups, and we find that increasing Russian language use correlates with increasing economic liberalism, as Russian speakers average 3.14 and Ukrainian speakers 2.98. Respondents evince approximately the same level of support for politically liberal values, regardless of language use, as only .02 point separates Ukrainian speakers (2.74) and Russian speakers (2.76). And while it is true that Ukrainian speakers demonstrate the weakest pro-communist orientation (2.76), it is not Russian speakers that have the strongest such orientation (2.91), it is mixed Ukrainian-Russian speakers (2.98). In sum, analysis of regional, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages with regard to reformist attitudes do not substantiate the view of those observers who believe western Ukrainians, whether because of their ethnic identity, linguistic patterns, historical ties to Europe, or national identity are consistently or substantially more democratic than their Russian and Russianspeaking eastern or southern Ukrainian counterparts, and definitely do not support the contention that they are more capitalistic. While important in dispelling stereotypes held by some scholars and by some people in Ukraine, this analysis is of limited utility. Instead of looking at the relationship between measures that are associated with national identity, it is better to directly construct a measure of national identity and see whether it is correlated with orientations to democracy and the market. And superior still is a multivariate approach that seeks to assess the independent ef-

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fect of many potential explanatory variables, including national identity, ethnicity, language, and region. Support for Reform in Ukraine: The Role of National Identity To directly assess the effect of the content of one's national identity on attitudes toward democracy and the market, a measurement of national identity is required. The alternative ethnic national identity complexes presented earlier were operationalized using seven questions from the 2001 survey that measure the components around which the identity complexes are formed: basic unifying features, basic distinguishing features, compatibility of multiple ethnic or national identities, domestic policy, and foreign policy. The seven questions and comments on their interpretation as they relate to the two national identity complexes can be found in the Appendix. These questions were combined into a single index that distinguishes between a strong Eastern Slavic national identity and a strong Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. To prepare the questions for combination into an index, several of them were reverse coded so that responses measured increasing support for the Eastern Slavic national identity, and decreasing support for the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Furthermore, to confirm that these seven measures intercorrelate to a sufficient degree to justify their use as a measurement of a single concept-national identity-a reliability analysis was conducted. This analysis yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .68.47 Finally, because these questions use answer scales that do not all contain the same number of responses, the survey data needed to be standardized before combining the questions into a composite measure of national identity. Therefore, the answers for each question were first converted into z-scores. Then, each respondent's z-scores for the questions were averaged to create an index of national identity with an average of zero and a standard deviation of 1.48 Increasing national identity scores signify greater strength of Eastern Slavic national identity, while decreasing scores signify greater strength of the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity.49 With national identity thus operationalized, we can turn to a bivariate and then multivariate analysis of its relationship to support for reform in Ukraine. Table 5 shows the correlation (Pearson's r) between support for Eastern Slavic national identity and the four measures of reformist attitudes discussed earlier: political liberalism, economic liberalism, authoritarianism, and communism. We find that for all measures there are statistically significant correlations whose absolute values range from .10 to .35
47. Many analysts use a standard of .70 to justify the combination of separate measures into a new one. Thus an alpha of .68 is deemed here sufficiently close to this standard to warrant the creation of a composite measure of national identity from the seven survey questions. 48. The average z-score was calculated only for those respondents for whom data was available for at least five of the seven questions. 49. The scaled index thus permits identification of not only those individuals with strong Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic national identity preferences but also those who favor a mixed version of ethnic national identity or are ambivalent towards it.

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine Table 5 Correlations between (Eastern Slavic) National Ideology Identity and Economic/Political
Political Liberalism Economic Liberalism Authoritarianism Communism

77

-.16***
***p - .001

-.19***

.10***

35***

Table 6 National Identity Index Scores by Ideological

Economically Liberal Politically Liberal Liberal Democrats
Index = -.117 (N = 425)

Orientation
Economically Illiberal

Social Democrats
Index = .077 (N = 161)

Politically Illiberal

Market Authoritarians
Index = -.037 (N = 409)

Socialist Authoritarians
Index = .191 (N = 337)

such that support for the Eastern Slavic identity predicts antireformist attitudes. The strongest correlation is found for the relationship between the Eastern Slavic national identity and pro-communist attitudes. As the communist system is likely closely identified in the minds of many Ukrainian citizens (both ethnic Russian and Ukrainian) with Russia for historical reasons, this suggests that the effect of national identity on political and economic attitudes operates more strongly through the aspect of national identity that compares or contrasts Ukraine to Russia than that which compares or contrasts the Ukrainian nation-state to the west. Another perspective on the bivariate relationship between national identity and reformism comes from the national identity scores of the groups in Table 2, categorizing respondents according to their orientations toward political and economic liberalism. Table 6 reveals that the average index score of the liberal democrats (-.117) is the lowest for the four groups, meaning that these respondents have the strongest Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Conversely, the group with the highest index score, and thus the strongest Eastern Slavic national identity, is the socialist authoritarians (.191). Consistent with a linear relationship between national identity and reformist attitudes, the identity scores of social democrats and market authoritarians lie between those whose orientations are consistently liberal (economically and politically) or illiberal. To control for the effect of a wide variety of potentially confounding variables that may result in either the overestimation or underestimation of the strength of the relationship between national identity and views on democracy and the market, ordinary least-squares regression analysis was

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employed. The independent variables in the equations included the ethnic and linguistic measures described earlier, along with dummy variables for four regions, with the center as the reference group. Educational level was measured on an 8-point scale, and settlement size on a 7-point scale. The survey assessed religiosity by asking respondents how often they go to church or attend religious services (including holidays), providing them with five choices ranging from "never"to "more than once a week." The independent variables related to economic well-being require some discussion. First, an objective measure of economic well-being derived from the average monthly income of the respondent's family was employed. Respondents were asked to include all wages, pensions, stipends, and other forms of income of all members of their family that live with them. To measure subjective economic well-being, one question in the survey asked "How would you characterize your economic situation: very good, good, tolerable, poor, very poor." In addition, the survey developed two questions for other subjective measures-past economic well-being and future economic well-being. The first question read: "How has your economic situation changed over the past five years: greatly improved, somewhat improved, remained the same, somewhat worsened, greatly worsened." The second question was "In your opinion, how will your economic situation change in the next five years: greatly improve, somewhat improve, remain the same, somewhat worsen, greatly worsen." As the latter question requires respondents to make a prediction, a significant number did not respond. These were coded with the same point value as assigned to the response "remain the same." All the subjective economic well-being questions were then reverse coded to measure increasing well-being. Table 7 presents the unstandardized and standardized coefficients from the regression analysis for political and economic liberalism.50Consistent with many other studies, age, education, and settlement size yield statistically significant associations with both political and economic liberalism, and in the expected direction: younger, more educated and more urban respondents are more reform minded. Neither religiosity nor language appears to have any independent effect on political and economic liberalism, while ethnicity is significantly correlated with economic liberalism, with increasing Russianess associated with market-oriented values. Region also has a significant independent relationship with the dependent variables. All four regional variables are negatively related to political liberalism, meaning that relative to the center these regions demonstrate weaker politically liberal views. Only the west and Crimea are less economically liberal relative to the center, however. While the coefficients for family income are not significant, those for material well-being are. Current material well-being is (positively) associated with economic liberalism, future material well-being is associated with political liberalism,
50. In the regression equations in Tables 7 and 8, collinearity diagnostics indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem for any of the models. The variance inflation factors for all independent variables, for example, are all well under 4 in each model.

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine Table 7 Linear Regression Equations for Political and Economic Liberalism
Political Liberalism
Age -.005 ***

79

Economic Liberalism
-.011 ***

(-.102) Education Sex? Family Income Settlement Size Religiosity Ethnicity Language West? South-East? Crimea? Kiev City? Material Well-Being- Current Material Well-Being-Past Material Well-Being-Future National Identity Adjusted R-squared N=

.053 ***

(.097) .027 (.017) .000 (.010) .045*** (.141) .043 (.059) .028 (.027) .065 (.073) -.226** (-.114) -.176** (-.113) .707*** (-.204) -.400*** (-.113) -.048 (-.053) .060** (.084) .080 *** (.098) -.227 *** (-.182) .139 1173

(-.212) .073*** (.118) .175*** (.097) .000 (.020) .025* (.067) .011 (.014) .053 (.045) .086* (.084) -.201 ** (-.089) -.009 (-.005) -.324** (-.078) -.177 (-.044) .102*** (.097) .115*** (.139) .013 (.014) -.333*** (-.234) .249 1231

*p - .05; **p ' .01; ***p - .001 Regression coefficients from ordinary least-squares analysis, with standardized coefficients in parentheses.
Dummy variables marked with "?"For sex, Female = 0, Male = 1

and past well-being is associated with both forms of liberalism. Most importantly for this study, national identity is significantly correlated with political and economic liberalism. The negative coefficients mean that the stronger the Eastern Slavic national identity, the weaker the support for liberal political and economic values.

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The standardized coefficients (in parentheses in the table) permit an assessment of the relative strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.51 Here we see that national identity, with a standardized coefficient of -.182, is substantially more important for explaining political liberalism than the variables for age (-.102), education (.097), settlement size (.141), and past (.084) and future (.098) material well-being. Likewise, the standardized coefficient for national identity in the economic liberalism regression equation (-.234) is higher than those for age (-.212), education (.118), settlement size (.025), language (.084), and current (.097) and past (.139) material well-being. The results of the regression analysis for support for authoritarian and communist political systems (Table 8) present a somewhat different picture. The equation for authoritarianism does a relatively poor job of explaining respondents' support for an authoritarian political system in Ukraine, as the adjusted r-squared is just .033. Only four variables are significantly associated with authoritarianism. Russian ethnicity is positively related to authoritarianism, living in the south-east (as opposed to the center) is negatively related, and current material well-being is also negatively related. Consistent with the analysis of political liberalism, though, Eastern Slavic national identity corresponds to authoritarian sympathies, and the standardized coefficients reveal that relationship is stronger than that of ethnicity and current material well-being. Turning to the analysis of support for a communist political system for Ukraine, we find that education and all the measures of material wellbeing are negatively related to such support. Russian ethnicity is positively associated with communism, but Russian language is negatively associated. Religious respondents show a tendency to be against a return to communism, which is not surprising given the latter's official promotion of atheism. What is perhaps surprising is that living in the south-east as opposed to the center is associated with less support for communism after controlling for the other independent variables. Finally, the national identity measure suggests that adherence to the Eastern Slavic national identity promotes advocacy of a return to communist rule in Ukraine. Most striking is the fact that the standardized coefficient for the national identity variable here (.363) is far higher than that for all the other statistically significant variables, the greatest of which is -.128 (language). The results of the multivariate statistical analysis indicate that scholars who ignore the role of national identity in the development of attitudes toward democratization and marketization are overlooking a critical potential determinant of political culture. The only variable that is significantly associated with all four measures of political and economic reform is national identity. And just as important, the strength of the association between national identity and all these measures is greater than for those of the other statistically significant independent variables, including those which scholars have stressed in previous studies.
51. The standardized coefficients for the dummy variables for region and sex cannot be compared to those of the other independent variables, however.

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine Table 8 Linear Regression Equations for Authoritarianism and Communism
Authoritarianism
Age -.001

81

Communism .004 (.048)

(-.017) Education Sex? Family Income Settlement Size Religiosity Ethnicity Language West? South-East? Crimea? Kiev City? Material Well-Being- Current Material Well-Being-Past Material Well- Being-Future National Identity Adjusted R-squared N=
-.028

-.104**
(-.113) -.095 (-.036) .000 (.016) .003 (.006)

(-.037) .067 (.030) .000 (.000) -.028 (-.062) .012 (.012) .098* (.068) -.064 (-.052)
-.204

-.120**
(-.097) .124* (.072) -.192** (-.128)
-.030

(-.073)

-.299***
(-.136) -.046 (-.169) -.109 (-.159) -.083* (-.065)
-.023

(-.023) -.060 (-.052) .195** (.111) .033 1261

(-.009) -.256** (-.097) .297 (.049) -.033 (-.006) -.093* (-.060) -.115** (-.094)

-.170**
(-.121) .767*** (.363) .240 1260

*p ' .05; **p ' .01; ***p ' .001 Regression coefficients from ordinary least-squares analysis, with standardized coefficients in parentheses.
Dummy variables marked with "?"For sex, Female = 0, Male = 1

The theoretical and empirical analysis in this article suggests that the Eastern Slavic national identity hinders mass support for democracy and market in Ukraine, while the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity promotes it. To the extent that political and economic development depends on mass values and views, that is, on political culture, this suggests that the

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Eastern Slavic national identity impedes the consolidation of democracy and capitalism in postcommunist Ukraine, while the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity assists it. This finding is particularly important given that, overall, the Eastern Slavic national identity is stronger than the Ethnic Ukrainian one at the mass level.52 The policy implications of this finding are that those who seek to promote a market economy and democratic political system and the internalization among the citizenry of the values on which they are founded should devote considerable effort to strengthening the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity in Ukraine. Thus, nation building is a critical element of the transition process in that country. This study also demonstrates that ethnic national identities do not necessarily hinder democracy, as scholars and commentators who promote "good" civic national identities over "bad" ethnic national identities seem to believe. Therefore it is important to make distinctions among different types of ethnic national identities. One of the ironies here is that the ethnic national identity that is based on a conception of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and their respective cultures as equal core components of the Ukrainian nation, the Eastern Slavic identity, is less conducive to democratic values than the ethnic national identity (Ethnic Ukrainian) that privileges one group and its culture and is therefore in some sense more exclusive and less egalitarian. Moreover, the analysis in this article suggests an explanation for the correlation between popular and elite support for democracy and support for market that is found in Ukraine and many other countries. To some extent such a correlation may flow from the fact that the foreign countries to which a nation compares and contrasts its own culture and identity themselves demonstrate some correlation between democratic and capitalistic institutions or values, for whatever reason. That is, either these countries historically or currently have (or, more importantly, project an image of having) both democracy and capitalism, or they have neither. For example, if people in a country see themselves as culturally similar to the United States and western Europe, places with both a strong democratic and capitalistic tradition, then these people are more likely to demonstrate support for both of these systems than they would in the absence of this perception. Similarly, if people in a country see themselves as culturally similar to a country having little experience with both democratic and capitalist values and institutions, then this will likely weaken their support for both capitalism and democracy. In the Ukrainian case, it seems that the crucial foreign comparison resulting in a link between national identity and support for democracy and capitalism at the mass level is that between Ukrainian culture in Ukraine and Russian culture in Russia. Cultural comparisons between Ukrainian culture in Ukraine and European culture in France, Germany, and Great Britain do not strongly correlate with the other components of the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic national identities (see the discussion in the
52. Shulman, "Civicand Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine."

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine

83

Appendix). Therefore such comparisons cannot be used to distinguish between these identities. Thus in contrast to elites, the masses construct Ukrainian national identity around one primary external comparison, that between Ukraine and Russia. This suggests that perceptions of the progress of democratization and marketization in Russia may play a key role in patterns of political culture in Ukraine. Given the overall strength of the Eastern Slavic national identity in Ukraine, if Ukrainians come to associate Russia with democratic and capitalist institutions and attitudes, then this will likely strengthen support for them in Ukraine. On the other hand, the failure of reform in Russia would hinder support for reform in Ukraine. Finally, it should be apparent that much further study is needed to flesh out the links between national identity and political culture. One impediment to such study is the dearth of public opinion surveys that incorporate questions on democracy, the market, and national identity simultaneously. Likely this reflects that traditional lack of dialogue between scholars of nationalism and scholars of political and economic development, and hopefully this article has underscored the need for a closer integration of these subfields.

Appendix
Survey Data Concerning Support for Political and Economic Liberalism Table 9 for Four Components of Political Liberalism Support
Component of Political Liberalism Party competition Permit individual freedoms Permit expression of dangerous ideas Individual rights Index of all components N 1292 1383 1347 1358 1356 Mean score on 5-point scale 2.20 2.30 3.13 3.36 2.75

Table 10 for Four Components of Economic Liberalism Support

Component of Economic Liberalism Income inequality Individual responsibility for welfare Private ownership of firms Many goods/high prices Index of all components N 1451 1469 1403 1437 1452 Mean score on 5-point scale 3.86 2.48 2.93 2.97 3.06

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Survey Questions Used in the Construction of the National Identity Index The national identity index was created using questions that measured the five major components of the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic national identity complexes presented in Table 1. Basic UnifyingFeatures The two national identities differ with respect to whether most or all people in Ukraine are or should be united primarily around a common Eastern Slavic culture, or by ethnic Ukrainian culture. The latter view accords ethnic Ukrainians and their culture a privileged status in the conceptualization of the nation-state of Ukraine. A survey question designed to assess whether Ukrainian culture holds this special place in the minds of respondents focuses on whether knowledge of this culture is necessary for membership in the national community: Please tell me which of the following qualities are most important for considering a person to be a real member of Ukrainian society. Use the scale where "1" means that these qualities are not important, and "5" means that they are very important: 'Be able to speak Ukrainian. 1 Completely unimportant A belief bership national Eastern -----2-------3-----4 5 Very important

that the ability to speak Ukrainian is important for national memis taken here as an indicator of support for the Ethnic Ukrainian identity, while belief that it is not important is consistent with the Slavic national identity.53

Basic Distinguishing Characteristics The two national identities also differ greatly regarding whether and how the Ukrainian nation-state does or should differ from other communities. One question addresses historical differences between Ukraine and Russia: People disagree about the degree of similarity or difference between the history of Ukraine and the history of Russia. Indicate on the given scale to what degree you think the historical experience of Ukraine and Russia is similar or different. "0"means that Ukraine and Russia developed
53. Thinking that the ability to speak Ukrainian is unimportant for national membership is also consistent with a civic national identity. But since the purpose of the index is to distinguish between support for two alternative types of ethnic national identity, low scores on this variable are interpreted as support for an Eastern Slavic national identity.

National Identity and Public Supportfor Reform in Ukraine along very different historical paths and "10" means that Ukraine and Russia developed along very similar historical paths. ---47 -8 -95-10 0--1----2----3 Ukraine and Russia developed along very different historical paths Ukraine and Russia developed along very similar historical paths

85

Another question tapped into cultural differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians: People disagree about the degree of similarity in culture, traditions, and views between various groups. Please tell me how similar or different in culture, traditions, and views you think the following groups are. Use a scale, where "0"means you think that these groups are very different, and "10" means that these groups are very similar. You can choose any number from "0"to "10."Please keep in mind that what's important here are your opinions, and that there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. "Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Russia." 0----1 ---2----3---47 -8 -95-10 Very different in culture, traditions and views Very similar in culture, traditions and views

The stronger the perceived similarity in history and culture between Russia and Ukraine, the stronger the Eastern Slavic national identity, and the weaker the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. It is important to note that the survey also asked about perceived cultural similarities and differences between "Ukrainians in Ukraine and Europeans in France, Germany and Great Britain." However, the answers to this question did not correlate strongly with the other questions used here to measure national identity, and thus it was excluded from the index. This suggests that in contrast to elite debates of national identity, which frequently compare or contrast Ukraine with Europe and the west, the masses place primary emphasis on the relationship of Ukraine to Russia. The implications of this finding for the connection between national identity and reformist attitudes in Ukraine are noted in the conclusion. Compatibility of Multiple Ethnic or National Identities Another key difference between the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities relates to perceptions of the competitiveness versus compatibility of Ukrainian and Russian identities and loyalties. A survey question on this issue read: "It is easy for a person to consider himself to be Russian and Ukrainian at the same time." The respondents' answer set was "fully agree," "more agree than disagree," "more disagree than agree," and "fully disagree," which was converted to a five-point scale. The Eastern Slavic national identity allows that these two identities are basically com-

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patible, while the ethnic Ukrainian national identity allows that there are tradeoffs between these identities. Domestic Policy The Ukrainian state has at its disposal the means to privilege one particular ethnic or cultural group over others, and thus can take action to implement a particular national identity. To determine whether respondents want the state to privilege the history of Ukrainians over the history of Russians, they were asked the following: The two largest nationalities in Ukraine are Ukrainians and Russians. To what degree do you think schools in Ukraine should devote attention to teaching the history of each these groups? Please use the given scale, where "1"means that schools should devote more attention to the history of Ukrainians, "5"means that schools should devote more attention to the history of Russians, and "3"means that the history of both groups should be given equal attention. You can choose any number on the scale. -4-5 3---------2-----1Schools should devote more attention to the history of Ukrainians Schools should devote equal attention to the history of Ukrainians and Russians Schools should devote more attention to the history of Russians

Answers 1 through 3 permit an assessment of support for the Ethnic Ukrainian versus Eastern Slavic national identity. As the Eastern Slavic identity centers on a bi-ethnic nation shared equally by ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, answers 4 and 5 were excluded from the analysis. Fortunately just twelve respondents were affected by this exclusion. Similarly, state language policy can privilege the Ukrainian language (as the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity calls for), or treat Ukrainian and Russian language equally: Recently there has been debate over the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. What do you think should be the status of the Russian language in Ukraine? 1. Russian should not be an official language at any level. 2. Russian should be an official language only in those regions where most of the local population speaks Russian. 3. Russian should be a state language of Ukraine alongside Ukrainian. 4. Russian should be the only state language of Ukraine. Here, answer four was excluded, as it does not conform to either the Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic identity. Again, just a few respondents (ten) were affected by this exclusion. Foreign Policy Finally, the two competing national identities demand different foreign policies for their implementation. Because of the symbolic and cultural

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consequences of foreign policy ties, the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity calls for a western foreign policy orientation, while the Eastern Slavic national identity calls for an eastern foreign policy orientation. To measure respondents' overall foreign policy preference, the survey asked: In your opinion, is it more important for Ukraine to develop close and friendly relations with western Europe or with Russia and Belarus? 1. Western Europe 2. Russia and Belarus Two other responses when volunteered by the respondent were also recorded: 3. Both are equally important 4. Neither is important Just six respondents chose answer 4, which was excluded because it does not distinguish between the two main versions of ethnic national identity. The remaining answers were recoded so that answer 3 was interposed between answers 1 and 2.