THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. He was sentenced to death. On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality. the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children. Appellant alone killed about six women, he himself admitted his participation in the massacre . However appellant's counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted. There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan. Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said constitution ordains:"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.). This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps. It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.. The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the butchery of Banaban."

 Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed band," So ordered.

Gerona vs. Sec. of education

June 11, 1955 RA 1265 was approved and went into effect. It directed the Sec. of Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony. The Secretary issued DO 8. These held the conduct of flag ceremonies compulsory in all public and private schools. Flag Ceremony: Formation in front of the flag Singing of the Philippine National Anthem with the proper salute Patriotic Pledge after the Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony, after proper notice and hearing, shall be subjected to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation. 2nd offense cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure. DO 8: Display of the Filipino Flag throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. Flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The petitioners' children, being Jehovahs witnesses, attending the Buenavista Community School, Masbate, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge so they were expelled from school in September, 1955. Petitioners requested that their children be allowed to attend and remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. They claim that the flag is an image from which their religion prohibits them to bow down to. SEC OF EDUCATION DENIED

Whether the mandate to salute to the Philippine flag constitutes an abridgement of the right to religion of Jehovahs witnesses? NO
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In said oath, taken while his right hand is raised, he swears allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, promises to defend the Constitution and even invokes the help of God;

and it is to be doubted whether a member of Jehovah's Witness who is a candidate for admission to the Philippine Bar would object to taking the oath on the ground that it is religious ceremony. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. The trouble with exempting petitioners from participation in the flag ceremony aside from the fact that they have no valid right to such exemption is that the latter would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. If the children of Jehovah Witnesses are exempted, then the other pupils, especially the young ones seeing no reason for such exemption, would naturally ask for the same privilege.

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

Ebralinag vs. Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993)

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge RULING: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to

act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE

Balbuena vs. Sec. of education

Members of the Jehovahs' Witnesses seek to enjoin the enforcement of DO, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in RA 1265. They claim it denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, due process of law and equal protection of the laws and that unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. They also raise the new issue that DO 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the OG as required by CA 638, Art. 2, CC and Sec. 11, RAC. They also claim that RA 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegation of legislative power for lack of any specific and definite standard. CFI DISMISSED prohibition and mandamus

Whether DO 8 is valid? YES

Whether RA 1265 is valid? YES

DO 8, being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. As in Gerona, it was not a penal legislation.

RA 1265 requires for simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem. That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve. Decision appealed from AFFIRMED.

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL, petitioner-appellant, vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch III, and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA, respondents-appellees.
Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner, contending no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. The remaining five members of this Court, Chief Justice on the other hand, hold the position that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. The vote is thus indecisive. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Except for the dispositive part announcing the judgment of the Court, the remainder of this opinion sets forth the reasons why there are constitutional objections to the continuing force and effectivity of Section 2175 as far as ecclesiastics are concerned. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.". There are previous rulings to that effect. The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot survive.

 This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." As stated by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt or non-payment of poll tax: 10 "It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article Ill of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. De los Santos v. Mallare 12 came next. The President, under the Revised Administrative Code, could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 13 Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos, who was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. Why such a power could not pass the test of validity under the 1935 Constitution was pointed out by Justice Tuason thus: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 14 It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.. As emphatically declared by Justice Black: "this Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him." 19 The analogy appears to be obvious. In that case, it was lack of belief in God that was a disqualification. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. As set forth at the outset, it is not even necessary to annul the challenged Administrative Code provision. It is merely declared inoperative by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the present Charter. Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside. Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect. No pronouncement as to costs.

G ERMAN

VS .

B ARANGAN

Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church. Petitioners, 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, they were barred by Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior, Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding because St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. Because of an alleged warning that any similar attempt to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse. Their alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing, respondents assured petitioners they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church They maintain the petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the President --- the yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. J.P. Fenix wrote "Mission Impossible" in "Mr. & Mrs." Magazine.

Whether the petitioners were denied of their freedom for religious worship? NO
While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship because previously, mobs crashed through the Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Here, the petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.

A.M. No. 2440-CFI

July 25, 1981

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA, Respondent.
Teofilo Ramos, Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo, took umbrage on the portion of the opinion of Judge Leopoldo Gironella in the course of acquitting the defendants accused of Triple Rape: "it will also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979 - August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the INK Her husband Florencio Ola and her in-lawj s were still in the process of being convinced to become members. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers of the INK as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of this action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of the INK. It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem." In the defense of the judge, he contended that the statements complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the statement of the complainant witness (Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact that she had always been accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of the sect. Ramos, Sr. claimed that the statement was uncalled for and intended to further malign the INK, thereby seriously putting under doubt judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of the law. This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution.

The use of the word "gimmick" could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as
understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is safeguarded by the fundamental law. 6 The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to its views is equally deserving of protection. While under the circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of the majority that an admonition would suffice.

WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in the use of language likely to offend an
individual or religious sect.

Estrada vs. Escritor AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.