THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: AN EXPOS AND CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZS CONTRIBUTIONS

BY

MATTHEW-MARY S. F. OKEREKE okereke3@yahoo.com

BEING A PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF THE DOMINICAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, IBADAN, NIGERIA.

2008
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OUTLINE

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INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................3

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A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF LEIBNIZ..........................................................................3

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LEIBNIZ AND MATERIALISM..................................................................................4

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LEIBNIZ AND DUALISM...........................................................................................5

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LEIBNIZS PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY...........................................................6

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THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: A CRITIQUE.............................................7

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CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................9

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INTRODUCTION The seventeenth century was a period of profound transformation in philosophy,

science and theology, and in the conception of human life. The scholastic philosophy of the universities was challenged, and many themes still at the centre of philosophical debate were initiated. It is at the centre of all these that Descartes through his Meditations introduced a strong dichotomy between body and mind albeit also propounding an interaction between them. This theory of dichotomy on one hand and its interaction on the other grasped the attention of many philosophers if not all and has (and is) being grappled with by philosophers worldwide either with a bid to support Descartes, to modify Descartes view or even to invent their own radically different stance. Despite the differences inherent in the theories that these philosophers have proffered to solve this Cartesian dichotomy, most of the solutions/theories can be broadly grouped into two: materialist and dualistic theories/solutions on the mindbody problem. In furtherance to our aforesaid, it is apt to assert here that it is among the theories or Solutions that cannot be grouped under the materialist or dualistic theories/solutions that the solution of Leibniz can be placed and rightly so. The philosophical import of Leibniz under this group is enormous and thus, it is our aim in this work, to concisely expose the solution he proffered to the mind-body problem and further give the implications or consequences of his contributions. In other to execute this plan, we have chosen to briefly discuss the background which produced Leibniz, his stance on materialism and on dualism, the theory of pre-established harmonyhis solution to the mind-body problem and then the logical implications of his theory of pre-established harmony. 2.0 A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF LEIBNIZ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in 1646 into a family of Bohemian origin at Leipzig. It is recorded that his father was a professor of moral philosophy in the University of
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Leipzig. Of the many books we used in our search on the life of Leibniz, one description of the young Leibniz seems to be recurring and this is the fact that the young Leibniz is often described as a precocious person.1 It will not be out of place to infer that Leibniz must have tapped greatly from his fathers librarythat which must have contributed greatly to his early mental development. Apart from this, Bertrand Russell asserts that four successive influences contributed to his education and these are: Scholasticism, Materialism, Cartesianism, and Spinozism.2 Imbued with the spirit of discovery and that of method, Leibniz attained the status of a respected philosopher, mathematician and statesman. Leibniz was considered a universal genius by his contemporaries and his works encompasses not only philosophy and mathematics but also law, diplomacy, theology, politics, history, philology and physics. With Descartes he shares the merit of having a more authoritative insight into the method and value of mathematics and physics than any other philosopher of the first rank. And with Hume he shares the honour of setting the stage for the rejuvenation of modern philosophy in the critical philosophy of Kant.3 Having contributed that which his lifetime permitted him to, he died in 1716. 3.0 LEIBNIZ AND MATERIALISM Before going ahead, we have deemed it fit to comment on Leibnizs take on materialism, one of the main groups that was and is still involved in the quest for providing an answer to the mind-body problem. Leibniz was strongly against materialism. For Leibniz, the realms of the mental and the physical form two distinct realms but though, not in a way conducive to dualism. Leibniz was opposed to materialism since according to him, perception
1 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Vol. 4 (New York: Image Books, 1994), p. 264; Mary Morris, Philosophical Writings by Leibniz ( London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1934), p. 1. A precocious person is one who becomes developed or matured, especially mental, at an unusually early age. 2 Cf. Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of The Philososphy of Leibniz ( London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), p. 5. 3 Mary Morris, Philosophical Writings by Leibniz (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1934), p. VII. 4

and consciousness cannot be possibly explained mechanically, and, hence could not be physical processes. A perception, for him, is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true unity, perception cannot be brought about by that which is not a true unitythat which is divisible and so, it follows for Leibniz that if matter is infinitely divisible, matter cannot form a true unity; it cannot explain perception and this for Leibniz consequently render materialism false. This system of argument by Leibniz has found even strong adherents in contemporary philosophy since many contemporary philosophers have objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought experiments like Leibniz's, furthermore, experiments designed to show that qualia and consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the mind are preponderant today. Leibniz further asserted that materialism is false by using an analogy to show the impossibility of artificial intelligence since no matter how complex the inner workings of a machine may be, nothing about it reveals that what is running in it are the inner workings of a conscious being. 4.0 LEIBNIZ AND DUALISM One would have ordinarily thought that a rejection of materialism by Leibniz should have led him to an embrace of the Cartesian dualism but the opposite is the case since he pours as much aversion on the Cartesian dualism as he did on materialism. According to the Cartesian dualism, the world fundamentally consists of two disparate substances: extended material substance (body) and unextended thinking substance (mind).4 Leibniz declared dualism false on the grounds that the existence of genuine extended material substance is actually not correct. For Leibniz, being and one are equivalent and in order for something to count as a real beinga substanceit must be truly one, or an entity endowed with genuine unity. Furthermore, he argues that for something to be genuine unity, it must be a simple and indivisible entity. Substantial unity, he writes, requires a complete, indivisible
4 Cf. Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James, The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003), pp. 650-651. 5

and naturally indestructible entity (to Arnauld, 28 November 1686).5 But matter is extended, and thus, Leibniz believes it is infinitely divisible. Hence, there is no such thing, for Leibniz, as material substance. 5.0 LEIBNIZS PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY Having rejected the materialist position by arguing that consciousness and thought cannot be captured by purely mechanical principles and the dualist position by discrediting their bifurcation of the universe into two different kinds of substances and the later interaction of these two different kinds of substances, Leibniz went ahead to posit that that which is consists solely of one type of substance, though there also exist infinitely many substances of this one type. These substances are partless, unextended entities, some of which are endowed with thought and consciousness, and others of which are found the phenomenality of the corporeal world. Although Leibniz argued in favour of the existence of only one type of substance as we have shown above, it is interesting that we note that he also held that the mind and body are metaphysically distinct. What he meant by this metaphysical distinction has been a debate over the years but on any plausible interpretation it is safe to assume (as Leibniz seems to have done) that for any person P, Ps mind is a distinct substance (a soul) from Ps body. With this assumption in hand, we may formulate the central issue in the form of a question: how is it that certain mental states and events are coordinated with certain bodily states and events, and vice-versa? It is to this poser that Leibniz proffered his pre-established harmony theory in which he asserted that each created substance is programmed at creation such that all its natural states and actions are carried out in conformity with all the natural states and actions of every other created substance and it is in accordance to this that he argues that what normally appear to us to be real causal relations between mind and body are, in metaphysical reality, the mutual conformity or coordination of
5 Mary Morris, Philosophical Writings by Leibniz ( London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1934), pp. XI-XV 6

mind and body with no interaction or divine intervention involved. Furthermore, in this theory of his, inter-substantial causality is denied and intra-substantial causality affirmed. According to the former, no state of a created substance has as a real cause some state of another created substance and according to the later, every non-initial, non-miraculous, state of a created substance has as a real cause some previous state of that very substance. It appears to us that one of the important motivations for Leibniz assertion of intrasubstantial causation is his account of substance. Leibniz defines a substance in terms of a complete concept, that is, a concept which contains within itself all that will ever be true of that substance. In view of this, the changes that occur in a substance are simply the result of the unfolding of its complete concept, a process that occurs through the spontaneous activity of the basic force of appetition that each substance possesses. Since each substance contains all of its predicates within itself, there is no need for the causal activity of other substances (i.e., no need for inter-substantial causation).6 This explanation reveals why it is fitting for Leibniz to use the term "pre-established"; all the predicates that will ever be true of a substance are 'pre-determined' or 'pre-established' in its complete concept. The "harmony" Leibniz describes arises because God has created substances that mirror each other completely in their internal changes. 6.0 THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: A CRITIQUE Reading through Leibnizs theory of pre-established harmony, we have come to observe that his theory somewhat coheres with religion since it emphasizes Gods perfections (for example, necessary existence, free agency, providence, power and knowledge). Flowing from this theory is the belief of the existence of a God: a God that is brought in to solve the problem in view. A critique to this would be that Leibniz brings a God, his supernatural pre-

6 Cf. Mary Morris, Philosophical Writings by Leibniz ( London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1934), p. XI-XII 7

establisher, to provide an explanation to the mind-body problem (Deus ex machina7). Thus, the validity of his theory is dependent on the existence of this supernatural being whose existence is even debatable among philosophers. Furthermore, it appears to us that even if this necessary supernatural being of Leibniz exists, his theory may still not solve the problem of interaction since this supernatural unextended being would still be presented to be the preprogrammed causation of effects later observed and thus taking us back to the original problem: where and how can an unextended substance interact with an extended substance? Another thing which may falsify Leibnizs claims would be a submission of his theory to that which is known as the law of parsimony or Ockhams razor for with this methodological tool, Leibnizs theory which introduces a third entity (that is, God) in its bid to provide solution to the mind-body problem would be knocked out by theories with lesser entities Again, we must note here that Leibnizs rejection of materialism using the analogy of the impossibility of artificial intelligence can be faulted for if he asserts that no matter how complex the inner workings of a machine may be, nothing about it reveals that what is running in it are the inner workings of a conscious being, then the question to him by proponents of artificial intelligence may be: what are those inner workings of a conscious being that cannot be exhibited by a machine? Besides the above, Leibnizs theory also seems compatible to the nature of human beings since its denial of inter-substantial causation gives emphasis to the independence of human beings from other creatures and its assertion of intra-substantial causation highlights both the perfect spontaneity and the immortality of the soul.

7 Peter Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (1981), s. v. dues ex machine. 8

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CONCLUSION Having perused through Leibnizs theory of pre-established harmony, we can assert

here that no critical mind would deny Leibnizs attempt to build a coherent system. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony does not satisfactorily explain the union of the mind and the body. In other words, Leibnizs theory does not clarify or solve the problem of interaction between the mind and the body introduced by Descartes Meditations. If this is the case, then we can categorically posit that despite the contributions of Leibnizs pre-established harmony to the mind-body problem, the problem remains unsolved.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Angeles, Peter. Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981. Bunnin, Nicholas and Tsui-James, E. P. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003. Collins, James. A History of Modern European Philosophy. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1954. Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy Vol. 4. New York: Image Books, 1994. Leibniz, Gottfried. Monadology. Translation of Daniel Kolaks The philosophy Source. Morris, Mary. Philosophical Writings by Leibniz. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1934. Russell, Bertrand. A Critical Exposition of The Philosophy of Leibniz. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958 Stokes, Philip. Philosophy: 100 Essential Thinkers. New York: Enchanted Lion Books, 2002. "http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Mind-body_problem:_New_approaches" (12 Dec 2009)

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