Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DISCLAIMER
Pershing Square Capital Management's ("Pershing") analysis and conclusions regarding McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") are based on publicly available information. Pershing recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Company and its advisors that could lead them to disagree with the approach Pershing is advocating. The analyses provided include certain estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the Company. Such statements, estimates, and projections reflect various assumptions by Pershing concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative purposes. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Actual results may vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Pershing manages funds that are in the business of trading - buying and selling - public securities. It is possible that there will be developments in the future that cause Pershing to change its position regarding the Company and possibly reduce, dispose of, or change the form of its investment in the Company. Pershing recognizes that the Company has a stock market capitalization of approximately $42bn, and that, accordingly it could be more difficult to exert influence over its Board than has been the case with smaller companies.
1
Table of Contents
Overview of McDonald's Pershings View of McDonald's Pershings Proposal to McDonald's: McOpCo IPO Company Response to Pershing Developing a Response to the Company Appendix A. Pershings Proposal: Assumptions B. PF McDonald's Financial Analysis C. McOpCo Financial Analysis
3 11 23 39 43 58 59 66 74
I. Overview of McDonald's
I.
Overview of McDonalds
On September 22nd, Pershing Square Capital Management (Pershing) presented a proposal for increasing shareholder value (the Proposal) to McDonalds management Pershing commends McDonalds management for its strong operational execution over the past two years Pershing appreciates the willingness and openness of McDonalds management to discuss the Proposal Management has taken our Proposal seriously our Proposal was presented to McDonalds Board of Directors Pershing had a follow-up meeting with McDonalds management on October 31 when the Company communicated its response to our Proposal Pershing is pleased to have the opportunity to share the details of our Proposal with the broader investment community
I.
Overview of McDonalds
Review of McDonalds
Worlds largest foodservice franchisor and retailer $42 billion equity market value $55 billion in estimated system wide sales 32,000 system wide restaurants, globally Serves 50 million customers daily in 119 countries Everyday 1 out of 14 Americans eats at a McDonalds One of the worlds most recognized brands Consistently named in the top 10 global brands along with Coke and Disney One of the largest retail property owners in the world Estimated owned and controlled real estate market value of $46 billion (1) Estimated 18,000 restaurants where McDonalds owns land and/or building Significant free cash flow business
I.
Overview of McDonalds
Following declines in same-store sales and profitability in 2001 and 2002, Management has improved operations through product innovation, capital discipline and strong execution. As a result, the Companys profitability has increased.
(1)
30.0%
Revenue / EBITDA
$15,000
$10,000
27.0%
25.5%
24.0%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
0.6%
(1.3%)
EBITDA
(2.1%)
Revenue
6
2.4%
EBITDA Margin
6.9%
I.
Overview of McDonalds
As a result of the Companys improved capital allocation, pre-tax unlevered free cash flow has increased from a five-year low of $2.0 billion in 2002 to $3.5 billion in 2004.
Historical Pre-Tax Unlevered Free Cash Flow(1) Performance
($ in millions)
$4,000 $3,483 $3,205 26%
$2,000
$2,199
$2,134
$1,994
18.7%
18.3%
18%
$1,000
15.4%
14.4% 12.9%
14%
$0 2000A 2000 2001A 2001 EBITDA CapEx 2002A 2002 2003A 2003 Margin % 2004A 2004
10%
_______________________________________________ (1)
Denotes Adjusted EBITDA CapEx. Adjusted EBITDA is adjusted for certain non-recurring and non-cash expenses.
7
I.
Overview of McDonalds
Although McDonald's stock has rebounded from its 2003 lows, it has been range bound in the low $30s for the past five years and is significantly off of its high of $48 per share reached in 1999.
$50.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00 11/12/99
07/12/00
03/12/01
11/10/01
07/11/02
03/11/03
11/09/03
07/09/04
03/09/05
11/07/05
I.
Overview of McDonalds
Over the past five years, McDonalds has only slightly outperformed the S&P 500 while its QSR peer group has vastly outperformed the index.
McDonald's 2.4% S&P 500 (9.6%) QSR Index 177.3%
QSR
MCD S&P
06/01/01
12/21/01
07/12/02
01/31/03
10/01/04
04/22/05
11/11/05
McDonald's
________________________________________________ (1) Includes YUM and WEN.
I.
Overview of McDonalds
Despite McDonalds strong real estate assets, number one QSR market position and leading brand, McDonalds trades at a discount to its peers. We believe this discount is due to a fundamental misconception about McDonalds business.
EV / 06E EBITDA
10.0x 9.5x 9.0x 8.5x 8.0x 7.5x 30-Day Average Trailing
(1)
W EN
YUM
P / 06E EPS
2 5 .0 x 2 0 .4 x 2 0 .0 x 1 5 .6 x 1 5 .0 x 1 0 .0 x 5 .0 x 0 .0 x 3 0 -D a y A v e ra g e T ra ilin g
(1 )
1 6 .7 x
W EN
YUM
9%
12%
12%
II.
Franchisees
Franchise Fee: 4% of restaurant sales Rent: greater of a minimum rent or a percentage of restaurant sales (current avg. ~9% of sales) Franchisee bears all maintenance capital costs
(1)
Illustrative return based on Pershings assumptions for the cost of land and building and approximate average unit sales in 2004. 12
II.
McOpCo
Landlord
McDonalds controls substantially all of its systemwide real estate Estimated 11,700 restaurants where McDonalds owns both the land and buildings and 7,000 restaurants where McDonalds owns only the buildings (1) Estimated $1.3 billion of income generated from subleases Estimated real estate value: $46 billion or ~94% of current Enterprise Value (2)
________________________________________________
Franchisor
Approximately 32,000 restaurants where McDonalds receives 4% of unit sales
Restaurant Operator
Approximately 9,000 Companyoperated restaurants
Reported financials have overstated margins due to a lack of transfer pricing Currently not charged a franchise fee Currently not charged a market rent
(1) (2)
Assumes that McDonalds owns the land and buildings of 37% of its system wide units and owns the buildings of 22% of its system wide units. Valuation based on Pershing estimates. See page 64 for more detail on real estate valuation. 13
II.
McOpCo
Landlord
Maintenance Capital Requirements: Risk Profile Minimal Triple net leases Very Stable / Minimal Risk Generates the greater of a minimum rent or a % of sales (current average ~ 9%) 70%90% Margins Some real estate development expenses Minimal: 5.75%-6.5% Real estate holding companies typical asset beta: ~.40 Hard asset collateral Low
Franchisor
High
Restaurants
Significant maintenance capex Medium Risk High operating leverage Sensitivity to food costs 7%10% Margins (1) High food, paper and labor costs Rent Franchise fee Medium: 8%-9% Mature QSR typical asset beta: ~.80-.90
Limited remodel subsidies as well as corporate capex Stable / Low Risk Low operating leverage Diverse and global customer base 30%50% Margins
________________________________________________
Low: 6.5%-7.5% Choice Hotels, Coke and Pepsi typical asset beta: ~.50-.60 Highly leveragable
(1) (2)
Typical margins are illustrative restaurant EBITDA margins and assume the payment of a market rent and franchisee fee, similar to a franchisee. Typical betas are Pershing approximations based on selected companies Barra predictive betas. Average cost of capital estimates are illustrative estimates based on average asset betas. 14
II.
In 2004, McDonalds company-operated restaurants appeared to contribute 46% of total EBITDA. However, once adjusted for a franchise fee and a market rent fee, McOpCo constituted only 22% of total EBITDA, with the higher multiple Real Estate and Franchise businesses contributing 78% of total EBITDA.
2004 Total EBITDA Adjusted for Market Rent and Franchise Fees
46% 54%
McOpCo
22%
McOpCo
55%
78%
Real Estate and Franchise
2004 EBITDA $2.4bn 2.8bn $5.2bn % 46% 54% 100%
________________________________________________
Note: The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to the Real Estate and Franchise business and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. McDonalds management has indicated this is a conservative assumption regarding the Real Estate and Franchise business. Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses. . 15
II.
Once adjusted for market rent and franchise fees, McOpCo would be contributing only 14% of total EBITDA-Maintenance Capex, with the Real Estate and Franchise business contributing 86% of total EBITDA-Maintenance Capex ,based on FY 2005E projections.
2005E Total EBITDA Capex As Reported
Real Estate and Franchise McOpCo
2005E Total EBITDA Capex Adjusted for Market Rent and Franchise Fees
Real Estate and Franchise McOpCo
14%
53%
47% 86%
'05 EBITDAMaint. Capex $1.9bn 2.2bn $4.1bn '05 EBITDAMaint. Capex $0.6bn 3.5bn $4.1bn
________________________________________________
The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to the Real Estate and Franchise business and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. McDonalds management has indicated this is a conservative assumption regarding the real estate and franchise business. In addition, we note that 2005E maintenance capex includes certain one-time capital expenditures related to systemwide remodeling program. Please see appendix for full reconciliation .
16
II.
Set forth below is a table which reconciles McOpCos, the Real Estate and Franchise businesses and stand-alone McDonalds FY 2004A income statements, assuming McOpCo pays a market rent and franchise fee. The analysis demonstrates that the Real Estate and Franchise business contributed approximately 78% of total EBITDA.
(U.S. $ in millions) 2004 Income Statement Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Rent From Company Operated Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Company Operated Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Non-Rent Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Company-Operated Rent Expense Additional Rent Payable to PropCo Franchise Fee Payable to FranCo Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA % of Total EBITDA
________________________________________________
Real Estate and Franchise P&L 3,336 1,280 1,505 569 $6,690 347 583 $930 576 427 1,485 3,272 774 $4,046 78%
Inter-Company Eliminations
2004 Consolidated Sum of Parts $14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,164 774 583 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,164 774 583 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 4,853 3,726 2,164 427 583 697 569 $13,019 495 710 427 $1,137 22%
$0
The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to the Real Estate and Franchise business and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. McDonalds management has indicated this is a conservative assumption regarding the real estate and franchise business. Note: Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses. 17
II.
Assuming 75% of G&A is allocated to the Real Estate and Franchise business, an allocation that McDonalds management indicates is conservative, we indicate below the EBITDA for McOpCo and the Real Estate and Franchise businesses, as depicted in the reported financials. We note that McOpCo has historically appeared to contribute approximately ~45% of consolidated EBITDA.
McDonalds Consolidated EBITDA
($ in millions)
$6.0 $5.0 $4.0 $3.0 $2.0 $1.0 $0.0
$5,183 $4,144 $1,995 $4,041 $1,893 $3,997 $1,841 $4,512 $2,072 $2,403
McOpCo
~45%
$2,780
$2,149 2000
$2,148 2001
$2,156 2002
Real Estate and Franchise McOpCo
$2,440
~55%
2003 2004
________________________________________________
Assumes McOpCo G&A to be 25% of consolidated G&A and Real Estate and Franchise G&A to be 75% of consolidated G&A. Management has indicated this is a conservative assumption regarding the Real Estate and Franchise business.
18
II.
Historical EBITDA by Business Type: Adjusted for a Market Rent and Franchise Fee
Despite an economic recession in 2001-2003, significant dips in McDonalds system wide samestore sales growth and declines in McDonalds stock prices, the Real Estate and Franchise business has grown every year over the last five years.
McDonalds Consolidated EBITDA ($ in millions)
$6.000 $5.000 $4.000 $3.000 $2.000 $1.000 $0.000 Real Estate and Franchise McOpCo
$4,144 $1,006
$3,138
$3,142
$3,169
$3,568
$4,046
2000
Samestore sales McOpCo Growth 0.6% (1.1%)
2001
2002
2003
2004
Notes: Assumes McOpCo G&A to be 25% of consolidated G&A and Real Estate and Franchise G&A to be 75% of consolidated G&A. Assumes McOpCo pays franchise fees of 4% of sales and rent of 9% of sales. 19
II.
$0.7 $2.1
$0.7 $2.5
$0.8
$0.8
$1.0
$1.0
$1.0
$0.9
$0.8
$0.9
$1.1
McOpCo
$2.6
$2.7
$2.9
$3.2
$3.1
$3.1
$3.2
$3.6
$4.0
1994
17.0%
1995
14.1%
1996
3.6%
1997
6.3%
1998
18.0%
1999
5.1%
2000
(1.1%)
2001
(10.6%)
2002
(7.9%)
2003
14.0%
2004
20.4%
McOpCo EBITDA Growth Real Estate & Franchise EBITDA Growth: Change in Year-End Stock Price: (15.6%)
4.9%
11.7%
8.5%
10.4%
15.3%
4.0%
4.3%
10.1%
7.4%
(0.5%)
0.1%
0.9%
12.6%
13.4%
30.5%
28.3%
16.9%
2.6%
54.3%
0.6%
5.2%
60.9%
5.0%
(15.7%)
(22.1%)
(39.3%)
54.4%
29.1%
________________________________________________
Notes: Assumes McOpCo G&A to be 25% of consolidated G&A and Real Estate and Franchise G&A to be 75% of consolidated G&A. Assumes McOpCo pays franchise fees of 4% of sales and rent of 9% of sales. 20
II.
McDonalds did not historically operate restaurants The Company initially entered the business of operating restaurants only as a defensive measure
Limited number of restaurants The idea emerged that we should operate a base of ten or so stores as a company. This would give us a firm base of income in the event the McDonald brothers claimed default on our contract (1) --Ray Kroc / Founder
Turner realized in the mid 70s that owning too many McOpCo units was not in the best interest of the Company
________________________________________________
(1) (2)
From Grinding It Out: The Making of McDonalds, p. 108. From McDonalds: Behind the Golden Arches, pgs. 288 - 291.
21
II.
Running a McDonalds is a 363-day-a-year business and an owner/operator, with his personal interests and incentives, can inherently do a better job than a chain manager. (1)
--Fred Turner / Former President and CEO
Illustrative Characteristics of Company Operated versus Franchisee Operated Restaurants (2)
Company Operated
Structure Taxes Leverage Levered Returns General manager
________________________________________________
Franchisee Operated
C-Corporation Corporate level tax 10% - 30% Low teens Salaried employee/ corporate manager
22
LLC / Partnership No corporate level tax 75% - 90% 40% and higher Owner / Entrepreneur
(1) (2)
From McDonalds: Behind the Golden Arches, pgs. 288 - 291. Illustrative leverage and equity return figures. Not based on company data.
Step 1: IPO of 65% McOpCo IPO 65% of McOpCo IPO generates estimated $3.27bn of after tax proceeds Assumes a 7x EV/FY06E EBITDA multiple Assumes $1.35 bn of Net Debt allocated to McOpCo
Step 2: Issue Debt and Pursue Leveraged Self Tender Issue $14.7bn of financing secured against PF McDonalds real estate Debt financing and IPO proceeds used to Refinance all of the existing $5 bn of net debt at Pro Forma McDonalds Repurchase 316mm shares at $40 per share Pay $300mm in fees and transaction costs
24
Pro Forma
IPO 65%
McOpCo
At the time of IPO, McOpCo signs market lease and franchise agreements with Pro Forma McDonalds (PF McDonalds)
PropCo
FranCo
Resulting Pro Forma McDonalds is a world-class real estate and franchise business McOpCo financials deconsolidated from PF McDonalds Leverage is placed only on PropCo FranCo is unlevered, maximizing its credit rating
25
An IPO of McOpCo would have several positive strategic and financial implications for both Pro Forma McDonalds as well as McOpCo.
Improves operating and financial metrics at every level Significantly improves PF McDonalds EBITDA and free cash flow margins Enhances return on capital and overall capital allocation for the PF McDonalds Improves ability of PF McDonalds to pay significant ongoing dividends
Typical Standalone
$ in millions
Mature QSR
FY 2006E
Revenue EBITDA EBITDA Margin EBITDA-Capex EBITDA-Capex Margin EBITDA-Maintenance Capex EBITDA - Maint. Capex Margin FCF FCF Margin
________________________________________________
15% - 20%
(1)
5% - 10%
We note that CapEx projections are net of proceeds obtained from store closures. (1) Typical QSR margin based on Wall Street estimates for YUM! Brands and Wendys.
An IPO of McOpCo would have several positive strategic and financial implications for both Pro Forma McDonalds as well as McOpCo.
Improves capital structure while maintaining investment grade credit rating Low-cost secured debt to replace current debt or issued incrementally on current structure Cheap CMBS structured financing issued at PropCo could judiciously utilize strong real estate collateral CMBS financing is non-recourse to McDonalds (parent) FranCo remains unlevered and is at least a AA credit PF McDonalds, the holding company, remains investment grade Improves alignment with franchisees
(1)
An IPO of McOpCo would have several positive strategic and financial implications for both McDonalds as well as McOpCo.
Allows for an accelerated McOpCo refranchising program Increases overall size of PF McDonalds investor base
Strong potential to attract both dividend / income-focused investors and real estate-focused investors
29
PF McDonalds operating metrics are much closer to a typical Real Estate C-Corporation or a high branded intellectual property business such as PepsiCo or Coca-Cola than they are a typical mature QSR.
Pro Forma Typical Mature (1) QSR
~15% - 20% ~7.5 % - 12.5% ~10% - 12%
2005E Operating Metrics: EBITDA Margins EBITDA CapEx Margins EPS Growth Trading Multiples Adjusted Enterprise Value CY 2006E EBITDA CY 2006E EBITDA CapEx Price / CY 2006E EPS CY 2006E FCF
(3) (2)
60% 50% 9%
/ ~8.5x - 9.5x ~12x - 15x ~13x - 16x ~17x - 20x 15.1x 16.0x 12.3x 15.5x 12.6x 14.2x
NA ~20x - 25x
24.3x 24.0x
20.1x 20.8x
18.8x 18.9x
1.7x 11%
0.0x 4%
NM 4%
Stock prices as of 11/11/05. Projections based on Wall Street estimates. (1) Typical mature QSR based on YUM! Brands and Wendys. (2) Adjusted for unconsolidated assets. (3) FCF denotes Net Income plus D&A less CapEx.
30
We believe REITs trade in the range of 13x-17x EV/06E EBITDA, depending on the type of real estate and the businesses the properties support.
EV / '06E Company Health Care Industrial Multifamily Office Regional Mall Self Storage Strip Center Triple Net Lease REIT Industry Total / Wtd. Avg. EBITDA 14.7x 16.3x 17.0x 15.2x 16.3x 17.5x 15.5x 13.1x 15.7x
Div. Yield 6.3% 4.2% 4.8% 4.7% 3.8% 3.8% 4.5% 6.4% 4.8%
P / '06E FFO 12.6x 13.9x 16.6x 13.8x 14.2x 16.7x 14.4x 12.8x 14.4x
P / '06E AFFO 13.3x 17.2x 19.4x 19.6x 16.9x 18.3x 16.5x 13.4x 16.8x
________________________________________________ Based on Wall Street research estimates at the time of Pershings initial Proposal to the Company.
31
$ in millions
Based on relevant publicly traded comparable companies, including several real estate holding CCorporations, Pro Forma McDonalds would trade in the range of 12.5x 13.5x EV/CY 06E EBITDA. We believe PF McDonalds would trade at a 37%52% premium over where it trades today.
EV/'06E EBITDA Multiple Range Enterprise Value Less: Net Debt (12/31/05E) Equity Value Ending Shares Outstanding (12/31/05E) (3) Price Per Share Premium to recent price (4)
Implied P/FY 2006 EPS Multiple
19.8x
5.1%
21.9x
4.6%
________________________________________________ (1) Assumes $1.35 bn of net debt allocated (2) (3) (4) (5)
to McOpCo and $5.0 bn of net debt allocated to PF McDonalds. In addition, assumes $9.7 bn of incremental leverage placed on PF McDonalds. Represents 35% of the market equity value of McOpCo. Assumes incremental leverage and the after-tax proceeds from McOpCo IPO (net of fees and expenses) are used to buy back approximately 316 mm shares at an average price of $40. Assumes a recent stock price of $33. P / FY 06E FCF multiple adjusted for Pro Forma McDonalds 35% stake in McOpCo.
32
McOpCo would likely be valued at $6.0 billion to $7.1 billion of equity market value or 6.5x7.5x EV/06E EBITDA.
________________________________________________ (1)
The valuation of PF McDonalds suggests a valuation range of $45$50 per share. Based on the midpoint of the valuation analysis, PF McDonalds could be worth $47.50 per share, a 44% premium over where it trades today.
PF McDonald's Valuation
Low 12.5x $55,799
(1) (2)
EV/'06E EBITDA Multiple Range Enterprise Value Less: Net Debt (12/31/05E) Equity Value Ending Shares Outstanding (12/31/05E) Price Per Share Premium to recent price (4)
Implied P/FY 2006 EPS Multiple
(3)
(5)
19.8x
5.1%
21.9x
4.6%
Memo:Share Buyback: Incremental Debt Issued Less Transaction Fees and Expenses (6) Approximate Cash Received From IPO, after Tax Total Funds Available for Repurchase # of shares repurchased (mm) Average price of stock purchased
________________________________________________ (1)
(2) (3)
Assumes $1.35 billion of net debt allocated to McOpCo and $5.0 billion of net debt allocated to PF McDonalds. In addition, assumes $9.7 billion of incremental leverage placed on PF McDonalds. Represents 35% of the market equity value of McOpCo. Assumes incremental leverage and the after-tax proceeds from McOpCo IPO (net of fees and expenses) are used to buy back approximately shares 316 million shares at an average price of $40. Assumes a recent stock price of $33. P / FY 06E FCF multiple adjusted for Pro Forma McDonalds 35% stake in McOpCo. Fees and expenses associated with the IPO and financing transactions. 34
Set forth below are the sources and uses of proceeds associated with a $14.7 bn issuance of secured collateralized financing (net of cash on hand), or an incremental $9.7 of net debt, based on expected net debt as of FY 2005E. We have assumed a 5% fixed rate for this collateralized financing. After this transaction, Pro Forma McDonalds would be leveraged approximately 3.5x Total Debt/EBITDA or at a 25% Debt to Enterprise Value ratio. Proceeds from this issuance would be used to repay existing debt, buyback shares and pay financing fees and expenses.
$ in millions
Sources
New CMBS Financing (net of cash) Percentage Loan to Value Total $14,650 44% $14,650
FY2005E $6,315 (1,350) $4,965 9,685 $14,650 3.5x 3.4x Investment Grade
24.5%
Uses
Repay Existing Net Debt at PF McDonald's Buyback Shares Fees and Expenses Total $4,965 9,535 150 $14,650
35
Comparing PF McDonalds Credit Stats with Comparable Real Estate Holding C-Corporations
10.2x
Brookfield Properties
British Land
Land Securities
Pro Forma
Debt / Enterprise Value
100% 75% 50% 25% 0% Brookfield Properties British Land Land Securities Forest City Enterprises 25% 48% 56% 35% 59%
Pro Forma
EBITDA/Interest: Rating:
________________________________________________ (1) (2)
5.8x (2)
2.3x BBB
36
1.5x BBB
2.5x NR
NA BB+
Based on Wall Street research estimates. Pro Forma McDonalds EV assumes a valuation multiple of 13x EV/FY06 EBITDA. Assumes an average 5% fixed rate on PF McDonalds debt.
A review of large REITs indicates that these businesses support investment grade ratings with a debt to enterprise value of 36% on average, as compared to Pro Forma McDonalds which would have a debt to enterprise value of 25%.
Company Name Simon Property Group Inc. Equity Office Properties Trust Vornado Realty Trust Equity Residential Prologis Archstone-Smith Trust Boston Properties Inc. Kimco Realty Corp. AvalonBay Communities Inc.
Total Debt/ Enterprise Value 47.2% 50.9% 37.4% 38.4% 31.5% 33.5% 36.0% 25.2% 27.3%
Moody's Rating Baa2 Baa3 Baa3 Baa1 Baa1 Baa1 NR Baa1 Baa1
Moody's Outlook Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable NR Stable Stable
S&P Rating BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ ABBB+
S&P Outlook Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable
________________________________________________
Notes: Stock prices as of 11/11/2005. PF McDonalds EV assumes a valuation multiple of 13x EV/FY06 EBITDA. Total Debt includes Preferred.
37
Despite being a C-Corp and lacking the tax advantages of a REIT, PF McDonalds has several superior credit characteristics REITs are required to pay 90% of earnings through dividends, whereas Pro Forma McDonalds has much more credit flexibility PF McDonalds has significant brand value to support its cash flows and overall credit
38
McDonalds asked its Advisors to help review the Proposal Goal was to review the proposal to assess 4 critical areas:
Advisors reported back with judgments on (1) Valuation (2) Credit Impact McDonalds Management reviewed the Proposal to assess (3) Friction Costs (4) Governance / Alignment Issues
40
Friction Costs
Some friction costs associated with the CMBS financing structure, but not a gating issue
Credit Impact
Incremental $9bn of leverage as proposed may put pressure on credit rating
Alignment Issues
Separation of McOpCo from PF McDonalds may cause alignment issues in the system
Potential property tax revaluations Legal costs Large transaction for CMBS market Mostly driven by CMBS financing
McDonalds management stated that, assuming adequate value creation, none of these issues would prevent a restructuring
41
Advisors were assigned to review the Proposal In general, Advisors agreed with Pershing on: McOpCo valuation Relative allocation of EBITDA between McOpCo and PF McDonalds However, their judgment was that PF McDonalds would not enjoy significant multiple expansion
42
V.
Friction Costs Friction costs immaterial in the context of value creation Friction costs and transaction delays were driven by CMBS financing Similar transaction could be effected with corporate debt
Credit Impact Stability of PF McDonalds cash flow stream and robust asset base should allow it to incur additional debt without a material adverse change in rating YUMs credit rating is BBB-
44
V.
Franchisor/Franchisee Conflict
Top Line (percent of sales) vs. Bottom Line
Some believe this conflict is mitigated by owning and operating units However, many of the most successful franchisors operate few, if any, units
Historical McDonalds Subway Dunkin Donuts Tim Hortons
McDonalds current skin in the game is overstated due to lack of transfer pricing
We believe McOpCo represents ~10% of McDonalds total value
PF McDonalds role as landlord, franchisor, 35% shareholder and board member, leaves them with ample skin in the game
45
V.
Level the playing field: McOpCo should compete on the same basis as franchisees
Pay market rent and franchise fees Be focused on bottom-line profitability Be run by equity compensated management
46
V.
Although there are some differences in opinion regarding friction costs, leverage and potential alignment issues, the key disparity between Pershing and the Companys views was regarding the Valuation of Pro Forma McDonalds
47
V.
V.
Comparable Companies
PF McDonalds operating metrics are much closer to a typical Real Estate C-Corporation or a high branded intellectual property business such as PepsiCo or Coca-Cola than they are a typical QSR.
Assumes PF McDonalds price of ~$47.50
2005E Operating Metrics: EBITDA Margins EBITDA CapEx Margins EPS Growth Trading Multiples Adjusted Enterprise Value (2) / CY 2006E EBITDA CY 2006E EBITDA CapEx Price / CY 2006E EPS CY 2006E FCF
(3)
Pro Forma
60% 50% 9%
13.0x 15.5x
15.1x 16.0x
12.3x 15.5x
12.6x 14.2x
21.1x 20.9x
NA ~20x - 25x
24.3x 24.0x
20.1x 20.8x
18.8x 18.9x
3.4x 24%
1.7x 11%
0.0x 4%
NM 4%
Stock prices as of 11/11/05. Projections based on Wall Street estimates. (1) Typical mature QSR based on YUM! Brands and Wendys. (2) Adjusted for unconsolidated assets. (3) FCF denotes Net Income plus D&A less CapEx.
49
V.
Significant Free Cash Flow Yield / Dividend Yield Assuming No Incremental Debt
At McDonalds current price of approximately $33 per share, we estimate Pro Forma McDonalds dividend / FCF yield would be approximately 6.7%. (1)
McDonald's Stock Price McOpCo Share Price (7x EV / EBITDA Multiple) Implied Pro Forma McDonald's Share Price Yield on Pro Forma McDonald's
Memo: Pro Forma McDonald's Free Cash Flow 2006E EBITDA Less: Maintenance Capital Expenditures Less: Growth Capital Expenditures Plus / Less: Decreases / (Increases) in Working Capital Less: Interest (1) Less: Cash Taxes Free Cash Flow PFMcDonald's Shares Out (assuming no self-tender) Free Cash Flow per Share
________________________________________________ (1)
Assuming PF McDonalds pays out 100% of its FCF as dividends. (2) Assumes no incremental leverage and an average cost of debt of 5% on the existing $5 bn of net debt at Pro Forma McDonalds.
50
V.
Pershing believes the best way to think about Pro Forma McDonalds is as a growing annuity.
Real Estate and Franchise EBITDA ($ in billions) Based on Pershing Assumptions
$4.0
$3.0
$2.0
$1.0
$1.5
$0.0
$1.6
$1.8
$1.9
$2.1
$2.5
$2.6
$2.7
$2.9
$3.2
$3.1
$3.1
$3.2
$3.6
$4.0
1990
Real Estate & Franchise EBITDA Growth:
________________________________________________
1991
4.9%
1992
11.7%
1993
8.5%
1994
10.4%
1995
15.3%
1996
4.0%
1997
4.3%
1998
10.1%
1999
7.4%
2000
(0.5%)
2001
0.1%
2002
0.9%
2003
12.6%
2004
13.4%
Notes: Assumes McOpCo G&A to be 25% of consolidated G&A and Real Estate and Franchise G&A to be 75% of consolidated G&A. Assumes McOpCo pays franchise fees of 4% of sales and rent of 9% of sales. 51
V.
Which Would You Rather Own: Pro Forma McDonalds or a Large Retail REIT?
McDonald's Stock Price McOpCo Stock Price PF McDonald's Stock Price Scenario 1: No Sharebuyback No Incremental Leverage Pre-Tax Yield (2) After-Tax Investor Yield (3) Estimated LT Dividend Growth
Note: Assumes a 7x EV / FY 06E EBITDA multiple on McOpCo. (1) Retail / REIT dividend yield based on Simon Property Group. Illustrative LT Dividend growth based on Pershings estimates. (2) Assumes full payout of free cash flows for PF McDonalds. (3) Assumes 15% tax rate on PF McDonalds dividend and a 35% tax rate on the REIT dividend. (4) Scenario 2 Pre-Tax and After-Tax Yields are adjusted for a 35% stake in McOpCo.
52
V.
Which Would You Rather Own: Pro Forma McDonalds or 10-Year U.S. Treasury?
McDonald's Stock Price McOpCo Stock Price PF McDonald's Stock Price Scenario 1: No Sharebuyback No Incremental Leverage Pre-Tax Yield
(1)
Note: Assumes a 7x EV / FY 06E EBITDA multiple on McOpCo. (1) Assumes full payout of free cash flows for PF McDonalds. (2) Assumes 15% tax rate on PF McDonalds dividend and a 35% tax rate on the 10-Year Treasury dividend. (3) Scenario 2 Pre-Tax and After-Tax Yields are adjusted for a 35% stake in McOpCo.
53
V.
Which Would You Rather Own: Pro Forma McDonalds or a Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS)?
McDonald's Stock Price McOpCo Stock Price PF McDonald's Stock Price Scenario 1: No Sharebuyback No Incremental Leverage Pre-Tax Yield (1) After-Tax Investor Yield (2) Estimated LT Dividend Growth
Note: Assumes a 7x EV / FY 06E EBITDA multiple on McOpCo. (1) Assumes full payout of free cash flows for PF McDonalds. (2) Assumes 15% tax rate on PF McDonalds dividend and a 35% tax rate on the TIPS dividend. (3) Scenario 2 Pre-Tax and After-Tax Yields are adjusted for a 35% stake in McOpCo.
54
V.
Based on a review of the cost of capital of Real Estate holding corporations and Intangible Property / Franchise businesses like Coca Cola and Choice Hotels, we believe that Pro Forma McDonalds levered FCF could have a discount rate in the area 7.25% - 7.75%. As such, we believe PF McDonalds would have a FCF Yield of 4.25% - 5.25%. This implies a midpoint equity valuation range of $48 per share.
Estimated Discount Rate Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate Implied FCF Yield Implied FCF Multiple FY'06E Free Cash Flow per Share (1) (Note: FCF Assumes Proposal Scenario)
Assumes no dividend paid in FCF calculation. Includes the value of PF McDonalds 35% equity stake in McOpCo (approx. $2 per share). Assumes a 7x EV / FY 06E EBITDA McOpCo valuation multiple.
55
V.
Conclusions
McDonalds is significantly undervalued today Over 80% of its cash flows comes from real estate income and franchise income Proposal creates value for several reasons Increases shareholder value Improves management focus Increases transparency Improves capital allocation Improves franchise alignment There are multiple ways to unlock value Pershings Initial Proposal Variations on Pershings Initial Proposal
56
V.
Next Steps
Engage constituents regarding proposal Shareholders Franchisees Broad investment community Incorporate your feedback Consider revised proposal
57
V.
Q&A
58
Appendix
Pershing has assumed the following structural and tax assumptions with respect to an IPO spin-off of McOpCo.
65% of McOpCo shares are IPOed in the transaction 35% stake retained by PF McDonalds allows for McOpCos business to be deconsolidated McOpCo is assumed to be essentially a debt free subsidiary Immediately prior to the IPO, $1.35bn of McDonalds consolidated FY 05E net debt is allocated to McOpCo $1.5 billion of total debt allocated $150mm of cash and cash equivalents allocated The remaining $5bn of FY 05E net debt is allocated to PF McDonalds $5.15bn of total debt $150mm of cash and cash equivalents McOpCos tax basis is assumed to be approximately $1.65 billion Tax basis is equal to $3 billion of initial assumed basis (based on an assessment of net equipment and other property at McDonalds) less $1.35 billion of allocated net debt To the extent that the IPO distribution exceeds PF McDonalds tax basis in McOpCo, then the tax cost for the IPO would be the amount by which the IPO distribution exceeds McDonald's basis multiplied by McDonalds corporate and state/local tax rate
61
Pro Forma
PF McDonalds performs a leveraged self-tender $4.2 bn cash received
$4.2bn Note
McOpCo
McDonalds retains 35% stake
McOpCo
PropCo
Issues CMBS financing, or $9.7bn of incremental debt
FranCo
No debt at FranCo
McOpCo declares and pays a dividend to McDonalds (parent) in the form of a Note in an amount equal to the anticipated proceeds from an initial public offering of McOpCo For illustrative purposes, we assume the Note is for $4.2bn, or 65% of the equity market value of McOpCo (assumed to be $6.5bn)
McOpCo undertakes the IPO and uses the proceeds to repay the dividend note. The tax cost for the IPO would be the amount by which the IPO distribution exceeded McDonald's basis in the McOpCo stock multiplied by McDonalds corporate and state/local tax rate Assuming a $4.2bn of IPO distribution, the tax cost would be approximately $1bn Tax cost equals $4.2 billion of distribution less $1.65 billion of basis multiplied by the tax rate of 38% As such, after tax proceeds of the McOpCo IPO will be approximately $3.2 billion
62
PF McDonalds is organized as a real estate business (PropCo) and a franchise business (FranCo) PropCo issues secured financing with proceeds used for Repaying existing debt at PF McDonalds Buying back shares PF McDonalds performs a self tender using proceeds from: New CMBS financings After tax proceeds of IPO
Book Basis of McOpCo Net Debt Allocated to McOpCo Adjusted Basis in McOpCo
Collateralized Financing
Assuming PF McDonalds owns the land and building of 37% of its system wide units and owns the buildings of 22% of its system wide units, then a preliminary valuation of McDonalds real estate suggests a value of $33 billion.
Avg. Annual Rev. Per Unit Est. Market Rent % Est. Market Rent $ Est. # of Units Est. Rent Income Cap Rate Total Real Estate Value
$ in million
Property Value Owns Land and Building Owns Building (Leases Land)
1.75 1.75
9.0% 4.5%
0.16 0.08
11,709 6,962
7.0% 8.0%
$ in million
Est. # of Units
Cap Rate
0.10
12,975
10.0%
64
We estimated the asset betas of several Real Estate holding C-Corporations and several high branded intellectual property businesses.
High Branded Intangible Property Business Betas (Dollar values in millions)
Adjusted Equity Beta 0.49 0.46 0.86 0.60 0.49 Cost of Equity 7.3% 7.2% 9.3% 7.9% 7.3% Equity Value $101,776.1 99,498.9 2,285.7 $67,853.6 99,498.9 Total Debt $4,200.0 4,607.0 296.7 $3,034.6 4,200.0 Preferred Stock 41.0 $13.7 Marginal Tax Rate 38.0% 38.0% 38.0% 38.0% 38.0% Unlevered Beta 0.48 0.45 0.79 0.57 0.48 Total Debt & Preferred / TEV 4.2% 4.7% 11.7% 6.8% 4.7%
Company Coca Cola Co. Pepsico Inc. Choice Hotels Mean Median
Company British Land Brookfield Properties Forest City Enterprises Land Securities Mean Median
Note: Market information as of 11/10/05. Utilized treasury stock method. Sources: Barra, company reports, Factset, and Wall Street Equity research.
65
Based on a blended asset beta calculation we determined a range of values for the WACC of PF McDonalds.
Blended Asset Beta Calculation
Asset Beta Average Real Estate Unlevered Asset Beta
Main Target Assumptions PreTax Cost of Debt Risk-Free Rate Equity Risk Premium Tax Rate WACC Calculation Unlevered Asset Beta Releverd Beta Levered Cost of Equity Equity Weight AfterTax Cost of Debt Target Debt & Pref. / TEV Implied Debt / Equity WACC
Asset Beta Average High Branded Intellectual Property Unlevered Asset Beta 0.57
0.38
WACC Sensitivity Analysis Levered Beta 0.55 6.1% 6.5% 6.9% 7.3%
0.46 0.56 7.4% 75.0% 3.7% 25.0% 33.3% 6.5% Debt / TEV
Note: Market information as of 11/10/05. Utilized treasury stock method. Sources: Barra, company reports, Factset, and Wall Street Equity research.
66
Set forth herein are the assumptions for the Pro Forma McDonalds business.
Net Unit Growth Approximates 1.5% - 2.0% of total franchise system unit growth annually or 1.0% - 1.5% of systemwide unit growth Revenue drivers: Average systemwide same-store sales CAGR of ~2.5% annually Rental revenue from franchisees of 9.0% of franchise & affiliated system sales Rental revenue from McOpCo of 9.0% of McOpCo sales Franchise revenue from franchisees of 4.0% of franchise & affiliated system sales Franchise revenue from McOpCo of 4.0% of McOpCo sales Cost drivers: Franchise rental expense based on a historical % of rental revenue from franchisees McOpCo rental expense based on a historical % of rental revenue from McOpCo D&A calculated assuming a 20-year useful life for existing net depreciable PP&E of approximately $12.5 billion (excluding land), and a 20-year useful life for depreciable PP&E purchased in the future 75% of SG&A allocated to Pro Forma McDonalds Net CapEx drivers: All CapEx is net of proceeds received from store closures $1.3 million of CapEx for each new unit where Pro Forma McDonalds owns the land and the building in 2005 and 2006, growing at an inflationary rate of 2.0% thereafter $650K million of CapEx for each new unit where Pro Forma McDonalds owns the building but not the land in 2005 and 2006, growing at an inflationary rate of 2.0% thereafter Run-rate maintenance CapEx of approximately $320 million, implying approximately $10K per system wide unit, growing at 2% Allocation of 75% of consolidated McDonalds corporate CapEx Consolidated corporate CapEx held constant at 0.7% of sales Other Incremental total debt of $9.7 billion, resulting in total debt of approximately $14.8 billion (net debt of $14.65bn) Free cash used to buy back shares and pay dividends $150 mm minimum cash balance Tax rate of 32% Minimal working capital requirements 25% Debt to Cap ratio increasing to 30% in 2008 Assumes an illustrative 30% dividend payout ratio to match current consolidated McDonalds
68
Set forth below is table which reconciles McOpCos, the Real Estate and Franchise businesses and stand-alone McDonalds FY 2004 income statements, as they are currently reported. The analysis demonstrates how McOpCo is paying neither a market rent nor a franchise fee.
(U.S. $ in millions) 2004 Income Statement Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA % of Total EBITDA
________________________________________________
Real Estate and Franchise P&L 3,336 1,505 $4,841 347 $347 576 427 1,485 2,006 774 $2,780 54%
2004 Consolidated Sum of Parts $14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,747 774 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,747 774 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 4,853 3,726 2,747 427 $11,753 495 1,976 427 $2,403 46%
The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to the Real Estate and Franchise business and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. To the extent that there should be more G&A allocated to McOpCo, then there would be a greater percentage of total EBITDA at the Real Estate and Franchise business than what is shown here. Note: Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses. 69
Set forth below is a table which reconciles McOpCos, Pro Forma McDonalds and standalone McDonalds FY 2005E income statements. The analysis demonstrates the flow of rent income, franchise income and rent expense upon separation of the businesses.
(U.S. $ in millions) 2005 Projected Income Statement Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Rent From Company Operated Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Company Operated Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Non-Rent Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Company-Operated Rent Expense Additional Rent Payable to PropCo Franchise Fee Payable to FranCo Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA % of Total EBITDA Maintenance Capex EBITDA - Maintenance Capex % of Total EBITDA - Maintenance Capex
________________________________________________ (1)
Pro Forma McDonald's P&L 3,578 1,354 1,590 602 $7,124 214 616 $830 600 499 1,631 3,564 712 $4,277 80% 749 3,528 86%
Inter-Company Eliminations
2005 Consolidated Sum of Parts $15,042 3,578 1,590 $20,211 5,132 3,926 2,400 789 616 $12,863 600 499 2,174 4,075 1,288 $5,362 100% 1,250 4,113 100%
$15,042 3,578 1,590 $20,211 5,132 3,926 2,400 789 616 $12,863 600 499 2,174 4,075 1,288 $5,362 100% 1,250 4,113 100%
$15,042 5,132 3,926 2,400 576 616 737 602 $13,989 544 510 576 $1,086 20% 501 585 14%
$0
Assumes total PF McDonalds D&A of approximately $712 million, which is composed of $499 million (or 70%) of franchise PP&E and $214 million (or 30%) of D&A associated with company-operated units. 70
Set forth below is a table which reconciles McOpCos, Pro Forma McDonalds and standalone McDonalds FY 2006E income statements. The analysis demonstrates the flow of rent income, franchise income and rent expense upon separation of the businesses.
(U.S. $ in millions)
(U.S. $ in millions)
Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Rent From Company Operated Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Company Operated Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Non-Rent Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Company-Operated Rent Expense Additional Rent Payable to PropCo Franchise Fee Payable to FranCo Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA from Operations % of Total EBITDA Maintenance Capex EBITDA - Maintenance Capex % of Total EBITDA - Maintenance Capex
________________________________________________ (1) Assumes total PF McDonalds D&A
McOpCo P&L
$15,429 $15,429 5,264 4,012 2,458 587 632 756 617 $14,327 560 542 587 $1,130 20% 504 626 13%
Inter-Company Eliminations
(1,389) (617) ($2,006) (632) (756) (617) ($2,006) $0
of approximately $737 million, which is composed of $516 million (or 70%) of franchise PP&E and $221 million (or 30%) of D&A associated with
71
company-operated units.
Set forth herein is a table which demonstrates net capital expenditures by category for McOpCo, PF McDonalds and the standalone (consolidated) McDonalds. Note: Our Free Cash Flows are derived using Net Capital Expenditures, net of proceeds received from closures. We note that the Company typically generates $300 - $400mm of proceeds annually from closings.
2006E Net Capital Expenditures (U.S. $ in millions) Consolidated McDonald's New Restaurants, Net Existing Restaurants Corporate/Other Net Capital Expenditures $316 787 156 $1,259 McOpCo $30 465 39 $534 Pro Forma McDonald's $286 322 117 $724
72
Below are the summary projections for Pro Forma McDonalds based on the assumptions detailed on page 68.
($ in millions, except per share data) 2002A Income Statement Data Revenue % Growth EBITDA % Margin EBITDA - CapEx % Margin D&A EBIT % Margin Net Interest Expense Equity Income from OpCo Net Income EPS Average Shares Outstanding 35.0% $5,401.0 2003A $6,008.5 11.2% $3,568.2 59.4% 2004A $6,690.0 11.3% $4,046.0 60.5% 4,046.0 60.5% 774.0 $3,272.0 48.9% 2005E $7,124.1 6.5% $4,276.7 60.0% 3,312.7 46.5% 712.3 $3,564.4 50.0% 2006E $7,393.1 3.8% $4,464.0 60.4% 3,739.5 50.6% 736.9 $3,727.0 50.4% (736.6) 107.9 $2,141.4 $2.27 945.4 2007E $7,676.7 3.8% $4,653.4 60.6% 3,909.2 50.9% 768.5 $3,884.9 50.6% (801.5) 121.9 $2,218.6 $2.47 897.8 2008E $7,969.9 3.8% $4,849.3 60.8% 4,085.0 51.3% 794.5 $4,054.8 50.9% (889.7) 137.5 $2,289.8 $2.72 842.8 2009E $8,276.2 3.8% $5,054.9 61.1% 4,258.5 51.5% 821.5 $4,233.4 51.2% (932.5) 151.7 $2,396.3 $2.97 806.4 2010E $8,596.2 3.9% $5,270.8 61.3% 4,440.1 51.7% 849.6 $4,421.2 51.4% (971.8) 162.4 $2,507.9 $3.24 773.3 2011E $8,930.9 3.9% $5,497.5 61.6% 4,630.1 51.8% 878.8 $4,618.6 51.7% (1,012.7) 171.9 $2,623.9 $3.54 741.8 4.1% 9.3% 2006 - 2011 CAGR 3.9%
$3,168.7 58.7%
4.3% 4.4%
$2,492.7 46.2%
$2,827.4 47.1%
4.4%
73
Below are the summary cash flow projections for Pro Forma McDonalds based on the assumptions detailed on page 68.
($ in millions, except per share data) 2002A Cash Flow Data EBITDA less: Cash Taxes less: Cash Interest Expense less: Dividends less: Change in Working Capital less: Growth CapEx less: Maintenance CapEx plus: After-tax Dividends from McOpCo Free Cash Flow (post dividends) Free Cash Flow (pre dividends) FCF per Share (pre dividends) Illustrative Stock Price at 20x LTM FCF 20 Balance Sheet Data Cash Revolver Long-Term Debt Total Debt / Capitalization Total Debt / EBITDA Net Debt / EBITDA 150.0 0.0 $14,800.0 24.5% 3.5x 3.4x 150.0 0.0 14,800.0 26.8% 3.3x 3.3x 150.0 0.0 17,393.4 30.0% 3.7x 3.7x 150.0 0.0 18,331.6 30.0% 3.8x 3.7x 150.0 0.0 19,104.0 30.0% 3.8x 3.7x 150.0 0.0 19,904.5 30.0% 3.8x 3.7x 150.0 0.0 20,740.4 30.0% 3.8x 3.7x 2003A 2004A 2005E 2006E $4,464.0 (956.9) (736.6) (653.2) 6.2 (285.9) (438.6) 0.0 $1,398.9 2,052.1 $2.17 $43.41 2007E $4,653.4 (986.7) (801.5) (676.8) 6.5 (291.6) (452.6) 0.0 $1,450.8 2,127.6 $2.37 $47.40 2008E $4,849.3 (1,012.8) (889.7) (698.5) 6.7 (297.4) (466.9) 0.0 $1,490.7 2,189.2 $2.60 $51.95 2009E $5,054.9 (1,056.3) (932.5) (731.0) 7.0 (314.7) (481.7) 0.0 $1,545.7 2,276.7 $2.82 $56.47 2010E $5,270.8 (1,103.8) (971.8) (765.0) 7.2 (333.5) (497.2) 0.0 $1,606.7 2,371.7 $3.07 $61.34 2011E $5,497.5 (1,153.9) (1,012.7) (800.4) 7.5 (354.0) (513.4) 0.0 $1,670.6 2,471.0 $3.33 $66.63 2006 - 2011 CAGR
8.9%
74
Set forth herein are the assumptions for the McOpCo business.
Net Unit Growth 90 net new owned restaurants in 2005 Net unit growth thereafter only in the franchised system. Assumes 200 new gross units and 200 closed units annually. Revenue drivers: Average same-store sales growthof 2.5% -2.7% annually on a total company basis Average unit sales of $1.6mm on a global basis in FY 2005 Cost drivers: Food and paper costs held constant at 34.1% of sales, based on historicals Payroll and employee costs of 26.1% in 2005, stepping down to 25.5% percent by 2011 Occupancy and other costs (excluding D&A) held constant at 20.5% of sales D&A calculated as 110% of capex in 2006 trailing to approximately 107% of CapEx by 2015 4.0% of sales paid to Pro Forma McDonalds as a franchise fee 25% of consolidated SG&A allocated to McOpCo CapEx drivers: Average maintenance CapEx per unit of approximately $50k in 2005 and 2006, growing at an inflationary rate of 2.0% thereafter Allocation of 25% of consolidated McDonalds corporate CapEx Consolidated corporate CapEx held constant at 0.7% of sales Other No dividends Total Debt of $1.5 billion allocated (Net Debt of $1.35bn) Free cash used to pay down debt and then buy back shares $150 mm minimum cash balance Tax rate of 32% Minimal working capital requirements
76
Set forth below are the summary projections for McOpCo based on the assumptions detailed on page 76.
(U.S. $ in millions) 2004A Income Statement Data Revenue % Growth EBITDA % Margin EBITDA - CapEx % Margin D&A EBIT % Margin Net Interest Expense Net Income EPS Average Shares Outstanding $14,223.8 11.2% $1,136.7 8.0% 1,136.7 8.0% 427.0 $709.7 5.0% 2005E $15,042.4 5.8% $1,085.7 7.2% 562.5 3.7% 575.5 $510.2 3.4% 2006E $15,428.9 2.6% $1,129.6 7.3% 595.6 3.9% 587.4 $542.2 3.5% (90.9) $306.9 $0.24 1,273.7 2007E $15,838.3 2.7% $1,173.3 7.4% 628.1 4.0% 599.6 $573.6 3.6% (68.5) $343.5 $0.27 1,273.7 2008E $16,259.2 2.7% $1,218.5 7.5% 662.0 4.1% 609.3 $609.2 3.7% (43.9) $384.4 $0.30 1,273.7 2009E $16,692.0 2.7% $1,265.4 7.6% 697.3 4.2% 622.0 $643.3 3.9% (17.0) $425.9 $0.33 1,273.7 2010E $17,136.9 2.7% $1,313.9 7.7% 734.0 4.3% 635.0 $678.9 4.0% 0.2 $461.8 $0.37 1,248.1 2011E $17,594.4 2.7% $1,364.2 7.8% 772.2 4.4% 645.2 $718.9 4.1% 3.4 $491.2 $0.41 1,191.9 9.9% 11.3% 2006 - 2011 CAGR 2.7%
3.8% 5.3%
5.8%
77
Set forth below are the summary cash flow projections for McOpCo based on the assumptions detailed on page 76.
2006 - 2011 CAGR
2004A Cash Flow Data EBITDA less: Cash Taxes less: Cash Interest Expense less: Dividends less: Change in Working Capital less: Growth CapEx less: Maintenance CapEx Free Cash Flow (after dividends) Free Cash Flow per share (before dividends) Balance Sheet Data Cash Revolver Long-Term Debt Total Debt / EBITDA Net Debt / EBITDA
2005E
2006E $1,129.6 (145.1) (88.7) 0.0 6.2 (30.0) (504.0) $367.9 $0.29
2007E $1,173.3 (163.9) (61.5) 0.0 6.5 (30.6) (514.5) $409.3 $0.32
2008E $1,218.5 (184.9) (31.4) 0.0 6.7 (31.2) (525.3) $452.5 $0.36
2009E $1,265.4 (203.9) (6.1) 0.0 7.0 (31.8) (536.2) $494.3 $0.39
2010E $1,313.9 (218.3) 3.4 0.0 7.2 (32.5) (547.4) $526.3 $0.44
2011E $1,364.2 (231.1) 3.4 0.0 7.5 (33.1) (558.8) $552.0 $0.49
8.5% 11.1%
78
DISCLAIMER
Pershing Square Capital Management's ("Pershing") analysis and conclusions regarding McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's or the Company) are based on publicly available information. Pershing recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Company and its advisors that could lead them to disagree with Pershings conclusions or the approach Pershing is advocating. The analyses provided include certain estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the Company. Such statements, estimates, and projections reflect various assumptions by Pershing concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative purposes. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of such statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Actual results may vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Pershing manages funds that are in the business of trading - buying and selling - public securities. It is possible that there will be developments in the future that cause Pershing to change its position regarding the Company and possibly reduce, dispose of, or change the form of its investment in the Company. Pershing recognizes that the Company has a stock market capitalization in excess of $40bn, and that, accordingly, it could be more difficult to exert influence over its Board than has been the case with smaller companies.
2
Agenda
Background of our involvement What are our objectives? Brief review of our Initial Proposal Our Revised Proposal Benefits of our Revised Proposal Company Franchisees Shareholders Q&A
3
September 22, 2005: Pershing Square Capital Management (Pershing) presented a proposal for increasing shareholder value (Initial Proposal) to McDonalds management October 31, 2005: McDonalds management communicated its response to our Initial Proposal
Management believed that our Initial Proposal (1) would result in potential frictional costs; (2) could have an unfavorable credit impact; and (3) could create system issues McDonalds believed, based on its advisors valuation, that there was not enough value creation to outweigh frictional costs and other concerns
November 15, 2005: Pershing presented the Initial Proposal to the investment community
Since November 15, we have had numerous discussions with shareholders and franchisees from around the world
Today we would like to share our Revised Proposal for Creating Significant Value at McDonalds which incorporates feedback from McDonalds management, franchisees and other shareholders
4
Improve McOpCos operating performance Strengthen the McDonalds System Unlock significant shareholder value
We believe our Revised Proposal will:
Achieve these objectives Address all of the Companys concerns regarding our first proposal Increase McDonalds share price to $46-$50 per share (before considering any operational benefits) Minimize execution risk and management distraction
5
Confidential
McOpCo, as a wholly owned subsidiary, is not achieving its full business and financial potential McOpCo does not pay a market rent or a franchise fee, unlike a typical franchisee Adjusting for a market rent and a franchise fee, McOpCo has lower average unit margins than those of an average U.S. franchisee Corporate subsidies in the form of uncharged rent and uncharged franchisee fees have led to McOpCo being run inefficiently over time Uneconomical capital allocation decisions Suboptimal pricing policy
7
McOpCos Estimated Average Unit EBITDA margins versus U.S. Franchisees Estimated Average Unit EBITDA margins(1)
Estimated 4-Wall EBITDA Margins
16% Estimated 4-Wall EBITDA Margin %
14.8% 12.7%
(1)
(2)
12%
8.8%
8%
(1)
4%
0%
Note: See page 57 of the Appendix for Pershings detailed assumptions. 1) Analysis is based on Pershings estimates using 2004 financial data. McDonalds does not provide average unit data for McOpCo or McDonalds franchisees in its public financials. Assumes a market rent of 9% of sales and a franchise fee of 4% of sales. 2) Based on $260k of average EBITDA per franchised store and average revenues per franchised store of approximately $1,760k.
8
No direct equity compensation in McOpCos business No market-based performance measurement system Farm Team mentality whereby the best McOpCo managers are promoted to corporate McDonalds If they dont join corporate McDonalds, they sometimes leave to become a franchisee Top restaurant operators need more incentive to stay at McOpCo
9
McOpCos restaurant portfolio needs to be optimized in order to improve margins and capital allocation
Refranchise select units in mature markets Because of their developed franchise systems, mature markets do not need the same capital or resources as emerging markets e.g., U.S., Canada and U.K.
McOpCo
Capital and freed-up resources from refranchising should be redeployed in fast growing / high return emerging QSR markets Regions where franchise laws are still in infancy and McDonalds franchise base is not yet sufficient to drive growth e.g., China and Russia
Confidential
Pershing spoke with franchisees from around the world. Heres what they told us:
(1) Inherent conflict between McDonalds and the Franchisees: McDonalds Top-line focus versus Franchisees Bottom-line focus
McDonalds makes the bulk of its profits from the franchisees top line However, top line same-store sales growth does not always translate into improving franchisees bottom line Stock market often rewards McDonalds for higher same store sales growth even though the franchisees are sometimes pressured to sacrifice margin for discount pricing
(2) McOpCo, with its subsidized economics, magnifies this conflict
McOpCo does not compete on equal footing because it does not pay a market rent or franchisee fee Suboptimal pricing or capital allocation decisions do not impact McOpCos financials as dramatically as those of franchisees Perception among franchisees is that McOpCo is not held to the same degree of accountability
12
(3) Capital allocation criteria / decision-making process varies between McOpCo and the franchisee community
Low ROIC investments are occasionally forced upon franchisees McOpCo regional managers often make capital investment decisions they will not have to live with, given their status as salaried employees with limited tenure in any one position Made for You program is an example of a historical capital investment decision that may have been amended or prevented by an arm's-length McOpCo Hundreds of millions of dollars of capital invested in a kitchen system that is widely considered inefficient For many franchisees, it has led to decreased profitability, increased wait times and increased staffing requirements Testing at McOpCo did not reveal the true economic impact of the program Made for You problems could have been prevented if the system had the appropriate checks and balances
13
McOpCos subsidized economics reduce the impact of lower margin product pricing decisions As such, approximately 27% (1) of the McDonalds system currently does not price optimally Reduces the profitability of the entire system Underpricing at McOpCo pressures franchisees to sacrifice penny profits for traffic and sales volume
Franchisees generally agreed that control of McOpCo should remain with McDonalds Keeps the franchisee vote democratic and dispersed
________________________________________________
(1):
Based on approximately 8,119 McOpCo restaurants out of 30,516 systemwide McDonalds restaurants, as of 2004.
14
Franchisees have a strong interest in buying McOpCo restaurants Given McDonalds exclusivity requirements for franchisees, the only opportunity for franchisees to materially increase their wealth is to own more McDonalds units A refranchising program would create an attractive incentive system Would allow the top quartile performing operators to be rewarded with an opportunity to increase units McOpCos current portfolio of restaurants needs to be rationalized through refranchising, in order to Increase McOpCos profitability Improve systemwide same-store sales growth Satisfy considerable franchisee demand
15
Confidential
Franchise
Approximately 32,000 restaurants where McDonalds receives 4% of unit sales
17
There are very few businesses in the world with all the attractive business characteristics of
Brand McDonalds
Brand McDonalds Collects a royalty of 13% of systemwide sales Real Estate Franchise
World-leading brand ~ 60% EBITDA Margins (1) Low maintenance capital requirements ~ 55% EBITDA maintenance capex margins (1) Low operating leverage / high earnings stability High ROIC Low cost of capital Valuable fixed asset base 50 year track record Global and diverse customer base
18
________________________________________________
(1) .
Based on Pershings estimates. Assumes McOpCo pays a market rent and franchise fee.
The first step to unlocking shareholder value is to introduce transparent segment financials.
McOpCo does not pay an arm's-length rent or franchise fee to Brand McDonalds As such, reported financials do not make apparent that approximately 80% of McDonalds EBITDA is derived from the higher multiple Brand McDonalds Issuing transparent segment financials for McOpCo and Brand McDonalds would demonstrate True profitability of Brand McDonalds True operating margins and capital requirements at McOpCo
19
In 2004, McDonalds company-operated restaurants appeared to contribute 46% of total EBITDA. However, once adjusted for a franchise fee and a market rent fee, McOpCo constituted only 22% of total EBITDA, with Brand McDonalds contributing 78% of total EBITDA.
2004 Total EBITDA As Reported 2004 Total EBITDA Adjusted for Market Rent and Franchise Fees
46% 54%
McOpCo
22%
McOpCo
55%
78%
Brand McDonald's
2004 EBITDA $2.4bn 2.8bn $5.2bn % 46% 54% 100%
Brand McDonald's
________________________________________________
Note: The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to Brand McDonalds business and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. McDonalds management has indicated this is a conservative assumption regarding Brand McDonalds. Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses. . 20
Objective 3: Unlock Shareholder Value at McDonalds (contd) McDonalds is fundamentally Not a restaurant company
McDonalds FY 2005E EBITDA Maintenance CapEx, Adjusted for a Market Rent and Franchise Fee(1)
McOpCo
14%
86%
Brand McDonald's
Confidential
Our Initial Proposal called for Step 1: McOpCo to be organized as an independent entity
Signs arm's-length rent and franchise agreements with McDonalds
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
12/31/05 at consolidated McDonalds of which $1.35 bn of net debt is allocated to McOpCo and $5.0 bn of net debt allocated to Brand McDonalds.
There have been several mischaracterizations of our Initial Proposal which we believe need to be cleared up.
Provide for the sale of any real estate by McDonalds Put franchisees in danger of having a new landlord Involve the creation of a REIT Require a real estate financing to create significant value Hinge on a leveraged share buyback as its primary method of value creation
Our Initial Proposal did:
Assume significant value would be unlocked once McOpCo was IPOed and investors had access to transparent financials for Brand McDonalds, demonstrating that it is fundamentally NOT a restaurant company
25
Frictional Costs
Frictional costs associated with the CMBS financing and taxes due to the 65% McOpCo IPO Concerns regarding a potential new landlord (rent hikes)
Credit Impact
$9.7bn of incremental leverage may put pressure on credit rating
Alignment Issues
Brand risk due to a loss of McOpCo control
Management
Franchisees
McOpCo will compete for new units Fear of preferential treatment of McOpCo
Shareholders
26
Confidential
of 5% of IPO proceeds.
Continued
28
(contd)
in FY2005E. FY2005E dividend payout ratio based on 9/30/2005 Last Twelve Months after-tax free cash flows, calculated as operating cash flows less cash flows from investing activities.
29
Revised Proposal requires no incremental debt to be issued over total debt position as of 9/30/05
Frictional Costs
No CMBS financing
Alignment Issues
Maintain control of McOpCo Retain flexibility
Management
Franchisees
Preserves highly democratic franchisee system McOpCo will be a net seller of units in mature markets
Shareholders
30
Current Issue
McOpCo is not reaching its full business and financial potential
McOpCos management can be compensated based on the market performance of its business McOpCo managerial focus will improve as a result of having greater accountability, increased responsibility, a better performance measuring yardstick via the public markets and more direct incentives
31
Pershing believes that a publicly traded arm's-length McOpCo, which remains controlled by McDonalds, would strengthen the McDonalds System. McOpCo makes optimal pricing, capital allocation and refranchising decisions Arm's-length McOpCos decision-making criteria on product pricing and capital allocation will be substantially similar to that of the franchisee community McOpCo, no longer subsidized by Corporate McDonalds, will review its restaurant portfolio more closely for refranchising rationalization / opportunities Refranchising program would create an incentive system whereby the best operators would be rewarded with an opportunity to own new units Poor performing operators will be motivated to improve performance to earn the right to own more restaurants Franchisees would recognize that the new McOpCo competes on equal footing McOpCo, required to pay arm's-length rent and franchise fees, would face the same economic consequences as franchisees, thus creating a better aligned system Improves fairness and accountability throughout the system
32
Would increase McDonalds credibility in the system and allow it to better understand the true impact of new product introductions
Testing products at arm's-length McOpCo would provide McDonalds with A better understanding of the true economic impact of its new products on the typical owner/operators bottom line More credibility when communicating impact of new products to franchisees Franchisee participation on the McOpCo Board will temper any perception that McOpCo receives preferential treatment from McDonalds 80% ownership of McOpCo would preserve McDonalds skin in the game Bottom-lined focused McOpCo would be influential in endorsing new products
33
given its need to grow its business for the benefit of its new shareholders? Answer: No, quite the opposite. We believe a more likely scenario is the following: McOpCo, no longer supported by corporate subsidies, will price more optimally Refranchising program will remove McOpCo as a competitor in many key markets McOpCos most attractive growth plan is to focus on emerging markets where the franchise base is still in its infancy, such as China and Russia
Question: Under your Revised Proposal, is there any risk that McDonalds real estate will
be sold or that franchisees will experience unexpected rent hikes? Answer: No. We have never endorsed the sale of real estate or the creation of a REIT. We dont believe its the right operational move We are confident management is not inclined to sell the real estate
34
Question: How will this change a franchisees day-to-day interaction with McDonalds
Corporation? Answer: There will be no changes. A franchisees day-to-day interaction with McDonalds will not be affected by the creation of a publicly traded McOpCo. However, the franchisee community may find a strong ally in a publicly traded McOpCo McOpCos management will be able to push back on lower margin / low return new products introduced by Corporate McDonalds McOpCo will improve the check and balance mechanisms in the system Testing at McOpCo on new products will be a better benchmark for how a product will perform throughout the system Many McOpCo stores in the U.S., Canada and U.K. will be up for refranchising Franchisee representation on McOpCos Board will improve McOpCos credibility and communication with the system
35
Question: Would a publicly traded McOpCo hinder the current Farm Team system or
inhibit McDonalds ability to recruit top McOpCo managers to work at Corporate? Answer: No. We believe the creation of a publicly traded McOpCo will actually improve the talent pool at both Brand McDonalds and McOpCo. Offering direct equity compensation in McOpCo will Attract best-in-class operators Improve retention Arms-length, publicly traded McOpCo is better training ground than the current wholly owned McOpCo Better real world business discipline for managers, once corporate subsidies are removed Teaches restaurant operators how to run a public business With 80% ownership, Brand McDonalds will still be able to leverage its deep relationship with McOpCo for recruiting purposes
36
A publicly traded McOpCo would increase financial transparency and would allow investors to appropriately value McDonalds on a sum-of-the-parts basis.
Ability to increase dividends Reduce option dilution at McDonalds through the use of McOpCo currency McOpCo IPO would allow Wall Street analysts and the broad investment community to value McDonalds on a sum-of-the parts basis Investors would focus more on the value of Brand McDonalds
37
Brand McDonalds operating metrics and business characteristics (100% royalty-based revenues, low cost of capital and high earnings stability) are much closer to high branded intellectual property businesses such as PepsiCo, Coca-Cola or Choice Hotels or a typical Real Estate C-Corporation than they are to a typical QSR. We believe Brand McDonalds could be worth 12.5x 13.5x EV/2006E EBITDA.
Based on an approximate $48 sum-of-the-parts value for McDonalds
2005E Operating Metrics: EBITDA Margins EBITDA CapEx Margins Long-term EPS Growth
(2)
Brand
Choice Hotels
66% 61% 16% 23% 18% 11% 31% 27% 9%
60% 50% 9%
Business Characteristics: Maint. Capital Requirements Earnings Stability Average Cost of Capital Fixed Asset Value Trading Multiples Adjusted Enterprise Value (3) / CY 2006E EBITDA CY 2006E EBITDA CapEx
________________________________________________
Low
High
Low
High
13.0x 15.5x
19.1x 20.3x
12.2x 15.4x
12.0x 13.6x
Stock prices as of 1/13/2006. Projections based on Wall Street research estimates. Analysis assumes a 7x EV/EBITDA valuation multiple for McOpCo. (1) Typical mature QSR business characteristics based on YUM! Brands and Wendys. (2) Brand McDonalds long-term EPS growth rate is based on the Companys current dividend payout ratio and assumes excess free cash flow after dividends is used for share buybacks. 38 (3) Adjusted for unconsolidated assets.
As Reported
Segment 2006E EBITDA
$1,130 4,464
5,594
7.0x 9.3x
8.9x
$7,908 41,675
$49,582
7.0x 12.5x
7.0x 13.5x
$7,908 55,799
$63,707
$7,908 60,263
$68,171
$34.00
$46 45%
$50 57%
________________________________________________ Note: Assumes $1.25bn of proceeds from IPO and $1.75bn of existing cash on hand used to repurchase shares. Capital structure assumptions are detailed on page 56 of the Appendix. Analysis is pro forma for a McOpCo spin-off and McDonalds share buyback on 12/31/05. (1) Based on 10/31 closing price of $31.60. 39
Assuming McOpCo pays a market rent and franchisee fee, we have modeled McOpCo FY 06E EBITDA of $1.1 billion and Brand McDonalds FY 06E EBITDA of $4.5 billion. Based on these assumptions, we believe McDonalds stock price would trade in the range of approximately $46 $50 per share, as a result of a 20% IPO of McOpCo.
________________________________________________
Note: Assumes 75% of consolidated G&A is allocated to Brand McDonalds, with the rest allocated to McOpCo. Assumes McDonalds FY 05E Net Debt of $8.1bn, Minority Interest in McOpCo of $1.3bn, and FY05E Diluted Shares Outstanding of 1,186mm, all pro forma for Pershings Revised Proposal.
40
Pershing believes that McDonalds, pro forma for the McOpCo 20% IPO, would have a 2006E Free Cash Flow yield of 4.3 % - 4.7% at stock price in the range of $46 - $50 per share. We note our Free Cash Flow calculation is based upon our estimates of 2006E After-Tax Levered Operating Cash Flow less Growth and Maintenance Capital Expenditures. (1)
McDonald's 2006E FCF/Dividend Yield at Varous Stock Prices Current Stock Price
2006E FCF Yield $34 6.3% $46 4.7%
Projected
$47 4.6% $48 4.5% $49 4.4% $50 4.3%
________________________________________________
(1) FCF Yield is based on Attributable Free Cash Flow before dividend payments. See Appendix page 54 for a calculation of FY 2006E Attributable Free Cash Flow.
41
A minority IPO of McOpCo would have minimal execution risk and negligible frictional costs McOpCo
Simple transaction Many successful value creating precedent transactions Minimal management distraction Frictional costs of roughly 5 cents per share Preserves current structures control of McOpCo
McDonalds would maintain the flexibility to repurchase minority McOpCo stake
if desired improvements were not obtained Minority buyouts are simple and common transactions with minimal transaction costs
42
Pershings valuation is based on the business as it exists today, assuming no further operational improvements.
Pershing believes that creating a publicly traded arm's-length McOpCo will substantially improve both top-line and bottom-line performance of McDonalds We believe that McOpCo has EBITDA margins of roughly 7.3% (post corporate allocation) (1) Based on comparable restaurant businesses, we believe McOpCo is capable of achieving at least 10% EBITDA margins However, Pershing has assumed no incremental operational improvements as part of its valuation
We also see potential G&A improvement as an additional opportunity
Standalone McDonalds LTM 9/30/05 G&A per systemwide unit of $68k versus YUM! Brands LTM 9/30/05 G&A per systemwide unit of approximately $35k
We have not included an IPO / potential spin-off of Chipotle as part of our analysis
IPO and potential spin-off of Chipotle will create additional value for investors
________________________________________________
(1)
McOpCo EBITDA margins are after adjusting for a market rent and franchise fee and allocating 25% of McDonalds consolidated G&A to McOpCo.
43
We believe our Proposal can potentially increase McDonalds share price to $50 per share. In addition, we believe McDonalds strong management team, running a world-leading brand, can create significant additional value based only on incremental operating improvements.(1)
McDonalds Potential Stock Price
$60
$50
$50
$40
Pershing Proposal
Recent: $34
$30
Pershing Proposal:
McOpCo 20% IPO and Market Revaluation of McDonalds
_______________________________________________
Improve G&A to YUM! levels of $35k per systemwide unit (~$1bn of G&A savings)(2)
(1) (2)
See Appendix page 55 for more detail regarding our assumptions on operating improvements. Total savings denotes consolidated G&A, of which 75% is allocated to Brand McDonalds and 25% is allocated to McOpCo.
Simple transaction Minimal execution risk, management distraction and frictional costs
Positions McOpCo to make optimal capital allocation and business execution decisions Improves the Systems checks and balances Allows McDonalds maximum control and flexibility regarding future strategic alternatives
Q&A
Confidential
Appendix
Confidential
Appendix
Set forth below is a table which reconciles McOpCos, Brand McDonalds and stand-alone McDonalds FY 2004 income statements, as they are currently reported. The analysis demonstrates how McOpCo is paying neither a market rent nor a franchise fee.
2004 Income Statement Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA % of Total EBITDA
________________________________________________
Brand McDonald's P&L 3,336 1,505 $4,841 347 $347 576 427 1,485 2,006 774 $2,780 54%
2004 Consolidated Sum of Parts $14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,747 774 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,747 774 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 4,853 3,726 2,747 427 $11,753 495 1,976 427 $2,403 46%
The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to the Brand McDonalds and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. To the extent that there should be more G&A allocated to McOpCo, then there would be a greater percentage of total EBITDA at Brand McDonalds than what is shown here. Note: Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses. 48
Appendix
Set forth below is a table which reconciles McOpCos, Brand McDonalds and stand-alone McDonalds FY 2004A income statements, assuming McOpCo pays a market rent and franchise fee. The analysis demonstrates that the Brand McDonalds contributed approximately 78% of total EBITDA.
2004 Income Statement Sales by Company Operated Restaurants Rent from Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Rent From Company Operated Rest. Franchise Fees From Franchise and Affiliate Rest. Franchise Fees From Company Operated Rest. Total Revenue Company Operated Expenses: Food and Paper Compensation & Benefits Non-Rent Occupancy and Other Expenses (excl. D&A) Company Operated D&A Company-Operated Rent Expense Additional Rent Payable to PropCo Franchise Fee Payable to FranCo Total Company Operated Expenses Franchised Restaurant Occupancy Costs Franchise PPE D&A Corporate G&A EBIT Depreciation & Amortization EBITDA % of Total EBITDA
________________________________________________
Brand McDonald's P&L 3,336 1,280 1,505 569 $6,690 347 583 $930 576 427 1,485 3,272 774 $4,046 78%
Inter-Company Eliminations
2004 Consolidated Sum of Parts $14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,164 774 583 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 3,336 1,505 $19,065 4,853 3,726 2,164 774 583 $12,100 576 427 1,980 3,982 1,201 $5,183 100%
$14,224 4,853 3,726 2,164 427 583 697 569 $13,019 495 710 427 $1,137 22%
$0
The analysis assumes that 75% of the total G&A is allocated to Brand McDonalds and 25% is allocated to McOpCo. McDonalds management has indicated that this is a conservative assumption regarding the real estate and franchise business. Note: Analysis excludes $441 mm of non-recurring other net operating expenses.
49
Appendix
For modeling purposes, we have assumed a 20% IPO of McOpCo and the proposed share repurchases occurred on 12/31/2005. In addition to our IPO assumptions, set forth herein are assumptions regarding share repurchases, capital structure and dividend policy.
Appendix
Equity Markets
IPO of McOpCo Shares
$1.3bn Note
McOpCo
McDonalds retains 80% stake
McOpCo
McOpCo declares and pays a dividend to McDonalds (parent) in the form of a Note in an amount equal to the anticipated proceeds from an initial public offering of McOpCo For illustrative purposes, we assume the Note is for $1.3bn, or 20% of the equity market value of McOpCo (assumed to be $6.6bn)
McOpCo undertakes the IPO and uses the proceeds to repay the dividend note. Any tax cost for the IPO would be the amount by which the IPO distribution exceeded McDonald's basis in the McOpCo stock multiplied by McDonalds corporate and state/local tax rate Assuming a $1.3bn of IPO distribution, there would be no tax cost associated with the IPO Assume a $1.65 billion of tax basis
No incremental leverage issued PF McDonalds repurchases approximately 7% of the fully diluted share base using Excess cash on hand After tax proceeds of IPO
51
Appendix
Given the estimated tax basis in McOpCo, we believe that no taxes would need to paid in an IPO of McOpCo.
$0 38% $0
$0 38% $0
$0 38% $0
After Tax Proceeds Distribution Taxes Payable After Tax Distributions Estimated IPO fees Net Proceeds
52
Appendix
Set forth herein are the schedules for (1) FY 2005E funds available for proposed share buybacks; (2) 05E Total Debt Balances; and (3) 05E Cash Balances. We have assumed that no incremental debt would be issued at McOpCo as of 9/30/2005 on top of the estimated $3 billion required to repatriate earnings from foreign territories.
Pre-IPO Cash Available to Fund Share Buybacks: Beginning Cash Balances 1/1/2005 Plus: FY'05E Free Cash Flow Before Dividends and Debt Pay Down Less: FY'05E Debt Reduction Less: FY'05E Dividends Equals: FY 2005E Cash on Books Available for Share Buybacks FY 2005E Total Debt Balance: Beginning Total Debt Balances 1/1/2005 Less: FY'05E Debt Reduction Estimated New Term Loan to Fund Repatriation Total Debt FY 2005E Post IPO FY 2005E Cash Balance: Beginning Cash Balances 1/1/2005 Plus: FY'05E Free Cash Flow Before Dividends and Debt Paydown Less: FY'05E Debt Reduction Less: FY'05E Dividends Plus: Estimated IPO Proceeds, net of fees Less: Share buybacks Plus: Proceeds from Repatriation FY 2005E Ending Cash Balance FY 2005E Net Debt
53
$1,380 2,351 (1,155) (843) $1,733 $9,220 (1,155) 3,000 $11,065 $1,380 2,351 (1,155) (843) 1,246 ($2,979) 3,000 $3,000 $8,065
Appendix
Set forth herein is a schedule for 2006E Free Cash Flow based on our estimates. Attributable free cash flow per share deducts the minority interest free cash flow pertaining to the 20% stake of McOpCos no longer owned by McDonalds. FY2006E shares outstanding is pro forma for the proposed share buyback.
$5,594 (1,186) (563) (316) (943) 12 (74) $2,525 1,176 $2.15 2,272 $1.93
less: Cash Interest Expense less: Growth CapEx (Net of Proceeds from Closings) less: Maintenance CapEx less: Change in Working Capital less: Minority Interest Free Cash Flow Attributable Free Cash Flow Before Financing Activities FY 2006E Average Shares Outstanding (mm) Attributable Free Cash Flow per Share Dividends Paid at 90% of Attributable FCF Dividend Paid per Share
54
Appendix
Set forth herein is a table which details our assumptions regarding potential operating improvements.
Segment
McOpCo Brand McDonald's Total
EBITDA
$1,554 4,464 6,018
Less: FY'05E Net Debt Less: Minority Interest (Market Value) Equals: Market Value of Equity PF FY'05E Diluted Shares Outstanding (mm) Estimated Share Price
G & A Savings: Improving to $50k per unit Unit Level Assumption: ~50k per unit G&A Allocation Assumptions: McOpCo 25.0% 75.0% $125 $375
7.0x 13.5x
Brand McDonald's
Savings ($ in mm) McOpCo
Brand McDonald's
Less: FY'05E Net Debt Less: Minority Interest (Market Value) Equals: Market Value of Equity PF FY'05E Diluted Shares Outstanding (mm) Estimated Share Price
G & A Savings: Improving to YUM! Levels Unit Level Assumption: ~35k per unit G&A Allocation Assumptions: McOpCo 25.0% 75.0% $250 $750
7.0x 13.5x
Brand McDonald's
Savings ($ in mm) McOpCo
Brand McDonald's
Less: FY'05E Net Debt Less: Minority Interest (Market Value) Equals: Market Value of Equity PF FY'05E Diluted Shares Outstanding (mm) Estimated Share Price
55
Appendix
Valuation Assumptions
Segment
$1,130 4,464
5,594
7.0x 9.3x
8.9x
$7,908 41,730
$49,638 6,332 $43,306 1,274
7.0x 12.5x
7.0x 13.5x
$7,908 55,799
$63,707 8,065 1,312 $54,331 1,186
$7,908 60,263
$68,171 8,065 1,312 $58,794 1,186
$34.00
$46 45%
$50 57%
________________________________________________ Note: Assumes $1.25bn of proceeds from IPO and $1.75bn of existing cash on hand used to repurchase shares. Analysis is pro forma for a McOpCo spin-off and McDonalds share buyback, as proposed, occurring on 12/31/05. (1) Based on 10/31 closing price of $31.60. 56
Appendix
Set forth herein is a table which details our assumptions regarding average unit level 4-Wall EBITDA margins for McOpCo and U.S. Franchisees.
($ in thousands) Avg. Unit Sales Operating Income Before Rent Expense Less: Market Rent & Franchisee Fee Operating Income after Rent and Franchise Fee Plus: Estimated D&A 4-Wall EBITDA (w/ Mkt. Fees)
$260
(1)
14.8%
________________________________________________
Note: McOpCo estimates based on FY 2004 financial data and assumes 2,002 U.S. McOpCo units and 6,117 International McOpCo units. (1) As presented by Ralph Alvarez, President of McDonalds North America, at McDonalds Analyst Meeting at Oak Brook, IL on 9/21/05. .
57
$50 $45 $40 $35 $30 $25 $20 $15 $10 1/19/99
$48
11/12/1999
10/1/99
6/12/00
2/22/01
11/4/01
7/17/02
3/29/03
12/9/03
8/20/04
5/2/05
1/13/06
58