Los Banos vs Pedro ( RULE 117 Sec 3, 5, and 8 ) Facts: Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded

firearm without the required authorization form the COMELEC. He then filed a Motion to Quash arguing that the information contains averments which, if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification and the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He then attached in his motion a COMELEC certification exempting him from the gun ban. The RTC quashed the information. The private prosecutor months after, moved to reopen the case as it was found out that the certification was falsified, the RTC granted the motion and reopen the case. Pedro then opposed the motion and argued that the dismissal had become permanent arguing Sec 8 of Rule 117, applying the TIME BAR Rule. The RTC however denied his motion and proceeded with the case. Pedro then elevated the matter to the CA by way of Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated opening. The CA ruled in favor of Pedro. Issue: Whether the Quashal of an information can be treated as a provisional dismissal, thus applying the Time Bar Rule? Ruling: No. Time Bar rule is a procedural rule under Sec 8 of Rule 117 which is a procedural limitation qualifying the right of the state to prosecute. The time bar rule only applies in cases of provisional dismissal and not in case of Quashal. An order sustaining a motion to Quash does not bar another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3 (g), (i) of Rule 117. The above grounds relied by Pedro are grounds for Quashal and not for provisional dismissal therefore the time bar rule does not apply. People vs Lacson ( RULE 117 Sec 3, 5, and 8 ) Facts: Lacson was charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons. Before plea, he filed a motion for the judicial determination of probable cause and for the examination of witness. Not only did the Judge granted the motion he also dismissed the case provisionally. Lacson, did not objected to, nor express approval of the provisional dismissal of the Judge, believing that it was beneficial to him. Notice was not also served to all the offended party December 1 2000, the rule with regards to Time Bar took effect. Lacson then argued that the new rule should be applied retroactively as it benefits the accused. He asserts that the two-year period should begin to run on March 29 2000 when the prosecutor received the resolution of the Judge ordering the provisional dismissal of the case. The prosecutor on the other hand argues that doing so, would prejudice the state as it would only have a year and three months left to revive the information.

Issue:

1) The rules provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party; thus, whether the mere acquiesce of the accused without objection nor approval on his part is tantamount to an express consent? 2) Whether the Time Bar rule ( 2 year period ) should be applied retroactively on March 29 2000 when the prosecutor received a copy of the resolution of the judge dismissing the case provisionally or from December 2000 when the Rule took effect? Ruling: 1) No, the mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. Express consent is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. 2) The law should be applied on December 2000 when the law took effect. As the US Supreme Court held in Griffin vs People, We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announce has always been the law and therefore that those who did not availed themselves has waived their rights. The prosecution could not be expected to comply with the rule as early as March of 1999 as the rule governing time bar was not yet enforced at that time. Viudez vs CA ( Rule 112 ) Facts: A resolution was issued by the fiscal finding probable cause against the petitioner. A criminal case was then filed in court against them and a warrant of arrest was followed thereafter. Petitioner however, contested the findings of the fiscal in the Department of justice by way of a petition for review. While the said petition was pending, he filed a motion in court to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner grounded his motion on DOJ circular NO.70 Paragraph 2 section 9 which states that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance The court however, denied the motion. He then appealed the denial of the motion to the Court of Appeals, which nevertheless affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition Issue: Whether the implementation of the warrant of arrest issued by the RTC should be suspended pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for review filed by petitioner? Ruling:

The said DOJ circular is merely directory and is directed to the appellant and the prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Thus, the consequent implementation of the warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice.

People Vs Talusan ( on PLEA ) Facts: Petitioner was charged with Kidnapping with Rape. Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty. The Judge then conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the accused plea. After which, a death penalty was meted on him. As the Death Penalty was imposed, the case then was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review. On appeal, the appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an improvident plead of guilt as it failed to judiciously follow the guidelines to set forth in People vs Pastor The guidelines to be observed in the conduct of searching inquiry in cases of guilty pleas, according to the said case are as follows: 1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes. 2. 3. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. 5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a

violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. 6. 7. Issue: Whether the accused is correct? Ruling: NO, There is no definite and concrete rule as to how the Judge would conduct a searching inquiry. As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ascertained; the requirements are deemed satisfied. Crespo vs Mogul ( Rule 110 ) Facts: A motion to dismiss was filed by the Fiscal pursuant to the instructions of the secretary of justice. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The accused them elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to restrain the judge from proceeding with the case. The CA however affirmed the decision of the lower court in denying the motion to dismiss and ruled that the lower court has discretion on the matter, depriving them of such by virtue of the instruction of the secretary of justice would erode the courts independence and integrity. Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Fiscal upon instruction of the secretary of justice, may refuse to grant the motion? Ruling: Yes, While it is true that the Fiscal including the Secretary of Justice has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed on court, once the case had already been brought to court whatever disposition they may have should be addressed for the consideration of the court. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The

accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.