SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON CASES OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 The respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, and lived with a mistress with whom he has a child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husbands psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to private respondent, thus a valid ground to render the marriage void. HELD: NO. Marriage is valid. RATIO: They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations. Theyre not incapable of doing them. Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. SC enumerated the guidelines in invoking the psychological incapacity under Article 36: 1. the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belong to the plaintiff 2. the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified b. alleged in the complaint c. sufficiently proven by experts and d. clearly explained in the decision. 3. the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage 4. Psychological Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 6. the essential obligations must be those embodied by Art 69 to 71 (husband and wife) of FC as well as Art 220, 221 and 335 (parents and children) 7. interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the PI while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts 8. the trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SC issues a certification. (last sent not anymore needed pursuant to SC resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10)

LEOUEL SANTOS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

G.R. No. 112019 January 04, 1995 Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S to work as a nurse. She only called up Leouel seven months after she left with promise to return after her contract expires on July 1989. She didnt come back. Leouel had a military training in the US and he looked for Julia but he never found her. In 1991, Leoul filed a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of FC. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? HELD: NO. Dismissed. RATIO: SC defined psychological incapacity as to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. For psychological incapacity to be proven, there must be a real inability to commit oneself to the essential obligations of marriage. Mere difficulty of assuming these obligations which could be overcome by normal effort does not constitute incapacity. Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal gave 3 characteristics of psychological incapacity:

1. gravity that would really render one incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties in marriage
2. juridical antecedence means it should be rooted in history, existing prior to the marriage 3. incurability including cure that is beyond the partys means. Circumstances of the case at bar do not amount to psychological incapacity.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755 Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

ISSUE: Is there a need for Personal Medical Examination of Respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity HELD: No. The SC rules in the negative. RATIO: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although SC is sufficienty convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of this acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 is NOT to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999 Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on January 1, 1981 and they begot three (3) children. On July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 alleging that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his obligation to support the family, devoting most of this time drinking, had affairs with many women and cohabiting with another women with whom he had an illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family. ISSUE: Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article. 36 HELD. No. RATIO: Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these facts are manifestations of a discolored personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

Expert testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of the psychological incapacity to show that it existed at the time of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

CHI MING TSOI VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND GINA LAO-TSOI G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 On May 22, 1988, Gina Lao married Chi Ming Tsoi. According to Gina, since the time of their marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. The defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ? HELD: Yes. Granted. Marriage void. RATIO: Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations and constant non-fulfillment of such will destroy marriage. Prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity, although physically capable. Filipinas are modest, Gina would have not subjected herself to such public scrutiny if she was just making this up. Chi Mings reluctance & unwillingness to perform sexual acts with a wife he claims he loves dearly, proves that this is a hopeless situation & of his serious personality disorder. Grave enough.

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent. G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002 Leni & Alfonso Choa were married on March 15, 1981. They had two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. Alfonso filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Lenis incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not Cheryl is psychologically incapacitated. HELD: NO. Petition granted. Marriage is still valid.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

RATIO: Alfonso presented insufficient evidence to prove Lenis incapacity. The totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. Grounds of Alfonso: lack of attention to their children, immaturity, lack of intention to procreate are not sufficient to render one as psychologically incapable. Reasons should be grave, with juridical antecedence and incurable. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. The physician, in his testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.

BERNARDINO S. ZAMORA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA, Respondents G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007 Petitioner alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child and that private respondent abandoned him by working in the United and had become an American citizen. Defendant denied it and said she loves children as she is a nurse by profession and faulted her husband for the breakup that had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them. ISSUE: Whether or not Norma Zamora is psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. HELD: No. Petition is denied. Norma is not psychologically incapacitated. RATIO: The mere refusal to bear a child is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, since even if such allegation is true, it is not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity SC applied the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), which states (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. There is nothing in Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995), upon which private respondent relies, that requires as a condition sine qua non the presentation of expert opinion of psychologists and psychiatrists in every petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code. This Court merely said in that

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

case that the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. Citizenship.

NILDA V. NAVALES, PETITIONER, VS. REYNALDO NAVALES, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008. Reynaldo married Nilda who was a single mother and known as waitress in a local bar. The first year of marriage of the couple was peaceful but problems between them arose when Nilda worked as aerobics instructor in a gym where Nildas flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. According to Reynaldo, Nilda wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would destroy her figure. Due to these, Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again. ISSUE: Whether nymphomania, promiscuity and flirting are grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity? HELD: No. SC finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. RATIO:

Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The flirtatious acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent. G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag on September 7, 1975. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation and re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. Erlinda alledged that Avelino was an alcoholic, would physically abused her if she refused to have sex and that he was imprisoned for a crime. Erlinda filed a case for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. Only Erlinda and her counsel appeared on trial and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. Without waiting

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment to CA but was denied and The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice? HELD: The law does not define what psychological incapacity is and therefore, the determination is left solely with the courts on a case-to-case basis. Determination of psychological incapacity depends on the facts of the case. Each must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts Taking into consideration the guidelines in Republic vs Molina in the interpretation of Article 36 of FC, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS VS. BRIX FERRARIS G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 ISSUE Whether or not Brix psychological incapacitated as to render his marriage with Amy void. HELD: No. RATIO:

The Court found Brixs alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
he and Amy quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006 Norma and Eulogio were married on March 27, 1965. Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity alleging his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985. Issue: Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature comtemplated by Article 36 of FC. HELD: No. RATIO:

The circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital
obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, 220, 221, and 225of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Normas lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened Normas claim of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity. Normas omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.

VILLALON vs. VILLALON JAIME F. VILLALON, PETITIONER VS. MA. CORAZON VILLALON November 18, 2005, G.R. No. 167206 Petitioner was married to respondent for 18 years. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his marriage to respondent, citing psychological incapacity on his part as a ground. Petitioner alleged the psychological disorder as that of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Cassanova Complex.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was indeed psychologically incapacitated to render his marital obligations HELD: No. RATIO: The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage Petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. He simply fall out of love and has consequently refused to stay married to her. Refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of law.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents. G.R. No. 127623 April 12, 2000 On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. Lower court and CA denied the petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and 2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. HELD: Marriage void due to lack of marriage license. The issue on the psychological incapacity of Fernando Sy was rendered moot and academic. RATIO:

Habitual alcoholism,refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and refusal to have sex and performing the marital act only to satisfy himself does not constitute psychological incapacity. It falls short of the quantum of evidence. The general rule is that you do not assign an error in judgment, the appellate court will not tackle that unassigned error or issue. But in this case, even if the issue was unassigned, it was so obvious from the record that there was no marriage license which proved that the marriage is void because there was no marriage license.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

DEBEL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004 David married Sharon and produced four children. Sharon had an illicit affair with several men and then later to a Jordanian national named Ibrahim whom she also married and had two children. The petitioner filed a case and avers that during the marriage Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment fall within the term of psychological incapacity. Held: No. Sharon Dedel is not psychological incapacitated.

RATIO:

Private respondents infidelity or perversion do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. It appears that private respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage; in fact, the record disclosed that there was a blissful marital union. It must be shown that the acts are a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

EONILO ANTONIO, Petitioner, versus MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 This is a landmark case on Psychological Incapacity which proclaims, under certain circumstances, habitual lying as constitutive of psychological incapacity which may lead to nullity of marriage. The petitioner-husband claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. ISSUE: Whether or no repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity of the respondent HELD: Yes. RATIO:

The Court acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. The case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitioners for declaration of nullity under

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.

Respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents. G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005 Noel deceived Isabel into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; Wife claimed that she suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation. Noel filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations. HELD: No. Moral and Exemplary damages are deleted. RATIO: The acts or omissions of petitioner constitute psychological incapacity. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity

manifest only after its solemnization. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

Karen Rae |Psychological Incapacity