Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-19650 September 29, 1966

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CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.: In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the firstprize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day allexpenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional firstprize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows: SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts: Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. "SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company. SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives". Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows: In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails. The respondent appealed. The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim. 1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible. As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives." Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350). We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

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Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention. The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand. It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903. In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief. 2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal. Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.) Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yardstick in the following terms In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." . Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

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There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest: The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849). Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio. While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products. Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneuticsnoscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied). we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

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Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976 RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners, vs. LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent. Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners. E.V. Guevarra for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (Second Division) in CA-G.R. No. 38363-R, entitled "Leoncio Barrameda, plaintiffappellant, vs. Development Bank of the Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga City), Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang, defendants-appellees," which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 5697, "dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff". Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive portion: We therefore find that the appealed judgment should be reversed and set aside and another one entered declaring (1) null and void the sale executed on September 3, 1963, by defendant Development Bank of the Philippines in favor of its defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No. 5003 cancelled and (3) the mortgaged property redeemed; and ordering the Clerk of the lower court to deliver the amount of P7,271.22 deposited to defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and the Register of Deeds to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff in lieu of T.C.T. No. 5003 upon payment by him of corresponding fees; with costs against the defendants in both instances. Undisputed facts are: Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1418, containing an area of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio Taban, Minalabac Camarines Sur; to annul any and all contracts affecting said property between the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang and to recover damages, attorney's fees and costs. The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP to secure a loan of P22,000.00. For failure of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments as they fall due, the mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial sheriff conducted an auction sale in which the mortgagee, as the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged property for P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit 2) and the DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership (Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the sale and affidavit on September 2, 1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418 in the name of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003 issued to the DBP (Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September 3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang purchased the land from their codefendant. The sale in their favor was annotated on TCT No. 5003 on November 26, 1963 only. Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20, 1963, plaintiff offered to redeem the land. In view of the refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff commenced this suit. The original complaint was filed in court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964, plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the sum of P7,271.22, representing the repurchase price of the land. The trial court held that the one-year period of redemption began to run on April 23, 1962, when the sale at public auction was held, and ended on April 24, 1963; that the plaintiff's offer to redeem on November 20, 1963 and the deposit of the redemption price on August 12, 1964 were made beyond the redemption period; and that defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang 'are legitimate purchasers for value.

Two principal issues raised are: (1) In the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank of the Philippines) which provides: The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at public auction, judicially or extra- judicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to said bank shall, within one year from the date of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real property ... (Emphasis supplied), shall the period of redemption start from the date of auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in the register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court held? (2) Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond what appeared in the certificate of title of their vendor the Development Bank of the Philippines and investigate the validity of its title before they could be classified as purchasers in good faith? Petitioners' principal contentions are: that Section 31 of Commonwealth Act No. 459 which created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, predecessor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of the Philippines, clearly provides that the right to redeem the real property sold at public auction judicially or extra-judicially may only be exercised "within one year from the date of the auction sale"; that there is no provision in Commonwealth Act No. 459 expressly stating that the redemption period of one year shall start from the registration of the certificate of sale in the register of deeds; that Sec. 31 of C. A. 459 is a specific provision of law which governs redemption of real property foreclosed by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now the Development Bank of the Philippines), and prescribes the redemption period for both judicial and extra-judicial foreclosures of mortgage; that insofar as foreclosures of mortgage by banking and financial institutions are concerned, the period of redemption applicable must be the one prescribed in their respective charters as, in the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459; that the ruling in the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31, 1962, cited by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is not applicable to the case at bar because this Court based its Agbulos ruling on Section 26 (now Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is not clear when the period of redemption should start (date when execution sale was conducted, or when the certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the certificate of sale was registered in the registry of deeds), and this Court ruled that as the land involved in that case is registered under the Torrens system, the date of redemption should begin to run from the date of registration, unlike in the case at bar where Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and clearly provides that the running of the redemption period shall start from the date of the auction sale; and that the ruling of this Court in Gonzales vs. P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824, also invoked by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is likewise not applicable to the case at bar because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act No. 2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459. Section 32 of Act 2938, which is now Section 20 of R.A. No. 1300 (PNB Charter) provides that the mortgagor shall have the right to redeem within one year the sale of the real estate. This is Identical to the provision appearing in Sec. 26, now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules of Court, while under Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459, the period of redemption should star, on the date of the auction sale, and the latter provision is applicable specifically and expressly to the case at bar. It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in Metropolitan Insurance Company, substituted by spousesLoreto Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs. Pigtain 101 Phil. 1111, 1115-1116, wherein this Court, in construing Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, categorically stated that the one year redemption period shall start from the date of sale and not from the report of the sale or the registration of the sale certificate in the office of the Register of Deeds, is more applicable to the present case. The pertinent portion of the decision in the Marcaida case follows: But again the appellants claim that in this particular case, the statutory redemption period of one year should begin from December 17, 1954, when the auction sale was actually recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila and not from December 15, 1953, when the sale at public auction of the properties in question took place. We find its contention to be also untenable in view of the clear provision of the aforesaid Section 6 of Act No. 3135 to the effect that the right of redemption should be exercised within one year from the date of the sale. It should not be overlooked that the extrajudicial sale in question was for foreclosure of a mortgage and was not by virtue of an ordinary writ of execution in a civil case. ... And since the appeallants had failed to redeem the land in question within the time allowed by Section 6 of Act 3135, the appellee has perfect right to require the cancellation of the attachment lien in question. (Emphasis supplied) Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by petitioners, the crucial issue to determine is the choice of what rule to apply in determining the start of the one year redemption period, whether from the date of the auction sale or from that of the registration of the sale with the registry of deeds. In other words it is whether a literal interpretation of the provision of Section 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 that the period of redemption shall start from the date of the auction sale shall govern, or whether the words, "auction sale" shall be considered in their ordinary meaning or in the same sense that site is used in the texts of Section 26, now 30, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act 2938, now Section 20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated differently, should the word "sale" used in the above indicated provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter, under whichWe ruled that the redemption period shall start from the registration of the sale in the registry of deeds be applied to foreclosure sales for the DBP and give to the words auction sale" in its charter the same meaning of "sale" as used in connection with registered land? We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue must entail not merely trying to determine the meaning of the words auction sale" and "sale" in different legislative enactments, but, more importantly, a determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task to achieve as it depends more on a determination of the purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a period of redemptiom of their foreclosed properties. Mortgagors whose properties are foreclosed and are purchased by the mortgagee as highest bidder at the auction sale are decidedly at a great disadvatage because almost invariably mortgagors forfeit their properties at a great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs by the mortgagee himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his credit or the balance threof at the auction sale. That is the reason why the law gives them a chance to redeem their properties within a fixed period. It cannot be denied that in all foreclosures of mortgages and sale of property pursuan to execution, whether judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different legislative enactments, a public auction sale is a indispensable pre-requisite to the valid disposal of properties used as collateral for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in different laws used as collateral for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no moment, since the presumption is that when they used those words "sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they really referred to only one act the sale at public auction indispensably necessary in the disposition of mortgaged properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their owners.

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In the case of Ernesto Salazar, L-15378, promulgated July 31, 1963, this Court stated:

et

al.

vs.

Flor

De

Lis

Meneses,

et

al.,G.R.

No.

The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by appellants in their third assignment of error, which is to this effect: that the lower court erred in not holding that the period of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are concerned, started only on May 26, 1956, registered. Should We rule to this effect, it is clear that hen appellants attempted to exercise their right to redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and when they initiated the present action on October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had not yer expired.

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We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, promulgated on July 31, 1962, We held: The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that when property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act sold, the operative act is the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not take effect this a conveyance or bind the land it is registered. (Section 50, Act 496; Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna vs. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester vs. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646) (Emphasis supplied) We find no compelling reason to deviate from the aforequoted ruling and not apply the same to the present case. To Us petitioners' main contention that there is a great deal of difference in legislative intent in the use of the words 94 auction sale" in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act 2938, and See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into insignificance in the light of Our stand that those words used interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the public auction sale required by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or levied upon. Our stand in the Salazar case and in those mentioned therein (Garcia vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959; Gonzales et al. vs. Philippine National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is firmly planted on the premise that registration of the deed of conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the same had taken place. To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the question of when the one year period of redemption should start (from the time of registration of the sale) would better serve the ends of justice and equity especially in this case, since to rule otherwise would result in preventing the respondentmortgagor from redeeming his 59.4687 hectares of land which was acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines as the highest bidder at the auction sale for the low price of only P7,271.22 which was simply the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt of P22,000.00 after the respondentmortgagor had paid the sum of P14,728.78. As it is, affirmance of the Appellate Court's decision would not result in any loss to petitioners since the amount of P7,271.22 they paid to the Bank will be returned to 'them. What further strengthen's Our stand is the fact found by the respondent Appellate Court that respondent Barrameda has always been in possession of the disputed land. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, We find it no longer necessary to determine whether the petitioners are purchasers in good faith of the land involved, since the respondent Barrameda redeemed the mortgaged property within the legal period of redemption and, consequently the sale of the property executed on September 3, 1963, by the Development Bank of the Philippine in favor of the petitioners is null and void. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is affirmed, with costs against petitioners. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., affirmed. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918

JACINTO MOLINA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellant. Araneta & Zaragoza for appellee. FISHER, J.: After the publication of the decision announced under the date of February 1st., 1918,1 counsel for appellee presented a petition for a rehearing. This petition was granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted. Two of the members of the court, as constituted at the time of the argument on the motion for a rehearing, were not present when the case was first submitted and did not participate in the original decision. Upon the facts, as correctly stated in the original majority decision, a majority of the members of the court as now constituted is in favor of setting aside the original decision and affirming the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an "agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the disputed tax was levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended. The provision upon which the plaintiff relies reads as follows: In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following commodities shall be excluded: . . . (c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.) The same exemption, with a slight change in wording, is now embodied in section 1460 of the Administrative Code, of 1917. The question of law presented by this appeal, as we view, is not whether fish in general constitute an agricultural products, but whether fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied are an agricultural product. As stated by judged Cooley in his great work on taxation: The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . . If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.) The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose of the Legislative had in mind in establishing the exemption contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the law making body that by exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry would be favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged. It is a fact, of which we take judicial cognizance, that there are immense tracts of public land in this country, at present wholly unproductive, which might be made fruitful by cultivation, and that large sums of money go abroad every year for the purchase of food substances which might be grown here. Every dollar's worth of food which the farmer produces and sells in these Islands adds directly to the wealth of the country. On the other hand, in the process of distribution of commodities to the ultimate consumer, no direct increase in value results solely from their transfer from one person to another in the course of commercial transactions. It is fairly to be inferred from the statute that the object and purpose of the Legislature was, in general terms, to levy the tax in question, significantly termed the "merchant's tax," upon all persons engaged in making a profit upon goods produced by others, but to exempt from the tax all persons directly producing goods from the land. In order to accomplish this purpose the Legislature, instead of attempting an enumeration of exempted products, has grouped them all under the general designation of "agricultural products." It seems to require no argument to demonstrate that it is just as much to the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation and growth of fish as of corn, pork, milk or any other food substance. If the artificial production of fish is held not to be included within the exemption of the statute this conclusion must be based upon the inadequacy of the language used by the Legislature to express its purpose, rather than the assumption that it was actually intended to exclude producers of artificially grown fish from the benefits conferred upon producers of other substances brought into the store of national wealth by the arts of husbandry and animal industry. While we have no doubt that the land occupied by the ponds in which the fish in question are grown is agricultural land within the meaning of the Acts of Congress and of the Philippine Commission under consideration in the case of Map vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175) and others cited in the original majority opinion, it does not seem to us that this conclusion solves the problem. A man might cultivate the surface of a tract of land patented to him under the mining law, but the products of such soil would not for that reason, we apprehend, be any the less "agricultural products." Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under consideration. "Agriculture" is an English word made upon of Latin words "ager," a field, and "cultura," cultivation. It is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary as meaning in its broader sense, "The science and art of the production of plants and animal useful to man . . ." In Dillard vs. Webb (55 Ala., 468) it is held that the words "agriculture" includes "the rearing, feeding and managing of live stock." The same view was expressed in the case of Binzel vs. Grogan (67 Wis., 147). Webster defines "product" to be "anything that is produced, whether as the result of generation, growth, labor, or thought ... ," while "grow" is defined in the Century Dictionary as meaning "to cause to grow; cultivate; produce, raise . . .." While it is true that in a narrow and restricted sense agricultural products are limited to vegetable substances directly resulting from the tillage of the soil, it is evident from the definitions quoted that the term also includes animal which derived their sustenance from vegetable growths, and are therefore indirectly the product of the land. Thus it has been held that "The product of the dairy and the product of the poultry yard, while it does not come directly out of the soil is necessarily connected with the soil . . . and is therefore farm produce. (District of Columbia vs. Oyster, 15 D. C., 285.) In the case of Mayor vs. Davis (6 Watts & Sergeant [Penn. Rep.], 269) the court said: Swine horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay, vegetables, fruits, eggs, milk, butter, lard . . . are strictly produce of the farm . . .

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Without attempting to further multiply examples, we think it may safely be asserted that courts and lexicographers are in accord in holding that the term "agricultural products" is not limited in its meaning to vegetable growth, but includes everything which serves to satisfy human needs which is grown upon the land, whether it pertain to the vegetable kingdom, or to the animal kingdom. It is true that there is no decision which as yet has held that the fish grown in ponds are an agricultural product, but that is no reason why we should not so hold if we find that such fish fall within the scope of the meaning of the term. Of necessity, the products of land tend constantly to multiply in number and variety, as population increases and new demands spring up. In California there are farms devoted to the growth of frogs for the market. In many places in North America foxes and other animals usually found wild are reared in confinement for their fur. In Japan land is devoted to the culture of the silkworm and the growth of the plants necessary for the food of those insects. Bees are everywhere kept for the wax and honey into which the land is made to produce by those engaged in these occupations are "agricultural products" in the same sense in which poultry, eggs, and butter have been held to be agricultural products. Now, if the purpose of agriculture, in the broader sense of the term, is to obtain from the land the products to which it is best adapted and through which it will yield the greatest return upon the expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital, can it not be said that it is just as much an agricultural process to enclose a given area of land with dykes, flood it with water, grow aquatic plants in it, and feed fish with the plants so produced as to fence in it and allow poultry to feed upon the plants naturally or artificially grown upon the surface? In the last analysis the result is the same a given area of land produces a certain amount of food. In the one case it is the flesh of poultry, in the other the flesh of fish. It has been agreed between the parties that an important article of diet consumed by fish grown in a pond consists of certain marine plants which grow from roots which affix themselves to the bottom of the pond. In a real sense, therefore, the fish are just as truly a product of the land as are poultry or swine, living upon its vegetable growths, aquatic or terrestrial. Thus, land may truly be said to produce fish, although it is true that the producer is not a fisherman. Neither is one who grows foxes for their pelts a hunter. As contended by counsel, the inquiry is not whether fish in general constitute an agricultural product, but whether fish artificially grown and fed in confinement are to be so regarded. Honey produced by one who devotes his land to apiculture might be so regarded, even if we were to admit that wild honey gathered in the forest is not. Pigeons kept in domestication and fed by the owner would fall within the definition. Wild pigeons obtained by a hunter would not. Firewood gathered in a natural forest is not an agricultural product, but firewood cut from bacauan trees planted for that purpose has been held to be such a product, and its producer exempt from the merchant's tax. (Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil. Rep., 271.) Other comparisons might be made, many of which will be found in the opinion in which two of the members of the court expressed their dissent from the original majority opinion, but enough have been given to make our position clear. During the many hears that the statute before us has been in existence, since it first appeared, substantially in its present form, in section 142 of Act No. 1189, passed in 1904, no attempt has been made, until this case arose, to construe it as not applying to fish grown in ponds, and much weight should be given to this long continued administrative interpretation. The opinion of the Attorney-General, cited by Justice Malcolm, will be found on examination to have no bearing upon the present inquiry, as in that case question was, not whether fish grown and fed in ponds were agricultural products, but whether ". . . fishermen, shell and pearl gatherers . . ." were liable to the occupation tax. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the word "fishermen" was used to mean men growing fish in ponds, and it must, therefore, be assumed that it was used in its proper grammatical sense to designate persons engaged in catching fish not artificially produced. The decision in the case of The United States vs. Laxa (36 Phil. Rep., 670) is not controlling, as the reasoning upon which it is based was not concurred in by four members of the court. Furthermore, the Laxa case might be distinguished from the one now under consideration, were it necessary to do so, in that it has been stipulated in this case that fish cultivated in ponds subsist largely upon aquatic plants which grow from roots which attach themselves to the bottom of the pond, and are therefore in a real sense a product of the land, while in the Laxa case the evidence was that they subsisted solely upon free floating algae. We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision heretofore rendered herein must be set aside, and the judgment of the lower court affirmed. So ordered. Arellano, Araullo, J., dissents. C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant. Manuel O. Chan for appellees. MONTEMAYOR, J.: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,

representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs. Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:. SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590: SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers. Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.) When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.) Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.). By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

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The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied) The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied) We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers. So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45? Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245): The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds. Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.

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Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption. And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-7899 June 23, 1955

ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, PASTOR MALLORCA, GONZALGO DE LA TORRE, and JOSE ARTICULO,petitioners-appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE FELIX S. FERRER, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bacolod, and JOSE F. BENARES,respondents-appellees. Arrieta and Nolan for appellants. Parreo and Banzon for appellees. CONCEPCION, J.: The question involved in this case is one purely of law. On June 13, 1953, respondent Jose F. Benares filed, with the Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod, a criminal complaint, which was docketed as Case No. 2864 of said court, against petitioners herein, Alfredo Montelibano, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre and Jose Articulo, charging them with the crime of malicious mischief. It is alleged in said complaint: That on or about the 5th, the 7th and the 8th of June, 1953, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, Alfredo Montelibano, as author by inducement, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalo de la Torre and Jose Articulo, as authors by direct participations, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and deliberately cause damage to the sugarcane plantation belonging to Jose F. Benares, the offended party herein, intentionally and using bulldozer and destroying completely eighteen (18) hectares of sugarcanes obviously under the impulse of hatred and a desire for revenge, as the accused, Alfredo Montelibano, failed in his attempt to have the herein offended party punished for contempt of Court in Civil Case No. 1896 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, thereby causing upon said Jose F. Benares damage in the amount of more than P13,000.00. Upon the filing of this complaint, due course was given thereto by the herein respondent, Hon. Felix S. Ferrer, Municipal Judge of the City of Bacolod, who, likewise, issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. On or about June 22, 1953, the aforementioned defendants (petitioners herein) filed a motion to quash said warrant of arrest, as well as the complaint, upon several grounds, which may be reduced to two, namely : (1) The only officer

authorized by the Charter of the City of Bacolod to initiate criminal cases in the courts thereof is its City Attorney, who is opposed to the institution of said Case No. 2864; and (2) Said case involves a prejudicial question. In this connection, petitioners alleged, and Benares has not denied, the following: Sometime in 1940, the Capitol Subdivision Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Subdivision), of which petitioner Alfredo Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased Lot No. 1205-I-1 (which is the same property involved in Case No. 2864) to Benares, for a period of five (5) crop years, ending in the crop-year 1944-1945, with an option in favor of Benares, of another five (5) crop-years. On June 5, 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares, unlawful detainer case No. 1896 of the Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod, which, in due course, subsequently, rendered a decision ordering his ejectment from said lot. Benares appealed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (in which it was docketed as Civil Case No. 1896). On motion of the Subdivision, this court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding Benares to turn over the aforementioned lot to the Subdivision, which filed a bond undertaking to pay to Benares "all damages which he may sustain" by reason of the issuance of said writ, "if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto." Inasmuch as Benares continued planting on Lot No. 1205-L-1, instead of delivering it to the Subdivision, the latter filed a petition praying that the former be declared in contempt of court. This petition was denied, by an order dated April 30, 1953, which however, required Benares to "immediately and promptly obey the order of preliminary mandatory injunction." On June 5, 1953 the provincial sheriff delivered the land in question to the Subdivision. Seemingly, acting upon instructions of petitioner Montelibano, his co-petitioners thereupon cleared the land of the sugarcane planted therein by Benares. Hence, the criminal complaint filed by the latter. The Municipal Court denied the aforementioned motion to quash said complaint and the warrant of arrest, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, whereupon petitioners instituted the case at bar, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2828, against said Municipal Judge, and complainant Benares, for the purpose of securing a writ of certiorari and mandamus "annulling and vacating all the proceedings so far taken by respondent Judge in said Case no. 2864" and "holding that said Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same" and "dismissing said case" with a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent judge "to desist from further proceedings in the case." The writ of preliminary injunction was issued by said court of first instance, which, in due course, eventually rendered a decision, dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioners. The case is now before us on appeal taken, from said decision, by the aforementioned petitioners, the defendants in said criminal case. It is not disputed that the complaint in question was filed by Benares directly with the municipal court of Bacolod, and that the City Attorney had, not only no intervention whatsoever therein, but, also, expressed, in open court, his opposition thereto. The issue boils down to whether said municipal court may entertain said complaint. Petitioners contend that it may not, relying upon section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the pertinent part of which provides: . . . The City attorney . . . shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals. The city attorney shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violation of ordinances, and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused. . . .. Upon the other hand, respondents argue that this provision is merely declaratory of the powers of the City Attorney of Bacolod and does not preclude the application of Sec. 2 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court reading: Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employees of the government or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated. This was the very same provision invoked by the petitioner in the case of Espiritu vs. Dela Rosa (45 Off. Gaz. 196), in which this Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of First Instance of Manila to accept a complaint filed, directly with said court, by the offended party in a given case, without the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila. In his concurring opinion therein, then Chief Justice Moran had the following to say: I concur upon the ground that Rule 108 section 4 does not apply in the City of Manila where the only officer authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigation is the City Fiscal (sec. 2474, Adm. Code) and therefore, all criminal complaints should be filed with that officer who in turn may, after investigation, file the corresponding information with the Court of First Instance. The provisions of the Administrative Code on this matter have not been repealed by the Rules of Court. (Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz., p. 13.) (Emphasis supplied.) As indicated in said decision, the same was based, partly, upon the rule laid down in Hashim vs. Boncan (71 Phil. 216), which, in turn, was predicated upon earlier precedents (U. S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 317; U. S. vs. McGovern, 6 Phil. 621; U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; U. S. vs. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553). In case of Sayo vs. Chief of Police (45 Off. Gaz. 4875) the language used by this Court was: Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with the municipal court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistance, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused. xxx xxx xxx

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In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation

abovementioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information without the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. . . .. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear, therefore, that, in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal, who is thereby given, by implication, the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter, originally found in Section 39 of Act the pertinent part of which we quote: . . . The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the municipal courts of the city of Manila. He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused, and discharge all other duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals . . .. This provision was mutatis mutandis reproduced, firstly, in section 2437 of the Old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), then in section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, and lastly in section 38 of Republic Act no. 409. We do not see, and respondents herein have not pointed out, any reason why the above quoted provision of the Charter of the City of Bacolod, should be interpreted differently from said sections of the Charter of the City of Manila, which are substantially identical thereto. On the contrary, considering that said provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila had been consistently construed in the manner above indicated, before being incorporated in the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the conclusion is inevitable that the framers of the latter had reproduced the former with intent of adopting, also its settled interpretation by the judicial department (In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 77). In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. . . . It is not necessary that a statute should be reenacted in identical words in order that the rule may apply. It is sufficient if it is reenacted in substantially the same words. . . . The rule has been held to apply to the reenactment of a statute which received a practical construction on the part of those who are called upon to execute it. The Supreme Court of Nebraska says : "Where the legislature in framing an act resorts to language similar in its import to the language of other acts which have received a practical construction by the executive departments and by the legislature itself, it is fair to presume that the language was used in the later act with a view to the construction so given the earlier." . . . (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, 2d. ed., section 403 . . . two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion. (50 Am. Jur. 343) . . . Since it may be presumed that the legislature knew a construction, long acquieced in, which had been given by the courts to a statute re-enacted by the legislature, there is a presumption of an intention to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment. It is accordingly a settled rule of statutory construction that when a statute or a clause or provision thereof has been construed by a court of last resort, and the same is substantially re-enacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction. (50 Am. Jur. 461) In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from must be, as it is hereby, reversed and another one shall be entered annulling the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge and enjoining the latter to refrain from entertaining the complaint aforementioned and to dismiss the same. With cost against respondent Jose F. Benares. It is so ordered. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 159149 August 28, 2007

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Energy, Petitioner, vs. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: In its Motion for Reconsideration,1 respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. seeks the reversal of this Courts Decision2 dated June 26, 2006, which upheld the validity of the assailed Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-10. In assailing the validity of the Circular, respondent argues that:

I. Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the "assailed Circular") listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined the prohibited/punishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not included in the law. II. The petitioner-appellant admitted that the assailed Circular listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. III. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, is in the form of a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the State. IV. The assailed Circular not only prescribed penalties for acts not prohibited/penalized under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, but also prescribed penalties exceeding the ceiling prescribed by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. V. The Honorable Court failed to consider that the imposition by the assailed Circular of penalty on per cylinder basis made the imposable penalty under the assailed Circular exceed the limits prescribed by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. VI. The Honorable Court failed to rule on the position of the respondent-appellee that the amount of imposable fine prescribed under the assailed Circular is excessive to the extent of being confiscatory and thus offends the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. VII. The noble and laudable aim of the Government to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some [un]scrupulous individuals in the LPG industry should be achieved through means in accord with existing law. 3 The assigned errors, being closely allied, will be discussed jointly. On the first, second and third grounds, respondent argues that the Circular prohibited new acts not specified in Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended. Respondent insists that since B.P. Blg. 33, as amended is a penal statute, it already criminalizes the specific acts involving petroleum products. Respondent invokes the "void for vagueness" doctrine in assailing our decision, quoted in this wise: The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders4 (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent misconstrues our decision. A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void because general terms are used therein. The lawmakers have no positive constitutional or statutory duty to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. 5 Thus, respondents reliance on the "void for vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. Demonstrably, the specific acts and omissions cited in the Circular are within the contemplation of the B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. The DOE, in issuing the Circular, merely filled up the details and the manner through which B.P. Blg. 33, as amended may be carried out. Nothing extraneous was provided in the Circular that could result in its invalidity. On the fourth, fifth and sixth grounds, respondent avers that the penalties imposed in the Circular exceeded the ceiling prescribed by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. Respondent contends that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis, is no longer regulatory, but already confiscatory in nature. Respondents position is untenable. The Circular is not confiscatory in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis. Those penalties do not exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which penalizes "any person who commits any act [t]herein prohibited." Thus, violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase "any act" as mandated in Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in an indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical operation of B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."
1avv phi1

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All other arguments of respondent having been passed upon in our June 26, 2006 Decision, we uphold the validity of DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 sought to implement B.P. Blg. 33, as amended. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration by respondent is hereby DENIED with definite finality. No further pleadings will be entertained. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

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DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. RESOLUTION MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows: RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary. That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office. A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided: ... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied). Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours). And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated: No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3 The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied). The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.

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The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read: Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours) During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus: MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices? MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of the judges. MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6 xxx MR. OPLE. x x x Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the government. An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7 And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows: FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in government. Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced: xxx xxx

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says: No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax. So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied: FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore. The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted.9 The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.12
1avv phi 1

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Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied). it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed. Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Yap, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996 JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice". The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel". In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted through torture, and that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner, the question of what crime brigandage or robbery was committed is likewise motu proprio addressed by the Court in this Decision. Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision 1 of respondent Sandiganbayan 2 in Criminal Case No. 8496 promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution 3 promulgated on July 27, 1987 denying his motion for reconsideration. The Facts Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged in the following Information: 4 That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two of whom were armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit: 1) Postal Delivery Truck 2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers 3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers 4) Treasury Warrants 5) Several Mail Matters from abroad in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount. Contrary to law On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty. Their coaccused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in absentia. 5 Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution. Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the following: 6 The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service revolver, Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1) with six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel was a PC Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo Miravalles, a former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in connection with the hijacking of a delivery van by the elements of the Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of their right to remain silent and to have counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the existence of the sworn statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that said document was made under duress.

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The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. 6-a and the submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense, accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies plus those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera. Filoteo also submitted his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution proffered rebuttal evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L. Evidence for the Prosecution At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick up and deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were seated beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that morning at the Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airport where they were issued waybills 7 for the sacks of mail they collected. They then proceeded to the Central Post Office where they likewise gathered mail matters including 737 check letters 8 sent by the United States Embassy. All the mail matters were placed inside the delivery van, and its door padlocked. As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes Benz sedan 9 overtook their van and cut across its path. The car had five (5) passengers three seated in front and two at the back. The car's driver and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third man in front and the person immediately behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in the back had on a long-sleeved shirt. 10 Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, "Are you not going to stop this truck?" 11 Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the van's engine. Alighting from the car, the armed group identified themselves as policemen. 12 They ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van. As he stepped out of the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he surrendered it to one of the car passengers. 13 The three postal employees were then ordered to board the Benz. As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of the malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo Frias, going up the van. Inside the car, the three delivery employees were ordered to lower their heads. They sat between two of their captors at the back of the car while two others were in front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to straighten up as he was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse of the pimply face of the man to his left. He also recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo Frias, respectively. 14 As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling "densely confined." We was allowed to raise his head but with eyes closed. However, he sneaked a look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow beside him who poked a "balisong" at him as Angel Liwanag. The man in uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel. Earlier, as he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and recognized Frias. 15 These incidents yielded the pieces of information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza, Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects at Camp Crame later on. The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop, the captured men discovered that they were along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told to run towards the shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left, they put on their pants and reported the incident to the Kalookan Police Station. The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4, 1982. Discovered missing were several mail matters, 16 including checks and warrants, along with the van's battery, tools and fuel. 17 In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montao, then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of the hijacking incident. 18 Responding to the request, the SOG, which was tasked to detect, investigate and "neutralize" criminal syndicates in Metro Manila and adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One group was led by Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they conducted a "massive intelligence build-up" to monitor the drop points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated. On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about 9:00 P.M. of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer. The informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the checks were in the possession of their companions in Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt. Ferrer introduced himself and his companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed, Frias calmed down only when assured that his penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with the authorities. Frias thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza. Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who was in another car during the mission, to accompany Frias to Obrero Tondo while he escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly was in possession of several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation section of the SOG for further questioning. Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilao's group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking incident, Perez admitted participation therein and expressed disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks even after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks in his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.'s. 19 An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their two-way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza were in Lt. Pagdilao's custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his companions should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin Mateo. They met at the designated place and proceeded to Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.

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Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men heading in their direction. Perez identified them as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something into the ricefield which, when retrieved, turned out to be bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic bag. 20 As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car, Mateo said, "Sir, Kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa panalo. Marami pa akong tseke doon sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin babalikan." 21 Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved several other checks in another plastic bag. On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag admitted participation in the postal hijacking. At a confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind of the crime.

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Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo to the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The lawmen found petitioner at home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his participation in the hijacking, petitioner was dumbfounded (" parang nagulat). Pursuant to standard operating procedure in arrests, petitioner was informed of his constitutional rights, 22 whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However, the group, including petitioner, returned to the latter's place to recover the loot. It was "in the neighborhood," not in petitioner's house, where the authorities located the checks. 23 The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking, telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had earlier volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero which, quoted in full, reads as follows: BABALA Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman Filoteo, na ang dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol sa isang kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982 doon sa Meycauayan, Bulacan, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang maraming tsekeng US, tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo. Nais ko ring ibigay sa iyo ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod: a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik; b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong sarili mong pili upang may magpapayo sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat; c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga katanungang maaring makasira sa iyo sa dahilang anumang iyong isasalaysay ay maaring gamitin pabor or laban sa iyo sa kinauukulang hukuman; d. Na kung ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa CLAO-IBP upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang bayad. 1. TANONG: Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong lubos na naiintindihan at nauunawaan? SAGOT: Opo. 2. T: Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot na ito bilang katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang-loob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan at sumusumpang lahat ng iyong isasalaysay ay pawang mga katotohanan lamang? S: Opo, pipirma ako Ser. (Sgd.) JOSE D. FILOTEO (Affiant) MGA SAKSI: (Sgd.) ROMEO P. Ssg., PC C1C, WAC (PC) (Sgd.) TOLENTINO

ESPERO

THERESA

L.

3. T: Maari bang sabihin mong mull ang iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang bagay-bagay na maaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?

S: Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may-asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General Assignment Section, Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at kasalukuyang nakatira sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo, Manila. 4. T: Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas? S: Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong ako ay mapasok sa serbisyo. 5. T: Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF? S: Noon lamang pong January 1982. 6. T: Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan? S: Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking ina naman ay Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila noon July 17, 1951. 7. T: Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral? S: Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang second semester ng 4th year ko. 8. T: Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF? S: Sa Follow-Up Unit ako. 9. T: At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit no GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga specific duties? S: Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at-large sa mga suspects namin sa mga kasong hawak ng investigation. 10. T: Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit-kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong ginagawa? S: Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong hi-nayjack namin na Philippine Mail delivery van. 11. T: Wika mo'y kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan? S: Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who was seated in the investigation room and asked the name and was duly answered: Martin Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias, Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang mga taga LRP ng PC Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa pang Sergeant na ang alam ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin. Walo (8) (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as "SIYAM [9]") kaming lahat doon noon at ang mga gamit naman naming kotse noon ay ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda na isang Mercedes Benz na may plakang NMJ-659 kung saang ang driver namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza (corrected and initialled by affiant to read as "AKO") at ang mga kasama naman naming sakay ay sina Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP (affiant added and initialled this additional fact: "AT RAUL MENDOZA"). Ang isang kotse namang gamit namin ay pag-aari daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong minaneho na isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa kaming contact ni Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina AliasNINOY na isang dispatcher at Alias JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito sa trabahong ito ay si Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta upang umeskort sa kaniia sa pag-hijack ng delivery van. 12. T: Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post Office patungong norte? S: Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas- 4:00 hanggang alas-5:00 ng hapon. 13. T: Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga naganap noong hapon na iyon?

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S: Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office, sinundan na namin, una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating namin sa Malinta, Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa pagsunod, van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at huli na ang Lancer. Noong makapasok na kami ng boundary ng Meycauayan, Bulacan ay kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang delivery van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun ng LRP datiil sila noon ang may hawak ng kanilang Armalite Rifle pero may service pa silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang tatlong maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa Mercedes Benz, habang nakatutok ang kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng delivery van at ako na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina Junior Mateo at si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post Office na maydala ng delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin sa Manila ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza ay dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn din at sumunod sa amin. Noong makarating na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay inunahan na kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga, parang follow the leader na dahil siya na noon ang aming guide. 14. T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay? S: Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina Carding Perez, at noong nakarating na kami roon ay iniyatras ko na ang van sa kaniling garahe at doon ay ibinaba namin lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na ho alam kung ilan lahat iyon, na siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis kaming muli ng mga kasama ko rin sa van papuntang Quezon City kung saan namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung hindi ako nagkakamali. 15. T: Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari? S: Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding Perez sa may bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga na noong mga duffle bag sa (sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o orange na Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang usapan namin noon dahil sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si Carding Perez, kami naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda sa San Marcelino, Malate, Manila na sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown na si Carding Perez ang nagmaneho. Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin noon ang Mercedes Benz na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew ng delivery van dahil ibinaba at iniwanan daw nila sa Caloocan City. Ang naroroon na lamang noon ay sina Angelo Liwanag, si Raul Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon ang Mercedes Benz namin doon kina Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa kamag-anak, dahil hindi nila alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat naming kasama sa Toyota Corona na sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt. Jun doon sa tinitirhan nitong huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan Bridge sa may Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong apat, sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa Bocaue, Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at paglabas namin sa exit papuntang Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang lugar pero alam kong puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding Perez iyon pero hindi ko alam ang pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang buong tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang sundalong naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag pang ibang mukha pero hindi ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami, pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na nga, nakita na namin ang mga tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks he voluntarily surrendered) at aming inihiwalay ngayon sa mga sulat na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo sa Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos ay pahinga. Kinabukasan mull, gabi, inilipat na namin doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito (Affiant again referred to said checks). Isinakay namin noon sa isang cargo truck na pag-aari din daw nina Carding. lyong mga tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang sikretong compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis. Sikretong compartment iyon, na mahirap mahalata. 16. T: Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin mo nga kung anong uring baril iyon? S: Wala po akong baril, Ser. 17. T: Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to) sa iyo? S: E, di ganoon na nga he, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa aming grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay puro pangako ang nangyari. Kaya napagpasyahan namin na hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang onsehan sa amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravalles Alias JACK at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon muna sa amin ito nakatago (The checks recovered from the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang tumatagal ay umiinit at nalaman namin pati na may alarma na, kaya't inilipat namin doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod ng Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong kumare ko ang laman noon dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon noong isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang

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sa kinuha na namin ang supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic bag was again referred to) ay wala pa rin kamalay- malay ang kumare ko. 18. T: Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa Central Post Office, mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito? S: Iyong araw lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang nakikita, itong si Alias NINOY lamang ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya noon at nakikipag-usap kina Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala ko itong si AliasNINOY kung makita ko siyang muli. 19. T: Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa trabahong ito? S: Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong tropa na namin. 20. T: Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka bang nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa salaysay na ito? S: Wala na po. 21. T: Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang lumagda lamang? S: Opo. WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . ./ac (Sgd) JOSE D. FILOTEO MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA: (Sgd.) SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC (Sgd.) C1C THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC) 24 Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30, 1982. One was a certification stating that he voluntarily surrendered "voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers," that because of the "large number of pieces" of checks, he affixed his signature upon the middle portion of the back of each check "to serve as identification in the future, prior to the completion of its proper inventory and listing conducted by elements of SOG" in his presence, and that he "guided the elements of SOG" to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the sky-blue Mercedes Benz car which was surrendered to the SOG Headquarters. 25 The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner attested to his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the following facts: (a) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP but he refused to avail of the privilege; (b) that he was arrested by SOG men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982" sa dahilang ako ay kasangkot sa pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS Pension Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail;" (c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks and a Mercedes Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was not duly receipted for. 26 As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led the SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo Miranda on Singalong where the latter admitted that petitioner was his friend. He denied, however, having knowledge that his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe that his car would be used for surveillance purposes because petitioner's jeep was not available. The car was not returned until the evening following that when it was borrowed. 27 After the trip to Miranda's house, petitioner informed the investigators that some more checks could be recovered from hiskumare. Said checks were retrieved and turned over to headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda who later executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992 at the SOG. 28 Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his house. Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under custody and that they implicated him as one of their confederates, Miravalles reacted by saying, "Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan, eh." 29 Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At the barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan, Metro Manila, Saguindel voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG headquarters, after Miravalles initially informed him of the facts obtained during the investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, "Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa mga tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta." 30 With Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer and his team moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home, Relator

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excused himself, went upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six bullets 31 and said, "Sir, ito yong baril na nagamit." 32 The three suspects were brought to Camp Crame for further investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an after-operations report about their mission and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao an affidavit on the same matter. 33 Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn statements. 34 Prior to doing so, they waived their right to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted their participation and implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated that he was implicated in the crime only because in one drinking spree with petitioner, Mateo and one alias "Buro" during that month of May, they had a heated altercation. Like petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily surrendered vouchers and checks which were part of their loot in the hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator executed a certification to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used in the commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he needed the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner was visited by Jimmy Victorino and another comrade from the General Assignment Section of the WPD. For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint affidavit 35 manifesting their option to avail of their right to remain silent until such time as they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed a similar joint affidavit. 36 Severino Castro, the postal employee implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in court. However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I. 37 On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal employees Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and directed them to proceed to Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some pictures for identification of the culprits. The three recognized and pointed to the suspects in a line-up. Tagudar identified Saguindel and Liwanag. 38 Miranda pointed at Frias and Liwanag 39 while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and Liwanag. 40 Petitioner himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino Castro as their contact at the post office. 41 Five of the suspects who were not identified in the line-up were however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo and petitioner. SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No. 7885). 42 On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and aforequoted was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496. On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the accused 43 and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the Information asserting that under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they should be tried by a court martial. 44 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on January 3, 1984 45 on the ground that courts martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over them by virtue of their separation from military service. Evidence for the Defense Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman since August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in the Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police officers. 46 He also claimed to have received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the call of duty 47 and several commendations 48 for the distinguished performance of his duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982, he was a member of the Special Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area. Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial follow-up operation he allegedly participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the Shemberg Marketing Corporation. 49 Although a suspect, Mateo was not charged in the information subsequently filed in that case. Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters seeking assistance in his bid to lead a new life. Considering Mateo's familiarity with underworld characters, petitioner readily made him an informer who was paid from time to time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an effective informer. In fact, he allegedly supplied vital information on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases at the La Elegancia Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and Crafts, 50 and in an alleged racket in Aranque Market in Manila involving jewelries. As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioner's owner-type jeep whenever he was given an assignment. In one instance however, petitioner saw Mateo using his jeep with some male companions. Because Mateo denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then on refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given an allowance to cover his traveling expenses. About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and requested the latter to give him a good project as he was working for his transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged petitioner to lend him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery case. That same evening, petitioner approached his kumpare, accused Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latter's old Mercedes Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo could be identified as an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and "went around boasting of the Mercedes Benz." 51 Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised him to return the car between the hours of two and three in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila where petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who would be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met Almoguera and company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly before 5:00 in the afternoon when he was constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he had to attend a mandatory regular troop formation at 5:00 P.M. at the police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He returned to the beer house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00 o'clock, someone informed him that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for being late; the latter apologized and said that his surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then returned the car to Miranda, through the latter's cousin.

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At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a group of military men, went to petitioner's house at 810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only short pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he was handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the identities of his companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having knowledge of the exact location of the car but denied participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. 52 Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the residence of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on board two cars. When petitioner noticed that they were not heading for Miranda's place, he clutched the hand of Lt. Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was about to be "salvaged". Lt. Pagdilao however informed him that they would be dropping by petitioner's house first per the investigator's information that more checks could be recovered thereat. A warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in petitioner's house but nothing was found. Suddenly, someone from the other car came out of a nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had recovered some checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The latter surrendered his Benz to the group. At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner was repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he vehemently denied the accusation against him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat on his back. An object was tied to his small finger to electrocute him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied the "water cure" ("tinutubig") through his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They urged him to cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him. Meanwhile, petitioner's wife reported to the WPD General Assignment Section her husband's forcible abduction by armed men whom she mistook for CIS agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator went to the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was being investigated but no details were given thereon pending clearance with superior officers. 53 Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOG's refusal to allow petitioner's co-police officers to see him in his detention cell. 54 Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who was transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him. Petitioner revealed to Victorino the maltreatment done him but the latter expressed helplessness about it. In fact, Victorino advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG would not incriminate him (" para hindi ka pag-initan dito"). 55 The advice came after petitioner was warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated by the SOG, 56 should he refuse to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioner's cell and confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced to implicate petitioner. After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner refused to sign it. Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had an understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman was not member of the military but an "agent" of the SOG, and a member of the "Contreras gang". Petitioner was therefore constrained to sign the statement because of his excruciating experience ("hirap na hirap"). He however admitted having read the document before affixing his signature thereto and initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the certification he executed were allegedly also obtained by duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he did not even know Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta. Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioner's failure to appear despite subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as well as to authenticate his statement. 57However, petitioner swore that he never received the subpoenas. Petitioner's alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday on May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration at the Lakan Beer House. While his baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4, 1956, 58a joint affidavit 59 also attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary Gallardo, the owner of the beer house, corroborated Almoguera's testimony as to petitioner's alleged presence during the birthday celebration. The Respondent Court's Decision On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned 51-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as maximum, both of reclusion temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the action. Accused Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, for insufficiency of evidence. No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth of any proof as to the actual damages suffered by the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail matters, and it further appearing that the mail van which was hijacked had been recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants which were surrendered by some of the accused, without prejudice to the institution of the proper civil action to recover damages should proof thereof be available. Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-l and B-2, which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith and Wesson, Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively, which were surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-l to J5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22 pieces, respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks and vouchers, be returned to the Firearm and Explosives Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the Social Security System, respectively, upon proper receipts.

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Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General, Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio, Metro Manila and the Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for their information and guidance with respect to the other accused who are still at-large. SO ORDERED. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant alternative petition for certiorari and/or review on certioraricharging the Sandiganbayan with having gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at said Decision. The Issues The amended petition raises the following: Assignments of Error and/or Excess of Jurisdiction/Grave Abuse of Discretion
xxx xxx xxx

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First The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it made its determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Second The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other accused in the hijacking of the mail van indubitably established his direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation in the said hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules of Law. Third The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the voluminous SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and surrendered by petitioner and three of the other accused and in finding the testimonies and investigation reports relative thereto. "credible and unrefuted", said findings being, insofar as petitioner is concerned, absolutely without any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to the prosecution's only evidence that has some measure of competency and admissibility. Fourth The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding that dorsal portions of the checks and warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by him to indicate his admission of accountability therefor and that his signatures thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by him of said checks, said findings being absolutely without any support in the evidence. Fifth The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in admitting and considering against petitioner his alleged extra judical confession, despite petitioner's uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to give or sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross violation of Constitutional Provisions and the prevailing jurisprudence. Sixth The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that petitioner's participation in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably established "by the manner by which the SOG operatives succeeded in ferreting out the members of the hijacking syndicate one by one through patient sleuthing" and in finding that they did so "without resorting to extra-legal measures" and that "no evidence having been adduced to show that they were actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the herein accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full credence". Seventh

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that "even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, . . substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo" (Petitioner). Eighth Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that "accused Filoteo's ( petitioner's) and Mateo's [alleged]unexplained possession of the stolen checks raised the presumption that "they were responsible for the robbery in question", petitioner's alleged possession not being borne out but disputed by the prosecution's own evidence. Ninth The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that "accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and implausible". The truth of the matter being that they should have been sustained since petitioner was not identified by direct victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were present at the hijack and none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in his possession or retrieved from him. Tenth The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the participation of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of record and that said evidence "not only confirms the conspiracy between [him and the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission of the offense, but also their participation and/or indispensable cooperation". Eleventh The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in cavalierly rejecting, through the use of pejorative words, and without stating the legal basis of such rejection, the various vital factual points raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The Court believes that the above "errors" may be condensed into four: (1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him? (2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible? (3) Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper? (4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt? The Court's Ruling Preliminary Issue: Rule 4 or Rule 65? Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a "segurista", opted to file an (amended) "alternative petition" for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that the instant petition must be considered as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 60 this Court clearly ruled: Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on certiorariby this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court provides, in Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review and these must be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this general principle. Here, reading petitioner's Petition for Review and Memorandum in the most favorable possible light, petitioner may be seen to be in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain (f)acts in arriving at its factual conclusions. As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a person's life and liberty are at stake. 61

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As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would not prosper. Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on procedural matters, petitioner could have lost this battle through a summary dismissal of his "alternative" petition. But in view of the importance of the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of the matter. First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioner's extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime. Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the sameway that his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Court's admission evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases 62 upholding the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel "especially where the statements are replete with details and circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness." We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel. The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families." (emphasis supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored.) In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 the Court categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said: We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, 64 the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 65 issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. 66 Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, 67 the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught: . . . The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. . . . While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales.

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Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals 68 where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means. 69 Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. 70 Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law. 71 Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison 72 to make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983. The admissibility of petitioner's uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. 73 The waiver must also be categorical and definitive, 74 and must rest on clear evidence. 75 In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
76

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petitioner stated that:

. . . matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng Special Operations Group, PC/INP Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay malaya at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na walang abugadong magpapayo sa akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala naman akong isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan lamang, bagama't ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang tinanggihan: xxx xxx xxx Na ako ay hindi sinaktan a minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan; xxx xxx xxx Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right 77 but petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section, 78 still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel. It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course. 79 Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. 80 In other words, he was knowledgeable on the matterof extrajudicial confessions. The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture? Petitioner's claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical report 81 showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record shows that the investigating team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner even waived his right to present evidence 82 instead of impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers upon learning of its dismissal. Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the lines and strokes of a person's handwriting reflect his disposition at a certain given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that petitioner's signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after he had been subjected to maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioner's consent in executing the same had been vitiated. 83 Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we have pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied that respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence. More on this later. The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the crime. 84 Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.: 85 Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for "grave coercion, grave threat & maltreatment" which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City. 86 The complaint was an offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift a finger to revive it upon its dismissal. The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence Contrary to petitioner's claim, his culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. Hecould not be identified by the postal employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up driving the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the van. That the checks were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and upon learning that the authorities had begun to nail down the identities of the malefactors, hehad entrusted them to his "kumare". It was petitioner himself who led the team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the possession of his "kumare" in the neighborhood. 87 In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi has been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance between Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated during that time in approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have been physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 88 Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, this Court holds that the full force of the totality of the prosecution's evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself particularly in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
. . . It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of whic h has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 89

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The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on issues of credibility is accorded with highest respect by the appellate courts (People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170). Appellate courts will generally respect the findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. . . . 90

So overwhelming is the prosecution's evidence that respondent Court opined that even without the "inter-locking confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag" the remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction. 91 Said the respondent tribunal: However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we are of the considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car used by the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered voluminous assorted checks which were part of the loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was used by him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by prosecution witnesses Miranda and Bautista. Saguindel was identified in lineups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an Armalite rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to refute the evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes an implied admission of guilt. Moreover, accused Filoteo's and Mateo's unexplained possession of the stolen checks raises the presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in question. It is a rule established by an abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed the thief. This rule is in accordance with the disputable presumption "that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act." In the instant case, said accused has not given such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their possession had been positively established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by accused's own signatures at the back of said checks. Furthermore, accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and implausible. His claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Bent car from Rodolfo Miranda to help out his co-accused Mateo, who had been utilized by the

police as an "informer" and was following up tips in certain unsolved cases, appears to be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the morning of May 2, 1982, he waited at the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day and then went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police formation at around 5:00 o'clock p.m. when Mateo failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera that he was with them between 3:00 o'clock to 4:45 o'clock p.m., then from 6:00 o'clock to 8:30 o'clock p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 o'clock p.m. to 11:00 o'clock of the same date. It was through said witnesses that he tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 o'clock to 7:30 o'clock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the period from the time the mail van was hi-jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice that the distance between the crime scene and down-town Manila is some 15-20 kilometers and negotiable over first- class roads in some thirty (30) minutes. We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision: 92 The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic) been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which evidence not only confirms the existence of the conspiracy between them as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission of the offense, but also their participation therein as co-principals by direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the participants are responsible for what the others did in all the stages of execution of the offense. Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery? The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not argued by the parties in their pleadings, the question of which law was violated by the accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have brought up such question as it may benefit him with a reduced penalty. The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. 93 Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates: Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect to the highway robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a "Philippine Highway" which under Section 2 (c) thereof has been defined as "any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles or property or both", while under Section 2 (e) thereof "Highway Robbery/ Brigandage" has been defined as the "the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway". (Emphasis supplied) The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by the prosecution properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a postal van containing mail matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national highway in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the three (3) postal employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation of the entire van and its contents consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the crime was committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in conspiracy with their coaccused Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated in the planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense under the law in point are present. (Emphasis in the original text.) Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on anational highway (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in the case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, 94 where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more than the situs of the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado: The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity: The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." (Emphasis ours.)

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In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit: WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people: WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries: WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished is said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of "depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. 95 Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D. 532. 96 The facts alleged therein and proven by the evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244, par. 5, all of the Revised Penal Code. 97 From the facts, it was duly proven that: * personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.) * belonging to another were * unlawfully taken by the accused * with intent to gain (animo lucrandi) * with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293) * in an uninhabited place, or * by an band, or * by attacking a moving motor vehicle * on a highway; and * the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295) Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294, which is, " prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period".

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Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo should be lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only herein petitioner and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayan's Decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action. All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Belosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., took no part.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

PADILLA, J.: Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987. This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution. The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated inGold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

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The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
3

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5 The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and a dopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6

It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that xxx xxx xxx (3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. (4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. xxx xxx xxx (7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ... Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides thatSection 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices.

Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].

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The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. ThusMr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later. Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning. xxx xxx xxx On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following: MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera. MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26. MR. FOZ: That is correct. MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion? MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive department, and to require further confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence.

MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office. MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors. xxx xxx xxx

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MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President? MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of Commissioner de Castro? MR. FOZ: Yes. MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee? xxx xxx xxx MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote. MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . . THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments is approved. xxx xxx xxx MR. ROMULO: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY. MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. MR. DAVIDE: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. xxx xxx xxx

MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION? FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague. MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions. FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed. FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed amendment? MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"? WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE

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MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee. FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept? MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman. MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by Commissioner Bernas. THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide. xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).

It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII readingHe (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied) with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentenceRather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service. But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof. Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied]. and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in said third sentence. The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof ...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied]. The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; ... In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the

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Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows: 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head. Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows: Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991 ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents. G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991 SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents. Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co. Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions. ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution) The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz: The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401) The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404) When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power? In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

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In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action. The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

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Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]) In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948. The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground. Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

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In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family. The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections. The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar. Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution? Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer? Fr. Bernas: yes. xxx xxx xxx Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment? Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189) xxx xxx xxx Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . . Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4. Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231) xxx xxx xxx Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356) The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive. It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]) A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580) In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]: To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427) The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.

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It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution. The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980]) There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied) The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied) The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]) To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of

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the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case." The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen. There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies. Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen? Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen. Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject? Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz: ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards: 1. Persons born in Spanish territory. 2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain. 3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers. 4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied) The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949]) As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3) The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property. As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain. Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject. If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino. The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.

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On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule. It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found. This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29) The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24) The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918]) Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses. Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9) In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented. The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse. ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong. The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit: Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence? Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87) xxx xxx xxx Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

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Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside? Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110) The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]) The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed. Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8) The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced. The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents. Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied) To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965]) It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]) As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country. Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent. Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish. However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness. Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

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SO ORDERED. Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

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[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to NULlify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. [3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. [4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. [5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. [6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.[7] The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows: xxx 2. PURPOSE: The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security. 3. SITUATION: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. 4. MISSION: The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel. 5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS: a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality. c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.

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xxx.
[8]

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM [9] Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to anNUL LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, NULl and void and unconstitutional, arguing that: I THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT: A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. II IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.[10] Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,[11] dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment. The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. The petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will [13] sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue [14] affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the [15] presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. [17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

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The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment.[19] The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court. As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare.[20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus: More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security. xxx[21] Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result. We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or

measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. As Taada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the [24] people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question. The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [25] or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is [26] justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given [27] to this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of [28] discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[29] Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.[31] When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation[32]before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. xxx The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus: xxx Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
[23]

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During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit: FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence. When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody. xxx FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger. MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea? MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.[34] The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

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The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of [36] the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility [37] [38] patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and [39] manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to [40] these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious [41] incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution. It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are: 1. Elections;[42] 2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43] 3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44] 4. Amateur sports promotion and development;[45] 5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46] 6. Conservation of natural resources;[47] 7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48] 8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49] 9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities; 10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51] 11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;[52] 12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53] 13. Sanitary inspections;[54] 14. Conduct of census work;[55] 15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56] 16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57] 17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.[58] This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.[59] What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,[60] and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states: 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[62]
[50]

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To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courts following standards, to wit:

[63]

apply the

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel [64] subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory George Washington Law Review, pp. 404433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?

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x x x When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied) Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General: 3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,[66] 8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)[70] of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.[71] It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence. One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., on official leave. Puno, J., see separate opinion. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Panganiban, J., in the result. Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001 BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics. The Case Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. The Factual Antecedents With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2 Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline. The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote: "We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window. "It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections. "However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3 On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5 On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8 Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11 On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May

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17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court. Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15 Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues: "1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law? "2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. "3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. "4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16 The Court's Ruling The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. First Issue: Recourse Under Rule 65 Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19 We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21 The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25 Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26 Second Issue: Participation of Political Parties

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In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29 We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

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Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. "Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. "Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30 During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33 "MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista? MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido." Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system." For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office." Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: "x x x "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. x x x" Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections. Third Issue: Marginalized and Underrepresented That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows: "(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be

filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.) Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the partylist provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35 The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise: "SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies." "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented." In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37 The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states: "SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38

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The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41 The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system. Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43 While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections. As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress. Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries. This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system. Refutation of the Separate Opinions The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47 Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of

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fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof." Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to. But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute. Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply. Fourth Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50 In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties Respondents LakasNUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDPLaban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166. What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations. Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system. Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows: "JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors? ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52

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Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: "MR. OPLE. x x x In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition? MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54 The following discussion is also pertinent: "MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group. REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55 Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."58 Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered." 59 Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: "SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

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Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x." 61

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Epilogue The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives." Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity. Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization. In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941. WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
1wphi1.nt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, Davide, Jr., C.J., in Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business. and Gonzaga-Reyes, the dissenting of J. Vicente JJ., concur. result. opinion. Mendoza.

dissent

M.