City of Los Angeles

Hazard Mitigation Plan

REVISED January 2011 ADOPTED July 2011

Table of Contents
Section I Introduction A) Summary B) Background C) Definition of Hazard Mitigation D) Legal Authority E) Purpose F) Mission and Goals Section II Plan Revision and Maintenance A) Plan Development Background B) Plan Review and Maintenance C) Mitigation Strategy Project Submission, Management and Revision D) Planning Revision and Maintenance Participation E) Incorporation Into Existing Planning Mechanism Section III Demographics and Statistics A) Community Profile B) Demographics Section IV Hazard Profile, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment A) Summary B) Earthquake C) Terrorism & Weapons of Mass Destruction (CBRNE) D) Brushfire (change to Urban/Wild Land Interface Fire) E) Flood F) Public Health Hazards G) Hazardous Materials H) Civil Unrest I) Transportation J) Drought K) Special Events L) Severe Weather M) Dam Failure N) Critical Infrastructure O) Tsunami P) Landslide/Debris Flow Q) High Rise / High Occupancy Building Fire R) Radiological Incident Section V Hazard Mitigation Strategy and Project Summary A) Prioritization of Projects

1 1 2 2 3 3

5 13 14 15 17

21 22

24 30 55 71 94 113 114 125 128 137 150 153 165 174 191 203 214 222

228

B) C) D) E)

Implementation and Administration of Mitigation Actions Project Funding Project Descriptions Mitigation Project Summary

229 229 230 232

SECTION I INTRODUCTION

A. SUMMARY
This Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) is not a stand-alone document, but is intended to augment the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Plan and its Annexes. The purpose of the Plan is to provide direction and guidance to City departments and the public concerning mitigation measures to lessen the risk of various hazards that threaten the City of Los Angeles. The development and implementation of this living document are the responsibilities of the Mayors Office, City Council, Emergency Operations Organization (EOO), participating private nonprofit business organizations, educational groups, other government agencies, participating community-based organization representatives, public and all City departments. The City of Los Angeles Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) includes resources and information to assist City residents, other government agencies, private and non-profit businesses and industries, educational institutions, community-based organizations, and others interested in mitigation planning for both natural and human-caused disasters. The mitigation plan provides a list of existing programs, proposed activities and specific projects that may assist the City of Los Angeles in reducing risk and preventing loss of life and property damage from natural and human-caused hazards. The Citys Local Hazard Mitigation Plan addresses existing and proposed mitigation policies, programs and projects for identified high-risk, moderate-risk, and low-risk hazards that threatens the City. The Hazard Mitigation Plan consists of a description of the process used to develop, review and maintain the Plan; a profile of the City of Los Angeles including demographics and statistical data; risk assessment of high, moderate, and low-risk hazards; and mitigation strategies. For the purposes of this Plan, potential hazards are divided into High Risk, Moderate Risk, and Low Risk categories. Potential hazards are reviewed and reassigned a ranking based on detailed analysis by the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Advisory Task Force as well as public input during each Plan revision cycle. The Plan includes a detailed assessment of the risks associated with each hazard (see Section IV), and provides historical information on past occurrences. The Plan also identifies existing measures to mitigate these natural and human-caused hazards, and proposes future mitigation programs and projects to lessen the impact of these risks (see Section V).

B. BACKGROUND
This Plan is in response to the Federal Disaster Mitigation Act (2000), Federal Register 44 CFR Parts 201 and 206, which modified the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act by adding a new section, 322 - Mitigation Planning. This law required local governments to develop and submit hazard mitigation plans by November 1, 2004, as a condition of receiving Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and other Mitigation project grants. The initial Plan was approved by FEMA in 2005, and become part of the State Hazard Mitigation Plan. The federal statute requires that this Plan be reviewed and submitted every five years; however, the City decided the Plan will be reviewed and submitted annually. 1

C. DEFINITION OF HAZARD MITIGATION

Hazard Mitigation is any sustained action taken to eliminate or reduce long term risk to human life, property and the environment posed by a hazard (Federal Register, Interim Final Rule, [(IFR) - 44 CFR Part 201, Feb. 26, 2002]. Hazard Mitigation Planning is the process of developing a sustained course of action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from both natural and technological hazards and their effects. The planning process includes establishing goals and recommendations for mitigation strategies. Hazard Mitigation may occur during any phase of a threat, emergency or disaster. Mitigation can and may take place during the preparedness (before), response (during), and recovery (after) phases. The process of hazard mitigation involves evaluating a hazards impact and identifying and implementing actions to minimize or eliminate the impact.

D. LEGAL AUTHORITY
Federal legislation has historically provided funding for disaster relief, recovery, and some hazard mitigation planning. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) is the latest legislation to improve this planning process (Public Law 106-390). The new legislation reinforces the importance of mitigation planning and emphasizes planning for disasters before they occur. As such, DMA 2000 establishes a pre-disaster hazard mitigation program and new requirements for the national post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Section 322 of DMA 2000 specifically addresses mitigation planning at the state and local levels. It identifies new requirements that allow HMGP funds to be used for planning activities, and increases the amount of HMGP funds available to states that have developed a comprehensive, enhanced mitigation plan prior to a disaster. States and communities must have an approved mitigation plan in place prior to receiving post-disaster HMGP funds. Local and tribal mitigation plans must demonstrate that their proposed mitigation measures are based on a sound planning process that accounts for the risk to and the capabilities of the individual communities. FEMA prepared an Interim Final Rule, published in the Federal Register on February 26, 2002 (44 CFR Parts 201 and 206), which establishes planning and funding criteria for states and local communities. For disasters declared after November 1, 2004 a local government must have a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) approved per section 201.6, in order to receive Federal HMGP project grants.

E. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Plan is to integrate Hazard Mitigation strategies into the day-to-day activities and programs of the City of Los Angeles. This Plan identifies and evaluates specific strategies to be considered by the City of Los Angeles and its departments. Upon acceptance by the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), selected strategies will be further developed for funding and implementation by the lead City departments. Adoption of the LHMP by the City and approval by FEMA qualifies the City of Los Angeles to obtain federal assistance for hazard mitigation and for the repair and replacement of infrastructure damaged in natural and manmade disasters.

F. MISSION AND GOALS

Mission The mission of the City of Los Angeles Local Hazard Mitigation Plan is to establish and promote a comprehensive mitigation policy and program to protect City residents, their property, public facilities, infrastructure and the environment from natural and manmade hazards. Upon review by the Local Hazard Mitigation Task Force and General Manger, the Goals are deemed valid for the 2010 Plan update. Goals 1) Protect Life and Property A. Identify natural and manmade hazards that threaten life and property in Los Angeles. B. Implement programs and projects that assist in protecting lives by making homes, businesses, essential facilities, critical infrastructure, critical operating facilities, and other property more resistant to losses from all hazards. C. Protect life and property by implementing state-of-the-art standards, codes and construction procedures. D. Reduce losses and repetitive damages for chronic hazard events while promoting insurance coverage for catastrophic hazards. E. Improve hazard assessment information to make recommendations for discouraging new development and encouraging preventive measures for existing development in areas vulnerable to natural hazards. 2) Increase Public Awareness A. Increase public awareness of existing threats and the means to reduce these threats by conducting educational and outreach programs to all the various community groups in the City. 3

B. Place more stress on the risks associated with natural and manmade hazards at public awareness campaigns conducted by various City departments. C. Provide informational items, partnership opportunities and funding resource information to assist in implementing mitigation activities. 3) Strengthen Partnerships A. Strengthen communication and coordinate participation among and within public agencies, residents, non-profit organizations, business, and industry to gain a vested interest in the implementation of mitigation measures. B. Encourage and support leadership within the private sector, non-profit agencies and community-based organizations to promote and implement local hazard mitigation activities. 4) Increase Emergency Service Effectiveness A. Increase effectiveness of City emergency services by implementing mitigation programs and projects that aid essential facilities and their responders during emergencies. B. Continue providing City emergency services with training and equipment to address all identified hazards. C. Continue developing and strengthening inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation in the area of emergency services. D. Continue to support and develop comprehensive mutual aid agreements. 5) Environmental & Historical Preservation A. Balance land use planning with natural and manmade hazard mitigation to protect life, property and the environment. B. Implement mitigation programs and projects that protect not only life and property, but the environment as well. C. Preserve and protect historical landmarks and structures in the City while implementing hazard mitigation programs and projects

SECTION II PLAN REVISION AND MAINTENANCE

A) PLAN DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND

Staff representatives from the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department Planning Division as well as other City department representatives attended the California Emergency Management Agencys Local Hazard Mitigation Plan workshops held in Los Angeles and Orange Counties in 2003. After attending the workshops, reviewing the Robert T. Stafford Act Section 322, the States Hazard Mitigation Plan Guidelines, the Federal Hazard Mitigation Handbook, and discussing the requirements with the City Emergency Operation Organization (EOO) Planning Subcommittee members, a Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) Advisory Task Force was created. A.1 Development of LHMP Advisory Task Force Developing a LHMP Advisory Task Force required the determination of appropriate agency representatives and stakeholders; namely representatives from City departments, outside government agencies, special districts within the City limits, educational institutions, private and non-profit business organizations, and community-based organizations. It was recognized that the LHMP Advisory Task Force, in addition to developing the Plan, would remain active for mitigation plan implementation and monitoring. In August 2003, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department (EMD) formed the LHMP Advisory Task Force. Membership was drawn from City agencies, representatives from City departments, private and non-profit business groups, state and federal representatives, educational resource representatives, and community-based organizations. (See Appendix C for a list of initial LHMP Advisory Task Force members). Over 40 departments, agencies and organizations were invited to participate in formulating the Local Hazard Mitigation Advisory Task Force. In accordance with local and State laws, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department was designated as the lead agency and chair in coordinating the efforts of the City of Los Angeles LHMP Advisory Task Force. A.2 Participation by Outside Organizations/Jurisdictions Seventeen neighboring jurisdictions, educational institutions, government agencies, social service and business groups were invited to participate in the initial LHMP process. All but three invited organizations played active roles in the Plan development. Involvement included: membership on and participation in LHMP Task Force meetings; provision of technical information; expert advice and consultation; assistance in outreach activities; and review of plan components during development. A.3 Initial Functions of the LHMP Advisory Task Force The LHMP Advisory Task Force was initially tasked with making recommendations and assisting in plan development. The following specific tasks were identified as required:

a) Coordinate multi-hazard mitigation planning tasks and activities with Emergency Management Department to develop an all-hazards disaster mitigation plan and support the Emergency Operations Board and Emergency Management Committee overseeing the planning process. b) Assist in carrying out the goals and objectives of the Citys Local Hazard Mitigation Plan in compliance with FEMA DMA 2000 Hazard Mitigation Act. c) Prioritize risks for implementing mitigation strategies. d) Identify Critical Response Facilities, Critical Operating Facilities and Critical Infrastructure and ascertain a risk exposure analysis for those facilities. e) Select highest and best mitigation recommendations and develop those recommendations for further action by the City of Los Angeles. f) Review mitigation planning drafts, recommendations and updates. g) Develop and implement long and short term goals. h) Integrate the Plan with all phases of Emergency Operations Organization Master Plan and Procedures and other City plans for consistency. i) Provide for the implementation of LHMP Advisory Task Force decisions. j) Encourage, coordinate and provide a methodology for the implementation of public input. k) Establish LHMP Advisory Task Force tasks to include but not be limited to the following: Determine implementation ability and constraints for proposed hazard mitigation planning steps and development of strategies. Bring forward community concerns through private and public input. Identify implementation resources. Provide for the update of the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan on a scheduled basis. Evaluate and provide the guidance to carry out mitigation activities. Assist in implementation of funding identification and procurement of mitigation reduction resources. A.4 Advisory Task Force Meetings The LHMP Advisory Task Force members last convened on August 4, 2010 to address specific objectives for the 2010 revision process. (See Appendix C for a list of the 8/4/10 meeting

attendees, minutes and agenda). The following items highlight the changes implemented in the 2010 revised Plan: Updated hazard areas used to assess Critical Facilities vulnerability for all city owned structures. Update inventory of Citys key Critical Facilities including estimated replacement costs for Federal funding requirement. New changes to the Mitigation Project template, the new form Project Worksheet includes unique project identifying number, definable project priority level and project status, with contact person and contact information assigned to that particular project; The deadline agreed by City agencies and departments for submitting Project Worksheets and the Critical Facilities Inventory to the Emergency Management Department was set for September 30, 2010. The deadline was subsequently extended to October 29, 2010 to include all new proposed mitigation projects and Critical Facility information.

A.5 LHMP Plans Continuing Mission The mission of the City of Los Angeles Local Hazard Mitigation Plan is to establish and promote a comprehensive mitigation policy and program to protect City residents, their property, public facilities, the infrastructure and the environment from natural and manmade hazards. As part of the 2010 annual revision and maintenance process, the LHMP Task Force reviewed the above mission statement, re-evaluated the supporting goals and objectives; and declared that the goals and objectives remain viable and prudent in implementing the Plans mission. The following is a table summarizing the goals and objectives of the LHMP Plan:

Goals
Goal 1: Protect Life & Property

Objectives
A B

Definition
Identify natural and manmade hazards that threaten life and property in Los Angeles. Implement programs and projects that assist in protecting lives by making homes, businesses, essential facilities, critical infrastructure, critical operating facilities, and other property more resistant to losses from all hazards. Protect life and property by implementing state-of-the-art standards, codes and construction procedures. Reduce losses and repetitive damages for chronic hazard events while promoting insurance coverage for catastrophic hazards. Improve hazard assessment information to make recommendations for discouraging new development and encouraging preventive measures for existing development in areas vulnerable to natural hazards.

C D E

Goal 2: Increase Public Awareness

Increase public awareness of existing threats and the means to reduce these threats by conducting educational and outreach programs to all the various community groups in the City. Place more stress on the risks associated with natural and manmade hazards at public awareness campaigns conducted by various City departments. Provide informational items, partnership opportunities and funding resource information to assist in implementing mitigation activities. Strengthen communication and coordinate participation among and within public agencies, residents, non-profit organizations, business, and industry to gain a vested interest in the implementation of mitigation measures. Encourage and support leadership within the private sector, nonprofit agencies and community-based organizations to promote and implement local hazard mitigation activities. Increase effectiveness of City emergency services by implementing mitigation programs and projects that aid essential facilities and their responders during emergencies. Continue providing City emergency services with training and equipment to address all identified hazards. Continue developing and strengthening inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation in the area of emergency services. Continue to support and develop comprehensive mutual aid agreements. Balance land use planning with natural and manmade hazard mitigation to protect life, property and the environment. Implement mitigation programs and projects that protect not only life and property, but the environment as well. Preserve and protect historical landmarks and structures in the City while implementing hazard mitigation programs and projects.

C Goal 3: Strengthen Partnerships A

Goal 4: Increase Emergency Service Effectiveness

B C D

Goal 5: Environmental & Historical Preservation

A B C

A.6 Ongoing Potential Constraints to Mitigation The Task Force conducted an initial review of potential constraints to Plan implementation in the City of Los Angeles. These potential constraints remain possible issues that can influence and affect mitigation plan revision and maintenance process that are underway: Legal Constraint - GIS maps and the identification of hazard zones are approximate and not intended to be used as a legal survey. Economic Constraints - Participation and assistance in providing information and staff resources for the Plan by certain City departments and other participating agencies may be limited because of money. Budget Constraints Land Ownership Constraints State and Federal Influences 8

Enormity of population and area served Sensitivity of information needed to complete the Plan - confidential information that cannot be released to the public because of security concerns. How do we utilize the information and still fulfill planning requirements. Building and code restrictions Cultural demands and barriers How laws are currently written

This constraint analysis provides ongoing assistance to individual departments in hazard mitigation project development efforts. A.7 Data Collection, Revision and Maintenance The early stages in the Plan development process were dedicated to inventorying the existing information resources. Each agency represented on the LHMP Task Force was requested to identify existing mitigation plans, documentation, capital improvement projects (including normal maintenance that has a hazard reduction role and mitigates potential disaster damage). Task Force members are required to follow the measures used in the initial plan development and prescribe them as future data collection methods to be incorporated into subsequent plan revisions: Look for any plans, studies and technical information that could be used to update the revised Plan. Locate documents or reports relating to Citys natural and human-caused hazards. Re-evaluate Critical Response Facilities in hazard areas. Re-evaluate Critical Infrastructure in hazard areas. Re-evaluate Critical Operating Facilities in hazard areas. Re-assess value of Critical Response Facilities, Critical Infrastructure, Critical Operating Facilities, and private/public property within hazard zones. Re-examine existing hazard mitigation programs and projects. Identify potential future mitigation programs and projects. A wealth of data and information was obtained, including previous studies and plans; maps of hazard areas; historical records of the occurrence and damage caused by previous events; existing hazard mitigation programs; and other resource materials. This information was made available in, or converted to, an electronic form. EMD staff organized the material and constructed a comprehensive electronic data/information base to facilitate the planning process. Much of the material appears in this document; however, the complete file is too voluminous for printing and publication. EMD will retain the complete file of resource material in its files for future reference. In addition to the information provided by the City departments, the Task Force also utilized information developed by the following partnering agencies: the County of Los Angeles Office of Emergency Management, the County of Los Angeles Public Health Department, the County 9

of Los Angeles Public Works Department, the University of Southern California Earthquake Center, the National Weather Service, and the UCLA School of Public Health. A.8 GIS Mapping The LHMP Task Force updated all hazard mappings in the original Plan, which was initially developed by the Bureau of Engineering and Planning Department GIS staff. This includes mapping of natural hazard zones, Critical Infrastructure, Critical Response Facilities, and Critical Operating Facilities. This work was augmented with existing electronic files from the Safety Element of the General Plan and the Flood plain Management Plan. These maps are updated by EMD and are depicted in the Hazard Vulnerability and Risk assessment section of the Plan (Section IV). A.9 Identification of Hazards Revisited During each LHMP review and revision process, the Risk Ratings for hazards and vulnerabilities within the City of Los Angeles are reviewed and re-prioritized according to new information. As such, the following table is the current representation of the vulnerabilities categorized by levels of risk rating:
RISK RATINGS FOR ALL HAZARDS AND VULNERABILITIES High Risk Rating Moderate Risk Rating Low Risk Rating Earthquake 22 Drought 14 Tsunami 12 Terrorism 20 Special Events 14 Landslide 11 Brush Fire 18 Severe Weather 13 High Rise Fire 9 Flood 18 Dam Failure 13 Radiological 9 Incident/Accident Public Health 18 Critical Infrastructure 13 Issues Interruption Hazardous 17 Materials Incident Civil Unrest 16 Transportation 16

The ratings were developed by the members of the Task Force through a consensus process. Please refer to Section IV, Subsection A1 for hazard rating developmental process and analysis. (See Appendix C for the Initial Hazard Risk Analysis Rating Form). A.10 Risk Assessment The vulnerability assessment is an in-depth analysis of risks associated with all identified hazards, that takes into account historical events as well as assessment of potential for future occurrences, and contains rich store of data collection. The risk assessment also takes into account survey results conducted annually as part of the required component to the Plans revision and maintenance process.

10

For the purposes of the risk assessment, the Task Force identified three categories of facilities for analysis: Critical City Operating Facilities, Critical Response Facilities and Critical Infrastructure. Critical Operating Facilities, also referred to as the Big Nine, are the facilities that house the majority of city personnel, and are required for the day-to-day conduct of City business. These include City Hall, City Hall East, City Hall South, Parker Center, Piper Technical Center, Personnel Building, West Los Angeles Municipal Building, Van Nuys Marvin Braude Building, and San Pedro Municipal Building. Critical Response Facilities are the Citys operating facilities necessary for hazard event response, and they include fire stations, police stations, hospitals, and evacuation centers, such as LAUSD Schools, and Recreation and Parks facilities Critical Infrastructure is represented by both public and private infrastructures. Critical Infrastructure is divided into two categories: Utilities and Transportation. Critical Infrastructure under Transportation includes: freeways, streets, bridges, railroads, airports and the harbor. Under Utilities, these include the potable water systems (treatment and reservoirs), waste water systems (treatment plants, major interceptors, sewer lines), electric power systems (power plants, substations, major transmissions lines), oil refineries, natural gas systems, and communication systems. The vulnerability of each of these systems are evaluated against each of the identified hazards and re-assessed during each revision cycle. NOTE: Natural gas and communications systems are privately owned, and related information is not available and therefore, not included in the risk analyses. A.10 Mitigation Measures Following the risk assessment, each City department provided lists of mitigation measures designed to reduce the adverse effects of natural hazards, and lists of preventative mitigation measures for human-caused hazards. Mitigation measures were divided into two categories: existing/ongoing measures and proposed measures. The rationale for including existing/ongoing measures was to demonstrate the breadth of the Citys existing aggressive hazard mitigation programs. The mitigation efforts are presented in Section V of the Plan. A.11 Development Tools and Methodology Through ongoing partnering efforts, the Task Force developed a wide variety of outreach tools and methods that have been utilized in the outreach strategy to date. The multi-pronged approach is designed to inform the community, develop partnerships and to elicit input and support. Members of the inter-disciplinary Task Force were apprised of the ongoing developments of the outreach activities. Their involvement will continue to guide the outreach activities over the coming years. The outreach tools and approach methods include: 11

Email/mail correspondence with representative from diverse sectors and populations Designation of a key neighborhood organization as a grassroots outreach champion Participation at public fairs in diverse geographical locations Ongoing distribution of mitigation materials developed by the multiplicity of partners at all levels Development, distribution and analysis of an extensive public questionnaire Dedicated website posting of mitigation process and revised Mitigation Plan with tool for public feedback Press release to media outlets announcing Plan revision and feedback opportunity Announcement of the revised Plan and feedback opportunity at BICEPP and ENLA meeting Public workshop for the revised Plan, sponsored by the Department of Neighborhood Empowerment Articles posted in quarterly Emergency Management Department newsletters, including announcement of plan revision and feedback opportunity Placement of the revised Plan in local libraries Spanish Translation of Executive Summary and press releases

A.12 Technical Resources Due to its size and complexity, the City of Los Angeles maintains a staff of highly qualified experts in a number of fields, including law enforcement, fire and life safety, transportation, building and safety, sanitation, water and wastewater treatment, electricity generation, engineering, GIS, planning, hydrology, geology, and etc. Typically these experts reside in specific departments such as Public Works, Water and Power, Transportation, and Planning. Since membership on the LHMP Task Force includes all major City departments, the LHMP has access to specialized expertise as needed. Technical expertise is provided by outside agencies participating on the LHMP Task Force, including the UCLA School of Public Health, the University of Southern California Earthquake Center, the California Institute of Technology, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Weather Service and Los Angeles County Public Works. Other technical resources are utilized, including the California State geological seismic hazard mapping program, which, and the Floodplain Management Plan for technical updates on the Citys flood hazards. Detailed technical data regarding the effects of earthquakes, fires and other hazards are usually provided by the Department of Building and Safety. And finally, the Safety Element of the Los Angeles General Plan, including Technical appendices is used for primary source in technical information. A.13 Financial Resources LHMP projects are generally funded from both City resources and State and Federal grants. Funding sources for the implementation of existing and proposed mitigation projects for City 12

funds include: General Fund, Special Revenue Funds, Prop. Q Funds (Police, Fire and Paramedic facilities), Prop. G Funds (Seismic retrofit of municipal buildings), and Permit Fees. Water Pollution Abatement Fund is a State grant, while Federal grants include Federal Aviation Grants, FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants and Department of Homeland Security Grants. The Citys proprietary departments (Harbor, Airports, and Water and Power) derive revenues primarily from user and concession fees, but also receive Federal and State grants. A.14 Annual Online Questionnaire During the development of the initial LHMP, the Task Force developed a customized questionnaire that elicited input from the public on hazard mitigation related issues. Based on the FEMA Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Guidelines, the original questionnaire, referred to as the Legacy Document, consisted of 23 questions covering five broad categories, including Natural Hazard Information, Household Preparedness Activities, Natural Hazard Risk Reduction, Community Natural Hazard Preparedness, and Citizen Profile. (See Appendix C) Based on the same guiding principles of consensus-building efforts mandated by the Plans policy objectives, the Emergency Management Department created a new questionnaire for the 2010 LHMP update. The questionnaire was available on EMDs official website during the month of September 2010 (see Appendix C for survey results). The 2010 Questionnaire consisted of 30 questions related to experience with past natural and manmade. Survey responses to hazards was use to rank participants perception of disasters. The participants were asked about media/communication sources trust; and any mitigation programs and/or projects that they would like see. The Questionnaire also contained questions relating to basic emergency preparedness knowledge, training, and education information, including the role of the Emergency Management Department as the lead coordinating agency for the City of Los Angeles. (See Sub-section D3 for more information on questionnaire distribution methods.)

B. PLAN REVIEW AND MAINTENANCE

Section 201.6(c)(4) of 44 CFR requires a formal plan maintenance program to ensure that the mitigation plan remains an active and relevant document. The Federal requirement is that the Plan be evaluated and updated at least every five years. The City of Los Angeles has elected to review the Plan annually and update accordingly. Coordination of the review will be led by the Emergency Management Department. Individual departments/agencies are responsible for implementing their specific mitigation projects. The City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department will be responsible for reviewing and tracking the changes made to this Plan annually. The Emergency Management Department will serve as the chair of the LHMP Task Force and will convene a series of meetings annually to review the Plan including the following: Overall effectiveness of the Plan (is the Plan being utilized effectively in other planning mechanisms, and to inform the City, stakeholders and public as to the various hazard vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies of the City). 13

Review annual survey data to include in the review process. Re-evaluation of the prioritized hazards (changing conditions, or progress in implementing hazard mitigation projects, may result in a need to re-prioritize hazards). Status of each proposed mitigation project (investigate reasons why mitigation projects or programs scheduled to start, or to be completed are not on schedule, incorporate new projects and make changes to previously-included projects).

The Emergency Management Department will post a hazard mitigation survey to City representatives, local stakeholders and the public by the end of July each year. The LHMP Task Force will convene following the conclusion of the survey period to review the results of the data collected from the survey. During a 30 day time window, the LHMP Task Force will be review the entire plan and prepare a list of recommendations and proposed amendments to the Plan components, including updates to their departments mitigation strategy projects (see Section V and Appendix E). The LHMP Task Force will then reconvene to discuss appropriate recommendations or suggestions for changes to the Plan. Upon completion of the annual review, the LHMP Task Force will work directly with the Emergency Management Department Planning Division to update all projects as listed in the Mitigation Strategies and appropriate appendices of this Plan. Once the Plan is reviewed and revised accordingly, the Plan shall be forwarded to the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Board for approval. A Record of Revisions is kept in Appendix A of this document in order to quickly identify changes made annually. The Emergency Management Department will ensure that the revised plan is submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency via the California Emergency Management Agency at least once within every five (5) year planning cycle in order to have the Federal Emergency Management Agency perform a formal review and approval of the LHMP.

C. MITIGATION STRATEGY PROJECT SUBMISSION, MANAGEMENT AND REVISION

Individual departments/agencies are responsible for implementing specific mitigation projects using the new Mitigation Strategy Project Worksheet -created during the 2010 Plan update- for all new proposed mitigation strategy projects. The Project Worksheet has been amended to include the following: unique identifying number, priority level, status level, description, name of responsible department/agency, lead contact person and their contact information, existing and potential resources, and implementation time frame for each proposed and existing/ongoing mitigation action. It is the responsibility of the responsible department/agency to determine the appropriate funding source and apply for such funding through the appropriate application process. Each department/agency is responsible for managing the project from initiation through completion, and for providing annual project status updates. 14

Departments should continually consider new mitigation strategy projects throughout the year. During the LHMP review and revision period, the LHMP Task Force will accept new projects for consideration and incorporation into the LHMP. Departments will be advised when the LHMP review and revision is taking place through the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Committee and Emergency Operations Board email rosters, and through the LHMP Task Force members. In order to submit a new project, departments must complete a Mitigation Strategy Project Worksheet and submit it to the Emergency Management Department Planning Division. Forms may be submitted beginning the first business day of July and no later than the last business day of August of each year. Projects can only be added, revised, modified or removed during the LHMP review and revision process. Based on updates to the LHMP, the LHMP Task Force may recommend updates to other City of Los Angeles planning elements (these include, but are not limited to documents such as: The Emergency Operations Plan, Annexes to the Emergency Operations Plan, Floodplain Management Plan, and Safety Element of the Citys General Plan).

D. PLAN REVISION AND MAINTENANCE PARTICIPATION

Integral to the successful review and revision process of the LHMP and review of mitigation strategy projects is the inclusiveness of the City departments, Citys key stakeholders and the public. The LHMP review and revision process is only as strong as the participation and work put into the process. The following sub-sections outline how each of these participants is active in the LHMP review and revision process. D.1 CITY DEPARTMENT PLAN REVISION AND MAINTENANCE PARTICIPATION The LHMP Task Force is comprised of representatives from the following ten City departments: Emergency Management Department (lead), Department of Animal Services, General Services Department, Department of Public Works, Department of Recreation and Parks, Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles World Airports, and Port of Los Angeles. Although only ten departments officially sit on the LHMP Task Force, all City departments are notified of LHMP Task Force meetings through the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Committee and Emergency Operations Board email lists, and are encouraged to attend the LHMP Task Force meetings. Comments, recommendations and suggestions by all City departments are highly encouraged and are beneficial to the review and revision process. All City departments are eligible to submit mitigation strategy projects as defined in Section II-C. D.2 STAKEHOLDER PLAN REVISION AND MAINTENANCE PARTICIPATION Integral to the successful review and maintenance process of the Plan and implementation of mitigation strategy projects is the inclusiveness of the Citys key stakeholders in the decisionmaking process. The City of Los Angeles is increasingly supporting new efforts to develop and strengthen relationships between the Citys elected officials, government staff, widely varied 15

business and industrial sector, media, science, academia, and the many diverse stakeholder sectors of the local population. The following organizations are invited to attend LHMP Task Force meetings: The American Red Cross, Southern California Gas Company (Sempra Energy), the University of Southern California (USC), California State University Northridge, University of California Los Angeles, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles Community College District, Los Angeles Unified School District, Port of Long Beach and County of Los Angeles Office of Emergency Management. D.3 PUBLIC PLAN REVISION AND MAINTENANCE PARTICIPATION Active local citizen participation is critical to the Citys mitigation plan revision and maintenance process and mitigation project implementation; ultimately, this consensus-building approach will serve to foster a new disaster reduction culture. However, the rich and complex diversity of the Citys cultural, racial and socio-economic communities exacerbates the challenge of risk reduction. The task of adequately reflecting the needs of a city the size and make up of Los Angeles is daunting. Additionally, a growing undercurrent of inter-cultural issues related to terrorism is evolving and new societal paradigms are emerging concerning trust and credibility related to government-sponsored initiatives. In order to facilitate annual review and revisions to the City of Los Angeles Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP), the Emergency Management Department engages the public through two main avenues. The first approach is through an online survey regarding hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness and community perception of vulnerabilities (Section II, sub-section A-15). In order to promote public participation, a brief description of the survey and its importance along with the link to the survey is sent using a flyer to the Citys Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) coordinator, the Department of Neighborhood Empowerment and various Neighborhood Councils through email networks. The public is given a four week window to complete the survey. The second approach is through an opportunity for public comment at the citys Emergency Operations Board meetings. The LHMP is presented annually at the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Board, which is open to the public and subject to the Brown Act. The item is placed on the agenda in advance of the meeting and the public is welcome to comment on the Plan and/or the process used. The LHMP Task Force will then review all collective data findings from LHMP review, accept comments, recommendations and suggestions from various participants, and finally make all appropriate revisions to the LHMP as necessary. D.4 STATE AND FEDERAL SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS Section 201.6(c)(4) of 44 CFR requires a formal plan maintenance program to ensure that the mitigation plan remains an active and relevant document. The Federal requirement is that the Plan be evaluated and updated at least every five years. The City of Los Angeles has elected to review the Plan annually and update accordingly. Every five years, the City of Los Angeles shall review and revise the LHMP in accordance to this document and submit for review to the 16

California Emergency Management Agency for review and forward to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for final approval. The Interim Final Rule (IFR) requires that the City of Los Angeles LHMP be submitted through the State Hazard Mitigation Officer (SHMO) at the California Emergency Management Agency, for initial review, before submittal to the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX Mitigation Office. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has requested that local governments submit LHMPs to the California Emergency Management Agency first and not directly to the Region IX Mitigation Office. Upon receipt of a the LHMP, the California Emergency Management Agency will perform an initial review of the Plan, make appropriate comments, and forward the mitigation plan "package" to FEMA Region IX for their courtesy review or for final review and approval. FEMA will communicate directly with the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department concerning required and recommended changes to the mitigation plan until final approval is achieved. When ready for submission for five year review and approval, the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department shall prepare a cover letter addressed to FEMA describing what is being submitted and the action to be taken (courtesy review or final review for approval). EMD shall forward the cover letter and a hardcopy of the Plan in a 3-ring binder, and shall include an electronic version of the Plan in a pdf format and an electronic version of the LHMP review crosswalk in an editable format. Once the Plan has been approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, it shall be forwarded to the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Board for approval. The Emergency Management Department shall prepare a memo to the Board recommending and requesting that the Board adopt the newly approved plan. D.5 LHMP LOCAL APPROVAL AND ADOPTION The LHMP must be reviewed and revised locally and submitted for local approval annually. The LHMP Task Force shall review and revise the LHMP as necessary and in years other than a year requiring five year Federal Emergency Management Agency review and approval, the LHMP Task Force shall submit the revised LHMP to the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Board for approval. This process also requires EMD to prepare a memo to the Board recommending and requesting that the Board approve the revised plan.

E. INCORPORATION INTO EXISTING PLANNING MECHANISM

The City of Los Angeles has prepared a number of related plans that support and complement the planning mechanisms of this Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. The most prominent of which is the City of Los Angeles General Plan that provides the basis for land use decisions, neighborhood zoning and other major community decisions. Additionally, the Safety Element of the General Plan was prepared specifically for the early recognition and mitigation planning for seismic, brushfire, flood and other hazards. 17

Many of the sixteen hazards identified in this Plan are addressed in detail in the Citys Emergency Operations Plan. This Plan identifies specific hazards, their threat, and their potential for destruction, and it addresses how the City will respond to and recover from all of these hazards. The Emergency Operations Plan specifies in detail the roles and responsibilities of each department for response and recovery. Departments, in turn, have developed detailed implementation plans and procedures. When departments are developing, preparing or revising plans, they are to review all applicable sections of the LHMP to ensure that their plan is consistent with the practices and strategies employed by the LHMP. In addition, planners should be familiar with the various hazard vulnerability assessments contained within the LHMP and take those into account when developing, preparing or revising plans.

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SECTION III DEMOGRAPHICS & STATISTICS

A) COMMUNITY PROFILE
The City of Los Angeles is an irregularly shaped city encompassing over 498 square miles which is comprised of approximately 468 square miles of land (214 square miles of which are hills and mountains) and approximately 29 square miles of water. The San Gabriel and Santa Susana Mountains bound the City on the north and the Santa Monica Mountains extend across the middle of the City. The Palos Verdes Hills and Pacific Ocean bound the City on the south and west. Much of the City of Los Angeles is built within old flood plains and mountains or adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The population is concentrated within urban centers which are interspersed by low density residential neighborhoods. Most of the flat lands of the City have been developed with some land use. Remaining open space tends to be concentrated within flood plains or along steep hillside and drainage water courses which typically have been designated as public park land, recreational, flood control or low intensity uses, consistent with State law. Vulnerability to fire and flood has increased as development has encroached into remaining open space areas. Concentration of development and infrastructure has increased the vulnerability of greater numbers of people, businesses and facilities to seismic, fire and flood events while at the same time providing greater resources for responding to such events. While fire, flood, and earthquakes pose high risk hazards to the City, Los Angeles also is subject to other natural hazards including drought, severe weather, tsunamis, along with landslides and debris flows. When a catastrophic natural disaster strikes, it may trigger secondary events. An earthquake may trigger a landslide or cause rupture of gas mains or hazardous material enclosures. Disruption of gas mains could contribute to or cause fires. If winds are present, fires could become wild fires. Fires can denude hillsides and thereby exacerbate potential flood hazard, inundation conditions and debris flows. Some hazards are associated with specific geological or geographic features. For example, the California State geological seismic hazard mapping program prepares maps which identify amplified shaking, liquefaction and landslide hazard zones. In addition to natural hazards, Los Angeles faces threats from human-induced hazards. These are also addressed in the Plan, and include terrorism, health issues, civil unrest, and special events. Such events as high rise fires, dam or reservoirs failures, and radiological accidents also pose significant risks. Given the magnitude and density of population and economic activity in the City, even the temporary disruption of critical infrastructures can result in personal injury or property damage.

21

Figure of State of California (beige), Los Angeles County (orange) and City of Los Angeles (red).

B) DEMOGRAPHICS
According to the latest estimate report dated April 29, 2010 released from the State of California, Department of Finance, the City of Los Angeles has reached a total population of 4,094,764 as of January 1, 2009, an increase of 6.4% from 2006 estimate of 3,849,378. The results from the recent 2010 U.S. Census report are not available for the 2010 revisions. Based on the November 2010 Draft Environmental Impact Report by the Southern California Association of Governments, the City has an average population density of 8,205 people per square mile and is projected to increase to 4.41 million by 2030.

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SECTION IV HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT

23

A. SUMMARY
Similar to most other large cities, the City of Los Angeles is faced with many hazards which could impact all segments of the local community. In this section, all hazards identified in Table A-1 (below) are discussed in detail in sub-sections B-R. Each subsection summarizes: 1) the hazard profile, 2) vulnerability and risk assessment, and 3) future development and trends, as they pertain to the City of Los Angeles. A.1 Hazard Risk Analysis Rating Because the Plan is designed to function as a comprehensive blueprint to guide City mitigation planning for all hazards, both natural and human hazards are addressed in the Plan. Hazards are subdivided into three categories based on probability of occurrence, and severity of potential impacts. The categories are High, Moderate, and Low. The hazard risk analysis used for this Plan is based upon an analytical process involving objective and subjective considerations, rather than a purely statistical account of past events. During the 2010 LHMP review and revision process, the Risk Ratings for hazards and vulnerabilities within the City of Los Angeles are reassessed and recalculated. As such, the following table (Table A-1) is the most current representation of the vulnerabilities and their risk rating.
High Risk Rating Earthquake Terrorism Brush Fire Flood Public Health Issues RISK RATINGS FOR ALL HAZARDS AND VULNERABILITIES Moderate Risk Rating Low Risk Rating 22 Drought 14 Tsunami 20 Special Events 14 Landslide/Debris Flow 18 Severe Weather 13 High Rise Fire 18 Dam Failure 13 Radiological Incident/Accident 18 Critical Infrastructure 13 Interruption 17

12 11 9 9

Hazardous Materials Incident Civil Unrest 16 Transportation 16 Table A-1. Summary of city-identified hazards. Hazards are further subdivided into three levels of risk: High Risk, Moderate Risk and Low Risk based on their corresponding risk rating.

These ratings were developed through a consensus process utilizing data collected from the annual surveys and recent scientific data or studies. The LHMP Task Force reviews this data and ranks each of the identified hazards according to eight categories: Magnitude, Duration, Distribution, Area Affected, Frequency, Probability, Vulnerability and Community Profile (Table A-2). City of Los Angeles will adopt the Critical Priority Risk Index (CPRI) method during the next Hazard Mitigation Plan update.

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2010 City of Los Angeles LHMP Hazard Risk Analysis Rating Form
Area Affected Vulnerability Distribution Community Priority 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 Community Priority 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 Natural Hazard Total Value 22 18 18 11 12 14 13 18 Total Value 17 9 20 16 13 13 9 Probability 3 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 Probability 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 Magnitude Frequency 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 Duration 3 2 2 1 2 2 1

Earthquake Brush Fire Flood Landslide Tsunami Drought Severe Weather (high heat, high winds, coastal erosion, hurricane, etc.) Public Health Issues (Smallpox, SARS, West Nile, Pandemic Influenza)

3 2 2 1 3 1 1

3 2 2 1 1 2 2

3 2 2 1 2 3 2

2 2 2 1 2 1 2

Area Affected

Human-Caused Hazard

Hazardous Materials Incident High-Rise Fire Terrorism/WMD Civil Unrest Dam Failure Critical Infrastructure Interruption (Water, Electricity, Information & Communication, etc.) Radiological Incidents/Accidents

2 2 3 3 3 3

2 1 3 2 2 1

1 1 3 2 2 2

1 1 2 2 2 2

3 1 1 2 1 1

Special Events (High Profile Dignitary 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 14 Visits, Political Conventions, High Profile Sporting Events, Parades, etc.) Transportation (Aviation, Port, 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 16 Ground, Rail) Table A-2. All-Hazard Risk Analysis Rating forms. Both Natural and Human-Made Hazards are reported in this mitigation plan.

25

Vulnerability 2 1 2 2 1 1 1

Distribution

Magnitude

Frequency

Duration

A.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Section Each subsection listed below includes a comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment for each identified hazard. The analysis addresses both public and private infrastructures and structures. a) Identifying Assets Critical assets identified in the Plan are subdivided into three categories: Critical Response Facilities. These include police stations, fire stations, hospitals, and other facilities necessary to respond to an event. (Figure B-1) Critical Infrastructure. These facilities include pipelines, refineries, streets, bridges, and other infrastructure that might be impacted by an event. Critical Operating Facilities. These include the facilities essential for continued City operations after an event. Called the Big Nine, these include the major municipal structures housing the majority of municipal functions and staff. The vulnerability of each category of facilities to potential hazard events is discussed in Section IV subsections B through R. Each subsection also includes information on future development trends in identified hazard areas. b) Methodology for Estimating Potential Asset Loss To calculate potential losses for Critical Response Facilities, Critical Infrastructure, and Critical Operating Facilities, an inventory of facilities by geographic location and estimated replacement value was conducted. Using GIS analysis, those facilities falling into hazard areas were identified. Total potential losses were obtained from asset owners for those facilities located within the hazard areas. (This information was not available for privately-owned critical infrastructures.) A similar process was followed for commercial and residential structures. Property values were extracted from the Assessors files. Then, based on known densities of structures, using GIS, the Assessors files were cross-tabbed with hazard zones to produce estimates of potential losses for commercial and residential structures. At the time this analysis was completed, commercial and residential valuations were not available for some hazards. This information will be included in future Plan updates. The above methodologies were applied only to those natural hazards that were associated with specific geographic areas, such as flood zones, dam inundation areas, tsunami zones, and brush fire hazard zones. Two approaches were utilized for estimating losses from earthquakes. Based on Alquist-Priolo maps prepared by the State Geologist, estimates of losses to Critical Response Facilities, Critical Operating Facilities and Critical Infrastructure were calculated. In addition, HAZUS analyses for two scenarios - 100-year return event and 500-year return event - were prepared. The results of both approaches were considered valuable input, and summarized in this Plan.

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Figure A-1. Map of Critical Response Facilities in City of Los Angeles.

27

A.3 Analysis of Future Development

Development Trends The Land Use Element of the General Plan indicates the pattern of development which is expected to occur in the very long term. The General Plan depicts the desired end state build-out of the City but provides no clear picture as to the pace, sequence or geographic pattern of the development process. Tentative Tract Maps give a better indication of impending development in the short term, because they represent a statement of intent by a developer to proceed with development of specific parcels in accordance with a detailed plan. Therefore, in this analysis the geographic location, size, and extent of proposed development as indicated by Tentative Tract Maps are utilized to assess the vulnerability of future buildings, infrastructure, and facilities in hazard areas. Tentative Tract Maps provide a detailed picture of future development but do not include specific types and numbers of buildings and infrastructure. These data will be developed and incorporated into the Plan during future updates. Regulation of Subdivisions (Tentative Tracts) The tools utilized to ensure that the process of granting entitlements for future development are the tentative tract map procedures codified under Article 7 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. An explanation of the subdivision process and identification of applicable Subdivision Application Requirements are detailed in the following paragraphs. Subdivision Map Act: The Subdivision Map Act of the State of California grants authority to the local agency to regulate and control the design and improvement of subdivisions within its boundaries. Subdivision: Subdivision is both the process and the result of laying out a parcel of undivided land into lots, blocks, streets, and public areas. It is the division of land into lots, tracts, parcels, or sites for the purpose of sale, lease or finance and subject to applicable regulations. Subdivision includes condominium projects. When you are dividing one parcel of land into five or more new parcels or developing a condominium project with five or more units, you are required to submit an application for a Tentative Tract Map. A division of one parcel of land into four or fewer new parcels or development of a condominium project that has four or fewer units requires the submittal of an application of a Parcel Map. These applications must be accompanied by either a Tentative Tract Map or Parcel Map which has been prepared by a registered Civil Engineer or Licensed Surveyor. The applications are filed with the City Planning Department simultaneously with an Environmental Assessment form. However, most Parcel Map applications are considered categorically exempt under the environmental guidelines. 28

Copies of the Tentative Map or Parcel will be forwarded to each member of the Subdivision Committee or Parcel Map Conference Committee who will submit their reports and recommendations to the Advisory Agency. After thorough review of the application and supplemental reports, the Subdivision/Parcel Map staff (City Planning) will schedule a public hearing. After appropriate notice, the Advisory Agency (City Planning) will hold a public hearing on all aspect of the proposed subdivision. After closing the public hearing, the Advisory Agency will make a determination and prepare a decision letter. Parcel Map Conference Committee: The committee is composed of the following officers of the City or their duly authorized representatives: the City Engineer; General Manager of the Department of Fire; Department of Transportation; and the Director of the Bureau of Street Lighting of the Department of Public Works. Subdivision Committee: The committee is composed of the following officers of the City or their duly authorized representatives: the City Engineer; Superintendent of Building; General Manager of the Department of Fire; General Manager, Department of General Services; Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Department of Water and Power; General Manager of the Department of Recreation and Parks; and the Director of the Bureau of Street Lighting of the Department of Public Works. All tentative tract determinations can be appealed to the Appeal Board within 10 days from the date of the mailing of the decision of the Advisory Agency. Parcel Map determinations can be appealed to the Appeal Board within 15 days of the mailing of the decision of the Advisory Agency. All Appeal Board decisions may be further appealed to the City Council. Subdivision Application Requirements The requirements below are subjects related to the hazards identified in the Plan. The City of Los Angeles Subdivision Committee would consider the earthquake hazard related issues in the subdivision application and enforce the tentative tract map requirements prior to approving any future development: Environmental Clearance (Categorical/General Exemption, Pending Environmental Assessment Form (EAF)) Subdividers Statement or Parcel Map Application Tentative Tract Map or Preliminary Parcel Map Radius Map Property Owners and Occupants List and Mailing Labels Tenant List and Tenant Information Chart (for demolition and condo conversion projects only) Photographs Solar Report (Tract Maps only) Oak Tree Report (if required) Flood Plain Hazard Information 29

Hillside Grading Computation (if located within a Hillside Area) Haul Route (if requested) Feasibility Study and Coastal Clearance (if located within a Coastal Zone) Building and Safety Grading Approval and Soil Report (if located within a Hillside Area) Landscape Plan (if requested)

Tentative Tract Map: Refers to a map made for the purpose of showing the design and improvements of a proposed subdivision creating five or more parcels, five or more condominiums which contain the following: The tract number. Sufficient legal description of the property to define its boundaries. Name, address and telephone numbers of the record owner, subdivider and person preparing the map. North point, engineering scale, date and area. The widths and approximate locations of all existing and proposed easements or rights-of-way within an adjacent to the property involved. Existing street names, and names or designations for all propose streets and highways. Approximate radii of all center line curves for streets, highways, alleys or ways. Lot layout, approximate dimensions of each lot and number of each lot. The locations of potentially dangerous areas, including geologically hazardous areas and areas subject to inundation or flood hazard. The existing contour of the land at intervals of not more than five feet, and of not more than two-foot intervals if the slope of the land is less than five percent. The approximate location of all buildings or structures on property involved which are to be removed, notations concerning all buildings which are to be retained; and approximate location of all existing wells. The approximate location and general description of any large or historically significant trees and of any oak trees and an indication as to the proposed retention or destruction of such trees. If any streets shown on the Tentative Map are proposed to be private streets, they shall be clearly indicated. The proposed method of providing sewage disposal and drainage for the property. A statement regarding existing and proposed zoning.

B. PROFILE OF EARTHQUAKE HAZARD

The City of Los Angeles is located in seismically-active southern California. The 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake and the 1994 Northridge Earthquake were reminders of the value of seismic safety-oriented planning and programs. While earthquake risk cannot be entirely eliminated, the disasters they cause can be significantly reduced through the informed application of regulatory measures and land use approaches, effective disaster response planning, and public 30

hazard awareness. Earthquake hazard was identified as High Risk hazard for the City of Los Angeles.

B.1 Identifying Earthquake Hazard

Seismic events present the most widespread threat of devastation to life and property and are considered, by the Hazard Mitigation Plan Advisory Task Force, as the highest-risk natural disaster to which the City of Los Angeles is susceptible. With an earthquake, there is no containment of potential damage, as is possible with a brushfire or flood. Unlike a brushfire or flood, whose path often can be generally measured and predicted, quake damages and related hazard events may be widespread and, at present, are unpredictable. Related hazard events could occur anywhere in the quake area, including inundations from damaged reservoirs or the release of hazardous materials, such as gas, which in turn could lead to fires or form toxic clouds. Since 1800 there have been approximately 60 damaging seismic events, or "earthquakes," in the Los Angeles region. After a brief hiatus between major events (circa 1940-1972), the greater Los Angeles area has experienced a number of moderate events which have resulted in considerable disruption of the infrastructure, impact on social and economic life, loss of lives and extensive property damage within the City, the greater metropolitan area and the adjacent region. According to the Geological Survey's records, some 20 quakes of magnitude 6.0 or higher have occurred in southern California since 1912. The most recent of these was the M6.7, 1994 Northridge Earthquake which was centered in the northwest part of the City, in the general vicinity of the 1971 San Fernando (a.k.a. Sylmar) quake. Following the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquakes, a variety of studies and cooperative information exchange ventures were initiated to expand knowledge concerning earthquakes so that people could be better protected in the event of future significant seismic events. Kobe, Northridge and other seismic event information are being used in formulating methodologies for strengthening buildings and structures to more successfully withstand severe damage and to better protect occupants and equipment during various types and degrees of seismic events. The California State Geologist's Seismic Hazards Mapping Program has provided maps that identify amplified shaking, liquefaction and landslide hazard zones. These maps are used in revising the Citys building, zoning and other codes, plans, standards, procedures and/or development permit requirements. Based on Richter scale and pre-Richter calculations, the second most-powerful tremor recorded in Los Angeles proper was in 1923 and centered in the San Jacinto Mountains, southeast of the City. The M6.3 earthquake caused only light damage in Los Angeles. In 1918, also in the isolated San Jacinto Mountains, some 150 miles from downtown, a mighty M6.8 quake occurred. 31

Comment [i1]: Check this

Los Angeles experienced two quakes of identical 6.3 magnitude --one in the Long Beach area in 1933 and another in Santa Barbara in 1925that produced disastrous damage because their epicenters were near central cities. The Long Beach toll was $40 million in property destruction and 115 lives lost. The Santa Barbara shake leveled much of the business district at a $6 million loss there, and killing 20. An earthquake in 1927 ranks--along with TehachapiBakersfield in 1952--as the all-time southern California whopper. Registering at 7.5, the 1927 upheaval centered just north of Point Arguello in the upper Santa Barbara channel, destroying railways bridges, crumbling cliffs and sending a seismic wave as far north as Pismo Beach. The Kern Countys series of quakes in 1952 reached M7.7 and rank as second-largest in the United States since records were kept, behind San Francisco's M8.3 cataclysm of 1906. The great Alaskan shake of March 27, 1964, with a magnitude of M8.5 was the strongest ever recorded in the nation. The Seismic Hazard Mapping Act has been in effect for over 10 years and more than 4,000 square miles of land have been zoned in Los Angeles, Ventura, and Orange counties and in portions of the San Francisco Bay Area. The area zoned under the Seismic Hazards Mapping Act encompasses over 165 incorporated cities having a total population of more than 12 million and an average annual volume of new construction over $10 billion. Two hundred high-risk cities remain to be zoned, representing a total population of about nine million and an average annual construction volume of over $13 billion. The San Andreas fault is responsible for the April 18, 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire. This earthquake, is one of many that have resulted from episodic displacement along the fault throughout its life of about 15-20 million years.

Magnitude and Intensity of an Earthquake During an earthquake, energy stored up in faults is released. In major earthquakes, the energy released is sufficient to break a large portion of the causative fault. In the worst-case scenario the fault ruptures along its entire length. When the fault ruptures, seismic waves propagate, resulting in the ground vibrations normally felt during an earthquake. Ground shaking generally causes the most widespread damage in an earthquake. Strong ground motion can catastrophically damage vulnerable structures such as freeway overpasses and unreinforced masonry buildings. Ground shaking can also trigger a variety of secondary hazards such as liquefaction, landslides, soil subsidence, fire, dam failure and even toxic chemical releases. USGS Earthquake Magnitude policy is to use Moment Magnitude (M),--an earthquake magnitude measurement very similar to the Richter measurement, --which measures the amount of energy released by the fault movement in relation to the fault area broken to determine the magnitude of an earthquake.

32

An earthquake size is usually expressed as a magnitude; however, an earthquake's destructiveness is commonly measured as seismic intensity. Intensity is used to measure the strength of shaking produced by the earthquake at a certain location, and is determined from effects on people, human structures and the natural environment. The intensity scale most often used is the Modified Mercalli (MMI). The MMI scale consists of 12 levels of shaking; the higher the number, the greater the damage (Table B-1).
Magnitude/Intensity Comparison
Class Great Magnitude (M) >8 MMI VIII or Higher Abbreviated Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale XII. Damage total. Lines of sight and level are distorted. Objects thrown into the air. XI. Few, if any (masonry) structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly. X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with foundations. Rails bent. IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures; well-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned. VII. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. VI. Felt by all, many frightened. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight. V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Some dishes, windows broken. Unstable objects overturned. Pendulum clocks may stop. IV. Felt indoors by many, outdoors by few during the day. At night, some awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standing motor cars rocked noticeably. III. Felt quite noticeably by persons indoors, especially on upper floors of buildings. Many people do not recognize it as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibrations similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated. II. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings. I. Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable conditions.

Major Strong

7-7.9 6-6.9 VII-IX

Moderate

5-5.9

VI-VII

Light

4-4.9

IV-V

Minor

3-3.9

II-III

Micro

<3

Table B-1. Summary table illustrating the relationship between Earthquake Classification, Magnitude (M) and Intensity (MMI), as described by the United States Geological Survey.

Faults Earthquakes occur at faults. Faults are classified as active, potentially active, or inactive depending on the last time the fault ruptured and other geologic information. Active Fault-- movement has been proven to have occurred within the last 11,000 years. Active faults have a high-risk of surface rupture. The Alquist Priolo Special Studies Zone (APSSZ) Act focuses on this risk category. 33

Potentially Active Fault-- shows evidence of surface displacement during the last two million years, but has not been proven to rupture within the last 11,000 years. These faults have the next lowest probability of being the site of a damaging earthquake. Although unlikely, maximum probable earthquakes may occur during a time span of concern to urban planners, engineers and developers. Potentially active faults are considered in the design of critical facilities such as dams, fire stations, emergency operation centers, etc. Inactive Fault--A fault which has been proven by direct geologic evidence not to have moved in the last 11,000 years. This type of fault is thought to pose no risk to conventional development and most critical facilities. Such faults however are considered potential seismic sources in the design of nuclear power plants.

There are numerous active and potentially active faults in southern California that have the potential for generating strong ground motions in Los Angeles (Table B-2). San Andreas Fault The San Andreas fault (SAF) forms at a plate boundary that cuts through most of the State of California. Due to its large size --more than 800 miles long-- and proximity to densely populated areas, such as Los Angeles, the SAF has the potential for great damage when it ruptures. Geologic studies indicate a total displacement along the SAF of at least 350 miles since about 15-20 million years ago. The rate of movement along the fault is approximately 35mm/yr. The Southern SAF has a recurrence interval of less than 100 years, meaning that on average, an earthquake can be expected every 100 years. The last large earthquake on the Southern SAF occurred in 1857, more than 150 years ago. Therefore, an earthquake at this section of the SAF is considered overdue. The largest historical earthquakes that occurred along the San Andreas Fault were in 1857 (in the southern section) and 1906 (in the northern section). The Fort Tejon Earthquake of January 9, 1857 in southern California apparently was about the same magnitude as the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906. According to newspaper accounts, ground movement in both cases was roughly the same type. An account of the 1857 earthquake describes a sheep corral cut by the fault that was changed from a circle to a "S"-shape--movement clearly representative of rightlateral strike-slip. Studies of offset stream channels indicate that as much as 29 feet of movement occurred in 1857. During the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake, roads, fences, and rows of trees and bushes that crossed the fault were offset several yards, and the road across the head of Tomales Bay was offset almost 21 feet, the maximum offset recorded. The San Francisco Earthquake and fire took about 700 lives and caused millions of dollars worth of damage in California from Eureka southward to Salinas and beyond. The earthquake was felt as far away as Oregon and central Nevada. The earthquake has been estimated at a magnitude 8.3 on the Richter Scale and MMI as high as XI. 34

Major known faults in the Los Angeles Region

San Andreas The San Andreas Fault is considered to be the major geological structural feature of southern California. A catastrophic earthquake having a Richter magnitude of 8.3 on the southern central portion of this fault is likely before the end of the 20th century and is estimated to have a current annual probability of occurrence between two and five percent. This fault is considered the second most active fault in California. This fault is capable of producing earthquakes in a range of 6.3 to 7.5 magnitude. This is a thrust fault located across the Los Angeles Basin, discovered in 1999. It runs about 25 miles from the La Puente Hills region in the southeast to just south of Griffith Park in the northwest. The frequency of a major rupture in the Puente Hills Fault is on the order of once per several thousand years. This fault is capable of producing an earthquake with a magnitude between 7.0 and 7.5. This fault system stretches from Cajon Pass in San Bernardino County to Ventura. It includes the Cucamonga, Sierra Madre, San Fernando and Santa Susanna faults. This fault extends along the base of the San Gabriel Mountains between Sunland and La Crescenta Flintridge. This fault is estimated to generate a maximum credible earthquake of magnitude 6.4, generating maximum seismic intensities of 8.5 to 9.0 MMI. This earthquake fault is least likely to cause liquefaction related damage. There is a 39 percent probability that within the next 100 years a magnitude 6.5 earthquake could occur on this fault. This fault is classified as an active fault and is capable of generating an earthquake with the shaking intensity of 7.5 to 8.0 MMI, similar to that experienced during the 1971 Sylmar Earthquake. This fault is located in the San Fernando Valley portion of the City. Damage resulting from a maximum credible earthquake is expected to be moderate and probably less than that experienced during the 1971 Sylmar earthquake. Is estimated to be capable of generating a magnitude 6.4 at a probability of 6.2 percent within the next 100 years. This fault is a reverse fault and therefore would result in a maximum credible earthquake that would have higher than anticipated accelerations and intensities. The liquefaction-prone area along the Los Angeles River would be subject to 10 to 10.5 MMI that would result in liquefaction damage. The Verdugo Fault traverses Burbank through the Verdugo Mountains located in the northeastern section of the City of Burbank. This fault is located along the lower slopes of the Verdugos and in the alluvium just south of these mountains. The Verdugo Fault has a low probability of 6.2 percent of delivering a magnitude 6.7 (8-10 MMI) maximum credible earthquake within the next 100 years. The Santa Monica Fault is one of the several northeast-southwest-trending, north-dipping, reverse faults that extend through the Los Angeles metropolitan area. This fault is capable of producing an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.0 to 7.0. The Santa Monica Raymond Hill Fault is capable of producing a 7.5 magnitude maximum credible earthquake. There is a very low probability (3.1 percent) that an earthquake on this fault will occur within the next 100 years.

NewportInglewood Puente Hills

Sierra Madre-San Fernando Fault System Sierra Madre

San Fernando

Hollywood

Verdugo Fault

Santa Monica Fault Raymond Fault

Table B-2. Summary table of known faults in the Los Angeles Region with description probability of rupture and potential maximum earthquake.

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According to the most recent Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast or UCERF Report (USGS Open-File Report 2007-1437) published by the Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (WGCEP 2007), there is a 97% probability that an earthquake of a M6.7 could occur in Southern California, causing extensive damage. The probability of a M6.7 earthquake occurring in the more specific Los Angeles region is 67%.
Potential Earthquake Scenarios in Southern California Puente Hills Newport-Inglewood Palos Verdes 6.8 Whittier Fault 6.7 Verdugo Fault 8.2 San Andreas Fault: Southern Rupture 7.8 San Andreas Fault: Repeat of the 1857 Earthquake 6.6 Santa Monica 6.5 Raymond Fault Table B-3. Projected building damage and potential earthquake magnitude on active faults in the Los Angeles area. $17,000 $18,000 $23,000 $32,000 $26,000 $31,000 M 7.1 6.9 7.1 Projected Building Damage in Millions $87,000 $54,000 $32,000

Seismic Analysis Studies conducted by the California Division of Mines and Geology, the U.S. Geological Survey, other agencies and private institutions have been reviewed and are summarized in this section to address the seismic hazards of most concern to the City of Los Angeles. These seismic hazards include ground shaking, fault rupture and liquefaction. Ground Shaking Hazard Ground shaking refers to the ground vibrations produced by an earthquake. Many variables affect the spatial distribution and character of ground motion that results from an earthquake. These variables include the size of the earthquake, the type of fault (e.g., strike-slip or thrust), the orientation of the rupture surface, the basin geometry and topography, and the subsurface and near-site geological conditions. Ground motion at the surface is influenced mostly by the interaction between the seismic waves and the local geological and site conditions. Because of the many uncertain variables involved, predicting earthquake ground motion from purely theoretical models is not possible. However, some models use earthquake magnitude 36

and distance to predict the ground motion levels that may be generated by future earthquakes and are related to structural damage and for use in hazard mitigation. For example, response spectra values - represent the actual amplitudes and frequency contents of the seismic waves generated by an earthquake as they interact with a structure at a specific location - are used in dynamic motion analyses required in certain cases by the Uniform Building Code. Fault Rupture Hazard Earthquakes can cause large horizontal or vertical displacements of the ground surface along an active fault. Structures built across such a fault experience extensive damage in the event of a fault rupturing. To prevent this kind of seismic hazard from occurring, the State of California enacted the Alquist Priolo Special Study Zone (APSSZ) Act of 1972. Under this act, active faults and fault zones are identified and mapped throughout the state. In addition, development within an APSSZ must include geological studies prepared by a registered geologist, and building setbacks away from the fault must be defined and implemented. Several faults in the County of Los Angeles have been designated as APSSZ by the California Division of Mines and Geology. Several other faults are currently considered potentially active. An important limitation of the APSSZ program is that mapping is regional. Consequently, certain local faults may not be expediently designated as an APSSZ, and faults with ambiguous evidence of activity may never be designated an APSSZ. The designation of a fault as active, potentially active or inactive is largely dependent on the purpose and the requirements of the regulatory definition used. Although the Alquist Priolo definitions are generally applicable to conventional development, the site location and design of critical facilities usually require more stringent definitions of seismic activity. Liquefaction Hazard Liquefaction is one of the most destructive secondary effects of seismic shaking. Liquefaction results from the loss of soil strength due to a sudden increase in pore water pressure during shaking. It occurs primarily in saturated and loose, fine to medium-grained soils, in areas where the groundwater table is 50 feet or less below the surface. Liquefaction occurs most often where groundwater is within 30 feet of the surface, but it may occur in areas where groundwater is up to 50 feet beneath the surface. High pore pressures that build up in sediments during repeated seismic vibrations cause the soil to behave as a liquid. Areas within the city subject to liquefaction hazard have been mapped (Figure B-2). The reduction in soil volume due to densification or extrusion causes settlement which may result in failure of structural foundations and retaining walls. Substantial structures, such as multi-story buildings or freeway interchanges, may settle up to several feet below grade or overturn in liquefied material. As with fault rupture, liquefaction can impact utility, flood control, and transportation lifelines. Damaged roadways pose accessibility problems for emergency response vehicles and can complicate evacuation operations. Severed water distribution lines can also impair firefighting efforts or, if associated with wastewater line breaks, may contaminate the drinking water supply. Lateral spreading, a particularly damaging 37

form of liquefaction that results in shallow flow failures on gently-dipping ground, caused the destruction of the Juvenile Hall facility in the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake.

B.1.2 Occurrence of Earthquake Hazard The 1987 M6 Whittier Narrows Earthquake, caused by a blind thrust fault, resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage. Most recently, the San Simeon Earthquake (M6.5) hit an area six miles northeast of San Simeon on December 22, 2003. As of March 17, 2004, FEMA had approved over $20.1 million in aid for recovery from this event. A strong earthquake, such as the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (M6.7) or the 1983 Coalinga Earthquake (M6.5), is capable of causing major damage if the epicenter is near a densely populated area. On May 18, 1940, an earthquake of magnitude 7.1 occurred along a previously unrecognized fault in the Imperial Valley. Similar movement on the Imperial Fault occurred during an earthquake in November 1979. The greatest surface displacement was 17 feet of right-lateral strike-slip in the 1940 Earthquake. Clearly, this fault is part of the San Andreas system. Other earthquakes of probable magnitudes of 7 or larger occurred on the Hayward Fault in 1836 and 1868 and on the San Andreas fault in 1838. Two recent major earthquakes, the 1992 Landers Earthquake (M7.3) and the 1999 Hector Mine Earthquake (M7.1) caused extensive surface fault rupture but relatively little damage because they occurred in lightly populated areas of the Mojave Desert. In contrast, earthquakes of smaller magnitude but in densely populated areas, such as the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (M6.9) and the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (M6.7), have caused extensive damage over large areas. The two largest earthquakes in California, the 1857 Fort Tejon Earthquake and the famous 1906 San Francisco Earthquake were similar in magnitude (M7.9 and M7.8 respectively) and resulted from movement along the San Andreas Fault. Earthquakes of this size (M7.7 to M7.9) can cause more extensive damage over a larger area than the M7.1 to M7.4 earthquakes that have struck California in recent decades. 1994 M6.4 Northridge Earthquake The most recent earthquake to greatly affect the City of Los Angeles was the Northridge Earthquake on January 17, 1994. It was the first earthquake to strike directly under an urban area in the nation since 1933 on a fault that was not previously known. Even though the Northridge Earthquake was a moderate quake, it is the most costly seismic event in the United States since the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake (see Table B-4 for detailed losses). The infrastructure of the metropolitan area was severely disrupted. Freeways collapsed, the power systems for the City and linked communities as far away as Oregon were temporarily "blacked out" and communications were disrupted. Due to abatement measures, planning, training and inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional coordination, response was much more efficient than in 1971 following the San Fernando quake. Stronger building codes and required retrofitting following the San Fernando quake contributed 38

to a reduction in damage to structures and buildings and resulted in better containment of hazardous materials in the 1994 quake. Coordinated response resulted in: rapid identification of damage sites, extinguishing of fires and addressing of fire hazards, administering to the injured and displaced often from battle-field like temporary facilities, and initiation of work to restore the disrupted cities and region. Closure of businesses, disruption of services and dislocation of people had a significant domino effect on the regional, state and national economy. The economic impact would have been greater had the quake been more severe or had the disruption of the infrastructure continued for a longer period of time. Social Losses
57 people died 8,000 people injured 1,567 people hospitalized

Structural Damage
92,000+ buildings damaged 25,000 Uninhabitable Dwellings 7,000 Buildings red-tagged (Structure is severely damaged; "unsafe" to occupy) 22,000 Buildings yellowtagged (moderately damaged structure; "limited use"/"restricted use") 9 Hospitals closed (2,500 beds lost) 9 Parking garages collapsed Portions of 11 major roads into Los Angeles had to close 2 Bridges on the I-10 Santa Monica Freeway collapsed 3 Bridges on Route 118 Simi Valley Freeway collapsed 2 Bridges on I-5 at the 14 interchange collapsed 2 Bridges (Gavin Canyon Bridges) on I-5 collapsed

Economic Losses
$1.4 billion damage to residential structures $ 0.5 billion damage to commercial structures $800 million in damage to public infrastructure and related emergency response costs $6.5 billion direct loss to the primary insurance industry (A.M. Best 7/94) $20+ billion direct economic loss including private property damage $500 mill to 1.2 bill recovery assistance funding shortfalls

22,000 people homeless

21 ,000 vacated residential structures 22,000 people were left homeless

Total Direct and Indirect Costs: $44 Billion in damage $30 Billion received in federal and private insurance funds $800 Billion replacement value on taxable property Structural

Table B-4. Summary of losses from the 1994 Northridge Earthquake.

It is possible that because the Northridge Earthquake occurred at 4:31 a.m. on the Martin Luther King Jr. national holiday, there was relatively low loss of life and human injury. A low number of commuters were traveling on the freeways and streets and few people were in 39

offices, industrial, commercial buildings, public garages and shopping centers, many of which suffered severe structural and non-structural damage. Officially lasting approximately 30 seconds, and with a magnitude measuring M6.7, this earthquake caused significant damage to some buildings in every area of the City. Of the 57 fatalities attributed to this quake, more than 25 percent (16 people) died as a result of the collapse of a single structure, the Northridge Meadows apartment building. The Northridge Earthquake was one of the most measured earthquakes in history. New information called into question traditional theories about land use siting and existing building code provisions. The intensity of ground motion caused by this earthquake was measured throughout southern California with among the highest readings 1.82 g, recorded near the Ventura Freeway in the Tarzana area. Ground motions as strong as 1.21 g were measured as far away as Inglewood (approximately 25 miles from Northridge). One g of ground motion is strong enough to make unsecured buildings or vehicles literally hop off the ground. According to the scientists of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC) presenting before the City Council's Ad Hoc Committee on Earthquake Recovery, the Northridge Earthquake raised the mountains by as much as 70 cm. The fault, which was previously unknown, appears to be truncated by the fault that broke in the similarly sized 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, the two faults abutting at 8 km depth. The Northridge Earthquake caused many times more damage than the 1971 event primarily because its causative fault is directly under the densely populated valley, whereas the 1971 fault lies under the mountains. The earthquake showed that thrust faults concealed below Los Angeles present a threat to the region approaching that posed by the San Andreas Fault. Ground failure induced by shaking can be as extensive as that caused by direct faulting, and the system of concealed faults under Los Angeles is more complex than previously thought. Non-ductile reinforced concrete buildings built before the mid-1970s behaved poorly with partial collapses of a multi-story medical clinic and a mall, both high-occupancy structures during business hours. Wood frame buildings, both old and new, showed deficiencies. Inadequate bracing in parking areas in the ground story of multi-story residential structures caused some ground story collapses and the deaths of people at one apartment complex. Five of the seven freeway bridges that collapsed were constructed of typically reinforced concrete box girders supported on reinforced concrete columns. The five were of pre-1971 non-ductile design and had been scheduled for retrofitting, and the other two dated to the mid1970s and were of better design. The significant fracturing of welds in steel frame buildings was unexpected because of the ductibility of steel. Many aspects of the problem, including proper repair strategies, remain to be resolved. Non-structural damage to furnishings, storage racks, ceilings, glass, piping and equipment was extensive, and as dangerous as and far more expensive than structural damage. Several 40

hospitals, which are designed for higher seismic forces than ordinary buildings, were forced to close solely because of non-structural damage. Schools suffered as much non-structural damage, and falling lights would have claimed lives had schools been in session. USGS and SCEC point out that current structural design practice has tended to focus solely on avoiding structural collapse. Engineers need to devise methods for limiting damage that can be offered as design options. Encouraging simple, cost effective mitigation among the public, such as securing computers, water pipes, ceiling tile and bookcases, could save billions of dollars in future earthquakes. The mitigation strategies for the heavily populated Los Angeles area should: recognize that large earthquakes in the urban areas are not very rare events; predict the effects of these earthquakes; and design buildings and response strategies that adequately account for these effects. While many in the earthquake engineering profession were not surprised by the type of damage seen, the general public was shocked by its extent and severity. It is not generally understood that many older buildings have not been strengthened to current code requirements, and that the goal of most current code requirements for new buildings is to prevent loss of life in an earthquake, not to protect the investment in a structure or its contents. Further, there are no requirements for privately owned buildings to be retrofitted to current standards, other than some municipal requirements to improve the earthquake resistance of old unreinforced masonry buildings. However, seismic strengthening and risk-reduction programs proved very effective, both in saving lives and in maintaining business operations. Several large companies that had strengthened their buildings beforehand had minimal business interruption and avoided substantial losses, potentially totaling in the hundreds of millions of dollars in some cases. Several levels of earthquake resistance may be codified that are intended to give engineers and owners the opportunity to design a structure to ensure usability after an earthquake. In addition to reducing or eliminating business interruption, these higher levels of resistance will also provide an extra margin of life safety. In metropolitan Tokyo, a similar earthquake would subject a far greater number of buildings than those in the San Fernando Valley due to very high accelerations, possibly accelerations well beyond those used by Japanese building codes for new construction. Much of the new construction in Japan is structural steel and is expected to perform reasonably well. However, Tokyo also has tens of thousands of older, reinforced concrete buildings much like the older concrete buildings that collapsed in the San Fernando Valley. Further, much of Tokyo, and particularly much of the industry that encircles the waterfronts along Tokyo Bay, is built on soft soil and fill. Many of these soft soils and landfills will dramatically amplify the ground motion and are likely to fail through liquefaction. Discrepancies in damage numbers may be observed among reports of different agencies as compared to this document due to the effective date of the database used for analysis, since 41

those numbers are continually revised by Building and Safety. Local losses from the Northridge Earthquake are outlined in the following tables at the Council District level.

Estimated damages by Council District Total Number Dollar Losses Residential 86,457 1,150,939,340 Commercial 6,236 459,955,246 Mix Use 224 7,568,900 Total 92,917 1,618,463,486 Structure by Council District Total Number Dollar Losses Estimated Repair Costs ($) 86,457 1,150,939,340 467,487,925 6,236 459,955,246 107,596,142

Apartment Condominium

B.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Earthquake Hazard

Approaches to Earthquake Hazard Analysis There are two analytical approaches to earthquake hazard analysis: deterministic and probabilistic. The traditional approach has been deterministic. For this method, seismic parameters are determined for a given site based on the size of the maximum credible earthquakes expected on selected active and potentially active faults in the area. This approach, therefore, gives the worst-case scenario. This method does not take into account at all the likelihood of a maximum credible earthquake occurring. Although the worst-case results of a deterministic analysis may be difficult to apply in real world planning situations, this method has been favored in the past because it is straightforward, disregarding uncertainties inherent to seismic parameters addressed in a probability analysis. The probabilistic method addresses the questions of how often and how strongly the ground will shake when considering all possible earthquakes in the area. For a probabilistic analysis, the maximum probable earthquake is arbitrarily defined as an earthquake that may occur within 100 years. In certain cases, however, it may be important to use a time period of say 30 to 50 years to best represent the designed lifetime or importance of the structure being considered. Structural engineers and planners use the results of such a probabilistic analysis to define the level of ground motion acceptable (risk is implicit) for a given structure. Critical facilities can then be designed or retrofitted for that ground motion level which, within economic reason, best approximates the strongest predicted ground motion. The results of the probabilistic method can only be considered realistic if the return period of earthquakes of different magnitudes on potentially causative faults is known with sufficient certainty. Assessment Methodologies Two methodologies were utilized in the development of the Citys Local Hazard Mitigation Plan to assess the Citys vulnerability to earthquake events, and to estimate potential losses. The 42

Alquist-Priolo earthquake methodology identifies vulnerabilities based on the potential for ground surface rupture. Municipalities in California are required by state law to incorporate Alquist-Priolo analysis into planning and building codes. A more recently-developed methodology called HAZUS was also used. HAZUS analysis provides estimates of peak ground acceleration (PGA) based on historic events and soil types. While the two methodologies produce differing estimates of damage due to earthquakes, both are useful for hazard mitigation planning. Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act Seismic hazard maps prepared by the State Geologist pursuant to the Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act of 1972, subsequently amended (Public Resources Code Sections 2621-2630, originally known as the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zones Act) and the Seismic Hazard Mapping Act of 1990, subsequently amended (Public Resources Code Sections 2690-2699.6 and 3720-3725). The Alquist-Priolo Act was established as a direct result of the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake. It requires that the State Geologist map active faults throughout the State. The purpose of this act is to prohibit the location of most structures for human occupancy across the traces of active faults and to mitigate thereby the hazard of fault rupture. The Hazard Mapping Act requires the State Geologist to map areas subject to amplified ground shaking (or conditions which have potential for amplified ground shaking), liquefaction and landslide hazard areas. Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, the hazard mapping program was revised and accelerated. Local jurisdictions are required by the Mapping Act to conduct additional studies and appropriate mitigation measures for development projects in areas identified as potential hazard areas by the maps. Seismic risk hazard assessment using Alquist-Priolo Special Studies has been used to identify vulnerable structures within the city. Figure B-1 illustrates Critical Response Facilities identified in the seismic hazard areas. A detailed inventory of city facilities is presented in Appendix D. Information attained from this analysis is used to enhance seismic hazard mitigation via landuse planning.

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Figure B-2. Seismic hazard map based on Alquist-Priolo rupture hazard. Critical Response Facilities within City of Los Angeles are identified in the seismic hazard area.

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Figure B-3. Critical Response Infrastructure identified in the Liquefaction Hazard Area. Liquefaction data provided by the USGS.

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HAZUS Analysis HAZUS-MH is a GIS-based regional loss estimation tool developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS). The primary purpose of HAZUS-MH is to provide loss estimates for earthquake, hurricane and flood hazards. These loss estimates are used by local governments to plan for mitigation of the effects of natural hazards and to prepare for emergency response and recovery. The analysis provides estimates of damage to assets including buildings, lifeline infrastructure, and critical facilities. The analysis also provides estimates of human casualties. HAZUS contains a catalog of historical earthquake epicenters. The historical epicenter catalog was developed based on information from the CNSS Worldwide Earthquake Catalog (now ANSS), the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) database, and the Earthquake Seismicity Catalog Volume 1 (NOAA/USGS). A HAZUS Risk Assessment Report prepared by the Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC)-under contract to City of Los Angeles- includes a comprehensive inventory of structures, facilities and infrastructure. However, this information is too voluminous to include in this document, but is available at the offices of the Citys Emergency Management Department. The HAZUS analysis reported in this Plan included two scenarios - 100-year return and 500-year return. The analysis incorporates the effects of soil types on estimated Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA). A disadvantage of using HAZUS is that the infrastructure inventory is not detailed at the local level. LA EMD is currently updating the HAZUS inventory at the city level. An improved Level -2 HAZUS-MH earthquake risk assessment is currently being conducted by City of Los Angeles EMD with a projected time of completion of Fall 2011. Findings from this assessment should be available by the next LHMP update. B.2.1 Identifying Assets Critical Response Facilities (listed below) are identified in the earthquake hazard and liquefaction maps: Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals City Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities) Critical Infrastructure Facilities in the City consist of the following facilities: Utility Infrastructure Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) 46

Comment [i2]: Not on the map

Electric Power System (Power plants, substations, major transmission lines) Wastewater System (Treatment plants, major interceptor sewer lines) Oil Refineries Natural Gas System Communication System

Transportation Infrastructure Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities Potable Water and Power Facilities Maps The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals. GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from CalEMA Mitigation Officer. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Earthquake Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. The City of Los Angeles has received maps of these facilities from the California Energy Commission (CEC) with the agreement that the maps will not be made available to the public. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by The Gas Company; therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Earthquake Zone The Communication System (Telephone system) in the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private providers. This information, like that of electricity, water, and natural gas, is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since are not disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned.

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Department of Water and Power History with Earthquakes As characteristic of most institutions in the City, earthquakes have affected DWP more than any other hazard. In 1933, the Long Beach Earthquake near the DWP Seal Beach Power Plant caused major damage to that facility. In 1971, the San Fernando Earthquake struck the northern edge of the San Fernando Valley causing power outages to approximately 636,000 customers at 6:01 A.M. on February 9 until the evening of February 11. Capital losses to Power System facilities were estimated at $25.4 million, which was concentrated in the Sylmar area. The Whittier Narrows Earthquake of October 1, 1987 affected approximately 264,800 DWP customers for up to an hour. An aftershock on October 4, 1987 affected a much smaller number of customers for up to an hour and forty-two minutes. A subsequent fire in a transformer that had internal damage from these earthquakes caught on fire on October 6, 1987, affecting an additional 37,000 customers in the downtown area for up to nine hours and twenty-two minutes. Except for the transformer, the damages to Power System equipment and facilities were minimal. On June 28, 1992, the Landers Earthquake of Magnitude 7.3 struck Yucca Valley in the Mojave Desert. Southern California, in general, along with the City of Los Angeles, experienced long, rolling, earthquake ground motions that caused faulting in many distribution lines and interrupted approximately 308,000 customers for up to twenty hours and forty minutes. Other than the distribution lines, this earthquake caused very little damage to the Power System infrastructure. The Northridge Earthquake struck with a Magnitude 6.7 event on January 17, 1994. During the Northridge Earthquake, DWP suffered significant damage and service interruption. For the very first time the City experienced a complete blackout of its 1.36 million customers. Approximately 93% of those customers were restored within 24 hours, all but the last 15,000 were restored within 48 hours, and less than 100 remained out of service for seven days. The Power System cost to restore damaged capital assets from this earthquake was estimated to be $138.44 million. Additional cost to mitigate against future earthquakes was estimated to be $77 million. Other Power System costs included additional fuel purchases ($9.9 million over expected fuel usage) and lost revenue (estimated at $34 million) due to customers that were unable to get or take power in the first six months following the event. Critical Operating Facilities in the Earthquake Zone Critical operation facilities in the City of Los Angeles are identified as the Big Nine Buildings. Phase II facilities and Information Technology Agency (ITA) Department are City facilities critical for continuity of government following a major disaster. These facilities house City Departments and staff critical in continuing government operations. Big Nine Facilities contain the largest number of departments and staff within them. Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA City facilities do not contain staff from proprietary departments such as the Department of Water and Power, Harbor Department, or the Los Angeles World Airports. Proprietary departments generate their own revenue but are still owned by the City. These Facilities are included under Critical Utility and Critical Transportation Facilities Sections (see previous section). Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA facilities are considered general fund departments. For the purpose of this report, only Big Nine buildings and proprietary department facilities are considered critical operating facilities. The names of these Big Nine facilities are listed below: 48

LA City Hall City Hall South City Hall East City Commercial Offices (Personnel) Piper Tech Parker Center San Pedro Municipal Building Marvin Braude Building West L.A. Municipal Building

B.2.2 Estimating Losses Alquist-Priolo Study Area While all of City of Los Angeles is exposed to an earthquake hazard, the following section summarizes losses based on structures exposed to Alquist-Priolo Special Study area. A summary of the assets exposed to seismic hazard is presented in table B-1. A detailed building inventory exposed to seismic hazard is presented in Appendix D.

Table B-1. City facilities associated with Earthquake Hazard in City of Los Angeles. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Special Earthquake Study Area Liquefaction Number Total Replacement Number Total Replacement Costs (million) Big Nine 1 15.8 8 738 Critical Response Fire* 13 286 36 792 Police** 3 120 8 320 Hospitals 2 N/A 9 N/A Schools 143 N/A 190 N/A Rec & Parks 52 TBD 47 TBD Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 118,778 18,552 --Commercial 32,330 18,819 --*Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard Fire Station in City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station.

Hospitals in the Earthquake Study Area - Asset Values Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of hospitals located in the City; however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific

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asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Evacuation Centers (Schools) in the Earthquake Study Area - Asset Values Schools are considered the responsibility of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a special jurisdiction. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of schools; however, the City does have a mutual agreement with LAUSD to use schools as evacuation centers when they are needed. Specific asset value information related to LAUSD schools may be available from the LAUSD Hazard Mitigation Plan. Water (Potable) & Power Infrastructure - Alquist-Priolo Study Zone Area DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities due to security concerns. The GIS Maps to match up with this numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. It also includes the individual property values (replacement values) for facilities along with a total value amount for facilities falling in the various hazard zones (See Appendix D). Power Facilities (Including Contents) PERTY VALUE Damage to the identified Water System facilities can severely impact the quality and quantity of water and its distribution. Following is a summary of the consequences resulting from damage to DWP facilities falling within the identified hazard zone areas (See Appendix D). Water Quantity Interruption of water service can significantly impact public health, sanitation, business operations, and reduce the Citys ability to fight structure fires and wildland fires. Water Quality Degradation of water quality for consumption can pose a significant threat to the health and safety of the people of Los Angeles. Water quality can become degraded due to damages to the water treatment, filtration and distribution system or by the introduction of toxic substances to reservoirs or other water system facilities. Public safety can also be impacted by interruptions in water distribution services. Damage to the identified Power System facilities can produce insufficient quantities of power if a source and distribution infrastructure is impaired or destroyed. As a result, public safety (e.g., law enforcement, fire suppression, traffic control); communication systems (e.g., telephone, radio and data); public information sources (e.g., commercial television and radio); water and natural gas delivery systems, storm water and sewage treatment systems; and public health (e.g., hospitals and convalescent homes, life support for patients outside of medical facilities) could all be directly impacted throughout the City. Insufficient quantities of power can also cause damage to generation and transmission stations, and to consumer electrical equipment.
Comment [i3]: Enter new values

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Estimated Losses - Residential and Commercial Structures Table B-1 displays the estimated losses for residential and commercial structures in the Earthquake Hazard Zone (Alquist-Priolo). Both the number of structures likely to be affected and the estimated dollar losses are shown.

B.2.3 Estimating Losses - HAZUS Analysis Estimates based on SCEC HAZUS risk assessment for City of Los Angeles are methodology are presented in this section. Estimates from City of Los Angeles EMD HAZUS Risk Assessment will be available in future plan updates. Introduction This section presents the results of the HAZUS analysis for a 100-year return event, i.e., an earthquake. HAZUS analysis estimates of aggregate total replacement costs of damaged buildings Building Inventory Table B-2 provides detailed information about City of Los Angeles building stock by occupancy.
Total Building inventory by General Occupancy Number of Buildings Building Value Content Value (thousand) (million) (million) Residential 708.06 159,499 79,750 Commercial 14.54 32,343 33,913 Industrial 1.65 5,096 7,310 Agricultural 0.04 152 152 Religious 0.63 1,711 1,711 Government 0.34 376 409 Education 0.07 1,017 1,209 Total 725.34 200,194 124,453 Table B-2. Total Building inventory for City of Los Angeles reported by General Occupancy in SCEC earthquake risk assessment. Occupancy

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Lifeline Inventory Within HAZUS, the lifeline inventory is divided between transportation and utility lifeline systems. There are seven (7) transportation systems that include highways, railways, light rail, bus, ferry, ports and airports. There are six (6) utility systems that include potable water, natural gas, crude & refined oil, electric power and communications. The lifeline inventory data is presented in Tables B-3 and B-4 below.
Transportation System Lifeline Inventory Estimated Current Replacement Value Economic Loss Value Million Highway N/A 9,395.01 -Railway N/A 418.75 -Light Rail N/A 130.05 -Bus N/A 16.72 -Ferry N/A 0 -Port N/A 231.52 -Airport N/A 312.69 -Total -10,504.73 -Table B-3. Summary of transportation system inventory taken from HAZUS risk assessment report prepared by SCEC for City of Los Angeles. System

System Potable Water Waste Water Natural Gas Oil systems Electrical Power Communication Total

Utility System Lifeline Inventory Estimated Current Replacement Value Value (million) N/A 433.80 N/A 613.98 N/A 96.22 N/A 1.30 N/A 1,038 N/A 2.48 -2,186.12

Economic Loss 230.87 255.36 119.58 0.44 320.27 1.02 927.55

Table B-4. Summary of utility system inventory taken from HAZUS risk assessment report prepared by SCEC for City of Los Angeles.

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Damage to Essential Facilities Essential facilities include hospitals, schools, fire stations, police stations and emergency operations facilities. High potential loss facilities include dams, levees, military installations, nuclear power plants and hazardous material sites. Table B-5 presents a summary of the number of hospitals, emergency response facilities and schools that are in the City and their replacement value.
Building Damage for Essential Facilities (number) Classification None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total Hospitals 7.20 20.59 14.71 2.36 0.13 45 Fire Stations 7.42 24.91 18.84 2.32 0.50 54 Police Stations 4.15 14.48 11.50 1.52 0.34 32 EOCs 0 0 0 0 0 0 Schools 243.85 303.06 370.30 99.70 17.80 1,035 Total 262.63 363.04 415.35 105.91 18.76 1166 Table B-5. Summary of building damage for essential facilities taken from HAZUS risk assessment report prepared by SCEC for City of Los Angeles.

Building Damage The following section depicts the estimated number of buildings that would be damaged in a 100-year return event and the resulting economic losses
Occupancy Residential Commercial Industrial Agricultural Religious Government Education Total None 310.56 4.48 0.44 0.03 0.22 0.12 0.03 315.88 Building Damage by General Occupancy Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 269.97 111.41 12.91 3.21 3.77 4.16 1.72 0.40 0.39 0.51 0.24 0.06 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 <0.01 274.43 116.36 14.97 3.70 Total 708.06 14.54 1.65 0.04 0.63 0.34 0.07 725.34

Economic Loss by General Occupancy (million) Occupancy Residential Commercial Industrial Agricultural Religious Government Education Total Structural 1,256.87 786.60 115.30 5.07 34.39 6.70 12.16 2,217.10 Nonstructural 7,070.24 2,227.87 327.61 4.27 110.15 23.36 59.23 9,867.72 Content Loss 1,962.47 1,033.05 250.63 3.32 49.94 10.47 30.43 3,340.31 Business Interruption 665.80 1,744 95.02 0.87 15.23 9.71 8.11 2,539.38 Total 10,955.38 5,792.17 833.5666 13.53 209.71 50.24 109.93 17,964.52

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Economic Loss to Lifelines For the transportation and utility lifeline systems, HAZUS computes the direct repair cost for each component. HAZUS does not compute business interruption losses due to lifeline outages. Table B-8 provides a breakdown of the expected lifeline losses. Transportation System Losses Replacement Economic Value* Loss* Highway 9,395.01 587.60 Railway 418.75 40.63 Light Rail 130.05 0.07 Bus 16.72 7.22 Ferry 0 0 Port 231.52 91.03 Airport 312.69 6.47 TOTAL 10,504.73 733.03 System
*numbers in trillions Table B-8. Summary of transportation system losses taken from HAZUS risk assessment report prepared by SCEC for City of Los Angeles.

Casualty Estimates Casualty estimates are provided for three (3) times of day: 2:00 AM, 2:00 PM, and 5:00 PM. These times represent the periods of the day that different sectors of the community are at their peak occupancy loads. HAZUS estimates the number of people that will be injured and killed by the earthquake event. The casualties are broken down into four (4) severity levels that describe the extent of the injuries. The levels are described as follows:
Severity Level 1: Injuries will require medical attention but hospitalization not needed Severity Level 2: Injuries will require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening Severity Level 3: Injuries will require hospitalization and can become life-threatening Severity Level 4: Victims are killed by the earthquake Casualty Estimates 2 AM 2 PM 5 PM Level 1 17,406.99 24,832.73 21,565.13 Level 2 3,750.66 6,806.83 6,232.49 Level 3 385.91 1,086.83 1,843.33 Level 4 722.45 2,067.54 1,763.76

B.3 Analysis of Future Development

The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to 54

earthquake hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates.

C. PROFILE OF TERRORISM HAZARD

Terrorism is the use of fear for intimidation, usually for political goals. Terrorism is a crime where the threat of violence is often as effective as the commission of the violent act itself. Terrorism affects us through fear, physical injuries, economic losses, psychological trauma, and erosion of faith in governments. Terrorism is not an ideology; it is a strategy used by individuals or groups to achieve their political goals. Terrorism was identified as High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles, with a risk rating of 20. Terrorists espouse a wide range of causes. They can be for or against almost any issue, religious belief, political position, or group of people of one national origin or another. Because of the tremendous variety of causes supported by terrorists and the wide variety of potential targets, there is no place that is truly safe from terrorism. Throughout California there are a nearly limitless number of potential targets, depending on the perspective of the terrorist. Some of these targets include: abortion clinics, religious facilities, government offices, public places (such as shopping centers), schools, power plants, refineries, utility infrastructures, water storage facilities, dams, private homes, prominent individuals, financial institutions and other businesses.

C.1 Identifying Terrorism Hazard The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Domestic terrorism is defined as the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States without foreign direction, and whose acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or the general populace, in the furtherance of political or social goals. International terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Potential Threat Element (PTE) refers to any group or individual in which there are allegations or information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature. [Note: this definition provides sufficient cause for the FBI to initiate an investigation.]

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Weapons of mass destruction are defined as an actual or imminent set of conditions in which radiological materials (nuclear), biological, or chemical agents are introduced by any means into an area. It is referred to as NBC (nuclear-biological-chemical) or also known as CBRNE (chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear-explosives). Formal definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Title 18 USC section 2332a) is: (1) Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity; (2)(a) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, or a missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; (b) poison gas; (c) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (d) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. The following table is a summary list of biological and chemical agents.

Weapon Type Biological

Category Pathogens: disease-causing organisms

Classification/Definition Class A: easily disseminated or transmitted person to person; high mortality rate; major public health impact; can cause public panic and social disruption Class B: moderately easy to disseminate; low morality rate; can cause moderate health issues Class C: can be engineered for mass dissemination in the future due to availability, ease of production, and dissemination; potential for high mortality rate and public health impact Chemicals that attack the nervous system Chemicals that are absorbed into the blood stream Chemicals that severely blister the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin on contact Chemicals that cause severe irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract (lining of the nose, throat and lungs) Drugs that make people unable to think clearly, can cause altered state of consciousness and/or possibly unconsciousness

Examples Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Smallpox, Tularemia, Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Ricin, Q-Fever, Food-borne Threats (E-coli/Salmonella) Yellow Fever, Hantavirus

Toxins: poisonous substances produced by living organisms Chemical Nerve Agents Blood Agents

Sarin, Soman, Tabun, VX Arsine, Cyanogen Chloride, Hydrogen Cyanide, Potassium Cyanide Mustards, Lewisite, Phosgene Oxime Ammonia, Phosgene, Hydrogen chloride BZ, Fentanyls, Tear Gas

Blister Agents Choking Agents

Incapacitating Agents

C.1.1 Increasing Threat The terrorist events of September 11, 2001, in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania marked a dramatic escalation toward more destructive terrorist tactics. These 56

incidents, coupled with a series of anthrax-related incidents in late 2001, are indicative of the increasing threat of terrorists using various forms of WMD to target the United States. Further, since September 11, there has been an escalation of hoaxes involving the use of chemical, nuclear, or biological agents perpetrated by individual(s) and/or terrorist groups wishing to instill fear and disrupt communities within the United States. While a conventional attack using bombs/explosive devices has been terrorists weapon of choice domestically, recent events indicate that yesterdays bomb threats have evolved into sophisticated use of highly volatile and exotic biological, chemical, or radiological materials. With the threat of domestic WMD terrorist attacks on the rise, there is a demanding need for evaluating jurisdictional threat data to better identify potential terrorist targets and likely WMD hazards. The following highlights the increasing threat of terrorist attacks prior to and post 9/11 in chronological order: i. ii. February 1993 - The presence of sodium cyanide residues in the debris of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City; February 1995 - Plot to use synthesized ricin by a Minnesota anti-government tax protest group whose members were convicted in 1995 of violating the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act; March 1995 - Sarin gas attack followed by an attempted hydrogen-cyanide assault in May by a Japanese cult on the Tokyo subway system; April 1995 - Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City; December 1995 - Nuclear terrorism surfaced in Moscow when Chechen separatists placed radiological waste in Moscow public parks to further their cause; August 1998 - U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; October 2000 - Suicide attack on the Naval destroyer, USS Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen; September 2001 - Anthrax-tainted letters distributed through the U.S. Postal System; March 2004 - Madrid bombings involving 10 bombs, 4 trains in 3 stations; August 2004 - Bombing of the two Russian aircraft by Chechen separatists; July 2005 - London bombings by home-grown terrorists.

iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. x. xi.

Recent events make WMD/NBC/CBRNE emergencies a plausible scenario necessitating detailed contingency planning and preparation of emergency responders in order to protect the civilian populace in major urban centers such as Los Angeles. The WMD/NBC/CBRNE threat to the public and emergency responders is real. It is no longer a question of if it will happen, it already has happened. The real question is when and where the next incident will occur. 57

C.1.2 Description of Terrorism Hazard The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of crisis and consequence management function and technical expertise across all levels of government. No single Federal, State, or local government agency has the capability or requisite authority to respond independently and mitigate the consequences of such a threat to national security. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, each of which may be a disaster scene, hazardous scene and/or a crime scene simultaneously. As in all incidents, terrorism incidents may involve mass casualties and damaged buildings or other types of property. However, there are several factors surrounding terrorism incidents that are unlike any other type of incidents that must be taken into consideration when planning a response: 1. First responders ability to identify aspects of the incident, such as signs and symptoms exhibited by victims, number of victims involved, scope of the incident, and etc. Reporting these factors accurately will be crucial in maximizing the use of critical but limited local resources, responding effectively and appropriately, and for triggering a State/Federal response. 2. Most chemical and biological agents are not detected by methods used for explosives and firearms, and can be carried in containers that look like ordinary items. They can be easily obtained for cost-effective mass production and dissemination to produce the maximum result. 3. The situation may not be recognizable until there are multiple casualties and/or unusual number of cases including: a large number of ill persons with similar disease or syndrome; large number of unexplained disease, symptoms or deaths; higher morbidity and mortality rate than expected with a common disease or symptoms; disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution, and etc1. Further, because agents are not readily identifiable, first responders may be at a higher risk or exposure to contaminants. 4. There may be multiple events, causing one event in an attempt to influence another event's outcome, such as, the use of secondary devices, releases or explosions, specifically targeting first responders to interfere with their response efforts.

1 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, CDC: The Public Health Response to Biological & Chemical Terrorism, Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials, July 2001.

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5. The location of the incident will be treated as a crime scene, as such, preservation and collection of evidence will be critical. Therefore, it is important to ensure that actions on-scene are coordinated between response organizations to minimize any conflicts between law enforcement authorities, who view the incident as a crime scene, and other life and safety responders, who view it as a hazardous materials or disaster scene. 6. Contamination of critical facilities and large geographic areas may result. Victims may carry an agent unknowingly to public transportation facilities, businesses, residences, doctor's offices, walk-in medical clinics, or emergency rooms because they don't realize that they are contaminated. First responders may unknowingly carry the agent to fire stations, hospitals, or to the locations of subsequent calls. 7. The scope of the incident may expand geometrically and exponentially, affecting various mutual aid jurisdictions. Airborne agents flow with the air current, and may disseminate via ventilation (HVAC) systems compromising sheltering-in-place efforts. Externally, these agents are subject to Mother Natures whim and are carried away to spread outwardly from the initial hot zone. . 8. There will be a stronger reaction from the public than with other types of incidents because the thought of exposure to a chemical or biological agent, or radiation evokes terror in most people. The psychological impact, the fear of the unknown intensifies the public's response to dangerous agents. 9. Time is working against responding elements. The incident can expand geometrically and exponentially without any warning. Although time and distance help lessen the exposure to radiological fallout, some radiation exposure can have delayed effects. The effects of some chemical and biological agents worsen over time. These factors include modes of transmission direct or indirect contact transmission (inhalation, digestion, or dermal), incubation period of the disease organism, and access to medical treatment. Critical resources and support facilities, such as utility stations and 9-1-1 centers, along with critical infrastructures, are at risk as potential targets. In addition, the overwhelmed local and State response capabilities will be compounded by the influx of worried well seeking refuge and medical attention. C.1.3 Background of Terrorism Hazard in Los Angeles I. Hawaiian Airlines Delayed After Bomb Threat, September 16, 2010:

A Hawaiian Airlines flight was delayed for nearly two hours on September 16, after someone phoned in a bomb threat. The LAPD bomb squad and a canine team searched the plane, which was due to leave LAX for Honolulu at 6 PM with 225 people onboard. The Boeing 767 was carefully inspected, and passengers and luggage were re-screened. 59

The flight took off after 8 PM. The investigation into the threat against Flight 9 is ongoing. II. Federal Authorities Investigate Threat on Thai Airways Flight at LAX, September 7, 2010: Law enforcement authorities were investigating a written threat that was found on a Thai Airways aircraft that landed at Los Angeles International Airport on September 7. After landing shortly before 9 PM, Flight 794 was taken to a remote area of the airport, where crew members and passengers were scheduled to be interviewed. Bomb technicians searched the plane and authorities planned to screen the luggage. The flight originated in Bangkok, Thailand. No other details are available. III. LAX Terminal Evacuated on False Report of Explosives, June 19, 2010: A man falsely claimed to be carrying an explosive at Los Angeles International Airport prompted the closure of the Tom Bradley Terminal before police shot him with a stun gun and took him into custody. The incident, which occurred around 5 PM, began when the suspect grabbed a passengers luggage outside of the terminal, ran inside and claimed the package contained a bomb, according to Los Angeles Airport Police. The terminal was evacuated for 20 minutes as officers pursued the man inside the facility. The package he was carrying did not contain explosives. IV. Attempted Arson, September 16, 2005:

On September 16, 2005, fire officials responded to a fire at the high-rise condominium home of the director of Los Angeles Animal Services, after residents observed smoke coming from a recyclables/janitorial closet. First responders recovered an improvised incendiary device consisting of a four-inch-long tube labeled TOXIC and using a cigarette as a fuse. The device, which had been placed next to a stack of newspapers in the recyclables/janitorial closet, had malfunctioned and only scorched the concrete floor of the closet. The Animal Liberation Front claimed responsibility for this incident. V. Attempted Arson, July 7, 2005:

In the early morning of July 7, 2005, fire officials responded to a vehicle fire in the driveway of a private residence in Los Angeles, California. In extinguishing the fire, authorities recovered a partially melted, plastic gasoline container from behind the vehicles left front wheel. The car belonged to a representative for the Animal Care Technicians Union, which represents employees for the Los Angeles Animal Services (LAAS). LAAS and its affiliates have been targeted by local animal rights extremists, and the LAAS union representative had been placed on a targets list of individuals profiled by extremists for direct actions. The incident remains under investigation. 60

VI.

Disruption of Plot to Attack Military and Jewish Targets, July 5, 2005:

On July 5, 2005, officers with the Torrance Police Department arrested Levar Washington and Gregory Patterson during a commercial armed robbery in progress at a Los Angeles area gas station. Their arrest, and subsequent local and FBI investigation, revealed that Washington and Patterson were conducting the armed robberies to raise money for an alleged terrorist plot targeting U.S. military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Jewish synagogues in the greater Los Angeles area. FBI investigation determined that Washington and Patterson were part of a Muslim convert organization, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (Authentic Assembly of Islam) or JIS, allegedly founded in prison by inmate Kevin James in 1997. The FBI identified James, Washington, Patterson all U.S. citizens and Hammad Samana, a Permanent Resident Alien of Pakistani origin, as the primary members of JIS. Samana was arrested on August 1, 2005. On August 31, 2005, a federal grand jury in Santa Ana, California, indicted James, Washington, Patterson, and Samana for their alleged roles in the terrorist plot on charges of conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. government through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Washington, Patterson and Samana were also charged with conspiracy to kill members of the U.S. government uniformed services and conspiracy to kill foreign officials. Washington and Patterson were further charged with interference with commerce by robbery and using and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. VII. Vandalism & Destruction of Property, August 22, 2003

On August 22, 2003, individuals associated with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) carried out acts of vandalism in the Los Angeles, California area, damaging roughly 125 vehicles and one commercial building. Much of the damage was caused by spray-painted graffiti, although in two cases, individuals set fire to sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Some of the graffiti associated SUVs with terrorism. On April 18, 2005, William Jensen Cottrell was sentenced to eight years and four months in federal prison and fined $3.5 million for the incident. Two other suspects in the attack Tyler Johnson and Michie Oe remained at large at the end of 2005. VIII. Attack by Lone Gunman at LAX, July 2002: On July 4, 2002, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, a 41-year-old Egyptian citizen, opened fire with a .45 caliber handgun at Los Angeles International Airport while standing in line at the ticket counter of El Al. El Al is Israels national airline, renowned for its stringent security measures and safety record. Hadayet opened fire at those standing in the ticket line, killing two persons and wounding four others before an airline security officer shot him dead. Airport Police units were on scene, along with a U.S. Customs officer, the Los Angeles Police Department and Fire Department personnel. 61

The gunman opened fire around 11:30 AM inside the Tom Bradley International Terminal. The deceased victims were a 20-year-old female, an Israeli national, El Al ticket agent and a 46-year-old male diamond importer. Those injured included a 61year-old woman who was shot and wounded, a man who was pistol-whipped, and the El Al security chief who was stabbed in the back. Two other men at the airport were taken to hospitals for care. Ten passengers were at the counter checking in for a Los Angeles-Tel Aviv flight at the time of the shooting; eighty passengers were already on the plane. The FBI assumed the primary responsibility for the investigation due to the possible terrorist connection, and in March 2003, the attack was determined a terrorist crime, with the gunman acting alone and not part of an identified group. The LAX shooting took place on the first Independence Day holiday after the 9-11 terrorist attacks in 2001, when the police were at "maximum deployment" due to terrorism concerns. IX. Attempted Terrorist Attack on LAX, New Years Eve 2000:

Ahmed Ressam (aka "Abu Reda"; aka "Benni Antoine Noris") is an Algerian national and suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). On December 14, 1999, Ressam was stopped as he came across the U.S.-Canadian border into Washington State. He had a trunk filled with explosives and timing devices, and a plan to detonate a suitcase bomb at LAX. Ressam said he picked LAX because, it was sensitive politically and economically. He was arrested at Port Angeles, Washington. The French government contended he was a member of the Groupe Roubaix, a cell of the GIA which operated in and around the town of Roubaix, France. The cell was responsible for carrying out several violent attacks around the town in the mid-1990s until a shootout with an elite French police team left several members dead in 1996. He was tried, along with 23 others, in absentia by a French court for his role in this group, which funded Jihad groups in Bosnia and Afghanistan through a series of violent robberies. Ressam is also a possible suspect in the 1996 Port Royal bombing, a rushhour subway attack in Paris that killed four and injured 91 others. American authorities believe Ressam is an al-Qaeda associate, and had spent over a year in an Algerian prison for allegedly trafficking weapons to extremist groups in the early 1990s. Ressam was convicted in April 2001 of conspiring to bomb LAX during the millennium celebrations. He later cooperated with American authorities and testified against fellow conspirator Mokhtar Haouari. He was due to be sentenced in September 2001, but the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon delayed his sentencing to February 2002. At a Congressional Hearing on Oct. 17, 2002, then CIA Director, George Tenet 62

stated that the disrupted plot to bomb LAX had only been delayed and emphasized that al-Qaeda has a history of revisiting targets. X. Bomb Explosion at LAX, August 6, 1974:

The Los Angeles International Airport experienced the most destructive bomb ever to hit a U.S. air terminal on August 6, 1974. Two skycaps were killed and 36 others were injured, mostly passengers waiting to board flights to Hawaii and Asia. Seventeen were hospitalized, one in critical condition and two in serious condition. Police and Federal agents tried to determine the origin of the blast. Investigators said the force indicated an explosive charge equal to about eight pounds of dynamite. About 300 persons were in the area when the bomb went off in a section of the overseas terminal about 20 feet from the Pan American World Airways check-in counter. Investigators believed the bomb was left in one of the coin operated public lockers; perhaps by someone who intended to eventually carry it aboard a plane. The blast tore out sections of the concrete wall behind the lockers, hurled some of the lockers through the lobby, ripped into the ceiling shredded baggage and blew out the glass from the terminal. The dead were identified as Harper Glass, 64, of Inglewood, California, and Leonard Hsu, 46, of Lomita, California. William Sullivan, head of the Los Angeles FBI office, said whoever left the bomb there "may have wanted to take it on a plane. At this point in the terminal, you are not required to go through security yet, and he probably placed it here because he couldn't go out to the airplane with it." XI. The Los Angeles Times Building Bombing/Explosion, October 1, 1910:

During the tumultuous political climate of the early 1900s, the Los Angeles Times came under attack for pursuing a strong conservative anti-union viewpoint, and for using militant tactics against organized labor. On October 1, 1910, the Times Building was bombed in the middle of a strike called to unionize the metal trades of the City. The south wall facing Broadway Street collapsed, causing the second floor to also collapse under the weight of its machines onto the first floor. The first floor then collapsed into the basement, destroying the heating plant and gas mains. The building, with many of its workers trapped inside, was soon in inferno. There was a loss of life of at least 20, and about the same number were injured, some of them permanently. Those implicated in the bombing included Ortie McManigal, James B. McNamara, and his brother John J. McNamara (secretary-treasurer of the International Union of Bridge 63

and Structural Iron Workers). With McManigal testifying against the McNamara brothers, James McNamara got a life sentence, while his brother received a sentence of 15 years. Two others, David Caplan and Matt A. Schmidt, were later implicated and received life sentences.

C.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Terrorism Hazard

History demonstrates that devastating terrorist acts can occur on United States soil. Terrorist acts have inflicted thousands of fatalities and injuries, major property loss, and significant disruption to normal life-support systems and commerce. The City of Los Angeles is the second largest City in the United States and the largest City in the Western portion of the Country. For this reason, Los Angeles has been identified as a prime target for terrorism. Numerous high profile targets exist throughout the City making Los Angeles very vulnerable to an attack. Experiences in the City of Los Angeles and around the world show that the extent of casualties and damage caused by a major disaster is influenced by the following factors: a) Time and season of occurrence or incident; b) Weather/climate conditions; c) Severity of impact or disaster; d) Population density of the affected community; e) Possible secondary events (chemical spills, transportation accidents, fires, building collapse, etc.); f) Ability to collect, analyze and, if appropriate, respond to threats; g) Ability of emergency service providers to effectively respond and recover; h) Preparedness level of individuals, families and businesses; i) Pre-disaster mitigation strategy measures and adoption j) Building constructions/conditions It is not operationally, or economically feasible for any single government entity or private business to have sufficient resources to respond, in a timely way, to every request for emergency service in the aftermath of a major disaster. Emergency responders include all levels of local, state and federal government, the private sector, community-based organizations, and organized and spontaneous volunteers. Departments such as Police, Fire, Airports, Building and Safety, General Services, Harbor, Information Technology, Public Works, Transportation, Water and Power, and many others, play prominent roles in emergency response operations. However, every department, every employee is responsible for supporting the Citys response to, and recovery from a terrorist event. Effective emergency management requires the ability to bring all resources both public and private to appropriately address threat reduction and response needs. To effectively collect, 64

analyze and respond to intelligence regarding terrorist threats, and to efficiently deliver emergency response services if a disaster occurs, require interoperability. Interoperability goes beyond the ability of emergency responders to communicate with one another on a common radio; interoperability is an attitude, a culture that successfully empowers diverse agencies from every level of government and the private sector to proactively work together to meet public safety needs. True interoperability nurtures joint planning and training so that, in a crisis, the diverse collective resources of all agencies are effectively coordinated into joint response operations that achieve synergism for the people of Los Angeles. It is a key focus of the Citys emergency planning, response and training organizations and agencies on the issue of terrorism. Initiatives Addressing Terrorism Since the terrorist events of 9/11 in 2001, much of the world has focused on new directions and initiatives involving the understanding of terrorism, threat reduction, and response. Yet, before this world-changing event, the issues of terrorism were actively being addressed in Los Angeles; and since 9/11, public and private stakeholders in Los Angeles have become increasingly involved in meeting the goals for public safety. Many have rallied to support activities, coordination and strength of extended global community in addressing this growing and constantly shifting threat. A. Anti-Terrorism Division (ATD): The Anti-Terrorism Division (ATD) of the Los Angeles Police Department was established in 1988 to focus attention on terrorism intelligence gathering, interdiction and coordination between the City of Los Angeles and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. And since its inception, the City has been actively participating in several interagency groups focusing on the prevention of and response to threats and acts of terrorism. B. Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) & Terrorism Working Group (TWG): The Citys Police, Fire, and numerous other departments are members of the Los Angeles County Operational Area Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) and Terrorism Working Group (TWG), which were established to develop an Operational Area Terrorism Response and Management Plan. TEW participants also include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the California National Guard, and other local, state and federal law enforcement, emergency medical service and public health agencies. The TEW monitors local, national and international developments around the clock, twenty-four hours-a-day, seven days-aweek, strengthening local and regional security. TEW works closely with the Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism (LATFOT), created to address regional intelligence gathering and response coordination. Coordinated by the FBI, LATFOT is an inter-agency joint counter-terrorism task force for the Los Angeles area. 65

LATFOT membership includes the US Secret Service, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and state and local law enforcement agencies, including the Los Angeles Police Department. C. Los Angeles Police Departments Archangel: LAPDs Archangel was born out of a need to engender inter-agency/departmental cooperation and coordination to facilitate the strategic application and management of information and resources for the prevention, deterrence, response and mitigation of critical incidents, including terrorism. Archangels primary focus is on prevention. Archangel was designed to identify locations of criticality and plan multi-agency/disciplinary prevention, deterrence, response and mitigation efforts. Archangel is aligned with, and contributes directly to, the U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys National Strategy for Homeland Security. Archangel is a partnership among the City and County of Los Angeles, the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Archangel is a scalable model, exportable across the nation. Archangel is divided into four distinct, yet integrated initiatives: 1. Identification and Prioritization of Critical Assets: Archangel has established a criterion, or definition, for identification of critical assets. The Archangel Critical Asset Definition is the product of an in-depth, nationwide study of working models and publications, together with the input of a working group comprised of subject matter experts and stakeholders. The definition is used to review and determine the comprehensive inventory of the City of Los Angeles, and was adopted by CalEMA for state-wide use. The definition is used to set guidance for resource allocation decisions. 2. Critical Asset Assessments (CAAs): Archangel has created a three-tiered template for Critical Asset Assessments from a multi-agency perspective that includes: a) Conducting appropriate Vulnerability Assessments (VAs) to determine and to reduce a locations degree of vulnerability; b) Harvesting detailed location-specific information (i.e. names, phone numbers, floor plans, site postings, etc.) in the form of Readiness Information Folders (RIFs) for use by pre-incident planners and on-scene Incident Commanders during critical incidents; c) Drafting site-specific pre-incident security enhancement plans and post-occurrence action plans designed to provide tactical guidance and insight to planners and/or to Incident Commanders in the field. 66

3. Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS): Archangel partnered with U.S. DHS to develop ACAMS, a secure interoperable webbased system to manage critical asset information. ACAMS coordinates the following: a) Critical Asset Inventory and Prioritization Modeling b) Critical Asset Assessments c) Buffer Zone Protection Plan d) Building Inventories e) Site Specific Pre-Incident Security Enhancement Plans f) Response Information Folders g) Site Specific Post-Occurrence Response Plan 4. Protective Security Task Force/Security Augmentation Team (PSTF/SAT): A PSTF/SAT is a plain clothes, low-profile team of personnel specifically trained and equipped to provide a comprehensive cloak of security to a threatened asset. Primarily, these will be deployed when intelligence indicates that a threat may be directed at a critical asset and/or event. In the absence of intelligence, the PSTF/SAT will deploy to critical assets throughout the area of responsibility providing a low-key but visible enhancement to the resident security measures. City Protocols In 1996, the Citys Emergency Operations Organizations (EOO) Emergency Management Workshop focused specific attention on terrorism preparedness and response. Prior to 9/11, terrorism issues were often viewed as law enforcement matters. Since the 9/11 attacks, all EOO Divisions have participated as members of the Los Angeles Operational Area Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW). As a result, the City and the EOO now participate collectively to increase awareness, reduce potential impacts, and to prepare for the possible effects of a terrorist attack. The EOO continues to support awareness efforts by providing the City with ongoing intelligence gathering and threat assessment. These activities further support City efforts to develop and enhance preparedness and operational response capability. As appropriate, the Police Department Operations Center, and the Police Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (TTAC) are activated to provide dedicated staff and equipment for a more detailed intelligence gathering and threat assessment specific to the City of Los Angeles. If necessary, the Mayor will activate the Citys EOC to expand the Citys threat assessment capability. This expanded assessment capability includes rapid access to all City departments, including the Harbor Department, Los Angeles World Airports and the Department of Water and Power.

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The City uses the Police Department Terrorism Threat Alert Level Advisory System to provide direction to City departments and the community on appropriate levels of response using five levels of threat situations. This system provides guidance to departments for their respective internal security operations and criteria for possible activation of the City EOC, and individual Department Operations Centers (DOCs). At the Mayors direction, all City departments have developed a Terrorism Threat Alert Level Section to their department emergency plans. These plans have been tested in exercises and actual events, and are the subject of continuous refinement. Each City department has reviewed its internal security protocols and the EOO is constantly assessing the Citys overall security needs in order to mitigate the potential impact of various threats including acts of terrorism. In 2002, under the direction of the Mayor, using guidelines approved by the Emergency Operations Board, every City department undertook an extensive review and update of its emergency plan. Revised City mail service protocols, new testing equipment for Police and Fire Hazardous Materials units, increased Hazardous Materials unit staffing, terrorism-specific training and exercises, enhanced personal protective equipment for first responders, and enhanced physical security measures for City buildings have been implemented. The City has conducted an exhaustive Homeland Security Needs Assessment of security-related needs. Approximately 165 projects were initially identified for implementation. In March 2003, the Mayor and City Council approved funding to provide Personal Protective Equipment to all City first responders. The EOO is continually reassessing the Homeland Security Needs Assessment, and working to identify funding, and/or alternative methods of implementing the scores of remaining projects. C.2.1 Identifying the Assets While the City of Los Angeles has many facilities and institutions actively involved in threat and vulnerability assessment, response and reduction, two facilities in particular are aggressively involved with ongoing programs addressing terrorism: Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) and the Port of Los Angeles. Los Angeles International Airport The Los Angeles International Airport, known as LAX, is considered the number one terrorist target in Los Angeles. The California State Attorney Generals Office ranks LAX at the top of their list of 624 prime terrorist targets in California. The Los Angeles Airport is a major international airport providing service to destinations on five continents, directly connecting the people of Los Angeles with the people of more than 22 countries around the world. Every year 56 million travelers pass through LAX. LAX operates on a 3,500 acre site, with two runways on the north complex and two runways on the complex, sixteen hangars on the airport grounds, and nine passenger terminals connected by a U-shaped 68

two level roadway. There are 59,000 jobs directly attributed to LAX. The Los Angeles Airport Police continually deploy specialized counter-terrorism teams specifically designed to deter and detect possible terrorist activity in and around the airport. In the event of a terrorist incident at LAX plans are in place to: Manage the incident based upon principals established by Standardized Emergency Management Systems (SEMS). An Incident Command System (ICS) will be used to direct field operations from a single Incident Command Post (ICP). One Incident Commander will be identified and the principal of Unified Command will be instituted to ensure all agencies with jurisdictional and functional responsibilities are included in response/mitigation planning. Some of the agencies that will play significant roles at LAX are the: Los Angeles World Airports Police Division (LAWAPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), Transportation Security Authority (TSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Los Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT), and California Highway Patrol (CHP). Representatives from these agencies will assemble at a pre-determined Joint Operations Center to receive information and coordinate response efforts. Immediately close the Central Terminal Area (CTA) and implement an emergency traffic plan. The plan outlines how traffic will be diverted away from LAX; specific locations uniformed officers will be deployed to; establishment of clear emergency ingress and egress lanes; identifies a reporting site for airline employees attempting to get into LAX, and what notifications will be made as they relate to traffic control. Information classified as Security Sensitive Information (SSI) such as security assessments providing critical information used to guide the development of security infrastructure, as well as operational doctrine and training programs, are not release to the public. Port of Los Angeles The Port of Los Angeles is part of the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex , with the Port Complex roughly split in half between these two Port Authorities. The LA/LB Port Complex is the third largest Port in the world in terms of movement of containerized freight. Forty-three percent of the containerized freight that enters the U.S. comes through the LA/LB Port Complex. The Port Complex also handles significant amounts of refined and crude petroleum, chemical produces, automobiles, break-bulk cargo and passengers. The Port of Los Angeles has approximately twenty-five major facilities that handle all of its cargo. The transportation infrastructure in and around the Port includes navigational channels, piers and berths, roads, railroad tracks and both road and railroad bridges. The Port Complex represents a major national asset because of the volume of goods that pass through the two Ports, and the overall impact on the nations economy that would result from 69

a significant reduction in the throughput of the Port. Individual port infrastructure components, such as navigable channels, bridges, piers, berths and cargo handling equipment are considered national assets within the national transportation and goods movement system. The LA/LB Port Complex has been the subject of several security assessments that include evaluation of vulnerability and threat. As part of the Harbor Department homeland security program, security assessment updates of the Port are conducted periodically. These security assessments provide critical information that is used to guide the development of security infrastructure, as well as operational doctrine and training programs. These assessments are classified as Security Sensitive Information (SSI) and are not released publicly. The Port of Los Angeles is heavily involved in a number of homeland security and maritime security efforts and initiatives. Operationally, the port security mission is performed by the Los Angeles Port Police, in conjunction with a number of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. The LA Port Police are sworn California Peace Officers and are attached to the LA Harbor Department. A network of coordinated intelligence agencies constantly monitors the level and type of threats that may confront the Port. These agencies are from the local, state and federal levels of government. The Director of the Homeland Security Division at the LA Harbor Department manages the homeland security program within the Port of Los Angeles. This division coordinates the Ports and the Citys involvement in a number of national, state and local port security programs including credentialing, cargo and supply chain security, and grant funded security infrastructure projects. The Port of Los Angeles is involved in a national security credentialing program called Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC). The Port, along with the Port of Long Beach and several other ports nationally, is a test location for the program. The expected outcome is a federally managed credentialing program that will include background checks. TWIC cards could then be used as the primary access control credential at all port facilities. There are a number of supply chain security initiatives underway. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead agency for cargo security. The Port of Los Angeles is involved in Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). OSC is a large-scale test and evaluation project that will provide extensive results and analysis on a wide range of supply chain security solutions. OSC results will be provided to CBP for use in the development of national standards for cargo security. Interagency operations within the Port Complex are coordinated through the Area Maritime Security Committee, which is chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port. This committee addresses joint planning, training and operations within federal, state and local agencies from both Los Angeles and Long Beach. C.2.2 Estimating Potential Losses 70

Estimating potential losses from terrorism involves addressing costs and losses on many levels. In addition to loss of life, categories of loss can include such areas as capital, environmental, social/cultural, economic, and institutional. Since 9/11, the planning and emergency managers in Los Angeles are increasingly focusing on the long and short-term direct costs and indirect loss potential due to terrorism. Lessons are being drawn from other recent experiences of U.S. terrorism. For example, the dramatic extent of costs and losses of the terrorist events of 9/11 to New York City, the Pentagon, and the world were unforeseen, but are now being better understood and applied. Lost were thousands of lives, millions of square office footages in one of the prime international business locations, a hundred thousand jobs, billions of dollars of assets, and an overall economic price tag of well over $100 billion dollars. The potential losses from terrorism for the City of Los Angeles are of great importance to the ongoing mitigation planning efforts. The Port of Los Angeles is directly addressing these loss issues because of its role in the international marketplace. Because of the scale of the cargo operations at the Port Complex, any interruption in cargo flow has the potential to have a significant impact on the national economy. Damage to individual port operations such as containerized freight, petroleum, or the carriage of passengers could result in losses and significant effects within a specific sector of maritime trade.

C.3 Analysis of Future Development The agencies and organizations involved with terrorism, specifically threat analyses and threat reduction capability studies in the City of Los Angles are examining the challenges presented by future development and expansion. Individually, and in collaboration with task forces and other facilities, plans are underway for continuation, changes and/or expansion of current initiatives. The collaborative efforts are currently underway by the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach. The Ports are creating joint plans to fully develop the security infrastructure throughout the Port Complex. Projects include: Joint Command and Control Center, interoperable communications, linked and redundant surveillance system monitoring, and full-port access control supported by a common credentialing system. D. PROFILE OF BRUSHFIRE HAZARD
Brush Fire was identified as a High Risk hazard for the City of Los Angeles. Risk from wildfire to life, property, natural resources, and firefighter safety is increasing. Deteriorating forest health, increasing fuel loads and other factors have led to more intense, destructive wildfires; and unabated, this pattern will continue. The history of California wildfires indicates the increasing trend of fire hazard:

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Population will grow and more people will live and use wildland areas, especially in the Central Sierra and in the southern California counties of Riverside, San Bernardino and San Diego. Topography and climate support ecosystems where large wildfires can be expected. Drought and fuel moisture conditions will be unpredictable but almost always dangerous in fire season. More structures will be constructed in areas that are very susceptible to wildfire. Historical legacy of narrow roads, difficult entrance, insufficient water supplies, flammable building construction and location that make many communities and homes wildfire-prone still exists. Public demand for wildland fire protection and other services will increase.

Assets at risk will increase, especially watershed assets, because of the rapid rise in the demand for water to supply more people. Based on population projections, the potential for accelerating loss of protected assets, especially life and property, will be greater from disastrous wildfires. Large wildfires do not respect political or property boundaries. Historically, the strength of California's firefighting agencies is found within a concept of mutual cooperation at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Day-to-day mutual aid for initial attack, as well as a statewide mutual-aid system for fire disasters, is the basis of this cooperation and coordination. The ability to rapidly mobilize, effectively deploy and support large numbers of specialized firefighting resources is essential to cope with large multiple fires.

D.1 Identifying Brush Fire Hazard

Californias diverse ecosystem significantly influences the threat of fire and its associated risks; fire has been shaping its landscape and natural resources over the millennia. Fire risk is predominately associated with the Wildland-Urban Interface areas. Correspondingly, of critical concern is the floods following fires scenario. Late fall fires followed by winter rains have caused significant damage to downstream people and property. Water quality is affected, stream temperatures change, and increased deposition of sediment decreases storage capacity in dams and reservoirs, and damages ecologically-sensitive resources. Finally, when the watersheds that are linked to alluvial fans typically associated with southern California are damaged by fires extreme sediment and high velocity flooding are possible. Fire conditions arise from a combination of hot weather, an accumulation of vegetation, and low moisture content in the air. These conditions when combined with high winds and years of drought increase the potential for a wildfire. Urban wildfires often occur in those areas where development has expanded into rural areas. A fire along this rural/urban interface can result in major losses of property and structures. The three general major factors that sustain wildfires and allow for prediction of a given areas potential to burn are fuel, topography and weather.

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Fuel is the material that feeds a fire, and can be generally classified by type and by volume. Fuel sources include from duff (dead tree needles and leaves, twigs and branches) to dead standing trees, live trees, brush and grasses. In the Wildland-Urban Interface, the urban forest or houses are considered principal source of fuel. The type of prevalent fuel directly influences the behavior of the wildfire. Topography consists of an areas terrain and land slopes which affect its susceptibility to wildfire spread. Fire intensities and rates of spread are accelerated with the increase in slopes as heat rises from fire. The natural arrangement of vegetation throughout a hillside can also contribute to increased fire activity. Post-fire slope stability is a serious issue for people, property and the environment downstream. Weather components such as temperature, relative humidity, wind and lightening also affect the potential for wildfire. High temperatures and low relative humidity dry out the fuels creating a highly volatile and combustible environment. Wind is the most treacherous weather factor. The greater the wind volume and speed, the faster the fire will expand and grow, and the more intense its effects and aftermath will be. Dry hot winds blowing in a westerly direction across southern California deserts are called the Santa Anas, which greatly exacerbate fire-prone conditions and fire spread. Brush fires are a major threat to life and property in the City of Los Angeles due to unique fuel, terrain and climatic conditions. The hazard is especially great when the dry Santa Ana winds arrive, usually in the fall and winter seasons. The desert-blown Santa Ana winds turn vegetation to tinder and spread localized fires quickly. D.1.1 Description of Brush Fire Hazard Profile Fire is an integral component of many of Californias ecosystems. However, uncontrolled wildfires are costly, putting lives and property at risk. Such fires compromise watersheds, open spaces, timber, range, recreational opportunities, wildlife habitats, endangered species, historic and cultural assets, wild and scenic rivers, other scenic assets, and local economies. The challenge is how to manage fires across Californias diverse ecosystems to reduce both costs and losses. On average, 10,000 wildfires burn half a million acres on an annual basis in California. While the actual number of acres burned fluctuates considerably from year to year, one trend that has remained constant for over a decade is the rise in wildfire-related financial losses. From 1947 to 1990, the dollar damages (in 2001 dollars) to structures and other resources in State Responsibility Areas (SRAs) exceeded $100 million only once. Between 1990 and 2001, losses exceeding $100 million occurred five times. The California Fire Plan identifies risk as the potential damage or loss to a specific asset. Analyzing fire risk involves two components: the probability of a fire occurring and the potential of such an event to cause change. The chance of a wildfire occurring is measured using an index of expected fire frequency referencing the historical events of fire. The potential of a fire event to cause change is based on the measure of potential fire behavior which relates to 73

age and condition of fuels. Together, these two measures comprise the fire threat. Fire poses a significant risk to the people of California and their homes, as evidenced by an increasing trend in structural loss from wildland fires. D.1.3 Background of Brushfire Hazard Fire was the first natural hazard to be addressed by early settlers of El Pueblo de Los Angeles, founded in 1781. The hot, arid climate, especially during the summer and fall months dried out the vegetation. Dry brush and vegetation were prone to fires caused by lightning strikes and spontaneous combustion. While nature adjusted to this phenomenon by making some of the native chaparral (vegetation) dependent on fires for regeneration, new sources of fire hazard came with the advent of human habitation. By the early 1800s, Los Angeles was an agricultural community with a small population. Buildings were generally constructed of adobe and tile. Fire hazard was initially an individual occurrence, and contained within an individual property. For example, hay mounds igniting spontaneously, or roofs set afire by sparks from cooking stoves, or from carelessness. As the City grew and buildings were established in close proximity to each other, entire blocks could burn in a matter of hours due to the lack of adequate water storage and delivery systems. Given these potentially catastrophic hazards it is not surprising that some of the earliest City building regulations addressed fire hazards. A brush clearance program of 1920, using paid civilians to clear vacant lots of debris and rubbish, significantly reduced brushfires. And in 1924, a civilian Mountain Fire Patrol was established to improve fire safety in hillside areas. The Patrol counseled private property owners in fire prevention and encouraged them to maintain burlap bags and other fire fighting materials to protect their homes which often were distant from fire stations or were not served by adequate roads. Boxes of fire fighting tools were placed at strategic locations along Mulholland Drive and fire breaks, fire trail and fire roads were maintained to slow the movement of fires and provide access for fire fighters. However, the fire breaks proved ineffective with major fires. Wind conditions, including those generated by a fire, could carry burning embers and materials far beyond fire breaks. In 1958, the City banned incinerators and open burnings to reduce fire hazards and improve air quality. The ban resulted in the lowest incidence of fires in 14 years. To date, the 1961 Bel Air Firestorm in the Santa Monica Mountains is ranked the Citys most costly brushfire. The 50 miles an hour Santa Ana winds, combined with fire-generated winds, carried burning debris and set new fires far from the main front. Within the first six hours, before defensive procedures became effective, 484 homes and other structures were destroyed. The fire lasted two days, destroyed over 500 structures and burned 6,090 acres of watershed within a 19-mile perimeter. Even with this loss, 78% of all the homes within the perimeter were saved. A direct result of the fire was the phasing out of the Mountain Fire Patrol, rebuilding the two existing fire stations and constructing two new stations along 74

Mulholland Drive. In addition, the Mountain Fire District and Buffer Zone boundaries were expanded to include a greater area and a Department Brush Clearance Unit was established to enforce brush clearance regulations in the Districts and Zones. The Public Works Departments Bureau of Street Maintenance currently has responsibility for enforcing brush clearance on vacant lots within other areas of the City. Devastating brushfires have resulted in establishment of more fire stations and facilities in hillside areas, and in more stringent requirements for fire hydrant installation, hillside brush clearance, fire access road systems, home sprinklers, fire resistant construction and landscaping materials, and development of improved fire fighting strategies and equipment. In 1962, the Department acquired its first helicopter with water dropping capability. Subsequently, air craft became important equipment for fighting brushfires, and were used in dropping water and chemicals on targeted fire areas. Flammable roofs have long been identified by fire agencies as major contributors to property damage and for spreading fire storms in developed areas near brushlands. In 1970, following the Chatsworth Fire in which 113 homes were damaged or destroyed, the City required that new homes in Mountain Fire Districts treat their combustible roof materials to be more fire resistant. Following the devastating December 1989 Sesnon (Granada Hills) fire which destroyed or damaged 30 dwellings, combustible roofing material was banned from use in construction of new homes in Mountain Fire Districts. Between October 25 and November 10 of 1993, an unprecedented series of 22 devastating wildfires occurred in the six counties within the southern California region (from Ventura to San Diego County). The fires were caused by arson (12 fires), arcing power lines (6), campfires (2) and undetermined sources and were fanned by Santa Ana winds, and fueled by a combination of dead undergrowth resulting from a sevenyear drought and heavy new growth caused by recent rains. The fires burned 197,277 acres, destroyed over 1,170 structures and killed three people. The Topanga-Malibu fire (November 27) burned 18,000 acres, destroyed 384 structures and killed three civilians. Firefighters from other fire sites were shifted to Malibu-Topanga and placed under the command of the Los Angeles County Fire Department by the FIRESCOPE center in Riverside County. The largest commitment of fire personnel in firefighting history, 7,136 firefighters, was involved in battling the Topanga portion of the fire and a total of over 9,000 personnel from 458 agencies from around the nation battled both segments. The fire was extremely dangerous, rapidly changing, and fast-moving. Firefighting was hampered by steep hillside terrains, narrow mountain roads, falling debris dislodged by the fire and shifting winds which sent flames up to 200 feet in the air and carried burning embers which ignited new fires. Resources were deployed to protect structures and to contain and eventually suppress the fire. Fixed wing and helicopter aircraft were used to battle fires. The 22 fires, especially the Topanga-Malibu fire, successfully tested the capabilities of a unified command system under FIRESCOPE protocols. The fires also tested the processes and 75

procedures of individual agencies to combat and manage major fires. The effectiveness of the Citys hillside brush clearance law was evident in two ways: the clearance of brush within 100 feet of structures in Mountain Fire Districts not only protected the structures, but kept the firefighters from having to stand on fire-causing fuel. Following the fires, a survey team was convened to review and recommend additional procedures and measures to improve fire response and coordination. A direct result of the Topanga-Malibu fire was the signing of a cooperative agreement for Super Scooper planes used to scoop water up from the ocean and drop it on brushfires. The Super Scooper agreement marked the first time that federal, state, county and a city government joined in a cooperative agreement with another nation (Canada) and a private manufacturing company in exploring new field equipment and tools. Another direct result of the fire was the Departments decision to secure syphon ejectors, pumps and other equipment to enable utilization of water from private swimming pools for firefighting. Historical Major Brushfires Affecting Los Angeles The following sections provide detailed descriptions and analysis of major brushfires that have affected Los Angeles in the past. a) Station Fire October 2009 The Station Fire burned approximately 160,577 acres from August-October. The fire began on August 26, 2009 at 3:30 pm and was fully contained at 7:00 pm on Friday, October 16, 2009. It took several additional weeks for the fire to be under full control (fire out with no heat). The fire originated by Hwy 2; 1.5 miles north of USFS Angeles Crest Station in Los Angeles County. The Station Fire is the largest fire in the recorded history of Angeles National Forest (est. 1892), the 10th greatest in California since 1933 and the largest in Los Angeles County history. The fire was determined to be cause by arson and turned into a fire investigation. It resulted in the death of two firefighters and injury of 22 persons, 89 homes and more than 110 other structures were burned. The Los Angeles Times reports costs exceeded $100M; the official costs have not been reported. The Station Fire threatened Mount Wilson Observatory, as well as, the communication towers with transmitters for every major television stations in Los Angeles. Cooperating agencies included: Forest Service (Lead Agency) with support from Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California State Highway Patrol, Cal Trans, and Los Angeles City Fire Department. The fire threatened 1,200 structures in the National Forest and the nearby communities of La Caada-Flintridge, Glendale, Acton, La Crescenta, Littlerock and Altadena, as well as, the Sunland and Tujunga neighborhoods of the City of Los Angeles. Events like this underscore the constant fire hazard threat in the Los Angeles area. This fire is typical of fires in heavy timber, with thick trees that retain heat more than the brush and grasses of most southern California fires. The terrain, described as steep and extremely rugged, made it harder to combat the fire. 76

b) Sayre Fire November 2008 The Sayre Fire started on November 14, 2008 around 10:49 pm. The fire burned 11,262 acres near Sylmar in Los Angeles County. The Sayre Fire resulted in 4 minor injuries, 487 residences destroyed and 1 commercial building. Costs reported in this fire are approximately $13.5 million. The significant size of the fire required 378 firefighting personnel. Resources used to combat this fire include 5 hand crews, 12 engines, 1 helicopter, 1 dozer, and 3 water tenders. Both LA County and LA City Fire personnel were involved in the fire assessment. Fuels involved - grass, brush, chaparral, oaks were all very prominent throughout southern California. c) Marek Fire October 2008 The Marek Fire started on October 22, 2008 at 1:58 am. The Marek Fire was managed under Unified Command with the Forest Service, Los Angeles County Fire, Los Angeles City Fire and Los Angeles County Sheriff. Other valuable cooperating agencies included: California Highway Patrol, Los Angeles County Animal Control, American Red Cross, Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles County Parks, Los Angeles County Coroner, and Los Angeles County Public Health. The fire started on the west side of Little Tujunga Canyon, Kagel Canyon, and Lakeview Terrace. The fire burned about 4,824 acres, destroyed 39 residences (38 mobile homes) and 5 outbuildings. The fire threatened 3,000 residents and resulted in the evacuation of 1,200 people. Additionally, 200 commercial buildings were threatened. One firefighter was injured and a transient male and his dog were found dead. 130 homes in the San Fernando Valley were without power due to the fire. Total of 262 personnel were involved in response to this fire. The terrain in this fire was described as difficult, light brush and chaparral up to 6 feet as fuel for the fire. d) Sesnon October 2008 The Sesnon Fire burned 14,703 acres in the Porter Ranch Community, Twin Lakes and Indian Hills area of the Los Angeles County. The fire started on October 13, 2008 around 10:38 am. The fire burned 14,703 acres and destroyed 15 residences and 63 outbuildings; 11 residences were damaged. Costs are reported around $12.6 million. The cause of the fire was determined to be an electrical distribution line down. Unified command was used to respond to this fire. Lead agencies were CAL FIRE, LA County Fire Department, LA City Fire Department and Ventura County Fire Department. Other cooperating agencies involved were CHP, National Park Service, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office, Los Angeles Police Department, Cal Edison, So Cal Gas, Los Angeles County OES, and CDCR. Total Fire Personnel reached 1,377 with 796 from CAL FIRE. e) 2003 California Wildfires 77

Surveys of the insurance industry confirmed a total of 7,260 claims filed from the southern California firestorms according to the Insurance Information Institute. Up to 3,500 structures have been damaged or destroyed by the southern California firestorms. Based on these reports, the wildfires were among the most costly brushfires in California history. The 2003 fires exceeded Oakland Hills as well as those of Laguna and the Topanga-Malibu areas, which had their 10-year anniversary. In Laguna, 441 structures were lost, resulting in $350 million in insured losses; in Topanga-Malibu, 323 structures resulting in $375 million in insurance losses. The estimated 585,000 homes, categorized in the highest risk level statewide, pose a potential financial loss of at least $106 billion, according to CDF projections. The fire danger is compounded by years of drought-like conditions, and the ravages of a bark beetle infestation that turned California forests into tinder boxes. Few communities are immune from the deadly combination of fierce October winds and the effects of summer's traditional lack of rain. Several times since 1982, wildfires in California have resulted in either gubernatorial proclamations of a state of emergency or presidential declarations of a major disaster. Among the worst years in State history was 1993. Twenty-one separate fires raged in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego and Ventura counties. Between October 26 and November 7, the blazes caused four deaths and 162 injuries, destroyed more than 1,200 structures and consumed almost 200,000 acres. To bring the blazes under control and prevent additional losses, more than 15,000 firefighters were deployed in the largest mutual aid call-out in California history. f) Old Topanga Fire - November 1993 The unique interplay of topography, fuel load, and wind has made the Santa Monica Mountains home to some of the most spectacular and horrific fires in the history of our nation. The Hume Fire of 1956, the Wright Fires of 1970, and the Piuma Fire of 1985 are the past names of the same "beast" that appeared on November 2, 1993. There have been literally hundreds of fires in the Santa Monicas throughout history, and many share similar routes to the ocean, through the same canyon corridors of the Santa Monica Mountains. Residents and fire fighters who experienced the Hume, the Wright, or the Piuma Fire claim that the speed and fury with which the Topanga Fire blew to the coast are unparalleled. g) Kirkwood Bowl/Laurel Canyon Brush Fire - September 16, 1979 One of the most spectacular blazes occurred on Sept. 16 in West Hollywood's Laurel Canyon, where a four-hour inferno destroyed 23 homes, partially ruined another five structures, and caused an estimated $4 million damages. The topography of the fire area is comprised of steep hills, heavy brush, very winding narrow streets, with single ingress and egress, a heavy concentration of older structures 78

built in close proximity to each other on top of ridges. In addition, the area has a poor water distribution system. The majority of structure loss occurred prior to the arrival of Fire Companies or before Fire Companies could be deployed into the area. In areas where Fire Department resources became operational, minimum fire loss progressed beyond that point. The primary reasons for the structure losses were: high temperatures for the previous two weeks; low humidity, wind from the south-southwest at 10 to 12 knots; delayed alarm; wood siding; structures built on ridges with minimal brush clearance; and the fire starting at the base of a very steep slope (approximately 70 degrees) covered with dense brush. With all of these conditions combined, the fire swept up the slope, exposing the houses on three ridges, where the houses sustained almost total destruction. The aforementioned conditions were evident as observed by the first-responding Companies, in that the loom-up had attained an altitude of between 1,000 to 1,500 feet, and between 5 and 10 structures were involved before the first Companies arrived. The primary reason for the losses being limited to the immediate area of involvement was the coordinated efforts of all resources deployed during the emergency. h) Mandeville Canyon Fire - October 23, 1978 The Mandeville Canyon Fire cost the City $70 million-plus. Fanned by hurricane Santa Ana winds, 11 brushfires in four counties taxed firefighting resources to--and beyond-limits, charred 38,000 acres, destroyed more than 200 homes, killed three people and injured at least 50. Miles of watershed were destroyed, paving the way for floods when the rains come. In a day filled with fires, The Mandeville Canyon Fire quickly gained priority because of its size, speed and danger to life and property. It pre-empted smaller fires elsewhere in the Southland, commanding resources from as far away as San Francisco. The Mandeville Canyon brushfire was touched off by 30 mph winds that apparently thrust and sparked high tension wires together shortly after 9:30 a.m. An hour after the first alarm, it was out of control on the west, and a helicopter survey patrol reported "it looks like it will burn all the way to Sunset Boulevard." From Mulholland Drive, it flashed into Kenter and Mandeville canyons and onto Pacific Palisades, demolishing 20 homes and badly damaging 16 other homes, a parish school and a church retreat house. Three schools and dozens of houses in the fires path were evacuated. In all, 157 Los Angeles City Companies -- the largest number ever called out at one time - fought the fire, aided by 30 other companies from mutual aid cities. As it burned, the already overtaxed City firefighting resources were called to 14 other major emergency incidents. 79

The score box includes: 5,500 acres in a 15-mile perimeter, fought by 450 firefighters, assisted by Santa Monica, Culver City, County and State forestry plus six helicopters, 16 bulldozers and four tractors. By next morning, heavy brush was still ablaze in Mandeville Canyon, but containment was announced Tuesday afternoon. It was another two days before control was reached. An ominous "special interest" notes on the Los Angeles Fire Department's official summary issued Tuesday: "At 1830 hours Monday, 149 companies were committed to the fire. Twenty-seven light task forces, two triples and three trucks were left to protect the City. During some periods of time when other fires occurred, the available resources were down to 16 light task forces." i) Topanga Canyon Fire - November 14, 1977 The first is an historical analysis of the November 1977 fire that started in the Garapito Creek watershed, and ran through the Cheney/Callon neighborhood into the Arteique area without crossing Topanga Canyon Boulevard. It represents a significant fire at the low end of the scale. The second simulates fires that get started at two different places under three sets of wind and weather conditions. One fire starts well outside Topanga Canyon, between the southern end of Van Alden Avenue and the unpaved section of Mulholland Highway in Encino. The other starts just north of the water tanks at the crest of Topanga Canyon Boulevard. From its start at about 2:00 p.m., the fire reached its fullest extent by dusk, about 5:00 p.m. In that time, half a dozen homes were destroyed or severely damaged, and all of Topanga east of Topanga Canyon Boulevard and north of the Center had been ordered to be evacuated. Wind and weather were critical variables. Fortunately, the wind was from the north and helped confine the fire to the east side of Topanga Canyon Boulevard. Most importantly, at around dusk the wind shifted to an onshore breeze, bringing in lower temperatures, higher humidity and fog, all of which conspired to slow and damp down the fire, making it possible for the firefighters to contain it overnight. Had those conditions not prevailed, the fire, headed for the Post Office Tract, might have done considerably more damage. In the years since 1977, all these homes have been rebuilt, most in similar style, and the burned-over vegetation has regrown to pre-fire condition--sometimes worse. New construction has greatly increased the density of homes and planting, while the roads have not been improved and in some cases have deteriorated. A new fire of the 1977 type is not only possible, but increasingly likely, as time goes on, as brushes, plants and homes multiply. 80

In terms of evacuation, the Cheney/Paradise Lane/Callon area has only one means of exit--Cheney Road. This narrow, winding road is also the only means by which firefighters can enter the area, creating the potential for collisions that could prevent aid reaching the scene of the fire. Similar conditions would have prevailed in the Arteique area as well as the Post Office Tract. j) The Agoura-Malibu Firestorm - Sept 25, 1970 On Sept. 25-29, 1970, three fires from New Hall to Malibu converged to consume 75,000 acres. The Agoura-Malibu firestorm, apparently torched by a firebug, swept to the sea in two hours on the path of winds up to 50 mph, taking with it three lives, 230 homes, 254 other structures and 25,000 acres of watershed. k) Bel-Air Brentwood Fire - November 6, 1961 During the week of November 6, 1961, the City of Los Angeles was visited by the most disastrous brushfire in the history of southern California up to that date. Lashing out from a point of origin high on the north slope of the Santa Monica Mountains, the fire raced through tinder-dry vegetation to the summit, leaped across Mulholland Drive and raged down the south slope into Stone Canyon on a rapidly widening front. Driven savagely before fifty-mile-per-hour winds, the flames sped on south and westward. The canyons and ridges of the coastal slope became engulfed in a veritable hurricane of fire. Thermal air currents, created by the intense heat, coupled with the high velocity winds swirled countless thousands of burning brands aloft to deposit them far in advance of the main fire front. Natural and manmade barriers were utterly incapable of interrupting the progress of the fire under such adverse conditions. Before the wild rush of this roaring destruction was finally subdued, 6,090 acres of valuable watershed had been consumed. Infinitely more tragic was the incineration of 484 costly residences and 21 other buildings. As this great fire gained in intensity, a second blaze was criminally ignited in Benedict Canyon which lies a mile to the east of Stone Canyon. Fortunately, air tankers successfully extinguished this fire while it was still incipient. Later, when the Bel Air-Brentwood Fire had reached an apex of violence, a third fire erupted just south of Mulholland Drive near Topanga Canyon. This is approximately seven miles to the west of the Stone Canyon area. This fire immediately demanded the attentions of the already overtaxed forces working on the Bel Air-Brentwood conflagration. Concurrently with these fires, twelve other major emergencies occurred within the metropolitan portions of the City. Unprecedented demands were made upon the resources of the fire department. The Bel Air-Brentwood area that suffered such terrible havoc is unique in one outstanding particular. There exists in no other fire protection 81

jurisdiction in the world a brush-covered region having such a concentration of valuable structures. Situated along the canyon floors and on narrow tortuous streets atop the ridges on the southerly slopes of the Santa Monica mountain range lies one of the most celebrated and desirable residential communities in the nation. Totally encompassing thousands of beautiful homes is a vast, dense growth of native brush. Reaching a height of twenty-five feet in places, this vegetation is the most flammable ground cover in the western hemisphere. Most of the area has not sustained a serious fire within memory. Unfavorable weather conditions critically compounded the already severe fire danger. A prolonged drought that had lasted for years had reduced the moisture content of the brush to almost nil. Hot, dry Santa Ana winds blew from the arid northeastern deserts to diminish the humidity to a perilous level. Temperatures were unseasonably high. Only a spark was required to precipitate the ravening scourge into the canyons and across the ridges. Prevailing structural conditions in the area served in various ways to accelerate the spread of fire. Shingle and shake roofs predominate, subjected to fire, they ignite readily to destroy the structure beneath. Moreover, these roofs send flaming pieces of wood into the air to drop on other roofs and into the brush, propagating innumerable new fires. Wide picture windows often crumble under the onslaught of the heat and pressure generated in the path of a rampant brushfire. Large, over-hanging, and unprotected eaves furnish a regrettably convenient lodging place for flying embers and super-heated air. The underlying causes for the extensive damage resulting from this fire have been long recognized by all fire protection authorities. Continuing efforts have been made to secure legislation to restrict and control building practices that create severe conflagration hazards. The removal of dense brush from lands adjacent to improved properties and the planting of less combustible ground covers are essential. Firefighting operations would be greatly enhanced by improvements in accessibility. Water supply problems on high ridges can be mitigated to a considerable extent. Radio communication facilities must be able to accommodate the increased traffic loads that occur in such periods of major emergency. Success in solving these and similar problems will tend to reduce the threat of disastrous fires in such areas as Bel Air and Brentwood. It is not possible to assess the total material damage that is attributable to this fire even at this time. The coming winter months must be viewed with apprehension. Torrential rains may wreak further havoc. Steep slopes, denuded of natural ground cover, offer little resistance to erosion and can lose cascades of water and mud into the lower canyons to add to the losses caused by the more direct effects of the fire. Re-seeding of the barren areas has been completed. 82

However, this cannot be regarded as a panacea. The advent of really heavy rainfall could render these efforts fruitless even though germination of the seed had begun. Other emergency measures are indicated and are being undertaken. Every possible means is being utilized to forestall any further property damage in the fire area. l) Beachwood Canyon Fire - May 12, 1961 On Friday, May 12, 1961, at 7:43 p.m., a brushfire began burning in the area of North Beachwood Drive and Ledgewood Drive, which is high in the Hollywood Hills about 1 mile above the heart of Hollywood. Later investigations disclosed that the fire started in the rear of 3009 Beachwood Drive. The hillsides in this area are very steep, and the streets are exceptionally narrow with many of them posted with "No Parking" signs on both sides. Many locations in this area, which is dotted with homes, can only be reached by one route. Numerous new homes cantilevered over steep hillsides which are heavily covered with brush, added to the conflagration-potential of this particular district, always considered by firefighters in the area as a possible stage for disaster. Due to the heavy brush, high winds, low humidity and rugged terrain the fire developed into major proportions within 15 minutes of the original alarm. A Major Emergency was declared at 7:59 p.m. Three conditions created problems for the Los Angeles Fire Department: first, the geographic location and prevailing weather conditions added greatly to the fire, the exceptionally narrow streets with some parked cars made the accessibility by fire fighting apparatus into the area extremely difficult. Second, this limited accessibility into the area forced the units that could get in to lay lines and protect homes, unable to concentrate on the raging brushfire. Third, the extremely hazardous wind conditions whipped the fire from one canyon to another faster than the apparatus could be strategically located. Many people were evacuated from their homes and a disaster shelter was set up at the Chermoya Street School, although there was no general order issued to evacuate the area. The Hollywood Stables in the Beachwood area was evacuated and approximately 60 horses were saved. A Girl Scout camp at the end of Canyon Drive was occupied by 146 girls; however, the Fire Department had the camp surrounded with adequate equipment and hose lines to prevent a major evacuation of the camp. Final tabulation showed that there were 8 homes totally destroyed, 9 homes damaged, and an estimated property loss of $500,000. All of the damaged homes were located in the area where the fire started and made its first fast run on Beachwood Drive, Deronda Drive, Rodgerton Drive, and Hollyridge Drive. The fire finally covered a 10-mile perimeter and burned 814 acres. It took almost 500 men to bring this fire under control. 83

105 units were on the scene. These included 55-engine companies (14 of these were from the County), 38 city tankers of various capacities; and, in addition, there were 12 miscellaneous Units. m) Laurel Canyon Fire - July 10, 1959 Fire loss figures for this emergency are difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy. The great majority of the physical loss is confined to 36 structures and six automobiles. Much of the loss will never be recovered through insurance payment. Claims suggest of competent evaluation, and a fair valuation of property damage might reach as high as $350,000. In spite of this sizable loss to the citizen victim, the absence of loss of life should be cause for real Thanksgiving. n) The La Tuna Canyon Brushfire - November 6, 1955 Two eight year old boys, in their own backyard in the 9600 block of La Tuna Canyon, were preparing a noonday feast when a strong easterly wind carried enough of their fire across a clearing to ignite the adjacent hillside brush. One of the boy's father attempted to extinguish the burning grass and brush with a garden hose. The wind quickly drove the fire through the tinder dry fuel and out of his reach. The father immediately called the fire department. The first-in Company reported a large, rapidly growing brushfire and immediately asked for additional help. This indicated a major brushfire was burning out of control, heralded in five nightmarish days and nights of wind driven fires in the rugged western half of the Verdugo Mountains. The 1955 La Tuna Canyon fire is actually a series of fires that burned in many directions at the beckon of wind and terrain conditions. At various times there were two or three major fire heads on the rampage simultaneously. A daily box score might help straighten out the maze of radio messages and on-the-scene reports that were issued. o) The 1938 Brush fire - November 23-30, 1938 A serious brushfire denuded a large area in the Santa Monica Mountains starting November 23, 1938 and burned out of control for several days, threatening much of the valuable property situated in and adjacent to the area. The point of origin was the Trippet Ranch in a valley tributary to Topanga Canyon, about three miles from the mouth of Topanga Canyon, a portion of which lies within the City of Los Angeles and the greater portion within Los Angeles County. The ranch house is situated on the City-limit line, and for a time there was some doubt as to whether the fire originated in City or County territory. It was determined that the point of origin was within the City. The fire was caused by the thoughtless act of the caretaker of the Trippet Ranch who had thrown out a pile of supposedly dead ashes near the edge of the brush. The live coals therein were carried into the brush by the high north winds prevailing, and due to the extremely low humidity at the time, the progress of the resulting fire was very rapid. Upon discovery, the caretaker attempted to extinguish the fire but failed. By the time the alarm was received the fire was under a great headway. 84

The first alarm received was at 12:49 p.m. on November 23rd. It was reported by a member of the Bureau of Fire Alarm, who had been sent to Fire Department Lookout Station No. 3 which is located on Temescal Peak, to repair No. 2 Mulholland telephone line, which services the Mountain Patrol stations and is connected with the County Forestry Station in Topanga Canyon. While engaged in this duty, he observed the fire soon after its beginning and seeing that it was attaining the headway rapidly, notified the Signal Office. p) The Griffith Park Brushfire - October 1933 The Griffith Park Fire occurred at 2:26 p.m. on October 3, 1933 in Block 36, Dam Canyon in the Mineral Wells Canyon area near the old Los Angeles Zoo. A group of 3,780 men was employed clearing brush as part of the Los Angeles County welfare relief program. A small fire had started at the bottom of a slope and a number of men were ordered or volunteered to fight the fire. A sudden wind change sent a shaft of flame up the slopes of Dam Canyon killing 29 workers from thermal burns and injuring more than 150 others. Engine 56, Hose 27 along with 50 Mountain Patrolmen responded and contained the fire to 46.83 acres.

D.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Brushfire Hazard The California State Hazard Mitigation Plan identifies fire vulnerability and potential losses on a watershed basis. Each type of fire risk within the South Coast Watershed is identified. These values are relative to those of the City of Los Angeles.
Risks to be addressed include: watershed values; ecosystem health; range forage; timberlands and woodlands; soils, riparian and aquatic habitats, recreation and open space, water quality and water supply. Fire Risk to Watersheds Fires can have significant adverse effects on watershed lands, watercourses, and water quality. Large, hot fires cause serious, immediate damage from which a watershed can take decades to recover. By burning off vegetation and exposing mineral soil, fire impairs the ability of a watershed to hold soil in place and to trap sediment before it enters stream systems. Loss of vegetation also means less water being absorbed by plants, causing a short-term increase in the quantity and the delivery rate of water entering streams. This can have significant effects downstream from the site of a fire. This increased runoff and its large sediment load can cause costly damage to downstream assets such as homes, roads, debris basins, and other infrastructure. It can also result in the loss of human life when at-risk residents are not evacuated. Increased sediment levels can overwhelm stream systems by filling in deep pools and their niches used by fish and other aquatic species, causing flooding and deposition in riparian 85

habitats, damaging small-scale and large-scale municipal water supply facilities, and even destroying structures. Over time, the cost of controlling erosion from wildfires has risen at a much faster rate than wildfire acreage. This is primarily due to the increasing value of downstream uses of high-quality water runoff. The Forest Service spent $48 million in the 1990s on post-fire soil-erosion compared to only $20 million in the 1970s (Robichaud, 2000). Municipal water districts spend far more than the Forest Service to address damages to storage, pumping, conveyance, and groundwater recharge facilities. In many areas, water districts have also increased expenditures to address the post-fire degradation in water quality. Fire Risk to Ecosystems As part of the ongoing national strategy to protect ecosystems from degradation, loss of diversity, and possible loss or conversion, a classification system was developed to assess firerelated risk to basic ecological health. A coarse-scale assessment of this measure, termed Condition Class, was conducted for the lower 48 states in support of the initial policy development for the National Fire Plan (Hardy et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2002; USFS, 1999). The process continues to be refined, to better meet the needs of local and regional efforts to reduce risks to ecosystem health and stability, while maintaining a centralized and consistent approach nationwide (Hann, 2002). The table below lists the definitions used to assess fire risks essentially an effort to recognize Type Change from native, single class environments. Of principal concern for the City of sage brush communities along the South Coast. Lands are indicating the relative risk to the ecosystem.
Low Condition Class 1 None, minimal

to ecosystem health. This is diversified fauna and flora to Los Angeles relates to coastal assigned one of three levels

Departure From Natural Regimens Vegetation Composition, Similar Structure, Fuels Fire Behavior, severity, Similar pattern Disturbance agents, Within natural range of Native species, variation Hydrologic Functions Increased smoke Low production Table D-1. Definitions used to assess fire risks.

Moderate Condition Class 2 Moderate Moderately altered Uncharacteristic Outside historical range of variation Moderate

High Condition Class 3 High Significantly different Highly uncharacteristic Substantially outside historical range of variation High

Condition classes are based on current vegetation type and structureas defined by California Wildlife Habitat Relationship type, size, and density and the unique combination of expected fire frequency and potential fire behavior. The distribution of condition classes throughout California has been mapped and is available from either California Department of Forestry and 86

Fire Protection - State Fire Plan, or in the State Hazard Mitigation Plan available at the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA). Fire Risk to Timberlands and Woodlands Californias extensive distribution of woodland vegetation, especially hardwood woodlands, provides key habitats for many species. The risk of habitat loss associated with fire in woodland areas is highly variable, due to both varying habitat quality and the unique fuel and vegetation response characteristics of specific areas. Habitat characteristics such as tree canopy height and closure, presence or absence of a developed shrub under story, and occurrence of special habitat elementssuch as snags and downed logsare important determinants of habitat quality for many species. There is little information on the role the structural characteristics of hardwood woodlands play in determining the level and value of associated wildlife use (Tietje et al., 1997). Consequently, it is difficult to reliably assess the effects of fire as a habitat-altering agent in hardwood areas. As recently as 2002, California researchers were unaware of any published research related to the effects of prescribed fire on California oak woodland habitats and associated wildlife species (Vreeland and Tietje, 2002). In general, fire influences on hardwood woodland habitat suitability are specific to animal and plant species, and are determined by fire intensity and frequency as an influence on landscape patterns of habitat. This includes such things as presence or absence of a shrub under story, post-fire oak resprouting ability, and amount of canopy cover present. Over the longer-term, fire frequency and intensity influences the presence and composition of under story species, young tree recruitment to the woodland stand, and ecosystem sustainability. Sapling recruitment may also be adversely influenced indirectly by fire induced population increases of certain wildlife that browse or otherwise damage saplings (Swiecki and Bernhardt, 2002). A light to moderately intense prescribed fire (flame heights less than one meter) recently conducted in mixed blue oak/coast live oak woodland in Californias central coast region, which resulted in no observed change in the relative abundance of small mammals, breeding birds, amphibians, or reptiles. Prescribed fire of this intensity was considered potentially beneficial by reducing competition from exotic annual grasses and stimulating shrub and trees vigor (Vreeland and Tietje, 2002). Habitat alteration that results in sparse to moderate levels of canopy closure may create conditions that support higher levels of biological diversity in some types of hardwood woodland. The California Wildlife Habitat Relationships System provides one tool to evaluate the effects of change in habitat use and value to terrestrial vertebrates, as a result of altered habitats structural conditions. Hardwood woodland habitat types such as blue oak, habitat alteration that results in sparse to moderate levels of canopy closure may create conditions that support higher levels of biological diversity in some types of hardwood woodland. The California Wildlife Habitat Relationships System provides one tool to evaluate the effects of 87

change in habitat use and value to terrestrial vertebrates, as a result of altered habitats structural conditions. Hardwood woodland habitat types such as blue oak, coastal oak, and valley oak support the greatest number of species that find optimal breeding habitat when canopy closure conditions are from sparse to moderate (10 to 60 percent). Roughly two-thirds of Californias hardwood woodlands are exposed to Very High or Extreme fire threats. While many areas may respond favorably to wildland fire, initial changes in the post-fire environment may cause temporary habitat loss and species dislocation. Fire Risks to Soils Fire presents a significant risk to soil, especially in denuded watersheds, through accelerated erosion potential in the immediate post-fire environment, particularly when subjected to severe rainstorms prior to any vegetation recovery (Wells et al., 1979). FRAP has developed a statewide risk assessment based on the expected marginal increase in surface erosion from a potential fire. Erosion is a natural process that occurs across a watershed at varying rates, depending on soil, geology, slope, vegetation, and precipitation. The intensity of a fire and the subsequent removal of vegetative cover increase the potential rate of soil erosion and new sediment sources. Wildfires affect surface erosion in a watershed by altering detachment, transport, and deposition of soil particles. Most wildfires create a patchwork of burned areas that vary in severity. Severely burned areas suffer increased erosion due to loss of the protective forest floor layer and creation of water-repellent soil conditions that can cause flooding, downstream sedimentation, and threats to human life and property. The effects of fire on soil resources are dependent on the intensity of the fire and are induced by soil heating and by removal of the protective cover of vegetation, litter, and duff. The magnitude of soil heating depends on fuel loading, fuel moisture content, fuel distribution, rates of combustion, soil texture, soil moisture content, and other factors. The movement of heat into the soil depends upon the peak temperature of the fire and how long the heat is present. Because fuels are not evenly distributed around a site, a single fire will cause varying levels of soil heating. The highest soil temperatures occur where fuel consumption is greatest and where the duration of burning is longest. Fires in forested areas often cause high soil temperatures due to heavy fuel accumulation. In contrast, rangeland fires are often shorter in duration and cause less soil heating because of their comparatively light fuel load. Fire Risks to Riparian and Aquatic Habitats Wildfire can produce a wide range of water quality and aquatic habitat outcomes, from beneficial to catastrophic. Wildfire outcomes are determined by weather, fuels, terrain, and to a lesser extent, suppression efforts. Large wildfires pose the greatest risk to water quality and riparian habitats. 88

If a wildfire encounters fuel levels that have been reduced through prescribed burning and/or mechanical means, there is a good chance the fire would produce conditions more favorable to maintaining good water quality and aquatic habitats. Highly destructive fires are thus minimized. Quick, cool and spotty fires tend to maintain water quality and aquatic habitats. These fires leave a mosaic of burned and unburned vegetation. Riparian vegetation often remains largely intact, due to the higher moisture content of the vegetation and soils. The lower temperatures and shorter fire-residence times mean that soils can still absorb precipitation. The spottiness of these fires means some soil cover is retained. Fire Risk to Recreation and Open Space After a wildfire, significant alteration of watershed lands and the associated stream systems is noticeable for periods varying from a few years to decades. In the short term, the presence of partially-burnt vegetation reduces recreational and open space values. Fires can also destroy campgrounds, trails, bridges, and other recreational facilities within the area. Increased amounts of downstream sedimentation may significantly affect streams and lakes, which tend to be the most heavily used spots within larger recreational areas. As the vegetation grows back and damaged recreational infrastructures are replaced, the recreational and open space values increase. However, it may take decades before vegetation types such as mature forests return to their pre-burn character. Grasslands and shrublands, on the other hand, can return to their pre-burn character within a decade. The recovery of riparian areas depends on the level of alteration caused by the increased sediment delivery and the restoration of the site through normal hydrologic cycles of in-stream downcutting and deposition. Fire Risk to Downstream Water Quality and Water Supply Infrastructure Wildfires can potentially affect water quality through increased sedimentation and increased turbidity, and through increases in nutrient loadings. Concentration of nutrients (phosphorous and nitrogen) is increased from burned vegetation and delivered to streams through surface runoff. Stream temperatures often increase after fire occurs, typically through the removal of overhead protective vegetation. Elevated stream temperatures are detrimental to most cold water fish species. Water delivery systems may be dramatically affected by fire. With the exception of the North Coast, most watersheds in California have extensive downstream water supply infrastructures serving rural residents, larger municipalities and agricultural users. Increased sediment can decrease storage capacity in dams and reservoirs. For example, the Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority estimates needing to spend more than $40 million per year, for a number of years, to mitigate the downstream damages of the 2003 fires in the upper watershed of the Santa Ana River (SAWPA, 2004). The largest 89

component would go towards mitigating the damage to water quality from the heavy salt load in the runoff. The removal of sediment from conveyance structures, recharge facilities, and wetlands represents the second largest component. Water agencies, including SAWPA, are increasingly looking at upstream investments that could be more cost-effective than after the fact mitigation efforts. Erosion is a natural process that occurs across a watershed at varying rates, depending on soils, geology, slope, vegetation, and precipitation. The intensity of a fire and the subsequent removal of vegetative cover increase the potential rate of soil erosion and new sediment sources. Wildfires affect surface erosion in a watershed by altering detachment, transport, and deposition of soil particles. Most wildfires create a patchwork of burned areas that vary in severity. Severely burned areas suffer increased erosion due to loss of the protective forest floor layer and creation of water-repellent soil conditions that can cause flooding, downstream sedimentation, and threats to human life and property. D.2.1 Identifying Assets Areas affected by Fire Hazard within the City of Los Angeles are mapped in Figure D-1. Detailed exposure of Critical Infrastructure to fire hazard is presented in table D-2. Critical Infrastructure is presented in detail in Appendix D. Potable Water and Power Facilities The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals. GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from CalEMA Mitigation Office. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. DWP History with Brush fires Historically, DWP has not had major damage from brushfires. However, in October of 2003, during the California wildfires a major transmission line in the Victorville area suffered great smoke damage. The repair of the line is estimated at $4M and no customer outages resulted from this brushfire. A small fire in two palm trees on a California State freeway right-of-way beneath three transmission lines caused an outage of 142,000 customers for a period of 23 minutes to 42 minutes in the North Hollywood and Van Nuys areas of Los Angeles on August 28, 1993. This disruption to the LADWP power system also caused an interruption of power being transmitted to the City of Burbank, which experienced an outage of 49,875 customers for a period of time from 8 minutes to 45 minutes. 90

Figure D-1. Critical Response Facilities identified in the Fire Hazard area. Fire hazard data is provided by City of Los Angeles Fire Department.

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Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Brushfire Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. The City of Los Angeles has received maps of these facilities from the California Energy Commission (CEC) with the agreement that the maps will not be made available to the public. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by The Gas Company; therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Brushfire Zone The Communication System (telephone system) in the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private providers. This information, like that of electricity, water, and natural gas, is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since it will be disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned. Critical Operating Facilities in the Brushfire Zone Critical operating facilities in the City of Los Angeles are identified as the facilities considered critical for continuity of government following a major disaster. These facilities house City Departments and staff critical to providing services to the public following a disaster. Big Nine Facilities contain the largest number of departments and staff within them. Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA City facilities do not contain staff from proprietary departments such as the Department of Water and Power, Harbor Department, or the Los Angeles World Airports. Proprietary departments generate their own revenue but are still owned by the City. Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA facilities are considered general fund departments. For the purpose of this report, only Big Nine buildings, and proprietary department facilities are considered critical operating facilities. Titles of these Big Nine facilities are listed below: LA City Hall City Hall South City Hall East City Commercial Offices (Personnel) Piper Tech Parker Center San Pedro Municipal Building Marvin Braude Building West L.A. Municipal Building

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D.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Estimated replacement costs have been determined for all Critical Infrastructure including Big Nine Facilities, Critical Response Facilities and Critical Infrastructure. See Appendix D for detailed potential losses from Fire Hazard.
Table D-2. City facilities associated with High Fire Hazard. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Number Total Replacement (million) Big Nine 0 -Critical Response Fire* 14 308 Police** 0 -Hospitals 3 N/A Schools 85 N/A Rec & Parks 99 TBD Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 123,941 16,600 Commercial 32,680 10,020 *Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard Fire Station in City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station.

Potable Water and Power Facilities in Brushfire Areas DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities because of security concerns. It also includes the individual property values (replacement values) for facilities along with a total value amount for facilities falling in the various hazard zones. The GIS Maps to match up with this numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. Damage to the identified Water System facilities can severely impact the quality and quantity of water and its distribution. Interruption of water service can significantly impact public health, sanitation, business operations, and reduce the Citys ability to fight structure fires and wildland fires. Degradation of water quality for consumption can pose a significant threat to the health and safety of the people of Los Angeles. Water quality can become degraded due to damage to the water treatment, filtration and distribution system or by the introduction of toxic substances to reservoirs or other water system facilities. Public safety can also be impacted by interruptions in water distribution services. Damage to the identified Power System facilities can produce insufficient quantities of power if source and distribution infrastructure is impaired or destroyed.

D.3 Analysis of Future Development

The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to brushfire hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates. 93

E. PROFILE OF FLOOD HAZARD

Flooding - the accumulation of water within a water body and the overflow of excess water onto adjacent floodplain lands- was identified as a High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles. Based on information provided by the Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, flooding in the Southwest United States can be separated into several types: Riverine (overflow from a river, channel, flash floods, alluvial fan floods, and dam break floods) Local drainage or high groundwater levels (Groundwater is very close to the surface in the Wilshire District, feeding the La Brea tar pits, which once entrapped prehistoric animals) Fluctuating lake levels Coastal flooding (including storm surges and tsunamis) Debris flows Subsidence

E.1 Identifying Flood Hazard Los Angeles County increased population by almost 270% between 1940 and 1990. This growth and urbanization have increased storm water runoff by creating impermeable foundations and surfaces which decrease the amount of water percolating into the soil. In turn, more runoff enters local storm drains and flood channels.
Land use planning is important in protecting the public from storm water related hazards. The State Subdivision Map Act allows local jurisdictions to disapprove permits for construction of structures in flood hazard or inundation areas if the hazards cannot be mitigated adequately. The Flood Control Act of 1960 authorized the Army Corps to provide flood maps and information to local jurisdictions to assist them in land use planning. Subsequent federal and state (Cobey-Alquist Floodplain Management Act, Water Code Section 8401c) legislation encouraged local land use planning, regulations and enforcement in flood prone areas by linking insurance rates and flood management funding to the adequacy of local regulations. Flood hazard areas, or floodplains which are subject to 100-year floods, comprise approximately 30 square miles of the City. These areas were mapped by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which deemed that approximately 15 square miles of the hazard areas were buildable. FEMA estimated that over 30,100 structures were located in the hazard areas. To comply with the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, which increased the insurance rates set forth in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and required local floodplain regulations 94

to have enforcement provisions, the City of Los Angeles adopted the 1980 Flood Hazard Management Specific Plan (amended in 1988 by Ordinance 163,913). The ordinance establishes annexation procedures and permit review and mitigation procedures for issuance of development permits in areas prone to flooding, mud flow or coastal inundation. It also specifies the responsibilities of City agencies which process the permits. Mitigation measures include relocation of structures within a property, increased base elevation, additional structural reinforcement, anchoring, and installation of protective barriers. A permit can be denied if mitigation is deemed insufficient to protect human life. Compliance with the National Flood Insurance Act makes the City eligible for FEMA funds and reduced Federal flood insurance rates. In addition, the General Plan Community Plan elements establish land use designations (zoning categories) for all properties within the City, in compliance with State land use requirements. Flood inundation areas generally are classified in the lowest density zoning categories. In general, flood control authority can be summarized as follows: (1) the United States Army Corps of Engineers oversees construction of projects associated with navigable bodies of water, including the Los Angeles River-related flood control systems and ocean harbors; (2) the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works oversees construction of ancillary Los Angeles County Flood Control District facilities and designs and/or maintains the flood control drainage facilities, including the Los Angeles River system (under the guidance of the Army Corps) to mitigate 100-year and 500-year storms; and (3) the City Bureau of Engineering oversees construction and maintenance of the Citys storm drainage system which is designed to mitigate 10-25 year magnitude storms. Various City agencies implement development permit, slope stability and watershed protection regulations. The flood control and storm drainage systems are comprised of the following principal features: (1) debris basins at the mouths of canyons to slow the flow of water and trap boulders, rocks and debris and to prevent clogging of the flow channels; (2) flood control basins (dams) at the upstream portions of the rivers to contain water and regulate downstream flow; (3) containment of over 400 miles of river and tributary systems within mostly open concrete flood control channels; (4) streets, gutters and catch basins to collect and route surface flows to storm drains which carry urban run-off to larger tributary systems and, ultimately, to the flood control channels and ocean; (5) spreading grounds in the San Fernando Valley to impound storm water and allow it to percolate into the ground where it replenishes the underground water system; and (6) associated bridges, reservoirs and water storage facilities. The purpose of the flood control system is to carry storm waters as quickly as possible to the Santa Monica and San Pedro (harbor area) bays to prevent flooding. Before the flood control system was built, the Los Angeles River and its tributaries flowed freely from the Santa Susana, Santa Monica and San Gabriel Mountains to the sea. A swamp existed in what is now the Central City. Figueroa Street was called Grasshopper Street and the area became known as Grasshopper Gulch due to the insects which lived in the swamp and plagued that part of the community. Today ground water still is very close to the surface in the 95

Wilshire District, feeding the La Brea tar pits, which once entrapped pre-historic animals, and requiring special building design considerations to protect against flooding of subsurface structures. Brea is Spanish for tar. The City terrain can be classified as 75 percent alluvial plain and 25 percent rugged canyons and hills. Elevations range from 5,074 feet at Sister Elsie Peak in the San Gabriel Mountains to nearly mean sea level in the southwestern part of the City. With the cooperation of City, County, and Federal agencies, Los Angeles has an extensive drainage system to protect its citizens and property from flood damage. The City, County, and Federal facilities have capacities for a 10-year event, a 50-year event, and a 100-year event, respectively. This system includes open flood control channels, flood control basins, storm drains, debris basins, detention basins, and spreading grounds. Within the broad context of regional flood control the Citys role is relatively small but critical. It is responsible for construction and maintenance of a storm drainage system within the Citys boundaries. The first drainage system was constructed by settlers after the City was established in 1784. Zanjas (ditches) were dug to trap and guide water for drinking, irrigation and drainage. During the 19th Century, wooden (typically redwood) and pottery pipes were added. The first large publicly constructed drainage system may have been the system installed by the Army Corps during the Civil War to drain ponds and wet lands and supply water to the Armys Drum Barracks at Wilmington. Los Angeles City committed itself to construction of a drainage system after the devastating floods of 1867-68. Contrary to common practice of the time, the storm drainage system was separated from the sewer (i.e., wastewater) system and remains separate today, except for treated wastewater which is discharged into the flood control system or directly into the ocean. The separation was established following an 1870 report, by Frank Lecouvreur, the Citys first Engineer, which reported that separation would prevent overwhelming of the sewer system by flood waters associated with periodic major storms. By 1879, a sewer system to take wastewater from what is now the civic center to the ocean was under construction. In addition, Lecouvreur designed an east-west street system to assist the flow of rain waters via a street gutter system. The gutters carried storm and daily runoff water via the zanjas to ponds and other natural collection areas or to rivers. The City Bureau of Engineering is charged with overseeing construction of the Citys storm drainage system. In addition, the Bureau, under contract to the County, sometimes designs and constructs sections of the County Flood Control system. The Citys storm drainage system is integrated with the County Flood Control system and drainage systems of neighboring jurisdictions. The City system consists of streets (including gutters), approximately 1,900 miles of storm drains beneath the streets, approximately 35,000 catch basins which collect runoff from the streets, several large spreading grounds and several pumping facilities. During dry weather the 96

combined County and City storm drainage systems carry tens of millions of gallons of runoff (e.g., treated wastewater, lawn irrigation, etc.) daily. During storms it carries billions of gallons of storm runoff per day. Runoff is carried via open flood control channels directly to the ocean or to collection systems, as envisioned by Lecouvreur in 1870. Until recent times, the drainage system primarily was financed with public funds or by bond programs. The State Subdivision Map Act of 1907 provided for dedication of land for public purposes. In 1911, the State Improvement Act empowered local governments to use easements, eminent domain, assessment districts and subdivision procedures to secure streets, sewers, drainage and other infrastructure systems. The Subdivision Map Act was amended in 1921 to allow cities to require easements for drainage purposes, but legal challenges prevented them from exacting land from property owners. Therefore, dedication of land for public purposes generally continued to be voluntary or was secured through purchase following costly and often lengthy condemnation proceedings. With limited funding available for purchase of easements and construction, development of the system was slow until the Great Depression when federal and state public works programs for the unemployed provided millions of dollars for system construction. A Citys right to withhold building permits for noncompliance with public dedication requirements was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 1966 (Southern Pacific Railroad versus the City of Los Angeles). This decision strengthened the Citys ability to secure drainage facilities in conjunction with new development. Local authority was further strengthened by the California Environmental Quality Act of 1971 which required development projects to mitigate potential environmental impacts of proposed projects. Under the State Subdivision Map Act (California Government Code Sections 66410ff), environmental mitigation and City regulations, the City in recent times has required owners of proposed development projects to construct drainage systems to accommodate runoff associated with a project and/or to protect a project and adjacent properties from storm water related hazards associated with the project. This has resulted in a systematic construction of drainage facilities in association with new development projects. Drainage facilities are built to design specifications determined by the Citys Bureau of Engineering. The Bureau in the 1920s established a hydrologic testing laboratory, later called the Hydraulic Research Laboratory. Using mathematical models and dynamic physical models, the lab developed and refined drainage system design and design standards. For specific projects its models were designed to take into account particular site specific factors such as degree of slope, susceptibility to flooding, anticipated velocity of water. The lab also designed associated equipment, including an efficient grate configuration for catch basin grates so grates would not be hazardous to bicyclists, and developed engineering aids such as hydraulic tables, charts and graphs. In the 1980s and 1990s, the lab focused on designing wastewater related hydraulic structures. The laboratory incorporated computer technology to assist in hydraulic analysis. However, despite tremendous advances, computer modeling technology is not yet able to achieve the detail and accuracy provided by the labs physical models. The labs design innovations and standards have been used not only in development of the Los Angeles storm water and wastewater systems and by the Citys engineers, but have been used by other jurisdictions and private engineers. 97

With the cooperation of City, County, State and Federal agencies, Los Angeles has an extensive drainage system to protect its citizens and property from flood damage. The system includes open channels, flood control basins, storm drains, catch basins, culverts, low flow diversion structures, pumping plants, debris basins, detention basins, and spreading grounds. The primary agencies that share flood control responsibilities within the City of Los Angeles are the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps), the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works (County), the City of Los Angeles, and Caltrans. Each agency exercises jurisdiction over the flood control facilities they own and operate. Since each agency is responsible for complying with varying regulations, policies, and design standards, flood control facilities throughout the City can differ. Typically, City and County storm drains are designed to carry flow from a 10-year storm within the pipe. Streets and gutters are also considered part of the storm drain system. The combination of storm drain pipe and street (curb to curb) typically provides capacity for a 25-year storm. Army Corps facilities are typically designed for a 100-year storm. In 1914, the State Legislature passed an act creating the Los Angeles County Flood Control District (now known as the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works) to control floods and conserve water. Early bond issues financed construction of 14 dams in the San Gabriel Mountains. In addition, flood channel modifications were undertaken and debris basins were constructed to trap sediment. In 1936, Federal legislation made the Army Corps a participant in Los Angeles Countys comprehensive flood protection program. The Army Corps Los Angeles River, San Gabriel River and Ballona Creek projects included the construction of 5 flood storage reservoirs or basins, 24 debris basins, 95 miles of main channel, 191 miles of tributary channels and two jetties. Together, these two agencies are responsible for all of the major flood control facilities that protect the City of Los Angeles. E.1.1 Extent of Flood Hazard in Los Angeles Storms which cause a high magnitude of water flow are potentially the most hazardous water activity confronting the City. The Los Angeles region is a semiarid region with rainfall which averages 15 inches per year. Rains tend to occur in heavy, short duration storms between November and April. In a 100-year storm, 10 to 24 inches of rain may fall within 24-hours or as much as one inch of rain a minute for a brief duration. Severe storms are periodic and may not occur for several years. Paving of the City with structures and impermeable surfaces has eliminated natural ponding areas which allowed water to percolate into the soil. This has amplified water runoff and velocity of runoff thereby increasing the potential for flooding. Water rushes from streets and other impermeable surfaces along the path of least resistance to the ocean. The major causes of flooding in Los Angeles are short-duration, high-intensity storms. The Spanish Mission fathers who traveled between San Diego and San Francisco in 1769-70 first 98

recorded flooding in the southern California area. In the 1800s, major floods occurred in 1810, 1825, 1862, 1884, 1889, and 1891. The Los Angeles River has altered its point of discharge to the ocean numerous times in the distant past, which is consistent with the alluvial nature of the Los Angeles basin. The flood of 1825 was severe enough to change the course of both the Santa Ana and Los Angeles Rivers. The most recent relocation occurred in the Flood of 1862 when the mouth of the Los Angeles River moved from Ballona Creek to its present location in Long Beach Harbor. In the 1900s, significantly damaging flood flows occurred in 1914, 1916, 1927, 1934, 1938, 1941, 1943, 1952, 1956, 1969, 1978, 1980, and 1983. While the largest flood was probably in the 1800s (1862), the most damaging flood took place in the 1900s (1969). The historical record indicates that large floods occur infrequently in Los Angeles, but the magnitude of their destruction is enormous, especially as development in the floodplain dramatically increased. Although a flood with a 100-year or greater frequency has not occurred in the 20th century, floods of near this magnitude have occurred in the past and caused extensive damages throughout the basin. Historical records of the United States Geological Survey indicate that the 1-in-100 year flood flow has been exceeded in the Los Angeles River Basin at the Tujunga Canyon in March 1938, and Topanga and Malibu Creeks in January 1969. E.1.2 Background In 1968, the U.S. Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act which established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP was broadened and modified with the passage of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 and later, the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994. The NFIP is a federal program administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with the purpose of reducing future flood losses. The mechanism to accomplish this is the requirement that communities participating in the program commit to the adoption and enforcement of minimum floodplain management standards. The NFIP makes federallybacked flood insurance available in communities that adopt and enforce floodplain management ordinances to reduce future flood damage. The NFIP, through partnerships with communities, the insurance industry, and the lending industry, helps reduce flood damage by nearly $800 million a year. Further, buildings constructed in compliance with NFIP building standards suffer 77 percent less damage annually than those not built in compliance. In addition, every $3 paid in flood insurance claims saves $1 in disaster assistance payments. The City of Los Angeles joined the regular phase of the NFIP on December 2, 1980. Compliance and ongoing participation in the NFIP ensures that all City residents can purchase flood insurance. Compliance with the NFIP also required the City to adopt and enforce a Specific Plan for the Management of Flood Hazards. The NFIP Community Rating System (CRS) was implemented in 1990 as a program for recognizing and encouraging community floodplain management activities that exceed the 99

minimum NFIP standards. The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 codified the CRS in the NFIP. FMP and Community Rating System Floodplain Management Plan (FMP) is a principal activity of the Citys compliance with the Community Rating System. The Floodplain Management Plan (FMP) has been developed to: Identify Citys known flood problem areas. Establish goals, objectives, and policies and implementation programs to reduce flooding and flood related hazards. Ensure the natural and beneficial functions of our floodplains are protected. The development, modification, and revision of the FMP are accomplished through the direction and oversight of a FMP Committee and under the supervision of a professional planner. The City has maximized the involvement of the public and the professional planner throughout the FMP Committee process. The initial Floodplain Management Report was created in 2001. The updated plan was adopted by the City Council under Council file No. 100498 on April 16, 2010 (see Appendix F for FMP information). Under the CRS, flood insurance premium rates are adjusted to reflect the reduced flood risk resulting from community activities that meet the three goals of the CRS: (1) reduce flood losses; (2) facilitate accurate insurance rating; and (3) promote the awareness of flood insurance. By continuing to implement more than the minimum required NFIP standards for flood hazard planning, the City of Los Angeles has been a voluntary participant in the CRS since 1991. Floodplain management planning is a principal activity of the Citys compliance with the CRS. The CRS recognizes 18 creditable activities, organized under four categories (numbered 300 through 600): Public Information, Mapping and Regulations, Flood Damage Reduction, and Flood Preparedness. Accumulation of credit points results in the assignment of a CRS classification. Flood insurance premium rates are reduced as the CRS classification decreases. There are a total of ten CRS classes: Class 1 requires the most credit points and gives the largest premium reduction; Class 10 receives no premium reduction. In November 2001, the City Council adopted the first Floodplain Management Plan (FMP) for the City and FEMA approved the FMP which upgraded the Citys CRS classification to level 8. As of April 2010 FMP update, the City of Los Angeles maintains a CRS rating of 7, an advance that occurred in October 2005. The rating provides for a 15% insurance premium reduction for City residents in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), and 5% discount for all other areas in the City. Overall, the citizens of the City of Los Angeles benefited in approximately half a million dollars per year in flood insurance savings. Existing City Regulations 100

The City Charter sets forth the authority for the establishment of specific plans as may be required to ensure the implementation of the General Plan and to comply with programs such as the NFIP. The Citys Specific Plan for the Management of Flood Hazards (Specific Plan) was originally established by Ordinance No. 154,405 and amended most recently in July 1998 by Ordinance No. 172,081. Ordinance No. 172,081 designates the City Engineer as the Flood Hazard Mitigation Coordinator for the City. The Flood Hazard Mitigation Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the implementation of this ordinance among the Planning, Building and Safety, and Public Works Departments. The Specific Plan is the key component of the Citys participation in the NFIP. The City Engineer has primary responsibility for implementing and managing the activities required within the NFIP. This authority is delegated to the Citys NFIP-CRS Coordinator, who is also certified as a Floodplain Manager. In addition, FEMA continually modifies and updates NFIP requirements for local agencies with the long-range goal of public safety and reduced flood damage. Repetitive Loss Properties In July 1994, the City of Los Angeles adopted a Repetitive Loss Plan as a part of our compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program Community Rating System. The Plan was approved by FEMA in September 1994. The development and implementation of the FMP will replace the existing Repetitive Loss Plan and corresponding implementation activities related to repetitive loss properties. A Repetitive Loss Property (RLP) is one for which two or more claims of $1,000 or more have been paid by the NFIP within any given 10-year period since 1978. The objective of the FMP is to provide programs with specific guidance for potential mitigation measures and activities to best address the problems and needs associated with RLPs. As of 2010, there are currently 146 RLPs within the City of Los Angeles, with 120 classified as active and 26 inactive. The RLPs have been identified and grouped by watershed area and flood hazard. The two watersheds that contain RLPs are the Los Angeles River and Ballona Creek. Flood hazards are described by hillside and non-hillside areas. The four groups of RLPs are Los Angeles River Hillside, Los Angeles River Non-Hillside, Ballona Creek Hillside and Ballona Creek Non-Hillside. The City has developed the FMP with the intent that the goals, objectives, policies and implementation programs apply to all properties within the City. However, RLPs also have a specific objective, policies and programs to address the problems unique to these individual parcels or areas. Detailed information on the most recent City of Los Angeles Floodplain Management Plan can be found at http://eng.lacity.org/projects/fmp/pdf/FMP_Final.pdf. The following are the historical storms in the Los Angeles area:

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February 27, 2010 Storm A heavy storm system moved over the southern California region. Residents and motorists in and below recently burned areas were put on alert as the potential for flash flooding and debris flows could hit. A flash flood warning was in effect for the Station and Morris burn areas in Los Angeles County. Law enforcement had already reported some minor debris flow occurring over the burn area. Rainfall at these rates caused flash flooding and debris flows in and below the recent burn areas, particularly the station, Morris and Santa Anita burn areas in Los Angeles County and the Jesusita, La Brea Gap and Tea burn areas in Santa Barbara County. People in the watch area were warned to remain alert and follow directions of emergency preparedness officials. November 26, 2008 Flood Flash flood warnings were issued in wildfire-charred areas in Ventura, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino and Orange counties. In northern Los Angeles County rain fell at nearly an inch per hour. Homeowners stacked sandbags to protect their homes. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger ordered state agencies to prepare to aid local agencies in case of disaster. Rains across Southern California, led to flash flood warnings in wildfire burn areas and residents whose homes were spared in recent fires faced mudslides. An early morning downpour spurred an evacuation order in Orange County, where at least 1,500 people in Yorba Linda were told to leave their homes. Voluntary evacuations had already been called for in the city of 65,000 southeast of Los Angeles, which was torched by the huge Freeway Complex fire earlier November. The storm flooded and forced the closure of part of Interstate 5 in San Diego. All the freeway's northbound lanes at Palm Avenue were shut at about 2 a.m. At least two vehicles hydroplaned in a few feet of water and crashed, according to the California Highway Patrol. A series of wildfires stoked by Santa Ana winds damaged or destroyed about 1,000 homes in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, Santa Barbara and San Bernardino counties this month. Those burn areas combined equaled about 65 square miles. In addition, October wildfires burned dozens more homes and scorched the equivalent of more than 35 square miles. More than 135 members of the California Conservation Corps were sent to canyons in Yorba Linda to place sandbags and clean out culverts and spillways to handle runoff. Heavy equipment operators placed lines of portable concrete barriers below the denuded hillsides of Chino Hills State Park to redirect potential storm flows away from Yorba Linda homes. Ninety percent of the wilderness park burned. Without the firerelated risks, rain might be appreciated in parched southern California because Downtown Los Angeles had recorded only .27 inch of precipitation since the July 1 start of the rain year 1.35 inches below normal for this time. 102

September 22, 2007 Flood Floods resulted from an cutoff or "orphan" low-pressure system, had began on coastal areas including Malibu, Long Beach and western Ventura County with light rainfall for much of the day. By 8 p.m intense precipitation affected from Orange County to Santa Barbara County. Light rain began in downtown Los Angeles shortly after 8 p.m. The low-pressure system formed in the Aleutian Islands and was driven to the L.A. region by an uncharacteristically southern-tending jet stream. The jet stream then moved northward again, essentially orphaning the low-pressure system just off Southern California's coast. February 20-21, 2005 Flood Six deaths were attributed to the February 2005 storm, including two people killed by mudslides that crashed into their bedrooms, and a cross-country skier buried by an avalanche north of Lake Tahoe. Another was a civil engineer who fell into a huge sinkhole in the San Fernando Valley. Two others died in traffic accidents. During the morning rush on Los Angeles's highways, the police reported some 120 accidents, up from about 50 a week in dry weather. A two-mile section of the Pacific Coast Highway near Malibu was closed by a landslide. The Hollywood Freeway was under several feet of water for four hours; some drivers, their doors jammed, escaped through windows. In Silver Lake, a hilly neighborhood near downtown Los Angeles, a house slid 30 feet down a hill, its two occupants still inside, and was prevented from sliding more only by a robust pepper tree. The residents were unharmed, but suddenly homeless. Another hill gave way in the exclusive Los Angeles quarter of Bel-Air, northwest of Beverly Hills, sending a swimming pool, the 20,000 gallons it contained, and the backyard that surrounded it tumbling into a neighbor's property below. Six damaged houses were redtagged in Pasadena and their residents ordered to leave. In Highland Park, just north of downtown Los Angeles, four houses on a sodden, slipping hillside suffered a similar fate, with their owners evacuated during the night. After surveying the wreckage of homes in Silver Lake and Highland Park, Mayor James K. Hahn of Los Angeles estimated citywide damage at $10 million and asked Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger to urge President Bush to declare a state of emergency for the City, which would make it eligible for federal disaster assistance. 1982-83, 1992, 1993, 1995, & 1998 Floods Precipitation episodes in Los Angeles, with a few notable exceptions, are largely caused by extra tropical disturbances approaching California from the west or northwest during the winter season.

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In wintertime, southern California is on the southern margin of the northern hemisphere jet stream and receives from ten to thirty of these north Pacific weather systems per year. Classical synoptic surface analyses show cold maritime polar air masses dropping southward from the Gulf of Alaska during the winter and early spring months. These cold air intrusions interact with relatively warm water in the eastern Pacific, and with other moisture sources streaming toward California from the west or south. With upper air support, surface waves can develop along the frontal boundary of cold air and move over southern California. The cold air may trigger enough atmospheric instability to generate cold core thunderstorms, which on occasion can spawn a funnel cloud or small tornado. As a winter storm approaches southern California from the west, moist subtropical air may become entrained within the system and depending on the continuity of the eastward movement of the storm produce copious amounts of moisture across the coastal plain and mountains adjacent to Los Angeles. In such events, the transverse and coastal ranges of Los Angeles County act as a continental catchers mitt, capturing huge amounts of water within the Los Angeles Basin. The flow of moisture from the southwest is associated with some of the heaviest rainfalls in southern California. Due to its origins near the Hawaiian Islands, this southwesterly flow of moisture into California is sometimes called the Pineapple Connection. Despite evidence to the contrary, there is a common misconception even among some Californians that it never rains in southern California. A study of record rainfall events that occurred in the State during the 1900s gives an interesting insight into this myth. In the years from 1900 to 1943, a clear majority of severe storms that occurred in California also affected southern California. Of the twelve years with very heavy precipitation and flooding during this period, all but four impacted southern California. However, from 1943 to 1992 (a period of almost fifty years) extreme rainfalls occurred in southern California on only five occasions, although central and northern California were affected in fourteen separate years. This time span covered an era of incredible growth within the Los Angeles Basin and the concurrent flood control construction project which tamed the flood-prone Los Angeles River. With a lessening of the threat of floods, and very few major storms through five decades, it is no wonder, then, that southern California developed a reputation for dry and benign climate. Since 1992, however, that shopping mall climate reputation has begun to tarnish or, perhaps rust is the better term. Beginning in that year, the decade of the nineties turned decidedly soggy. In fact, heavy rainfall events were noted in the basin during the years 1992, 93, 95, 97, and 98 helping to make the decade of the nineties the wettest since the 1930s and early 40s. It is interesting to note that the heaviest rainfalls recorded within the State of California have occurred on the mountain slopes of Los Angeles County. Californias greatest 24104

hour rainfall, 26.12 inches, occurred at Hoegees below Mount Wilson on the slopes of the San Gabriel Range on January 23, 1943. In fact, the mountains which drain into the Los Angeles Basin have the highest probable 24-hour maximum precipitation rates to be found anywhere in the continental United States with theoretical maximum of more than 48 inches near Mount Wilson! Short duration maximum rainfall rates are remarkable in the Los Angeles area. The heaviest rainfall observed within the Los Angeles County historic record occurred on January 4, 1995, when 2.60 inches of rain fell in one hour in the Long Beach area at Signal Hill. In the San Gabriel Mountains, where heavy orographic rains would be expected, the record hourly rainfall is a more modest 2.00 inches, set January 4, 1926 at Opids Camp, north of Mount Wilson. (Another storm in the same location produced 0.65 inches of rain in one minute in April of that year.) El Nino effect is one of several major ocean-atmosphere teleconnection patterns that influence the weather around the globe. In fact, for southern California, it is arguably the most significant of all such patterns. Due to its importance, it has been extensively studied by researchers since the 1960s. With the success of certain predictors related to these studies, the popular media have linked the Spanish name with rainy episodes in California to an almost tiresome extent. There is now little doubt that inter-annual variation in rainfall patterns in southern California is related to sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies in the Pacific Ocean. Equatorial Eastern Pacific SST maxima are the signature of the initialization of an El Nino pattern. Eastern Pacific SST maxima seem to cause the strengthening and southward shift of the northern hemisphere jet stream. The result is usually above normal rainfall for southern California. In a comparison of twenty-three El Nino events of various magnitudes (as identified by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) with the Los Angeles Civic Center rainfall record, it was determined that above normal rainfall at Los Angeles occurred in 78% of the El Nino years, with precipitation during the selected years averaging 134% of normal. The 1982-1983 El Nino phenomena had a slight effect on the temperature in October 1982 and January 1983, but the rest of the months remained unaffected. Precipitation was effected in these same years in the months of September, November, February, March, and April. As seen in the 1976-1977 El Nino years, precipitation varied considerably, while temperatures varied much more moderately. Therefore El Nino again showed some climatic influence. In the 1997-1998 El Nino years, temperatures were affected slightly in Los Angeles, especially during the months of August, September, and October. The slight rise shows El Ninos minimal effect on temperature. Precipitation in those years was more 105

dramatically effected as shown during the months of December, February, and May. The increased rainfall was a direct result of El Ninos influence on the climate. However, it should be noted that strongly positive El Nino anomalies have invariably produced heavy rainfall in southern California. Of the four strong El Nino anomalies recorded in the past century, all resulted in seasonal rain totals in excess of 30 inches at the Civic Center, with an average of 215% of normal. Heavy rainfall seasons in the Los Angeles area are almost always followed by unusually dry years. Heavy seasonal rainfall, defined as 25 or more inches of rain, occurred ten times during the 122-year period of record. In nine of the years following heavy rainfall, precipitation was below normal. The averages are impressive: Wet years averaged 30.48 inches of rain or 202% of normal. During January and March of 1995, much of Los Angeles was struck repeatedly by very strong storm systems laden with Pacific moisture and extremely heavy precipitation, causing extensive property damage. On January 4, 1995 a storm caused about six million dollars damage, mostly as a result of urban flooding from record rainfalls in the south portion of the Los Angeles Basin. Between 3:00 and 4:30 p.m. on January 4th, the area in south Los Angeles County between Long Beach and Carson was deluged with up to 3.40 inches of rain, while a gauge near LAX received only 0.12 inches and the Pomona area reported 0.55 inches. Two hundred structures were flooded and one hundred vehicles abandoned. Flood control facilities operated at peak capacity at many locations for short periods of time during the event, but the Los Angeles River did not approach capacity because intense rainfall occurred over only a relatively small portion of the lower drainage basin. The January storms resulted in a 430% increase to the normal January rainfall and the March storms resulted in a 267% increase to normal March rainfall. In 1998, another strong El Nino episode produced the wettest February of all time at downtown Los Angeles, with 13.68 inches recorded during the month. Over nineteen inches fell at Montebello Fire Station, just east of the downtown weather station. In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, seasonal rainfall records were established at six key area stations, including Chatsworth with an incredible 44.19 inches. For the entire 1997-98 rainfall season, precipitation over the whole district averaged a whopping 230% of normal. With such huge numbers, it was somewhat surprising to note that the only flooding reported was of the urban and small stream varietymore nuisance than disaster. 1980 Flood The February 16, 1980 Flood, estimated to be about a 40-year event, caused nearcapacity channel flows in the lower Los Angeles River that deposited debris on the top 106

of the levee which had previously been thought to have a 100-year protection. The 1980 Flood damaged and destroyed homes, washed out bridges and roads, eroded beaches, disrupted transportation and closed schools and recreation facilities. Thousands of people were evacuated from their homes, and some communities were without water or natural gas for extended periods of time. Twenty-nine people lost their lives during these storms. President Carter declared Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties disaster areas. The estimate of damage in the southern California area was $200 million. 1978 Storms The 1978 Storms also caused severe damage in the City. Rainfall in the City before these storms was considerably above normal and the watersheds were well saturated; therefore, soil moisture was at or near field capacity in most areas. In addition, several watersheds had been burned by brushfires during the summer of 1977, and other watersheds that had been burned during the summer of 1975 had not fully re-grown their vegetative cover because of the drought conditions that prevailed until the 197778 water year. On February 10, 1978, heavy runoff caused hillside erosion in the Verdugo Hills Cemetery located in the Tujunga area and washed debris into residential areas along Parsons Trail, where it accumulated to a depth of 6 feet. The debris-laden flow from Parsons Trail moved 3,400 feet downstream to Tujunga Canyon Boulevard, where it was joined by overflow from Rowley Debris Basin. Floating debris and mud from Zachau Debris Basin, in the Tujunga area, overtopped the spillway and filled the channel downstream, causing extensive damage to residences as far as 8,000 feet downstream. Unimproved reaches of Pacoima Wash and Big Tujunga Wash were eroded by high flows, and homes adjacent to these watercourses were damaged. Flows in Big Tujunga Wash eroded part of Foothill Boulevard and the area downstream. At least three homes were destroyed and one person was killed when debris-laden flows swept through Ebey Canyon, north of Sunland. The San Fernando Valley was hardest hit by the 1978 Storm, and this area alone accounted for damage to the Los Angeles Flood Control District facilities estimated at $14.9 million or 28 percent of the total storm damage countywide. As severe, as the damage from the 1969 and 1978 floods were, the LACDA Project facilities prevented more than $2.7 million in further damage. However, about $10 million in damage from mudflows in unprotected, rapidly developing foothill and canyon areas occurred in those years. In addition, about $2 million in damage from landslides occurred in the Pacific Palisades area. 1969 Storms Major storms in 1969 and 1978 demonstrated that the Los Angeles area is especially susceptible to disasters from sequential fire/flood cycles. The floods of JanuaryFebruary 1969 resulted from precipitation that approached six-times-normal in certain 107

areas. The most affected areas experienced flooding as great as that of 1938 with rainfall rates actually surpassing those experienced during the 1938 storm. Prior to the 1969 storm, the Little Rock brushfire consumed 1,760 acres of watershed cover in the Little Tujunga Canyon drainage area and 1,090 acres of watershed cover in the Pacoima Canyon drainage area, causing severe denudation of these watersheds during the summer of 1968. After the saturation of the soil mantle by the first 4 days of the storm, the high-intensity rainfall that occurred on January 22, 1969, caused severe erosion and heavy runoff in most watersheds. Damage in Los Angeles from the 1969 storms was confined almost exclusively to the foothills and canyons. In the San Fernando Valley, on February 25, 1969, flows in Big Tujunga Wash reached a maximum of over 17,000 cubic feet per second, washing out the Oro Vista Avenue dip crossing and eroding the south bank farther downstream. In Sunland, seven homes were destroyed on Bengal Street, and several others on Le Berthon Street and Wescott Avenue were inundated. These flows also undermined and destroyed the southern Foothill Boulevard and Wentworth Place bridges. In the West Los Angeles area, a great deal of damage was caused in 1969 by the saturated condition of the Santa Monica Mountains watershed. In Rustic Canyon, high flows severely eroded the natural watercourses, which had been protected somewhat with pipe and wire revetment. These flows battered the revetment and damaged homes, garages, and yards. On January 25, 1969, numerous earthslides and an abundance of eroded material caused Mandeville Canyon channel to silt up and overflow, destroying or badly damaging numerous residences and Mandeville Canyon Road. A mudslide destroyed a home along Mandeville Canyon road, killing a man and injuring a fireman who was attempting to rescue him. Record peak flows in Topanga Creek swept away bridges and washed out sections of Topanga Canyon Boulevard. Canyon roads between San Fernando Valley and the Hollywood-West Los Angeles area were closed because of earthslides. At least 10 persons were killed in storm-related accidents in the City of Los Angeles during the 1969 storms. Most notable during the 1969 storm season was the channel flow on the lower half of the Los Angeles River which represented over 80% of the design capacity. However, the Los Angeles County Drainage Area (LACDA) flood control system, which was 99% complete, protected the Los Angeles metropolitan area from what otherwise would have been unprecedented damage. Most of the damages that did occur were caused by mudflows in the foothill areas or by local storm drain inadequacies. In Los Angeles County, seventy-three lives were lost, and damages amounted to $31 million; with $12 million in damages sustained in the LACDA basin alone. 1938 Storms 108

The February 1938 Flood caused an estimated $40 million in damages and the loss of 113 lives throughout Los Angeles County. A large volume of floodwaters, predominately originating in the San Gabriel Mountains, caused significant flooding in the cities of Glendale and Burbank. Extreme flood flows eroded the banks of the Tujunga Wash, damaging residential and commercial structures and washing out bridges and roads.

E.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Flood Hazard The City of Los Angeles is very susceptible to floods. The assessment of flood hazards is best described through a systematic approach. The basic assessment approach is a strategy for prioritizing flood hazards at a planning level. The City used a systematic approach to allow for a ranking of primary hazards and to support the identification and assessment of problems. The basic assessment approach consists of the types of hazards and the categories of items affected. The basic assessment approach is intended to allow for the prioritization of the primary hazards, identification of problems, and to guide the development of goals, objectives, policies and implementation programs. The basic assessment approach is also the starting point for ranking the primary hazards based on the cause and effect of the hazards on people and property. Utilizing existing data and following the basic assessment approach, an assessment methodology was developed and applied based on the existing data for the City. For situations where a lack of existing data prevents identifying a problem, additional research and investigation may be recommended.
Hazard identification summarized basic facts related to the Los Angeles River Watershed; it covers a land area of over 834 square miles from the eastern portions of Santa Monica Mountains and Simi Hills, and Santa Susana Mountains to the San Gabriel Mountains in the west. The watershed encompasses and is shaped by the path of the Los Angeles River, which flows from its headwaters in the mountains eastward to the northern corner of Griffith Park where the channel turns southward through the Glendale Narrows before it flows across the coastal plain and into the San Pedro Bay near Long Beach. The Los Angeles River Watershed has diverse patterns of land use. The upper portion of the watershed, approximately 360 square miles, is covered by forest or open space, while the remaining watershed, 475 square miles, is highly developed with commercial, industrial, or residential uses. There are eight major tributaries to the Los Angeles River as it flows from its headwaters to the Pacific Ocean. These major tributaries include the Burbank Western Channel, Pacoima Wash, Tujunga Wash, and Verdugo Wash in the San Fernando Valley; and the Arroyo Seco, Compton Creek, and Rio Hondo south of the Glendale Narrows. The Los Angeles River was channelized between 1914 and 1970 to control runoff and reduce the impacts of major flood events in the region. Today the Los Angeles River is lined on 47.9 miles of its 51 mile length. There are three channels not lined with concrete reinforcement; the area within the Sepulveda Flood Control Basin, through the Glendale Narrows, and south of Willow Street in Long Beach. 109

The FEMA designated Special Flood Hazard Areas, identified in the Citys Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), will remain the only specially regulated areas for the City of Los Angeles at this time. The identified flood hazard areas will continue to be reviewed in light of new data and this review and data collection process will be supported through the development of goals, objectives and policies. The primary tool used to analyze high-risk areas is the Geographical Information System (GIS). To determine affected categories the FEMA designated flood zones were mapped and compared with other existing mapped data. Utilizing GIS and City Planning Department data, land uses, affected population, and critical facilities within high-risk areas are identified (Figure E-1).

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Figure E-1. Critical Response infrastructure identified in the Flood Hazard area.

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E.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Estimated replacement costs have been determined for all Critical Infrastructure including Big Nine Facilities. For individual building hazard, see Appendix D. A summary of estimated losses from flood hazard is listed below.
Table E-1. City facilities associated with Flood Hazard in the City of Los Angeles. Replacement costs based on assumptions. 100 year 500 year Number Total Replacement Number Total Replacement Costs (mill) Costs (mill) Big Nine Critical Response Fire* 1 286 0 792 Police** 3 120 8 320 Hospitals 0 N/A 0 N/A Schools 5 N/A 32 N/A # 10 56 Rec & Parks Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential TBD TBD Commercial TBD TBD *Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station. # Total number in 100yr and 500yr floodplain.

Hospitals in the Flood Zone - Asset Values Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of hospitals located in the City; however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Evacuation Centers (Schools) in the Flood Zone - Asset Values Schools are considered the responsibility of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a special jurisdiction. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of schools; however, the City does have a mutual agreement with LAUSD to use schools as evacuation centers when they are needed. Specific asset value information related to LAUSD schools may be available from the LAUSD Hazard Mitigation Plan. Critical Infrastructure in the Flood Zone - Asset Values Potable Water & Power Facilities in Flood Zone Areas - Asset Values DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities because of security concerns. The GIS Maps to match up with this

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numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan.

F. PROFILE OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAZARDS

The County of Los Angeles is the responsible authority for the City of Los Angeles and 87 other cities on issues pertaining to health. The County of Los Angeles Local Hazard Mitigation Plan addresses the related health hazard, risks, policies and programs and identifies the proposed mitigation actions. Public Health Hazards was a High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles. County of Los Angeles All-Hazard Mitigation Plan was adopted October 19th, 2004. The plan is available at http://lacoa.org/PDF/hazmitgplan.pdf. The Countys All-Hazard Mitigation Plan addresses all identified hazards, including the public health implications and response, and each Hazard section includes a response to Public Health issues. According to LA County All-Hazard Mitigation Plan (Section 3, p. 133), The mission of the Department of Health Services (DHS) during disaster response conditions is to provide for the medical and health needs of the population of the Los Angeles County Operational Area by organizing, mobilizing, coordinating and directing public and private medical and health resources. The Director of Health Services, as the Operational Area Coordinator, is responsible for the countywide management and allocation of medical and health resources, both public and private. The Department also provides and coordinates public health services during disaster response conditions. Public health services may include preventive health services, including the control of communicable diseases, coordinating inspection of health hazards in damaged buildings, inspection of vital foodstuffs, water, drugs, and other consumables, mosquito and other vector control, and detection and identification of possible sources of contamination dangerous to the general physical and mental health of the community. LA County All-Hazard Mitigation Plan, Section 4B- Biological and Health Emergencies, identifies Health Emergencies as a High Priority Hazard in Los Angeles County. Response teams such as Disaster Assessment and Recovery Team (DART) and Public Health Rapid Response Team (PHRRT) are in place to conduct rapid assessment and response after a disaster. Health hazards profiled in Los Angeles County HMP include: West Nile Virus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Mad Cow Disease (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease), Influenza (Flu), Avian Influenza (Bird Flu), Smallpox, Money Pox, Hoof and Mouth Disease, Hepatitis and other diseases. Refer to Los Angeles County All-Hazards Mitigation Plan for more information: http://lacoa.org/PDF/hazmitgplan.pdf.

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As of December 2010, County of Los Angeles initiated their updates to the All-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Upon adoption of the plan, the City of Los Angeles will incorporate relevant updates to this Plan.

G. PROFILE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Hazardous Materials Incidents Hazards was identified as a High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles. A hazardous material is any quantity of a substance which poses a threat to life, health or property. This includes a wide variety of solids, liquids and gases, all of which could be classified as hazardous. Thousands of new hazardous chemicals have been developed in this country since 1945 and more are being developed every day. There is growing emphasis at all levels of government about protecting the environment for future generations and correcting existing environmental problems. With the proliferation of toxic chemicals, and processes which make use of these chemicals, more and more attention is being paid to the health hazards posed by these chemicals especially in or adjacent urban areas. In the second half of the 1980s, numerous state regulations for dealing with hazardous materials were put into place. These regulations are continually being updated and augmented.

G.1 Identifying Hazardous Materials Hazard

The threat of a hazardous material incident in a city the size of Los Angeles has long been recognized. A release of a hazardous chemical can occur within a transportation route, a storage location, an industrial facility or a disposal site. Any discharge of a chemical in a densely populated area or along a heavily-traveled transportation route can create a significant problem for life, property or the environment. Response personnel and other public safety providers are at risk when dispatched to hazardous materials incidents. An incorrect action can cause injury or death that may not manifest itself for weeks or longer. We must be prepared to abate an incident once it occurs, and do so in a safe and effective manner. Hazardous material incidents require a specialized type of response. The Los Angeles City Fire Department has the overall authority to manage an incident within the City, but the list of other agencies with responsibilities continues to grow requiring effective coordination at all levels. Management of a hazardous material incident is a critical function performed by members of different responding agencies. It is vital for all personnel to be familiar with their own departments annex, as well as those of other responding agencies. All City departments that have responsibilities during a hazardous material incident have prepared an annex that delineated their responsibilities during such an event.

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The consequences of an accidental release of hazardous material may be immediate (such as fire, explosion, chemical/biological injuries, etc.), or may create a health hazard that manifests itself over time. Hazardous material incidents may result from an accident, a natural event such as a major earthquake, or by intentional human activity such as a criminal or terrorist attack. Los Angeles is vulnerable to many different types of hazardous material incidents, including: Release of Methane from Underground Oil Deposits: Substantial areas of Los Angeles are built over oil deposits, which produce methane, a flammable and explosive gas. Methane, a colorless, odorless, gas forms underground. Methane may be formed deep underground from biomass subjected to high pressure - the same process that forms oil. It may also be formed closer to the surface as a result of bacterial action on decomposing biomass. Methane gas is lighter than air. As it seeps toward the surface, there is the potential for concentrations or pockets of methane to collect underneath buildings or structures. The gas can also collect in the basements of unprotected structures. If such concentrations of methane gas reach levels of 5 to 15 percent of the air, there is a potential for fire and explosion. Industrial Accident: Countless industries located within the City of Los Angeles either use, or create hazardous materials in the normal course of business. Businesses which either use or produce hazardous materials are located throughout the City. Accidents at these locations may result in the release of hazardous materials, creating a danger to persons and property at the business site, as well as the surrounding community. According to a study performed by the Southern California Earthquake Center located at the University of Southern California, there are more than 300 industrial sites in the City on which are located significant quantities of hazardous materials. A site is defined for each facility/chemical combination, so there may be multiple entries for a single facility. While these locations are in virtually every part of the City, the major concentrations are the industrial area southeast of Downtown along the I-5 and I-110 freeways; in the east San Fernando Valley in a corridor roughly parallel to San Fernando Road; industrial areas adjacent to the Port of Los Angeles; and in the northwest corner of the Valley. In addition to private industry and business, major public facilities such as the Port of Los Angeles, LAX, and MTA maintenance and repair facilities also use, store, and generate large quantities of hazardous materials in the course of providing service to the public. Natural Disasters: Naturally-occurring events such as earthquakes and floods may also trigger the release of hazardous materials. For example, ground shaking from a major earthquake can rupture pipelines, cause transportation accidents and damage storage facilities, resulting in the release of hazardous materials.

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Transportation Accidents: The City of Los Angeles is criss-crossed with literally hundreds of freeways, major arterial streets, and rail lines upon which hazardous materials are transported. These routes pose fire, explosion, or exposure threats to the surrounding communities. According to a report prepared by Michael F. Waxman and Patrick Walsh (Highway Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials): Each year, almost five billion tons of hazardous materials and wastes are transported throughout the United States. These shipments include everything from explosives, flammables, corrosive or toxic chemicals to spent reactor fuel, low-level radioactive wastes and disease-causing biological agents. Each year more than 10,000 highway accidents involving such shipments are reported. More go unreported. Storage Facilities and Pipeline: Pipelines and storage facilities pose a significant hazard for the release of hazardous materials. Tank Farms are areas that include several large tanks for the storage of bulk liquids (chemical or petroleum products). While the size of individual tanks and the number of tanks in a specific farm may vary, tank farms may include 50 or more tanks, with individual tanks holding up to 20 million gallons of bulk liquid. In the City of Los Angeles, large tank farms are located in the Harbor Area (21 acres), near/on LAX, and in the industrial area southeast of Downtown. While rare, storage tank explosions can be catastrophic (see description of the 1972 explosion near the Port of Los Angeles, described in the next section.) Numerous pipelines transporting chemicals, natural gas, and petroleum products are located within the City. Rupture of a major pipeline can result in fire, explosion, or release of large quantities of hazardous materials injurious to public health and the environment. The National Transportation Safety Administration, Office of Pipeline Safety, provides information regarding the gas transmission pipeline accidents in the United States from 1986 through 2004. Transmission Operators include operators of high capacity pipelines that deliver from terminal to terminal, as opposed to Distribution Operators who distribute to homes and businesses. While the information provided by The National Transportation Safety Administration does not include other types of pipelines - gasoline for example - it is illustrative of pipeline hazards. G.1.1 Background During the 2010 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan review and update, the City deemed no significant changes for this hazard. S.S. Sansinena Explosion - December 17, 1976 116

In 1976, the bulk oil tanker S.S. Sansinena exploded in the Port of Los Angeles killing nine people, injuring 46 and causing an estimated $21.6 million in damage. The tanker was empty. Poor maintenance and operating procedures on board the ship was identified as the cause of the explosion. A low rumble, not unlike an earthquake, was quickly followed by a bright orange flash, and an explosion that sent a smoke cloud mushrooming into the sky. Already the boards at OCD were alive with calls, and Dispatchers doubled the normal first alarm assignment. Fire Boat 5 arrived to find two major portions of the tanker Sansinena engulfed in fire. Men were in the water shouting for help. They pulled out those they could see and moved into the stern and got off trapped crew members. In all, they took 18 men to safety. The yard was filled with sail boats and private motor craft, all in dry dock. The explosion had littered the boat works with pipe and rubble, but none of the small boats had been knocked off their stands. They successfully cut off the flames into the boat yard--with about 20 feet to spare. Oil continued to run into the yard, and filled a small turn-table 200 feet inside. Light Water Tender 85 from Harbor City was sent on the initial alarm. Firefighters walked in front of the rig to clear and pick a pathway through the debris. It wasn't until minutes after first arrival that firefighters learned that they had more than a ship on fire--that the entire center portion of the 810-foot super-tanker had been blown onto the wharf and was ablaze in the parking lot. They had three separate parts, all within a massive fire area. A rupture could bring thousands of gallons of high-grade crude pouring onto the fire ground. What was not immediately known was that the pipes had been ruptured underground by the bridge and deck portions of the ship which landed on the paved wharf parking area. The fire was knocked down once, then flashed over, nearly trapping a number of firefighters. It was this, the discovery that a great quantity of fuel was coming up under the mass of twisted steel that led commanders to realize they had a constant flow of fuel into the fire. They already had used AFFF, high-expansion and protein foam in knocking down the main fire, but it flashed back each time they thought they had full extinguishment. The decision was made to let the bridge area burn--and it did until four days later when valves were placed in position in the line near the fire. More than a half million gallons of crude was captured in the large mains when they were severed.

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The fire was officially knocked down at 10:20 p.m. The fire never extended beyond its original perimeter upon arrival of the fire department. The Sansinena had unloaded her cargo of Indonesian crude and was taking on ballast and bunker fuel. She had 16,000 bbls. of bunker oil aboard at the time of the explosion. She was due to sail at 11:00 p.m. GATX Tank Farm Explosion - August 8, 1972 Explosions ripped through a tank farm in a chemical storage area at Los Angeles Harbor touching off an inferno which illuminated much of San Pedro for more than three hours. At least 21 of the silo-like cylinders were destroyed, spilling highly inflammable solvents and chemicals. One explosion sent a tank soaring high into the air, trailing flames and resembling the liftoff of a space missile shot. It crashed to earth near a warehouse. About 50 of the 250 firemen battling the blaze suffered chemical burns on their legs, but none was believed seriously hurt. Water could not be used on the fire because most of the chemicals continued to burn after becoming mixed with water. Firemen braved flames, explosions and chemical burns to pour water on tanks untouched by flames to keep the contents cool and prevent other explosions. The fire started about 5:30 p.m. at the General American Transportation Corp., 220 E. 22nd St. +The company stores alcohol, acetone and other chemicals in tanks for distribution by tank trucks. Harbor Department police said they were investigating a report the fire started when a tank truck sheared a pipe serving one of the tanks. The tank's contents ignited with a roar which rocked the harbor area. At least three other violent blasts were touched off as the blazing sea of flames spread to other tanks. Tops of many tanks popped off in explosions and steel sections of the sides of many tanks buckled from the heat, causing more inflammable fluids to pour onto the ground. The tanks vary in diameter and range up to 45 feet in height. The average tank has a capacity of 180,000 gallons. No immediate estimate could be made of the loss. Firemen completely encircled the tank storage area, pouring water onto tanks and foam onto flames. Others stood on top of a concrete office building at 220 E. 22nd St., as flames licked against the structure. The fire was confined to the storage area about 2,000 feet south of Ports O'Call Village, a restaurant and shop complex. Billowing clouds of black smoke spread out for miles around the harbor area.

S.S. Markay Explosion - July 22, 1947 At 2:05 A.M., Sunday morning, June 22, 1947, the entire Wilmington-San Pedro area was rocked by a series of blasts when the oil tanker S.S. MARKAY exploded while loading a cargo of fuel oil for Northern California. The ship was moored at Berth 167, Shell Oil Company, Mormon Island (Wilmington). At the time of the explosion, the 118

Markay had loaded nearly 70,000 barrels of fuel, consisting mainly of gasoline, stove oil and diesel oil. The force of the blast spread flaming gasoline across a 600-foot channel to Berths 153 and 154, starting fires in the warehouses of the American President Lines Ltd., and poured an undetermined amount of blazing fuel on the waters between Berths 167, 168 and 153, 154, causing the pilings and wharves of these berths to catch on fire. The first alarm to be received by the signal office and fire stations in the Harbor area was a box which was pulled at Berth 90 in San Pedro. This box is over one-half mile across the channel from the scene of the original explosion, and calls for a response of the Battalion Chief; Battalion 6, Engine Companies 36 and 53, Salvage 36 (1 man), Rescue 36, and Tender 36. The force of the blast had aroused all companies in the Harbor area and these companies were alerted before receiving the actual location of the fire. After the first box came in, many more in the vicinity of the fire was pulled and all companies in the Harbor area responded to the scene of the disaster on the first alarm, with the exception of Engine 40, on Terminal Island, and Fire Boat 1, in Fish Harbor. At the Shell Oil Company Dock, where the doomed tanker was burning furiously, there were many tanks of various sizes and contents directly exposed to the heat from the fire devastated ship. The first company, Engine 48, responding to Berths 167 and 168 laid 1000 feet of 2 hoses from the hydrant outside of the Shell Oil Company premises and took a position on top of Tank No. 10, which normally holds 80,000 barrels of gasoline, but at the time of the explosion contained approximately 35,000 barrels of gasoline. Tank No. 16 of 5800 barrels capacity, but nearly empty at the time, was adjacent to Tank No. 10. These two tanks were a scant 250 feet from the blazing ship and were subjected to the radiated heat of the fire. From this position, this company proceeded to cool down both oil storage tanks. Engine Company 64 laid another 1000 feet of 2 1/2 hose into the fire and took their position towards the bow of the Markay and adjacent to Tank No. 14, which contained 20,500 barrels of diesel oil and was not more than 150 feet from the blazing ship. All companies held their positions through the duration of the fire, although lesser explosions occurred from time to time. O`Conner Electro-Plating Co. Explosion - February 20, 1947 At 9:45 a.m., a vicious chemical blast at the O'Connor Electro-Plating Co. ripped apart a four-block area in the manufacturing district on Pico Boulevard between Stanford Avenue and Paloma Street, leaving 17 dead and 150 injured. The explosion that destroyed or damaged 116 buildings had opened a crater 22 feet wide and 6 feet deep. 119

The blast shattered windows across a 1-square-mile area and was felt as far away as Long Beach and the San Fernando Valley. The scene was being compared to the disaster to the 1933 Long Beach earthquake, which caused 102 deaths and thousands of injuries. Relatives of the dead, injured and missing gathered amid the confusion. As telephone and electrical wires dangled in the street, police picked through evidence, finding body parts. A twisted 15-foot pipe had been hurled over a four-story building, landing a block away, where it killed a 10-year-old boy riding his bike. A young man visiting the plant with his salesman father struggled to safety as firefighters pulled the body of his father out of the rubble. Others workers were bleeding and moaning; some were tinted green by chemicals. The O'Connor Electro-Plating Co. had been in business in the same one-story brick building for almost 20 years. The plant was managed by Robert J. O'Connor, son of the company's founder. O'Connor knew little about chemistry, so he had hired Magee, who presented impressive credentials. But in truth, Magee had been working as a foreman at a local dairy and was only an aspiring chemist without even a high school diploma. For almost a year, Magee worked on a revolutionary process for polishing aluminum, anxiously waiting to get it patented. He was using a mixture of 140 gallons of acetic anhydride, nearly as volatile as nitroglycerin. It was imperative that the acids are kept under refrigeration. But an hour before the blast the refrigeration unit broke down. About the same time, as investigators later surmised, Magee apparently inserted a plastic rack into the solution, triggering the blast. The coroner's inquest found no criminal negligence on the part of the O'Connor family and laid responsibility for the devastation on Magee. The City Council later passed an ordinance giving the fire and health departments more power to regulate dangerous chemicals. Explosion and Fire in the Harbor - October 21, 1944 The explosion and fire at Berth 233, Wilmington on October 21, 1944, brought into flaming reality one of the many potential hazards of Los Angles' busy wartime harbor. Involved in the fire were two hundred feet of outfitting dock which was severely damaged to a depth of about thirty feet. At midnight of October 20, the S.S. Fredricksburg, a tanker operating for the War Shipping Administration, was tied up to Berth 151. Shortly after they began loading toluene into hold number two, while at the same time pumping water ballast out of hold number one. Toluene is a highly inflammable, very volatile petroleum substance that has many military uses such as a component part of high-test fuels and others the nature of which is restricted military information. 120

As early as 8:00 a.m. on the 21st several people, among them a caf owner, detected the odor of what they thought was gasoline in the area around Berth 223. An examination made by Coast Guard officers checking the source of the fumes disclosed that hold number two was leaking into hold number one containing the ballast water and was being pumped into the bay. The tidal current in the bay carries almost directly from Berth 151 on a southeasterly direction to Berth 223. At the outfitting dock, Berth 223, shortly before 2:00 p.m. naval and civilian crews were busy spray-painting, welding and doing other work on LSMs 211 and 212. About this time a welder, C.E. Truitt, struck an arc on the bow, in shore rail, of LSM 211. Instantaneously as he struck the arc, a flash fire occurred that completely enveloped the LSMs and a large area of the surrounding bay and docks. On the docks were about 25 vehicles, trucks and passenger cars, all of which took fire. To date sixteen men, five civilians and eleven Navy personnel have died, with more than thirty-five being hospitalized. Undoubtedly this toll would have been much higher had it not been for the courageous and efficient work of Mate Roquemore, who has spent his 20 years on the fire department in the bay area. Late in the afternoon, the fire out, the weary crews picked up and returned to their quarters, having completed a job well done. While the operations at the dock were going on, the fire boats cruised up and down the channel playing their batteries on the water to break up any oil slick that might tend to get under the wharf and further complicate matters. A point that is of interest to firemen in the Metropolitan area is that although Engine 81 laid its lines from a hydrant on Ferry street, Engines 38, 40 and 49 pumped at draft from the bay during the operations. Subsequent arson investigations developed two theories as to the cause of the fuel and vapors being in the bay around the LSMs. First it is known that toluene was escaping into the bay from the Fredericksburg, and that the tidal drift would carry it across the channel to Berth 223. If such was the case then the question arises, why was there no flash back to Berth 151? It is believed that incoming and out-going sea traffic would break up the continuity of any such flow on the surface of the water and this coupled with the ebbing of the tide, would confine the polluted area to around the ships at the pier and under the pier itself. The fumes from the material and from fuel carried in some instances in open containers aboard the ships covered the site with a blanket of highly inflammable vapors that took just one spark to start an inferno of death and destruction.

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A second theory is that fuel leakage from another ship that had been tied up to the same docks a short time before, had polluted the area along with some possible pollution from the tanker at Berth 151, and the fumes from these being ignited, caused the fire. The whole story will be unfolded when the Naval Board of Inquire reveals its findings sometime in the future.

G.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Hazardous Materials

Hazardous materials have been a concern since 1900 when the City experienced its first major oil industry fire. Extraction of oil and gas deposits began in 1896 when Edward Doheny discovered oil at Second Street and Glendale Boulevard (Westlake community). By 1900, he had erected more than 600 wooden oil rigs, installed hundreds of storage tanks and related facilities. In that year a family bonfire ignited the oil field at Bixel Street. An estimated 10,000 gallons of blazing oil spilled down the hills but was diverted and suppressed before it reached the densely built Central City. The saving of the downtown from a potential disaster prompted the City to purchase more fire suppression equipment and to expand the number of fire stations and personnel. Subsequent oil field fires in the Doheny and other fields throughout the City resulted in regulations to assure containment of oil fires in oil fields, refineries and oil and gas storage facilities. Much of the area south of the Santa Monica Mountains is underlain by gas and oil deposits. Such deposits that exist under other areas of the City as well as natural gas, crude oil and hydrogen sulfide, can work their way to the surface or infiltrate structures, causing potential fire and health hazards. In addition, landfills are sources of methane gas. The existence of underground gas and hazardous materials deposits require monitoring of excavations and known seepage areas. A major incident occurred in 1971 during the tunneling for the Feather River Project when a methane explosion killed 18 workers. Incidents relating to the gas seepage caused temporary safety shutdowns of the Metro Rail subway tunneling in 1993-95. In the 1920s the use of chemicals and hazardous materials in the Citys expanding manufacturing and commercial sectors increased the hazards for both workers and the general populace. A series of movie studios back lot fires and film processing laboratory fires occurred in the late 1920s. These incidents led to the enactment of City regulations to protect workers and the public from fires and fumes associated with highly flammable film and chemicals used in film processing as well as from hazards associated with flammable movie sets. Today hazardous materials are used in commercial, industrial, institutional and agricultural enterprises as well as households throughout the City. Los Angeles operates both a major international airport and a major harbor within its boundaries and operates other airport facilities within and outside its boundaries. Hazardous and highly flammable materials are shipped through, stored and used (especially fuels) at these facilities.

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They also are transported along freeways and highways and are stored in facilities throughout the City. Many hazardous materials, if released by accident or catastrophic event, could cause severe damage to human life and health and to the facilities and could disrupt activities within a radius of several miles around the release site. During the 1994 Northridge earthquake, over 100 incidents of quake related release of hazardous materials were reported. Of these, 23 involved release of natural gas, 10 involved releases of gases and liquid chemicals at educational institutions, and 8 involved release of hazardous materials at medical facilities. Gas leaks or chemical reactions triggered fires which destroyed or damaged nine university science laboratories. Rupture of a high pressure natural gas line under Balboa Boulevard in Granada Hills resulted in a fire which damaged utility lines and adjacent homes. A petroleum pipeline leak released 4,000 barrels of crude oil into the Santa Clara River north of Los Angeles and caused fires in the Mission Hills section of the City. Fires can damage labeling and warning signs which are posted on chemical and fuel containers and on structures to identify presence of hazardous materials. Identification of hazardous materials, storage and handling sites and information about containment facilities and/or procedures are important to protect emergency personnel as well as employees and the adjacent community during a spill incident and incident clean up. Hazardous materials management is regulated by federal and state codes. Within the City, the Fire Department is designated as the enforcement agency for the City, state and federal hazardous materials regulations. City regulations include spill mitigation and containment and securing of hazardous materials containers to prevent spills. In addition, the State Fire Marshall enforces oil and gas pipeline safety regulations and the federal government enforces hazardous materials transport pursuant to its interstate commerce regulation authority. Cooperative inter-jurisdictional efforts were underway to evaluate the Northridge, Kobe and other seismic experiences and to develop methods for reducing potential hazardous materials spills and related damage associated with seismic events. In response to the S.S. Sansinena explosion, the City Council adopted a unique ordinance which required the Fire Department to inspect all tanker ships in the Port prior to loading and unloading so as to assure compliance with City fire prevention and safety measures and regulations. Los Angeles is the only City in the nation which has established such a program. The Fire Department works cooperatively with the United States Coast Guard, the State and Los Angeles County in responding to offshore emergency incidents including responding to, containing and cleaning-up offshore oil spills. The Citys authority is to protect the shoreline (onshore). In accordance with a mutual aid agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Fire Department provides the initial response to any spill in the harbor or offshore. Its responsibility is to contain the initial spill and keep the situation from getting worse. The County is responsible for coordinating cleanup efforts. In 1996, the State was preparing a statewide 123

Coastal Oil Spill Contingency Plan to establish administrative procedures (e.g., chain of command) for responding to spills and providing cleanup, including training and utilization of volunteers in cleanup operations. The Fire Departments spill contingency plan will be incorporated into the State plan. Fairfax District Methane Zone Four hundred blocks in the Wilshire-Fairfax area of Los Angeles are designated as a Potential Methane Zone. Methane gas naturally seeps towards the surface. Unless the gas has a way to escape into the atmosphere, this is a potential hazard for Los Angeles. In March 1985, a clothing store at Third Street and Fairfax exploded and burst into flames. Luckily, only 23 people were injured. However, this incident made an apparently significant hazard to Los Angeles. Two factors contributed to this emergency - one natural and one manmade. A concentrated pocket of methane gas formed approximately 40 feet beneath the store. Methane also leaked into the basement of the store. Because of poor ventilation, the methane simply became more concentrated until it reached its explosive threshold. Construction work for a subway tunnel contributed to this build-up of gas. In 1989, a fountain of gas, water, and dust literally burst through the ground and created a geyser in the Fairfax district. The release lasted for a 24-hour period. This methane release would have been much worse if it had ignited. The Fairfax district is of particular concern because the methane is much more concentrated in this area. However, it should be noted that methane percolation covers most of the Los Angeles geographical area. Fairfaxs methane originates in part from a crude oil deposit 600 feet underground. McFarland Energy once drilled slanting wells from its property into these oil reserves, which were under adjacent parcels. A lawsuit blamed McFarland for releasing methane gas that drifted upward through abandoned, improperly sealed oil wells. Fairfax remains a methane-saturated area with the potential for gas explosions. Concrete foundations and asphalt streets impede the escape of gas into the atmosphere. Methane accumulates underground and can seep into basements, building up to an explosive threshold. City codes require all buildings in the area, new and old, to have a methane detector, but this provision is not enforced well. Inspections occur most often when the City issue permits for renovation or some building changes owners. For new construction, contractors must submit actual mitigation plans for dealing with methane. In apartment buildings, for example, the City Code requires a vent system capable of pumping in four changes of air per hour. All new buildings, including single-family homes, also must have a membrane under the building to help keep methane out.

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Hancock Park Elementary School sits across the street from the Fairfax explosion. It has methane alarms and a crude system of fans to blow stagnant air out from underneath its raised foundation. It is possible that seismic activity can further exacerbate the methane problem by causing new pockets to form or by igniting methane pockets as a result of damaged infrastructures. G.2.1 Estimating Potential Loss Hazardous Materials Incidents do not physically pose a threat to the structural integrity of essential City Facilities and Critical City Operating Facilities. However, if an incident does occur at an oil refinery, it could inflict structural and content damage to the oil system infrastructure. Oil refineries are privately owned facilities and the City does not have jurisdiction over them. Therefore, the City does not have access to the asset values of these facilities and cannot assess potential losses that facilities might incur from such an occurrence. In addition, hazardous material incidents can also occur at other privately owned industrial facilities that contain such products; however, the City does not have jurisdiction to obtain the asset values to estimate the potential financial losses they may incur. The Los Angeles Fire Department does have some hazardous materials unit that requires hazardous material business plans of all public and private facilities that contain reportable amounts hazardous materials on site. The LAFD maintains a database with all these private and public facilities and is obtainable to authorized personnel should it be required to be seen. However, because this information is confidential because of terrorism issues, this information will not be published in this plan.

H. PROFILE OF CIVIL UNREST HAZARD

Occasionally, the tranquility of the City is interrupted by a civil disturbance. When the magnitude of the disturbance reaches serious or major proportions, City resources must be mobilized. Because of this, Civil Unrest Hazard was identified as a High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles.

H.1 Hazard Identification

During a civil disturbance, the Police Division is the lead agency. However, other Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) divisions and City entities play a role in supporting the Police Divisions efforts. Some City entities have major tasks to accomplish at various points of the incident, whereas others will provide only minor support. This teamwork is essential in the restoration of order to the City. The City of Los Angeles has been at the center of civil unrest in the past. The Los Angeles Police Department defines civil unrest as a violent public disturbance of the peace by three or more individuals. Incidents of civil unrest often occur when groups or individuals whose sole purpose is to create shock or simply challenge the police to get the desired publicity for their cause.

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Civil disorders and disturbances are human caused disasters with tremendous potential for causing damage to the City. Like many other disasters, they are taken for granted since they occur infrequently, but unlike other types of disasters, these events are especially harmful with their effects on human lives in that they generally occur in times of already heightened societal tensions, and in fact are often directly caused by them. Whatever the type of civil disturbance, it is important to have a plan for managing such an event. The City of Los Angeles EOO Master Plan contains a Civil Unrest Annex. All civil disturbances can be mitigated through planning, but the mitigation of a civil disturbance is not solely a police function. It is a shared responsibility of City government, community leaders, business leaders, service organizations and community residents. H.1.1 Description of Civil Unrest Starting with the 1965 Los Angeles/Watts Riots, the Los Angeles Police Department has dealt with civil unrest on many occasions. Examples would include the 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles, the millennium celebrations, the Democratic National Convention, and demonstrations opposing the war in Iraq. As different incidents occur, the Department has continually adapted to the different issues and tactics brought about by these incidents and event participants. In todays day and age of protests, the use of professional protestors, anarchists, demonstrations, and counter demonstrations at many public gatherings has created the potential for civil unrest. Even events deemed to be celebrations often have the potential of turning into dangerous situations. When dealing with events that have the potential to become incidents of civil unrest, the Los Angeles Police Departments most important goal is safeguarding the citizens and property of Los Angeles. The City EOO and the Los Angeles Police Department have taken several measures to mitigate civil unrest. H.1.2 Background June 2000 LA Lakers Victory Riot Despite the fact that the Los Angeles Lakers beat the New Jersey Nets Sunday to win the NBA championship, hundreds of Lakers fans decided they would riot anyway. The crowd was mostly peaceful until just minutes after the game, when a group of fans began throwing debris at limousines and smashing the windows of a sport utility vehicle and a television news van. Within an hour, hundreds of Lakers fans began torching cars, looting businesses and setting bonfires in the streets around the Staples Center. Police used pepper spray and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. The Mayor praised police response and said City officials might learn some lessons from the episode that will help prepare for future victories from unrelated sports franchises in faraway cities. 126

1992 Civil Unrest in Los Angeles On April 29, 1992, immediately following and in response to the acquittal of four White police officers charged with the use of excessive force in their beating of black motorist Rodney King, thousands of people in Los Angeles took part in mass law breaking, including taking goods from stores, and setting fires. These acts, most commonly characterized as riots, though characterized as an uprising, rebellion, or insurrection by some, lasted about four days. Estimates of the number of lives lost during the unrest vary between 50 and 60, and estimates of the material damage done vary between about $800 million and $1 billion. Approximately 600 fires were set, and about 10,000 people were arrested. In addition to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), about 10,000 soldiers from the California National Guard, and thousands of soldiers from the United States Army and Marines were deployed to suppress the crowds. Smaller, concurrent riots occurred in other United States cities, including San Francisco, New York, Seattle, Washington, and Chicago. In addition to the immediate trigger of the Rodney Kings verdict, there were many other factors cited as reasons for the unrest, including: the extremely high unemployment among residents of the South Central neighborhood, which had been hit very hard by the nationwide recession; a long-standing perception that the LAPD engaged in racial profiling and used excessive force; and specific anger over the light sentence given to a Korean shop-owner for the shooting of Latasha Harlins, a young African-American. The 1965 Watts Riots 1964 seemed to mark a turning point in America; with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, a new age in race relations appeared to be dawning. But the states acted quickly to circumvent the new federal law. California reacted with Proposition 14, which moved to block the fair housing components of the Civil Rights Act. This, and other acts, created a feeling of injustice and despair in the inner cities. On August 11, 1965, a routine traffic stop in South Central Los Angeles provided the spark that lit the fire of those seething feelings. The riots lasted for six days, leaving 34 dead, more than a thousand people injured, nearly 4,000 arrested, and hundreds of buildings destroyed. After the riots, then Governor Pat Brown named John McCone to head a commission to study the riots. The report issued by the Commission concluded that the riots weren't the acts of thugs, but rather symptomatic of much deeper problems: the high jobless rate in the inner city, poor housing, and bad schools. Although the problems were clearly pointed out in the report, no great effort was made to address them, or to rebuild what had been destroyed in the riots. 127

H.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Civil Unrest

The entire City of Los Angeles is vulnerable to civil unrest. There are no specific hazard zones that can be identified or predicted. Civil unrest may result from a wide variety of causes, ranging from local to international. While it is not possible to make long term predictions of civil unrest events, it is highly probable that such events will occur in the City from time to time. Identifying Assets and Estimating Potential Loss All City assets are susceptible to being at risk. Los Angeles Police Department facilities, specifically Parker Center, are probably the most at risk since several demonstrations or rallies have originated at this location in the past. In the 1992 Civil Unrest, numerous protestors began rallying in front of Parker Center before chaos erupted throughout the City. Other police and fire facilities have also been targeted during past events. Previous experience indicates that Critical Response (police stations, fire stations) are at risk during periods of civil unrest. In addition, Critical Operating Facilities, such as City Hall, Parker Center, etc. are at risk of damage or destruction, or may be rendered temporarily inoperative for some period of time. Depending upon the nature of the event; however, all City owned assets may be considered vulnerable to damage or destruction as a result of civil unrest. Because of the extreme unpredictability of civil unrest events, no specific estimates can be made concerning potential losses.

I. PROFILE OF TRANSPORTATION HAZARD

Transport or transportation is the movement of people and goods from one location to another. Transport infrastructure consists of the fixed installations necessary for transport, and may be roads, railways, airways, waterways, and terminals such as airports, railway stations, and seaports. Terminals may be used both for interchange of passengers and cargo and for maintenance. Due to the important of this system, Transportation Hazard was identified as a High Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles.

I.1 Identification of Transportation Hazard

Executive Order EO 13010 on Critical Infrastructure Protection states that transportation is so vital that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. The City of Los Angeles Transportation network consists of aviation, harbor, ground and rail systems. Disruption to any part of this system would result in major safety and economic impacts to the City, State and country. 128

Harbor and Airport functions may be interrupted by many factors, including earthquakes, flooding or heavy storms, union strikes or criminal activity, and would cause delays of cargo delivery. Ports are major trade points and have complex infrastructures. Disruption of rail service can cause significant transportation system capacity problems, resulting in blocked streets and can create safety issues. Transportation corridors, such as the Alameda Corridor, are essential to the delivery of critical medical supplies. Ground transportation is essential for ingress and egress for emergency vehicles during disasters and is essential for police services. Access for emergency vehicles on freeways, highways, primary roads and secondary roads due to road damage can significantly reduce response. The following are some effects of interruptions to the Citys transportation system: Loss of power to traffic signals would cause them to go dark leaving as many as 4,500 intersections in the City without a traffic control device to control right-ofway. With no regulation of right-of-way, there will be a significant potential for accidents involving both vehicles and pedestrians, and congestion that could interfere with emergency response and recovery efforts. Disruption of DOTs Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control (ATSAC) System would result in the loss of the ability to adjust the timing of over 3,000 traffic signals from a remote location, to monitor the traffic flow and equipment status at the intersections and to access DOTs network of closed circuit cameras located throughout the City to observe traffic conditions. Loss of transit services, like DASH and Commuter Express bus services, would affect the ability of millions of system users to get to work, to shop, to go to school and to get to medical appointments.

Loss of private ambulance and non-ambulatory transportation services, which are licensed and regulated by DOT, would affect the ability of thousands of users to get to the hospital, dialysis treatments and medical appointments. I.1.1 Description of Transportation Hazard In December 1999, a 32-year-old Algerian with a false Canadian passport, was arrested in Port Angeles, Washington with more than 100 pounds of powerful explosives in the trunk of his car bound for Los Angeles International Airport, where he planned to blow up a terminal on New Year's Eve.2 In April 2002, a Metrolink commuter train and a Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) freight train crashed head-on in Placentia killing 2 and injuring 260. The crash shut down the major east-west rail artery between downtown Los Angeles and the rest of the western United
2 OnTrac Trade Impact Study: National Economic Significance of Rail Capacity and Homeland Security on the Alameda Corridor East (2003).

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States. This illustrates how a single incident impacted and affected an area that extended well beyond its point of origin.

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Figure I-1. Transportation infrastructure in the City of Los Angeles.

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I.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Transportation Hazard

Transportation Hazard is divided into three categories, all of which have their own Asset Identification and Loss Estimation sections. The sections include Aviation, Harbor and Ground Transportation. Aviation 1. Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) 2. Van Nuys Airport (VNY) LAX Los Angeles Airport (LAX) is the busiest airport in the world (based on the number of passengers). For calendar year 2009, LAX had 56.5 million passengers and 544,833 aircraft movements. The annual budget for LAX is more than $524.1 million for 2008. LAX contributes $61 billion to the economy each year or $167 million each day. Approximately 408,000 jobs are directly or indirectly due to the airport, including more than 59,000 jobs at 254 firms at the airport itself. In 2008, LAX handled 70 percent of the passengers, 75 percent of the air cargo, and 95 percent of the international passengers and cargo traffic in the five-county southern California region. LAX stations Coast Guard Facilities. The U.S. Coast Guard Air Station, the only one of its kind in the country, provides around-the-clock vigilance on search/rescue missions. Its personnel conduct maritime law enforcement on oil pollution in coastal waters. The station is located adjacent to the north runway complex. LAX is a dynamic airport which creates, attracts and supports economic activity throughout Southern California. LAX has an annual economic impact of $60 billion. This is generated by aviation activity on or near the airport, by off-airport expenditures related to the use of aviation services, and by money that is again spent and circulated throughout the local economy. An estimated $21 billion of this total is generated within the City of Los Angeles. LAX creates jobs. An estimated 59,000 jobs, directly attributable to LAX, are located on or near the airport. Approximately 408,000 jobs, spread throughout the region, are attributable to LAX. The employment in the City of Los Angeles due to the airport is estimated to be 158,000 jobs. One in 20 jobs in southern California is attributed to LAX operations. VNY Van Nuys Airport (VNY) is one of four airports owned by LAWA and averages 400,000 takeoffs and landings annually. VNY consists of more than 100 businesses. It annually contributes more than 1.3 billion to the southern California economy, supports over 12,300 jobs and generates an earnings impact of $707 million. VNY generates approximately $80 million state and local taxes. 132

An estimated 320,000 visitors utilize VNY every year, flying on corporate, private and charter aircraft. Travelers appreciate VNYs convenient location, and many spend money on local hotels, attractions and goods. These visitors spend approximately $176 million annually in the area and are responsible for generating 3,142 direct, induced and indirect visitor industry jobs, which in turn generate almost $93 million in personal income, wages and salaries. 3 In 2008, 790 aircraft were based at VNY, including 62 helicopters, 242 jets and 444 propeller aircraft. The airport also provides a base and maintenance facilities for fire, police, air ambulance, search and rescue, and news media aircraft that serve the region. Estimating Potential Losses Interrupted/disrupted service would likely negatively impact LAXs non-aviation revenues (concessions sales, parking, etc.) and could impact the financial health of our primary tenants. Similar interruptions at Van Nuys could negatively impact our fuel flowage fee revenues and could financially impact the business of our on-airport tenants. The extent of the impact on either airport is difficult to predict and would vary depending on the duration of the interruption/disruption. The impact on city, state or federal functions is unknown and would likely be characterized by the nature of the interruption/disruption. For example, VNY provides crash, fire and rescue service for the Los Angeles Fire department, therefore disruption to any of these services would affect emergency response and public safety. Extended interruption/disruption of service at either airport (but primarily LAX) would likely impact the local economy as the airports operations are directly linked to tourism and the facilitation of regional, national and international commerce. Future development of the City of Los Angeles airports are expected to increase environmental standards and to improve safety. In 2009, over $34 million dollars were awarded for infrastructure improvements. Harbor 1. Port of Los Angeles (POLA) 2. Port of Long Beach (adjacent to POLA) During the FY 2007 and 2008, the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) handled an average of 164.5 k automobiles. In this same time, cargo estimates were averaged to be 180.0 MMRT with a value of $242 million. Cruise traffic was estimated at 1.2 million passengers for both of these years and an average of 2,550 vessels arrived.

3 The Economic Impacts of Van Nuys airport on the Local and Regional Economy (2007).

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Trade is an important function of POLA. Top imports include furniture, apparel, automobile parts, electronic products and footwear. Top exports consist of paper, scrap metal, fabrics and raw cotton, pet and animal feed and resins. Net income for POLA in 2007 and 2008 respectively was $154.7 million and $125.0 million. Total operating revenue for these years was $426.3 million and $417.2 million. The POLA directly employs 1,073. However, related employment throughout California is estimated to be 1.1 million and 3.3 million throughout the US. POLA-related State and Local tax revenue is $5.1 billion throughout California and $21.5 billion throughout the U.S. The value of trade to the economy is calculated as $58.7 billion throughout California and $240.4 billion throughout the U.S. Estimating Potential Losses If we consider that approximately 44% of goods come through both the Los Angeles and Long Beach Port complex, a shutdown would have a significant impact on all levels of government within the US and countries that we trade with. Additionally, dispersed across the Harbor are oil refineries, business offices, storage facilities for hazardous material and cargo, container terminals, and more. Risk analysis for the Port of Los Angeles calculates economic consequences for extended shutdown of operations. A 15-day shutdown, a 120-day shutdown and a one-year shutdown would result in $300 million, $63 billion and $252 billion losses, respectively. The impact of a 15-day shutdown is considered small because most ships would simply wait out the port closures and businesses would be supplied through other ports. The 120-day and one-year shutdowns, in contrast, are considered significant because they account for the economic impacts of a delay of delivering goods as well as all ripple effects throughout the nations economy that such long-term delays involve 4. This includes costs ranging from the loss of local dock worker jobs to the reduced income and possible forced closure of nationwide businesses not receiving necessary parts or retail products. All levels of government would be working as quickly as possible to reopen the port. Almost every single business within the City of Los Angeles would be impacted one way or the other if the port was shut down for extended periods of time. It would be an economic catastrophe if we were not able to use this port complex because it is the only West Coast port that has the cargo handling capabilities to deal with the size of imports that come into this country. The substantial cargo (TEU) transported through Los Angeles in conjunction with Long Beach- Port alone one year is larger than the entire East Coast. Ground Identifying Assets - Freeways/Major Highways Interstate 110 - Harbor Freeway
4 Risk Analysis, 27 (3), 2007

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 State Route 1- Pacific Coast Highway Interstate 5 - Golden State Freeway State Route 2 - Glendale Freeway Interstate 10 - Santa Monica Freeway State Route 47 - Alameda Street State Route 60 - Pomona Freeway U.S. Route 101 - Hollywood Freeway Interstate 105 - Century Freeway Santa Monica Boulevard State Route 134 - Ventura Freeway Interstate 710 - Long Beach Freeway Estimating Potential Losses Studies that look at economic effects from bridge and highway losses consistently report job loss and economic losses in the billions. For example, 43 percent of businesses reporting losses after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake mentioned they were due to transportation issues. A 2001 study estimated losses from transportation issues due to a hypothetical earthquake in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area. Factors accounted for in this study include policy (e.g. Department of Transportation officials indicate that due to liability and safety risks associated with bridges the current operational perspective is to close them following a large earthquake), damage levels and in/out-flow of traffic. The study reports potential cumulative annual costs of almost $43 billion dollars if a medium to large size earthquake affected the Los Angeles Region due to reduction in transportation network capacity only.5 Identifying Assets - Railway 1. AMTRAK - Passenger 2. Los Angeles County Metro Rail - Passenger (Blue, Red, Green, Gold, Purple Lines) 3. Alameda Corridor AMTRAK There are several rails networks that operate through Los Angeles. AMTRAK operates several long-distance trains in Los Angeles: The Coast Starlight (Los Angeles-Oakland-Seattle), the Southwest Chief (daily Los Angeles-Albuquerque-Chicago), and the Sunset Limited (tri-weekly Los Angeles-New Orleans-Orlando). It also partners with the State of California to operate high frequency trains that make up 12 daily round trips to Santa Barbara and San Diego. City of Los Angeles is the 5th busiest station in the national Amtrak System. The Pacific Surfliner (San DiegoLos Angeles-Santa Barbara-San Luis Obispo)the 2nd-busiest corridor in the U.S. had 2,592,966 riders in FY09. A major Amtrak maintenance facility is in Los Angeles, which opened in 2001. Jointly funded by Caltrans and Amtrak, this complex maintains 21 locomotives and 204 cars. As a result of
5 Journal of Regional Science 41(1), 2001.

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Amtraks influx of ARRA capital dollars (see below), $25 million is being spent to expand and modernize this facility. Funds provided to Amtrak from the America Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will lead to investments in Los Angeles of over $38 million. 6 Alameda Corridor The Alameda Corridor is a 20-mile-long rail cargo expressway linking the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to the transcontinental rail network near downtown Los Angeles. It is a series of bridges, underpasses, overpasses and street improvements that separate freight trains from street traffic and passenger trains, facilitating a more efficient transportation network. The projects centerpiece is the Mid-Corridor Trench, which carries freight trains in an open trench that is 10 miles long, 33 feet deep and 50 feet wide between State Route 91 in Carson and 25th Street in Los Angeles. According to the Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA), Net Capital assets in 2009 were $1,931,631,381. Total Net Assets in 2009 were $182,136,459. 7 Over 35% of percent of all U.S. waterborne container trade moves through the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. The Alameda Corridor consolidates several major rail lines in order to expedite cargo distribution from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to points throughout the United States and to overseas markets. It is a partially below-grade rail line that connects the Ports with transcontinental rail yards operated by Union Pacific (UP) and Burlington Northern & Santa Fe (BNSF) near downtown and East Los Angeles. The creation of the Alameda Corridor eliminated more than 200 at-grade crossings, reducing aggregate daily waiting times by more than 15,000 man-hours and diesel emissions by more than 28 percent. The funding for the project included a mix of public and private sponsorship. Combined, these elements of freight management the Ports, intermodal facilities and rail lines are responsible for the delivery of consumer goods and intermediate products to nearly every part of the country. In addition, the rail lines running from Southern California provide vital linkages for Department of Defense (DoD) to move its assets during military mobilizations. Estimating Potential Losses A report calculated that in 2000, $74.0 billion dollars of domestically and internationally produced goods moved via the Union Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe lines of Alameda Corridor East on their way to destinations around the country. Inbound, $42.4 billion in goods were sent from around the United States to Los Angeles via Alameda Corridor East for consumption in the region or export abroad. The total value of goods moving by rail via Alameda Corridor East was thus $116.4 billion. It was estimated that a 10-day disruption cost of a Terrorist Attack on the Alameda Corridor East would total $4.1 billion. 30-day would cost $12.4 billion and 60-day disruption would cost $24.8 billion. 8
6 www.amtrak.com/ pdf/factsheets/CALIFORNIA09.pdf 7 ACTA Basic Financial Statements, 2009 (www.acta.org). 8 OnTrac trade Impact Study: National Economic Significance of Rail Capacity and Homeland Security on the Alameda Corridor east (2003).

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J. PROFILE

OF DROUGHT HAZARD

Drought is a complex issue involving many factors, with differing conditions and drivers throughout the State making this more of a regional focus. Because of this, Drought Hazard is identified as a Moderate Risk Hazard to the City of Los Angeles. There are four different ways that drought can be defined: Meteorological - a measure of departure of precipitation from normal. Due to climatic differences, what is considered a drought in one location may not be a drought in another location. Agricultural - refers to a situation when the amount of moisture in the soil no longer meets the needs of a particular crop. Hydrological - occurs when surface and subsurface water supplies are below normal. Socioeconomic - refers to the situation that occurs when physical water shortage begins to affect people.

J.1 Identifying Drought Hazard

Drought is different from many of the other natural hazards in that it is not a distinct event, and usually has a slow onset. Drought can severely impact a region both environmentally and economically. A droughts effects impact various sectors in different manners and with varying intensity. Adequate water is the most critical issue; agricultural, manufacturing, tourism and commercial and domestic uses, all require a constant, reliable supply of water. As the population in the area continues to grow, so will the demand for water. The drought issue is further compounded by water-rights specific to any state or region. Water is a commodity possessed under a variety of legal doctrines. In addition, the prioritization of water rights between farming and federally protected fish habitats in the State is also at issue. J.1.1 Description of Drought Hazard During the 2010 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan review and update, the City deemed no significant changes for this hazard. The 1987-92 Drought 9 This section focuses on conditions experienced during the most recent drought, the six-year event from 1987 to 1992. A few examples from the 1976-77 Drought are also mentioned, but detailed discussion of this earlier event is minimized because conditions have changed greatly since then. Impacts experienced during the 1976-77 Drought when 47 of the State's 58 counties declared local emergencies served as a wake-up call to water managers statewide, spurring implementation of many improvements to water supply reliability. Water Supplies and Water Project Operations The 1987-92 Drought was notable for its six-year duration and the statewide nature of its impacts. Because of California's size, droughts may or may not occur simultaneously
9

Source: DWR Drought Report, July 2000

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throughout the entire state. The jet stream's position during the winter storm season is an important determinant of regional precipitation amounts. California, spanning more than nine degrees of latitude (a north-to-south extent equaled or exceeded only by Alaska and Texas), seldom experiences uniform levels of wetness or dryness. Historical values for the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River indices shown in the previous chapter also demonstrate this point. As defined by these indices, the Sacramento River system experienced two dry years and four critically dry years during the drought; the San Joaquin River system experienced six critically dry years. Defining drought conditions in urbanized coastal Southern California is complicated. Historically, imports (from Northern California, from the eastern Sierra, and from the Colorado River) have provided about 65 percent of the region's water supply. Hydrologic conditions in the Colorado River Basin may vary greatly from those being experienced in California; the extensive storage in the river basin further acts as a buffer to short-term hydrologic changes. Colorado River unimpaired flow at the gauging station used for interstate compact administration was below the long-term historical average during the 1987-92 Drought, but the immediately prior multi-year wet period had filled system reservoirs. When the SWP sharply curtailed deliveries in 1991, MWD (the most junior of California's major Colorado River water users) was able to maintain a full Colorado River Aqueduct due to availability of surplus river water. Water users served by most of the State's larger suppliers did not begin to experience shortages until the third or fourth years of the drought. Reservoir storage provided a buffer against drought impacts during the initial years of the drought. The CVP and SWP met delivery requests during the first four years of the drought, but were then forced by declining reservoir storage to cut back deliveries substantially. (Cachuma Reservoir storage is also shown to provide an example of drought impacts to a Southern California reservoir not connected to imported water supplies.) In 1991, the SWP terminated deliveries to agricultural contractors and provided only 30 percent of requested urban deliveries. The CVP, with its larger storage capacity, reduced agricultural deliveries by 75 percent and urban deliveries by 25 percent in 1991. By the third year of the drought, overall statewide reservoir storage was about 40 percent of average. Statewide reservoir storage did not return to average conditions until 1994, thanks to an unusually wet 1993. Some examples of surface water supply impacts included: Among large urban agencies' water development projects, the City and County of San Francisco's system experienced the greatest supply impacts, having only about 25 percent of total storage capacity in 1991. The City and County constructed two turnouts one 75 cubic feet per second and the other 25 cfs on the California Aqueduct to obtain access to supplies from water transfers. Lake Tahoe, the principal storage facility for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's Newlands Project in Nevada, not only fell below its natural rim but also reached a record low of more than a foot below the rim. Storage on the Truckee River system, all dedicated to 138

Nevada uses, reached a low of ten percent of total capacity in 1991. The creek providing water for Markleeville, the county seat of Alpine County, dried up. A pipeline was constructed to a new water source. This example is typical of impacts faced by small rural water systems with marginal water supplies. As described later in this chapter, the drought spurred many water agencies to begin planning for new facilities to improve water supply reliability. Only two new water management facilities of regional scope were put into service during the drought. In Northern California, the Department's North Bay Aqueduct pipeline was completed in 1988, replacing previously constructed interim facilities. The NBA was used to convey SWP water and water transfers to Napa Valley communities experiencing significant shortages of local surface supplies. In the San Joaquin Valley, initial operational testing was being conducted for the Kern Water Bank, a project originally developed by the Department for SWP supply augmentation and subsequently turned over to local agencies to implement. In a 1990 test program, the Department banked about 100 thousand acre-feet of SWP water in what was then known as the Semitropic local element of the KWB. Semitropic Water Storage District returned, through exchange, about half the stored water in 1992. Delta regulatory constraints affecting CVP and SWP operations during the drought were based on SWRCB Decision 1485. (D-1485 requirements took effect in 1978, immediately following the 1976-77 Drought.) Other operational constraints included temperature standards established by SWRCB through Orders WR 90-5 and 91-01 for portions of the Sacramento and Trinity Rivers. On the Sacramento River below Keswick Dam, these orders included a daily average water temperature objective of 56F during critical periods when high temperatures could be detrimental to survival of salmon eggs and a pre-emergent fry. Groundwater extraction increased substantially during the drought. The total number of well driller reports filed with the Department was in the range of 25,000 reports per year for several years, up from fewer than 15,000 reports per year prior to the drought. The majority of the new wells drilled were for individual domestic supply. Water levels and the amounts of groundwater in storage declined substantially in some areas. As indicated earlier, groundwater extractions were estimated to exceed groundwater recharges by 11 maf in the San Joaquin Valley during the first five years of the drought. Precise surveys of the California Aqueduct identified an increase in subsidence along the aqueduct alignment in the San Joaquin Valley, in response to increased groundwater extractions.

Examples of impacts to groundwater supply included: Numerous private domestic wells went dry, as did wells supplying small systems in rural areas. Homeowners with private wells were forced to drill new wells or deepen existing ones. Groundwater users most at risk were typically those relying on extractions from small coastal basins with limited recharge, or on low-yield fractured rock formations such as those in the Sierra Nevada foothills. Dry wells at a number of small water systems in rural areas of the Sierra Nevada foothills resulted in the need to haul water. The counties affected 139

included Butte, Amador, Mariposa, and Tuolumne. Water levels in Salinas Valley aquifers declined, and increased seawater intrusion was noted. San Antonio and Nacimiento Reservoirs, used by Monterey County Water Resources Agency for groundwater recharge, were only at six percent of capacity in 1991. The valley's extensive agricultural production relies almost entirely on groundwater. (A new water recycling project providing supplemental irrigation supply, in the Castroville area, did not become operational until after the drought ended.) Some communities in the Central Coast area rely on small groundwater basins formed by coastal terrace deposits, with recharges to these basins being limited largely to direct precipitation over the basin. These communities typically experienced shortages throughout the drought, and instituted rationing in response. Santa Barbara experienced the largest water supply reductions of any of California's larger municipalities; its limited groundwater and local surface water supplies were unable to support area residents' needs. As described later in this chapter, the city was forced to adopt several emergency measures including a 14-month ban on lawn watering. Groundwater supplies ranged from none to minimal for the small North Coast communities that frequently experience water supply problems. In Mendocino, for example, supplies are provided by individual private wells. It has been estimated that ten percent of the town's wells go dry every year, an amount that increases to 40 percent during droughts. Other communities with problems included Weaverville and Fort Bragg (building moratoria/connection bans), Klamath (connected to a private well), and Willits (hauled water, installed temporary pipelines). Wells or springs serving several small water systems in the Russian River corridor went dry; water haulage was necessary.

Actions Taken by Water Agencies to Respond to Drought Department of Water Resources The Department devoted substantial resources to drought-related information collection and dissemination, including staffing a Drought Center to serve as a central point of contact for information and emergency assistance requests. The Department also chaired the interagency Drought Action Team established by Governor's Executive Order No. W-3-91. The Division of Flood Management compiled and disseminated climatology, hydrology, and water storage data. Staffs in District offices were tasked with performing anecdotal surveys of local water agency conditions, and with providing increased local assistance support in water conservation and other programs. Information collected by the Department was provided to the media, to the general public, and to the Legislature, and numerous status reports and other drought-related information were published. 140

In addition to routine SWP operations, the Department conducted several trial programs to improve SWP water supply reliability. The demonstration groundwater storage program with SWSD was one example. In 1989, a weather modification project using aerial cloud seeding was operated in the Feather River watershed. The Department additionally began a demonstration weather modification program using ground-based propane generators in the Middle Fork Feather River watershed in 1991. The program was terminated after three years when initial results indicated that a redesign was necessary, by which time the drought had ended. The Department used the California Aqueduct to wheel water for other agencies' droughtrelated water transfers, and also for the drought water bank. The bank, the most ambitious of the Department's drought response activities, is described in detail below. The Department developed the bank in response to the Governor's 1991 Executive Order. The bank operated three times during 1991 and 1992, then again in 1994, a critically dry year. The Department purchased water under 351 short-term agreements in 1991. About 50 percent of the water came from land fallowing, and about 30 percent from groundwater substitution. The remainder of the water came from reservoir storage. In 1992, about 80 percent of bank purchases came from groundwater substitution and 20 percent from reservoir storage. No land fallowing contracts were executed in 1992. While land fallowing was a major feature of the 1992 bank, it is also the water source that has the greatest potential for generating third party impacts. The costs to the seller of participating in land fallowing are higher, and it was determined that water purchased from other sources could be less expensive. Finally, demands in the 1992 and 1994 banks were much less than those in 1991, and a judgment was made that land fallowing was not needed to meet critical water needs. The 1991 and 1992 banks were able to acquire sufficient water to meet critical needs of all participants. The highest priority critical needs were basic domestic use, health and safety, and fire protection. Agricultural critical needs allocations were based on supplies for permanent plantings such as orchards and vineyards. DFG, in a program operated in parallel to the drought water bank, used emergency drought relief funding appropriated during the Legislature's 1991-92 extraordinary session to purchase almost 75 taf for fish and wildlife purposes. Most of the water was used for wetlands at wildlife refuges. Water users and residents in regions of bank sales expressed concerns about third-party impacts of the fallowing and groundwater substitution associated with the 1991 and 1992 banks. Some private groundwater users in Butte County not participating in the bank filed claims against the Department alleging impacts to their wells. The Department conducted extensive groundwater monitoring programs in areas of the groundwater substitution purchases, including installing extensometers to measure subsidence. The Department paid Yolo and Butte Counties amounts equivalent to two percent of the value of the groundwater 141

substitution contracts in their counties, to fund preparation of county water plans or to update existing plans. The Department also funded external reviews of 1991 and 1992 Bank operation, which included economic evaluation of third-party impacts. In 1993, the Department completed a programmatic environmental impact report covering operation of potential drought water banks over the next 5 to 10 years. A bank would be implemented as needed on an annual basis upon an executive order of the Governor, a decision by the Secretary for Resources, or a finding by the Department's Director that drought or other unanticipated conditions would significantly curtail waters supplies. The bank would continue to operate until water supplies returned to noncritical levels. The Department opened another drought water bank in 1994, together with a short-term water purchase program for SWP contractors. The Department began organizing a 1995 bank in September 1994, anticipating another dry year. By mid-November, water agencies had signed contracts with the Department to purchase water from the bank for critical needs. The bank acquired options to purchase 29 taf of water from five willing sellers. The options were subsequently not exercised due to wet conditions in 1995. Other Water Agencies The majority of the State's urban water retailers and water wholesalers implemented demand reduction techniques either voluntary or mandatory at some point during the drought. Demand reduction programs were typically accomplished through extensive customer education and outreach programs. Mandatory rationing levels reached as high as 50 percent in some hard-hit communities. Small communities in isolated areas lacking back-up water sources and the ability to interconnect with other water agencies typically had no recourse other than demand reduction or water haulage. Customers of agricultural water agencies reduced planted acreage to match water supplies expected to be available. Examples of other actions taken by water agencies are briefly summarized below. Increased groundwater extraction was a common response action. Agencies drilled new wells, deepened existing ones, or expanded distribution systems to serve groundwater to lands previously supplied only from surface water. Some agricultural water agencies worked with their customers to develop delivery schedules that stretched agencies' stored surface water by making growers responsible for meeting part of crop water needs through private groundwater extraction. Groundwater, either directly or through substitution, was the source of supply in many transfers. Water systems of all sizes constructed interconnections with neighboring agencies, to facilitate water transfers and exchanges. The City and County of San Francisco turnouts on the California Aqueduct are an example of interconnections made solely for the purpose of water transfers. 142

Some agencies constructed temporary or emergency pipelines to a back-up supply when their primary source of supply became inadequate. Multi-agency water transfers and exchanges used to make a temporary SWP water supply available to southern Santa Barbara County, for example, entailed construction of a 16-inch pipeline between Ventura and Oxnard. The City of Willits used pipe supplied by the Office of Emergency Services to make a temporary connection to an alternate water supply. The drought increased interest in water recycling projects, especially in Southern California. Planning began for a number of new projects. After the drought ended, however, studies of many smaller projects (and of projects not eligible for federal costsharing) were deferred. Projects most likely to remain active were typically those driven by wastewater disposal requirements, and those eligible for federal cost-sharing. Coastal communities' interest in seawater desalting likewise increased. The drought served as a catalyst for initiating research studies, bench scale tests, and demonstration projects, primarily in Southern California. Most of these efforts terminated with the end of the drought, because seawater desalting remains noncompetitive with other water supply augmentation options. The City of Santa Barbara did contract for installation of a modular, portable seawater desalting plant, in response to its severe reductions in local water supplies. The plant, rated at a production capacity of 7.5 AF/year, operated only during 1991. The plant was subsequently mothballed; later, part of its equipment was sold. During the time of its brief operation, it was the State's largest seawater desalting plant designed for providing municipal water supply. In a general sense, the drought encouraged water agencies to review the reliability of their water supplies and to initiate planning programs addressing identified needs for improvement. Examples of agencies performing extensive reviews of supply reliability in response to the drought included MWD, SDCWA, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and Alameda County Water District. The water transfers listed as contingency measures were short-term transfers. Shortterm transfers, including those for the Department's drought water bank, were widely implemented during the drought. It is difficult to accurately quantify the amount of short-term transfers implemented during the drought, because many transfers involved pre-1914 water rights not subject to SWRCB jurisdiction. Some short-term "transfers" were not actually transfers from the standpoint of water rights administration, as in the case of transfers of contractual allocations among CVP contractors. Long-term water transfers are usually considered to be part of improving water agencies' overall supply reliability, not as drought response actions. A water agency could execute a long-term agreement for transfers only in dry/drought years, or one which would entail exchanging wet year supplies for dry year supplies over the agreement's duration. Some agreements of this nature were executed subsequent to the drought's end. The drought encouraged water and power agencies to implement weather modification (cloud seeding) programs, most located in Coast Range and Sierra Nevada watersheds. The number of operating programs increased from perhaps a dozen prior to the drought 143

to 20 during the drought. However, the absence of cloud masses suitable for seeding is a limiting factor on the potential for water supply augmentation during droughts. Drought Impacts to Water Agencies The fundamental drought impact to water agencies was a reduction in available water supplies. Examples of further drought impacts to water agencies are briefly summarized below: Declining revenues and increasing operational costs were problems faced by most water agencies. Revenues declined as customers responded to calls for voluntary or mandatory reductions in water use. Costs increased, as agencies reacted to shortages by purchasing water, deepening wells, or implementing water education and conservation campaigns. Water agencies thus increased their rates to recover costs, sending a mixed message to the public use less water, pay more. Agricultural water agencies were especially affected by drought-related financial problems. Estimated statewide drought-idled acreage was on the order of 500,000 acres, about five percent of 1988-level harvested acreage. With reduced revenues, water agencies were hard-pressed to cover fixed costs. Financial problems experienced by Kern County Water Agency's member districts, together with concerns about SWP water allocation rules, were an impetus for subsequent negotiation of the Monterey Amendments between the Department and the SWP contractors. Some agencies not experiencing drought-induced water quantity problems nevertheless experienced water quality problems most typically, agencies relying on groundwater. Increased extractions resulted in lowered water tables and resultant contaminant migration toward production wells. The City of Fresno, for example, took at least 34 of its municipal wells out of service as a result of increased concentrations of pesticides, solvents, and salts. Most municipalities relying on small coastal groundwater basins observed increased amounts of seawater intrusion. Saltier water was also a concern for in-Delta diverters. The Department installed temporary barriers at two South Delta locations Middle River and Old River near the Delta-Mendota Canal intake to improve water levels/water quality/circulation for agricultural diverters. Contra Costa Water District relied largely on CVP supplies during the drought, because water quality at its Rock Slough intake was poor. (As part of Los Vaqueros project construction, CCWD subsequently constructed a new intake farther upstream on Old River, to lessen salinity intrusion impacts.) Some Southern California water agencies experienced increased salt concentrations as a result of receiving a higher percentage of Colorado River water in their MWD supplies. The total dissolved solids content of MWD's Colorado River supplies is typically on the order of 700 milligrams per liter. MWD attempts to provide a 50/50 blend of SWP and Colorado River water to its member agencies, to the extent practical. Reduced SWP 144

supplies during the latter part of the drought limited MWD's blending capability, and MWD lacked facilities to deliver a 50/50 blend throughout all of its service area. SDCWA was probably the most affected member agency. Imported MWD water provides 70 to 95 percent of SDCWA's service area supply; SDCWA received essentially 100 percent Colorado River water during 1991-92. Construction of Diamond Valley Reservoir and completion of the Inland Feeder will facilitate better regional distribution of SWP water for blending.

Drought-Related Legislation Public and media interest in droughts fosters heightened awareness of water supply reliability issues in the Legislature. More than 50 drought-related legislative proposals were introduced during the severe, but brief 1976-77 Drought. About one-third of these eventually became law. Similar activity on drought-related legislative proposals was observed during the 1987-92 Drought. Selected chaptered drought or water supply reliability bills from the 1987-92 Drought are summarized below, followed by a summary of the proposed State Drought Emergency Relief and Assistance Act of 1991. The Legislature took action on the provisions contained in this proposal during an extraordinary session held in 1991-92. Chaptered Drought or Water Supply Reliability Legislation Various technical and clarifying changes were made to Water Code provisions governing temporary and long-term water transfers. The use of potable water for specified non-potable purposes was declared to be a waste or unreasonable use of water if suitable, cost-effective reclaimed water supplies were available. Several measures expanding the types of applicable non-potable purposes were enacted. Leases of water for up to five years, with specified limitations, were exempted from SWRCB jurisdiction over water transfers. (Chapter 847-91) Groundwater substitution transfers were explicitly authorized; related findings were made. (Chapter 779-92) The Water Conservation in Landscaping Act directed the Department to draft and adopt a model water efficient landscape ordinance by July 1992. Local agencies not adopting their own ordinances by January 1993 were required to begin enforcement of the model ordinance as of that date. (Chapter 1145-90) The Agricultural Water Suppliers Efficient Management Practices Act required the Department to establish an advisory committee to review efficient agricultural water management practices, and to offer assistance to agricultural water suppliers seeking improved efficiencies. (Chapter 739-90) The Water Recycling Act of 1991 set a statewide goal of recycling 700 AF/year by 2000 and 1 MAF/year by 2010. (Chapter 187-91) 145

The Agricultural Water Conservation and Management Act of 1992 authorized agricultural water suppliers to institute water conservation or efficient water management programs. (Chapter 184-91) The Department was required to develop standards for installation of gray water systems in residential buildings. (Chapter 226-92) Effective January 1992, water purveyors were required to meter new connections. (Chapter 407-91) Caltrans was required to implement drought-resistant freeway landscaping, and to allow local agencies to place recycled water pipelines in highway rights-of-way. Another measure urged the Department of General Services to use drought resistant plants in new landscaping. The Urban Water Management and Planning Act, in effect since 1983, was amended in multiple sessions. Amendments in 1991 required water suppliers to estimate available water supplies at the end of one, two, and three years, and to develop contingency plans for shortages of up to 50 percent. The Department and the Department of Fish and Game were directed to submit various reports to the Legislature describing water supply availability and drought-related water needs for fish and wildlife.

The Drought and Emergency Management Actions As the 1987-92 Drought entered its fifth year, carry-over storage in the State's major reservoirs had been depleted and water agencies throughout California were facing the prospect of major reductions in supplies. The Governor signed an executive order in February 1991, creating a Drought Action Team and directing the team to coordinate a response to water supply conditions. The team was headed by the Director of DWR; its membership included representatives from nine other State agencies, with invited participation from additional State and federal agencies. Among other things, the team was charged with advising the Governor on "determining whether and when to proclaim a state of emergency due to drought conditions". Prior to formation of the Drought Action Team, the Governor had declared a state of emergency in the City and County of Santa Barbara in 1990, at the request of both jurisdictions. By early 1991, ten counties had declared local drought emergencies. By the end of 1991, 23 counties had declared local drought emergencies. Ultimately, no statewide declaration of emergency was made for the 1987-92 Drought, although a declaration would almost certainly have been made but for the "March Miracle" rains in 1991. Had such a declaration been made, the Governor would have had broad powers to take emergency response actions, as summarized below. Prior to the "March Miracle," for example, 146

plans were being made to require that all communities develop strategies to respond to a worst case scenario of a 50 percent reduction in their normal water supplies. Water Conservation in Landscaping Act The Model Water Efficient Landscape Ordinance was added to Title 23 of the California Code of Regulations in response to requirements of the 1990 Water Conservation in Landscaping Act. Local agencies not adopting their own ordinances by January 1993 were required to begin enforcement of the model ordinance as of that date. The model ordinance applied to all new and rehabilitated landscaping (more than 2,500 square feet in size) for public agency projects and private development projects that require a local agency permit. The purpose of the ordinance was to promote water efficient landscape design, installation, and maintenance. The ordinance's general approach was to use 0.8 ET0 as a water use goal for new and renovated landscapes. (ET0 is a reference evapotranspiration, established according to specific criteria.) To date, there has been no statewide-level review of how cities and counties are implementing this requirement; hence, its water savings potential remains to be quantified. Estimating urban landscaping water use is difficult due to lack of data. Only a handful of water districts in California have actual data on the extent of irrigated acreage (residential lots plus large turf areas, such as parks, cemeteries, and golf courses) in their service areas, and data are nonexistent at a statewide level. Emergency Services Act The Emergency Services Act (Government Code Section 8550 et seq.) authorizes the Governor to proclaim a state of emergency where he or she finds that conditions of disaster or extreme perils exist, caused by conditions such as flood, fire, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, earthquake, or volcanic eruption. These conditions of emergency must be beyond the control, or likely control, of the services, personnel, equipment and facilities of any single city or county. The emergency must also require the combined forces of a mutual aid region to combat. Generally, the act is triggered by a local emergency proclamation and a request to the Governor to proclaim an emergency. The Governor may also proclaim an emergency without such a local request, if he finds that a state of emergency exists, and local authority is inadequate to cope with the emergency. The Governor must proclaim the termination of the state of emergency at the earliest possible date that conditions warrant. Drought differs from other emergencies in that it occurs over a period of time, instead of being a sudden occurrence like fire, flood, or earthquake. Accordingly, its burdens on cities and counties are likely to be cumulative, rather than sudden and overwhelming. To invoke the extraordinary remedies of the Emergency Services Act, conditions of a disaster or extreme peril to the safety of persons and property should exist, and not be a matter of speculation. The act permits the Governor to assign a State agency any emergency 147

response activity related to the powers and duties of that agency. This assignment may be accomplished by executive order without the need of the Governor having to proclaim a state of emergency. Public agencies often have specific powers in their enabling acts to adopt water rationing and other demand reduction measures. Municipal water districts, for example, have specific authority to adopt a drought ordinance restricting use of water, including the authority to restrict use of water for any purpose other than household use. During a local emergency, cities and counties may promulgate orders and regulations necessary for the protection of life and property, and they have the authority to provide mutual aid to any affected area. Where a county has declared an emergency, it is not necessary for cities affected by emergency conditions within the county to make an independent declaration of local emergency. Water Code Sections 350-358 authorizes public and private water purveyors to declare a water shortage emergency and to adopt regulations and restrictions to conserve water. The governing body of a purveyor may declare a water shortage emergency whenever it determines that consumers' requirements cannot be satisfied without depleting the water supply to the extent that there would be insufficient water for human consumption, sanitation, and fire protection. The governing body may adopt regulations and restrictions on water delivery and use to conserve water for the greatest public benefit, with particular regard to domestic use, sanitation, and fire protection. The regulations may provide for connection moratoria. DHS has the authority to impose terms and conditions on permits for public drinking water systems to assure that sufficient water is available. This includes the authority to require an agency to continue its moratorium on new connections adopted pursuant to Water Code Section 350 et seq. Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution prohibits waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or diversion of water. Court decisions interpreting the Constitution have stressed that a use reasonable in times of plenty may be unreasonable in time of shortage, and reasonable use must be determined in the light of statewide conservation considerations. Water Code Section 275 directs the Department and the SWRCB to take appropriate actions before courts, administrative agencies, and legislative bodies to prevent waste or misuse of water. J.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Drought Hazard Unlike some potential hazards, the probability that Los Angeles will experience drought conditions in the future is virtually 100%. The only unknowns are exactly when, how severe, and the duration of drought conditions. Also, unlike other potential hazards, drought does not directly cause personal injury, death, or damage to facilities and infrastructure. Nonetheless severe drought could result in substantial monetary loss, and could exacerbate the effects of other natural hazards. Severe drought could result in the following adverse effects: 148

Substantial economic loss to agriculture and related industries. Loss of natural vegetation, potentially exacerbating the adverse effects of brushfires and floods. Economic loss to commercial and residential property owners from landscape damage due to water shortages or rationing. Water agencies also experience reduced revenue when water usage declines due to use restrictions on water Water supply agencies could experience increased cost of operations and/or increased treatment costs as less desirable sources of water supply are tapped. J.2.1 Estimating Potential Loss Potential Losses to Agriculture and Related Industries According to the 2002 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Los Angeles County is home to more than fifteen hundred farms. The market value of Los Angeles County farm products in 2002 was in excess of $281 million. While few commercial farms are located within the City limits, the City is home to significant numbers of workers in agricultural industries. In addition, agricultural production in the surrounding area, as well as related industries, generates retail and wholesale sales in the City. Severe or sustained drought not only causes direct damage to crops, a secondary result is increased susceptibility insect damage and disease. Loss of Natural Vegetation A substantial portion of the land area within the City of Los Angeles is composed of undeveloped hillsides and mountainous areas covered with natural vegetation. Loss of natural vegetation as a direct result of drought, or from secondary causes such as disease and insect damage increases the potential severity of other hazards, particularly flood, landslide/mudslide, and brushfire. The specific vulnerabilities associated with these hazards are discussed in sections E, P, and D respectively. An additional consequence of natural vegetation loss is loss of natural habitats for indigenous species of fauna. Damage to Residential and Commercial Landscape Public education efforts conducted by the Citys Department of Water and Power have resulted in increased awareness among property owners of the importance of low-water maintenance landscaping. In addition, commercial and government landscaping increasingly relies on reclaimed water. However, most landscapes (including lawns) within the City remains water intensive. The resulting economic loss is difficult to measure because costs would be distributed among an extremely large number of residential and commercial property owners. However, an extreme drought event could result in losses of hundreds of millions of dollars. 149

Increased Costs to Water Supply Agencies The high potential for drought increases to cost of water acquisition, storage, transportation and treatment for water supply agencies. Between 1991 and 2001, for example, southern California water agencies invested more than $261 million in conservation, recycling, and groundwater clean-up programs. According to the Metropolitan Water District, during the same time period more than three million water-conserving showerheads and almost two million ultra-low flow toilets were installed in southern California at a cost of $106 million.

K. PROFILE OF SPECIAL EVENTS HAZARD

As the nations second largest city, Los Angeles is the site of many public and special events. The proximity of Hollywood and major movie studios adds a special dynamic to the citys events. Therefore, Special Events Hazard was identified as a Moderate Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles. On average, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Major Events Planning Unit reported over one thousand public events in the City annually. Many of these events provide challenges for the City. According to the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT), more than 600 of these events required the deployment of LADOT personnel for such activities as posting and enforcing parking restrictions, closing streets, and directing traffic. For the purposes of this section, a Special Event may be defined as: ...any activity which occurs upon public or private property that will affect the standard and ordinary use of public streets, rights-of-way, or sidewalks, and/or which requires extraordinary levels of City services. This includes, but is not limited to: fairs, festivals, carnivals, sporting events, foot races, run/walk/bike-a-thons, markets, parades, street fairs, exhibitions, auctions, dances, and motion picture filming. K.1 Identifying Special Events Hazard Special Events pose three types of hazards: 1) First, such events result in concentrations of large numbers of people within limited geographic areas. Such concentrations exacerbate the effects of any other hazard that may result from, or be coincidental to the event. Special Events may increase the likelihood of human caused hazards such as terrorism, civil unrest or high occupancy building fire. Injuries and/or loss of life due to a naturally occurring hazard may be much greater if hazards such as earthquakes or severe weather occur during a Special Event. 2) Secondly, large scale Special Events require the deployment of police, fire, and emergency medical personnel, rendering these resources unavailable for response to emergencies in other locations in the City. 3) Finally, many large scale Special Events result in street closures and increased traffic congestion, slowing response time for emergency personnel and equipment.

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K.1.1 Description of Special Events Hazard The major categories of Special Events can be categorized in the following manner: entertainment industry/celebrity events, such as awards shows, concerts, and movie premieres; sporting events; VIP appearances or visits; political events, such as Iraq war protest rallies; festivals/parade events, such as the 4th of July celebrations or block parties; and fundraisers, such as run/walk-a-thons. There are also other major events that are not regularly recurring but are nonetheless frequent. Some examples include the Democratic National Convention (2000), NBA Championship Series (1972, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987-8, 2000-2), and dignitaries, VIP or Presidential visits. Each of these events draws thousands of participants or spectators, and they obviously have special security considerations. For a variety of reasons, numerous large events can be a source of problems. They can be terrorist targets or sources of civil unrest. Many ethnic and religious groups in Los Angeles have various celebrations and public events throughout the year; these may be targets for terrorists or demonstrators. Entertainment industry events can be targeted by protestors or terrorists because of their symbolic nature. Protests or political rallies can turn violent. Simply having a massive concentration of people requires additional planning and caution, regardless of the special risks associated with any particular event. Even without a major incident, massive public gatherings cause their own variety of trouble for Los Angeles. Crowds in general are associated with increased crime, street closures, delayed traffic, and so on. In many cases, emergency vehicles must detour around special events. If an emergency occurs at the heart of such an event, emergency vehicles may also have trouble getting to the site of the incident. Even without violence or tragedy, the best planned special events are rarely without problems or side-effects. Even before 9/11, Los Angeles was able to learn lessons from both its own previous major events (e.g., the 2000 Democratic National Convention and the 1984 Olympic Games). Other emergencies and tragedies across the nation also provided learning opportunities for Los Angeles. These examples include the following major events: the 1989 earthquake in San Francisco during the World Series; the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympic Games; the 1999 protests in Seattle during the World Trade Organization meetings; and the 2003 fire in Rhode Island during a rock concert. Each of these events, regardless of the magnitude of tragedy, provides Los Angeles with a basis for future special event planning. Special Event Planning In the City of Los Angeles, special events which require extraordinary deployment of City resources, or which result in blockage or closure of public streets or sidewalks require event sponsors to obtain special permits. Depending upon the nature of the event, permits are obtained from the Police Commission (Parade Permits), Board of Public Works (Street Closure 151

Permits), and/or the City Council (Motions declaring gatherings as Special Events). Most Special Events even small events such as street fairs -- typically require deployment of LAPD and LADOT resources. In some cases, other City departments such as the Fire Department may also deploy resources. In addition to resource deployment for the events themselves, Special Events require advanced planning and coordination by involved agencies. Working with event sponsors, LADOT develops plans for traffic control and routing, street closures, and special parking restrictions as required. LAPD develops plans for security, crowd control and critical asset protection. Special Event Traffic Management Plans LADOT screens approved permits for Special Events to determine the appropriate level of response. Responses range from simply posting parking restrictions at the event location to preparation of detailed Special Event Traffic Management Plans for large-scale events. Many factors go into the preparation of a successful Special Event Traffic Management Plan. Negotiations are held with event sponsors and other affected agencies to identify issues and areas of concern. Access to critical facilities such as hospitals, churches and schools must be maintained while minimizing the conflicts between event participants and vehicular traffic. Conflicts between event participants and non-event traffic are minimized by designing a cordoned area for event participants and designating detour routes around the cordoned area for non-event traffic and transit buses. The proper preparation and implementation of a Special Event Traffic Management Plan may require involvement from several units within the Department including field crews, engineering staff and parking enforcement personnel. For larger events, the Police Department and the Bureau of Street Services provide service in coordination with LADOT. Special Event Security Security for most events can be handled in a routine fashion. However, certain high-profile events require special preparations and planning. For security planning purposes, high profile special events fall into three categories: 1) unique events that warrant a focus on security simply because they are so rare (such as a visit by the President, or a foreign religious or political leader); 2) events that would otherwise be considered normal except for the unique nature of the guests or agenda; or 3) events that are controversial or worthy of media attention. (Shuster, Security Strategies for Special Events, Special Events Magazine, Feb., 2003). The assessment of potential threats must take into account a number of factors. First, threats increase for high profile events, especially where media coverage is involved. Participation by VIPs also raises threat levels, as does the symbolic value of the event or venue. LAPD planning for special events is led by the Special Events Planning Unit (SEPU), Major Events Planning Unit (MEPU) Task Force. Planning for special event security takes place on two levels. Since Los Angeles is home to such a large number of special events, each of the eighteen geographic areas within the Department is required to maintain Standing Plans to deal with a 152

wide variety of special events. In addition, the Department maintains single purpose operations plans to deal with specific events or incidents. For major Special Events, special operations plans may be prepared specifically for the event. Event planning consists of control and containment. This may be accomplished by the Major Events Planning Unit (MEPU) staff, or a special task force may be created depending upon the size of the event.

K.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Special Events Hazards Los Angeles will continue to be subject to Special Event Hazards. As the second largest city in the nation, the capital of the entertainment industry, the home of myriad ethnic and religious groups, the location of numerous major and well-known venues, and the American gateway to the Pacific Rim, Special Events are an inevitable component of daily life in Los Angeles. In fact, the richness of the Special Event calendar in Los Angeles is one of the factors that make life in the City interesting and exciting. Special Events occur in all geographic areas of the City, among all segments of the population.
By the same token, Los Angeles will continue to be vulnerable to the hazards associated with Special Events. As Los Angeles grows and diversifies the number and variety of Special Events is likely to increase. K.2.1 Estimating Potential Loss Special Events in and of themselves pose minimal threats to the physical infrastructure of the City. Critical Response Facilities, Critical Infrastructure, and Critical Operating Facilities are unlikely to experience physical damage as a direct result of Special Events. However, such facilities may be temporarily inaccessible due to Special Events that involve assemblage of large numbers of people, street closures, or traffic congestion. Therefore, a listing of assets possibly affected and estimates of potential losses due to damage and/or destruction of critical facilities are not appropriate for this hazard.

L. PROFILE OF SEVERE WEATHER HAZARD

Severe weather refers to any dangerous meteorological or hydro-meteorological phenomena, of varying duration, with risk of causing major damage, serious social disruption and loss of human life. While types of severe weather phenomena can vary depending on the latitude, attitude, topography, and atmospheric conditions of a region, general forms of severe weather include: thunderstorms, hurricanes, hailstorms, tornadoes, heavy precipitation, and damaging downburst winds. Extreme temperature variations caused by heat waves and cold waves can also be considered forms of severe weather. The term severe weather is generally used to describe many different extreme weather phenomena. Severe Weather Hazard was identified as a Moderate Risk for the City of Los Angeles.

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L.1 Identifying Severe Weather Hazard The types of natural disasters that are categorized as severe weather in this plan are the following: Extreme Heat High Winds Beach Erosion Tornadoes
Extreme Heat In Los Angeles, the summers are hot. Fortunately, the combination of high temperature and high humidity, which are requirements for the National Weather Service to call a Heat Emergency, are relatively rare. Nonetheless, such a combination of weather factors can occur here, and for this reason it is prudent to prepare. The only recognized source for Heat Emergency Advisories will be the Los Angeles Forecast Office of the National Weather Service (NWS). The actions recommended within this plan will result in increased operational readiness and preparedness of City Departments in the event of a Heat Emergency Advisory. High Winds (Santa Ana Winds) Santa Ana winds are one of the principal signatures by which Los Angeles weather is known. Santa Anas are offshore winds, usually warm, blowing from the mountains to the coast, and occurring principally in the fall and winter. They are a type of downslope (Foehn) wind which occurs in many other regions of the planet. But perhaps nowhere else do such winds impact so many people with so much force, and possess such extensive opportunity for damage and destruction. Fortunately, destructive Santa Ana winds are rare. For most Angelinos, and for the great majority of Santa Ana events, the effects of these offshore wind conditions are benign and even welcome. The Santa Ana condition is usually one of warm temperatures when the rest of the United States is in the grip of winter. For most of the district, Santa Anas are marked by light coastal winds, clean air and low humidity. There is much contradictory information in circulation with respect to Santa Ana winds. The name Santa Ana was applied to Los Angeles offshore winds over 100 years ago, with an early article describing Santa Anas appearing in the Los Angeles Evening Express on November 15, 1880. It is likely that the Santa Ana name (variously spelled Santa Anna or Santana) derives from Santa Ana Canyon in Orange County from which the winds sometimes blow with considerable force.

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An Associated Press account of a strong windstorm which occurred about Christmas Day in 1901 popularized the Santa Ana winds on a national scale. The wire services exaggerated account of the winds, and the alleged damage caused by them, resulted in an understandable reaction in the city of Santa Ana. Following this incident, the Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce tried, without success, to have newspaper editors refrain from using the name Santa Ana in connection with areas winds. Notwithstanding the citys objections, the U.S. Weather Bureau published a Climatology of California in 1903 which referred to the winds as Santa Ana, and that designation has remained in common use throughout the twentieth century. Santa Ana winds are a type of katabatic or downslope winds, generally warm and dry, broadly affecting the Los Angeles Basin with the strongest impact felt below passes and canyons of the coastal mountains. Offshore winds from the northeast or east must reach 30 mph or more below passes and canyons to reach minimum criteria for Santa Ana wind advisories. More typically wind speeds are in the 40 to 55 mph range, and in extreme cases winds can gust locally to over 100 mph. High pressure areas build in the fall and winter over the Great Basin as cold air translates into that region from Canada. When the surface pressure gradient reaches or exceeds ten millibar as measured from Tonopah, Nevada to LAX, wind gusts can reach 70 mph in the mountains and below passes and canyons near Los Angeles. If, in addition to strong gradients from the Great Basin, pressure gradients increase to eight millibar or more from San Francisco to LAX, a general Santa Ana condition will ensue that will affect most of the Los Angeles Basin. In this event, winds may gust to 40 mph or more at LAX and in downtown Los Angeles. Beach Erosion Beach erosion mitigation is under the auspices of the Army Corps. Taming of flood waters of the Los Angeles River and draining of marshes, dredging, construction of breakwaters and creation of new land masses for development of the harbors changed ocean wave action and reduced the flow of natural sediments (sand) to the sea. Change in wave action and lack of sand to replenish beaches resulted in erosion of the coastline, undermining of cliffs and reducing or eliminating beaches. Undermining of cliffs sometimes resulted in landslides and loss of homes and property. Initially local jurisdictions were responsible for beach protection. In the 1930s the Bureau of Engineering Hydraulic Research Laboratory evaluated sand migration to identify causes of erosion and means of mitigating erosion and protecting roadways and properties. It became clear the primary cause of beach erosion was due to the breakwaters and other Army Corps constructed modifications of wave action along the coast. Mitigation generally was beyond the expertise and resources of local jurisdictions. In 1956, damages had become so serious that Congress expanded the role of the Corps to include responsibility for beach erosion management, e.g., beach protection and replenishment. For this reason, the Beach Erosion hazard is not covered any further in this Plan and questions regarding this hazard must be referred to Federal Army Corp of Engineers. 155

Tornadoes The south coastal region of California, including the Los Angeles Basin, has the greatest incidence of tornadoes in the State. The cause of many, if not most, of the Los Angeles Basin tornadoes seems to be linked to the terrain layout of the basin, specifically the natural curvature of the shoreline and the location of the coastal mountains. Tornadoes in the Los Angeles Basin are typically less severe than those in other parts of the country. Severe storms researcher John E. Hales, Jr. (1983) stated that a tornado can hardly find a place to touch down around Los Angeles that wont hit something. That assertion notwithstanding, there is no record of a Los Angeles tornado ever causing a fatality. Nevertheless, the fact that tornadoes occur with great frequency in a very densely populated urban area makes the occurrence of tornadoes in the Los Angeles Basin particularly relevant. L.1.1 Description of Severe Weather Hazard Extreme Heat North American summers are hot; most summers see heat waves (extreme heat) in one section or another of the United States. East of the Rockies, they tend to combine both high temperatures and high humidity, although some of the worst have been catastrophically dry. In a normal year, approximately 175 Americans die of extreme heat. Among the family of natural hazards (lightning, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods or earthquakes), only the cold of winter takes a greater toll on human life than extreme heat. In the 40-year period from 1936 through 1975, nearly 20,000 died from the effects of heat and solar radiation in the U.S. In urban areas, the hot weather can trap pollutants, which, when combined with the stresses of hot weather, can create health problems. Statistics reveal a heavier concentration of heatrelated deaths in the crowded alleys and towers of the inner city, where air quality can deteriorate during a heat wave. The higher death rate within the inner cities can also be attributed to many people living in poorly ventilated buildings, most with no air-conditioning. For those with air-conditioning, the high cost of its operation can translate into a reluctance to use it. However, in a heat wave, airconditioning can be a life saving necessity. These factors were evident, during the summer of 1995, when the death toll in Chicagos Cook County reached about 300 as a result of extreme heat. Nearly all of the deaths occurred in places without air conditioning, or where air conditioning was not being used. Two-thirds of the victims were persons over 60 years of age. The elderly, young children and those who are sick or overweight are more likely to become victims. There are other members of the community who are also susceptible - the homeless, chronic invalids, as well as our animal and pet population. High Wind (Santa Ana Winds) For downtown Los Angeles, the predominant wind direction is from the west-southwest for most of the year. The average annual wind speed is 6.2 mph. But there are significant diurnal 156

and seasonal exceptions to this normal. Generally, most of the Los Angeles Basin experiences light and variable gravity or land breezes during the night and morning hours. Winds then reverse to onshore sea breeze patterns during the late morning or afternoon hours, depending on distance from the ocean and local topography. The direction of this onshore wind flow varies from west-southwest (at LAX and downtown) to south-southeast (at Long Beach, El Monte and Pasadena) to southeast or east (at Van Nuys and Burbank). Afternoon sea breezes normally range from 10 to 15 mph, but can be enhanced by increases in onshore pressure gradients. At downtown Los Angeles, strongest mean monthly wind speeds occur in March, with lightest winds usually recorded in August and September. A peak wind (one minute average) of 49 mph was recorded from the north during a Santa Ana windstorm in January 1946. Wind gusts to 70 mph or more have a return period of more than 100 years, while winds can gust from 55 to 60 mph once in 25 years. (Some studies have suggested greater return periods.) Strongest winds, from a northerly direction, occur in winter as a result of Santa Ana katabatic conditions. More rarely, strong southeasterly winds gust to 50 mph or more as a result of the transition of a north Pacific winter storm across the district. Santa Ana winds typically affect southern California via three main sources: (1) The Santa Clara River Valley, impacting the San Fernando Valley, Malibu Hills and Ventura County; (2) Cajon Pass, affecting Fontana, Santa Ana, eastern and southern Los Angeles County; and (3) Banning Pass, which affects southern Orange County. Santa Anas may last from one day to up to a week or longer. They occur most often in the fall and winter, with a frequency of occurrence peaking in the month of December. Santa Anas affect the Los Angeles Basin very unequally; winds tend to channel in the usual places below specific passes and canyons. Within these channels, winds tend to come in gust clusters, letting up from time to time and blowing fiercely at other times. Strong winds may blow in one neighborhood, while a few blocks away there are only gentle warm breezes. In the extreme, Santa Ana winds represent a potential threat to public safety. The winds can spread destructive fires, take roofs off of houses, and uproot trees. They can carry clouds of dust, lowering visibilities, and they can pose serious dangers for motorists, pilots, farmers, and mariners. In November 1961, flames driven by Santa Anas at speeds in excess of 100 mph resulted in a loss of hundreds of homes in the exclusive Bel Air district of Los Angeles. Tornadoes In the period from 1950 to 1992, the basin had 99 confirmed tornadoes. According to Blier and Battan (On the Incidence of Tornadoes in California 1994), this area has a tornadic incidence similar to that of the State of Oklahoma. However, these researchers go on to point out that 157

the size, severity and duration of California tornadoes is less than those common to the plains states, and the tornado count in the Golden State may be inflated due to inaccuracies within the database. Unlike their Plains counterparts, southern California tornadoes occur mainly in the winter. Of the 99 tornadoes that were reported in the Los Angeles Basin between 1950 and 1992, the vast majority (83) occurred in the months November through March. March had the highest number of incidents (22). The fact that few tornadoes occur in the Los Angeles Basin during the warm season is primarily due to the stabilizing effect of the marine layer, and the lack of dynamic forcing during the warmer months. Roughly a quarter of the tornadoes listed by Blier and Battan originated as waterspouts over either Santa Monica Bay or San Pedro Channel. There were many more waterspouts that never made landfall; these were not included in the tornado count. In conjunction with topographic features which set up favorable cyclonic, low-level wind patterns, severe storms researcher John E. Hales, Jr. identified a number of synoptic weather features in Los Angelesmore common to the cool seasonthat are associated with the strongest of the tornadoes that he studied. These include: Closed cyclonic circulations from the surface to 500 millibar (mb). A west-southwest oriented, 120 knot or stronger, 300 mb jet that crosses the coast near San Diego. The tornadoes always form on the cyclonic side of the jet. A dewpoint at San Diego of 51 or greater. The 500 mb temperature on the Vandenberg sounding -5 (-20C) or colder. A mean cold front position on the California/Arizona border. Usually, tornadoes occur well behind the surface cold front. A time of occurrence between 1200 and 1500 PST, coincident with maximum solar heating. A strong increase in wind speed with height similar to wind profiles in the central United States.

In the 1997-98 El Nio episode, the Pacific storm track was located over southern California for much of the winter season. This produced a number of days in which Hales criteria were approximated over the Los Angeles Basin and adjacent waters. In that season, there were over twenty days in which either waterspouts, funnel clouds or tornadoes were reportedincluding 30 separate sightings. Two tornadoes touched down within the City of Long Beach.

L.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Extreme Weather Hazard

L.2.1 Extreme Heat The most vulnerable populations exposed to extreme heat are the elderly, young children, and those who are sick or overweight are more likely to become victims. There are other members 158

of the community who are also susceptible - the homeless, chronic invalids, as well as our animal and pet population. Nearly all of the deaths occurred in places without air conditioning, or where air conditioning was not being used. Two-thirds of the victims were persons over 60 years of age. Extreme heat can kill by pushing the human body beyond its limits. Under normal conditions, the bodys internal thermostat produces perspiration that evaporates and cools the body. However, in extreme heat and high humidity, evaporation is slowed down and the body must work harder to maintain a normal temperature. When the bodys ability to shed heat is compromised, a heat-related disorder (e.g., sunburn, heat cramps, heat exhaustion or heat strokes) may develop. The severity of heat disorders tends to increase with age -- heat cramps in a 17-year-old may be heat exhaustion in someone 40, and heat stroke in a person over 60. Other persons who may have special vulnerability to extreme heat include young children, the disabled, the poor, and the homeless who may lack the resources to seek shelter from extreme heat conditions. The following are National Weather Service accepted terms which describe various situations, probabilities and actions.
Table L-1. National Weather Service Terms for heat wave conditions. Heat Advisory Conditions of a Heat Wave are present. Heat Disorders When the body is unable to maintain a normal temperature, the results are called heat disorders. There are four major heat disorders: Sunburn Symptoms, redness of the skin and pain. In severe cases, swelling of the skin, blisters, fevers and headaches. Heat Cramps Symptoms, painful spasms usually in leg muscles and possibly the abdomen, heavy sweating. Heat Symptoms, heavy sweating, weakness, cold, pale and clammy skin, possible Exhaustion fainting and vomiting. Normal temperature possible. Heat Stroke Symptoms, high body temperature (106 F or higher). Hot, dry skin. Rapid and strong pulse. Possible unconsciousness. Heat Index (also referred to as the apparent temperature) The heat index, given in degrees Fahrenheit, is an accurate measure of how hot it really feels when relative humidity (RH) is combined with the actual air temperature. Heat Wave Temperatures reach 10 or more above the average high temperature for the region, last, or (Extreme Heat) are predicted to last, for a prolonged period of time. A Heat Wave is often accompanied by high humidity.

L.2.2 Tornadoes Tornadoes can potentially occur anywhere in the Los Angeles Basin. Wood frame structures, unreinforced masonry buildings, and mobile homes are most vulnerable to damage or destruction from tornados. Since 1950 tornadoes have caused slightly more than $60 million in property damage and injured fewer than 50 Los Angelinos. Compared with damage from other natural hazards these impacts are relatively modest. 159

The Fujita Tornado Damage Scale is commonly used to describe the severity of tornados: Category F0 - Light damage (less than 73 mph) Category F1 - Moderate Damage (73 - 112 mph) Category F2 - Considerable Damage (113 - 157 mph) Category F3 - Severe Damage (158 - 206 mph) Category F4 - Devastating Damage (207 - 260 mph) Category F5 - Incredible Damage (261 - 318 mph) Since 1950 there have been 32 tornadoes in Los Angeles, ranging in intensity from F0 to F2. L.2.3 High Wind (Santa Ana Winds) The portion of the City most subject to high Santa Ana winds forms an arc along the northern portion of the City. These areas include foothill and valley areas adjacent to mountain ranges. The following maps depict the High Wind Hazard area and the critical facilities located within these areas subject to potential damage from high winds. See Figure L.1 for a map indicating the identified high wind threat area of the City of Los Angeles. L.2.3.1 Identifying Assets High Winds hazard is the only one of four hazards identified under Severe Weather that could be mapped. Extreme Heat and Tornados can possibly occur anywhere in the City limits and Beach Erosion occurs anywhere along the ocean coastline. Because of this, a vulnerability assessment and GIS map identification could only be applied to the High Wind hazard (Figure L1). Critical Response Facilities The LHMP Advisory Task Force considers the following facilities critical in response to any disaster: Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities) See Figure L.1 for critical facilities identified in the High Wind zone hazard area for the City of Los Angeles. The replacement values of critical response facilities and their contents that fall in the hazard areas are in the following section, Estimating Potential Losses. Technically, critical response facilities are not vulnerable to the high wind hazard. Most of the facilities are constructed on materials capable of withstanding high Santa Ana Winds. However, maps identifying these facilities have been included along with an asset value assessment of facilities that fall in this hazard zone. 160

Comment [i4]: Pending information from City Departments

Figure L-1. Critical Response Infrastructure identified in High Wind Hazard area. High Wind Hazard data provided by the City of Los Angeles Fire Department.

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Critical Infrastructure Facilities Utility Infrastructure Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) Electric Power System (Power plants, substations, major transmission lines) Wastewater System (Treatment plants, major interceptor sewer lines) Oil Refineries Natural Gas System Communication System Transportation Infrastructure Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities The majority of critical infrastructure facilities are not vulnerable to the High Wind hazard. Most of the facilities are constructed on materials capable of withstanding high Santa Ana Winds. However, some utility infrastructures may still be damaged either directly or indirectly. Therefore, maps identifying critical infrastructure facilities in the High Wind zones have been mapped. In addition, an asset value assessment for these facilities has been completed as well. Potable Water and Power Facilities Maps The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals. GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from the State CalEMA Mitigation Office. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Earthquake Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by The Gas Company; therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City.

Comment [i5]: Pending information from City Departments

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Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Earthquake Zone The Communication System (Telephone system) in the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private provider. This information, like that of the electricity, water, and natural gas is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since it will be disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned. Critical Operating Facilities in the Flood Zone Critical operation facilities in the City of Los Angeles are identified as the Big Nine Buildings, Phase II facilities, and Information Technology Agency (ITA) Departments that consist City facilities critical for continuity of government following a major disaster. These facilities house City Departments and staff critical in continuing government operations. Big Nine facilities contain the largest number of departments and staff within them. Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA City facilities do not contain staff from proprietary departments such as the Department of Water and Power, Harbor Department, or the Los Angeles World Airports. Proprietary departments generate their own revenue but are still owned by the City. These facilities are included under Critical Utility and Critical Transportation Facilities Sections (previous section). Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA facilities are considered general fund departments. For the purpose of this report, only Big Nine buildings, and proprietary department facilities are considered critical operating facilities. Titles of these Big Nine facilities are listed below: LA City Hall City Hall South City Hall East City Commercial Offices (Personnel) Piper Tech Parker Center San Pedro Municipal Building Marvin Braude Building West L.A. Municipal Building The majority of critical City operating facilities are not vulnerable to the High Wind hazard. Most of the facilities are constructed on materials capable of withstanding high winds. However, some facilities may still be damaged either directly or indirectly. Therefore, maps identifying these facilities in the high wind areas have been mapped. In addition, an asset value assessment of these facilities has been completed as well. L.2.3.2 Estimating Potential Loss Table L-2 is a summary of Potential Asset Losses of Critical Response Facilities in the High Wind Zone. For individual building hazard, see Appendix D.
Comment [i6]: Enter new values Comment [i7]: Enter new values

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Table L-2. City facilities associated with High Wind Hazard. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Number Total Replacement (million) Big Nine --Critical Response Fire* 10 220 Police** 1 38 Hospitals 1 N/A Schools 73 N/A Rec & Parks 54 TBD Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 69,384 TBD Commercial TBD TBD *Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station.

Potable Water and Power Facilities Technically, severe weather, such as high heat, high winds, beach erosion, etc. does not affect the water and power facilities. However, the asset values of water and power facilities that fall in the high wind zone are as follow: Wastewater Facilities in the High Wind Zone - Asset Values Not affected by high winds Transportation Infrastructure in the High Wind Zone - Asset Values Transportation system not affected by high winds Natural Gas Facilities in the High Wind Zone - Asset Values The natural gas system is privately owned and operated by The Gas Company. Asset value information is not available to the City. Oil Refineries in the High Wind Zone - Asset Values Oil Refineries are owned by private companies. Asset value information is not available to the City. Communication System Facilities in the High Wind Zone - Asset Values The Communication System (Telephone System) is privately owned and operated by Pacific Bell. Asset value information on the telephone system is not available to the City. CRITICAL OPERATING FACILITIES IN THE HIGH WIND ZONE - ASSET VALUES Not affected by high winds.

L.3 Analysis of Future Development

The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was 164

determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to high wind hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates.

M. PROFILE OF DAM FAILURE

A dam is a barrier across flowing water that obstructs, directs or slows down the flow, often creating a reservoir, lake or impoundments. Most dams have a section called a spillway or weir over which, or through which, water flows, either intermittently or continuously, and many have hydroelectric power generation systems installed. Dams are considered "installations containing dangerous forces" under International Humanitarian Law due to the massive impact of a possible destruction on the civilian population and the environment. Dam failures are comparatively rare, but can cause immense damage and loss of life when they occur. Dam Failure Hazard was identified as a Moderate Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles.

M.1 Identifying Dam Failure Hazard

Seiches and Inundation (water storage facilities) A Seiche is a surface wave created when a body of water is shaken. Seiches are of concern relative to water storage facilities because inundation from a seiche can occur if the wave overflows a containment wall, such as the wall of a reservoir, water storage tank, dam or other artificial body of water. Mitigation of potential seiche action has been implemented by the Department of Water and Power through regulation of the level of water in its storage facilities and providing walls of extra height to contain seiches and prevent overflow. Dams and reservoirs are monitored during storms and measures are instituted in the event of potential overflow. These measures apply to facilities within the Citys borders and facilities owned and operated by the City within other jurisdictions. Inundation due to water storage facility failure also is a potential hazard. The Baldwin Hills Dam failure of December 14, 1963 and near collapse of the Van Norman Dam during the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake resulted in strengthening of the federal, state and local design standards and retrofitting of existing facilities. Thirteen dams in the greater Los Angeles area moved or cracked during the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. The most seriously damaged was the Pacoima Dam which was located approximately eight miles from the epicenter. However, none were severely damaged. This low damage level was due in part to completion of the retrofitting of dams and reservoirs pursuant to the 1972 State Dam Safety Act following the San Fernando quake. The Act also required the preparation of inundation maps. M.1.1 Description of Dam Failure Hazard Dams are man-made structures built for a variety of uses including flood protection, power generation, agriculture, water supply and recreation. When dams are constructed for flood protection, they usually are engineered to withstand a flood with a computed risk of 165

occurrence. For example, a dam may be designed to contain a flood at a location on a stream that has a certain probability of occurring in any one year. If a larger flood occurs, then that structure will be overtopped. Overtopping is the primary cause of earthen dam failure. Failed dams can create floods that are catastrophic to life and property as a result of the tremendous energy of the released water. Dams typically are constructed of earth, rock, or concrete. Two factors that influence the potential severity of a full or partial dam failure include the amount of water impounded and the density, type and value of downstream development and infrastructure. Dam failures can result from any one or a combination of the following causes: prolonged periods of rainfall, earthquake, inadequate spillway capacity, internal erosion caused by embankment or foundation leakage, improper design, improper maintenance, negligent operation and/or failure of upstream dams on the same waterway. California utilizes over 1,200 dams and thousands of miles of levees to meet its water supply, conveyance, and flood protection demands. The greatest weakness of this system is liquefaction-induced failures caused by strong ground shaking. The Los Angeles Dam Story In 1971, the near-failure of a dam during a magnitude 6.7 earthquake forced 80,000 people to evacuate their residences. In 1994, the replacement dam survived an almost identical earthquake with little damage. Underlying this progress in designing critical structures are years of research on the powerful shaking during large earthquakes. Perched above the densely populated San Fernando Valley, the Lower San Fernando Dam-predecessor to the Los Angeles Dam--holds a large reservoir, 1.6 miles long and as much as 130 feet deep. Liquefaction resulting from strong ground motion resulted in severe damage of the dam during the 1971 San Fernando earthquake forced residents to evacuate homes in a 6-milelong area down the valley. The reservoir was the terminus of the main aqueduct system for Los Angeles, which supplied 80% of the City's water. The 1971 San Fernando Earthquake shook loose a massive slide in the upstream slope of the Lower San Fernando Dam that lowered the crest about 30 feet. The slide carried away much of the crest and upstream concrete facing of the 2,100-foot-long dam. As shown in the photograph at right, only a narrow shattered wall of dirt remained. Had the reservoir behind the dam been at its maximum height, water would have overtopped and rapidly eroded the dam, flooding the valley below. The dam was constructed between 1912 and 1915 using construction methods that provided weak resistance to earthquake shaking. Moments after the San Fernando Earthquake of 1971, only a thin dirt wall stood between 80,000 people in the San Fernando Valley of southern California and 15 million tons of water poised behind a heavily damaged dam. The 142-foot-high Lower San Fernando Dam was perilously close to failure. At any moment a strong aftershock could have triggered a disaster. As it was, residents in an 11-square-mile area were forced to evacuate, while the water behind the earthen dam was lowered, a process that took 3 days. Damage from the magnitude 6.7 166

shock was so heavy that the dam could not be repaired to safely hold its water supply in the event of another large earthquake. A replacement dam was needed--one designed to withstand strong ground shaking associated with earthquakes expected in the area. The story of the new, safer design begins with years of research on ground motion. Throughout earthquake-prone regions of the United States, scientists record ground motion during strong earthquakes. By studying these records, scientists can estimate the severity of shaking that is likely to occur during future earthquakes. Engineers then can use these estimates to design structures better able to resist expected levels of shaking. Such cooperation among scientists and engineers is crucial to reducing fatalities, injuries, and property damage. The design of the new Los Angeles Dam is a case in point. In studying records of strong shaking from the 1971 shock and other shocks, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) scientists realized that shaking near the epicenter of an earthquake is much stronger than had been recognized previously. Hence, they recommended the new dam be designed to withstand shaking about three times stronger than that assumed in design studies prior to USGS consultation. The recommendations were met with skepticism at first, because critical structures were being designed for lower levels of shaking at that time. Inasmuch as the new dam was to be financed with federal disaster assistance funds, the higher estimates of shaking were used in its design. The Los Angeles Dam and Reservoir lie between the storm water retention basins formed by the old Lower and Upper San Fernando Dams. The new $33 million Los Angeles Dam and Reservoir was built in 1975-76 about 3,000 feet up the valley from the old Lower San Fernando Dam. However, the old dam was not dismantled. Instead, it was reconstructed--though not to meet the USGS shaking estimates--to provide a holding basin for storm water and to back up the new dam. Two decades later, the 1994 Northridge Earthquake put the Los Angeles Dam to the test. The Northridge Earthquake was almost equal in magnitude to the previous San Fernando Earthquake. Ground shaking was very strong, with amplitudes among the highest ever recorded but consistent with the USGS estimates. Yet the dam showed only minor deformation and superficial cracking. Despite the intense shaking, the crest of the dam moved only 1 inch sideways and settled only 3.5 inches. In contrast, the Lower San Fernando Dam again suffered heavily. Cracking and movement seriously damaged the upstream slope. Had the old dam been holding as much water as it had in 1971, the damage would have been far greater--at least equaling that from the 1971 Earthquake. The 1994 Northridge Earthquake cracked the surface pavement on the upstream slope of the Los Angeles Dam. Overall, the dam, designed to withstand severe shaking, suffered very little damage. Better protection of U.S. citizens from earthquake catastrophes is no accident. It comes from major advances in earthquake science, improved understanding of how structures perform 167

during earthquakes, and enhanced construction practices. This story shows the differences in performance of two structures during nearly identical earthquakes. The Los Angeles Dam, designed to withstand severe shaking anticipated by USGS scientists, remained intact during the Northridge Earthquake. In contrast, the Lower San Fernando Dam, which was built to lower shaking standards and with 1912-1915 construction methods, suffered major damage during both the 1971 and 1994 earthquakes. This success story focuses on dams. But other critical structures--such as nuclear power plants, bridges, and hospitals--are also being built more strongly today to resist the violent shaking that is now recognized to accompany large earthquakes. Damage to Dams from the 1971 Sylmar Earthquake Three Los Angeles area dams were damaged as a result of the 1971 earthquake. Several thousand persons were evacuated from homes south of Van Norman Dam in Mission Hills. Van Norman Lake reportedly sank one foot in the middle. Boundaries of the evacuation area include San Diego Freeway on the east; Balboa Boulevard on the west, Roscoe Boulevard on the south and the dam on the north. A 60-foot section of the concrete dam at the lake's southern edge collapsed, and portions were reported still crumbling during the evacuation. The evacuation area extended east to Van Nuys Boulevard, south to Ventura Freeway and west to Corbin Avenue. The dam holds back more than 6 billion gallons of water and is the largest in the City's water system. Mclay Dam in the San Fernando Valley community of Pacoima developed a minor crack, and water was trickling down the face of the structure. Communication lines downed in the area made progress reports difficult to obtain but not immediate emergency was anticipated. Cracks also were reported in Hansen Dam on Sepulveda Boulevard in Lakeview Terrace. Baldwin Hills Reservoir Collapse - December 17, 1963 On the afternoon of December 14th, 1963, with swift suddenness, improbable tragedy struck the Baldwin Hills section of Los Angeles. Lost homes, ruined property and even death flooded downward on a broad river of rushing water from the broken dam at the head of Cloverdale Road. Automobiles, fragments of houses, and chunks of concrete were rolled and jammed like logs down the flume of the flood's path to the bottom and deposited in incongruous heaps on the ruins of Village Green, which minutes before had been a quiet Saturday-relaxed apartment community. In the rushing disaster, unwary residents were trapped. On roofs, in second floor rooms, on small insecure islands of debris, they signaled desperately for help, and help was swift to come. Distinguished among the rescuers were Fire Department members who reported to the scene. 168

Their training, courage and knowledge of how to act in emergency situations made their help more significant than that of any other agency. Eighteen persons were rescued and flown out to a safe location, at least six of these, and quite possibly more, could not have been rescued in any other way and would have been lost except for the fire department helicopter.

M.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Dam Failure Hazard

Much of the City of Los Angeles consists of low-lying, relatively flat terrain, surrounded by several mountain ranges including the Santa Susana, Santa Monica and San Gabriel ranges. Before the flood control system was built in the Los Angeles area, the Los Angeles River and its tributaries flowed freely from the mountains to the sea, periodically flooding large portions of the basins south of the mountains. As a result of the 1914 floods, the Los Angeles County Flood Control District was created to control flooding and protect the increasingly built up urban area. Following the devastating floods of 1938, the Army Corps of Engineers began channelizing the Los Angeles River. The Sepulveda Flood Basin and dam was completed in 1940. The system of dams, debris basins at the mouths of canyons to slow water flow, flood control basins and dams, channelization of over 400 miles of river and tributary systems, and spreading grounds provides flood protection to most of the urbanized area. However, a major dam failure(s) would result in significant flooding, property damage, and potential loss of life to significant portions of the City. Inundation Hazard Impact and Extent There are 22 dams in the Los Angeles area, 6 large dams, and 14 smaller mountain dams. Five of the dams in the immediate area are owned and operated by the Corps of Engineers, including Sepulveda, Hansen, Lopez, Santa Fe and Whittier Narrows. Over 1/3 of the land area and the population of the City is potentially threatened by failure of one or more dams in the vicinity. Dam failure is more likely to occur in conjunction with other hazard events, such as Severe Weather or Earthquake. For example, thirteen dams in the greater Los Angeles area moved or cracked during the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. M.2.1 Identifying Assets Critical Response Facilities: The LHMP Advisory Task Force considers the following facilities critical in response to any disaster: Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities)

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These assets are included on Figure M-1 along with the Dam Inundation area. The replacement values of critical response facilities and their contents that fall in the hazard areas are in the following section, Estimating Potential Losses.

Figure M-1. Critical Response Facilities identified in the Dam Inundation Hazard area.

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Critical Infrastructure Facilities Critical infrastructure facilities consist of the following facilities: Utility Infrastructure Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) Electric Power System (Power plants, substations, major transmission lines) Wastewater System (Treatment plants, major interceptor sewer lines) Oil Refineries Natural Gas System Communication System Transportation Infrastructure Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities Potable Water and Power Facilities Maps The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals. GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from CalEMA Mitigation Office John Rowden. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. DWP History with Floods Floods DWP has not had major damage due to floods. When floods occur, service to some citizens may be interrupted. However, this interruption is typically sporadic and is restored within minutes. There are few examples of longer interruptions caused by floods in which restoration of services has been within hours such as occurred in the Watts floods of November 2003. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. The City of Los Angeles has received maps of these facilities from the California Energy Commission (CEC) with the 171

agreement that the maps will not be made available to the public. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by the Southern California Gas Company, therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone The Communication System (Telephone system) in the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private providers. This information, like that of the electricity, water, and natural gas is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since it will be disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned. Critical Operating Facilities in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone Critical operation facilities in the City of Los Angeles are identified as the Big Nine Buildings, Phase II facilities, and Information Technology Agency (ITA) Departments that consist City facilities critical for continuity of government following a major disaster. These facilities house City Departments and staff critical in continuing government operations. Big Nine facilities contain the largest number of departments and staff within them. Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA City facilities do not contain staff from proprietary departments such as the Department of Water and Power, Harbor Department, or the Los Angeles World Airports. Proprietary departments generate their own revenue but are still owned by the City. These facilities are included under Critical Utility and Critical Transportation Facilities Sections (previous section). Big Nine, Phase II, and ITA facilities are considered general fund departments. For the purpose of this report, only Big Nine buildings, and proprietary department facilities are considered critical operating facilities. Titles of these Big Nine facilities are listed below: LA City Hall City Hall South City Hall East City Commercial Offices (Personnel) Piper Tech Parker Center San Pedro Municipal Building Marvin Braude Building West L.A. Municipal Building

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M.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Summary of Potential Asset Losses of Essential Facilities in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone Asset Values. For individual building hazard, see Appendix D.
Table M-1. City facilities associated with dam inundation hazard in the City of Los Angeles. Replacement costs based on assumptions.
Pacoima Dam Number Total Repl. costs (million) Big Nine Critical Response Fire* Police** Hospitals Schools Rec & Parks Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 65250 TBD 2672 TBD 435 -Commercial TBD -TBD -TBD -*Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station. ^Estimates from previous Hazard Mitigation Plan, not part of the updated 2010 plan. Numbers adjusted for inflation. 298,746 91,836 54,206 58,542 Devils Gate Dam Number Total Repl. costs (million) Big Tujunga Dam Number Total Repl. costs (million) Inundation Area^ Number Total Repl. costs (million) 4 187 40 11 15 234 54 880 400 N/A N/A 406 Comment [i8]: Enter new values Comment [i9]: Enter new values

7 2 2 5 21

154 80 N/A N/A TBD

0 0 9 0 3

--N/A N/A TBD

1 0 0 0 1

22 ---TBD

Hospitals in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of hospitals located in the City, however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Evacuation Centers (Schools) in the Potential Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values Schools are considered the responsibility of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a special jurisdiction. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of schools, however, the City does have a mutual agreement with LAUSD to use schools as evacuation centers when they are needed. Specific asset value information related to LAUSD schools may be available from the LAUSD Hazard Mitigation Plan. Critical Infrastructure Potable Water & Power Facilities in Potential Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities because of security concerns. The GIS Maps to match up with this numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. It also includes the individual property values (replacement values) for facilities along with a total value amount for facilities falling in the various hazard zones.

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Natural Gas Facilities in the Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values The natural gas system is privately owned and operated by the The Gas Company. Asset value information is not available to the City. Oil Refineries in the Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values Oil Refineries are owned by private companies. Asset value information is not available to the City. Communication System Facilities in the Dam Inundation Zone - Asset Values The Communication System (Telephone System) is privately owned and operated by Pacific Bell. Asset value information on the telephone system is not available to the City. Estimated Losses - Residential and Commercial Structures The table below displays the estimated losses for residential and commercial structures in the Inundation Hazard Zone. Both the number of structures affected and the estimated dollar losses are shown. Data is broken down by Council District.

M.3 Analysis of Future Development

The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to dam inundation hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates.

N. PROFILE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERRUPTION HAZARD

In the late 1970s, infrastructure was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of the nations public works. By the mid-1990s, however, the growing threat of international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of infrastructure in the context of homeland security. Successive federal government reports, laws and executive orders have refined, and generally expanded, the number of infrastructure sectors and the types of assets considered to be critical. Critical Infrastructure Interruption Hazard was identified as Moderate Risk for the City of Los Angeles. The National Strategy for Physical Protection (NSPP) contains the most recent detailed list of critical infrastructures and assets of national importance. The list may continue to evolve; however, as economic changes or geopolitical developments influence homeland security policy.

N.1 Identifying Critical Infrastructure Interruption Hazard

With almost 3.7 million people and 470 square miles, Los Angeles is the largest City in the State of California and the second most populous City in the United States. Additionally, Los Angeles is a significant global business center and transportation hub, the daytime population of the 174

City increases by hundreds of thousands, drawn from the more than 15 million people that live in the greater southern California area. Los Angeles can point with pride to the fact that over the past century, it made significant investments in its water, power, sanitation and transportation infrastructure. Working closely with other public utilities, the City has also enjoyed excellent natural gas and telephone service. As the Pacific Rim Gateway and home to numerous information and telecommunications service providers, Los Angeles, the nation, indeed the world, relies on the maintenance and continuity of dozens of information and communications providers. Each day, dozens of minor interruptions to these services occur across Los Angeles as a result of equipment failures, traffic accidents and other natural and manmade causes. While inconvenient for those directly involved, the vast majority of these interruptions pass without posing a threat to public health and safety. A significant failure of one critical infrastructure can have a "domino effect" on other vital services. A widespread power outage will hinder the flow of traffic due to signal failures and can affect water pressure at higher elevations due to inoperative pumps. A prolonged interruption of one or more of these critical services will pose a significant threat to the health, safety and property of the people of Los Angeles. The population density found in the City of Los Angeles is unlike most of the communities in the United States. The situation that exacerbates this is the presence of nearly all of the usual hazards that face our communities. As example, recent events make WMD/NBC/CBRNE emergencies a plausible scenario necessitating detailed contingency planning and preparation of emergency responders in order to protect the civilian populace in major urban centers such as Los Angeles. Among the events heightening the threat level are the Sarin attack and the attempted hydrogen-cyanide assault on the Tokyo subway system. The presence of sodium cyanide residue in the debris of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City heightened domestic concern. The biological incident of note includes the synthesis of ricin by a Minnesota anti-government tax protest group whose members were convicted of violating the Biological Weapons AntiTerrorism Act. Historically earthquakes have been a major hazard that could disrupt the citys infrastructure. Since 1800 there have been approximately 60 damaging earthquakes, in the Los Angeles region. After a brief hiatus between major events, the greater Los Angeles area has experienced a number of moderate events which have resulted in considerable disruption of the infrastructure, impact on social and economic life, loss of live and extensive property damage within the City, the greater metropolitan area and the adjacent region. The most recent of these was the 6.7 magnitude 1994 Northridge Earthquake which was centered in the northwest part of the City, in the general vicinity of the 1971 San Fernando (a.k.a. Sylmar) quake. 175

Following the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquakes a variety of studies and cooperative information exchange ventures were initiated to expand knowledge concerning earthquakes so that people could be better protected in the event of future significant seismic events. Kobe, Northridge and other seismic event information is being used in formulating methodologies for strengthening buildings and structures to more successfully withstand severe damage and to better protect occupants and equipment during various types and degrees of seismic events. Many potential hazards pose continued threats to the City of Los Angeles. Other vulnerable aspects of infrastructure interruptions include transportation failure, natural gas or petrochemical facility release as well as energy and power disruption. These examples of the type and severity of hazards which could impact the City of Los Angeles is only a wake-up call to residents and emergency planners to prepare now for a disaster of devastating magnitude which could impact the Los Angeles. N.1.1 Description of Critical Infrastructure Interruption Hazard Interruption in the basic services of power, gas, water and sanitation are not uncommon in Los Angeles. Most of the service outages are subsequent to other emergencies, such as earthquakes or storms. However, some are isolated events caused by accidents or failures of the aging infrastructure. In some cases, infrastructure interruptions are exacerbated by manmade problems, such as pollution. The following list of infrastructure interruptions provides a sampling of the challenges Los Angeles has endured. April 2004: LAX had three power outages within 10 days. On April 12, a power outage caused two planes to come within five miles of each other. Back-up batteries to the air traffic control tower malfunctioned, and the controllers were overloaded at the time of the outage. The power outage was caused by a crow that was electrocuted by power lines feeding the airport. While the outage only lasted a second, radar and communications systems failed and dozens of planes were delayed. During the second outage on April 19, the back-up batteries to the tower worked properly, but parts of the airport remained without power for two hours. This outage was traced to a failed transformer that regulates power to the two circuits that serve LAX, but the exact cause of the failure was never determined. A third power outage on April 21 was also caused by a crow sitting on a wire. This time all back-up power systems operated properly. However, there were delays when security and passengers screening systems had to be re-booted. February 2003: A migrating cloud of chromium 6 has been slowly encroaching upon wells and water treatment facilities that serve Los Angeles, Burbank and Glendale. While the pollutant has been moving slowly, all three cities may lose their local water supplies unless the EPA assists them. The threat is still a few years away, but the threat is very real and increasing. Chromium is a naturally occluding metallic element, but it is 176

used to harden steel and make paint pigments. Chromium 6 is a carcinogen created after chromium undergoes certain chemical reactions. November 5, 2001: A power outage caused by a car accident led to the release of 1.4 million gallons of raw sewage into the Pacific Ocean, Marina del Rey, and Ballona Creek. The car crash knocked down power lines to a sewage pumping station. The power outage lasted only 20 minutes, but the pumps shut down completely. Enough sewage was released to affect beaches from Santa Monica to Manhattan Beach. The backup power and alarm system malfunctioned because the waste water pumping plant was undergoing construction, and the systems were turned off. The sewage spill went unnoticed for fifteen hours. Twelve more hours passed before sanitation officials notified the LA County Public Health office, and at least ten more hours passed before lifeguards were notified of the sewage release. Civilians in the area first reported raw sewage pouring out of manholes and flowing directly into storm drains. It took a full twenty four hours before the beaches were closed.

N.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Critical Interruption Hazard

Whenever an interruption or potential interruption of an infrastructure critical to the health, safety and property of the people of Los Angeles occurs or threatens to occur, to the extent possible and in conformance with existing emergency plans, departments will maintain those necessary operations needed to fulfill mission critical functional responsibilities. Additionally, as appropriate, departments will fulfill their respective EOO responsibilities and follow the procedures outlined in their departmental annex. Determining when an interruption or threatened interruption of a critical infrastructure threatens the health, safety and property of the people of Los Angeles and warrants EOO response will be predicated on unique factors that will vary in every circumstance. While specific guidelines cannot be provided for every potential scenario, consideration of two primary factors will normally determine the City's Response Level: Risk - does the interruption pose an immediate health and safety threat, or, because of its potential duration, is it likely to become a health and safety threat? Involvement - how many people are likely to be affected, or, are those potentially affected more at-risk (e.g., senior citizens, disabled, children, etc.)? A high risk event involving a localized, small number of people may warrant a response comparable to a lower risk event having widespread or City-wide impact. N.2.1 Identifying Assets The following services/assets are considered critical infrastructures: Water Supply Systems 177

Electrical Power Systems Natural Gas/Fuel Distribution System Information and Communications Government Services Transportation Emergency Services Banking and Finance

The above list of critical infrastructures is not in priority order. Water Distribution Systems The Department of Water and Power (DWP) is the City agency responsible for potable water distribution interruptions. DWP is also responsible as the liaison to two other water regulated agencies, the Metropolitan Water District and the California Department of Water Resources. Power Distribution Systems The Department of Water and Power (DWP) is the City agency responsible for the City of Los Angeles power distribution system. DWP is also recognized as the official City liaison to seven other power regulated agencies: City of Glendale City of Burbank City of Pasadena Owens Valley Electric Southern California Edison California Independent Service Operators Western Electricity Coordinating Council

Natural Gas/Fuel Distribution System The Department of Water and Power (DWP) is the City liaison for natural gas. DWP is liaison to two privately owned gas utility companies that do business in the City of Los Angeles: Sempra Energy Company (Southern California Gas) Southern California Gas Company - Sempra Energy Information and Communications The Citys Information Technology Agency is the City coordinator for various computer related communication systems and networks. ITA provides services to numerous City computer systems such as: LAPD ECCCS system, LAFD FCCS system, IBM Enterprise Servers, and approximately 160 distributed system servers. (DCTS, SMS, PAYSR, 311, GROUPWISE, and SOS) ITA provides services to the City-wide network system, the hub of all critical network components that connect all City department locations. 178

ITA is also the official City liaison to various telephone (voice and data)/Cellular/Paging Services: Pacific Bell GTE (Verizon) AT&T (Wireless) Sprint PCS Nextel Communication There are with: several primary support vendors to the City that ITA is responsible for coordinating STK: Computer Peripherals maintenance IBM: IBM Enterprise Server maintenance OCE: Printer maintenance RECALL: Off-site Tape services SUNGUARD: Disaster Recovery services

ITA is also liaison to the Department of General Services (GSD) for facility management: UPS power network connections chilled water pipes alarm systems Government Services The coordinator for government services is the Department of Public Works (PW). PW provides the following services to the public and to other City agencies: PW Sanitation PW Street Lighting PW Street Services Department of Water and Power Los Angeles World Airport Los Angeles Harbor General Services Department Public Works is also the official City liaison to several other government agencies: LA County Public Works Reciprocal Storm and Sewage Drains Army Corps of Engineers Stormwater System (city storm drains empty into LA river) County Health Services Assess Public Health Safety at HazMat Spill Site

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Emergency Services Emergency services are defined as those services that when interrupted would cause an immediate threat to the health and safety of individuals or the community at large. They are broken down into the following categories: Fire: Services required to suppress and to extinguish fires. Life Safety: Services required to provide immediate medical treatment in the field (i.e. paramedic and emergency medical treatment). Police: Police activities involving arrests, processing and detention of felony suspects, intoxicated drivers, and the arrest of other law violators in the interest of public safety. Health: Services required to ensure continued operations of emergency services at hospitals, emergency rooms, the coroner, and other medical facilities. The Police or Fire Department would be acting coordinators for City-wide emergency services, as needed. The primary Service Providers are: Fire Department (Fire and Life Safety services) Police Department (Police services) Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (Health services) Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (Public Health) Banking and Finance The Office of the Controller is the City coordinator for banking and finance. The primary service providers responsible for banking and finance are the following: Office of the Controller Office of the Treasurer Information Technology Agency The Controllers Office has liaison responsibilities with all City departments, agencies, offices and entities. The Office of the Treasurer maintains liaison with banks and other financial institutions. N.2.2 Estimating Potential Losses Water Distribution Systems There are two types of potable water interruptions that can affect the water system and lead to potential financial and safety related losses: water quantity and water quality. Interruption of water service can significantly impact public health, sanitation, business operations, and reduce the Citys ability to fight structure fires and wild land fires.

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Degradation of water quality for consumption can pose a significant threat to the health and safety of the people of Los Angeles. Water quality can become degraded due to damage to the water treatment, filtration and distribution system or by the introduction of toxic substances to reservoirs or other water system facilities. Public safety can also be impacted by interruptions in water distribution services. Power Distribution Systems Power interruptions can result in several potential financial and safety related losses. Insufficient quantities of power can significantly impact: Public safety (e.g., law enforcement, fire suppression, traffic control) Communications systems (e.g., telephone, radio and data) Public information (e.g., commercial television and radio) Water and natural gas delivery systems Storm water and sewage treatment systems Public health (e.g., hospitals and convalescent homes, life support for patients outside of medical facilities). Insufficient quantities of power can also cause damage to generation and transmission stations and consumer electrical equipment. Natural Gas/Fuel Distribution System Interruptions to the natural gas distribution system can result in several potential financial and safety related losses. An interruption in the delivery of natural gas due to pipeline damage that results in natural gas escaping into the atmosphere can pose a threat to the health, safety and property of the people of Los Angeles from the potential for explosion and/or fire caused from the ignition of those escaping gases. The inability to deliver sufficient quantities of natural gas could impact the private and public sectors' space heating, water heating and cooking capabilities. The reduced capability of space heating over an extended period of time in the colder months of the year could pose a health threat to those portions of the City of Los Angeles' population that would be more vulnerable to sustained colder temperatures, mainly the elderly, those in poor health and infants. The inability to deliver sufficient quantities of natural gas to hospitals and food service providers that use natural gas to heat the water could impact their sterilization practices. The inability to deliver sufficient quantities of natural gas to electric power producers who use natural gas in the production of the electricity and do not have adequate alternate fuel capabilities could impact the amount of electricity available to the City of Los Angeles. Information and Communications Interruptions to information technology can result in several potential financial and safety related losses. These consist of the following. Computer Hardware, Software, Application, Database failures, Network component, power related, water damage Facility access, security related issues 181

City Wide Network: All City department network connections Telephone/Cellular/Paging Services ECCCS (LAPD 911 dispatch), FCCS (LAFD 911 dispatch) Enterprise Server: City department ES applications access; including LAPD NECS, City Payroll. ES printing: direct deposit, form41, Election jobs Impairment of public safety operations (dispatch) and basic City functions. Distributed Server Systems (public safety, payroll, supply, 311, email)

Private communication companies provide City telephone services including data circuits, Private Branch Exchange & voice mail trunking, etc. Cell phones are an integral part of each department's daily operations and emergency plans. These companies also provide paging service for all City employees. Citizens of Los Angeles will not be able to contact City agencies. Emergency notification of critical City personnel would be in jeopardy. Government Services There are several types of infrastructure Interruptions that could result in potential financial and safety related losses. Sanitation Services Sewage collection and treatment may be interrupted as a result of an earthquake (broken sewers or pipes, damaged collectors and/or pumping or treatment systems) or flooding (overflowing sewer system - waste flowing into streets or the ocean). Storm water collection may be interrupted as a result of an earthquake causing damage to catch basins, pipes or pumping systems. A power interruption may also temporarily disable those facilities. Spills in the City as well as contamination of the ocean and local beaches may create a public health risk. Criminal activity such as a terrorist attack or civil disturbance could destroy wastewater or stormwater collection and treatment systems. Refuse collection may be interrupted due to many factors. Earthquake, flood or heavy storm, union strikes, criminal activity, lack of power needed to dispense fuel, may suspend or reduce services for a short time. Interruption may create health hazards for residents. Street Lighting Services Street Lights would de-energize due to power failure, causing dark and unsafe conditions to the public on streets, tunnels and bridges. Older concrete street lights may be damaged during earthquake. Any interruption to the delivery or dispensing of fuel or to fleet maintenance would delay Street Lighting operations. All field work is handled by light and heavy equipment/trucks. 182

Street Services Street and some bridge repairs may be interrupted due to earthquake, flooding or criminal activity that would disrupt the delivery of oil, natural gas, rock and sand to the asphalt manufacturing plants (two plants downtown LA and San Fernando Valley). Heavy storms or earthquake that would cause slope failure would interrupt clearing the streets. A geologist would have to first assess the hillside to determine stability. If stable, removal of mud and debris can begin. If unstable, the construction of an emergency bulkhead would be required before clearing the street. Depending on the degree of instability, this could take from days to months to repair. Flooding would interrupt clearing the streets of debris and obstacles. Work could not begin until flood waters recede. Any interruption to the delivery or dispensing of fuel or to fleet maintenance would delay street services operations. All efforts are handled by light and heavy equipment/trucks. Interruption to street access may increase emergency vehicle response times, cause major traffic delays, or postpone delivery of goods and services. General Services Department Centralized support services provide fleet management, property management, supply services and administration/building support to critical Fire, Police and Life/Safety City service departments. Interruption of support to emergency services would cause immediate threat to the health and safety of residents. Emergency Services Interruptions to the City emergency services can occur for a number of reasons. Critical utility/public work infrastructure interruptions will have an effect on emergency related departments providing crucial services to the public. The City considers emergency services a critical infrastructure. Utility/public work infrastructure interruptions could potentially create the following health and safety related losses: Fire Services Water Delivery Systems: Loss of water delivery systems will cause fire services to lack sufficient water to fight fires. Although most of Los Angeles relies on a gravity fed water system, several mountain and hillside areas of the City require water to be pumped to higher elevations. These pumps are susceptible to power outages. Examples of water delivery problems affecting fire services are: o Ruptured water mains and feeder lines o Power or mechanical failures at mountain water pumps 183

Electrical Power Systems: A power failure can affect/degrade fire services in several ways. Some examples are: o Failure of gasoline fuel pumps at fire station o Loss of mountain area water pumps o Downed electrical wires requiring fire personnel to stand by until repair crews arrive. These personnel are not available to respond to fires. o Loss of radio communications network o Fire stations without power cannot receive radio or telephone calls for service (most fire stations do not have back-up generators). Natural Gas/Fuel Transportation, Storage and Distribution: Reliable gasoline supplies are critical to the continued operations of the fleet of vehicles used to provide fire services. Also, a fire caused by a rupture of a natural gas line can cause a large percentage of on-duty fire resources to be committed to a single incident and thus degrade the available resources for other fire emergencies. Information and Communications: The delivery of fire services relies on two significant communications systems: the telephone system and the Fire Department radio system. A failure of either system will cause a serious degradation in fire services. For example: o Lack of telephone service to a particular community will prevent outgoing 9-1-1 emergency calls from being made. o Failure of the incoming 9-1-1 system will prevent emergency calls for service from reaching the Fire Department. o A radio system failure will significantly hamper the dispatch of fire resources. o The fire dispatch center uses computer aided dispatch program to prioritize (needs) and manage fire resources. A failure of this system will significantly hamper the dispatch of fire resources. Government Services: The Fire Department requires much support from other government agencies to effectively deliver emergency services. Among the support services required are: o Gasoline fuel delivery o Vehicle parts o Computer and radio equipment repair and support o Direct field support at major fires for traffic and crowd control o Field relief at incidents of downed electrical wires to free up fire resources for fire calls for service. Transportation: 184

Clear ingress and egress for emergency vehicles during disasters are essential for fire services. This includes access for emergency vehicles on freeways, highways, primary roads and secondary roads. Road damage can significantly reduce response time by fire resources to life threatening fires. Other: Any major structure or brush fire can cause so many fire resources to be committed to one incident that the ability to respond to other fires is degraded. Some historical examples are: o Bel Air Fire (1961) - 484 homes lost o Library Fire (1986) - 60 fire companies assigned o First Interstate Tower Fire (1988) - 64 fire companies assigned o Malibu/Topanga Fire (1993) - 65 fire companies assigned. Life Safety Services Electrical Power Systems: A power failure can affect/degrade life safety services in several ways. Some examples are: o Failure of gasoline fuel pumps at fire stations (no fuel for rescue ambulances) o Failure of public gasoline fuel pumps o Downed electrical wires requiring fire personnel to stand by until repair crews arrive. These personnel are not available to respond to emergency medical service (EMS) calls. o Loss of radio communications network o Fire stations without power cannot receive radio or telephone calls for service (most fire stations do not have back-up generators). Natural Gas/Fuel Transportation, Storage and Distribution: Reliable gasoline supplies are critical to the continued operations of the fleet of vehicles used to provide life/safety services. Also, a fire caused by a rupture of a natural gas line can cause a large percentage of on-duty fire/EMS resources to be committed to a single incident and thus degrade the available resources for other fire emergencies. Information and Communications: The delivery of life safety services relies on two significant communications systems: the telephone system and the Fire Department radio system. A failure of either system will cause a serious degradation in life safety services. For example: o Lack of telephone service to a particular community will prevent outgoing 9-1-1 emergency calls from being made. o Failure of the incoming 9-1-1 system will prevent emergency calls for service from reaching the Fire Department. o A radio system failure will significantly hamper the dispatch of life safety 185

resources. o The fire dispatch center uses computer aided dispatch program to prioritize (needs) and manage life safety resources. A failure of this system will significantly hamper the dispatch of life safety resources. In addition, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services manages a network of communications systems that are used to provide direct field support to paramedics and to coordinate the transportation of injured patients to hospital, emergency rooms and trauma centers. A failure of any of these systems would hamper life safety services in the City of Los Angeles. These systems are: o The Medical Alert Center (MAC) o Rapid Emergency Digital Data Interface Network (REDDINET) o Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio System (HEAR) Government Services: The Fire Department requires much support from other government agencies to effectively deliver emergency services. Among the support services required are: o Gasoline fuel delivery o Vehicle parts o Computer and radio equipment repair and support o Direct field support at major incidents for traffic and crowd control o Field relief at incidents of downed electrical wires to free up fire resources for emergency medical calls for service. Transportation: Clear ingress and egress for emergency vehicles during disasters are essential for life safety services. This includes access for emergency vehicles on freeways, highways, primary roads and secondary roads. Road damage can significantly reduce response time by life safety resources to life threatening incidents. Police Services Water Delivery Systems: In the event of a loss of water service, the majority of police facilities would continue to function normally. To address the hygienic issue raised during a loss of water service, the Incident Command Post Unit has the capability to deliver and set up portable restroom facilities for use by personnel at police facilities. Loss of water service to any of the Los Angeles City jails would cause both safety and hygienic problems for both staff assigned to the affected facility and to inmates in custody. Los Angeles City jails do not maintain a water reserve at any of their facilities, nor do they have any secondary measures to provide water to inmates. 186

In instances where water service is lost, inmates are evacuated from the affected facilities and transferred to non-affected City facilities, or to the custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff. Where inmates are to be relocated is dependent on the amount of inmates affected, estimated time frame of lost service and the day of the week it occurs. This decision will be made by the Commanding Officer, Jail Division, with the assistance of the on duty Watch Commander. Electrical Power Systems: Police facilities maintain back-up generator systems as a contingency for a power outage. These generator systems are capable of providing an ample power supply to the affected facilities, thus limiting any degradation of police services. A power failure can affect/degrade police services in several ways. Some examples are: o Downed electrical wires requiring police personnel to establish and maintain perimeters until repair crews arrive. These personnel are not available to respond to police calls for service. o Creates the possibility of civil unrest and looting, thus requiring the deployment of a large number of police personnel and resources to restore order. This would degrade the amount of available police resources for response to other police emergencies. Natural Gas/Fuel Transportation, Storage and Distribution: Reliable gasoline supplies are critical to the continued operations of the fleet of vehicles used to provide police services. Also, a fire caused by a rupture of a natural gas line can cause a large percentage of on-duty police resources to be committed to a single incident and thus degrade the available resources for response to other police emergencies. Police fueling stations maintain back-up generators to address an electric failure and continue to provide fuel to police and emergency vehicles. Information and Communications: The delivery of police services relies on multiple communications systems to assist in providing police services to the community. These systems include the telephone system, Police Department radio system, Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), Decentralized, Consolidated Crime Analysis Database (C-CAD), Network Communications System (NECS), and the Local Area Network (LAN). Although the Police Department has contingency plans and manual systems in place, a failure of any of these systems will cause a serious degradation in police response and services. For example: o Lack of telephone service to a particular community will prevent outgoing 9-1-1 emergency calls from being made. o Failure of the incoming 9-1-1 system will prevent emergency calls for service from reaching the Police Department. o A radio system failure will significantly hamper the dispatch of police resources. 187

o A failure of the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system would significantly delay the creation of police calls for service and hamper the ability of Communications Division to properly track and assign police calls for service. Additionally, a failure of this system would prevent officers from using their Mobile Digital Terminals (MDT). Failure of this system would prohibit patrol officers from accessing information regarding outstanding criminal warrants, current domestic violence restraining orders, and drivers license information. Additionally, the inability to track the location of patrol units creates an officer safety concern. o Failure of the Decentralized Automated Booking Information System (DABIS) would cause delays in the processing and booking of new inmates into the Citys jail facilities. A failure of this system is overcome by resorting to the preexisting system of manual entry. o A failure of the Consolidated Crime Analysis Database (C-CAD) would prohibit personnel from accessing and generating DR numbers. This system failure is overcome by resorting to a manual system. o Failure of the Local Area Network (LAN) would prevent officers from accessing computer versions of the departments administrative forms, CCHRS, and departmental publications/orders. This system failure could be overcome by manual completion of necessary forms and accessing published departmental publications/orders. Government Services: The Police Department requires much support from other government agencies to effectively deliver emergency services. Among the support services required are: o Gasoline fuel delivery o Vehicle parts o Computer and radio equipment repair and support o Direct field support at major incidents (e.g., communications, traffic control, sheltering, etc.) Other: Large scale civil unrest and looting can cause many police resources to be committed to one incident, limiting their ability to respond to other police calls for service. Some historical examples are: o Watts Riots (1965) o Civil Unrest (1992) o Lakers NBA Championship Celebration/Unrest (1999) o Democratic National Convention (2000) Health Services

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There are 83 receiving hospitals in Los Angeles County. The LAFD uses trauma centers at 13 of these hospitals. Generally, a problem must affect several hospitals in order to create a serious threat to the ability to provide emergency health services. Water Delivery Systems: A loss of water supply will have a mixed impact on hospitals, emergency rooms and trauma centers. Hospitals are required to have potable drinking water on site for emergencies. A failure of the normal water delivery system, however, will eliminate water used for hand washing and sterilizing. Electrical Power Systems: All hospitals are required by law to have back-up emergency generators. These generators will provide operational power to emergency rooms, intensive care units and critical care units. Only a failure of the generator would cause a life safety danger. Communications: The Los Angeles County Department of Health Services manages a network of communications systems that are used to provide direct field support to paramedics and to coordinate the transportation of injured patients to hospital emergency rooms and trauma centers. A failure of any of these systems would hamper life safety services in the City of Los Angeles. These systems are: o The Medical Alert Center (MAC) o Rapid Emergency Digital Data Interface Network (REDDINET) o Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio System (HEAR) Government Services: o Emergency health services do not require significant government services to operate. Other: There are four unique threats to the delivery of emergency health services, which constitute the most significant threat to health service operations. Blood supply - The supply of blood is frequently short during non-disaster periods. Any event with mass casualties will exacerbate this shortage. Internal disasters - These are disasters at hospitals that cause them to cease operations. Examples are: o Fires o Hazardous materials release o Generator failure during a power outage 189

Convergent casualties - Excessive patients descending on the hospital network will overwhelm the ability to deliver services. The following are examples of convergent casualty scenarios: o Disaster-level epidemics o Major earthquake o Biological terrorist attack Staff shortages - The most critical asset for emergency health services is medical personnel. A major regional natural disaster or high profile public health incident may cause medical personnel not to report to work. Any measurable level of absences is likely to degrade emergency health services. Banking and Finance Interruptions to the City banking and finances can occur for a number of reasons. Critical utility/public work Infrastructure Interruptions could create potential financial losses and cause problems by not having accounting funds to pay for staff and resources which would be necessary in response to emergencies or disasters. The City considers banking and finance a critical infrastructure. Utility/public work infrastructure interruptions could potentially create the following potential losses to banking and finance services: Controller Loss of Power in City Hall East: Loss of power in City Hall East would disrupt the Controllers ability to access the Citys Financial Management Information System and Payroll Systems, thereby preventing the Controller from accounting for transactions as they relate to the general ledger and payroll. Loss of power in City Hall East would also prevent the Information Technology Agency from printing checks on the Controllers behalf. Loss of Accessibility or Habitability of City Hall East: The Controllers Office is centrally located on the third and fourth floors of City Hall East. In addition, ITA and the Controllers Office print checks at various locations throughout the building. If City Hall East or the Civic Center area were to become inaccessible or uninhabitable, the Controllers Office would be unable to perform its regular duties in a normal manner, and would have to rely on emergency procedures to perform its functions. Potential threats to the accessibility or habitability of City Hall East or the Civic Center area that would threaten or disrupt the Controllers operations include natural threats (fire, earthquakes, major storms), technological threats (major aircraft crashes, hazardous material spills), criminal activities (civil disturbances, acts or threats of terrorism), or non-structural hazards (employee safety, facility/equipment survivability). Treasurer 190

Extended Power and/or Computer Systems Failure: Long term power failure and/or computer systems failure could delay collection and deposit of revenues to Citys bank accounts. In consequence, the following payments could be delayed: Compensation to employees, which in turn could have negative impact on employee welfare, morale and productivity; payments for purchases of supplies and equipment from vendors, which might delay delivery of vital items; payment for services provided by contractors, which might delay delivery of those services; payments to the Citys bond holders, which could cause reduced ratings for the City and higher interest rates to be paid for future debts.

N.3 Analysis of Future Development

This section is not applicable to this human-caused hazard.

O. PROFILE OF TSUNAMI HAZARD

Tsunamis are large ocean waves which are generated by impulsive geophysical events such as submarine earthquakes, co-seismic coastal or submarine landslides, and volcanoes. In the deep ocean, tidal waves may travel at speeds up to 500 mph, and they can propagate rapidly across the world oceans and strike distant shorelines. Tsunami Hazard was identified as a Low Risk Hazard for the City of Los Angeles. O.1 Identifying Tsunami Hazard Tsunamis are typically classified as either local or distant (tele-tsunami). These two types of tsunamis have different implications for comprehensive planning, zoning, building siting, design, and construction activities, and evacuation warning. Tsunamis from local sources usually result from earthquakes occurring off nearby coasts. In southern California, large offshore or coastal fault movements can cause large submarine landslides along steep and unstable slopes of the continental shelf edge and offshore borderland ridges generating locallydestructive tsunamis for the adjacent coastal areas. The travel time of the locally-generated tsunami, from initiation at the source to arrival at coastal communities may be within 5 to 30 minutes. These are rare but there is evidence around the world that they do occur. Tsunamis from distant sources are the most common type observed along the Pacific Coast of the United States. The Pacific states may suffer both regional and Pacific-wide tsunamis. Regional tsunamis affect smaller areas than Pacific-wide tsunamis. The time required for a distant tsunami to reach the Hawaiian and mainland coasts will vary between 5 to 18 hours, depending upon the tsunami place of origin. The effects of a distant tsunami on a coastal area may be negligible or severe depending upon the magnitude of the tsunami, its source distance, and its direction of approach. Storms at sea also can generate heavy waves. Both have the potential of causing flooding of low lying coastal areas. Hazardous tsunamis are rare along the Los Angeles coast. However, storm generated waves have caused considerable damage to property and beaches along the 191

ocean perimeter. The City Flood Hazard Specific Plan sets forth design criteria for development in coastal zones, including increased base building elevations. The Army Corps is responsible for constructing and maintaining the breakwaters which are designed to mitigate damaging wave action, particularly in the harbor area. The Harbor Department works cooperatively with the Army Corps relative to maintenance and protection of the breakwater facilities. Along with the fire and police departments, it participates in the Federal tsunami alert program to warn potentially affected properties and harbor tenants of tsunami threats and to advise them concerning protective response actions. Depending upon the magnitude of the tsunami, coastal areas of the City could be inundated, most notably in the Santa Monica, San Pedro and the Los Angeles Harbor areas. Continued development in areas exposed to coastal inundation has increased the risk of property damage and loss of life from future tsunamis. While historic and geologic evidence suggests a threat of tsunami is greater in Alaska, Hawaii and the northern coastal areas of California, some evidence indicates a potential for events impacting southern California. In 1994, the United States Senate Appropriations Committee directed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to formulate a plan for reducing tsunami risks to the nations coastal residents. Subsequent studies have indicated the potential for a local or distant source tsunami affecting the Pacific shoreline states. Subsequent studies and workshops sponsored or supported by NOAA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and CalEMA have raised the consciousness of public disaster services agencies, and led to the development of tsunami action plans in some of the most endangered localities. Given the above conditions, and the recent activities of Federal and State agencies in defining the issues, a tsunami element would be a prudent addition to the Countys and coastal cities' overall disaster planning efforts. Integration of a tsunami element into existing plans will provide for coordinated and supported activities, maximize available resources, provide a strong foundation of expertise, and contain any additional actions which may be necessary to effect appropriate preparation and response. The Los Angeles County Operational Area is the lead agency for tsunami response. In the event of a tsunami emergency, the City of Los Angeles will coordinate any response activity through the County Operational Area. The State of California requires every communitys general plan to include a safety element and tsunamis are specifically mentioned as a hazard to be applicable. The California Coastal Management Program (CCMP) under the California Coastal Act requires each city or county lying wholly or partly within the coastal zone to prepare a Local Coastal Plan (LPC). While the specific contents of LCPs are not specified by state law, LCPs must be certified by Coastal Commission as consistent with policies of the Coastal Act. The Coastal Act (Public Resources Code, Division 20) has provisions relating to geologic hazards, but does not mention tsunamis 192

specifically. Section 30253(1) states that new development shall minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic, flood, and fire hazard. The basic principal which defines land use planning is that development should be prevented or limited in high hazard areas whenever possible. Where development cannot be prevented or limited, land use density, building value, and occupancy should be kept at a minimum. Key concepts linked to effective land use in tsunami areas are: new development should be avoided in Tsunami Hazard Areas, new development that is located in hazard areas should be designed to minimize future loss and existing urbanized development in hazard areas should be redeveloped, retrofitted or recycled into other uses. O.1.2 Description of Tsunami Hazard Up until 1992, the tsunami hazard in California was primarily attributed to tele-tsunamis, i.e., tidal waves generated far-field; pre-1985 hazard predictions had only identified an overall small risk, subject to disclaimers. As a result, most of the tsunami risk reduction in the U.S. concentrated to mitigating the hazard in Hawaii and Alaska. The Cape Mendocino tsunami triggered more comprehensive analysis of historic events in California, and now the risk from locally generated (near shore) tsunamis is believed to be high along the coast from Crescent City to Cape Mendocino, moderate, South of the Cape to north of Monterey, high, south of Monterey to Palos Verdes and moderate, South of Palos Verdes to San Diego 10. The characteristics of the tsunami wave, both offshore and along the coast, will depend primarily on the sea floor deformation. Predicting the exact characteristics of that deformation is beyond current scientific capabilities. Scenarios of sea floor deformation used in research are based on and generally consistent with both geological information from prehistoric tsunamis and known seismic and geological characteristics of known fault systems. While predicting the impact of Tsunamis anywhere in the world is a process fraught with uncertainty, the rarity of tsunamis compounds the uncertainties, and has forced scientists to blend computers, fundamental laws of physics, and information from prehistoric earthquakes and tsunamis in a fairly unique way.2 February 28, 2010 Latest Tsunami Warning Issued An 8.8 magnitude earthquake in Chile raised tsunami concerns in coastal cities across the Pacific. By the time the tsunami hit Hawaii a full 16 hours after the quake officials had already spent the morning ringing emergency sirens, blaring warnings from airplanes and ordering residents to higher ground.

Reprinted from California and the World Ocean 97 Proceedings of the Conference American Society of Civil Engineers Held March 24-27, 1997, San Diego, California

EVALUATING THE TSUNAMI RISK IN CALIFORNIA Costas Emmanuel SynolakiS, Dick McCarthy, Vasily V. Titov , and Jose Borrero

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There were no immediate reports of widespread damage, injuries or deaths in the U.S. or in the Pacific islands. Waves hit California, but barely registered amid stormy weather and a surfing contest outside San Diego went on as planned. Despite reports of significant problems in coastal areas of California, no injuries or major property damage occurred. It was still possible that the tsunami would gain strength again as it heads to Japan, and nearly 50 countries and island chains remained under tsunami warnings from Antarctica to Russia. But scientists said the worst threat had passed. The tsunami raised fears that the Pacific could fall victim to the type of killer waves that killed 230,000 people in the Indian Ocean in 2004 the morning after Christmas. During that disaster, there was little to no warning and much confusion about the impending waves. Officials said the opposite occurred after the Chile quake: They overstated their predictions for the size of the waves and the threat. The U.S. Navy moved more than a half dozen vessels to try to avoid damage from the tsunami. A frigate, three destroyers and two smaller vessels were being sent out of Pearl Harbor and a cruiser out of Naval Base San Diego, the Navy said. The tsunami caused a series of surges in Hawaii that were about 20 minutes apart, and the waves arrived later and smaller than originally predicted. The highest wave at Hilo measured 5.5 feet (1.7 meters) high, while Maui saw some as high as 2 meters (6.5 feet). Water began pulling away from shore off Hilo Bay on the Big Island just before noon, exposing reefs and sending dark streaks of muddy, sandy water offshore. Waves later washed over Coconut Island, a small park off Hilo's coast. Officials in Tonga and the Samoas evacuated coastal residents and used radio, television and mobile phone text messages to alert residents. On the island of Robinson Crusoe near Chile, a huge tsunami wave flooded the village of San Juan Batista, killing at least five people and leaving 11 missing. Sea surges hit 6 1/2 feet at several places in New Zealand. Waters at Tutukaka, a coastal dive spot near the top of the North Island, looked like a pot boiling with the muddy bottom churning up as sea surges built in size through the morning, sucking sea levels below low water marks before surging back. Australia warned of the possibility of dangerous waves, strong ocean currents and flooding from Queensland State in the north to Tasmania in the south. No evacuations were ordered. Past South American earthquakes have had deadly effects across the Pacific. A tsunami after a magnitude-9.5 quake that struck Chile in 1960, the largest earthquake ever

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recorded, killed about 140 people in Japan, 61 in Hawaii and 32 in the Philippines. It was about 3.3 to 13 feet (one to four meters) in height per, Japan's Meteorological Agency. 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami The most devastating tsunami in recorded history resulted from a magnitude 9.0 (some estimates are as high as 9.3) which occurred at 7:58 AM local time on December 26, 2004. The epicenter of the quake was located some 18.6 miles below sea level along the subduction zone where the India Plate dives under the Burma Plate in the Indian Ocean off Sumatra. The rupture occurred along a 750 mile section of the fault, extending up to 60 miles wide. The earthquake originated in the Indian Ocean off the western coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The great quake resulted in raising the sea-bed by several meters. This huge displacement of water triggered a tsunami which devastated the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South India, Thailand and other countries bordering the Indian Ocean. The waves did not originate from a point source, as mistakenly depicted in some illustrations of their spread, but radiated outwards along the entire 750-mile length of the rupture. Waves of up to 100 feet were reported, with surges extending up to 1.5 miles inland. The tsunami wreaked destruction of cities, villages, and resulted in more than 220,000 deaths. Some estimates range as high as 300,000 dead. The 2004 tsunami is the deadliest on record, resulting in more than twice the death toll of the 1703 tsunami near Awa, Japan which killed 100,000 people. In addition to the death toll, forests were leveled, crops destroyed, water, sewer and electrical systems knocked out, and entire atolls rendered uninhabitable due to destruction of fresh water sources. 1964 Alaska Earthquake and Tsunami On March 27th, 1965, a devastating earthquake measuring 9.2 on the Richter Scale struck in Alaska. The force of the earthquake triggered tsunami waves which hit the California Coast. The tsunami resulted in 11 deaths in the Crescent City area of northern California, (The) tsunami slammed into the Orange County coast, hammering Huntington Beach with tidal surges of about 4 to 5 feet and causing moderate damage. The impact could have been worse if there had been a high tide at the time.3 Lifeguard Lt. Walt Snyder, who was working on Huntington Beachs only rescue boat, recalled huge tidal surges that made whirlpools. They had more speed and punch than most tidal surges. (Source: Long Beach Press Telegram, March 2nd, 2005.) O.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to Tsunami Hazard Tsunamis, caused by earthquakes or undersea landslides, threaten Californias west coast, especially in northern California. There are two types of tsunamislocal and distant. Although 195

local tsunamis represent the more immediate threat, allowing at-risk populations only a few minutes to find safety, California is vulnerable to and must plan for both tsunami types 11. Tsunami Warning Systems In 1994, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was directed by Congress to formulate a plan for reducing tsunami risks to the nation's coastal residents. NOAA created and operates the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle, Washington, a research center for the study and monitoring of tsunamis. The Pacific Marine Environmental laboratory developed the first reliable scientific instruments for detecting tsunamis. Known as a "tsunamimeter", these instruments detect tsunamis by the water pressure exerted by a tsunami passing overhead. Six of these instruments are deployed in the Pacific Ocean. When a tsunamimeter detects a tsunami, it sends acoustic signals to a buoy on the surface. The buoy converts the signals to radio waves and relays the data to an orbiting satellite which then alerts several warning centers, including the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii, and the West Coast Tsunami Warning Center in Alaska. The process takes about two minutes. The signals are then evaluated by NOAA scientists to determine if a tsunami warning is necessary. (Source: encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia). As a result of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, NOAA has announced plans to greatly enhance the systems for tsunami detection and warning. More than $37 million will be invested to deploy an additional 32 advanced technology tsunamimeters. The new system -know as the "Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) system will also use advanced technology for analyzing the data transmitted from the underwater instruments. The new system, scheduled to be fully deployed by 2007, will provide the United States with nearly 100% protection capability for a U.S. coastal tsunami, expanding monitoring coverage throughout the entire Pacific and Caribbean basins. In addition, the United States Geological Survey will enhance its seismic monitoring and information delivery from the Global Seismic Network to provide additional detection and predictive capability. Most tsunamis are generated by earthquakes beneath the ocean floor. Seismic data is key to predicting a tsunami. Internationally, tsunami detection and warning systems are being developed under the umbrella of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). The mission of the GEOSS is to develop a comprehensive, sustained and integrated Earth observation system. Currently, 54 nations including the United States participate in the GEOSS effort. The goal is to extend tsunami detection and warning systems to all the earth's oceans.

Source: Tsunami Hazard Mitigation - A Report to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Prepared by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, Seattle, Washington, March 31, 1995. www.pmel.noaa.gov/ ~bernard/ senatec.html

11

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Recently introduced proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress would improve not only detection and monitoring systems, but would also enhance the ability of local, state and Federal governments to plan for, and mitigate the effects of tsunamis. The proposed legislation (S. 50) is designed to "increase and accelerate mapping, modeling, research assessment, education, and outreach efforts in order to improve forecasting, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery of tsunami and related coastal hazards." The legislation would also provide funding to improve state, Federal and international coordination for tsunami hazard detection, warning, and mitigation. Tsunami Warning Communications Systems The network of tsunami detection oceanic buoys provide immediate warning about any indications of a tsunami begin generated or moving. The monitors are linked with satellites and real time information is monitored by the West Coast Pacific Tsunami Center in Alaska and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii. This system is effective for detecting tsunamis of distant origin. This information is monitored and evaluated by NOAA scientists who assess the risk and issue a tsunami warning if indicated by the data. Warnings are transmitted to state agencies via the National Warning System (NAWAS). In California, the Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) Warning Center receives the information from the NAWAS and immediately transmits it to local operational areas using the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), California Warning System (CALWAS), and Emergency Digital Information System (EDIS). The information is simultaneously transmitted to designated local response agencies such as the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, Harbor Department, etc. Depending on the content of the warning, the City and County agencies will determine the appropriate course of action. If the first wave is expected to reach the coast with enough time for evacuation, the decision to make a complete, immediate evacuation may be necessary. However, if the wave is expected in 3+ hours, a phased evacuation is possible with the closing of beaches and removal of emergency equipment and personnel from coastal areas. The City and County may elect to declare a local emergency. Threat from Tsunamis Originating Close to Shore The preceding discussion focused on "distant" tsunamis, i.e., those triggered by a seismic or volcanic event thousands of miles away. Southern California also faces a threat from tsunamis generated close to shore. Such a tsunami could result from a major earthquake, or an undersea landslide, or both near to the shore. Several major earthquake faults are located off the California coast. While none of these are thought be capable of a "great" earthquake of a magnitude of 8.0 or more, several could generate quakes in the 6.0 range. Such a quake could generate a tsunami, especially if it involved major uplift of the undersea earth surface. The Northridge Earthquake, for example, involved and "uplift" of the surface.

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Perhaps the more likely danger would be that an off-shore quake would trigger an underwater landslide, which in turn would generate a tsunami. Geologists believe that there are several potential landslide areas off the southern California coast, including two off the Palos Verdes area. It has been estimated that an undersea landslide off the Palos Verdes Peninsula could result in tidal surges of 6 to 8 feet in the Los Angeles harbor. None of the monitoring and detections systems currently scheduled for deployment would detect, or provide warning of such an event. A resulting tsunami would reach the coastline in minutes (tsunamis are known to travel in open waters at more than 500 miles per hour). To provide some degree of warning for coastal residents, a system of underwater hydrophones has been proposed. Theoretically, hydrophone technology can detect and identify sound waves accompanying underwater ground movements that can generate a tsunami, and generate a tsunami warning the threatened coastal area. Such a system could provide a few minutes warning of an impending near" tsunami. However, such systems have not been tested or deployed, and are not recognized for tsunami detection by the state and Federal governments. As the technology develops it may prove to be a viable element of the coastal tsunami detection and monitoring system in the future. The City must remain consistent with the County, State and Federal governments in recognizing proven disaster prediction and detection technology. California Tsunami Inundation Maps Tsunami inundation maps are a very important tool to assist in the development of tsunami evacuation plans, evacuation routes, sign locations, and targeted public educational programs. In addition, the maps are critical for identifying public facilities and critical infrastructure likely to be damaged by a tsunami, and for estimating potential losses to life and property. The inundation area maps used in this Plan are based on the best available data. In 2002, Federal grant funds were obtained to develop enhanced Tsunami inundation maps covering the area from northern California through the Palos Verdes Peninsula. These improved inundation maps are being developed by the University of Southern California Civil Engineering Department, Tsunami Section. The Los Angeles Harbor area was not included in this State mapping effort for funding reasons. Additional funding has been requested to complete the State inundation mapping program, including the Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor area. As these new maps become available, the Plan will be reevaluated and revised as necessary. City of Los Angeles Tsunami Task Force (TTF) Following the disastrous earthquake and tsunami which occurred in the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, the Los Angeles City Council directed the formation of a City Task Force to assess the vulnerability of the City of Los Angeles to tsunami threats, and to recommend appropriate tsunami hazard mitigation actions.

Comment [i10]: Will these updates affect this Plan?

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The Task Forces analysis resulted in a series of findings (which are incorporated into the Hazard Identification section of this chapter) and led to the development of a set of proposed hazard mitigation actions to reduce the adverse effects of a tsunami event on the City and its residents. O.2.1 Identifying Assets Critical Response Facilities: The LHMP Advisory Task Force considers the following facilities critical in response to any disaster: Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities) These assets are included on Figure O.3 along with the inundation zone layer. Critical Infrastructure Facilities Critical infrastructure facilities consist of the following facilities: Utility Infrastructure Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) Electric Power System (Power plants, substations, major transmission lines) Wastewater System (Treatment plants, major interceptor sewer lines) Oil Refineries Natural Gas System Communication System Transportation Infrastructure: Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities Potable Water and Power Facilities Maps The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals.

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GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from CalEMA Mitigation Officer John Rowden. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Tsunami Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. The City of Los Angeles has received maps of these facilities from the California Energy Commission (CEC) with the agreement that the maps will not be made available to the public. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by the Southern California Gas Company; therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City.

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Figure O-1. Critical Response Facilities identified in the Tsunami Inundation Hazard area. Tsunami inundation data provided by the USGS.

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Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Tsunami Zone The Communication System (Telephone system) in the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private providers. This information, like that of the electricity, water, and natural gas is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since it will be disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned. O.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Summary of potential asset losses of Critical Response Facilities in the Tsunami Zone. For individual building hazard, see Appendix D.

Table O-1. City facilities associated with Tsunami Hazard. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Number Total Replacement (million) Big Nine 0 -Critical Response Fire* 5 200 Police** 0 -Hospitals 0 N/A Schools 2 N/A Rec & Parks 1 TBD Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 3859 TBD Commercial^ 8,076 2,298
*Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station. ^Estimates from 2005 Hazard Mitigation Plan, not part of the updated 2010 plan. Total Replacement Costs adjusted for inflation.

Hospitals in the Tsunami Zone - Asset Values Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of hospitals located in the City; however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Evacuation Centers (Schools) in the Tsunami Zone - Asset Values Schools are considered the responsibility of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a special jurisdiction. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of schools; however, the City does have a mutual agreement with LAUSD to use schools as evacuation centers when they are needed. Specific asset value information related to LAUSD schools may be available from the LAUSD Hazard Mitigation Plan.

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Potable Water & Power Facilities in Tsunami Zone - Asset Values DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities because of security concerns. The GIS Maps to match up with this numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. It also includes the individual property values (replacement values) for facilities along with a total value amount for facilities falling in the various hazard zones. Natural Gas Facilities in the Tsunami Zone - Asset Values The natural gas system is privately owned and operated by the Southern California Gas Company. Asset value information is not available to the City. Oil Refineries in the Tsunami Zone - Asset Values Oil Refineries are owned by private companies. Asset value information is not available to the City. Communication System Facilities in the Tsunami Zone - Asset Values The Communication System (Telephone System) is privately owned and operated by Pacific Bell. Asset value information on the telephone system is not available to the City. O.3 Analysis of Future Development The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to tsunami hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates

P. PROFILE OF LANDSLIDE/DEBRIS FLOW HAZARD

Landslide/Debris Flow Hazard was classified as a Low Risk Hazards for the City of Los Angeles. Some landslides move slowly and cause damage gradually, whereas others move so rapidly that they can destroy property and take lives suddenly and unexpectedly. Gravity is the force driving landslide movement. Factors that allow the force of gravity to overcome the resistance of earth material to landslide movement include: saturation by water, steepening of slopes by erosion or construction, alternate freezing or thawing, earthquake shaking, and volcanic eruptions. Landslides are typically associated with periods of heavy rainfall or rapid snow melt and tend to worsen the effects of flooding that often accompanies these events. In areas burned by forest and brushfires, a lower threshold of precipitation may initiate landslides. Debris flows, sometimes referred to as mudslides, mudflows, lahars, or debris avalanches, are common types of fast-moving landslides. These flows generally occur during periods of intense rainfall or rapid snow melt. They usually start on steep hillsides as shallow landslides that liquefy and accelerate to speeds that are typically about 10 miles per hour, but can exceed 35 203

miles per hour. The consistency of debris flows range from watery mud to thick, rocky mud that can carry large items such as boulders, trees, and cars. Debris flows from many different sources can combine in channels, and their destructive power may be greatly increased. They continue flowing down hills and through channels, growing in volume with the addition of water, sand, mud, boulders, trees, and other materials. When the flows reach flatter ground, the debris spreads over a broad area, sometimes accumulating in thick deposits that can wreak havoc in developed areas.

P.1 Identifying Landslide/Debris Flow Hazard

Landslides Watershed protection is a primary concern of the City of Los Angeles, especially in hillside areas. Permeable soils soak up rain and irrigation water. Proper grading and drainage systems channel and collect water to protect slopes from saturation and slippage. Catch basins divert surface water to street gutters which divert the water to storm drains and flood control channels so as to reduce erosion and flooding. The Bureau of Engineering, Building and Safety Department, Planning Department and Fire Department coordinate development, permit review and issuance to assure proper grading, drainage, irrigation and landscaping so as to preserve slope stability, provide erosion control and reduce potential for flooding and fire hazard. Following major brushfires, federal or state agencies typically seed denuded areas with wild plant seeds which rapidly germinate thereby encouraging regeneration of vegetation which will hold the soil and protect the watershed from erosion. Remedial measures, such as sandbagging and erection of temporary erosion control measures, are instituted in anticipation of storms so as to protect road systems and property from potential landslides, flooding and mud and debris flows. To reduce fire hazards and protect slopes, the City requires vegetation clearance and encourages hillside property owners to plant appropriate vegetation and to implement proper irrigation and slope maintenance measures. Slope Failure and Subsidence Los Angeles is a part of the Pacific Coastal Region, a huge geologic region which stretches from Alaska to the tip of South America. The region consists of young geologic areas in which the mountains still are in the process of growing and shaping the California land form. Los Angeles is one of the few major cities in the world with a mountain range (the Santa Monica Mountains) bisecting its land area. In addition, it is bounded by the Santa Susana and Verdugo Mountains and the Palos Verdes Hills. The Beverly Hills and Baldwin Hills bound or cross other sections of the City. The Pacific Ocean interacts with the coastal boundaries of these ranges to create seaside cliffs and beaches. Under natural conditions, slopes often give way, resulting in landslides. As City development spread from the flat lands of what is now the Central City and the San Fernando Valley into the hillsides and along the base of slopes, unstable soil and erosion 204

sometimes contributes to landslides and mud and debris flows which impacts development, especially following rain storms. Landslides can be triggered by natural causes such as earthquakes, ocean wave action or saturation by storm, or can be induced by the undercutting of slopes during construction, improper artificial compaction or saturation from sprinkler systems or broken pipes. The principal tool for mitigation of geologic hazards is the City Grading Code. In 1929, the Building and Safety Department began to compile and correlate data on soil conditions for distribution to Realtors, builders and prospective property buyers. In 1952, hillside grading provisions were added to the Building Code. Los Angeles was the first city in the nation to have such provisions. Storms of 1957-58 caused extensive damage in hillside areas and led to adoption of the 1963 Grading Code. It was the first such legislation in the nation and served as a model for other jurisdictions. A unique feature of the Code was a requirement that professional geologists supervise hillside grading. Under the Code, the Department of Building and Safety has the authority to withhold building permit issuance if a project cannot mitigate potential hazards to the project or which are associated with the project. A property owner may be required to install pilings to anchor a structure to bedrock, to construct retaining walls, build drainage systems or implement other mitigation measures. If, after a project is constructed, potential slope stability hazards are identified, the City can require implementation of stabilization measures. The Grading Code periodically is revised to reflect new technology and improve standards and requirements. Pursuant to the State Hazard Mapping Act, the State Geologist prepares maps which identify potential landslide hazard areas. A description of this program is contained in the Seismic Events section of the Safety Element. To regulate subsurface extraction activities, the City established Oil Drilling District procedures in 1948 and Rock and Gravel District procedures in 1951. The latter was superseded in 1976 by the Surface Mining District ordinance which brought the City into compliance with the California Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975. The former has been amended several times to improve protective and procedural measures and, in 1971, to include offshore oil drilling. Both contain provisions for monitoring and imposing mitigation measures to prevent significant subsidence relative to oil and gas extraction and mining activities. The City Oil Administrator of the Office of the City Administrative Officer is responsible for monitoring oil extraction activities and has the authority to recommend additional mitigation measures to the Planning Commission after an Oil Drilling District is established. The Planning Department Office of Zoning Administration issues and administers oil drilling permits and may impose additional mitigation measures, as deemed necessary, after a permit has been granted, such as measures to address subsidence. P.1.2 Description of Landslide/Debris Flow Hazard 205

Because the City of Los Angles is so susceptible to land and mudslides during and following a major disaster such as wildland fires and earthquakes, the following profile shows the characteristics of a typical landslide/mudslide in the Los Angeles Basin. At 4:31 a.m. local time on 17 January 1994, a 6.7 earthquake struck the Los Angeles metropolitan area in southern California. The earthquake hypocenter was 18 km beneath the City of Northridge in the San Fernando Valley on a blind thrust fault striking N. 58 W. and dipping 42 southward (Wald and Heaton, 1994). The 17 January 1994 Northridge, California, Earthquake (M=6.7) triggered more than 11,000 landslides over an area of about 10,000 km. Most of the landslides were concentrated in a 1,000-km area that includes the Santa Susana Mountains and the mountains north of the Santa Clara River Valley. Landslides triggered by the Earthquake were mapped in the field and from 1:60,000-scale aerial photography provided by the U.S. Air Force and taken the morning of the Earthquake; these were subsequently digitized and plotted in a GIS-based format, which also are accessible via Internet. Most of the triggered landslides were shallow (1-5 m), highly disrupted falls and slides in weakly cemented Tertiary to Pleistocene clastic sediment. Average volumes of these types of landslides were less than 1,000 m, but many had volumes exceeding 100,000 m. Many of the larger disrupted slides traveled more than 50 m, and a few moved as far as 200 m from the bases of steep parent slopes. Deeper (>5 m) rotational slumps and block slides numbered in the hundreds, a few of which exceeded 100,000 m in volume. The largest triggered landslide was a block slide having a volume of 8X10E06 m. Triggered landslides damaged or destroyed dozens of homes, blocked roads, and damaged oil-field infrastructure. Analysis of landslide distribution with respect to variations in (1) landslide susceptibility and (2) strong shaking, recorded by hundreds of instruments, will form the basis of a seismic landslide hazard analysis of the Los Angeles area. Distribution and Types of Landslides Triggered The Northridge Earthquake triggered landslides over an area of about 10,000 km that is roughly concentric about the epicenter. The landslide limit is the smoothed curve connecting the locations of farthest landslides at several different azimuths from the epicenter. The maximum epicentral distance to the landslide limit is about 70 km, which is about average in relation to historical worldwide earthquakes of this magnitude (Keefer, 1984). Within this broad area of scattered landslide activity is a 1,000-km area of much more concentrated landsliding that lies north and northwest of the epicenter, primarily in the Santa Susana Mountains and the mountains north of the Santa Clara River valley. This area of greatest landslide concentration consists primarily of Late Miocene through Pleistocene clastic sediment having little or no cementation and that has been folded and uplifted by rapid tectonic deformation. The young, weak material lacks significant tensile strength and erodes readily to form steep-walled canyons that commonly head in nearly vertical slopes. The 206

combination of low strength and steep relief reaching elevations of 1,000 m above sea level makes the area highly susceptible to failure during seismic shaking. Landslides were most dense along the steep-walled canyons that have been incised into the northern and southern flanks of the Santa Susana Mountains; slides were more sparse along the gently domed crest of those mountains. In the northeast part of the Santa Susana Mountains, landslide distribution reflects the regional geologic structure; outcropping strata that form steep ridges can be traced laterally by the broad bands of landslides. Landslides were much more sparsely scattered throughout the Santa Monica and San Gabriel Mountains, which generally consist of more competent rock than exists in the Santa Susana. One notable exception is the area in and around Pacoima Canyon. The most common types of landslides triggered by the earthquake were highly disrupted, shallow falls and slides of rock and debris, numbering in the thousands to tens of thousands (if very small failures are considered) and extending over the entire area within the landslide limit. Deeper, more coherent slumps and block slides, commonly in more competent materials, numbered in the tens to perhaps hundreds and occurred primarily in the Santa Susana and Santa Monica Mountains. One well developed liquefaction-induced lateral spread was mapped in Tapo Canyon; other incipient lateral spreads have been reported but were not visible in the air photos. Shallow, Disrupted Landslides As described previously, the Santa Susana Mountains and the mountains north of the Santa Clara River valley are extremely susceptible to failure during seismic shaking. In some areas in the Santa Susana Mountains, more than 75 percent of the slope area was denuded by landslides triggered by strong shaking. Characteristic landslides in this area were several decimeters to a few meters deep and consisted of dry, highly disaggregated material that cascaded downslope to flatter areas at or near the base of the steep slopes. Northeast of the epicenter, fewer and more widely scattered rock falls were triggered in the San Gabriel Mountains, which consist primarily of Mesozoic granitic and Precambrian metamorphic rock that, although deeply weathered, is more competent than the weak sediment of the Santa Susana Mountains. An exception is the southwest corner of the San Gabriel Mountains, where younger sediment produced abundant failures comparable those in the Santa Susana Mountains. One area of exceptionally abundant landslide activity in the Mesozoic intrusive rock of the San Gabriel Mountains is near the mouth of Pacoima Canyon, where landslide concentrations were as high as in the Santa Susana Mountains. Slopes in surrounding canyons, however, had relatively few rock falls and rock slides despite having similar rock types exposed. Preliminary assessment of the characteristics of these rocks that determine their susceptibility to seismic failure (criteria from Harp and Noble, 1993) indicated no significant differences between the rock mass quality in Pacoima Canyon and that of surrounding canyons that experienced far fewer slides. Pacoima Canyon does, however, have much steeper, higher slopes than surrounding canyons, and this 207

may make the slopes there inherently less stable as well as contributing to locally amplified strong shaking. Certainly shaking levels were high at Pacoima Dam, where strong-motion records on bedrock at the south abutment produced peak accelerations of about 1.5 g (Shakal and Others, 1994). Interestingly, the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake also produced anomalously high ground accelerations in Pacoima Canyon (Cloud and Hudson, 1975). The scattered landslides in the Santa Monica Mountains generally are fairly small, shallow, disrupted landslides. This presumably is because most of the rock in the Santa Monica is more competent than that in the Santa Susana and because the ground shaking appears to have been lower in the Santa Monica. The highest concentration of slides is from the very high, steep slopes in Malibu Canyon. 2007 California Wildfires The southern California wildfires of 2007 stripped ground cover from millions of acres, including many steep canyons. Now that the fires are over the homes of thousands of Californians in and near such canyons are at risk from dangerous debris flows. USGS, in partnership with NOAA, FEMA and state and local agencies, worked to provide the scientific information that emergency agencies need to predict debris flows and protect lives and homes. The USGS MultiHazards Demonstration Project coordinated the USGS response to the 2007 southern California firestorms. The effort was unprecedented in its scope, efficiency, deployment, and results. Upon the onset of the fires the USGS funded airborne remote sensing data, helped to staff the debris flow mapping project, and coordinating the fire response internally, with the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, and later with OES and FEMA officials at the Multi-Agency State and Federal State and Federal Task Force (MAS-G) in Colton, CA. Just in time for the first round of post-fire rains, the USGS and FEMA were able to complete and release a series of flood inundation and debris flow maps showing the areas within the eleven burned areas that may be impacted by flooding and debris flows. These maps illustrated to federal, state, and local emergency responders the volume of debris flows that can be expected from specific areas, and identified the areas prone to impact by floods and debris flows. The maps were provided to forecasters with valuable information as part of the joint NOAAUSGS flash flood and debris flow warning system for recently burned areas in southern California. USGS scientists were also able release an ash advisory before the rains based on preliminary results of ash samples taken immediately from burn sites in suburban and wildland areas. Several ash samples analyzed to date produce elevated pH levels, suggesting the ash may generate caustic alkalinity upon contact with rainwater or water-based body fluids such as perspiration or fluids lining the respiratory tract. Residential ash samples preliminarily showed elevated levels of some metals or metalloids such as arsenic, lead, copper, and/or zinc. The USGS conducted assessments of some critically endangered species within the fire footprints. Several aquatic species were in extreme peril of extirpation from flooding, debris flows, and dry ravel. 208

Department of the Interior with USGS scientists are installing instruments and streamgages to help keep emergency responders and the public informed and alert. The southern California winter rains have the potential to wash the denuded hillsides into neighbor-hoods in devastating debris flows (also called mudflows) and floods into neighborhoods and contaminated ash from the fires into the regions water supplies. 1994 Northridge Earthquake Landslides and rockfalls triggered by the earthquake were common on steep slopes surrounding the epicentral region. Failure of the coastal terrace at Pacific Palisades damaged several homes and temporarily blocked the Pacific Coast Highway (State Highway 1). Numerous slope failures occurred along steep slopes and shattered ridge crests in the Santa Susana Mountains, particularly along their northern flank. In the Granada Hills area, a portion of an apartment building in a hillside condominium development collapsed because of foundation movements in an area that appeared to have had downslope movement prior to the earthquake. In the Valencia area, located about 20 km north of the epicenter, damage was observed in two hillside developments in three-story apartment buildings and single-family wood-frame houses that were constructed on fills. 1987 Whittier Earthquake Small surficial slides could be observed in previous landslide terrain in Turnbull Canon in the northern Whittier area. In general, however, the terrain was much too dry for the ground shaking to have activated deep-seated landslides. Dust clouds rose over the southern flank of the west-central San Gabriel Mountains caused by rock falls and surficial sliding from road cuts. 1971 San Fernando Earthquake Landslides When it was apparent that the landslide potential of the hillsides, though great, did not threaten any urban areas, the geologists turned their attention to the study of geologic effects-so often ephemeral--and to other geologic hazards that may have been developed or increased by the earthquake. In 1969, the California Division of Mines and Geology published Map Sheet 15, entitled Preliminary Reconnaissance Map of Major Landslides, San Gabriel Mountains, California by D. M. Morton and R. Streitz. The landslides they mapped included those in the eastern half of the San Fernando quadrangle. Dr. Morton's paper describes an additional 1,000 landslides generated by the earthquake--most of them west of the area previously mapped, but many in Big Tujunga Canyon, the site of already mapped slides.

P.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment

Overall Summary 209

All mountain and hillside areas within the City of Los Angeles are vulnerable to the likelihood of human injury and property damage resulting from landslides/mudslides. Landslide hazard areas are scattered throughout the City. Typically, landslides and mudslides occur in conjunction with other hazard events, such as earthquakes, floods, and severe weather. Impacts and Extent of Hazard As detailed in previous sections of this chapter, landslides/mudslides have caused significant property damage as well as injuries and loss of life in the City. In addition, landslides/mudslides have damaged infrastructure such as roads, bridges, pipelines and other facilities. In isolated cases, formerly developed properties have been red tagged, or rendered unfit for human habitation due to landslide/mudslide events. Even though the geographic extent of the hazard threat is limited to certain areas, in many cases unpopulated and/or developed, the consequences of such events can be serious. The City expends significant resources in efforts to mitigate the effects of landslides/mudslides particularly as they pertain to development. The Bureau of Engineering, Building and Safety, Planning and Fire Departments coordinate development review and issuance to assure proper grading, drainage, irrigation and landscaping so as to preserve slope stability, provide erosion control. To protect slopes, the City encourages hillside property owners to plan appropriate vegetation and to implement proper irrigation and slope maintenance measures.

P.2.1 Identifying Assets Critical Response Facilities The LHMP Advisory Task Force considers the following facilities critical in response to any disaster: Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities) These assets are included on Figure P.3 along with the landslide hazard zone layer.

210

Figure P-1. Critical Response Facilities identified in the Landslide Hazard Area in the City of Los Angeles.

211

Critical Infrastructure Facilities Critical infrastructure facilities consist of the following facilities: Utility Infrastructure Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) Electric Power System (Power plants, substations, major transmission lines) Wastewater System (Treatment plants, major interceptor sewer lines) Oil Refineries Natural Gas System Communication System Transportation Infrastructure: Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities Potable Water and Electric Power Facilities Maps The Department of Water and Power (DWP) of the City of Los Angeles is responsible for the Citys water and power facilities. DWP considers water facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, water pipelines, pump plants, etc.) and power facilities (power generation plants, transfer stations, transmission lines, etc.) as confidential information because of security concerns regarding terrorism. GIS Maps identifying the locations of all water and power facilities within the different hazard areas are available only to authorized individuals. GIS maps containing this information will be maintained in a Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan at the Department of Water and Power Office of Emergency Management in accordance with instructions from CalEMA Hazard Mitigation Officer. Access to this information may be arranged through the Office of Emergency Management on an individual basis to individuals who have appropriate security clearance. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Natural Gas System) in the Earthquake Zone The natural gas system is considered sensitive information because of the threat of terrorism. Because of this, the mapping of these facilities will be kept confidential. The City of Los Angeles has received maps of these facilities from the California Energy Commission (CEC) with the agreement that the maps will not be made available to the public. In addition, the natural gas system is privately owned and operated by The Gas Company; therefore, asset information on these facilities is not available to the City. Critical Utility Infrastructure (Communication System) in the Earthquake Zone The Communication System (Telephone system) in the communities of the City of Los Angeles is owned and operated by private providers. This information, like that of the electricity, water, 212

and natural gas is considered sensitive because of terrorism issues. Because of this, the City will not provide maps in this document of these facilities since it will be disclosed to the public. In addition, asset information on these facilities is also not available to the City since it is privately owned. P.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Table P-1 presents a summary of Potential Asses Losses for Critical Response Facilities in the Landslide/Mudslide Zone Area. For individual building hazard for all City structures, see Appendix D.
Table P-1. City facilities associated with Landslide/Debris Flow Hazard. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Number Total Replacement (million) Big Nine 0 -Critical Response Fire* 4 88 Police** 0 -Hospitals 1 N/A Schools 4 N/A Rec & Parks 136 TBD Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential 42,792 TBD Commercial^ TBD TBD
*Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station. ^^Estimates from previous Hazard Mitigation Plan, not part of the updated 2010 plan. Numbers adjusted for inflation.

Comment [i11]: Enter new values

Hospitals in the Landslide Zone - Asset Values Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of hospitals located in the City; however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Evacuation Centers (Schools) in the Landslide Zone - Asset Values Schools are considered the responsibility of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a special jurisdiction. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction of schools; however, the City does have a mutual agreement with LAUSD to use schools as evacuation centers when they are needed. Specific asset value information related to LAUSD schools may be available from the LAUSD Hazard Mitigation Plan. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN LANDSLIDE/MUDSLIDE ZONE - ASSET VALUES Potable Water & Power Infrastructure DWP provided asset value analysis on potable water and power facilities using a numbering system rather than providing the names of the facilities because of security concerns. The GIS 213

Maps to match up with this numbering system can be located in the DWP Secure Annex to the City Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. It also includes the individual property values (replacement values) for facilities along with a total value amount for facilities falling in the various hazard zones. Natural Gas Facilities in the Landslide/Mudslide Zone- Asset Values The natural gas system is privately owned and operated by the Southern California Gas Company. Asset value information is not available to the City. Oil Refineries in the Landslide/Mudslide Zone- Asset Values Oil Refineries are owned by private companies. Asset value information is not available to the City. Communication System Facilities in the Landslide/Mudslide Zone- Asset Values The Communication System (Telephone System) is privately owned and operated by Pacific Bell. Asset value information on the telephone system is not available to the City. Critical Operating Facilities (Big Nine) in the Landslide/Mudslide ZoneZone - Asset Values None

P.3 Analysis of Future Development

The methodology used to assess Future development in the City of Los Angeles and its exposure to hazard risk is presented in Section II.A.3. During the LHMP 2010 revision, it was determined that additional analysis was necessary to assess Future Development exposure to earthquake hazard. This analysis will be completed in summer 2010 and will be incorporated in future LHMP updates.

Q. PROFILE OF HIGH-RISE FIRE HAZARD

High-rise structures are defined as structures exceeding the reach aerial reach of local fire department equipment, usually 75 feet (7 to 8 stories). High rise structures are generally classified as residential, hotel/motel, office, hospital, and other. The vast majority of reported high rise fires occur in residential structures. This assessment addresses fire hazard in high rise occupied structures only. High-Rise Fire Hazard is considered Low Risk Hazard in the City of Los Angeles.

Q.1 Identifying the High-Rise Fire Hazard

High rise fires pose significant problems for both fire suppression and occupant safety. The following analysis of the unique fire safety issues related to high rise buildings: When buildings are constructed beyond the reach of a fire departments highest ladder, two important firefighting strategies are taken away from firefighters. First, life-saving 214

victim removals using ladders are eliminated. Searches and rescues can be accomplished only from inside stairways. The second firefighting strategy in a high rise is the ability to extinguish a fire with an outside master stream. Firefighters must extinguish the fire using handheld hose streams advanced through heat and smoke from an inside stairway. The response time in a high rise building fire may be 15 minutes or longer. At a high rise building, unlike a low rise building, firefighters, after they arrive, may have to walk 100 to 200 feet through an open space or large lobby. They then have to question building employees about the fire location, check an alarm panel, etc. Firefighters battling a fire in a high rise building depend on the building systems for success in extinguishment. The elevator system must take them, tools, and equipment up to the fire. The standpipe system must provide water pressure and volume to the upper floors. A building communication system must allow fire department firefighting radio transmission. The structural steel framework of a high rise building interferes with fire department radios. High rise buildings have sealed or locked windows. Venting by breaking thick glass windows is extremely dangerous. Falling glass can injure people on the sidewalk and cut supply hoses. Because these buildings are sealed, large volumes of heat and smoke generated by the fire become trapped in the structure. The so-called stack effect (the result of temperature difference between the inside and outside of a sealed high-rise building) causes smoke to spread up or down many floors during a fire. Large volumes of smoke and heat move uncontrollably during a high rise fire. Lastly, firefighters cannot order all the people in a high rise building to leave during a fire. It is not possible for thousands of people to leave a burning building quickly. It would take several hours. Q.1.1 Description of High-Rise Fire Hazard History and Background The first four-story wood frame building was constructed in Los Angeles in 1882. By 1888, seven-story buildings with brick bearing walls were permitted and fire escapes were required for buildings four stories or more in height. With the advent of elevators and minimal masonry reinforcement, the City in 1903 allowed the construction of its first 13-story office building. In 1905, the fire escape ordinance was made retroactive and enforcement was delegated to the Building Department. Subsequently, water connections were required in new multi-story buildings to facilitate fire fighting. In 1910, the height limit was set at 150 feet (13 stories) for steel frame office buildings, the maximum possible under then available engineering techniques, and five stories for residential buildings, including hotels. After building technological advances enabled construction of taller buildings, the height limit was retained to assure that the proposed City Hall would be the Citys tallest building. 215

City Hall was dedicated in 1928 and at 452 feet in height (over 28 stories) it remained the tallest building until the 1957 floor area ratio ordinance replaced the height ordinance. The 1957 ordinance allowed unlimited height with a maximum floor area in order to encourage provision of open space and more imaginative building design. In 1962, the 32-story Occidental Tower (later TransAmerica Building) was constructed in the Central City community. It became the first building to exceed the height of City Hall. Hundreds of high rise buildings have since been constructed in the City. This has necessitated entirely new techniques for fire mitigation, suppression and rescue. The Los Angeles Experience In 1964, Operation High Rise was instituted. It used empty buildings to study the propagation, effects and spread of fires and to develop systematic response and suppression procedures for high rise fires. Procedures developed by this unique program and subsequent programs have been used by emergency response agencies throughout the world. The first significant local test of Operation High Rise was in 1968 for a fire in the 9-story U.S. Borax and Chemical Corporation building in the Westlake area. Heat activated elevator buttons caused elevators to be called to and to remain at the fire involved floor, resulting in the death of one firefighter. Emergency alarm systems failed to work and hand held walkie-talkies proved ineffective inside the building. Out of this tragedy came new building construction requirements and firefighting procedures, including banning of heat activated elevator buttons by Los Angeles and establishment of a new Department procedure requiring firefighters to use stairs instead of elevators to gain access to a fire involved floor. The first major high rise fire in the nation, the One New York Plaza fire of 1970, triggered a national review of hazards associated with high rise buildings. The California State Legislature in 1974 adopted high rise fire safety regulations which included requirements for automatic sprinkler systems in any new buildings which were 75 or more feet in height. Revised procedures were successfully used in the 1971 Westwood Center Building (Glendon Avenue, Westwood community) Fire. The Department quickly contained the fire and suppressed it within half an hour. In 1976 the new Incident Command System (ICS) was instituted. It was designed to improve operations and coordinate fire suppression resources. Its first major test was the 1976 fire on the 20th floor of the Occidental Tower building. The success of ICS resulted in adoption of the ICS methodology by other emergency response agencies around the world. The 1979 Fire on the 11th floor of the Bunker Hill West Tower (Hope and Third Streets, Central City) was the Citys first major fire in a residential high rise building. Residents were phoned and urged to remain in their rooms so that opening of doors would not spread the fire and so that residents would not become victims of smoke inhalation. One couple died when they were literally blown off a balcony ledge when the fire burned from the open room across the hall, through the door to their unit, causing a blast of heated air. Following this tragedy, rescue 216

procedures were improved and, in 1980, smoke detectors were required in all new residential high rise buildings and any high rise buildings which were issued remodeling permits. In 1984, the Departments improved ICS procedures were successfully used in responding to the 12-story Fickett Towers (Van Nuys community) senior citizen building fire. The fire was knocked down in 71 minutes and all 230 of the elderly and infirm tenants were successfully evacuated. The most materially damaging high rise fire in City history occurred in 1988 in the 62-story First Interstate Bank Building Fire (Wilshire Boulevard at Hope Street, Central City) which claimed the life of one civilian. The fire began on the 12th floor and moved upwards to the 16th floor before it was contained and suppressed. Following the Interstate fire, the City Council required fire sprinklers in the 363 existing commercial and office buildings constructed before the State sprinkler regulations became effective. The fire also underscored to private industry the need for private back-up systems and facilities to enable continuance of business operations following a fire. One of the most complex and difficult fires ever fought by the Department was the 1986 Central Library fire (5th Street at Grand Avenue, Central City). The open book stacks, narrow corridors, circuitous stairways, interference of the thick walls with the walkie-talkies, lack of windows and ventilation, dense smoke, intense heat (estimated as high as 2,500 degrees in some areas), limited access and firefighter exhaustion due to heat and exertion made the fire difficult to attack. Extensive pre-planning for a potential fire in the historic structure resulted in an orderly evacuation of library staff and patrons and invaluable familiarity of the fire commanders with the building and its unique fire suppression demands. Salvage units quickly instituted procedures to protect the 1.2 million books and documents from smoke and water damage. Ingenious methods were devised to direct smoke from the building and relay fire fighters in and out of the fire areas. After seven hours and thirty-eight minutes the fire was brought under control. It took another five days to mop up the hot spots and for the building to cool down. The 350 firefighters saved over a million books. Only 350,000 books were fire or water damaged and only 4% of the $500 million value of the structure was lost. Major Structure Fires in Los Angeles The following list includes the major structure fires occurring within the City of Los Angeles since 1887: o Belmont Hotel Fire, December 16, 1887 o Los Angeles Times Building Explosion and Fire, October 1, 1910 o Brennan Hotel Fire, January 24, 1913 o Shrine Auditorium Fire, January 11, 1920 o Gray Building Fire, November 6,1939 o OConnor Electro-Plating Co. Explosion and Fire, February 20, 1947 o Ponet Square Hotel Fire, September 13, 1970 o Dorothy Mae Apartment Fire, September 9, 1982 o Los Angeles Central Library Fire, April 29, 1986 o First Interstate Bank Fire, May 4, 1988 o Pan Pacific Auditorium Fire, May 24, 1989 217

Los Angeles High Rise Fire Code In addition to building, plumbing, and electrical codes which apply to all structures in Los Angeles, the City has adopted a High Rise Fire Code specifically designed to reduce the occurrence of high rise fires, as well as to reduce the resulting injuries, loss of life, and property damage (Section 57.118 et seq, City of Los Angeles Fire Code). This section of the Fire Code promulgates specific and detailed regulations related to Fire Control Rooms, Building Communication Systems, Fire Department Voice Communication Systems, Elevator Systems, Fire Protective Signaling Systems, Emergency Smoke Control Systems, Standby Emergency Power Systems, Stair shaft Doors, and Automatic Sprinkler Systems. In addition to requirements for new buildings, the City has taken an aggressive stance to require sprinkler system retrofit of existing older buildings. Probability of Future Occurrences There are more than 420 high rise structures in the City of Los Angeles. Despite vigorous code enforcement, building inspection, and training for owners and occupants, the potential for a disastrous event still exists. There is no way to predict when or where such an event will occur.

Q.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment to High-Rise Fire Hazard

For the purposes of this assessment, high rise buildings in Los Angeles are divided into three categories according to date of construction: pre-1960, 1960-1974, and post-1974. The reason for this categorization is based upon the code requirements in effect at the time of construction. Pre-1960 buildings were required to have a dry standpipe for firefighting and a wet standpipe for occupants. A dry standpipe does not have water or water pressure; water must be pumped through the system by firefighters from street level. After 1960 all high rise buildings were required to have a combo system, i.e., wet standpipes for both occupants and firefighters. This allowed firefighters to attack fires more quickly at higher floors, since water and water pressure is available on all floors. All buildings constructed after 1974 are required to be equipped with automatic sprinkler systems, considered to be the most effective tool for fighting high rise fires. According to information published on the Emporis website (Emporis is a private real estate data and information company), there are approximately 509 high rise buildings located in the City of Los Angeles. While high rise structures are located in almost all parts of the City, they are concentrated in a few areas: the Central City (173), the Wilshire District (70), Westwood (52), West Los Angeles - Century City (43) and Hollywood (20). Analysis of data on the Emporis website indicates that approximately 38% of total high rise structures are pre-1960; approximately 28% were constructed between 1960 and 1974; and 34% were constructed from 1975 to the present. This means that only about one-third of the high rise buildings in the City were constructed with automatic sprinkler systems. This does not take into account, however, the number of older buildings that may have been retrofitted with sprinkler systems. 218

Telecommunications Buildings Within the Central City In most cases, damage, injuries, and loss of life from a high rise building fire is limited to the building itself and the immediate surroundings. The concentration of telecommunications facilities in the Central City area, most within high rise buildings, presents a special case. Since the late 1990's there has been a significant concentration of telecommunications facilities within a ten square block area in downtown Los Angeles. Most of the major and many smaller telecommunications firms serving the greater Los Angeles Area have located facilities in the area. The percent of space devoted to telecommunications in buildings within this area varies from about 10% to 100%. In total, it is estimated that more than 2.4 million square feet of floor space to devoted to telecommunications and related uses. Instead of housing office workers, these buildings house routers, switching equipment, servers, and associated support equipment. The National Fire Prevention Association website indicates that 23% of fires in office structures are caused by electrical distribution equipment. Therefore, this high concentration of telecommunications infrastructure not only poses a significant fire hazard, the results of a catastrophic fire in a major telecommunications structure could cause major disruption to communications within the City, as well as nationally and internationally. Q.2.1 Identifying Assets Critical Response Facilities: The LHMP Advisory Task Force considers the following facilities critical in response to any disaster (See Figure B.4): Fire Stations Police Stations Hospitals Evacuation Centers (LAUSD Schools & Recreation and Park Facilities) The Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center is located in high rise structure subject to the High Rise Fire Hazard. Critical Infrastructure Facilities Critical infrastructure facilities consist of the following facilities: Utility Infrastructure: Potable Water System (Treatment plants, dams & reservoirs) Electric Power Systems Wastewater System Oil Refineries Natural Gas System 219

Communication System

Transportation Infrastructure: Freeways Streets Bridges Railroads (Light Rail) Airports Harbor Facilities Among Critical Infrastructure Facilities, only Communications Systems are considered directly vulnerable to significant damage from the High Rise Fire Hazard. However, administrative and executive offices of both privately owned and publically owned infrastructure facilities are subject to potential damage from high rise structure fires. Notable among these are the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Metropolitan Water District, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the Citys Department of Water and Power. Catastrophic fires occurring in the high rise structures housing these administrative and command-and-control facilities could cause major disruption to water supply and transportation systems. Critical Operating Facilities Critical operating facilities in the City of Los Angeles are identified as the Big Nine buildings, Phase II Facilities, and Information Technology Department that are critical for continuity of government following a major disaster. These facilities house City Departments and staff critical in continuing government operations. Big Nine Facilities contain the largest number of departments and staff within them. Big Nine," Phase II and ITA City facilities do not contain staff from proprietary departments such as the Department of Water and Power, Harbor Department, or the Los Angeles World Airports. Proprietary departments generate their own revenue but are still owned by the City. These facilities are included under Critical Utility and Critical Transportation Facilities sections (previous section). Big Nine," Phase II and ITA facilities are considered general fund departments. For the purpose of this report, only Big Nine buildings and proprietary department facilities are considered critical operating facilities. Big Nine facilities are listed below: LA City Hall City Hall South City Hall East City Commercial Offices (Personnel) Piper Tech Parker Center San Pedro Municipal Building Marvin Braude Building West L.A. Municipal Building 220

Figure Q-1. High Rise Structures in City of Los Angeles.

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Q.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Critical Response Facilities Located in High Occupancy Structures - Asset Values
Table Q-1. City facilities associated with High Rise Structures. Replacement costs based on assumptions. Number Total Replacement (million) Big Nine 2 530 Critical Response Fire* 0 -Police** 0 -Hospitals 1 N/A Schools 0 N/A Rec & Parks 0 -Critical Infrastructure See Appendix D Residential and Commercial Residential N/A -Commercial^ TBD TBD
*Replacement costs based on estimated construction costs for a standard fire station in the City of Los Angeles. **Replacement costs based on construction costs for a standard police station. ^^Estimates from previous Hazard Mitigation Plan, not part of the updated 2010 plan. Numbers adjusted for inflation.

Hospital in High Occupancy Structures Hospitals are considered the responsibility of the County of Los Angeles. The City of Los Angeles does not have jurisdiction over hospitals located in the City; however, the City does have a mutual understanding with the County that victims can be treated at these facilities. Specific asset value information related to hospitals may be available in the County of Los Angeles Hazard Mitigation Plan. Critical Infrastructure Located in High Occupancy Buildings - Asset Values There are no Critical Infrastructure Facilities located in High Occupancy Structures. Q.3 Analysis of Future Development According the data compiled by the Emporis Company, there are currently (December 2010) a total of 58 high rise buildings proposed for construction in the City of Los Angeles, and 2 under construction. These 14 structures represent an increase of approximately 12% in the total number of high rise structures in the City. Given the small number and distribution of proposed/under construction high rise structures, these additional structures are not considered to constitute a significant increase in the High Occupancy Building Fire Hazard.

R. PROFILE OF RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT HAZARD

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has indicated that radiological accidents can occur wherever radioactive materials are used, stored or transported. In addition, nuclear power plants, hospitals, universities, research laboratories, industries, major highways, railroads and shipping yards could be the site of a radiological accident. Although frequently considered a type of hazardous material, a radiological accident requires specific and unique responses. The 2002 edition of the Merriam Webster Medical Dictionary describes radiological as, of or 222

relating to especially nuclear radiation: producing or capable of producing casualties by nuclear radiation.

R.1 Identifying Radiological Incident/Accident Hazard

The primary radiological threat to the Los Angeles Community is from the transportation of radiological material and proximity to facilities that produce radiation. In this risk analysis, radiological Incident excludes emergency planning efforts required for individual who are licensed to possess radioactive material. There are instances of radioactive materials being transported through the City of Los Angeles daily. This includes transportation because of medical reasons or transportation because for scientific reasons. The commercial nuclear power facility that could pose a radiological hazard in the City of Los Angeles is the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant (SONGS), which is a 3-unit site located approximately 10 miles south of San Clemente, California. Although spills are not a frequent occurrence, the City of Los Angeles has experienced such events. In January 2000, the City experienced a radioactive spill at Eagle Rock, California. That event caused the early morning closure of the Glendale Freeway. This transportation incident was caused by a car stalling on the freeway and was struck by at least four other vehicles, one of which was transportation radioactive materials. Regardless of where a person may be in the City, anyone is subject to becoming exposed to a hazard caused by radioactive materials. The production, handling, and transportation of radioactive materials are regulated by the State and Federal government. However, City of Los Angeles agencies, primarily the Fire Department, exercises a significant response role to radiological accidents. R.1.1 Description of Radiological Incident/Accident Hazard The basic hazard associated with radioactive material is the emission of ionizing radiation. Radioactive material, whether naturally occurring or manmade, is unstable and is constantly seeking a stable atomic configuration through a process called radioactive decay. As radioactive material decays to stable, non-radioactive material, or to other types of radioactive material, ionizing radiation is emitted. This ionizing radiation is emitted in either particle or electromagnetic waveform. The four basic types of radiation of concern are: alpha radiation (particles), beta radiation (particles), gamma radiation (electromagnetic waves), and neutron radiation (particles). Alpha Radiation. Alpha radiation is composed of positively charged particles. Each particle is composed of two neutrons and two protons, making an alpha particle identical to the nucleus of a helium atom (2 He). Alpha 4 radiation is less penetrating than either beta or gamma radiation and may be completely stopped by a sheet of paper. Alpha radiation is not a hazard external to the body, but becomes a hazard if the alpha-emitting radioactive material gets inside the body. Beta Radiation. Beta radiation is composed of negatively charged particles. Each particle is identical to an electron (-1 e). Beta radiation is more penetrating than alpha, but less 223

penetrating than gamma radiation and may be completely stopped by a thin sheet of metal such as aluminum. Beta radiation is an external hazard to the skin of the body and to the eyes, and is also an internal hazard if the beta-emitting radioactive material gets inside the body. Gamma Radiation. Gamma radiation is high energy, short wavelength electromagnetic radiation, frequently accompanying alpha and beta radiation. Gamma radiation is much more penetrating than either alpha or beta radiation because of its wave form. Gamma is similar in form and energy to K-radiation. Gamma radiation is not entirely stopped by materials but can be almost completely attenuated by dense materials like lead or depleted uranium, and with greater thicknesses of materials such as water or concrete. Because of its penetrating power, gamma radiation is a hazard to the entire body, whether or not the gamma emitting radioactive material is inside or outside the body. Neutron Radiation. Neutron radiation is composed of particles with no electrical charge (1 n). Neutron radiation is less penetrating than gamma radiation, but more completely stopped by an appropriate thickness of a hydrogenous material like water or concrete. Neutron radiation has the unique property of being able to convert non-radioactive material to radioactive material. Neutrons are external hazards. They are emitted by machines such as nuclear reactors. They could be an internal hazard if a source emitting neutrons enters the body. Radiological materials have many uses and serve very important purposes in our country. Some of their most common uses include: Use by doctors to detect and treat serious diseases. Use by educational institutions and companies for research. Use by the military to power large ships and submarines. Use by companies in the manufacture of products. Use as a critical base material to help produce the commercial electrical power that is generated by a nuclear power plant. Use as one of the critical components in nuclear weapons, which are relied upon to help deter the threat of war. Under extreme circumstances an accident or intentional explosion involving radiological materials can cause very serious problems. Consequences may include death, severe health risks to the public, damage to the environment, and extraordinary loss of, or damage to, property.

R.2 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment

Through extensive research of available records, documents and electronic databases, the number of radioactive accidents occurrences in the City of Los Angeles in the past ten years is very small, almost non-existent. While there are many sites within the City where relatively small amounts of radioactive materials are used or stored, there are no major known radioactive material production or storage facilities in the City. However, with more than 160 miles of freeways and 1,400 miles of major and secondary roadways in the City of Los Angeles, 224

it is reasonable to expect that radiological incidents are likely to occur again in the future. (See Figure I.1) The greatest potential for accident or incident involving radioactive materials is related to transport. Due to the widespread use of radioactive materials in medical and industrial processes, an accident involving a transport of radioactive materials could occur at almost any location on the 6,000 mile street network of the City of Los Angeles. However, the transport of radioactive materials for these purposes involves relatively small amounts. Regional transportation facilities, specifically including major highways, railways, airports and ports, are the most likely locations for accidents involving large quantities of radioactive materials. These regional facilities transport materials passing through the region, as well as materials originating at or destined to locations within the City. R.2.1 Identifying Assets All assets of the City of Los Angeles, including Critical Response Facilities, Critical Infrastructure, and Critical Operating Facilities are potential locations for an incident or accident involving radioactive materials. R.2.2 Estimating Potential Loss Because of its nature, a radiological release is unlikely to cause structural damage or damage to the contents of facilities. In the unlikely event of a release the limited potential losses might include water, medical supplies or food stuff which could become exposed to radiation. The most likely exposure would be from Gamma radiation. The threat of exposure from either Alpha or Beta radiation is much lower because of the relative ease with which their rays can be blocked. Therefore, the City does not have access to the asset values of these commodities and cannot assess potential losses that individuals might incur from radiation exposure. However, the importance of early detection, warning and mitigation cannot be over emphasized because the impact of Gamma exposure on human life can be critical if detection and warning are delayed. Radiological incidents can also occur in or near privately owned industrial facilities that contain critical products; however, the City does not have jurisdiction to obtain the asset values to estimate the potential financial losses they may incur.

R.3 Analysis of Future Development

The Los Angeles Fire Department have a hazardous materials unit that requires hazardous material business plans of all public and private facilities that contain reportable amounts of hazardous materials on site. As more radiological incidents occur the Fire Department will be able to track the incidents and provide early warning to potentially exposed populations as well as more guidance on critical route designations. The LAFD maintains a database on the occurrence of transportation incidents and incidents at public and private facilities. That information is obtainable to authorized personnel should it be required. However, because of the threat of terrorism, such information is confidential and will not be published in this Plan. 225

SECTION V HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGY AND PROJECT SUMMARY

Over the past 50 years the City of Los Angeles has experienced a large number of serious emergency and disaster situations including fires, floods, earthquakes, severe weather, and civil unrest, among others. As a result, the City and its constituent departments have deployed aggressive programs to mitigate the effects of hazards and disasters for many years. In addition to the efforts of individual departments, the City has developed an organizational structure designed to coordinate the activities of the individual departments in hazard mitigation and emergency response efforts. These efforts predate the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Appendix E of the LHMP contains a comprehensive set of more than 400 hazard mitigation projects and programs designed to reduce the risks associated with the 17 hazard categories identified in the Plan. Each hazard identified in Section IV of the Plan has a corresponding mitigation section in Appendix E (with Section A designated for those projects classified as all hazards). Taken together, the existing/ongoing projects along with the new proposed projects constitute a comprehensive set of measures designed to reduce the potential losses identified in the Risk Assessment (Section IV) of the Plan. Mitigation measures include a broad range of approaches to hazard mitigation including retrofit/relocation, code enforcement, development of new regulations, public education, surveillance and security, development of redundant facilities, among others. Measures are included to mitigate risks to existing buildings and infrastructure, as well as new buildings and infrastructure. Each project description identifies the specific goal(s) and objective(s) addressed by the measure. All City departments are to determine mitigation efforts to reduce hazard risk for all existing building and infrastructure. Department should submit the specific mitigation strategies as projects to EMD. In addition, when City departments are in the design and development phases of new buildings and infrastructure, departments are to consider the potential effects of the hazards outlined in the Plan. Departments should take into account how to address mitigation strategies into the development or construction phases.

A) PRIORITIZATION OF PROJECTS
New proposed projects in the Plan are prioritized by the implementing agency for several reasons. First, because agencies already have ongoing hazard mitigation programs, new projects can be most efficiently folded into ongoing programs. This assures continuity in project delivery. Secondly, it is anticipated that new projects will be funded from a wide variety of funding sources in addition to Federal Hazard Mitigation Grants. Lastly, some City departments are quasi-independent, proprietary departments (Airport and Harbor Department, Department of Water and Power) with their own revenue streams, boards of directors, etc. Each implementing agency prioritized proposed new projects based upon a number of factors including: the five goals in support of the Plans mission; the availability of funding; the relative cost-effectiveness of the project compared to alternatives; the extent to which the proposed 228

project complements existing programs, and/or fill gaps in existing programs; the extent to which the project addresses the risks assessed in Section IV; and finally, the potential of economic and social damage. Instructions on how to prioritize projects are included at the beginning of each section of Appendix E. In addition to prioritization, these instructions also include detailed instructions on how to submit new projects, amend/revise existing projects and remove projects as necessary. To prioritize projects, departments took into account costs, potential benefits, and potential funding opportunities. The City's process for developing mitigation proposals includes some degree of cost benefit analysis, depending on the type of project and the source of potential project funds. Finally, based on the implementing agencys specific prioritizing goals, each project is assigned a priority level of High, Medium or Low.

B) IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF MITIGATION ACTIONS

As previously stated in Section II, Subsection C, individual agencies will be responsible for implementing specific mitigation projects. The responsible agency, existing and potential resources, and implementation time frame are specified for each proposed and existing/ongoing mitigation action in the project description. The LHMP Task Force is responsible for monitoring Plan implementation, and for ensuring that Mitigation Actions implemented by individual departments are implemented according to schedule. The Plan will be updated annually in beginning in July with project submissions/updates due to the Emergency Management Department no later than the last business day of August. The project submissions and amendments shall be added to the LHMP no later than the last business day of September annually. Each project listed in Appendix E shall be reviewed annually by the respective submitting department/agency. As such, each department/agency shall update the status of the project to accurately reflect the current status. Under the identified schedule of each project, the department/agency shall identify an intended completion date. If this date is unable to be met, the department/agency shall update appropriately and give an explanation as to any reason the scheduled completion date must be extended or deferred.

C) PROJECT FUNDING
The funds required to implement the mitigation action plan will come from a variety of sources including: Federal Hazard Mitigation Grants, City budget, bond proceeds, other Federal grants (HUD, FAA, etc.), special fees and assessments, user fees, and permit fees. For those projects submitted to the Federal government for grant funding, the City is prepared to elaborate on project benefits and costs using FEMA's Benefit/Cost Toolkit. Some projects are (or will be) included in agency capital improvement budgets, while some, especially ongoing projects, are included in agency operating budgets. 229

D) PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
The following information is found in each hazard subsection and is provided for each project: Project Number Project Title Project Description Cost (if known) Project Schedule (start and end dates) Responsible Agency (lead agencies) Financing (source of funding) Goals Addressed Hazards Addressed Contact Person/Information Each project is identified with a unique alphanumeric designation which identifies the hazard addressed and the responsible department. The abbreviations used to identify responsible agencies and hazard codes are listed in the table below, including a table referencing the field names and definitions. Agency Designators DOT Department of Transportation EMD Emergency Management Department LAFD Fire Department LAPD Police Department DWP Department of Water and Power DPW Department of Public Works LAWA Los Angeles World Airports HAR Harbor Department, Port of LA LADBS Department of Building and Safety GSD General Services Department LAHD Housing Department ITA Information Technology Agency DAG Department of Aging DAS Department of Animal Services DDS Department on Disability PL City Planning Department

230

Code AH BF CI CU DR DT EQ FL HO HZ LM PH RD SE SW TE TR TS

Hazard Name All Hazard Brush Fire Critical Infrastructure Interruption Civil Unrest Dam Failure Drought Earthquake Flood High Rise/High Occupancy Fire Hazardous Materials Incident Landslide/Mudslide/Debris Flow Public Health Issues Radiological Incident/Accident Special Events Severe Weather Terrorism Transportation Tsunami

Field Name Project Priority

Mitigation Strategy Projects Definition High Medium Low TBD = Priority level to be determined later Pending = Project submitted but no scheduled start date Ongoing = Project is in progress or is a continuous ongoing project Suspended = Project is temporarily suspended Withdrawn = Project has been withdrawn by submitting agency/department Completed = Project is completed TBD = Status information to be determined later $ = estimated cost in dollars currently funded [$] = estimated cost in dollars not funded FTE = Full Time Equivalent staff currently funded [FTE] = Full Time Equivalent staff not funded TBD = Cost information to be determined later 231

Project Status

Cost

E) MITIGATION PROJECT SUMMARY

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-DWP-06 AH-DWP-10 AH-DWP-11 AH-DWP-12 AH-DWP-13 AH-DWP-14 AH-DWP-15 AH-DWP-16 AH-DWP-17 AH-DWP-20 AH-DWP-21 AH-DWP-22 AH-DWP-23 AH-DWP-24 AH-DWP-25

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism
X X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X

X X X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X

X
X X

232

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-DWP-26 AH-DWP-27 AH-DWP-28 AH-DWP-29 AH-DWP-30 AH-DWP-31 AH-DWP-32 AH-DWP-33 AH-DWP-34 AH-DWP-36 AH-DWP-37 AH-DWP-38 AH-DWP-39 AH-DWP-41 AH-DWP-42

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism
X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X

X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X X X X X

X X X

X X X X X

X X

X X X X X X

X X

X X

X X X X X X X

X X

X X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X X X

X X X X X

233

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-DWP-43 AH-DWP-44 AH-DWP-45 AH-DWP-47 AH-DWP-48 AH-DWP-01 AH-DWP-03 AH-DDS-03 AH-DDS-04 AH-DDS-05 AH-DDS-06 AH-DDS-01 AH-DDS-02 AH-LAWA-01 AH-LADBS-01

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X X X X X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X

234

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-LADBS-02 AH-LADBS-03 AH-LADBS-04 AH-LADBS-05 AH-LADBS-06 AH-LADBS-07 AH-EMD-01 AH-EMD-02 AH-EMD-03 AH-EMD-04 AH-EMD-06 AH-EMD-09 AH-EMD-10 AH-EMD-11 AH-LAFD-01

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

235

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-LAFD-02 AH-LAFD-03 AH-LAFD-04 AH-LAFD-05 AH-LAFD-06 AH-LAFD-07 AH-LAFD-08 AH-ITA-01 AH-ITA-02 AH-ITA-03 AH-ITA-04 AH-ITA-05 AH-ITA-06 AH-ITA-07 AH-ITA-08

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

236

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

AH-ITA-09 AH-ITA-10 AH-ITA-11 AH-ITA-12 AH-ITA-13 AH-LAPD-01 AH-DPW-03 AH-DWP-49 AH-DDS-07 AH-DDS-08 AH-HAR-01 AH-HAR-02 AH-HAR-03 AH-DAS-07 EQ-LAWA-03

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X X X X X X X X X X P

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X

237

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

EQ-LAWA-02 EQ-LADBS-01 EQ-LADBS-03 EQ-LADBS-04 EQ-LADBS-05 EQ-LADBS-06 EQ-LADBS-07 EQ-LADBS-08 EQ-LADBS-09 EQ-LADBS-10 EQ-LADBS-11 EQ-LADBS-12 EQ-LADBS-13 EQ-LADBS-14 EQ-EMD-01

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

238

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

EQ-LAFD-03 EQ-LAFD-01 EQ-LAFD-02 EQ-DPW-06 EQ-DPW-07 EQ-DPW-08 EQ-DPW-09 EQ-DPW-10 EQ-DPW-11 EQ-DPW-12 EQ-DPW-14 EQ-DPW-15 EQ-DPW-16 EQ-DPW-19 EQ-DPW-22

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

239

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

EQ-DPW-27 EQ-DPW-28 EQ-DPW-29 EQ-DPW-30 EQ-DPW-13 EQ-DPW-17 EQ-HAR-03 EQ-HAR-04 EQ-HAR-06 EQ-LAHD-08 EQ-LAHD-09 EQ-LAHD-10 EQ-LAHD-11 EQ-LAHD-12 EQ-LAHD-14

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

240

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

EQ-LAHD-15 EQ-LAHD-16 EQ-LAHD-17 EQ-LAHD-18 EQ-LAHD-01 EQ-LAHD-02 EQ-LAHD-03 EQ-LAHD-04 EQ-LAHD-05 EQ-LAHD-06 EQ-LAHD-07 EQ-GSD-06 EQ-HAR-08 EQ-HAR-09 EQ-HAR-10

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

241

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

TE-DWP-20 TE-LAWA-11 TE-LAWA-12 TE-LAFD-01 TE-LAPD-03 TE-LAPD-04 TE-LAPD-11 TE-LAPD-12 TE-LAPD-17 TE-LAPD-20 TE-LAPD-21 TE-LAPD-22 TE-LAPD-01 TE-LAPD-02 TE-LAPD-05

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X X X

X X X X X

X X

X X

242

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

TE-LAPD-06 TE-LAPD-07 TE-LAPD-08 TE-LAPD-09 TE-LAPD-10 TE-LAPD-13 TE-LAPD-14 TE-LAPD-15 TE-LAPD-16 TE-LAPD-18 TE-LAPD-19 TE-LAPD-23 TE-DPW-05 TE-DPW-06 TE-DPW-07

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

243

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

TE-DPW-08 TE-DPW-09 TE-HAR-03 TE-HAR-05 TE-HAR-10 TE-HAR-12 TE-HAR-13 TE-HAR-14 TE-HAR-15 TE-HAR-16 TE-HAR-17 TE-HAR-18 TE-HAR-19 TE-HAR-20 TE-HAR-21

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

244

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

TE-HAR-22 TE-HAR-23 TE-HAR-24 TE-HAR-25 BF-LADBS-01 BF-LADBS-02 BF-LADBS-03 BF-LAFD-01 BF-LAFD-13 BF-LAFD-07 BF-LAFD-08 BF-LAFD-15 BF-LAPD-01 BF-LAPD-02 BF-LAPD-03

Project

Brush Fire P P P P P P P P P P P

Terrorism P P P P

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

245

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

BF-DPW-01 BF-DPW-02 BF-DPW-03 BF-DPW-04 BF-DPW-05 BF-LAHD-01 BF-LAHD-02 BF-LAHD-03 BF-LAHD-04 BF-LAHD-05 BF-LAHD-06 BF-LAHD-07 FL-DDS-01 FL-DDS-02 FL-LADBS-01

Project

Brush Fire P P P P P P P P P P P P

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P P

246

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

FL-LADBS-02 FL-LADBS-03 FL-LADBS-04 FL-EMD-01 FL-LAFD-01 FL-LAFD-02 FL-LAFD-03 FL-LAFD-04 FL-DPW-46 FL-DPW-47 FL-DPW-01 FL-DPW-02 FL-DPW-03 FL-DPW-04 FL-DPW-05

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

247

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

FL-DPW-06 FL-DPW-08 FL-DPW-09 FL-DPW-10 FL-DPW-11 FL-DPW-12 FL-DPW-13 FL-DPW-14 FL-DPW-15 FL-DPW-17 FL-DPW-19 FL-DPW-20 FL-DPW-21 FL-DPW-22 FL-DPW-23

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

248

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

FL-DPW-24 FL-DPW-25 FL-DPW-26 FL-DPW-27 FL-DPW-28 FL-DPW-29 FL-DPW-30 FL-DPW-31 FL-DPW-33 FL-DPW-34 FL-DPW-35 FL-DPW-36 FL-DPW-37 FL-DPW-38 FL-DPW-39

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

249

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

FL-DPW-40 FL-DPW-41 FL-DPW-42 FL-DPW-43 FL-DPW-44 FL-DPW-45 FL-DPW-46 FL-DPW-47 FL-HAR-01 FL-HAR-02 FL-HAR-03 FL-PL-40 FL- DPW-49 FL-DDS-03 FL-DDS-04

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

250

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

FL-DDS-05 FL-HAR-04 PH-DWP-20 PH-LADBS-01 PH-LADBS-02 PH-LAFD-04 PH-LAFD-01 PH-LAFD-02 PH-LAPD-02 PH-LAPD-01 PH-LAPD-03 PH-DPW-01 PH-DPW-02 PH-DPW-03 PH-DPW-04

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood P P

P P P P P P P P P P P P P

251

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

PH-DPW-05 PH-DPW-06 PH-DPW-07 HZ-DAS-01 HZ-LADBS-01 HZ-LADBS-02 HZ-LADBS-03 HZ-LAFD-01 HZ-LAFD-02 HZ-LAFD-03 HZ-LAFD-04 HZ-LAFD-05 HZ-LAPD-01 HZ-LAPD-02 HZ-LAPD-03

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

X X X

X X

252

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

HZ-LAPD-04 HZ-LAPD-05 HZ-LAPD-07 HZ-DPW-01 HZ-DPW-02 HZ-DPW-03 HZ-DPW-05 HZ-DPW-06 HZ-HAR-02 CU-LAFD-01 CU-LAPD-01 CU-LAPD-02 CU-LAPD-10 CU-LAPD-11 CU-LAPD-03

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X X X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P X X X

253

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

CU-LAPD-04 CU-LAPD-05 CU-LAPD-06 CU-LAPD-07 CU-LAPD-08 CU-LAPD-09 CU-LAPD-12 CU-LAPD-13 TR-HAR-01 TR-HAR-02 DT-LADBS-01 DT-LADBS-02 SE-LADBS-01 SE-LADBS-02 SE-LAPD-02

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P

X X X X X X X

P P P

254

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

SE-LAPD-03 SE-LAPD-01 SE-LAPD-04 SE-LAPD-05 SE-LAPD-06 SE-LAPD-07 SE-LAPD-08 SW-DAS-01 SW-LADBS-01 SW-LAHD-01 DR-DPW-01 DR-DPW-02 CI-DWP-10 CI-DWP-13 CI-DWP-17

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

255

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Health Issues Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident High Rise Fire

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

CI-DWP-18 CI-LAPD-01 CI-LAPD-02 CI-DPW-07 CI-DPW-02 CI-DPW-05 CI-DPW-06 CI-DPW-08 CI-DPW-09 TS-LADBS-01 TS-LADBS-02 TS-EMD-02 TS-EMD-03 TS-EMD-06 TS-LAFD-01

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood X X

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

256

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

TS-DPW-01 TS-HAR-03 LM-LADBS-02 LM-LADBS-01 LM-LAFD-01 LM-LAFD-02 LM-LAFD-03 LM-HAR-01 LM-HAR-02 HO-LADBS-01 HO-LADBS-02 HO-LADBS-03 HO-LADBS-04 HO-LADBS-05 HO-LADBS-06

Project

Brush Fire

Terrorism

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

257

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes) High Risk Hazards Hazardous Materials Transportation Moderate Risk Hazards Critical Infrastructure Interruption Severe Weather Special Events Low Risk Hazards Radiological Incident/Accident

High Rise Fire

Health Issues

Dam Failure

Landslide/ Debris Flow

Earthquake

Civil Unrest

HO-LADBS-07 HO-LAFD-01 HO-LAFD-02 HO-LAFD-03 HO-LAFD-04 HO-LAHD-01 HO-LAHD-02 RD-LAPD-06 RD-LAPD-07 RD-LAPD-10 RD-LAPD-01 RD-LAPD-02 RD-LAPD-03 RD-LAPD-05 RD-LAPD-08 RD-LAPD-09

Project

Brush Fire X

Terrorism X X

Tsunami

Drought

Flood

X X

P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P

X X

X X

258

Low Risk Hazards High Rise Fire Landslide/ Debris Flow Tsunami Critical Infrastructure Interruption Dam Failure Severe Weather Special Events Drought Transportation Civil Unrest 259 FL-DPW-50 FL-DPW-51 Project P P Moderate Risk Hazards High Risk Hazards Health Issues Flood Brush Fire Terrorism Earthquake Hazardous Materials

Radiological Incident/Accident

P = Projects Primary risk X = Additional related risks (All Hazard projects will not have a P and will only have an X in all associated boxes)