10 Vigilantism 82

WNDI 1 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism
*****Vigilantism*****
*****Vigilantism*****................................................................................................1
*****Vigilantism*****.......................................................................1
Topic Overview.........................................................................................................3
Topic Overview...............................................................................3
Aff Case.................................................................................................................... 6
Aff Case.........................................................................................6
Neg Case................................................................................................................10
Neg Case......................................................................................10
***Definitions***.....................................................................................................12
***Definitions***............................................................................12
Vigilantism.............................................................................................................12
Vigilantism...................................................................................12
Failed.....................................................................................................................14
Failed...........................................................................................14
Failed T.................................................................................................................. 15 Government........................................................................................................... 16
Government..................................................................................16
Enforce................................................................................................................... 16
Enforce.........................................................................................16
Law........................................................................................................................17
Law..............................................................................................17
Law T.....................................................................................................................18 ***Aff cards***........................................................................................................19
***Aff cards***..............................................................................19
The Legality of Vigilantism.....................................................................................19
The Legality of Vigilantism............................................................19

Empirical examples of Vigilantism and its successes..............................................27
Empirical examples of Vigilantism and its successes.......................27

Vigilantism saves system money............................................................................34
Vigilantism saves system money....................................................34

Voluntary Action.....................................................................................................35
Voluntary Action...........................................................................35
Community Policing................................................................................................36
Community Policing.......................................................................36
Vigilantism can spur social change.........................................................................38
Vigilantism can spur social change.................................................38

Social Contract and Vigilantism..............................................................................39
Social Contract and Vigilantism......................................................39

Vigilantism and its relation to morality...................................................................39
Vigilantism and its relation to morality...........................................39

Vigilantisms Enforcement benefits.........................................................................40
Vigilantisms Enforcement benefits................................................40

Security failures without vigilantism.......................................................................50
Security failures without vigilantism..............................................50

***Neg Cards***..................................................................................................... 51
***Neg Cards***.............................................................................51
Legal implications of vigilantism.............................................................................51
Legal implications of vigilantism....................................................51

Vigilantism and the conception of Justice................................................................55
Vigilantism and the conception of Justice.......................................55

Punishment distributed by vigilantism....................................................................59
Punishment distributed by vigilantism...........................................59

Social movements blocked through vigilantism......................................................69
Social movements blocked through vigilantism...............................69

Vigilantism Helps Police..........................................................................................70
Vigilantism Helps Police................................................................70

Racism and vigilantism...........................................................................................71
Racism and vigilantism..................................................................71

Empirics of vigilantism ...........................................................................................77
Empirics of vigilantism .................................................................77

Community policing flaws.......................................................................................82
Community policing flaws..............................................................82
Topic Overview
Resolved: Vigilantism is justified when the government has failed to enforce the law. This topic seems to provide ample ground for both the aff and the neg debaters. One of the most important aspects for the affirmative and by extension the negative is how vigilantism will be defined. Looking through the topic literature, one can see that the definition can mean anything from simply establishment violence to crime control. How the word is defined will end up framing the debate as well as influencing how the judge views the round. It is obviously more beneficial for the affirmative debater to frame vigilantism in the best light possible because it will enable them to skirt NC offense if the neg is using a different definition of vigilantism. With a topic such as vigilantism, where there are numerous interpretations, it is very important that the affirmative choose a specific topic area to debate. The common conception that vigilantism is taking the law into your own hands doesnt have to strictly relate to violent crimes. Community security is an ever growing form of security where the community shoulders some of the burden originally held by police in order to ensure their own safety. This is a very different form of vigilantism, but it still involves individuals taking the law into their own hands and protecting their own interests due to enforcement failures. The word justified, although important, is no more than the prescribed value in the round. In evaluating vigilantism, we are trying to determine if it is justified and therefore, it is the overarching goal. More importantly, it is important to note that the government section and the fact that the resolution omits both an actor and timeframe. Therefore, ACs which avoid empirical data can make arguments to ignore harmful examples of vigilantism because there is no reason to assume the same circumstances will exist in the resolutional world. What drives an individual to vigilantism is always going to be contingent on the social structure which they are brought up in as well as their own personal beliefs. With no social structure in the resolution, examples such as vigilantism being taken to an extreme wont necessarily apply.
Lastly on the definitions, the government failing to the enforce the law doesnt solely apply to extreme failures in protection. As seen with most philosophers views on governmental legitimacy, the government is required to uphold a certain level of protection for their citizens. If this is the case, then a failure to enforce the law can be something as little as not having enough patrols for communities to feel safe. Now to evaluate the Aff arguments: One of the benefits of vigilantism is the monetary and procedural benefits which a government gets from allowing citizens to take certain aspects of the law into their own hands. Crimes occur at an alarming rate which can never be totally checked by government agencies. Therefore, by delegating minor aspects of law enforcement to the public, more resources are freed up for other endeavors. Also, in terms of justice, when an individual is hurt, there must be some type of repercussion. If nothing more, the individuals who are affected need to see justice for what they went through. Therefore, if the state is unable to enforce the law for whatever reason, then it is essential that someone else does in terms of justice. This is not to say that the action will be overly violent, just that it is justified. The AC doesnt necessarily have to defend the means with which individuals act, only that they are justified because no one has punished the criminal for their misdeed. Going off of the idea that the government should protect its citizens, and the fact that the government doesnt have all the resources to enforce all laws, it would be justified for individuals to check crime that the government cant necessarily regulate. For example, say at a local park, drug dealers were going out to move their product after the police had lowered the amount of patrols in the area. At that point, a crime is occurring while at the same time the law cannot be enforced by the police. Therefore, because the police are unable to stop the action from occurring, the citizens instead are able to protect themselves through private security, community watchdog groups and patrols. These types of vigilantism are not as violent but still fall under the resolutions wording. This type of argument gives an inherent benefit as well in that NC arguments about extensive violence dont apply because the AC is discussing vigilantism on a wider and less violent scale. As for the negative, there is obviously something to be said about the slippery slope that can occur when people decide to start taking the law into their own hands. When we evaluate the term justice, we have that belief of what is right and wrong based off a moral code but that code is then placed into law. The resolution furthers this belief by making the main aspect the failure to enforce the law. Therefore since justice in some respect is tied to the law, individuals have to let it run its course, even if that means that some individuals are not punished. In dealing with the issue of vigilantism, there is a lot of topic literature which discusses how vigilantes often act on impulse which means that their decisions are not always clear. An inherent difference in how police handle situations is that there are guidelines for how they should carry themselves, however with vigilantes, there are no such rules. As a result, their actions can never be just because there is no way to check their
actions. The key with this topic is to define the round with the most specific definitions as possible, and if you do that you should be fine. Good luck
Aff Case
Resolved: Vigilantism is justified when the government has failed to enforce the law. Because the enforcement of all laws is necessary I affirm I offer the following definitions in order to clarify the round Vigilantism is defined by Peter Sederburg (Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570) as actions directed against people believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal system. Such acts harm private persons or property, but the perpetrators escape justice due to governmental inefficiency or corruption. These actions, which can range from use of force to nonviolent action, are not aspects of the AC burden. The resolution solely stipulates that the ac must show that the principle of vigilantism is justified not how it is conducted. This is true because as Kelly Kline (The American University Law Review [vol. 47]
1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SELF-HELP OR WHY CANT DICK SHOOT HENRY
further explains If true vigilantism encompassed wide spectrum of actions, the task of defining it would be Herculean. Discussing vigilantism as a general concept is further justified because we have no agent of action, thus making it impossible to know exactly what forms of vigilantism would be used.
FOR STEALING JANES TRUCK?)
Government is defined as the governing body of persons in a state, community, etc Failure to enforce the law: In the context of the resolution, a failure to enforce the law dictates that the enforcement agency was unable to provide any action for the crime committed. Individuals who view the state in a poor light and thus take the law into their own hands are acting not on a true conception of justice but on their own conception of right and wrong. Further, these types of actions do not fall under the spectrum of the resolution because the government has enforced the law, but to a different standard than that of the individual. Therefore, vigilantism we look to in the resolution are not acts of revenge, but acts of prevention of crime which is occurring due to enforcement failures. The Value for the round is Justice as proscribed by the resolution. Thus the criterion for the round is establishment of a social good H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter Sederburg explain: Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 If a vigilantes actions are in fact a rational response to a failure of the established criminal justice system, if the vigilante bases his actions on an accurate perception of social need, and if he keeps the imposed sanction within socially tolerable bounds, then the vigilante has provided a social good. Punishing a citizen for providing a benefit to society is simply nonsensical. It lowers total social wealth by wasting scarce judicial resources and by creating perverse incentives to avoid socially beneficial behavior. Justified vigilantism would minimize these problems by minimizing information costs and maximizing total social welfare.
As Rosenbaum explains, if vigilantism is able to provide a social benefit to society, then it should be considered justified vigilantism. By showing that vigilantism can potentially provide a social good, the action itself becomes justified. Hence the burden of the affirmative is to show that when vigilantism can provide potentially provide an inherent benefit to the system. If a social good is possible through vigilantism, than the action itself will be justified regardless of how effective enforcement is. Contention one: Vigilantism creates more security A: Vigilantes hold certain advantages over regular law enforcement Kelly D. Hine explains: The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SELF-HELP OR WHY CANT DICK SHOOT HENRY FOR STEALING JANES TRUCK?
Large, bureaucratic governmental law enforcement is expensive. The costs of creating and maintaining the necessary work force and infrastructure are staggering. Private enforcers, such as vigilantes, enjoy a tremendous cost advantage over public enforcers in this respect. Vigilantes are not salaried, they do not require extensive training, and they generally keep capital expenditures to a minimum. As members of the community victimized by crime, vigilantes also enjoy the benefits of increased familiarity with their victimizers. This familiarity should make apprehension easier, thereby lowering the cost of enforcement. Furthermore, vigilante law enforcement does not subject the criminal to the continuing level of stigma associated with a public criminal record. Vigilante enforcement as a principle, provides both economic and social goods to the citizens of any community. Their ability to conduct actions without stigma increases social good for criminals, while the close sense of community allows for increased familiarity with their victimizers making apprehension easier. As Hine explains, each benefit is a social good which justifies the concept of vigilantism, especially when the state has failed in protection. B: Vigilantism results in better police enforcement and crime legislation Daniel Nina explains: (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and
bad community
In the denial of the state as guarantor of the social order, vigilantism will invoke an imagined order that either existed in the past (in its decadent mode), or never existed but is desired (in its idealised mode). In defense of an imagined order, vigilantism establishes counterhegemonic practices. These not only challenge state authority, but also change the state agenda. In this regard, by developing a discourse on an imagined order, vigilantism creates a new political and social environment, which forces the state to adopt a tough law and order approach. In many cases, vigilantism forces the state to take a tough stance on crime, or on the public tolerance of political and social activism. New legislation and greater police powers are among the measures that can result from appeals by vigilante organizations on the state. Spurring change in the operating system of a bureaucratic system is a necessary but difficult task for citizens to fulfill. Vigilantism places pressure on the state to adopt a new more effective approach in the future to address the laws which are not being enforced. In a utopian world, the police would enforce all laws, but under the resolution since they are failing in this duty, vigilantism can be used to create new legislation and a better quality of life. Therefore, vigilantism can provide a social good in that it can fix problems within the system. C: Implementation lag from police leave gap Hine furthers:
The established public law enforcement system encounters problems under these facts similar to the problems discussed in reference to an exogenous increase in the harm from crime. The inherent funding and implementation lag may again result in underenforcement. This under-enforcement creates a gap between the demand and the available supply of criminal justice, which raises the price society, is willing to pay for law enforcement. As discussed above, this gap forms the basis for a black-market in criminal justicefor a vigilante justice supply to fulfill the communitys demand. Due to the amount of crime which occurs in any system, police organizations inherently will face a lag as orders work their way through the chain of command. This under enforcement which the legal system creates is harmful to the social good, and to be remedied, can be fixed with vigilantism. D: Vigilantism can provide substitute to system when it has fallen apart H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg explain: Crime rate increases appear commonly to afflict a society undergoing rapid social change which erodes previously established communal norms and relations and hinders the development of new ones. These conditions exist in rapidly changing urban areas where relationships are increasingly depersonalized; in frontier regions where the migrant population, though dispersed, is also uprooted, and the penetration of the formal system may not be very deep; or in regions disrupted by some social calamity, such as war. Other problems-corruption, inefficiency, or an overly refined system of due process-may also contribute to an increase in crime. Under these conditions, vigilantism may be a temporary substitute for the regular system of law enforcement, until the latter increases its coercive capabilities or the people internalize new system-supporting norms of behavior Every society faces times or situations in provinces or states where crime rates increase due to social change or other conditions. During these times of increased violence, individuals are more likely to live in fear of physical abuse or property damage. This fear can be remedied however through vigilantism until a new system is able to restore order. As an underview: For the negative to access justice and thus be able to draw offense in the round, they have to be able to not only show that peace without some form of vigilantism can be achieved, but also that it is possible for a state to not enforce its laws but still maintain legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. This is true because if the government is not viewed as legitimate, any revolutionary action by citizens including taking the law into their own hands is justified.
Thomas M. Tripp explains: (Prof at Georgetown), Robert J. Bies and Karl Aquino. Social Justice Research 20.1 (March 2007): p10(25). At the core of our argument is that victims want justice (Bies, 2001; Bies and Tripp, 1996). Victims want to see offenders punished, and possibly to have restored whatever was taken away from them, whether it be their money, their sense of law and order in the organization, or even their reputation (Bies and Tripp, 1996; Darley and Pittman, 2003; Hogan and Emler, 1981). If such justice can be delivered by the organization, or by the offender, then there is no rational need for the victim to seek justice through revenge. This is one way to stop revenge after an offense occurs: the organization can investigate the offense and punish the offender. That is, if the organization has a law and order analog to the legal system, then victims may use it instead, if they believe it is fair and effective. This is exactly what our research suggests: when victims of offense perceive the organization has a procedurally fair climate, they are less likely to seek revenge (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006). The implication for organizations is clear: if they want peace, they must ensure justice.
Neg Case
I negate My value for the round is Justice as proscribed by the resolution Thus my criterion for the round is accurate assessment of threats This standard acts as a side-constraint to any form of justice in that for a vigilantes action to be considered justified, they must be able to have accurately assessed the crime that has occurred as well as the cause behind their action. An individual who acts on a flawed conception of right vs. wrong can never be justified in terms of morality. Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SELF-HELP OR WHY CANT DICK SHOOT HENRY FOR STEALING JANES TRUCK?
As in defining vigilantism, when asked whether state intrusion is justified, nine different people will provide ten different answers. Perhaps because of this divisiveness, our system generally entrusts the legislaturesocietys collective consciencewith the power to determine which actions to criminalize, how severely to punish them, and at what level to set enforcement. Because compromise lies at the heart of the democratic lawmaking process, extremism is often held in check. Therefore, if justice and conceptions of right versus wrong must lie with a legislative group, vigilantism justice must coincide with these ideas. If a vigilantes actions have risks of going outside the societys collective conscience of justice, then the practice as a whole cant be considered just. My sole contention is that vigilantes are unable to have accurate assessments of risk A: Vigilantes act on impulse Hine furthers: But absent state intervention, the vigilante faces no similar restriction. In fact, the imminence of the harm and the exigency of the circumstances surrounding vigilante action promote extremism. Because the crime affects his business, his family, his community, the potential vigilante may overestimate the costs of crime to society as a whole. In the eyes of the victimized citizen, this misperception would justify a higher degree of law enforcement relative to crime. In the terms of the model, the vigilante consumption shifts in favor of law enforcement because crime is perceived as more expensive. This shift actually lowers total social wealth, due to the vigilantes access to imperfect information Those who are most likely to engage in vigilantism have a skewed sense of morality and correct punishment, making it impossible to make an accurate assessment of the crime and the corresponding action which should take place. A lack of enforcement by police will never justify an AC ballot insofar as it comes with unjust actions by vigilantes.
B: Vigilantes ignore inherent aspects of societys legal system Tom T. OConnor explains: Vigilantism, Vigilante Justice, and Self-Help (August 20, 2007) Director, Institute for Global Security Studies, Austin Peay State University http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort Vigilantes regard the criminals and people they target as living outside the social bonds and communal ties that hold our society together. It's not so much that they dehumanize their target, but that the target represents an alien enemy that must be defended against. The target must also be punished, and punished outside the law. Any and all legal matters on the subject are seen as unnecessary intrusions on the basic freedom that all communities enjoy to protect themselves. Zimring (2004) says that the vigilante mindset is the opposite of the due process mindset. Vigilante thinking is precisely the opposite of any notion of fairness, fair play, or a chance for acquittal. Vigilantes do not care to wait for the police to finish their investigation, and they care less about any court's determination of proof. To a vigilante, punishment should be inflicted upon those deserving of it at the first opportunity -- no waiting, and the more severe the punishment, the better. All government actors have legal procedures which with crimes are addressed, however by avoiding this avenues, an individual can no longer have accurate assessment because they are focused instead on expediency. The mindset that legal matters are an intrusion to community action goes against the only true weighing mechanism of justice, the legislative process, and thus can never be just.
***Definitions*** Vigilantism
-Vigilantism is vague Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
Ask nine different people to describe a vigilante and you will likely receive ten different answers. Detractors have branded groups as diverse as anti-abortionists, state militias, opponents of disfavored politicians, countries imposing trade sanctions, heckled basketball players, and the politically correct as vigilantes. If true vigilantism encompassed this wide spectrum of actions, the task of defining it would be Herculean indeed. -Vigilantism definition Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SELF-HELP OR WHY CANT DICK SHOOT HENRY FOR STEALING JANES TRUCK?
Classic vigilantes (1) are members of an organized committee; (2) are established members of the community; (3) proceed for a finite time and with definite goals; (4) claim to act as a last resort because of a failure of the established law enforcement system; and (5) claim to work for the preservation and betterment of the existing system. Under Professor Burrows definition the anti-abortionists and militiamen do not qualify as true vigilantes the anti-abortionists failing because of their desire to alter the existing system, the militias failing because of their perpetual nature.20 At least one other legal scholar has adopted this definition of vigilantism; this Article will do likewise. -Different types of vigilantism Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
American vigilantism has passed through three distinct incarnations over the last two hundred years: Classical vigilantism, neovigilantism, and pseudo-vigilantism. Classical vigilantism, the earliest stage, originated during the late colonial or early federal period and concerned itself primarily with policing various miscreants on the expanding western frontier. Neovigilantism was an urban phenomenon originating in San Francisco in the mid-1850s. Unlike classical vigilantes, who were concerned with protecting home and hearth from marauders, neovigilantes often targeted religious and ethnic minorities for persecution. Pseudo-vigilantism surfaced following the dramatic increases in crime and the tremendous social upheavals experienced in the 1960s. This most recent manifestation of vigilantism appears to combine traits of both its predecessors. -Vigilantism is violence and coercion of individuals definition Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Vigilantism is simply establishment violence. It consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion -Crime control vigilantism Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Crime control vigilantism: This is directed against people believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal system. Such acts harm private persons or property, but the perpetrators escape justice due to governmental inefficiency, corruption, or the leniency of the system of due process. This form of establishment violence, engaged in by private persons, is the kind most commonly associated with vigilantes. Indeed, American history is replete with examples of private groups restoring "law and order" where it has broken down or establishing it in areas into which the government's formal apparatus of rule enforcement has not yet effectively extended. This action has often been organized and led by representatives of the higher socioeconomic classes in the crime-plagued community, though the followers have tended to represent broader class back-grounds.

-Social Group control vigilantism definition
Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Social group control vigilantism: Establishment violence directed against groups that are competing for, or advocating a redistribution of, values within the system can be considered social group control vigilantism. This is based on the recognition that not all violence perceived as supportive of the status quo is exercised against "nor-mal" criminal activity. Rather, illegal coercion is often the response of those who feel threatened by upwardly mobile segments of society or by those who appear to advocate significant change in the distribution of values. Group control vigilantism can easily lapse into a form of reactionary violence, as the formal political system becomes supportive of a new distribution of values. But unlike threats to the established order from simple criminal elements, it may be possible to satisfy both the threatening and established groups through a partial redistribution. If the situation is viewed as essentially "zero-sum," however, the potential for this type of vigilantism probably increases. Other contributing factors should not be underestimated; however, for certain communal groups often expect the government to protect their interests through formal procedures. A case in point is that certain Islamic groups in predominantly Moslem countries advocate the creation of an Islamic constitution. -Democratic governments can be seen as hindrance to dealing with revolutions because they move slowly(how governments fail) Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 On a more abstract level, authoritarian elements may consider "democratic" guarantees as hindrances in dealing with revolutionary, or even reformist, movements. Such was evidently the case after the October 1968 student riots in Mexico City. Certain important members of the dominant Mexican political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, apparently participated in the creation of youth combat groups, known as the Halcones (Falcons), organized to prevent future student riots and to "maintain order." On June 11, 1971, 10,000 university students supporting a strike were attacked by several hundred Falcons armed with bamboo staves, pistols, automatic rifles, and submachine guns. -Regime control vigilantism definition Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Regime control vigilantism The examples of crime and social group control vigilantism are cited simply for illustration; undoubtedly, they could be multiplied many times. For the most part, they concern the use of violence by established groups to preserve the status quo at times when the formal system of rule enforcement is viewed as ineffective or irrelevant. Essentially, the violence is directed outward against the threatening elements in society. Government ineffectiveness, however, suggests that vigilante action may be directed against the regime itself, if the established sectors find their lack of capabilities too frustrating. Regime control vigilantism, then, is establishment violence intended to alter the regime, in order to make the "superstructure" into a more effective guardian of the "base.'' -Vigilantism not always violent definition Roberta Senechal de la Roche Sociological Forum, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 97-128) Self-help is not always violent, but also includes lesser forms of aggression such as an audience booing a speaker or a group of children ridiculing a playmate (Clayman, 1993). All manner of insults, taunts, criticisms, and protests, as well as vandalism, arson, and other damage to property maybe instances of collective self-help
Failed
-Political Ideology can help determine what someones correct punishment (therefore, the words failed to enforce
the law depends on the individual and is not straight forward.) David Jacobs American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Aug., 2005), pp. 656-677 Conservatives view criminals as responsible for their acts. If"crime is a decision, not a disease" (John Major, quoted by Garland 2001), increases in the expected costs of such acts should be effective, so conservatives often believe that deterrence is the best antidote for crime. Conservatives use such rationales to justify dubious claims that the threat of the death chamber will save many innocent victims from criminal violence.4 But liberals believe that crime is caused by inequitable conditions (Garland 2001), so they are skeptical about harsh sanctions (Brillon 1988; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986). Capital punishment is likely to be legal in the most conservative states( Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Hence, we expect more death sentences where conservative values dominate. -Discontent with government due to inefficiency leads to perception of failure Peter Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Other sources of discontent arise if the government's formal goal achievement is being frustrated by corruption or other causes of inefficiency. Establishment groups, then, may view their value capabilities as a diminishing asset. Under these conditions, the inclination to take defensive action in violation of the system's formal rules will increase. This action, nevertheless, is believed to be fundamentally supportive. A basic relationship can be hypothesized from the above analysis: the potential for vigilantism varies positively with the intensity and scope of belief that a regime is ineffective in dealing with challenges to the prevailing sociopolitical order. -Failed definition American Heritage Dictionary To prove deficient or lacking; perform ineffectively or inadequately: failed to fulfill their promises; failed in their attempt to reach the summit. To be unsuccessful: an experiment that failed. To receive an academic grade below the acceptable minimum. To prove insufficient in quantity or duration; give out: The water supply failed during the drought. To decline, as in strength or effectiveness: The light began to fail. To cease functioning properly: The engine failed. To give way or be made otherwise useless as a result of excessive strain: The rusted girders failed and caused the bridge to collapse. To become bankrupt or insolvent: Their business failed during the last recession.
Failed T
A. Violation: The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright 2006 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. defines Failed:To abandon; forsake
B. Violation: The affirmative does not meet the above definition because: The opponent defines the violation to narrow and allows only for unsuccessful implimentation of laws.
C. Standards: 1.Briteline-The opponent has no briteline which tells us at which point one has failed or not achieved their goal whether it be one try or no try 2.Time skew-The opponent has unlimited time to prepare for this debate and I only have the time I have after Cross Examination. 3.predictibility-The opponent is unpredictable because there is much more of the literature on the over all literature. 4.Ground-The opponent removes all my ground in this debate because I have to uphold when the law fails completely that the vigilantism is not beneficial, while they then only have to uphold part of the resolution.
D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness, ground, and because the Aff has the burden to affirm the resolution.
Government
-Government definitions Websters dictionary 1. the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; political administration: Government is necessary to the existence of civilized society. 2. the form or system of rule by which a state, community, etc., is governed: monarchical government; episcopal government. 3. the governing body of persons in a state, community, etc.; administration. 4. a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation, taken as representing the whole: a dam built by the government. 5. (in some parliamentary systems, as that of the United Kingdom) a. the particular group of persons forming the cabinet at any given time: The Prime Minister has formed a new government. b. the parliament along with the cabinet: The government has fallen. 6. direction; control; management; rule: the government of one's conduct. 7. a district governed; province
Enforce
-Enforce definitions Websters Dictionary 1. to put or keep in force; compel obedience to: to enforce a rule; Traffic laws will be strictly enforced. 2. to obtain (payment, obedience, etc.) by force or compulsion. 3. to impose (a course of action) upon a person: The doctor enforced a strict dietary regimen. 4. to support (a demand, claim, etc.) by force: to enforce one's rights as a citizen. 5. to impress or urge (an argument, contention, etc.) forcibly; lay stress upon: He enforced his argument by adding details.
Law
-Law definitions Websters Dictionary the principles and regulations established in a community by some authority and applicable to its people, whether in the form of legislation or of custom and policies recognized and enforced by judicial decision. 2. any written or positive rule or collection of rules prescribed under the authority of the state or nation, as by the people in its constitution. Compare bylaw, statute law. 3. the controlling influence of such rules; the condition of society brought about by their observance: maintaining law and order. 4. a system or collection of such rules. 5. the department of knowledge concerned with these rules; jurisprudence: to study law. 6. the body of such rules concerned with a particular subject or derived from a particular source: commercial law. 7. an act of the supreme legislative body of a state or nation, as distinguished from the constitution. 8. the principles applied in the courts of common law, as distinguished from equity. 9. the profession that deals with law and legal procedure: to practice law. 10. legal action; litigation: to go to law. 11. a person, group, or agency acting officially to enforce the law: The law arrived at the scene soon after the alarm went off. 12. any rule or injunction that must be obeyed: Having a nourishing breakfast was an absolute law in our household. 13. a rule or principle of proper conduct sanctioned by conscience, concepts of natural justice, or the will of a deity: a moral law. 14. a rule or manner of behavior that is instinctive or spontaneous: the law of self-preservation.
Law T
A. Violation: Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2006. defines law as: any written or positive rule or collection of rules prescribed under the authority of the state or nation
B. Violation: The affirmative does not meet the above definition because: The opponent treats law as some over encompassing inner view of rules. But this is not the case it must be written and upheld by some governing body.
C. Standards: 1.Briteline-The opponent does not show when the law is or is not a law is a younger sibling being told not to go into a brothers room just reasoning for that older sibling to practice vigilantism? 2.Time skew-The opponent has unlimited time to prepare for this debate and I only have the time I have after Cross Examination. 3.predictibility-This ruins predictibility because all the literature on the topic of vigilantism refers to actual laws 4.Ground-It removes my ground in this debate because my opponent gets the ability to pick any law they wish. While I am denied this ground.
D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness, ground, and because the Aff has the burden to affirm the resolution.
***Aff cards*** The Legality of Vigilantism

-Law comes from people OWEN WISTER, THE VIRGINIAN 435-36 (1902). [The people] are where the law comes from, you see. For they chose the delegates who made the Constitution that provided for the courts . . . . And so when your ordinary citizen sees [the justice system fail] he must take justice back into his own hands where it was once at the beginning of all things. Call this primitive, if you will. But so far from being a defiance of the law, it is an assertion of itthe fundamental assertion of self-governing men, upon whom our whole social fabric is based. -State supports vigilantism Rachel Neild (January 1999) Rights and Democracy Intl Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, From National Security to Citizen Security: Private Responses to Social Insecurity Vigilante actions against criminals are a response to state ineffectiveness combined with a culture of violence. Vigilantism is both a response to and is encouraged or permitted by the state's incapacity to act. If the state cannot apprehend or deter criminals whose acts give rise to vigilante responses, it also lacks the capacity (and often the will) to deter the vigilantes. States sometimes seek to co-opt rather than to confront vigilantism raising concerns about the regulation and accountability of such arrangements. -Vigilantism best because crime rates spawn from the community atmosphere Tim Hope Crime and Justice, Vol. 19 pp. 21-89 Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995) The essay revolves around a central paradox: there has been a continuous and consistent pattern of criminological research suggesting that community structure itself shapes local rates of crime-that community crime rates may be the result of something more than the mere aggregation of individual propensities for criminality or victimization (Sampson 1987, Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Yet much of the effort to alter the structure of communities in order to reduce crime has not been noticeable successful or sustainable. Does this mean that the community approach, as a strategy of prevention, should be abandoned, despite the weight of research pointing to the importance of community life in crime causation? A more helpful distinction may be between two dimensions along which local social institutions-and purposive prevention programs-operate in communities (Duffee 1980; Sampson 1987). First, there is a horizontal dimension of social relations among individuals and groups sharing a common residential space. This dimension refers to the often complex expressions of affection, loyalty, reciprocity, or dominance among residents, whether expressed through informal relations of relations that connect local institutions to sources of power and resources in the wider civil society of which the locality is acknowledged to be a part. This essay suggests that the two dimensions are equally important-and related-in their effect on local crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993).While the principal mechanisms for maintaining local order may be expressed primarily through the horizontal dimension, the strength of this expression-and hence its effectiveness in controlling crime- derives, in large part, from the vertical connections that residents of localities have to extracommunal resources. Many of the approaches reviewed here have either neglected to address sufficiently the vertical dimension of community power (or powerlessness) or have met with failure or resistance when they have done so. The paradox of community crime prevention this stems from the problem of trying to build community institutions that control crime in the face of their powerlessness to withstand the pressures toward crime in the community, whose source, or the forces that sustain them, derive from the wider social structure.

Vigilantism is appreciated, and not always violent. Tom Johnson Non-Violent Vigilantism NEW STRAIT TIMES 2006 VIGILANTISM assumes numerous forms, some benevolent, some menacing. Taking the law into your own hands is not always a good idea but try telling that to grieving parents whose child is killed by a criminal. As illegal as it sounds, vigilantes who confront criminals head on, like snatch thieves, seemed to be embraced by a grateful public. Lately, snatch thieves caught after snatching a handbag were soundly assaulted by a mob before they were surrendered to police. While we do not endorse this conduct, we understand the sentiment fuelling the rage, especially those of female victims injured or who lost their lives. Vigilantism also takes on a level that does not invoke violence, like the shopkeeper who can't seem to stop vehicles from being parked illegally in front of the shops despite the presence of a yellow line. Realizing that yellow lines are no deterrent, the shopkeepers improvised, placing a pail with a 'No Parking' sign in such a position that parking would be very awkward. The MMS report featured today underscores a non-violent vigilantism but it does have a rather creepy connotation. - Ed Canadians support vigilantism. Gabrielle Louis Large Majority of Canadians Support Vigilantism, Poll Finds THE GLOBE AND MAIL 1987 A large majority of Canadians believe people have the right to take the law into their own hands to protect themselves and their property, a Gallup Poll released yesterday indicates.Gallup's question referred to recent incidents in which retail store owners in Canada used firearms against robbers. Respondents were asked whether they 'feel that incidents like these - taking the law into one's own hands, often called vigilantism - are sometimes justified because of the circumstances, or are never justified. 'Sixty-eight per cent of the respondents said 'vigilantism' is justified under certain circumstances, while another 8 per cent volunteered that it is always justified. Twenty-one per cent said such action is never justified, while 3 per cent had no opinion. Breaking the results down by place of residence, Gallup's survey suggested that 73 per cent of people in cities with a population of more than 100,000 felt that 'vigilantism' is sometimes or always justified. The figure was 72 per cent in centers with 10,000 to 100,000 people, and 81 per cent in places with less than 10,000 people. The poll was based on 1,018 in-home interviews with adults, conducted in early January. A sample of this size is considered accurate within a margin of four percentage points, 19 times out of 20. Mistakenly, people mistake vigilantism as bad. Philip Perlmutter A Look at American Vigilante CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITER 1985 In a democracy how should a person respond to personal violence or the threat of it? The question haunts the now famous - or infamous - shooting of four young men in a New York subway car. Without knowing the details of what had occurred, the public clearly sided with Bernhard Goetz, who at the very least reflected what people would like to do if and when threatened with personal violence. Nevertheless, some people decried Mr. Goetz's action as unjustified, racist, and an encouragement of vigilantism, because the four men were black and had simply asked for $5. Adding to the passion and complexity of the debate was a grand jury's refusal to charge him with attempted murder - only with illegally possessing guns. And yet, transcending the details of what actually happened is a conflict of self-defense and vigilantism. Since critics of Goetz's action seem wedded to the word ''vigilantism,'' it is worth recalling its history in America. According to Prof. Daniel J. Boorstin, it arose, ''not to circumvent courts, but to provide them; not because the machinery of government had become complicated, but because there was no machinery at all; not to neutralize institutions already there, but to fill a vacuum. . . .'' Also, Prof. Richard Maxwell Brown, in a detailed study of the vigilante tradition, made a similar point: ''On the frontier the normal foundations of a stable, orderly society - churches, schools, cohesive community life - were either absent or present only in rough, immature forms. The regular, legal systems of law enforcement often proved woefully inadequate for the needs of the settlers. Fundamentally, the pioneers took the law into their own hands for the purpose of establishing order and stability in newly settled areas. . . .'' Though vigilantism was often violent, using round-ups, floggings, expulsions, and even hangings, it was not all bad. There were ''good'' vigilante groups which dealt with the problem of disorder and then disbanded, resulting in an increase in social stability; and there were ''bad'' vigilante groups, which encountered opposition, resulting in socially destructive vigilante wars. The critics of Goetz have projected only one dimension of past vigilantism, the ''bad'' one, ignoring the real, everyday anxieties and fears of people who live in our urban badlands, where lawlessness and disorder are high, where community organization and law enforcement are weak, and where housing, employment, education, and social services are inadequate, conditions that demand relentless criticism and cumulative reform.

Vigilantism is an option when the law fails. Philip Perlmutter A Look at American Vigilante CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITER 1985 In a democracy, citizens rightfully have a number of options. They can accept dangers, and do little, hoping that things will somehow improve. Second, they can defend themselves through legitimate, or illegitimate activities, hoping to bring about change. Third, they can retaliate with physical force against the oppressive environment. Last, they can emigrate - the smart but difficult option for poor or average citizens. For any human being, there is not, nor should there be, only one response, especially the one prescribed by the non-afflicted, whose sense of justice is too often contaminated by their distance from injustice. How can one say to let the police handle the problem of law and order when the police themselves admit the problem is beyond them, even with their guns, jails, and specialized training? Also, how can one condemn the victim for asserting in a far less militant manner what labor, power politics, business, and governments do every day, when threatened? Why the alarm over an innocent citizen decisively stopping four un-innocent citizens? No, the Goetz case is not new - or dangerous. What is new and dangerous is when actual lawlessness and disorder are ignored because of a distorted suspicion of those who defend themselves. People in our urban badlands know and feel the dangers about them. It is they who should be listened and responded to - and it is here that the opponents of Goetz-like self-defense are at their most irrelevant, for their public condemnations are barren of hope, promise, and remedy, and thereby certain to intensify the helplessness, desperation, and militancy of law-abiding citizens. -Vigilantism is a tool used to check violence in times of social upheaval. CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 This paper develops the proposition that organized episodes of self-help criminal justice tend to arise as adaptive forms in places and times of sharp social transition-frontiers. Our method is to compare extralegal appendages to the official criminal justice systems of England and America between the mid-eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries. In England during this period, extralegal associations called private prosecution societies emerged as one approach to coping with ineffective criminal law enforcement and making the existing criminal justice system more accessible in the face of a very expensive private prosecution procedure. American crime-control vigilantism of the same time is similar in respect to its rationale, social composition and transitory period of widespread existence. However, the English self-help criminal justice organizations differed from most of their American counterparts by maintaining a strong attachment to the rule of law and rarely, if ever, acting as courts or executing a sentence. We conclude that both varieties of extralegal crime control were a response to the problem of social control on a type of frontier. The comparison also suggests a continuum of crime control strategies dimensioned along their relationship to the official legal system. -Frontier regions are particularly difficult regions for the enforcement of laws. CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Frontiers pose particular problems for the administration of criminal justice. For example, as a general rule, issues of deviance and social control are magnified on geographical frontiers. In pre-revolutionary America and the other British colonies this was the case partly because these regions were forced to receive thousands of England's criminals sentenced to "transportation," especially in the eighteenth century. As Glaser (1971:25) puts it, "people who are treated as objectionable tend (or are forced) to move to locations where there is more tolerance of diversity. These areas, therefore, acquire high concentrations of persons regarded elsewhere as deviant.... Thus America was a collecting ground for the deviants of Europe, and within America, the western frontier was long the area to which deviants moved from the eastern settlements." At the same time, social control at the frontier region is likely to be hampered by mobile populations, difficult or distant travel between communities and few resources for regular lawenforcement personnel. Geographical frontiers, then, are likely areas in which self- help criminal justice takes root.

Local residents uniquely key to prevent community crime Tim Hope Crime and Justice, Vol. 19 pp. 21-89 Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995) Shaw and McKay failed to describe the particular features of social disorganization or, from the point of view of criminological theory, to provide a consistent account of how social disorganization caused individual delinquency (wootton 1959, Kornhauser 1978). However, it is arguable whether Shaw and McKay actually need an individuallevel theory to guide preventive action. Since the real analysis seemed to confirm that the prevalence of delinquency was consistent with the Chicago Schools structural model of distribution of resources and pathology between neighborhoods of the city, despite changes in their populations, then it followed, logically, that delinquency would be a property of areas, which is the level at which Shaw and McKay thought that intervention should be targeted (Shaw and McKay 1969 p. 321). Their position seemed to have been, not that individualized methods of curbing delinquency-by inculcating moral values or providing standards of guidance would be ineffective, but that the institutional infrastructure for implementing these methods was lacking: Through the leadership of local residents it is possible to effect closer coordination of local institutions, groups, and agencies, into a unified program for the area as a whole (Shaw and McKay 1969 page 322). Government doesnt like vigilantes KELLY D. HINE,Law Clerk at U.S. District Court, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1997,pg. 1228 the dramatic increases in crime and the tremendous social upheavals experienced in the 1960s. This most recent manifestation of vigilantism appears to combine traits of both its predecessors. To this framework, this Article adds an additional category: faux-vigilantism. Faux-vigilantes are those individuals characterized by their detractors, the media, or themselves as vigilantes, but who fail to satisfy the definition of true vigilantes set out above. Lynch mobs, rioters, disturbed subway commuters, and numerous others populate this category. These individuals are not true vigilantes and their actions fall beyond the scope of this essay. C. Legal Treatment of Vigilantism [The people] are where the law comes from, you see. For they chose the delegates who made the Constitution that provided for the courts . . . . And so when your ordinary citizen sees [the justice system fail] he must take justice back into his own hands where it was once at the beginning of all things. Call this primitive, if you will. But so far from being a defiance of the law, it is an assertion of itthe fundamental assertion of self-governing men, upon whom our whole social fabric is based. This passage from The Virginian provides the quintessential reasonselves with punishing ordinary badmenhorse and cattle thieves, counterfeiters, and assorted gangs of desperadoes, while neovigilantes targeted ethnic and religious minorities and political opponents). -Community efforts to prevent crime necessary in poor areas Tim Hope Crime and Justice, Vol. 19 pp. 21-89 Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995) In order to compensate poor communities for their lack of institutional infrastructure, and mindful of the humiliations often entailed in receiving the services of philanthropy (Shaw and McKay 1969 pg. 323), Shaw initiates the Chicago Area Project in 1932, which, in one way or another, has been the source model of community action to the present (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). -Vigilantes enforce same values as state H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 The primary causes of these activities (vigilantism) are disillusionment with the governments ability to enforce the laws and, apparently, the belief that the police are corrupt. These cases are examples where groups normally classified as potential participants in dissident violence share certain values with the established legal system and are attempting to extend the enforcement of these shared norms into their neglected communities.

-Police officials use excessive force to apprehend criminals H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Though crime control vigilantism is usually associated with private persons, the occupational origin of many Esquadrao members suggests that law enforcement officials may also engage in establishment violence in the fulfillment of their regular duties. Most simply, this occurs when excessive physical compulsion is used by a policeman in apprehending a criminal. Of course, the line between justifiable and excessive coercion is fine. Enough evidence has been gathered, however, to suggest that police violation of formally guaranteed rights occurs in the United States and elsewhere. Not uncommonly, the rules governing the official application of physical coercion are castigated as handcuffing the police and preventing them from carrying out their crime control responsibilities effectively. Urban areas in the nighttime pose special problems for law enforcement. CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Melbin (1978) has supplemented the common spatial dimension of frontiers by adding a temporal one. He suggests that the urban nighttime has become the contemporary frontier. American settlement moved westward and eventually reached the California coast. "California's main cities have since become areas of great activity in the dark hours, as if the flow across the continent swerved into the nighttime rather than spilling into the sea" (Melbin, 1978:6). Melbin enumerates the similarities between land and time frontiers including: (1) "settlement" in stages; (2) sparse, homogeneous populations (mostly males); (3) fewer social constraints; (4) isolated "settlements"; (5) decentralized government; (6) new behavioral styles; (7) more lawlessness; and (8) more helpfulness and friendliness. To these we might add, specifically, a tendency for the emergence of extralegal modes of criminal justice. Contemporary American urban groups like the Guardian Angels in New York City are urban nighttime parallels to those on the nineteenth-century American land frontier. ' -Law enforcement historically has not been endorsed by a government. CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Law enforcement and peace keeping have not always been exclusively official functions. One extreme of extralegal policing is captured in American Wild West incidents and legends of spontaneous, deadly vigilante criminal justice. Impatient or otherwise dissatisfied with the capacity of the official agents of the law to maintain peace in their community, citizens banded together to root out the alleged lawbreakers and dispense summary justice in lieu of the courts, and concluded the process with swift enactment of a punishment. As popularly conceived, the essence of vigilantism is private citizens taking the law into their own hands, from start to finish. -Vigilante societies can and do function CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Melbin (1978) has supplemented the common spatial dimension of frontiers by adding a temporal one. He suggests that the urban nighttime has become the contemporary frontier. American settlement moved westward and eventually reached the California coast. "California's main cities have since become areas of great activity in the dark hours, as if the flow across the continent swerved into the nighttime rather than spilling into the sea" (Melbin, 1978:6). Melbin enumerates the similarities between land and time frontiers including: (1) "settlement" in stages; (2) sparse, homogeneous populations (mostly males); (3) fewer social constraints; (4) isolated "settlements"; (5) decentralized government; (6) new behavioral styles; (7) more lawlessness; and (8) more helpfulness and friendliness. To these we might add, specifically, a tendency for the emergence of extralegal modes of criminal justice. Contemporary American urban groups like the Guardian Angels in New York City are urban nighttime parallels to those on the nineteenth-century American land frontier. '

-Law enforcement historically has not been endorsed by a government. CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Law enforcement and peace keeping have not always been exclusively official functions. One extreme of extralegal policing is captured in American Wild West incidents and legends of spontaneous, deadly vigilante criminal justice. Impatient or otherwise dissatisfied with the capacity of the official agents of the law to maintain peace in their community, citizens banded together to root out the alleged lawbreakers and dispense summary justice in lieu of the courts, and concluded the process with swift enactment of a punishment. As popularly conceived, the essence of vigilantism is private citizens taking the law into their own hands, from start to finish. Typically, a group of concerned citizens took the initiative by posting in a public place, such as a pub or a church, a notice calling for a general meeting and stating the reasons why a prosecution society was needed. The reasons usually included concern over damage or theft of property within the township, the high cost of prosecuting offenders, and inadequate enforcement of the law. The society, the notice said, would bring offenders before the courts and improve enforcement of the existing law. Implicit was an assumption that a greater likelihood of prosecution would deter offenders. Two important points need emphasis here. First, there was a definite concern for the cost of prosecution; and second, neither the concept of the law nor its content were in question-only problems surrounding the effectiveness of the law's enforcement. In order to achieve their aims, members signed a formal charter agreeing to pay an initiation and annual subscription fee for the purpose of meeting the expenses connected with the investigation, apprehension, arrest and prosecution of offenders who committed crimes against their property. In addition to the defrayment of costs, which also included the costs of apprehension, whether by reward or payment of specialists,5 this "self-help" was further supplemented by members agreeing to share any information they acquired concerning any offense which occurred against any other member and, in particular, by agreeing not to receive stolen property. -Police Lag Steven D. LEVITT Alvin H. Baum Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 92, No. 4, (Sep., 2002), pp. 1248 Including a second lag of police (as done in Levitt, 1997) somewhat reduces the point estimate on violent crime, but does not greatly affect the property crime coefficient. Adding streets and highway workers as an instrument for police increases the elasticities for both crime categories, but also raises the standard errors because the sample size shrinks by 25 percent. In an alternative model, streets and highway workers might be more appropriate as a righthand-side variable rather than an instrument. The estimates are little changed by its inclusion. The coefficients are similar across small and large cities in the sample, but appear to be larger in the later years of the sample. -Political Threats David JACOBS, Department of Sociology, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 103, No. 4, (Jan., 1998), pp. 837 Political or threat explanations for the states use of internal violence suggest that killings committed by the police should be greatest in stratified jurisdictions with more minorities. Additional political effects such as race of the citys mayor or reform political arrangements are examined. The level of interpersonal violence the police encounter and other problems in departmental environments should account for these killing rates as well. Tobit analyses of 170 cities show that racial inequality explains police killings. Interpersonal violence measured by the murder rate also accounts for this use of lethal force separate analyses of police killings of blacks show that cities with more blacks and a recent growth in the black population have higher police killing rates of blacks, but the presence of a black mauor reduces these killings. Such findings support latent and direct political explanations for the internal use of lethal force to preserve order.

-Members occupational communities are effective CRAIG B. LITTLE CHRISTOPHER P. SHEFFIELD State University of New York at Cortland and University of Sheffield University of Sheffield American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, (Dec., 1983), pp. 796-808 Unfortunately, primary source documentation to determine the occupation, income and status of members in this period is scarce and, as Styles (1980:198) has pointed out even when extant, ". . . The utility of the available descriptions of occupation is compromised by the wide variations of status and income within particular trades." Despite these difficulties, however, members' occupational descriptions gleaned from various local records suggest that the impetus for organization and administration of the prosecution societies came from merchants and/or renters of land who found support in their endeavor from large landowners. The occupations of committee members that we have established include gentleman, merchant, weaver, attorney, clergy and dyer. This variety suggests a more complex fusion of property-oriented interests than a simple dichotomy of traditional landed gentry and emergent bourgeois class. There is also some evidence to show that the prominent members of the societies held public office, for example, as members of a Parish Council, or as constable. Listed "occupations" of one society towards the end of the nineteenth century were gentleman, innkeeper, merchant and worsted goods manufacturer. Our analysis of membership reveals that, consistent with the nature of the staple industry in the Halifax region, a significant proportion of the membership was connected with the textile industry. Further- more, several society charters emphasize the need to protect property connected with that industry. The "Agreement of sundry persons in Sowerby, Soyland and Skircoat, 1785" specifically addresses itself to "Merchants, Manufacturers, Dealers in Dyes, or finishers of Woolen Goods, Shalloon worsted stuff and other goods; every of us Owners of Tentors, Tentor grounds. However, the societies were not necessarily or solely concerned with offenses against industry. For example, the "Agreement to Pros- ecute Offenders, Halifax, 1796" begins: Whereas divers individuals have been greatly injured in their property by a set of offenders trespassing on their ground and wilfully suffering their cattle to do it and by shooting pigeons, cutting trees, destroying gates . . . (emphasis ours) From the data available we cannot conclude that the societies emerged solely from the interests of an emergent class, nor that this rising bourgeoisie had proprietary dominance over the societies. The societies grew during a period of social and economic change and reflected increasing concern over property rights, property crime and the inefficient methods of enforcing laws related to those rights. Neither the charters, the meeting minutes nor the membership of the societies suggest that these organizations arose out of an underlying quarrel about the law. The rule of law was not open to question. The law, regarding content, was seen to be apt. Problematic law enforcement, rather than desire for legal reform, stimulated the development of the societies by the propertied classes, whose membership included a broad mix of agricultural capitalists, merchants and industrialists. So far we have outlined a composite picture of the intent of the societies, their structure and areas of concern based upon our examination of the records from several of them. We next turn to the activities of one particular society from which there -Justified when no enforcement Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
A scenario in which established law enforcement does not exist presents the easiest case for understanding the rationale underlying social justification and acceptance of extra-judicial self-help. When an established governmental system for enforcing the criminal law does not exist, the only means available to protect Becarrias repository of the public well being is private action. Classical vigilantism on the American frontier epitomizes such private action. In the absence of an established law enforcement system, the social wealth explanation for vigilantism is straight forward. Under these circumstances, nothing but the threat of harm from the victim provides incentives for individuals to forego crime. If the potential criminal is significantly stronger or more brutal than the potential victim, deterrence is ineffective. Under the model discussed in this Article, the probability that the criminal will incur a criminal sanction is now zero. Therefore, no matter how high the actual sanction, the expected cost of criminal activity is also zero. Individuals will commit any act providing a net personal benefit.

-Individuals who take the law into their own hand but abide by the spirit of the law are justified in their action V. F. Nourse University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 5 (May, 2003), pp. 1691-1746 If any of this is right, then we may present an alternate account of the necessity defense. We can begin to see that the doctrine of necessity does more than simply focus on individuals' minds or choices and, indeed, that it cannot be explained (in full) without a consideration of its constructive effects. To avoid the fear that defendants are permitted to "legislate," the doctrine is constructed to remit claimants to "alternative" procedures and, in political cases, to exhaust their remedies before the legislature. At the same time, the defense remains for cases where the state is unavailable. If the defendant has, in effect, done something (like creating a firebreak) that "stands in" for what the law itself would have done when the state is absent, then to punish that person is, in effect, to punish the innocent. And, as we have already seen from our consideration of the institution of "telishment," punishing the lawabiding/innocent can pose hazards not only for defendants but for the rest of the liberal polity. Thus, the defense remains available, a signal that, when there is no policeman at hand, the law-abiding will not be punished for, in effect, abiding by the spirit of the law. -Vigilantism fills enforcement void Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
Vigilante justice fills the law enforcement void. Before the vigilante action, the probability of incurring sanctions for criminal activity was negligible. With the vigilance committee on patrol, this probability increases dramatically. By reintroducing the possibility of apprehension and punishment, the vigilante enforcer provides significant levels of deterrence to societys criminal element. -Lag justifies vigilantism H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 The time lag inherent in governmental administration effectively freezes funding levels.146 As a result, the output of criminal justice remains static, despite the benefits available to society from an increase in production. But even if the legislature approves funding to increase enforcement, the lag persists because of the need to train additional police and build additional infrastructure. These governmental restrictions on the supply of criminal justice force society to consume more of the substitute good (i.e., permit more crime to take place) than it would in an unfettered market. -How to justify Vigilantism H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 If a vigilantes actions are in fact a rational response to a failure of the established criminal justice system, if the vigilante bases his actions on an accurate perception of social need, and if he keeps the imposed sanction within socially tolerable bounds, then the vigilante has provided a social good. Punishing a citizen for providing a benefit to society is simply nonsensical. It lowers total social wealth by wasting scarce judicial resources and by creating perverse incentives to avoid socially beneficial behavior. Allowing a justified vigilantism defense would minimize these problems by minimizing information costs and maximizing total social welfare. -Allowing vigilantism can provide benefits such as local resources for improved law enforcement Uri Yanay (professor at Tilburg U.) Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1993), pp. 381-396 Firstly, government should not fear and negate a community initiative, even if it touches a sensitive area such as improved personal safety. By legitimizing it under law, such an initiative can be monitored, sanctioned and even encouraged. Secondly, despite the nationwide dimensions of the phenomenon, localizing each initiative and allowing the local authority and the local police to monitor and direct it under the overall supervision of the state provided a balanced formula for action, control and coexistence. Third, the state has co-opted the initiative and managed to introduce overall community care policy into a domain under traditional state monopoly, gaining public recognition, support and local resources for improved law enforcement, with substantial community backing. The final implication is that if chal lenged volunteers may transform their initial, self-centered aims of securing their own neighborhoods into broader aims of serving the public at large - as a 'tame' legal public service.
Empirical examples of Vigilantism and its successes

-community policing used to curb youth crime Susan F. Bennett Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 539, Reactions to Crime and Violence (May, 1995), pp. 72-84 As a community policing participant, a young mother recruited neighbors to hang out in the park during the evenings to deter the youths who generally occupied it. The youths were noisy and intimidated other residents, who were unsure if the young people were gang members or drug dealers. During the co-occupation, the youths and adults began to discuss their contentions over the use of the park. At a community meeting, the mother reported the youths' concerns about their limited options in the community and started to question the group's frequent assumption that young people are the problem. This small example occurred in an area where crime is particularly likely to be divisive: a very heterogeneous community, where racial differences are intensified by socioeconomic differences. This and similar incidents suggest that, when given opportunities for collective actions and decision making, residents can broaden problem definitions to be more inclusive and reflect the collective good of the community
-Survey shows that many immigrants are successful in illegally coming into countries Alejandro Portes Social Problems, Vol. 26, No. 4, Theory and Evidence in Criminology: Correlations and Contradictions (Apr., 1979), pp. 425-438 The data presented below come from a study of 822 documented Mexican immigrants inter- viewed at the point of arrival in the United States during 1972-73. Interviews were conducted in Spanish immediately after completion of immigration formalities. Interviews took place over a nine-month period at border check points in El Paso and Laredo. These are the two major ports of entry along the Texas border, and second and third, respectively, for Mexican immigrants in the nation. Results from the present study confirm this impression. Fully 43.7 percent of the sample came outside immigration quota limits as spouses of U.S. citizens (IR-1 visas). An additional 4.7 percent came as children of U.S. citizens (IR-2 visas). The Immigration and Naturalization Service does not break down figures on quota immigrants from the Western Hemisphere (SA-1 visas) by specific categories. Our belief is, however, that most of the 46.5 percent of quota immigrants in the sample received visas as spouses or immediate relatives of U.S. permanent residents When asked, 61.5 percent said they had resided previously in the United States. That figure is probably an underestimate, because some respondents might have been reluctant to report prior (illegal) entry: collating responses to a number of other relevant questions, we arrived at an estimate that 69.9 percent of the sample could be reliably regarded as having resided in the United States for extended periods prior to documented entry. The point of these figures is that the study of legal Mexican immigration is, to a large extent, identical to that of prior illegal immigration. No claim is made that former illegal immigrants identified in this manner are representative of the total illegal population. They represent, however, an important and so far unresearched sector of that universe. Their characteristics ideally should be compared with those of illegals identified by other means, such as official apprehensions. Still, the present data offer an initial glimpse of those immigrants who have not only succeeded in remaining in the United States, but have consolidated their position through legal entry.
-Illegal immigration isnt entirely stopped by US border patrol Thomas J. Espenshade Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21, (1995), pp. 195-216 Because the volume of illegal US immigration is not directly observed, studies of the gross flow of undocumented migration across the Mexico-United States border have typically invoked Immigration and Naturalization service data on the number of border apprehensions of unauthorized aliens as a proxy for the size of the illegal migrant flow. Such statistics are generated whenever the US border Patrol apprehends someone who is in the country illegally. Most unauthorized migrants are captured either as they cross the border or shortly thereafter. In addition, attempted border crossings have been densely concentrated along a few stretches of border. As an extreme example, the Chula Vista station in the San Diego sector covers just a single mile of border, yet records more apprehensions than any other station. Five out of six apprehensions are adult male Mexican nationals. When Mexican women and their children are included, the total Mexican proportion of all apprehensions rises to nearly 98%. In general, the typical undocumented migrant is a young adult Mexican male who comes across the southern border near a major US city and who, unless he manages to avoid detection altogether, is in the United States for a few hours or days at most before being apprehended by the US border Patrol.

- Illegal immigrants can take jobs in any sector of the economy Alejandro Portes Social Problems, Vol. 26, No. 4, Theory and Evidence in Criminology: Correlations and Contradictions (Apr., 1979), pp. 425-438 Everyone concerned with the process believes that illegal immigration occurs because of economic reasons: immigrants come to take advantage of the superior economic opportunities offered by a developed economy. The usual companion impression is that illegal immigrants must come from the most impoverished and backward sectors of their country of origin. In the specific case of Mexico, undocumented migration to the United States has, for decades, been associated with the plight of a largely illiterate and dispossessed rural population (Briggs, 1978; Santibafiez, 1930). The dominant image held of surreptitious border crossers has been that they are peasants, frequently unemployed at home and coming to perform agricultural work in the United States. Tables 1 to 7, drawn from the present sample, afford the opportunity to test these assertions. First, there is no doubt that immigration from Mexico occurs for economic reasons. Asked for their main reason for coming to the U.S., 49.5 percent of immigrants in the sample responded in terms of work, wages and living conditions. This percentage equals those for all other response categories put together. Further, when asked what they considered was the major problem confronting Mexico, 61.1 percent mentioned poverty, unemployment, high prices and other economic difficulties (Table 1). The hypothesis that immigrants come predominantly from rural communities is examined in Table 2 by comparing their community of origin (main locality of residence before age 16) with those of the overall population of Mexico. As seen in Table 2 the immigrant sample as a whole and immigrants with prior residence in the United States are more "urban" than the original population. In Mexico, 58 percent of the population lived in communities of less than 10,000 in 1970; so did 37.3 percent of all- immigrants and 43.6 percent of immigrants with prior U.S. residence. Forty-eight percent of the formerly undocumented immigrants, however, came from urban communities of 20,000 or more; and the figure for the total Mexican population is only 35 percent. A related notion is that illegal immigrants are destined primarily to small agricultural communities in the United States. This rural-to-rural migration pattern has figured prominently in most prior descriptions of the flow (Santibafiez, 1930; Buroway, 1976). Table 3 presents the size-distribution of communities where immigrants intended to reside. Only 15.5 percent of the total sample and 16.4 percent of immigrants with prior U.S. residence planned to live in communities of 10,000 or less. At the other extreme, fully 73 percent of both formerly undocumented immigrants and of the total sample planned to reside in cities of 100,000 or more; of these, 54 and 46 percent, respectively, planned to live in cities of over half a million. Clearly, these immigrants not only come from cities in Mexico, far more than the majority intend to seek residence in metropolitan areas of the United States. -More illegal immigrants than border patrol agents Thomas J. Espenshade Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21, (1995), pp. 195-216
Despite their widespread use as a proxy for unauthorized migrant flows, apprehensions data are conceptually inappropriate indicator because they measure undocumented aliens who have failed in their attempt to enter the United States, whereas the issue of general policy and research interest pertains to the number who succeeded. More specifically, not all aliens who enter the United States clandestinely are captured by the Border Patrol. Some migrants are apprehended several times in the same reporting period, with the consequence that INS arrest figures literally refer to count of the number of apprehensions and not the number of persons apprehended. Finally, the level of apprehensions is sensitive to changes in Border Patrol effectiveness in locating and apprehending illegal aliens. Despite these limitations, Espenshade suggests that the number of apprehensions and the estimated level of the underlying undocumented flow are correlated at .90. One may conclude that changes in the number of apprehensions track changes in the volume of illegal immigration reasonable well. On the other hand, the same evaluation shows that the estimated size of the illegal migrant flow is roughly 2.2 times the number of border patrol agents.
-Immigration is a problem to American citizens that needs to be checked Thomas J. Espenshade Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21, (1995), pp. 195-216 Several reasons have been advanced for the rise in neo-restrictionism, including fears associated with economic insecurity and concerns over immigrants undesirable cultural traits. But another unmistakable part of the explanation is the concern over unauthorized immigration. Commenting on the early 1980s situation, Passel noted, one important characteristic that distinguishes contemporary immigration from previous waves of immigration is the presence of significant numbers of undocumented or illegal immigrants. Espenshade & Hempstead found that respondents to a 1993 survey who though that most recent US immigrants were illegal had a significantly higher tendency to regard current immigration levels as too high.

-Migration flows will continue to rise over the next few years Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 Pressures underlying migratory movements have been rising over the last two decades and are likely to expand further in the years to come. In many developing countries, population growth is running far ahead of the pace of jobs creation. Political, ethnic and religious conflicts are pushing an ever larger number of refugees in the direction of the more stable and prosperous countries. Above all, migration is encouraged by the expanding per-capita income differentials between rich and poor nations, while technical advances in transportation and communications are reducing the cost of international migration. A combination of all these factors has created an environment in which current and potential future migration flows are becoming increasingly more volatile and unpredictable with respect to both origin and magnitude. The receiving countries have responded by trying to restrain immigration. Rules for granting refugee status or for issuing residence and work permits, as well as tourist visas, are becoming increasingly restrictive, targeting in particular the nationals of developing countries and potential asylum seekers (see OECD 1992). A combination of restrictive immigration policies and expanding migratory pressures has produced rapid growth in the stock of undocumented aliens in industrial countries. In the U.S.A. the number of illegal migrants has grown quickly since the late 1960s, reaching a figure of between three and six million by 1980, and has continuously increased since then, except in the late 1980s when a one-time drop was due to legalization (Chiswick 1988a). According to a report issued by the Commission of the European Communities (1991, p. 38), of the approximately three million foreigners living in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal in 1987, only about one half were legal residents. The remaining 1.5 million were irregular migrants, mainly from non-European countries. More recent estimates place the number of illegals at 1.2 million in Italy alone. - Tougher actions need to be taken against illegal immigrants Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 In response to growth in the stock of illegal foreign workers, the receiving countries have expanded their efforts to stop further inflows of illegal aliens, and also to make it more difficult for foreign workers to obtain authorized employment. Among the policies used to achieve these related objectives are measures that penalize employers who hire undocumented foreign workers. In the U.S.A., comprehensive employer sanctions have been introduced with the passing of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Similar measures have already been applied for some time in Australia, Canada, and the countries of Western Europe. In the last few years additional, stronger measures of the same type have been passed into law in a number of industrial countries.12 The next two sections examine the implications of such measures on factor rewards and the allocation of resources under two alternative assumptions: In one case, stiffer sanctions have a direct impact only on the hiring of illegal aliens (case B). In the other case they are assumed to increase the expected cost of hiring not only foreign, but also (to some extent) native clandestine workers. -Illegal immigrants often take jobs at lower rungs of social ladder, which still takes jobs away from citizens Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 Foreign workers lacking legal status normally take jobs which are at the bottom of the social ladder. Reflecting the supply and demand conditions and various constraints influencing the markets for illegal foreign labor, these are jobs which typically involve low wages, which tend to- be temporary, and where working conditions are harsh, unpleasant, often unsafe, and lack compliance with labor legislation. There are no unions, no social security and very little legal protection. These jobs involve seasonal help in agriculture (such as in the U.S.A., Italy, Greece, Spain and Germany) work in hotel and restaurant trades (as in Italy, Greece, Switzerland and France) and garment making (as in the U.S.A., France, and Spain). Illegal foreign workers are also employed in the construction industry, in the personal services sector, as street vendors, and throughout the expanding underground economy.

-Need to have enforcement of laws Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 If natives are employed in the underground economy (case A), an increase in fines and enforcement of laws pertaining to employment of clandestine foreign labor may also serve to increase to some extent the expected cost of hiring clandestine native workers. The policy will then affect all wages as well as the allocation of resources, even if it does not cause illegal foreign workers to leave the economy. Let us now examine these effects in the short run and in the long run. In the context of our model, policy changes that raise the employers' expected cost of hiring clandestine labor are reflected in an increase in o-. If the cost of hiring a clandestine native differs from that of hiring a clandestine migrant, the value of o- will differ for the two categories of workers. In terms of Figure 1, an increase in the value of a- pertaining to employment of clandestine native workers shifts the ZZ schedule to the right, resulting in a lower W and a higher Pz in the long run. The values of V and U fall in the same proportion as W, where U should now be interpreted as the underground economy wage received by native workers. To the extent that the employers' expected penalty for hiring a clandestine foreign worker exceeds that for hiring a clandestine native, the underground economy wage that firms are willing to pay migrants is correspondingly lower than U.14 Long-run changes in wages of the three sectors accompany changes in the allocation of resources and relative commodity prices. A lower V indicates that Py is also lower, although by a smaller percentage, and that output of Y expands relative to X and Z. These adjustments in the pattern of production imply that the economy under- goes a decline in the number of skilled workers, an increase in the number of unskilled workers in the official economy, and a decline in the number of clandestine natives. Thus, while native workers might be expected to benefit from tougher enforcement measures, it turns out that they all suffer a cut in real income (not only in terms of the numeraire X, but also in terms of good Y) and a smaller number of natives ends up being skilled in the long run. Their only consolation is that illegal foreign workers experience an even larger decline in real income. - Tougher actions against immigrants could be increased vigilantism Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 If the measures affect only the employment of illegal foreign workers and have no direct implications for clandestine natives employed in the underground economy (or, as in case B, if there are no natives employed in the underground economy), then the only consequence of tougher sanctions is to lower the wage received by migrants by the amount equal to the increase in the expected (sanction-inclusive) cost of hiring illegal aliens. Wages of all native workers, relative commodity prices and resource allocation all remain unaffected. Although not modelled explicitly in the present study, there are two obvious channels through which tougher measures could have an impact on native workers even in case B. First, contrary to what has been assumed in Section 3, in a more general setting the government's enforcement budget need not be continuously balanced. Tougher sanctions may then reflect an increase in fines imposed on firms convicted of hiring illegal aliens while enforcement expenditures are held constant. Such a policy change would generate a surplus in the enforcement budget, enabling the government to transfer excess revenues to native workers. It would serve to redistribute income from illegal aliens to native workers. Alternatively, if tougher measures consist exclusively of an increase in enforcement expenditures which are not fully covered by a larger number of fines collected (given the enforcement technology), all the net costs-in the presence of perfect international capital mobility-would be a burden to the native workers. Second, tougher enforcement measures and/or fines may serve to deter future immigration flows, as well as induce (or compel by means of deportation) return migration, lowering the economy's stock of illegal aliens. If the stock of illegal foreign workers does in fact diminish, this secondary, repatriation effect of sanctions entails changes in the economy which are precisely the opposite of those observed in response to an inflow of illegal foreign workers. Recalling that an inflow raises the real wage of every native worker in case B, an outflow of foreign workers, triggered by tougher sanctions, would lower real wages of both skilled and unskilled natives. While keeping in mind these possible extensions of the model, let us continue to assume in what follows that the stock of illegal aliens is exogenously given and the enforcement budget is continuously balanced

-Illegal immigrants are often uneducated and as a result monopolize certain markets Mexican immigrants in the United States tend to congregate in regions near the Mexican border. Data from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing show that 46.5% of Mexican-born individuals who had immigrated within the previous five years resided in the border region of California and 8.6% resided in the border region of Texas. Of all Mexican immigrants, 41.6% resided near the California border and 13.1% resided near the Texas border.7,8 The direct labor market consequences of Mexican immigration are thus likely to be concentrated in border areas. Recent Mexican immigrants tend to have low levels of education relative to U.S. workers. In 1990, Mexican-born individuals in the United States who had immigrated within the previous five years had an average of nine years of education, compared to more than thirteen years for U.S. natives. Unsurprisingly, workers who are recent immigrants are most prevalent in industries that are relatively intensive in the use of less-skilled labor. Table 1 shows the share of workers who are Mexican immigrants for selected industries in California, Texas, and the rest of the United States in 1980 and 1990. We focus on manufacturing because it is this sector for which we have wage data, but we also show figures for other high-immigrant industries. For the border region of California in 1990, more than 32% of workers in the apparel, textile, food products, lumber, and furniture industries were Mexican immigrants, and a substantial fraction of these were recent arrivals. In the state as a whole, the shares of workers who are Mexican immigrants are somewhat smaller. For the border region of Texas in 1990, the fraction of workers who were Mexican immigrants was 45% in apparel, 27% in textile, 21% in food products and lumber, and 15% in furniture. Again, immigrant shares in the state as a whole are smaller. In contrast to the border, Mexican immigrants account for a small fraction of workers in these industries for the rest of the United States. - Illegal immigration doesnt involve just one country Alejandro Portes Social Problems, Vol. 26, No. 4, Theory and Evidence in Criminology: Correlations and Contradictions (Apr., 1979), pp. 425-438
It is important to begin by clarifying what illegal immigration is not. It is not, first of all, a flow coming from a single country. The overwhelming representation of Mexico in apprehension statistics is, in part, a function of the deployment practices of the Border Patrol, which tends to concentrate its efforts along the southern border. Although Mexican immigrants are certainly a majority of the illegal or undocumented population, the proportional representation of other countries-especially those from the Caribbean-is not insignificant (Office of the U.S. Attorney General, 1978). A relatively novel twist in Caribbean immigration is furnished by Dominican workers who are reported to enter the United States surreptitiously be crossing the Mona passage into Puerto Rico. Illegal immigration, then, should not be conceived simply as a process involving only Mexico and the United States, but as one originating in several peripheral societies. Second, illegal immigration is not only caused by "push" forces in the original countries, but by the needs and demands of the receiving economy. The relative stability of the illegal flow, year after year, cannot be attributed to an impoverished alien population "overwhelming" the U.S. borders; it must be acknowledged that this flow of immigrants fulfills important needs for agricultural and urban industrial firms in the United States. Clearly, the persisting relationship illegal immigration creates is a symbiotic one, simultaneously fulfilling concealed but nonetheless real economic needs-on both sides of the border (see Portes, 1977a, b; Bach 1978b). Third, illegal immigration is not primarily a movement of economic "refugees" in search of wefare, but one of workers in search of job opportunities. The illegal flow is, above all, a displacement of labor. More specifically, it is a displacement of low-wage labor, advantageous for many enterprises. Fourth, illegal immigration is not necessarily permanent. Available studies of Mexican immigration at its points of origin, as well as data from this study, suggest that there is a significant proportion of return migration. The dominant stereotype concerning illegal immigration still couples the image of "impoverished masses overwhelming the border" with the idea that those who cross the gates of the landof-plenty do so never to return. But empirical research suggests that many illegal immigrants do return and that the process is a complex one often involving cyclical entries and departures from the United States (see Cornelius, 1978). Reasons for this pattern are not difficult to understand once one realizes that, although work-opportunities and wages are higher in the United States, the money saved from wages can be used for consumption or reinvestment at much higher rates in the country of origin. The aspects of illegal immigration just reviewed are not, however, the only commonly-held ideas about the nature of illegal immigration. They are merely the ones most convincingly clarified by past research. The following results begin to address a fifth and so far underresearched aspect-the socioeconomic backgrounds and present characteristics of the immigrants themselves

- Illegal immigrants lead to further violations of law Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 For its part, the underground economy has flourished in industrialized countries for a number of reasons. A major one is that, by hiring irregular workers, an employer can avoid paying payroll taxes. In a country like Italy, where payroll taxes add 50 to 60% to basic pay, the incentives for hiring irregular workers are significant. Other advantages for employers include the possibility of paying by piece-rate, avoiding the constraints imposed by trade unions and labor legislation, and flexible labor utilization in terms of working hours and layoffs. Underground activities are particularly concentrated in industries which are labor-intensive, where economies of scale do not play a major role, and where demand conditions are volatile. In such an environment the use of irregular workers offers employers major possibilities for cutting labor costs while at the same time providing irregular workers with advantages that are not available in the official labor market (Del Boca and Forte 1982). These include income-tax evasion and the possibility of attaining greater flexibility of working time (Contini 1982, p. 201 and 1989, p. 239). And while legal residents normally participate in the underground economy as a matter of choice, illegal aliens, because of their very status, are compelled to do so. - Illegal immigration helps an underground economy Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 Rapid growth in the number of illegal immigrants and their participation in the underground economies of the U.S.A. and Europe has stimulated a lively debate over the economic consequences of undocumented immigration. It is argued that illegal foreign workers displace low-skilled natives, depress wages, and neutralize market pressures that would otherwise result in a rising trend of wages (see the survey by Greenwood and McDowell 1986). In addition, it is said that the availability of unskilled legal and illegal migrants lowers the pace of structural adjustment and technological progress, reducing the economy's competitiveness in the international market (Harrison 1992). If capital is mobile across sectors, illegal immigration may draw capital to the underground economy, depriving the rest of the economy of capital and causing it to stagnate (Ichino 1992). Illegal aliens are also said to draw benefits from the host country's social programs without always making the corresponding contribution to the programs' budgets. -Illegal immigrants can hurt US workers Thomas J. Espenshade Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21, (1995), pp. 195-216 Americans have long held conflicting attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. We pride ourselves in being a nation of immigrants, and yet many tend to view recent waves of immigrants with skepticism if not outright hostility. Drawing on more than a century of print media coverage of US immigration, Simon & Alexander show that little has changed in how immigrants are perceived. At least since the 18802, immigrants have been assumed to take jobs away from and to lower wages of native workers, to add to the poverty population, and to compete for education, health and other social services. Negative feelings toward immigrants were reinvigorated as successive new waves arrived-first the Irish, then the Italians, then the Mexicans and now Asians. All that seems to have changed are the origins of migrants and the terms used to describe them. Seldom are new immigrants today referred to as they were in 1920 as the melting pots unsightly indigestible lumps. -2.5 to 3.5 million people living in the US illegally Thomas J. Espenshade Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 21, (1995), pp. 195-216 Great controversy has in the past characterized estimates of the total number of undocumented migrants resident in the United States, with some estimates exceeding 10 million. Recent research has refined these estimates, and today there is greater agreement about possible error ranges. Research by Warren & Passel indicates that the number of undocumented settlers and long-term sojourners who were counted in the 1980 US decennial census was about 2.1 million. More than half of these were from Mexico. Informal estimates suggested that between one half and two thirds of the stock of illegal aliens in the United States were included in the 1980 census, which implies that the total number of undocumented persons resident in the country in 1980 was in the range from 2.5 to 3.5 million.

-vigilantism helped spur the civil rights movement Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 The empirical focus of this article is on the civil rights movement and countermovement during Reconstruction, 1866-1877, and the judicial decisions that mediated the federal response. In the years immediately following the end of the Civil War, there was a significant and potentially favorable shift in the political opportunities for a civil rights movement. The Civil War and the emancipation of slaves were extremely disruptive to the economic and political status quo in the South and the nation in general. When freedmen were granted the right to vote in 1868, this further undermined the political status quo and seemingly enhanced the prospects for a successful civil rights movement. Countering these favorable shifts in political opportunity, however, was the emergence of a white supremacist countermovement that utilized violent tactics to repress civil rights activists. This article focuses primarily on the dynamics of protest in Louisiana, although brief discussion of parallel developments in other states is provided. Louisiana warrants particular attention because, first, it is the state in which white violence led to the critical Supreme Court case of United States v. Cruikshank (92 U.S. 542, 1876). This case under- cut the ability of the federal government to respond to the violence of the white supremacist countermovement. While the factors precipitating Cruikshank were of a local character, the Cruikshank decision had national consequences for the civil rights movement of that time.
Vigilantism saves system money

-vigilantes do a better job
Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SELF-HELP OR WHY CANT DICK SHOOT HENRY FOR STEALING JANES TRUCK? Large, bureaucratic governmental law enforcement is expensive. The costs of creating and maintaining the necessary work force and infrastructure are staggering. Private enforcers, such as vigilantes, enjoy a tremendous cost advantage over public enforcers in this respect. Vigilantes are not salaried, they do not require extensive training, and they generally keep capital expenditures to a minimum. As members of the community victimized by crime, vigilantes also enjoy the benefits of increased familiarity with their victimizers. This familiarity should make apprehension easier, thereby lowering the cost of enforcement. Furthermore, vigilante law enforcement does not subject the criminal to the continuing level of stigma associated with a public criminal record. -Implementation lag from police leave gap Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
The established public law enforcement system encounters problems under these facts similar to the problems discussed in reference to an exogenous increase in the harm from crime. The inherent funding and implementation lag may again result in underenforcement. This under-enforcement creates a gap between the demand and the available supply of criminal justice, which raises the price society is willing to pay for law enforcement. As discussed above, this gap may form the basis for a black-market in criminal justicefor a vigilante justice supply to fulfill the communitys demand. -Individuals can be effective as enforcement as seen through the creation of the US fire service to protect property Uri Yanay (professor at Tilburg U.) Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1993), pp. 381-396 No government can protect all people and property against fire and disasters. This led to the pioneering American volunteer firefighter. There are a million volunteer firefighters who comprise 8o per cent of the fire services in the United States. The fire services are the oldest voluntary groups in the USA and embody a national sense of public service. Because of the type of service performed, and the leisure time devoted to the service, the volunteers gain public recognition and status (Perkins, 1987, I988). Thompson (1993:156) notes that ' . . . volunteer firefighters assume the responsibility of providing essential, nondeferrable public goods to their communities, often at considerable personal risks and without pecuniary reward'. Community responses saves money and provides substitute for state action Thomas M. Tripp(Prof at Georgetown), Robert J. Bies and Karl Aquino. Social Justice Research 20.1 (March 2007): p10(25). Uri Yanay (professor at Tilburg U.) Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1993), pp. 381-396 Voluntary, community initiatives are increasingly viewed as an effective and efficient substitute for state intervention. They are effective because they sensitively operate where needs are most pressing, freely exploring for, and adopting flexible, effective ways to solve problems and reduce needs (Wolfenden Committee, 1978). Voluntary initiatives are believed to be efficient because of their small structure, the use of volunteers who contribute time, knowledge and skills for no (or nominal) fees. Voluntary organizations can be politically independent, and generate their own agenda based on people participating and forming the environment of the organization
Voluntary Action
-individual action fosters cooperation and sends positive message Uri Yanay (professor at Tilburg U.) Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1993), pp. 381-396 Titmuss claimed that voluntarism has significant advantages as it emphasizes the individuality of altruistic action which may form social cooperation that is independent of the state. It is valuable because it affirms and fosters the idea that people can join together to solve their own problems. Volunteering gains power if it is institutionalized and organized. Weber defines a social relationship as communal ' . . . if the orientation to action . . . is based on the subjective feeling of parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together . . . Communal relationships may rest on various types of affectual, emotional or traditional bases . . .'
Community Policing
Community policing is effective and has possible gains. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 99 Problem-solving and community policing are strategic concepts that seek to redefine the ends and the means of policing. Problem-solving policing focuses police attention on the problems that lie behind incidents, rather than on the incidents only. Community policing emphasizes the establishment of working partnerships between police and communities to reduce crime and enhance security. The prevalent approach that emphasizes professional law enforcement has failed to control or prevent crime, has failed to make policing a profession, and has fostered an unhealthy separation between the police and the communities they serve. Although adoption of these new organizational strategies presents risks of politicization, of diminished crime-fighting effectiveness, and of enhanced police powers, possible gains in strengthened and safer communities make the risks worth taking. Community policing reforms police operations. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 100 My basic claim is that these ideas usefully challenge police departments by focusing departmental attention on different purposes to be achieved by them and different values to be realized through police operations. These ideas also encourage police to be more imaginative about the operational methods that might be used to achieve police department goals and the administrative arrangements through which these departments are guided and controlled. More particularly, the ideas emphasize the utility of widening police perception of their goals beyond the objectives of crime fighting and professional law enforcement to include the objectives of crime prevention, fear reduction, and improved responses to the variety of human emergencies that mark modern urban life. They also suggest the importance of bringing careful analysis and creative thought to bear on the problems citizens nominate for police attention and to find the solutions to those problems, not only in police-initiated arrests, but instead in a variety of responses by police, communities, and other municipal agencies. They suggest the wisdom of shifting from very centralized command-and-control bureaucracies to decentralized professional organizations. Community policing helps police legitimacy. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 125 The concept of community policing also changes thinking about the bases of police legitimacy. In community policing, the justification for policing is not only its capacity to reduce crime and violence at a low cost while preserving constitutionally guaranteed rights but also its ability to meet the needs and desires of the community. Community satisfaction and harmony become important bases of legitimacy along with crime fighting competence and compliance with the law. Politics, in the sense of community responsiveness and accountability, re- emerges as a virtue and an explicit basis of police legitimacy. Thus community policing sees the community not only as a means for accomplishing crime control objectives but also as an end to be pursued. Indeed, as an overall strategy, community policing tends to view effective crime fighting as a means for allowing community institutions to flourish and do their work rather than the other way around (Stewart 1986; Tumin 1986). Community policing also seeks to make policing more responsive to neighborhood concerns. Despite the overlaps, each concept has its own distinctive thrust Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 150 (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988). Problem solving emphasizes thoughtfulness and analysis over community cooperation. Community policing seeks to rivet the attention of the organization not on its own internal operations but instead on how its cooperation with the community seems to be developing. As a matter of emphasis, a problemsolving police department could err by becoming too focused on problems that the police thought were important and by not being responsive enough to community-nominated problems. A community-oriented department might become so focused on maintaining its relationships with the community that it forgot that it was supposed to mount operations that reduced crime, victimization, and fear.

Community policing provides alternative policing strategies. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 150 Problem-solving and community policing represent interesting new concepts in policing. Evaluated as alternative strategies of policing, they show both promise and hazards. These hazards, though daunting, must be compared not with some ideal but with the current operational reality of policing as it now occurs. Against that standard, the benefits begin to look a little greater and the hazards a little smaller. Key to the successful implementation of either of these ideas as an overall strategy of policing are efforts to build an outside constituency, and broaden the terms of police accountability. Key to that is articulating a set of values that can serve as a basic contract to guide the working partnership of the police and the community as they seek together to define and resolve the problems of crime and fear. There is one further point worth making as one thinks about community and problem-solving policing as possible future strategies of policing. That has to do with the question of how the current drug crisis and the looming threat of more widespread violence will affect the potential success of these strategies. To many, the urgency of these problems constitutes an important reason to stand with the tried and true and resist any experimentation. I tend to think the opposite. If there are any areas in which the strategies of problem-solving and community policing are likely to be most needed, it is in dealing with these particular problems. Surely, an important part of dealing with drugs is learning how to mobilize communities to resist drug dealing. Surely, an important part of dealing with random violence is dealing with rational and irrational fears. Surely, an important part of controlling riots is having networks of relationships that reach deeply into ethnic communities. If anything, then, these problems give impetus to further developments in problem-solving and community policing.
Vigilantism can spur social change

-Repression and failure of law can spur social movements Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 Given that repression can have varied effects on social movements, social movement analysts need to identify the factors that mediate the effect of repression on social movements. Opp and Roehl (1990) and Rasler (1996) identify two conditions that must exist in order to counter the negative effects of repression. First, the repressive acts must be perceived as illegitimate. This perception is most likely to exist when repression is violent, as opposed to "legalistic," and when repression is directed against protesters engaged in non- violent protest activities. Second, the attitudes of those within the protesters' social net- work must remain supportive of the strategies and goals of the protest movement. -Repression can spur social movement
Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 Evidence indicates that repression can have both positive and negative effects on social movements. Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolf- gang Roehl (1990) contend that repression is a "cost" that, at least initially, deters participation in protest movements. In their research on the antinuclear movement in Germany, however, they find that the short-term negative effect of repression was neutralized and even reversed. In her study of the Iranian revolution, Karen Rasler (1996) finds the same pattern. In a similar vein, Doug McAdam (1982) and Steven Barkan (1984) argue that the modem civil rights movement in the United States benefited significantly from the violence of white supremacist opponents. More specifically, the civil rights movement benefited from the presence of a triad of sequential events: civil rights protest, white violence, and federal intervention on behalf of civil rights protesters. The violent attempts by white supremacists to repress civil rights activism often provoked federal intervention on behalf of the civil rights protesters, thereby ironically enhancing the latter's chances for success. Given that repression can have varied effects on social movements, social movement analysts need to identify the factors that mediate the effect of repression on social movements. Opp and Roehl (1990) and Rasler (1996) identify two conditions that must exist in order to counter the negative effects of repression. First, the repressive acts must be perceived as illegitimate. This perception is most likely to exist when repression is violent, as opposed to "legalistic," and when repression is directed against protesters engaged in non- violent protest activities. Second, the attitudes of those within the protesters' social net- work must remain supportive of the strategies and goals of the protest movement. Opp and Roehl's (1990) and Rasler's (1996) work provides important insights into the paradox of why repression is fatal to protest mobilization in some cases, but provokes further protest action in other cases. However, further explication of the conditions that mediate the effect of repression on social movements is needed. Both Opp and Roehl's and Rasler's articles focus on the mediating role played by the perceptions and attitudes both of protest participants and of people within their social networks. It is also necessary, we argue, to consider the structural context in which repression occurs. If the structural context is conducive to unrestrained repression, repression is likely to be severe, pervasive, and persistent. Under these conditions the political opportunities for protest shift in a decidedly unfavorable direction, and the social movement is likely to falter even if the repression is viewed as illegitimate and even if both the protesters and the individuals in their social networks remain sympathetic to the goals of the protest movement.
-relationship between social movements and governments can be strained Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 Analyses of legal decisions have tended to be the purview of lawyers and legal scholars and have been slighted by social movement scholars. There have been exceptions, however. For example, Paul Burstein (1991) argued that the bus boycott tactic of the modem civil rights movement owed at least some of its success to the U.S. Supreme Court, and Barkan (1984) flatly states that the Montgomery bus boycott campaign would have been defeated had not the Supreme Court intervened at a critical moment. Similarly, Joel Handler (1978) asserted that the success of the 1960s voting rights campaign depended in part on successful court litigation. Moreover, in their article on social movements and countermovements, David Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg (1996) recognized the importance of court rulings concerning the legality of various protest tactics and the penalties imposed for using illegal tactics. They argued that the tactical options and choices of movements and countermovements can be significantly influenced by court rulings. Generally speaking, however, social movement analysts have given scant attention to the judicial system. This neglect is unfortunate because, as we will demonstrate, the courts can play an important role in mediating the relationship among social movements, countermovements, and the government.
Social Contract and Vigilantism

-Government has obligations to people who may act if protection is insufficient Uri Yanay (professor at Tilburg U.) Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1993), pp. 381-396 The Hobbesian model of the state is based on a 'social contract' between individuals who surrender part of their liberties, personal assets and rights to the 'sovereign', who, in turn, guarantees their personal safety. If the sovereign fails to provide such protection, or when people believe that the protection is insufficient, this contract may be challenged. People organizing to secure their personal safety signal the sovereign that it has not fulfilled its part of the deal. When this is the case, other binding commitments under the 'contract' may be questioned. It can therefore be hypothesized that the more popular a collective action becomes involving personal safety, the more threatening this initiative may be to state authorities.
Vigilantism and its relation to morality

- If state wants peace, must ensure that government is seen as procedurally fair. (therefore, continued state failures in protection only perpetuates the problem) Thomas M. Tripp (Prof at Georgetown), Robert J. Bies and Karl Aquino. Social Justice Research 20.1 (March 2007): p10(25). At the core of our argument is that victims want justice (Bies, 2001; Bies and Tripp, 1996). Victims want to see offenders punished, and possibly to have restored whatever was taken away from them, whether it be their money, their sense of law and order in the organization, or even their reputation (Bies and Tripp, 1996; Darley and Pittman, 2003; Hogan and Emler, 1981). If such justice can be delivered by the organization, or by the offender, then there is no rational need for the victim to seek justice through revenge. This is one way to stop revenge after an offense occurs: the organization can investigate the offense and punish the offender. That is, if the organization has a law and order analog to the legal system, then victims may use it instead, if they believe it is fair and effective. This is exactly what our research suggests: when victims of offense perceive the organization has a procedurally fair climate, they are less likely to seek revenge (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006). The implication for organizations is clear: if they want peace, they must ensure justice. -Community policing has been supported by legal system James Forman, Jr.The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 95, No. 1 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 1-48 Over a decade after it was first introduced, community policing remains the most important innovation in American policing today. Called "the most significant era in police organizational change since the introduction of the telephone, automobile, and two way radio,"' community policing has been supported by the past three Presidents, Congress, every major police organization, and much of the public. A broad cross section of the legal academy also endorses community policing. Those who seek new ways for inner-city communities to mobilize against disorder and crime support it, as do others whose principal concern is reducing police abuse of minorities.
Vigilantisms Enforcement benefits

-Vigilantism can provide substitute to system when it has fallen apart H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Crime rate increases appear commonly to afflict a society undergoing rapid social change which erodes previously established communal norms and relations and hinders the development of new ones. These conditions exist in rapidly changing urban areas where relationships are increasingly depersonalized; in frontier regions where the migrant population, though dispersed, is also uprooted, and the penetration of the formal system may not be very deep; or in regions disrupted by some social calamity, such as war. Other problems-corruption, inefficiency, or an overly refined system of due process-may also contribute to an increase in crime. Under these conditions, vigilantism may be a temporary substitute for the regular system of law enforcement, until the latter increases its coercive capabilities or the people internalize new system-supporting norms of behavior. -Crime prevention groups can be effective Susan F. Bennett Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 539, Reactions to Crime and Violence (May, 1995), pp. 72-84 A variety of community organizations engage in crime prevention: block clubs, community associations, umbrella organizations of community groups, and community development corporations. Their programs have been equally varied: reducing the opportunities for crime through target hardening, better surveillance of the neighborhood, and changes in the physical design of the neighborhood; reducing the causes of crime, usually through youth programs that provide tutoring, recreational activities, employment opportunities, and similar activities; helping victims through victim-witness programs; and strengthening law enforcement efforts. Often police departments, other city agencies, and social service organizations sponsor similar programs. Community organizations, however, are particularly suited to fulfill several functions needed for community crime prevention programs: generating participation, developing an understanding of community problems, addressing the broader social causes of crime, and developing the residential side of the partnership for community policing. -Community policing provides better contact for areas Susan F. Bennett Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 539, Reactions to Crime and Violence (May, 1995), pp. 72-84 Studies of community activism and crime prevention programs indicate that relatively few individuals begin participating because they are concerned about crime or other community problems. More generally, individuals are recruited through face- to-face encounters with acquaintances who are participants or with community organizers. Residential turnover means that recruitment in this fashion is an ongoing process. Community organizations are better suited to maintaining face-to-face contacts with community residents than are police departments or other city agencies. In some communities where the police-and possibly other government authorities are mistrusted, residents are more likely to respond to local leaders and organizations. -Community Policing prevents crime Dennis Hoffman- Prof. Criminal Justice Univ. Nebraska (2000) Cliffs Quick Review Criminal Justice pg. 83 To prove effectiveness of community policing, proponents point to testimonials from police chiefs and mayors from various communities: Many chiefs of police and mayors credit community policing with lowering crime rates. They claim that community policing has restored order in neighborhoods where open-air drug markets thrived and gangs hung out.

- Empirically proven: Vigilantism necessary to prevent theft Andrew Morris Professor of Law and Business at Univ. of Illinois (April 2007) The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, Vol. 57 No. 3 Foundation for Economic Education, Miners, Vigilantes, and Cattlemen: Property Rights on the Western Frontier Located far from official law enforcement, western communities attacked by criminal elements were forced to defend themselves. Two vigilante efforts in Montana Territory shed some light on how property rights can be defended in the absence of the state. Montanas first gold rush occurred in the Bannack-Virginia City area in 186364, bringing hundreds of miners to the remote region. Among them was a Californian named Henry Plummer, who soon organized a criminal gang that proved efficient at separating miners from their money. Using a spy in the stage office, secret codes chalked on stagecoaches, and Plummers unofficial position as sheriff of the two communities, the gang robbed and killed over a hundred men, At first the miners were helpless to resist the well-organized criminals since no one was willing to stand alone against the force the Plummer gang could muster. The ability to resist the gangs depredations was further reduced by the lack of long-term reputations, which would have fostered trust among the miners in the area. With little social capital and unsure who was involved in the gang and who was not, those outside the gang did not know whom to trust and so could not organize against it. This problem was solved by the chance discovery that there were several Masons in the area. The bonds between Masons provided the basis for the organization of a vigilance committee to counter the Plummer gang. Why did the Montana vigilantes succeed? Three factors made them successful examples of private law enforcement. First, everyone had high opportunity costs for their time. Just as the gold miners in California had to give up time gathering gold, so the Montana miners and ranchers who made up these efforts could profit more from engaging in mining and ranching than they could by stealing their neighbors property. The incentive to institutionalize their power into a means to confiscate rivals property didnt exist. Second, the general problem with private law enforcement is not that there will be too much of it but that there wont be enough. Economists refer to this as the free rider problem because of the temptation we have to free ride on others efforts. If my contribution to the vigilante effort isnt going to determine its success or failure, I might as well stay home and let the rest of the group risk death and injury chasing vicious bandits in the snow. If everyone feels that way, of course, the effort does fail. Indeed, one participant said, The people bore with crime until punishment became a duty and neglect a crime. The Montana vigilantes overcame this problem by drawing on preexisting groups. In the 1863-64 committee the Masons formed the core group and the loyalty the group inspired in its members was enough to overcome the individual incentive to free ride. Third, these vigilance committees, unlike the southern white supremacists or the San Francisco 1856 committee, were organized to defend life, liberty, and property. The clear mission in support of widely accepted natural rights served to both motivate the members and to constrain the exercise of their power. Men drawn into hazardous volunteer activities, such as chasing criminals, by the need to defend their property and lives could not be easily persuaded to continue such work in pursuit of personal gain. - Studies show that police and public can work together David Thacher Law & Society Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2001), pp. 765-798 In contrast with this relatively pessimistic perspective, a few researchers have acknowledged the significance of value conflict but have suggested that police can sometimes overcome it by developing innovative new police practices. Many of these studies focus on conflicts about the use of authority. As I discuss later in this article, police and many community members often call for aggressive enforcement for the sake of crime control, but other community members may view aggressive enforcement as harass- ment. Tracy Meares and Dan Kahan have acknowledged the force of this dilemma, but they suggest that police can sometimes escape it by using innovative enforcement approaches that reduce lawbreaking by changing its social meaning, since these "social norm" approaches may be more acceptable to the community than more conventional enforcement strategies (Meares & Kahan 1998:818-19). (For example, Meares and Kahan discuss reverse stings, which focus on the consumers rather than on the suppliers of drugs and prostitution and thereby create a different image of the nature of these offenses.) Similarly, in a study of Boston's Ten-Point Coalition, Christopher Winship and Jenny Berrien suggested that the Boston Police Department was able to maintain support from black churches and the African-American community during a strong anti-gang enforcement initiative by acting within boundaries of fairness and respect that they had negotiated with church leaders. So long as police respected those constraints, church leaders offered their public support for police tactics, creating an "umbrella of legitimacy" that sustained police-community relations. Winship and Berrien do not describe what exactly the boundaries of fairness and respect involved, but they note that police were expected to "focus on the truly bad youths," to deal with those youths "in a fair and just way," and to refrain from using "indiscriminate and abusive methods"

- Vigilante action is necessary when the state has not provided a safe community environment Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community Communities, Rose (1996) argues, are part of the new imaginary collective where people co-exist. The emergence of the community as the centre of the collective identity has implications for the general society, or the nation-state where the community is located. Communities that defy the existing order, as regulated by the state, can be defined as bad. Those who support the existing order are categorised as good. Moreover, both normative definitions of the good and the bad are historically bound and, as such, have a relative meaning. What is good or bad is relative to who determines the social meaning of a communitys behavior. As a result, communities that engage in vigilante practices in post-apartheid South Africa, do so at the risk of being labeled bad by the state despite the inability of the state to provide a safe and secure environment for the community. To be a good community, its members must adhere to the existing legal order. However, when that existing order does not guarantee the safety and security of the community, the emergence of the bad community is a possibility. It is here where the phenomenon of vigilantism can be located the need to protect the community. - Vigilantism is not mere establishment violence Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community The academic literature on vigilantism does not provide substantial comparative definitions of what it is. According to Johnston: "Vigilantism arises when some established order is perceived to be under threat from the transgression (or potential transgression) of institutionalized norms. Vigilantism is, in other words, a reaction to real or perceived deviance. This distinguishes it from mere establishment violence."The perception that order is under threat seems to be the key indicator for the emergence of a vigilante reaction. As in the case of Dirty Harry, the concerted reaction requires just one individual who, in the pursuit of order, creates a new law outside the states legal order. In Dirty Harry, Inspector Callahan deals with a perceived liberal criminal justice system that protects the rights of people detained and arrested by the police. In this sense, the order that Callahan wants to adhere to is no longer in existence. Instead of obeying the (new) law, Callahan decides to defend the old order by disregarding the law. -Vigilantism results in better police enforcement and crime legislation Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community In the denial of the state as guarantor of the social order, vigilantism will invoke an imagined order that either existed in the past (in its decadent mode), or never existed but is desired (in its idealised mode). In defense of an imagined order, vigilantism establishes counterhegemonic practices. These not only challenge state authority, but also change the state agenda. In this regard, by developing a discourse on an imagined order, vigilantism creates a new political and social environment, which forces the state to adopt a tough law and order approach. In many cases, vigilantism forces the state to take a tough stance on crime, or on the public tolerance of political and social activism. New legislation and greater police powers are among the measures that can result from appeals by vigilante organizations on the state. -Police practices dont work What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear? David Weisburd, John E. Eck Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 593, To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices (May, 2004), pp. 42-65 Over the past three decades, scholars have increasingly criticized what has come to be considered the standard model of police practices (Bayley 1994; Goldstein 1990; Visher and Weisburd 1998). This model relies generally on a "one-size-fits- all" application of reactive strategies to suppress crime and continues to be the dominant form of police practices in the United States. The standard model is based on the assumption that generic strategies for crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are all examples of this standard model of policing

-Vigilantism is organized out of public fear and unrest when government ignores its obligations Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community The model of the nation-state has become the accepted model of organizing societies. The state has been seen as an agent of modernization of social transformation to safeguard accepted standards of living (for example, health, education and human security). One of the essential functions of the state, in addition to guarantees of social order, is that of providing the necessary means and resources for the safety and security of its citizens. However, the modern state no longer exclusively guarantees the safety of its citizens. In some countries, this function has been, or is being privatized and run by the private and corporate sectors. In this regard, the (re)emergence of vigilantism needs to be located in the decentralization of the state and the social fears people have about their quality of life and their safety. Many developing countries do not even approximate the ideal modern state. Johnstons normative definition on vigilantism, as discussed above, needs to be re-examined in light of the transformation of the state. The social order that seems to be under threat, as suggested by Johnston, could also be a reflection of the limitations of the state to respond to the needs of a particular community, in particular when the community in question feels neglected by the states response to its security. The rich get better (corporate-driven) security, while the poor get a poorly and budget-limited state service. The decentralization of the state impacts on the role that the communities outside there adopt. Vigilantism arises from the perception that the state is doing nothing to assist the community in guaranteeing its safety. -Since the state cant keep up with crime, citizens must either lower standards for quality of life, or take vigilante action Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community Communities react to crime in different ways. The good community reacts to an increase in crime by demanding more state initiatives to combat crime. Within the current process of state transformation, vigilantism seems a reasonable alternative response to crime. It is acknowledged that the state is a limited player with regard to crime prevention. The idea that the state has a monopoly on its sovereign powers to guarantee the safety of its citizens is a myth. Thus, regardless of what the good community needs, the state is no longer the sole guarantor of safety and security. This limits our expectations of the role of the state, as well as the quality of life that people expect to live. Garland defines this problem in a succinct way: "The promise [by the state] to deliver law and order and security for all citizens is now increasingly replaced by a promise to process complaints or apply punishments in a just, efficient and cost-effective way. There is an emerging distinction between the punishment of crime which remains the business of the state, and the control of crime which is increasingly deemed to be beyond the state in significant respects. -Citizen protection by the state is classist, poorer communities must take private action to ensure safety Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community There is a general acceptance that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by police and state agencies, and that the profit motive (outsourcing) is not to be feared in policing. As a result, the rich will be policed preventively by making use of commercial security, while the poor will be policed reactively by enforcementoriented public police forces. Since there is a qualitative difference in the efficacy of these approaches deterrence versus prevention the poor end up being less secure. -Vigilantism changes police and how police stations operate David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 One answer to this has been community policing. Its philosophy is straightforward: the police cannot successfully prevent or investigate crime without the willing participation of the public, therefore police should transform communities from being passive consumers of police protection to active co-producers of public safety. Community policing changes the orientation of the police and represents a sharp break with the past. Community policing transforms police from being an emergency squad in the fight against crime to becoming primary diagnosticians and treatment coordinators.

-Police cant stop all crime Jerome H. Skolnick, David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 First, increasing the numbers of police does not necessarily reduce crime rates, nor does it raise the proportion of crimes solved. Neither does "throwing money" at police departments by boosting police budgets and manpower. Certainly, if there were no police, there would be more crime. But, once a certain threshold has been reached, neither more police nor more money seem to help very much. Such crime- control measures do have an effect, but they constitute a minor part of the equation. Such social conditions as income, unemployment, population, and social heterogeneity are far more important predictors of variation in crime and clearance rates (Morris and Heal 1981). Second, randomized motorized patrolling neither reduces crime nor improves the chances of catching criminals. Such randomized patrols do not reassure citizens enough to affect their fear of crime, and they do not generate greater trust in the police. Regular foot patrols, by contrast, have been shown to reduce citizens' fear of crime, although they do not appear to affect crime rates (Kelling 1981). Third, two-person cars neither reduce crime nor catch criminals more effectively than one-person cars. Further, police are no more likely to be injured in oneperson cars (Boydstun, Sherry, and Moelter 1977). Fourth, although saturation patrolling does reduce crime, it does so at the cost of displacing it to other areas (Kelling et al. 1974). Fifth, the legendary "good collar" is a rare event. Even more rarely do patrol police confront a crime in progress. Only "Dirty Harry" encounters an armed robbery with his morning coffee. Most of the time, cops passively patrol and provide emergency services (Skolnick and Bayley 1986). Sixth, response time does not much matter. If even one minute elapses from the time the crime is committed, there is less than a 10 percent chance that police will apprehend the criminal. Even instantaneous reaction would not be effective. Since citizens delay an average of four to five and one-half minutes before calling the police, speed of response makes little difference. Citizens seem to want a predictable response. Crime victims recognize that the perpetrator will usually have left the scene by the time the police arrive. Citizens want a police response they can count on. They prefer, research has shown, a less rapid but assured response to a sometimes rapid but unpredictable response (Percey 1980). Seventh, criminal investigations are not very effective in solving crimes. Generally, crimes are solved because offenders are immediately apprehended or because someone identifies them with a name, an address, or a license plate number. Holmes and Watson worked effectively from subtle clues to apprehension of criminals. Real-life detectives work from known suspects to corroborating evidence. This means that, in order to solve crimes, the police must obtain information from residents of the communities in which crimes occur. But, if residents are hostile and suspicious of police, citizens are less likely to provide information (Greenwood and Petersilia 1976). -Private security provides security David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 Pluralizing the sources of policing affects not only the quantity of policing but its quality as well. Although both public and private police rely on visibility to deter criminality, private police emphasize the logic of security, while public police emphasize the logic of justice. The major purpose of private security is the reduce the risk of crime by taking preventive actions; the major purpose of the public police is to deter crime by catching and punishing criminals. -Data shows even increasing the number of police wont reduce crime David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 First, government is unlikely to be able to respond effectively through traditional law enforcement programs. It will certainly not be able to do so through simply increasing the number of public police. Most research over the past 30 years has failed to show a connection between variations in the numbers of police and the incidence of crime.

-Community policing can mean many different things which gives leeway to the aff Jerome H. Skolnick, David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 Many readers of this essay will think they already know what community policing is. They will expect pet programs to be discussed that they think are valuable. The point is that community policing is not a single program or even an accepted core of programs. If one goes to police departments and says, "Show me an example of community policing," one will be shown different activities in different places. This lack of programmatic clarity is cause for concern. Because community policing is an increasingly popular phenomenon in modern policing, it is easy to conclude that it is only rhetoric or merely a clever phrase coined to make policing appear more humane. Is this the case? We think not. We argue that community policing is a coherent concept and that it has identifiable programmatic elements.
- Community policing spreads out responsibility Jerome H. Skolnick, David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 The central premise of community policing is that the public should play a more active part in enhancing public safety. Neither the police nor the criminal justice system can bear the responsibility alone. In an apt phrase, the public should be seen along with the police as "co- producers" of safety and order. Community policing thus imposes a new responsibility on the police to devise appropriate ways for associating the public with law enforcement and the maintenance of order. This unexceptional formulation of community policing does not really narrow the concept very much. Hard-bitten older officers recognize full well that their job is made easier if the public cooperates and supports the police. They spend much of their professional life asking for assistance from the public. What is new, they growl, about that? Nothing at all. It follows, therefore, that, if community policing is to mean something distinctive, it must refer to programs that change the customary interaction between police and public. New phrases are empty and misleading if they do not describe a new reality. -Police already use citizens for aspects of crime prevention David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 Furthermore, work traditionally performed by uniformed officers has increasingly been given to civilian employees. Usually these are jobs that don't require law enforcement, such as repairing motor vehicles, programming computers, analyzing forensic evidence, and operating radio-dispatch systems. Of all police employees, 27% in the United States are now civilians; 35% in Great Britain; 20% in Canada and Australia; and 12% in Japan (Bayley 1994). A variation on this is to contract out-privatize-support functions altogether, such as publishing, maintaining criminal records, forensic analysis, auditing and disbursement, and the guarding of police premises. Police departments are also beginning to use senior citizen volunteers to provide specialized expertise as pilots, auditors, chemists, or computer programmers. - Community policing allows police to draw from a wider range of resources What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear? David Weisburd, John E. Eck Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 593, To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices (May, 2004), pp. 42-65 Community policing, perhaps the most widely adopted police innovation of the last decade, is extremely difficult to define: Its definition has varied over time and among police agencies (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994; Greene and Mastrofski 1988). One of the principal assumptions of community policing, however, is that the police can draw from a much broader array of resources in carrying out the police function than is found in the traditional law enforcement powers of the police. For example, most scholars agree that community policing should entail greater community involvement in the definition of crime problems and in police activities to prevent and control crime (Goldstein 1990; Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Weisburd, McElroy, and Hardyman 1988). Community policing suggests a reliance on a more community-based crime control that draws on the resources of the public as well as the police. Thus, it is placed high on the dimension of diversity of approaches in our typology. It lies to the left on the dimension of level of focus because when community policing is employed without problem solving (see later), it provides a common set of services throughout a jurisdiction.

-Citizens take aspects of crime prevention which police dont have resources for David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 Some communities employ special support personnel, often dressed in uniforms similar to those of the police, in frontline functions as well. The most common of these are the now ubiquitous parking-meter patrols. But uniformed civilians also conduct crime-prevention classes, make security inspections of premises, provide follow-up counseling to crime victims, resolve neighborhood disputes, and advise about pending criminal matters. -Allowing citizens to take action where enforcement has failed frees up resources to be used elsewhere David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 Expanding the auspices under which policing is provided increases the number of security agents. If visible policing deters, then communities should be safer if there are private uniformed security guards and designated civilian patrols and watchers to supplement the public police. If the expansion of private policing was occurring at the expense of public police, of course, then safety would not be enhanced. But that does not appear to be happening. Relative to population, there are more police in developed democracies in 1995 than in 1970 despite the growth in private security. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that pluralizing has made communities safer.
-Police have problems protecting individuals/knowing where crime will take place Lawrence W. Sherman Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 159-230 Predictability alone, however, does not necessarily make a proactive strategy more effective than a reactive one. It is also necessary to have tested and effective tactics available for attacking predictable crime. When confronted by 125 commercial addresses with highly predictable crime problems, for example, a specially selected group of five Minneapolis police officers (the Repeat Call Address Policing [RECAP] unit) was unable to develop effective ways to reduce repeat calls for service at those addresses (Sherman et al. 1989). They succeeded in closing down two high-crime taverns, reorganized security at a bus station, had fences built around a high-crime parking garage, and tried to install better access control at a YMCA. But overall, they could not reduce total calls compared to a control group. The team was more successful at reducing multifamily residential calls for service by working with the property managers on tenant problems (including evictions), but only temporarily; after six months of reduced calls, the effects of proactive intervention withered away. -Proactive efforts are justified if they prove effective Lawrence W. Sherman Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 159-230 On empirical grounds, then, the balance between proactive and reactive strategies should depend on the availability of proven specific tactics. If more tactics are proven effective, then more proactive effort may become justified. And the evidence of effectiveness may become even clearer when specific tactics are linked to specific offenses. -The community is an important resource to be tapped for use by police Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 To others, adding the word "community" to policing serves to remind the police that the community is an important resource to tap in pursuing the goals of crime reduction and that the cultivation of community support must be an operational goal of policing, influencing decisions about the priority given to certain kinds of activities and about the overall structure of the organization -Community policing allows cooperation among citizens and police Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 To still others, adding the word "community" to policing redefines the ends as well as the means of policing. In this view, the goal of policing is not just to reduce crime but also to reduce fears, restore civility in public spaces, and guarantee the rights of democratic citizens; in short, it is to create secure and tolerant democratic communities. In both these latter cases, advocates of community policing think it is important to add the word to the enterprise of policing because it focuses the attention of police departments on their relationship to the communities they police, and that is an important corrective to the style of policing that had emerged under the professional model of policing.

Police do a poor job of enforcement Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 An assessment of professional law enforcement as a strategy of policing should begin by observing that it has not so far had a great record in controlling crime. That observation has often been made, and (quite properly) seems to the police to be a cheap shot. They argue that they have done their part well but that they have been let down by the rest of the criminal justice system that has been unable or unwilling to prosecute, convict, and jail those whom police have convincingly accused of crimes. Some, in policing and elsewhere, also argue that adverse changes in societyincreasing poverty and unemployment, continuing racism, an increase in the size of crime-prone age groups, the collapse of families, the decay of moral values-tend to increase levels of crime, and that the police and the criminal justice system have done well to keep crime at current levels. -Police enforcement tactics have been proven ineffective Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158
But there is worse news for the strategy of professional law enforcement. Two decades of research have cast doubt on the operational effectiveness of the principal tactics on which the police now rely. We can no longer be confident that patrol deters crime (Kelling et al. 1974), that detectives, working only from evidence at the scene of the crime, can often solve crimes (Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia 1977), or that rapid response results in the apprehension of offenders (Kansas City Police Department 1977- 79; Scott 1981; Spelman and Brown 1984; for an alternative view, see Larson and Cahn 1985). Nor can we be sure that arrests, even when followed by successful prosecutions, convictions, and jail terms, produce general deterrence, specific deterrence, or rehabilitation (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978). We can still rely on incapacitation to control some crimes by some offenders (Cohen 1978; Green- wood with Abrahamse 1982). And it is certainly too much to claim that these tactics have no effect on levels of crime. Nonetheless, the confidence we had a decade ago in the professional strategy of policing as a set of operational crime-controlling programs has now eroded.
-Police cant control crime Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 Strategists now recognize that the reactive nature of current police strategy sharply limits its crime control potential. Reliance on patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation virtually guarantees that police efforts to control crime will be largely reactive. Police on patrol cannot see enough to intervene very often in the life of the community. If they wait to be called, they are, by definition, waiting until an offense has occurred. That is particularly true if they view the calls as discrete incidents to be examined for serious law breaking rather than as signs of an underlying problem that has a past and a future. The vices of the reactive strategy have been more apparent than its virtues. To many, it is simply common sense that preventing crimes is better than waiting for them to occur. What this position ignores, however, is that, in waiting, privacy and liberty are protected; and further, that insofar as specific deterrence and incapacitation discourage current offenders from committing future crimes, the current strategy produces future crime prevention. But there are two better arguments about the weakness of the reactive approach than the argument that it is not sufficiently preventive. -Police cant stop victimless crimes Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 First, the reactive strategy is systematically unable to deal with crimes that do not produce victims and witnesses. This has long been obvious in trying to deal with so-called victimless crimes such as prostitution, gambling, and drug dealing. It has recently become clear, however, that many other crimes do not produce victims and witnesses ready to come forward (Moore 1983a). Sometimes people have been victimized and know it but are reluctant to come forward because they are afraid or they are closely related to the offender and reluctant to see him or her arrested, or some combination of the two. It is hard for the reactive strategy to reach systematic extortion or wife battering or child abuse, for the victims do not give the alarm. It may even be hard to get at robbery in housing projects where the victims and witnesses fear retaliation. It is also difficult for the reactive strategy to reach criminal offenses that produce victims who do not know they have been victimized. Many white-collar crimes ranging from insurance frauds to dumping of toxic waste fall into this category of producing delayed harms. Because such offenses are essentially invisible to a strategy that depends on victims or witnesses raising alarms, such crimes cannot be handled well by a purely reactive strategy.

-police cant maintain community presence in an area Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 Second, the reactive strategy weakens the sense of police presence in a community and makes citizens unsure that they can rely on the police to come when they call or to handle the situations that bother them with any kind of responsiveness to their objectives and concerns. Police operating reactively rarely have time to visit victims and witnesses in the days or weeks following their involvement in criminal offenses. Detectives may show up to obtain statements, and prosecutors may call to notify of court appearances, but patrol officers will seldom call again to offer comfort and reassurance. Similarly, the police for the most part will not get out of their cars to talk to citizens (Sherman 1986, p. 356). And, if called, police will often cut short the encounter if there is no legal action to be taken. Indeed, George Kelling has pointed to the irony that the abrupt end of many encounters with citizens is justified by the desire of the officers to get back "in service"-in service to a dispatcher who may need a car to be dispatched (Moore and Kelling 1983). Finally, the police know little about the people or situations they encounter. In Sherman's words, reactive policing becomes a historical, and without a context (1986, p. 356). Taken together, this means that the police feel distant from a neighborhood's citizens: being distant, they seem both unreliable and uncontrollable. The price is that citizens, and particularly those who are afraid, do not call the police and, instead, absorb their losses and live with their fears. -Citizens can act as first line of defense because police cant be everywhere Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158
The fundamental idea behind community policing, by contrast, is that effective working partnerships between the police and the community can play an important role in reducing crime and promoting security (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). Community policing emphasizes that the citizens themselves are the first line of defense in the fight against crime. Consequently, much thought must be given to how those efforts might best be mobilized. One important technique is for the police to open themselves up to community-nominated problems. Opening the department to community-nominated problems often affects the police understanding of their ends as well as their purposes, for the communities do not always nominate serious crime problems as their most important concerns. In expressing their concerns, citizens' fears become as important as their actual victimization. The factors that trigger fears often turn out to be things other than serious crime (Skogan 1986). Thus community policing changes one's vision of the ends of policing as well as its means.
-Community policing reduces costs and protects constitutional rights to privacy Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 The concept of community policing also changes thinking about the bases of police legitimacy. In community policing, the justification for policing is not only its capacity to reduce crime and violence at a low cost while preserving constitutionally guaranteed rights but also its ability to meet the needs and desires of the community. Community satisfaction and harmony become important bases of legitimacy along with crime fighting competence and compliance with the law. Politics, in the sense of community responsiveness and accountability, re- emerges as a virtue and an explicit basis of police legitimacy. Thus community policing sees the community not only as a means for accomplishing crime control objectives but also as an end to be pursued. Indeed, as an overall strategy, community policing tends to view effective crime fighting as a means for allowing community institutions to flourish and do their work rather than the other way around (Stewart 1986; Tumin 1986). Community policing also seeks to make policing more responsive to neighborhood concerns. None of this is intended to make the police entirely subservient to communities and their desires. The police must continue to stand for a set of values that communities will not always honor. For example, the police must defend the importance of fairness in the treatment of offenders and the protection of their constitutional rights against the vengeance of an angry community. The police must stand for and seek to produce fairness in the allocation of publicly financed protective services across the population of a city rather than cater to the most powerful neighborhoods. And police executives must retain control over such things as the assignment of particular personnel and the establishment of department wide policies and procedures, lest the enterprise cease to operate as a citywide institution and become instead a mere compilation of several independent departments. Under a strategy of community policing, police departments should become more responsive and accountable to the demands of citizens.

-Police can end up focusing on problems they deem as important instead of community issues Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 Despite the overlaps, each concept has its own distinctive thrust (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988). Problem solving emphasizes thought- fullness and analysis over community cooperation. Community policing seeks to rivet the attention of the organization not on its own internal operations but instead on how its cooperation with the community seems to be developing. As a matter of emphasis, a problem-solving police department could err by becoming too focused on problems that the police thought were important and by not being responsive enough to community-nominated problems. A community-oriented department might become so focused on maintaining its relationships with the community that it forgot that it was supposed to mount operations that reduced crime, victimization, and fear - Community crime prevention is becoming a new effective tool to combat crime David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606 In recent years private policing has also expanded under noncommercial auspices as communities have undertaken to provide security using volunteered resources and people. A generation ago community crime prevention was virtually nonexistent. Today it is everywhere-citizen automobile and foot patrols, neighborhood watches, crimeprevention associations and advisory councils, community newsletters, crime-prevention publications and presentations, protective escort services for at-risk populations, and monitors around schools, malls, and public parks. Like commercial private security, the acceptability of volunteer policing has been transformed in less than a generation. While once it was thought of as vigilantism, it is now popular with the public and actively encouraged by the police. Because these activities are uncoordinated, and sometimes ephemeral, it is hard to say how extensive they are. Impressionistically, they seem to be areas. Policing has become a responsibility explicitly shared between government and its citizens, sometimes mediated through commercial markets, sometimes arising spontaneously. Policing has become pluralized. Police are no longer the primary crime- deterrent presence in society; they have been supplanted by more numerous private providers of security. - Police are looking for new methods to try for enforcement including community security David H. Bayley, Clifford D. Shearing Law & Society Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996), pp. 585-606
The visible presence of the police seems to be stretched so thin that it fails to deter. Police devote about 60% of their resources to patrolling but complain about running from one emergency call to another, often involving noncriminal matters. The scarecrow has grown tattered in relation to the prevalence of crime. At the same time, regrettably few villains are caught in relation to crimes committed: 21% in the United States, 26% in Britain, and 16% in Canada (1992 statistics).2 Even fewer receive any sort of punishment through the criminal justice system. Crime pays, as scarcely more than 5% of crimes committed in the United States result in the imprisonment of the criminals involved. Because the police know all this, they are desperately searching for new approaches, responding in part to the competition they face from private security whose strategies overwhelmingly favor prevention over detection and punishment. The central question underlying police soul-searching is whether they can become more effective in truly preventing crime.
-Retaliation has little support in terms of justice Lynne N. Henderson Stanford Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1985), pp. 937-1021 Despite its popularity among victim's rights proponents, retaliation has received relatively little support from philosophers or social scientists. Vengeance is uncivilized, and it certainly cannot be said to appeal to the "higher nature" of man, yet the "romantic version of the vindictive theory . . . holds that the justification of punishment is to be found in the emotions of hate and anger, these emotions being those allegedly felt by all normal or right-thinking people." The retaliatory view of retribution ultimately is a utilitarian view, because its justifications are that it prevents mob violence, channels society's outrage, and preserves the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by paying heed to the community's sense of justice. But none of these rationales adequately support retaliation, even from a utilitarian perspective. First, except in unusual or highly publicized cases, the likelihood of mob violence is almost nonexistent. Second, most crime-even core crime-does not provoke strangers to retaliate directly against the criminal. Third, although it may be proper to be angered by evil acts, it is not at all self-evident that vengeance or retaliation is the only available or appropriate response for channeling society's outrage-another perfectly appropriate response to outrage would be to renew efforts to prevent violent crimes. Finally, some crimes transcend even outrage and any response may be futile in an instrumental sense.

-State acts as mediator for victims who are seeking vengeance Lynne N. Henderson Stanford Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1985), pp. 937-1021 Focusing on the particular harm caused emphasizes retaliation. This appeal to personal vengeance may be necessary to elicit the victim's cooperation with the prosecution in some cases, but not all: Victims may cooperate because of feelings of social duty or altruism as well. And whether formalizing individual retaliation at the sentencing stage is beneficial either to victims or to society is questionable. Explicit encouragement of a victim's urge to retaliate does not necessarily aid the victim's recovery and, as noted earlier, may foreclose the possibility of taking responsibility for the experience. From society's perspective, the state attempts to mediate among individuals in order to prevent vigilantism and runaway vengeance, and a greater focus on individual retaliation may thwart this goal. Thus, while retaliation is the only rationale for the criminal sanction with which victim participation at sentencing and an emphasis on the particular harm are consistent, this rationale is problematic for both the victim and society. And ironically, while victim's rights advocates have urged victim participation in sentencing for the purpose of apprising the sentencer of the specific harm caused, mandatory or determinate sentencing laws may render the information provided largely irrelevant. Nonetheless, the victim may have an interest in being heard independent of the reasoning behind the criminal sanction. -Vigilantism is often associated with vengeance Lynne N. Henderson Stanford Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Apr., 1985), pp. 937-1021 To the extent that vengeance is associated with vigilantism, barbarity, lynching, and other pejoratives, the tendency has been to reject it as a justification for punishment. Similarly, to the extent that it is associated with historical punishments such as drawing and quartering and other forms of torture, it seems reflective of a less enlightened state.
Security failures without vigilantism

-Governments will be unable to provide security to individuals due to costs and other barriers
Because of staffing and deployment rules, additional officers must be hired in order to get one extra uniformed police officer on the streets around the clock throughout the year (Bayley 1985). The incremental cost of a unit of "visible presence" on American streets is, therefore, about $500,000-10 times a patrol officer's average annual salary plus benefits. Few governments are going to be willing to make such investments. Moreover, the distributional requirements of democratic politics ensure that additional police officers will not be concentrated in high-crime neighborhoods where their marginal utility would be highest, but will parcel them out in dribs and drabs so that every politician can claim to have gotten some police for his or her constituency. The allocations made under the 1994 Crime Control Act in the United States show this clearly. Distributional politics reduces the effectiveness of public expenditures on policing in any democratic society. Democratic governments are also limited in their ability to respond to crime by political values. In the Anglo-American tradition, government is distrusted. As a result, public pressure to "get tough" on crime invariably encounters stiff resistance from people concerned about civil liberties. Governments may sometimes enact Draconian policies, but in the long run they swing back and forth between punishment and due process. Deterrence, which will continue to dominate the efforts of modern democratic governments to control crime, clashes with the very precepts on which government has been established. Democratic societies may fear crime, but they fear authoritarianism more. We believe, therefore, that democratic governments are unlikely to be able to allay the public's desperate need for safety through the criminal justice system. The demand for security is unlikely to be met by governmental action, whether through amelioration or deterrence.
***Neg Cards*** Legal implications of vigilantism

- Vigilantism and any type of action must be feasible (thus placing a burden of proof on the aff to show inherent benefits) Mark Harrison Moore Crime and Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing (1992), pp. 99-158 In principle, even the most radical organizational strategy must en-ompass an explanation not only of its value but also of its feasibility; otherwise it is disqualified as an appropriate organizational strategy. Indeed, that is what is required of the analyses that go into developing an organizational strategy. A strategy is developed by searching for and finding a "fit" between the organization's capabilities and its envi- ronmental opportunities. That, in turn, depends on a simultaneous analysis of two key factors: the challenges and opportunities that are present in the firm's market environment and an assessment of the firm's distinctive capabilities for producing particular products or services that can be used to establish its market niche and identity. -Vigilantes dehumanize targets so that they can be punished to any extent Tom T. OConnor Vigilantism, Vigilante Justice, and Self-Help (August 20, 2007) Director, Institute for Global Security Studies, Austin Peay State University http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort Vigilantes regard the criminals and people they target as living outside the social bonds and communal ties that hold our society together. It's not so much that they dehumanize their target, but that the target represents an alien enemy that must be defended against. The target must also be punished, and punished outside the law. Any and all legal matters on the subject are seen as unnecessary intrusions on the basic freedom that all communities enjoy to protect themselves. Zimring (2004) says that the vigilante mindset is the opposite of the due process mindset. Vigilante thinking is precisely the opposite of any notion of fairness, fair play, or a chance for acquittal. Vigilantes do not care to wait for the police to finish their investigation, and they care less about any court's determination of proof. What they do care about is justice -- quick, final, cost-effective justice. To a vigilante, punishment should be inflicted upon those deserving of it at the first opportunity -- no waiting, and the more severe the punishment, the better. These are all romantic notions that feed an appetite for punishment more than an appetite for vengeance. -Vigilantes avoid checks of legal system Tom T. OConnor Vigilantism, Vigilante Justice, and Self-Help (August 20, 2007) Director, Institute for Global Security Studies, Austin Peay State University http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort Punishment is the foundational matter of justice, and those who deserve punishment also deserve to pay (lex salica) or receive some kind of harm equal to the harm they have done (lex talionis). Unfortunately, lex talionis cannot be uniformly applied to every human harm committed. That is the reason we have a system of laws and courts -- to sort out the particulars and differences between a criminal who deliberately commits a crime and one who accidentally commits a crime. Also, lex talionis cannot possibly deal with extreme types of crime, such as the genocide of thousands of people. What would the vigilante do in this case? Kill the deserving party thousands of times over? Nor is vengeance satisfying. Almost anyone who's ever thought about it knows than vengeance is an un-tempered emotion like fear, lust, and anger. Justice and punishment should NOT be guided by banal, primitive, un-tempered emotions. Instead, we normally try to moderate or temper our feelings when thinking about how to punish somebody. Vigilantism undermines law. John Cruickshank Vigilantism Intolerable, Hnatyshyn tells Lawyers DATELINE 1987 Mr. Hnatyshyn called vigilantism an attack on the democratic foundations of Canadian life, and declared it "alien to our sense of law. Our laws are a reflection of our societal values and are designed to protect the rights of all of us," he said. He suggested that the spirit of vigilantism in Canada is based on an overestimation of levels of violence in Canadian society 'We have basically a law-abiding country . . . In the largest cities of our country, people still feel free to walk the streets without fear of intimidation," he told reporters after his speech. Thats why I say categorically as minister of justice vigilantism is unacceptable. We have a country which operates under the government and the rule of law and any suggestion that we should allow people to take the law into their own hands and operate under a kind of Charles Bronson justice is unacceptable."

Vigilantism gets out of control. Makubetse Sekhonyane Popular Justice A Type of Criminality BUSINESS DAY 2001 Vigilantism creates work for the legitimate justice system, writes Makubetse Sekhonyane Incidents like last weeks killing of four youths in Pimville, Soweto for allegedly stealing some chairs from a church have become a common occurrence in SA. Could this be an indication of the weakness of the criminal justice system, or is it an excuse for criminality? It is undeniable the increase in crime in the past few years has meant that, in many areas, criminals are holding communities to ransom. It is also true that the criminal justice system is slow and largely ineffective. But should this all mean that the community take the law into its own hands? The phenomenon of vigilantism in SA is neither new nor unique. It can be traced to the early 1970s and 1980s. The rise of vigilantism during this period was indirectly supported by the state. Vigilante groups then served to ensure that people complied with apartheid laws, particularly the pass laws and the homeland laws. This period also witnessed the establishment and growth of what has become known as popular justice, with structures being set up as alternatives to the formal justice system, which was viewed as being illegitimate and oppressive. Thus both the structures of popular justice and vigilante groups developed and thrived in a particular political context. Today, however, popular justice and vigilantism are understood to mean the same thing. Adherents perceive themselves as anticrime agents. Plethora of reasons is given for supporting vigilantism, including weak, ineffective and corrupt police; slow and unsatisfactory court processes; the cost and inaccessibility of the justice system; and a human rights culture which affords criminals more rights than their victims. However, in their pursuit of swift and harsh punishment, these groups violate human rights and flagrantly disregard the law. The punishment meted out often exceeds the crime, and offenders are not afforded the right to defense. This is well illustrated by acts such as tossing people into crocodile-infested rivers, parading alleged offenders naked in public, dragging suspects behind moving cars, neck lacing and lynching. Criminal law is constructed for the law-abiding V.F. Nourse, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, May, 2003, p. 1691-174 I accept Rawls's invitation to consider punishment as an institution. In Part I, I tease out of the criminal law a latent political economy-a set of relations implicit, yet unexpressed, in conventional criminal law theory and public discourse about the criminal law. Using the perspective generated by counterfactual method, I argue that doctrines that have traditionally been thought to focus only on defendants may actually reflect less about the hearts and minds of defendants than about the needs of the law-abiding and their perceived relation to their government. In Part II, I apply this approach in a place where its application might seem unexpected-to a variety of criminal law defenses, including self-defense, necessity, provocation, and insanity. I urge, in each case, that these defenses incorporate elements that demand deference to majoritarian norms and aim to prevent private punishment. Put in other words, as Emile Durkheim posited so long ago, the criminal law is not constructed for defendants, it is constructed for the lawabiding. In Part III, I respond to potential objections to this approach that argue it is illiberal because it looks beyond individual minds or characters or "choosing selves." I claim that, in its crudest forms, an analysis that is conducted solely at the individualized level may backfire; it may actually undermine a liberal polity's own stated aim to respect the individual. Efforts to intellectually sequester the defendant from the state yield a "paradox of individualization" in which state oppression may thrive, implanted by the law into descriptions of persons' minds and actions. If criminal law theorists are looking for a liberal political theory that can help explain the criminal law, they would be better advised to consider the institutional implications of what Stephen Holmes has called the "anti-self-exemption" principle.

In a world where there are no criminal laws there is rule of the strong in place of rule of the law. V.F. Nourse, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, May, 2003, p. 1691-174 Imagine a world in which there were no criminal laws. If one assumes a society of persons of different strengths and a certain level of natural aggression, then it is fairly easy to imagine a rather nasty and brutish gathering, one that is "ruled by the strong." It also seems clear that, when we replace our Hobbesian "rule of the strong" with a "rule of law," we must beware that we may reinvent the same "rule of the strong." (After all, without state legitimization, an arrest is no different from a kidnapping.) It is in this sense that the criminal law implies institutions of governance; it reflects an aspiration toward a non- violent ordering of society that controls both the individual and the state. At least in theory, then, the criminal law should be seen as a fundamental agent in maintaining a just relation between citizen and state. Although this premise is widely accepted by rather ancient political philosophers, one is unlikely to read about it in much contemporary scholarship on the criminal law or political theory. Indeed, as George Fletcher has commented, "Criminal punishment is the most elementary and obvious expression of the state's sovereign power.... In the contemporary writing on political theory, however, both criminal law and criminal procedure receive short shrift." This gap is particularly acute for the standard criminal law scholar who, when not busy trying to "solve" the crime problem or deciphering sentencing grids, tends to imagine the criminal law in opposition to, rather than constructive of, a political order. If the conventional wisdom disappoints, life and history do not. At some level, we recognize that the criminal law and political life are not unrelated. -Vigilantism is a threat to democracy Tom T. OConnor Vigilantism, Vigilante Justice, and Self-Help (August 20, 2007) Director, Institute for Global Security Studies, Austin Peay State University http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort The vigilante knows it is not vengeance they seek, nor even some lending of respectability to the spirit of vengeance. The vigilante is no avenger. The vigilante simply wants punishment, or just deserts, and they want it swift and sure. The only problem is that vigilante justice is sometimes too swift and too sure. Vicious beatings and on-the-spot executions do not fit the crime. The only purpose that vigilantism serves is to turn the tables on those criminals who make victims out of people. Vigilantes desperately want to avoid thinking of themselves as victims, so they become victimizers themselves. It might even be said that vigilantes ultimately become criminals, since they must rationalize what they know is improper behavior in the strongest terms possible -- self-defense, social defense, lex talionis, natural law, patriotism, religion, honor --- all the time claiming that they are engaging in the most law-abiding behavior or duty there is -- the duty to preserve the sacred right to protect one's self. It is a frontier ethic of survival and self-responsibility. If no one else will do anything, especially the legal system, then it is the red-blooded duty of any honest patriot to act, to kill-or-be-killed, to take a stand and do one's part. It takes a certain kind of over-zealousness to commit illegal acts in the name of do-it-yourself justice, and until more ethnographic research is done (as many experts have called for), we will not know exactly how the vigilante mindset develops. Vigilantism represents a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law. -Vigilante groups must be monitored by police to keep human rights in place Innocent Chuwuma (Dec. 2002) Carnegie Council, Voice for Ehics in Intl Policy Responding to Vigilantism: Human rights dialogue Human rights groups and policymakers must find a way to ensure both that due process is protected and that the rights of communities to organize and protect themselves are respected. The first step is to differentiate between vigilante groups that employ mob justice in their operationswhose modus operandi cannot be tolerated in a democratic society and which should be disbandedand those whose activities are amenable to the rule of law and due process and that could work (and do work) under close police supervision. Many groups that promote racial discrimination, religious persecution, and state-sponsored violence operate under the guise of vigilantism. These groups not only offend sensibilities, but also violate every human rights treaty that Nigeria has ratified. One of the most enduring examples of these kinds of groups is the Bakassi Boys, active in the three eastern states of Abia, Anambra, and Imo. They began as an initiative of traders in Aba, but were later hijacked by state governments, which added partisan political ends to their objectives and armed them with dangerous weapons (including firearms) without police checks. The Bakassi Boys make routine public spectacles of some of the criminal suspects they capture, often parading them naked through the streets, chopping body parts into pieces, and later burning them to the cheering of crowds. These kinds of groups cannot be tolerated, and human rights groups should advocate forcefully for their disbandment

-Vigilantism is empirically proven to increase crime Makubetse Sekhonyane & Antoinette Louw (April 2002) Violent Justice Vigilantism and the States Response, Monograph 72, Chapter 1 Introduction Vigilantism not only leads to an increase in the overall level of crime, but also influences how government responds to crime generally and most importantly, undermines the rule of law. The activities of vigilante groups like People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) in the Western Cape and Mapogo-a-Mathamaga (referred to as 'Mapogo') in the Northern Province are cases in point. The activities of both these groups have seen a rise in gang related violence in the case of Pagad, and many instances of assault in the case of Mapogo. The brutal and illegal methods employed by vigilante groups have also forced reactions from the communities in which they operate, which in turn result in more crime. -Vigilantism unnecessary: there are alternatives Rachel Neild (January 1999) Rights and Democracy Intl Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, From National Security to Citizen Security: Community Based Security and traditional law systems Vigilantism tends to further weaken and undermine official criminal justice channels and creates alternative centers of coercion outside of the state security apparatus. However, there are community-based responses to insecurity and state absence that, while they have often been coopted by authoritarian or colonial regimes, may offer some potential in a democratic setting for enhancing community participation in local security in a responsive and accountable fashion.A final type of informal justice emerges in several countries from the NGO sector setting up conflict resolution and/or arbitration systems for a wide range of users. These vary from corporate institutions (arbitration run by lawyers) through the average person who does not wish to, or cannot afford to, go to court (the Community Dispute Resolution Trust, South Africa) or the poor in slums (a highly successful project in Bangladesh). The meeting points out the weakness of state capacity and, indicating that "improvements in access to justice are more likely to come from the civil society sector",asserts that "there should be a strategic partnership between state and non-state justice mechanisms in a new form of pluralism in which they complement each other. -Vigilantism has a racist track record H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Much of the antiblack violence in the United States exhibits the characteristics of communally based vigilantism. The early Ku Klux Klan was, in part, intended to terrorize negroes back into their proper position after the upward mobility they experienced during the Reconstruction. Morris Janowitz notes that some of the race riots that occurred in the first quarter of the twentieth century expressed the desire of certain elements of the white community to kick the Negro back into his place. Vigilantism fails in the long term H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Secondarily, however, one might ask if vigilantism is an efficacious strategy for stabilizing a sociopolitical order and, if so, under what conditions. The answer to this question can be obtained through an understanding of two facets of vigilante violence. First, vigilantism is basically negative; that is, the essential aim is to suppress, or even eradicate, any threat to the status quo. Second, vigilante coercion tends to be applied in an ad hoc fashion. Even though the violation of formal boundaries may be supported by substantial segments of the community, vigilantism is disorderly; that is, it inhibits the development of reasonably accurate and stable behavioral expectations. In general, vigilantism may be initially eufunctional for the stabilization process; but it tends to be dysfunctional over the long run. The short gains of establishment violence accrue from controlling the process of mobilization and its attendant strains. The longer term costs relate to the negative nature of vigilantism; that is, though it may buy time, it cannot replace formal political institutions and, indeed, it is probably antiethical to their growth. -Vigilantism undermines laws H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 The potential costs of crime control vigilantism are obvious: establishment violence can rapidly become worse than the crime itself. Punishments tend to be disproportionate; the innocent have little protection; and quasi-criminal elements are attracted to the movement as a semi-legitimate avenue for the expression of their antisocial tendencies.
Vigilantism and the conception of Justice

-Cant have justified Vigilantism
Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
No state currently recognizes a Justified Vigilantism or Community Protection defense to criminal prosecution. As a result, the established legal system treats vigilantes no differently than other citizens. If the legislature criminalizes the underlying conduct and the accused is unable to raise a protection, law enforcement, or other statutorily recognized defense, then the vigilante conduct is not tolerated in the eyes of the law. -Vigilantism can hurt immigrants who are trying to flee from unjust living situations
In a country like Mexico, open and declared unemployment is a luxury; few really have access to the system of social security which might subsidize periods of enforced idleness. In 1969, only 20.9 percent of the economically active population (EAP) was covered by Mexican social security (Economic Commission for Latin America, 1974). Thus, it is not surprising that in the 1970 census declared unemployment amounted to only 3.8 percent of the EAP. Much more significant are the figures on disguised unemployment and on underemployment, representing people who must somehow survive with neither minimally remunerated nor stable employment. Twelve percent of the Mexican EAP was estimated to be in conditions of disguised unemployment and an additional 35-40 percent was underemployed in 1970. Together, they amount to almost half of the labor force (Urquidi, 1974; Alba, 1978). Second, Mexico has experienced the contradiction of a sustained rate of economic growth coupled with an increasingly unequal distribution of national income. During the last three decades, the average annual rate of growth in national GNP has been 6 percent. During the same period, inequality in the distribution of income has not decreased, it has increased-substantially. By 1973, Mexico had a GNP per capita of (U.S.) $774. The top 5 percent of the population had 29 percent of the national income, and the top 20 percent received 57 percent of the national income. At the other extreme, the poorest 20 percent received an income share of only 4 percent (United Nations, 1974). Eighteen percent of the population had annual incomes of less than (U.S.) $75 (cf. Portes and Ferguson, 1977). Third, Mexico has absorbed an increasingly modern culture and the modern cult of advanced consumption, while denying the mass of the population the means to participate even minimally in it. As in the advanced countries, the mass media have made sure that the attractions of modern consumerism reach the most remote corners of the country. Especially in urban areas, people are literally bombarded with advertising for new products and the presumed benefits that their acquisition would bring. But underemployment and a highly unequal income distribution actually deny access to these goods to the majority of the population (Eckstein, 1977; Alba, 1978). Fourth, Mexico faces the contradiction between a formally nationalistic government policy and an international reality of increasing dependence involving control of the Mexican economy by foreign sources. Approximately half of the 400 largest industries in Mexico are foreign-owned, predominantly by U.S. corporations. Over 25 percent of industrial production, especially in the most technologically advanced and dynamic branches, is generated by multinational companies. There are more subsidiaries of major U.S. multinationals in Mexico than in any other Latin American country and these foreign companies are buying up an increasing number of domestic firms (Vaupel and Curhan, 1977). Mexican foreign trade is entirely dominated by the United States, which accounted, in 1976, for 62 percent of the imports and received 56 percent of the exports. Mexican external public debt, which in 1955 represented 54 percent of foreign exchange earnings, had surpassed 160 percent by 1970.
-Each individuals own conception of right v. wrong demonizes vigilantism Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998 VIGILANTISM REVISITED: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
As in defining vigilantism, when asked whether state intrusion is justified, nine different people will provide ten different answers. Perhaps because of this divisiveness, our system generally entrusts the legislaturesocietys collective consciencewith the power to determine which actions to criminalize, how severely to punish them, and at what level to set enforcement. Because compromise lies at the heart of the democratic lawmaking process, extremism is often held in check. Vigilantism is defined as establishment violence H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p. 541 It is commonly summarized as "taking the law into one's own hands." Yet, generalizing from the specific phenomenon, vigilantism is simply establishment violence. It consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion. Vigilantism, then, is considerably more inclusive than the summary "justice" dispensed by angered crowds against "criminal" elements.

Vigilante violence aims to restore values of the status quo; it differs from revolutionary and reactionary violence which seek to redistribute values and upset the status quo H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p. 543-544 These idealizations are illustrative, not exhaustive. between allowable coercion and "violence," the apportionment of legal coercion is not neutral. Rather, such coercion tends to be predominately supportive of the status quo. Indeed, when coercive acts increase in intensity or when a more radical redistribution of values is attempted, the probability that such acts may violate these boundaries also rises, other things being equal. Violence aimed at the redistribution of values may be identified as either "revolutionary" or "reactionary," while violence directed at value maintenance may be termed "vigilante." Vigilante violence results from the consistency of their principles combined with a perception that others are violating those principles H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.544 The potential for violence, in Gurr's analysis, is fundamentally linked to the intensity and scope of feelings of "relative deprivation." These feelings in turn are related to the extent to which "value expectations" exceed "value capabilities." In the special case of vigilante violence, a singular type of deprivation appears to be operative: "decremental deprivation." This occurs when value expectations of groups remain fairly constant, but perceived value capabilities decline. The more precipitous this decline, the greater potential for violence by the "deprived" groups -Vigilantes act on impulse Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
But absent state intervention, the vigilante faces no similar restriction. In fact, the imminence of the harm and the exigency of the circumstances surrounding vigilante action promote extremism. Because the crime affects his business, his family, his community, the potential vigilante may overestimate the costs of crime to society as a whole. In the eyes of the victimized citizen, this misperception would justify a higher degree of law enforcement relative to crime. In the terms of the model, the vigilante consumption shifts in favor of law enforcement because crime is perceived as more expensive. This shift actually lowers total social wealth, due to the vigilantes access to imperfect information.
-Social costs hurt law enforcement

Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
Vigilante law enforcement, however, also creates social costs by undermining the stability and authority of the established criminal justice system. Moreover, public law enforcement benefits from economies of scale and from the specialization of labor. The effective public monopoly on law enforcement also mitigates problems resulting from the uneconomical duplication of enforcement efforts and from free riders. Furthermore, vigilante action may result in criminal penaltiesa cost to both the individual vigilante, who experiences the disutility of fines, imprisonment and stigma, and to society, which must bear the cost of imposing these penalties.

Groups are able to take defensive actions in order to enforce rules; the magnitude of vigilante violence is dependent upon the regime to defend ones formal boundaries H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.545-546 Other sources of discontent arise if the government's formal goal achievement is being frustrated by corruption or other causes of inefficiency. Establishment groups, then, may view their value capabilities as a diminishing asset. Under these conditions, the inclination to take defensive action in violation of the system's formal rules will increase. This action, nevertheless, is believed to be fundamentally supportive. A basic relationship can be hypothesized from the above analysis: the potential for vigilantism varies positively with the intensity and scope of belief that a regime is ineffective in dealing with challenges to the prevailing sociopolitical order. As with the likelihood of violence in general, the probability of vigilantism is directly related to the scope and intensity of the normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence.12 Thus, dissident and establishment violence may be nurtured by the same systemic values. Gurr, moreover, considers two additional variables to be important determinants of the magnitude of dissident violence: The intensity of these feelings, in turn, would be related to the importance to the established group of the values threatened the balance of dissident and regime coercive control, and (2) the balance of dissident and regime institutional support. Neither of these variables seems to be of direct relevance to this analysis, though they undoubtedly affect the establishment groups' feelings of relative deprivation. Two factors of possible importance, however, are suggested: the coercive capability of the formal state apparatus vis-a-vis the vigilantes, and the amount of social support for those who engage in acts of establishment violence. The magnitude of vigilante violence appears negatively related to the ability (both objective capability and "will") of the regime to defend its formal boundaries against this type of breeching and positively related to the scope and coherence of social support for the vigilante movement. Vigilantism is key to public safety David H. Bayley, specialist in international criminal justice, and Clifford D. Shearing, Australian National University, LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 96, p. 588 While once it was thought of as vigilantism, it is now popular with the public and actively encouraged by the police. Because these activities are uncoordinated, and sometimes ephemeral, it is hard to say how extensive they are. Impressionistically, they seem to be as common as McDonald's golden arches, especially in urban areas. Policing has become a responsibility explicitly shared between government and its citizens, sometimes mediated through commercial markets, sometimes arising spontaneously. Policing has become pluralized. Police are no longer the primary crime- deterrent presence in society; they have been supplanted by more numerous private providers of security. Searching for Identity During the past decade, police throughout the developed democratic world have increasingly questioned their role, operating strategies, organization, and management. This is attributable to growing doubts about the effectiveness of their traditional strategies in safeguarding the public from crime. The visible presence of the police seems to be stretched so thin that it fails to deter. Police devote about 60% of their resources to patrolling but complain about running from one emergency call to another, often involving noncriminal matters. The scarecrow has grown tattered in relation to the prevalence of crime. At the same time, regrettably few villains are caught in relation to crimes committed: 21% in the United States, 26% in Britain, and 16% in Canada (1992 statistics). Even fewer receive any sort of punishment through the criminal justice system. Crime pays, as scarcely more than 5% of crimes committed in the United States result in the imprisonment of the criminals involved. Because the police know all this, they are desperately searching for new approaches, responding in part to the competition they face from private security whose strategies overwhelmingly favor prevention over detection and punishment. The central question underlying police soul-searching is whether they can become more effective in truly preventing crime. One answer to this has been community policing. Its philosophy is straightforward: the police cannot successfully prevent or investigate crime without the willing participation of the public, therefore police should transform communities from being passive consumers of police protection to active co-producers of public safety. Community policing changes the orientation of the police and represents a sharp break with the past. Community policing transforms police from being an emergency squad in the fight against crime to becoming primary diagnosticians and treatment coordinators

-Citizens arrest laws undermine parts of vigilantism such as preventive action University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 120, No. 5 (May, 1972), pp. 952-982 The law of citizen's arrest is bottomed on traditional common law rules. Several of these rules, the details of which vary considerably among jurisdictions, have been embodied in state statutes. In most jurisdictions, a private citizen may not arrest an individual unless he knows with certainty that a felony has been committed and reasonably believes that the individual committed it. Presumably, neighborhood defense groups may employ the citizen's arrest to the same extent as an individual. Because of the requirements of certainty and a reasonable belief, however, the group member may find that the common law right of arrest does not allow him to patrol, investigate, and take preventive action. The common law further gives the individual the privilege of self-defense. He may use reasonable force to prevent harm to himself even if the application of such permissible force results in death or serious bodily injury to the aggressor. Jurisdictions differ as to whether the individual must exhaust all avenues of retreat before he meets a threat to his life with deadly force. Even where no retreat requirement is included, however, it is doubtful that the common law right of self-defense would apply to one who arms himself and then places himself in a position where he is likely to be attacked. This is, of course, the position of neighborhood defense groups that conduct aggressive, armed patrols. Where they injure those who attack them, members of these groups possibly may not be allowed to rely on self- defense principles because their posture and conduct invited the attack. -Help Keep governmental monopoly on enforcement Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
The criminal sanctions faced by vigilantes pose a barrier to entering the criminal justice market. By establishing barriers to entry, the public criminal justice system minimizes competition. Without competition from private criminal justice suppliers, the established system may continue to exact monopoly rentswhen the sheriff is the only law in town, the sheriff is an important individual.
-The worse the original action, the more likelihood of revenge, therefore, when vigilantism occurs, it usually occurs with extreme crimes. Thomas M. Tripp(Prof at Georgetown), Robert J. Bies and Karl Aquino. Social Justice Research 20.1 (March 2007): p10(25). Second, research shows that the more severe are the harms, then the greater the motivation for revenge (Bradfield and Aquino, 1999; Miller and Vidmar, 1981). In fact, Tripp et al. (2002) showed that in the workplace, much like in courts of law, more severe harms mandate more severe forms of revenge. In Tripp et als vignette study, subjects imagined themselves as coworkers observing a conflict between two other coworkers. After receiving information about the conflictparticularly about the harms caused by the offense and by the revengesubjects then judged the victim-cum-avengers response among moral and aesthetic dimensions. In general, subjects judged proportionate acts of revenge (i.e., the amount of harm the victim-cumavenger causes the offender equals the amount of harm the offender caused the victim) as morally neutral, and judged disproportionate acts of revenge as morally bad. Of most interest here is that of the two disproportionate acts of revengeunder-retaliation and over-retaliationsubjects judged underretaliation just as harshly as they judged over-retaliation. This finding suggests that employees do not approve of acts of injustice that go unpunished.
Punishment distributed by vigilantism

-Unchecked violence by vigilant Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
So what makes violent vigilante law enforcement more objectionable than violent law enforcement by the state? More directly, why punish a vigilante for committing acts that are justified when performed under the color of law? The ultimate answer to these questions most likely centers around the vigilantes unchecked use of excessive, and often deadly, force. - Even with an absolute distinction between public and private, private police are largely unburdened by the law Douglas Lichtman The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 615-648 Those who worry about the encroaching powers of the public police in the war against terrorism ignore an equally important group. Increasingly, the private police are considered the first line of defense in the post- September 11th world. Hardly anything is known about the private police, yet they are by far the largest provider of policing services in the United States, at least triple the size of the public police. More importantly, the functions, responsibilities, and appearance of the private and public police are increasingly difficult to tell apart. This development has been surprisingly underappreciated. What's more, the law recognizes a nearly absolute distinction between public and private. This means that private police are largely unburdened by the law of constitutional criminal procedure or by state regulation. While the law multiplies distinctions between private and public police, the two groups perform many of the same tasks, and private police benefit from heavy public involvement. This is the paradox of private policing. Private police long ago outpaced the public police in terms of persons employed and dollars spent. Today they provide crime control and order maintenance services in many of the places in which we work and live. Uniformed guards patrol shopping malls, "gated communities," and even public streets.3 Employers routinely hire private investigative agencies to conduct background checks on prospective employees.4 Many of these privately paid police behave like public law enforcement officers: detaining individuals, conducting searches, investigating crimes, and maintaining order. Because few empirical studies exist, the private police remain largely unknown. Courts have not developed comprehensive rules governing private police, and statutory regulation is minimal, even non-existent in some states. To make matters worse, legal scholars-especially those who study the public policehave paid them hardly any attention. Values may be redistributed in a peaceful manner rather than a violent manner H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.545 In every society, however, there are other groups that have a latent-if not a manifest-interest in altering the status quo, whether through criminal violence, reform, or revolution. In certain circum-stances, a peaceful, partial redistribution of values may be possible. Where it is not, these discontented groups-depending, among other things, on their feelings of relative deprivation-may resort to more threatening challenges to the existing distribution. From the point of view of the challenged groups, a primary function of government is to control these dissidents. Most governments, however, are bound by certain rules regulating the threat or use of the instruments of social control, although these rules may be regarded by some establishment groups as hampering the government's effectiveness. -Private security have some powers which police do not Elizabeth E. Joh The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 95, No. 1 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 49-132 Consequently, it would be a mistake to think of private police as lacking a legal basis from which to exercise coercive power. The private police also possess some powers that the public police lack. Many are authorized to act as agents of property, and can rely upon the powers of exclusion or ejection for those considered undesirable or unwelcome from the malls, corporate campuses, and other private spaces that are policed privately. Public police may lack these specific powers of exclusion in the places they serve.

Once one punishes the innocent, it harms the individual punished and creates collateral effects. V.F. Nourse, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, May, 2003, p. 1691-1746 Deterrence and retribution, the twin pillars of much criminal law theory, too often disappoint. Think about it for a moment: if we truly wanted to deter more crime, or exercise our vengeance to its utmost, we would "string 'em up," kill the offender's children, or jail the innocent. We don't do these things-not necessarily because of deterrence or retribution (whatever these otherwise capacious ideas mean) but because the resulting political order would be intolerable. We know that dictatorships deal with crime very easily. We also know that they seek to legitimize their violence through the criminal law. Hitler's criminal code formed mens rea and actus reus in the image of the Volk; Stalin's code formed these same ideas in terms of Bolshevik ideology.) Today, the new Chinese criminal code purports to limit criminalization to the "harm" principle, but then defines harm in ways that enable the punishment of dissent. Now think about why our criminal law may look as it does. Perhaps we have forgotten to ask how, in a system of telishment, we are ever to know whether these officials are "authorized" to issue a "telishment" or systematically "de- ceptive" about telishment. Put in other words, once one punishes the innocent, one not only harms the individual punished but also creates collateral effects for the law-abiding and for those who govern the practice of punishment. The logic of this claim parallels the insights of other disciplines, such as law and economics, which insist that to understand the effect of a law, one cannot simply look at the law itself. If wrongly punished rules of law will change relations between citizen and government. V.F. Nourse, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, May, 2003, p. 1691-1746 One must look, as well, to "how people will respond" to the law and what relations they will create in response. Rawls is looking at the institutional and political (rather than market/contract) effects of individualized rules and arguing that one cannot understand an individualized rule (punishing an innocent man) without considering important responses to, or effects of, the rule on (1) law-abiding citizens; (2) legal officials; and (3) the relations created between them. Just as a rule that punishes speech is likely to have "chilling" effects (all law-abiding speakers respond to the rule), the practice of telishment not only causes harm to the individual thrown in jail but inspires widespread fear in the populace about "whether the same fate won't at any time fall on them." The rule also has effects on the relation between citizens and their government; a law that gives officers discretion and opportunities for deception in the determination of "who" is innocent is likely to yield widespread distrust in government officials. In such a world, the "people will come to have a very different attitude towards" the practice of punishment and, I would add, their government as a whole. The risks of which Rawls speaks are what we might call risks to a political order or claims of political structure. This insight invites important questions about modern views of the criminal law. Since the 1970s, there has been an often unstated consensus that the proper level of analysis of the criminal law is at the individualized level of mind or conduct (whether of individual defendants or the collective sum of all potential defendants). Moreover, it has been assumed that the "individual level" forms an "exception to" and is "opposed to," rather than "constructive of," more generalized rules and institutional commitments

Example of vigilantes in Brazil executed people because of the inefficiency of Brazils establish judicial institutions H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.549 Crime control vigilantism This is directed against people believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal system. Such acts harm private persons or property, but the perpetrators escape justice due to governmental inefficiency, corruption, or the leniency of the system of due process. This form of establishment violence, engaged in by private persons, is the kind most commonly associated. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg with vigilantes. Indeed, American history is replete with examples of private groups restoring "law and order" where it has broken down or establishing it in areas into which the government's formal apparatus of rule enforcement has not yet effectively extended. This action has often been organized and led by representatives of the higher socioeconomic classes in the crime-plagued community, though the followers have tended to represent broader class back-grounds. Crime control vigilantism initiated by private persons can occur in any society where the government is believed to be ineffectual in protecting persons and property. One of the more prominent con-temporary illustrations is that of the Esquadrao da Morte (Death Squad) in Brazil. These self-appointed interpreters of the law, thought to be mainly off-duty policemen, have executed an estimated 500 to 1,200 people. According to spokesmen claiming to be Esquadrao members, the death squads have been taking these actions because of the inefficiency of Brazil's established judicial institutions. The spokesmen claim that apprehended criminals are permitted to go free for long periods while awaiting trial by the authorities. Esquadrdo members, additionally, feel that most criminals cannot be or are not being rehabilitated. For these reasons, the squads believe that they are performing a service for the nation by executing people suspected of being habitual criminals. Evidently many Brazilians are in agreement with this appraisal. In a 1970 public opinion study, for example, 60 percent of the Sao Paulo residents polled claimed that they favored the existence of the Esquadrdo Example of vigilantes in America executing drug pushers because they believe that the government is not enforce the laws properly H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.550 Other interesting examples of this type of vigilantism have occurred in American urban ghettos. In Chicago an organization called the "Afro-American Group Attack Team" is attempting to rid the community of drug dealers.19 Similar groups are operating in New York, where it has been reported that ten drug pushers were executed during an eighteen-month period by black and Puerto Rican vigilantes, and in Washington, where the "Spades Unlimited" are trying to make it "dangerous" for dope peddlers to trade. The primary causes of these activities are disillusionment with the government's ability to enforce the laws and, apparently, the belief that the police are corrupt. These cases are examples where groups normally classified as potential participants in dissident violence share certain values with the established legal system and are attempting to extend the enforcement of these shared norms into their neglected communities Vigilantism can work KELLY D. HINE,Law Clerk at U.S. District Court, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1997,pg. 1222 In a small town in Texas, citizens band together to confront and harass drug dealers, ultimately driving the dealers from their neighborhood. The local police praise the community for organizing a legalized vigilante movement.1 In Oakland, California, housing complex residents use threats of civil law suits to prompt building owners to evict criminals. The residents leader describes the process as cheap, safe and fast justice.2 In Dallas, Texas, a group of mall security guards whip four youths with belts and canes after the youths admit to stealing from a mall store.3 A grand jury refuses to indict the guards for their actions.4 In each case, citizens chose to supplement established legal norms by administering their own brand of criminal justice. In each instance, many in the community applauded the vigilante action.

-Violence controlled by social agencies David JACOBS, Department of Sociology, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 103, No. 4, (Jan., 1998), pp. 838-839 Although violence by social control agencies in advanced states is comparatively unusual, that does not make it ineffective. We may have been misled by the relative absence of conspicuous force in these societies. In any case, the discipline has neglected coercion and its chilling effects on nonconforming behavior, particularly in the most advanced industrial democracies. While we do not believe that coercion or its threat is the only important explanation for order, we suspect that further study of the conditions that lead to state violence will increase our understanding of how order is maintained in advanced societies. Developments in historical political sociology have established the importance of political violence, but theoretical advances in sociology of law and social control based on the work of Vole (1958), Turk (1969) and Black (1976) furnish some of the more useful explanations for this outcome. Sociologists who stress coercive explanations for order often see the control agencies of the state as principally serving the interests of the privileged. According to this political threat view, a primary (but not the only) use of criminal law and law enforcement agencies is to maintain control over the dangerous classes who threaten public order. Many Weberian and most neo-Marxist theorists who see coercion as a major way to preserve order think that differences in rewards are based on power (Lenski 1966; Collins 1975). According to this view, the privileged benefit greatly from existing arrangements while many citizens receive much less; inequality is an unstable condition that must be sustained by sanctions or their threat. If racial or economic disparities are at least partly sustained by coercion, enhanced state violence can be expected in areas where economic disparity and the menace of an underclass are greatest. We study such political explanations (and many others) for variation in the amount of internal state violence by looking at rates of lethal force within political subunits. This study assesses the determinants of the rate of killings committed by the police in the 170 U.S. cities. The conventional assumption is that police violence is a reaction to the violence the police encounter, so killings by police officers are a necessary response to the brutality they must control. A political approach suggests instead that police violence should be especially likely in areas where racial or economic divisions with political consequences are severe. If the privileged are threatened by the disorderly potential of a racial or economic underclass with little to lose and much to gain from redistributive violence, diminished efforts to control the police or demands that they be unfettered should be likely in racially or economically divided cities. Political explanations suggest that police killings will be most common in economically stratified cities with larger percentages of minorities because dominant groups have much to lose from threats to public order by a racial or economic underclass. In this article we see if the police use of lethal force can be explained by political arrangements or by social divisions that are likely to have political consequences, but we also assess reactive accounts that stress interpersonal violence and other problems officers encounter in the urban environments they must police. Because race is such an important consideration in a study of police violence and because our initial results suggest that the determinants of police killings of black deserve separate study, we analyze the factors that explain these race-specific lethal force rates as well. Results from studies that assess many competing hypotheses are more accurate (Johnston 1984), so we use can inclusive strategy. This means the theoretical section that follows cannot focus on just a few explanations

-Police Are Effective Steven D. LEVITT Alvin H. Baum Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 92, No. 4, (Sep., 2002), pp. 1244 The challenge in estimating a causal impact of policy on crime is to overcome simultaneity bias: increases in crime are likely to induce politicians to hire more police. Virtually every cross-sectional or correlational study published on the topic finds either no impact of police on crime, or even a positive relationship between two variables (Samuel Cameron, 1988). To date there have been three studies that take seriously the identification issues: Levitt (1997), Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody (1996), and Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan (2000). These three papers have utilized very different estimation strategies Levitt (1997), as noted earlier, uses electoral cycles as instrumental variables. Marvell and Moody (1996) employ a Granger-causality approach, demonstrating that increases in police Granger-cause reductions in crime. Using the city-level panel data set constructed and used in Levitt (1997), the elasticity of total index crime (violent and property combined) is estimated to be -0.30. Mar- vell and Moody (1996) also show that increases in crime (especially violent crime) predict future increases in the size of the police force. Corman and Mocan (2000) use monthly time- series data for New York City over the period 1970-1996. Corman and Mocan argue that the use of monthly data minimizes any simultaneity bias because of lags in the political response to rising crime. If it takes policy makers three months to increase the police force when crime rises, than annual data will be contaminated by simultaneity, but monthly data will not.2 They report elasticities of crime with respect to the number of police that range from -0.29 to -1.385 across crime categories, with a median value of -0.452. As in Levitt (1997), police are found to be most effective in reducing homicide among the index crimes. -Fire fighters as an instrument Steven D. LEVITT Alvin H. Baum Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 92, No. 4, (Sep., 2002), pp. 1245 To identify the impact of police on crime using instrumental variables, one needs an instrument that predicts changes in the size of the police force, but is unrelated to changes in crime (after controlling for other relevant factors). In what follows, I propose the number of municipal firefighters per capita as plausible instruments. Factors such as the power of public sector unions, citizen tastes for government services, affirmative action initiatives, or a may- or's desire to provide spoils might all be expected to jointly influence the number of firefighters and police. Empirically, changes in the number of police officers and firefighters within a city are highly correlated over time. Whether firefighters may be plausibly ex- cluded from the equation determining crime is a more difficult question. There is little reason to believe that the number of firefighters has a direct impact on crime. However, if the set of factors that influences the number of firefighters, (e.g., the local economy, fiscal crises) also affect crime, and these are not properly accounted for in the estimation, the exogeneity of the instrument may be called into question. In the empirical work, therefore, I attempt to control for factors like the local economy, and in some cases, the number of municipal streets and highway employees.3 The data set used is an annual, city-level panel covering the period 1975-1995. In order to be included in the sample, a city needed to have at least 100,000 residents in 1973. A total of 122 cities are included in the sample. Be- cause the data on firefighters is incomplete, however, there are typically only about 100 observations per year in the data set.4 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.5 The final column of the table reports standard deviations after city-fixed effects and year dummies have been removed, since this is the relevant source of variation used in the paper. There are roughly twice as many police as there are firefighters. There is also substantially greater variation in the number of police, especially within a city over time. One hypothesis to explain this fact is that police staffing responds to crime fluctuations, whereas as the number of firefighters may not.

-Private police, are more likely to take the law into their own hands Douglas Lichtman The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 615-648 As for their legal status, many private police do not possess the same legal powers as the public police. Many private security guards, for instance, possess no greater legal capabilities than do ordinary citizens to forcibly detain persons who are suspected of or have in fact committed a crime, although there is less distinction between the citizen arrest power and peace officer arrest power than might be expected.76 For example, in many states, an ordinary citizen may arrest someone for a misdemeanor committed in her presence, and for a felony that she has probable cause to believe that the person has committed (subject to the limitation that a felony has in fact been committed).77 Even if citizens and private police possess the same formal powers, the more important difference is a practical one; private police are occupationally disposed to use powers that a citizen may rarely, if ever, invoke. Some private police do possess greater legal powers than ordinary private citizens. Deputization confers upon private police the same powers granted to the public police.78 For example, private police on many college campuses possess "peace officer" powers while on duty and within the con- fines of the campus.79 There are also large numbers of public police working as private police in their off-hours.80 Some of these "moonlighting" police even work in their public uniforms and drive their public squad cars, all while on a private payroll -Boundaries for private police are unclear, thus increasing the chance for abuse Douglas Lichtman The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 615-648 By contrast, the boundaries of private policing are much less clear, in part because there has been so little scholarly attention, and because there is no equivalent to criminal procedure law governing them.60 Because "there is a growing lack of consensus as to what exactly the 'private policing' construct entails,"61 what is and is not defined as "private policing" here is not without contest.62 We can attribute some of the disagreement to the fact that private police are employed in a variety of different contexts: acting as bodyguards, patrolling property, investigating fraud, and maintaining order. Another source of confusion is the range of organizational forms.63 Some private police are employees of large, publicly-held multinational corporations, while others are solo practitioners. All, however, share a common purpose: to pursue their clients' objectives - Private punishment leads to partial or punish too severely V. F. Nourse University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 5 (May, 2003), pp. 1691-1746 If the doctrine and theory disappoint, our intuitions tell a more robust, but inarticulate, story. People feel very strongly about the Goetz case. And yet they describe their emotions in ways that sound positively governmental. They tell us that Goetz "took the law into his own hands,"5" that he was a "vigilante" or a revolutionary. The fear that appears to be expressed is that, if the law grants Goetz's defense, he will be permitted, in effect, to "legislate" for the rest of us. Put in other terms, the risk we emote in our criticisms of Goetz is a fear that a constitutionalist might call "countermajoritarian," a risk that the prejudices of the few will end up governing the many. Notice that this risk and public rhetoric are not unique to the Goetz case. Indeed, it is a claim that, in theory, might be made of any defendant claiming self- defense, or any defense for that matter." It reflects, I believe, concerns about private punishment and its tendency to be self-exempting. If we allow any defendant to exempt himself from the rules and challenge the state's monopoly on violence, we fear that he will enforce the law in ways that are excessive or partial. If, as Locke believed, men are left to privately punish, they will exempt themselves, indulge favorites, and punish too severely; "for men to be judges in their own cases, ...self- love will make men partial to themselves and their friends."

-Punishing illegal immigration can hurt the economy Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 In the long run, allowing for interoccupational mobility of native workers, an inflow of illegal foreign labor has no effect on wages of natives when both natives and foreigners are employed in the underground economy. Alternatively, when only foreign workers occupy jobs in the underground economy, all native workers enjoy an increase in real wages. In the context of the present model, skilled natives benefit because illegal immigration reduces the cost of the intermediate good used by the sector employing skilled labor. Unskilled natives benefit because the economy expands, increasing the demand for the services of unskilled labor. Thus, the model illustrates the possibility that all native workers may benefit from illegal immigration as the inflow of foreign workers enables them to enjoy larger scarcity rents. Imposition of stiffer sanctions on employers found to be hiring illegal aliens was found to have no effect on wages of natives if native workers do not participate in the clandestine labor market. If they do participate and tougher sanctions raise the cost of hiring not only foreign, but also clandestine native workers, real wages of all natives decline. Accordingly, employer sanctions do not seem to be an effective policy instrument when used with the objective of raising the real income of native workers. Similarly, in the context of the present model, legalization of the status of clandestine foreign workers has no positive effects on the real income of natives. -People in democratic societies cant be justified to take the law into their own hands V. F. Nourse University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 5 (May, 2003), pp. 1691-1746 The necessity defense demands deference to the state for reasons we have already seen under the more colloquial label of "taking the law into one's own hands."88 As one court has put it: "In a society based on democratic decision making, ... a protestor cannot simply assert that her view of what is best should trump the decision of the majority of elected representatives." The critic of necessity fears that violent opponents of the draft or abortion or nuclear power have acted "above" the state, exempting themselves from rules applicable to others. This, in turn, implicates courts' view of the proper approach toward necessity claims. As one judge opined: "In some sense, the necessity defense allows us to act as individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal provision or crafting a one-time exception -Vigilantism will lead to the strong ruling over the weak V. F. Nourse University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 5 (May, 2003), pp. 1691-1746 The risk of self-exemption poses an extraordinarily serious problem for any liberal theory of the state. If there are no restraints on the individual use of violence, then liberalism is impossible because the strong will rule over the weak. But if one institutes government to control individual violence, one must control not only those being governed but also those governing from, again, instituting a rule of the strong. Without controlling the latter, one has replaced one form of aristocracy of the strong with another. If this is right, then we can return to the basic premise with which I began this Article and hear the modern vernacular in its more ancient context. Listen to the angry debates about some of the most controversial criminal law cases. Hear critics of Bernhard Goetz cry that he "took the law into his own hands." Or listen to the critic of Judy Norman who claims she became 'judge and executioner."187 These are not isolated phrases. They punctuate law review articles and news accounts; they appear on television newscasts and in legal 188 treatises, asserted by both scholars and pundits alike.8 Now look closer. Goetz is accused not of an individual failing-of lacking self- control, making bad choices, or having a bad character-but rather, he is accused of being a "lawmaker." Similarly, Norman is not being accused of individual failings such as psychological trauma or even failed virtue but, instead, she is accused of being an "executioner." These are structural sins, not individual ones. This should be less of a surprise. For, to see in violence risks to governance and governing structures is to silently invoke a rather ancient tradition in liberal political philosophy.

-Formed under the guise of public safety, vigilante groups attempt to control communities James K. Stewart Public Administration Review, Vol. 45, Special Issue: Law and Public Affairs (Nov., 1985), pp. 758-765 Assuring the public of rapid response to genuine alarms. Finally, public administrators must be alert to other possibilities for abuse when the use of authority and force are delegated to those other than public police. Some groups may attempt to use the facade of a private security enterprise to achieve their own ends. In Oakland in 1967, for example, a faction of the Black Panthers sought to create armed private security that would compete with police in controlling areas of the community. In other cities, vigilante-type groups formed under the guise of public safety have taken control of neighborhoods. It is incumbent upon public administrators to develop safeguards that minimize the potential for such abuses. - Vigilantes can cause a slippery slope of violent imposed rule V. F. Nourse University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 5 (May, 2003), pp. 1691-1746 One might object here that it is cruel and pointless to treat any defendant, even a rather unattractive one, "as if' he were the state. There is no question that the vernacular expressions are crude and overdrawn.58 No one believes that defendants are in fact like states; the metaphor relies not on an actual similarity of power59 but, instead, on a similarity of structure and risk. It is as if the interlocutor were saying: if we take this defendant and we multiply him over and over again to make a far larger population, what kind of a government or state would we have? If we multiply Goetz a hundred-, a thousand-, or a million-fold, will we have, as many believe, a violently imposed rule of white supremacy, or will we have corrected a failure to protect the everyman? The intellectual structure of this discourse, then, is me- tonymic; the defendant stands in for our fears about governance. Lest one remain in doubt about the importance of Goetz's relation to the state, one need only consider one of the key disagreements in the case. Goetz premised his claims, in part, on the theory that he had been left to suffer several muggings with no aid from the law.60 If he acted as an apparent aggressor in the subway, if he jumped the gun, he seemed to say, it was not his fault, it was the fault of the state that had abandoned him. Goetz's claim was that, in fact, he had not acted "above" the law at all but, instead, had properly deferred to the state-it was simply that the state had failed him.61 All of this helped to support his adherents' claims that "Goetz" was a law-abiding citizen, serving the interests of"everyman." One need not resolve such a question to see that it is not easily cabined within the minds of individuals. The standard doctrinal treatment of Goetz's claim, however, invites us to do just that. Under the standard treatment, we are forced to ask whether the "reasonable person" standard should be "subjectivized" to incorporate the particular defendant's experience of prior victimization."6 This way of phrasing the question quite obviously changes the argument from one about the proper relation of the state to the defendant to one about the qualities and characters of defendants, reasonable persons, or subjectively reasonable persons. Militiamen are not vigilantes KELLY D. HINE,Law Clerk at U.S. District Court, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1997,pg. 1224 militiamen do not qualify as true vigilantesthe anti-abortionists failing because of their desire to alter the existing system, the militias failing because of their perpetual nature.20 At least one other legal scholar has adopted this definition of vigilantism;21 this Article will do likewise. Vigilantism is not just an American phenomenon KELLY D. HINE,Law Clerk at U.S. District Court, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1997,pg. 1226 While I adopt the remainder of Burrows definition, I reject this limitation. Professor Burrows statement directly conflicts with his own account of a personal brush with non-violent regulation related only three pages earlier. See id. at x (recalling a vigilantes act that did not include violence). I contend that non-violent vigilantism (i.e., nonviolent extra-judicial selfhelp) is in fact possible. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (offering examples of non-violent action done in the interest of justice being condoned as forms of legalized vigilantism).

Professor Burrows also denies vigilante classification to the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Panthers, and others based on each respective groups failure to meet one or more of his criteria. See BURROWS, supra note 10, at 14-15. 21. See Brandon et al., supra note 9, at 891. Unlike this Article, however, Brandon accepted Burrows violence limitation on the definition of vigilante action. See id. (affirming violent behavior as a requisite characteristic of vigilante action); BURROWS, supra note 10, at 13-14 (indicating that vigilantes are only effective if they are capable of intimidating others). 22. Vigilantism is not a uniquely American phenomenon. Although historically vigilantism has experienced its greatest acceptance in the United States, examples of vigilante activity can be found worldwide. See, e.g., Barry Hillenbrand, Afterlife of Violence: The Cease-Fire May Have Halted the Killings, But the Hard Men Are Still Preying on Their Communities, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 58 (describing I.R.A. and Loyalist punishment beatings in Northern Ireland as method to enforce order); Malachi ODoherty, Vigilantes Threat to NI Peace, NEW STATESMAN & SOCY, June 2, 1995, at 7 (discussing punishment beatings inflicted by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries -Vigilantism unnecessary: Public and police forces combined key to community safety Dennis Hoffman- Prof. Criminal Justice Univ. Nebraska (2000) Cliffs Quick Review Criminal Justice pg. 83 A growing consensus within police circles is that community policing is the best strategy for fighting crime in residential neighborhoods. This strategy is based on police-community reciprocity-the police and public cooperate to prevent and to solve crimes. An important premise of this approach is that police fight crime locally rather than follow dictates from Washington DC. Community policing often features decentralization of command through substations to increase police-citizen interaction. It also involves foot patrol so police can walk and talk with citizens. New York City and other metropolitan areas incorporate into community policing a zero tolerance attitude toward minor crimes and disorder to enhance feelings of community safety. -Community Policing does not prevent crime Dennis Hoffman- Prof. Criminal Justice Univ. Nebraska (2000) Cliffs Quick Review Criminal Justice pg. 84 Critics of community policing attack this approach to crime-fighting from different angles: The evidence from particular communities used to demonstrate that community policing reduces crime is suspect. By appealing to anecdotal evidence to support the claim that community policing reduces crime, proponents make a hasty generalization on the basis of a very few and possibly unrepresentative cases. The correlation between falling crime rates and the establishment of community policing may be coincidental. the fact is that over the past few years crime has been declining and has done so in communities where there is no community policing. -Vigilante justice can go under the radar as seen with immigration Gabriela A. Gallegos California Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 6 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1729-1778 In rural areas, most notably in Texas and Arizona, some ranchers now take Border Patrol business into their own hands. Tales of vigilante justice by landowners amount to more than local legend. When immigrants traverse some landowners' property en route to their new homes, they may face armed militias ready to defend their property and their country. "During the past two years, Mexicans passing through this comer of South Texas [from Del Rio to El Indio] have been the targets of six shootings. Two of the victims were killed. All of them were shot in the back." After a South Texas rancher admitted to killing an undocumented Mexican immigrant on his property, he was fined $4,000 and sentenced to 180 days of probation.149 In Arizona, anti-immigrant vigilantes organize their own strategies to combat the "'invasion' of migrants from south of the border." Ads recruiting volunteers for a "neighborhood ranch watch" ask vacationers to help protect the ranchers' property from unlawful trespass. The public advertisements and the light penalties for some of these a strategy of border militarization for deterring illegal immigration, it neglects the strategy's consequences of increased Border Patrol and surveillance on border residents, such as citizens, legal residents, and undocumented immigrants.

-Vigilantes use excessive violence Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
The vigilantes proclivity for violence runs deeper than a simple misperception. The vigilante believes (correctly or incorrectly) that a reduction in crime will increase social welfare. To deter crime, the vigilante must either increase the likelihood of apprehending and convicting criminals or increase the sanction for criminal activity. The tool of choice depends on the vigilantes view of the established legal systems ability to handle criminals once apprehended. If the vigilante believes the established system competently handles criminals once caught, she will prefer an increase in the probability of apprehension over an increase in the sanction for crime. But if the vigilante views the established system as unable to administer properly criminal justice, the vigilante will prefer higher sanctions. The second scenario, involving the proper or misguided distrust of the establishment, is by far the more common in the history of American vigilantism. In the terms of the model, the vigilante who distrusts the establishment would view the probability of inflicting criminal sanctions as minimal because the system is ineffective at ferreting out and punishing criminals. Raising the apprehension rate, merely to have the established system fail to punish the wrongdoer, would waste the vigilantes resources. Moreover, the opportunity costs of abandoning his normal work in favor of hunting down outlaws keep the citizen from undertaking law enforcement on a regular basis. To compensate for this low probability of apprehension, the vigilante increases the actual punishment dealtthe less capable the vigilante believes the established system, the more brutal the punishment. Because the vigilante, by definition, will not act unless he perceives significant shortcomings in the established system, the vigilante enforcer invariably metes out punishment in excess of that normally considered appropriate. -Nativistic racism leads to vigilante justice gabriela A. Gallegos California Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 6 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1729-1778 While lawmakers at times consciously manifest nativistic racism, this Comment treats nativistic racism as an unconscious, group-based phenomenon that informs current policies and their applications. A national self-identity based on nativistic racism pervades policymaking and shapes the regulation and enforcement, or lack thereof, of laws affecting border peoples. Ian Haney Lopez terms the phenomenon of unintentionally applying laws discriminately as common sense. Common sense theory helps explain decisions that reveal often-widespread social understandings. Nativistic racism helps to explain both the social understandings that in- form policy decisions and the failure of policymakers to adequately consider the well-being of border peoples in the calculus of the national interest. With a nativistic racist conception of the national interest, the border becomes a problematic feature of the nation-state. -Vigilantism sacrifices human rights of border people gabriela A. Gallegos California Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 6 (Dec., 2004), pp. 1729-1778 Specifically, U.S. policies often sacrifice the civil and human rights of border peoples by punishing border crossers and incentivizing immigrant smuggling and acts of vigilantism. Meanwhile, line workers lose jobs and grow more vulnerable to labor violations as foreigners seeking to invest in the United States gain free entry and reentry, because they make no attempt to become American. Border peoples remain low on the policymaking priority list unless they can pay for the privilege of fitting into the national interest. -Need some check on vigilantism Kelly D. Hine The American University Law Review [vol. 47] 1998
After viewing the history, and the causes, as well as the pros and cons, does the current position of the established criminal justice system make sense? The social animosity that excessive violence raises undoubtedly necessitates some check on vigilantism.

-Vigilantism wont keep crime from happening Jerome H. Skolnick, David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 The answer has to be this: with respect to crime-and perhaps more importantly, to perceptions and fear of crimethere is almost an international language, a virtually predictable set of public responses to rises in crime and fear of crime. One part of the response is to seek to punish criminals more severely and to fill prisons to capacity and overcapacity. Another part is to look to the police to prevent crime from occurring in the first place. The question then becomes, is it possible for police to prevent crime? Or, put another way, are there policies, allocative strategies, or techniques that, when adopted and carried out, lower crime rates? To that question, there is no simple answer. At best, we can offer a firm "maybe." -Vigilantism can simply be violence once an individual chooses to act H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 As with any framework, the distinctions drawn tend to deteriorate when applied to the actual social world. In this case, the major problem lies with the concept of the establishment groups' perception of declining governmental effectiveness. This could result from actual decay or simply because the formal institutions are no longer representing previously established value positions; that is, the problem is one of a formally sanctioned redistribution of values, not of ineffectiveness. This can occur particularly when a subsystem establishment differs substantially from that of the larger system of which it is a part. Under these circumstances, vigilantism begins to shade into forms of dissident violence. Several such marginal cases are discussed in the typology of establishment violence presented in the following section.
Social movements blocked through vigilantism

-Social movements are hindered when political opportunities are contracted due to social forces Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 The importance of "political opportunities" for protest has been emphasized in research on social movements (Eisenger 1973: Jenkins and Perrow 1977: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1993; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989: Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). Social movement theorists contend that the political system's openness to change varies, thereby affecting the chances for successful collective protest. Social movements are facilitated when there is an expansion of political opportunities resulting from either serious disruption of the political status quo or from broad social processes that strengthen the political position of the challenging group. Conversely, social movements are hindered when there is a contraction of political opportunities because of social forces that either weaken the political position of challenging groups or strengthen the political position of other groups. -Repression by groups including those using vigilantism can undermine social movements Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 Evidence indicates that repression can have both positive and negative effects on social movements. Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolf- gang Roehl (1990) contend that repression is a "cost" that, at least initially, deters participation in protest movements. In their research on the antinuclear movement in Germany, however, they find that the shortterm negative effect of repression was neutralized and even reversed. In her study of the Iranian revolution, Karen Rasler (1996) finds the same pattern. In a similar vein, Doug McAdam (1982) and Steven Barkan (1984) argue that the modem civil rights movement in the United States benefited significantly from the violence of white supremacist opponents. More specifically, the civil rights movement benefited from the presence of a triad of sequential events: civil rights protest, white violence, and federal intervention on behalf of civil rights protesters. The violent attempts by white supremacists to repress civil rights activism often provoked federal intervention on behalf of the civil rights protesters, thereby ironically enhancing the latter's chances for success.'
Vigilantism Helps Police

Vigilantism can help make policing more efficient David H. Bayley, specialist in international criminal justice, and Clifford D. Shearing, Australian National University, LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 96, p. 589 Although community policing has gotten most of the publicity in recent years, many police believe that law enforcement, their traditional tool in crime fighting, can be made more efficient. This approach might be called crime-oriented policing. It involves developing smarter enforcement tactics so that crime will not pay. Some examples include the setting up of fencing operations to catch habitual thieves and burglars; harassing drug markets so as to raise the cost of doing business; monitoring the activities of career criminals and arresting them for minor infractions of the law; cracking down unpredictably on criminal activity in particular locations; installing video cameras on public streets; and analyzing financial transactions by computer to spot cheating and fraud. Police are also discussing, and sometimes implementing, a strategy that is a hybrid of community-oriented and crime oriented policing. It is referred to as order-maintenance policing and involves stopping the disorderly, unruly, and disturbing behavior of people in public places, whether lawful or not. This suppressive activity not only reassures the public, demonstrating the limits for unacceptable behavior but reduces the incidence of more serious crime (Wilson & Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). Moonlighting = valuable perquisite of police enforcement David H. Bayley, specialist in international criminal justice, and Clifford D. Shearing, Australian National University, LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 96, p. 589 - 590 Police are also beginning to charge fees for covering rock concerts, professional sporting events, and ethnic festivals. In some cities, businesses have banded together to pay for additional police patrols in order to get the protection they think they need. In a development that is found across northern America, police not only sell their protective services but allow their own officers to be hired as private security guards-a practice known as "moonlighting." Many American police regularly work two jobs, one public, the other private. Indeed, moonlighting is considered a valuable perquisite of police employment. What this means is that the pluralizing of policing is being directly subsidized in the United States by public funds. Private policing uses police that have been recruited, trained, and supported by government. When acting as agents of private entities, police retain their legal authority and powers. Not only do public police work as private police but civilians non-police people-increasingly share responsibilities within public policing. Special Constables in Great Britain and Cadets, Police Auxiliaries, and Reserves in the United States often work on the street alongside regular police personnel. Police have no greater powers than citizens David H. Bayley, specialist in international criminal justice, and Clifford D. Shearing, Australian National University, LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW, 96, p. 592 The major purpose of private security is the reduce the risk of crime by taking preventive actions; the major purpose of the public police is to deter crime by catching and punishing criminals. Arrest is the special competence and preferred tool of the public police. By using it quickly and accurately, they hope to deter criminality. Private police, on the other hand, both commercial and community based, have no greater enforcement powers than property owners and ordinary citizens. Thus, their special competence and preferred tool is anticipatory regulation and amelioration. By analyzing the circumstances that give rise to victimization and financial loss, they recommend courses of action that will reduce the opportunity for crime to occur. These recommendations are followed because they become conditions for employment or participation.
Racism and vigilantism

-Vigilantism used to keep minorities in unequal relationship David Jacobs American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Aug., 2005), pp. 656-677 A common dominant group reaction to the threat to their ascendance posed by larger minority populations involves extralegal violence. The lynching of ex-slaves that occurred after Reconstruction is an excel-lent example. Black (1976) has argued that because they are used for the same ends, illegal and legal social control methods are at least partly interchangeable. Phillips, quoting Turk, claimed that "both official and unofficial killings constitute 'behavior intended to establish and maintain an unequally beneficial relationship."' According to many scholars, whites often used lynchings to control ex-slaves and to ensure that they did not forget their subordinate place in a racial caste system. Yet although many historians and some sociologists have assessed the determinants of lynchings, few have studied the legal consequences of this mass violence. The Ku Klux Klan is an example of racial vigilantism H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.552 Much of the antiblack violence in the United States exhibits the characteristics of communally based vigilantism The early Ku Klux Klan was, in part, intended to terrorize Negroes back into their "'proper position" after the upward mobility they experienced during the Reconstruction. Morris Janowitz notes that some of the race riots that occurred in the first quarter of the twentieth century ex-pressed the desire of certain elements of the white community "to 'kick the Negro back into his place.'" Such sentiments probably continue to contribute to white violence against blacks, such as the antibussing incidents in Pontiac, Michigan, in 1971. In some out-breaks of antiblack violence in the United States, establishment violence in the local or regional subsystem may be considered reactionary violence in the context of the national system. Racial Vigilantism does not only occur in the United States but also overseas for instance, in the Chinese community H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.552-553 Racial vigilantism is not confined to the United States. The position of the overseas Chinese community in Southeast Asia is quite tenuous, and the Chinese often suffer violence at the hands of the dominant ethnic group. In May 1969, for example, communal tensions in Malaysia exploded into several weeks of bloody riots. The official estimate of the total killed was placed at 200, predominantly Chinese. In Malaysia, where no communal group possesses a majority, the dominant Malays resist relinquishing significant control of the system to the Chinese community, whereas the Chinese will not submerge their culture into that of the Malay. This type of vigilantism is similar to that manifested by some tribal violence in Africa. The anti-Ibo attacks in northern Nigeria in May and September 1966 were rooted in resentment against the economic inroads the industrious Ibos had made in the North. Officials will tolerate minor violations performed by vigilantes H. Jon Rosenbaum, Peter C. Sederberg, Special Assistant to the Provost for Undergraduate Initiatives at Emery University, Comparative Politics, 1974, p.546 One might expect a regime to be less willing to impose severe sanctions on those who seem basically supportive, even though formally violating its rules, especially if the vigilantes appear to have the support of "core" establishment groups in the community. Officials are also more likely to tolerate acts seen as relatively minor violations of the boundaries; in other words, the more extreme the violation, the more likely the official response. Moreover, if a regime is ineffective in deterring the dissidents who originally contributed to the potential for vigilantism, it may also lack the capability to deter the vigilantes. If community support is low, however, the number of people willing to engage in "vigilantics" will be correspondingly limited, and the formal institutional efforts to maintain due process will be reinforced rather than frustrated. The preceding discussion can be schematically illustrated by the preliminary causal framework in ,Figure 2.

-Vigilantism is contradictory about how the public will react David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Scattered through the sparse literature on vigilantism are a number of contradictory propositions about public response, which might be synthesized under two heuristic rubrics: crystallized simplicity and fluid complexity. The two models make differing predictions about issue dimensions, sectoral grouping, and movement of opinion over time. The first model, crystallized simplicity, derives from a benevolent "political order" perspective on the state. Regimes are viewed as fairly monolithic and static structures which normally provide order for grateful citizens. Dissident movements are viewed less favorably: when they arise to challenge public order, citizens demand a tough regime response. Regimes consider it proper to resort to repression conducted by official organs and, if necessary, associated private groups. These formations are perceived by regimes and citizens as desirable for reducing social conflict and restoring public peace. Vigilantes arise out of a generalized public unease about disruption. They represent a spontaneous rising of the masses, which in turn is legitimated and given organizational coherence by regimes. When disorder grows to unacceptable levels, regimes will assist in mobilizing private citizen groups to reclaim public space from deviant formations. Although some short-term disorder may be generated in the process, these disruptions are tolerated. Since vigilantes provide a framework for order and garner support from most social sectors, ultimately their operations are effective in reducing deviance .The predictions of the crystallized-simplicity model about the dimensionality of public issues, grouping of social sectors, and change of response over time are clear. First, public opinion concerning vigilantes will take a bipolar shape from the beginning of their appearance. While many specific issues may arise, a single dimension will structure these many subissues. This dimension, order-disorder, underlies public responses and reflects the very raison d'etre of vigilantism, namely the repression of deviance. -Vigilantism groups polarize the system David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Second, citizens will group themselves into one of two widely separated coalitions, a small anticounterdissident cluster and a large procounterdissident one (Langford 1974). Most social sectors will ally themselves with the vigilantes. The antivigilante grouping will embrace the dissidents and their supporters. Most sectors, however, grateful for the order-restoring activities of vigilantes, will fall into the other grouping. Third, the model implies only minimal movement of public opinion. By the time dissident disorder has grown to the point at which vigilante groups appear, public opinion is already split. Vigilante activities simply crystallize that opinion. Societies seriously disrupted by deviants are already "wholly polarized" (Mc- Clintock 1985a:52). Indeed, vigilantes reflect this polarity when they present citizens with a choice of being "for us or against us" (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1976). Vigilantism is merely a minor addition to the political equation. Public opinion on vigilantism will display little change over time. Vigilantes and government can exist because the system is a failure KELLY D. HINE,Law Clerk at U.S. District Court, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 1997,pg. 1232 In reality, the criminal justice system is far from perfect. The system makes mistakes, and many costs and benefits defy calculation. These imperfections create the potential for the punishment of socially desirable actions, for the failure of sanctions to deter some undesirable actions, and for the actual imposition of sanctions for criminal activity.68 Because of these imperfections, the actual level of punishment for crime is not irrelevant. Concerns for the disutility caused by punishment, 69 for the ability of the criminal to pay the sanction imposed, and for the effect of the sanction on marginal deterrence,70 now provide incentives for smaller, finite sanctions.71 Put simply, real world 66. This we know because the expected personal cost of engaging in the criminal activity is set higher than the expected benefits derived from crime. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (explaining costbenefit analysis of crime). Because no one would commit crimes

-Counterrevolutionary vigilantism is often violent David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Empirical evidence for these two models, however, is lacking. This is especially true regarding vigilantism in the Third World. Further, the two models are poorly delineated. Thus, a semiconfirmatory and semiexploratory approach to empirical examination seems most appropriate. The present study investigates the dimensionality, grouping, and dynamics of public opinion toward vigilante groups established in the Philippines during the late 1980s to combat a growing communist insurgency. To the extent that vigilantism against revolutionary dissent differs from vigilantism against nonrevolutionary dissent, the scope of the findings may be limited. On the other hand, in terms of state sponsorship, social composition, close connections with military forces and other features, Philip- pine vigilantes appear to have much in common with their counterparts in El Salvador and other revolutionary settings. To this degree the study may serve as a useful case for understanding public response to counterrevolutionary vigilantism elsewhere in the Third World. - Vigilante actions can provoke counterattacks hurting the original cause David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Third, opinion on vigilantism will display a good deal of fluidity. Movement and countermovement interact dialectically. The strategies of dissidents and vigilante counterdissidents continually change. Sectoral opinions are correspondingly altered. The effectiveness of vigilantes may vary over time. Whereas initially they may reduce disorder, dissidents soon devise effective counter- strategies. Vigilantes provoke counterattacks, which elicit extreme reactions from their supporters. The middle class is a key participant in the conflict. Its many sectors frequently alter their positions on issues, depending on changing interests and the unfolding of events precipitated by dissident and counterdissident strategies. Legal groups, for example, may begin to oppose violations of civil liberties, while small-business groupings may begin to support vigilantes for protection of their property from growing disruption. Indeed, most social sectors display some movement toward or away from vigilantism. Since vigilantes tend to generate problems for most citizens, however, one can observe a net public alienation over time -Vigilante actions tend to spill over to uninvolved citizens David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Second, several groupings of social sectors will form on these many issues. Indiscriminate use of force against uninvolved citizens, typical of vigilante operations, activates a number of sectors against the formations (Johnson 1962). Indeed, vigilantism generates internal tensions within the regime countermovement. The various bureaucracies may disagree on the legality and efficacy of vigilantism (Shotland 1976; Tucker 1985). Whereas the professional coercive organs of a regime may support vigilantism in principle, they often clash with the groups over operational procedure and turf (Levytsky 1972). Indeed, vigilantes clash with each other, creating law and order problems for coercive organs (McClintock 1985b). Parliamentary and judicial organs may oppose the violations of constitutional rights by vigilantes. To the extent that dependent regimes rely on foreign powers for support of vigilante operations, a nationalistic reaction against external interference can arise, further complicating issue positions. Vigilantism undermines public confidence in regime institutions -Vigilantes are untrained and their actions can affect many sectors David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 The predictions of the fluid-complexity model about issue dimensionality, social grouping, and opinion change differ greatly from those of the crystallized simplicity model. First, although an order-disorder dimension of public opinion may be visible, many other issues will arise in the course of vigilante operations. Sponsorship by elites, for example, produces concern among middle-class sectors and hardship among working-class sectors, especially the very poor (Premo 1981). Since vigilantes take the law into their own hands and interfere in conventional political processes, they raise a number of constitutional and legal issues (Hofstadter and Wallace 1970). Often they are untrained amateurs (Deane-Drummond 1975). They may produce as much disruption as they prevent, in turn affecting many sectors (Brown 1975; Zurcher and Harries-Jenkins 1978). The attraction of antisocial elements to vigilante formations may even provoke a negative response from antidissident supporters of a regime. A high degree of opinion complexity can be observed.

-Vigilantism is used by regimes to maintain power David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Vigilantism arises from the need of regimes to mobilize auxiliary forces to counter growing dissident threats to their power. It represents less a rising of the masses than a calculated manipulation by regimes. It is a fluid process within a complex system of social sectors having a multiplicity of interests in conflict (Johnson 1982). Order is only one citizen interest. Vigilantism causes many other interests to become salient. It usually exhibits elite sponsorship, semisecret organization, coercive activities and other features that impact an array of social sectors and affect each sector in unique ways (Burrows 1976; Chomsky 1985; Herman 1982; Kreml 1976). Often vigilante leaders recruit unstable personalities and criminals who do not reflect the public's norms. They provoke more distrust and anxiety than gratitude. -Vigilantes operate with a sense of anonymity David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Vigilantes, social formations of private citizens to suppress deviance, are commonly employed by political regimes, yet the phenomenon is rarely examined by social scientists (Stettner 1976). Vigilante groups are usually short-lived and operate with a high degree of anonymity. Often perceived by scholars as peripheral to military, police, and other established organs of force, vigilantism against political dissidents has only recently been the focus of systematic research (Kowalewski 1982; Mason and Krane 1989). Yet vigilante groups may play a major role in regimes' battles against political dissidence, especially when it grows and crosses the threshold into violence. -Vigilantism and the death penalty are linked (individuals use the death penalty as a new form of social control) We analyze recent death sentences to discover whether the vigilantism directed largely against blacks in the past and current racial threats to white dominance attributable to larger black populations operate together to produce additional death sentences. Evidence for such a combined relationship between prior vigilantism and recent minority threat would support claims that the death sentence is currently imposed partly because it is a legal and therefore more acceptable replacement for lynchings. These considerations suggest that death sentences should be especially likely in states with the largest minority populations that also had a history of frequent vigilante violence. -Vigilantism has been used to ensure separation of races Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 In the Jim Crow South, a set of social and legal codes enforced by legal coercion and vigilantism ensured the separation of the races and almost complete black subjugation (Wacquant 2000). Many scholars have claimed that the current death penalty is a partial replacement for vigilantism used in the past to maintain this caste system (Bowers 1984; Dollard 1957; Marable 2000; Phillips 1987). This claim seems plausible because the states that once had the highest lynching rates now appear to use the death sentence most often (Zimring 2003). Yet despite the extraordinary nature of this violence, the effects of lynchings have been infrequently investigated.

-Political killings can hurt political movements Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 The campaign of terror begun during 1868 was widespread. In Arkansas, there were over two hundred political murders during this campaign. In Georgia, the death toll was lower, but reported incidents of beatings were extremely high (McPherson 1982). In Alabama and Mississippi, violence by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) or similar organizations was openly justified by explicit reference to the Union (or "Loyal") Leagues. The Selma Times urged whites to form Klan-like organizations wherever Union Leagues were active; the Mobile Register provided similar encouragement, saying: "The first object of these clubs should be a persevering and systematic movement to break up the 'Loyal Leagues'" (quoted in Fitzgerald 1989, p. 216). Similar attitudes and behavior typified whites in the Carolinas where the lives of state and local Republican officials with links to the black community were threatened (Rable 1984). But nowhere was the white violence surrounding the 1868 election campaign greater than in Louisiana (Tunnell 1989; USHR 1869-1870). In response to the pervasive violence, the conservative Planters Banner commented: "Most of the negroes now show a disposition to vote the democratic ticket, and live on friendly terms with the white people of the parish" (quoted in Warmoth 1930, p. 69). The power of violence to defeat the forces of reform is evident in the electoral statistics. St. Landry parish, which gave the Republican nominees for the state constitutional convention 2,200 votes in April 1868, did not give the Republican ticket a single vote in the November 1868 election. Only 276 votes were cast for the Republican party in the November elections in the entire city of New Orleans, despite the fact that 21,000 voters in that city had registered as Republicans (War- moth 1930). The fraud and violence that marked the 1868 elections in Louisiana and at least some other southern states did not, however, prevent the Republicans from winning the presidency. Importantly, blacks supplied the crucial votes that sent Grant to the White House. Although he won by a majority of 309,000 votes, he polled a minority of the white votes; the nearly half a million votes cast by blacks ensured his election (Bennett 1967). No stronger message could have been sent concerning the importance of blacks electorally to the Republican party. White violence peaked again during the 1872 campaign. Though this period was contentious throughout the South, it was especially pugnacious in Louisiana, where the Republican party split into several factions but in the end fielded only one official Republi- can party ticket with William Kellogg as its gubernatorial nominee. Conservative Republicans bolted from the Republican party and initially formed a coalition with "Reform" Democrats. This group then forged a coalition with the "Extremist" Democrats who nominated John McEnery as their gubernatorial candidate. McEnery was from Ouachita parish, which had a reputation as one of the most violently oppressive parishes in the state in regard to black civil rights (Warmoth 1930). -Individuals can use legal blanket to justify repressive actions David Jacobs American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Aug., 2005), pp. 656-677 Inclinations to use deadly force to sustain unequal relationships either can take the form of extralegal vigilantism or these proclivities can be expressed with legal sanctions that now may be partly used for the same repressive ends. Claims about the interchangeability of lynchings and current death sentences rest on the presence of a welldocumented repressive tradition that continues to make lethal reactions to racial threat acceptable to many citizens via the means described by Stinchcombe (1987), Wacquant (2000), and Zimring (2003). But the blatantly inequitable laws and vigilantism used in the Jim Crow era have become indefensible. A more acceptable alternative is to carry out lethal repression under the cloak of law. Because it is imposed by an ostensibly objective legal process, the death penalty provides an acceptable way to continue the use of lethal sanctions to control "problem populations." This replacement hypothesis leads to an expectation that an interactive relationship should be present because death sentences should be most common in states that currently have larger proportions of African Americans combined with a history of repeated lynchings.

-Vigilantism unnecessary, Sheriff has jurisdiction over government neglect or abuse Sheriff Richard Mack (January 30 2008) Constitutional Law Enforcement Association, County Sheriff the Ultimate Check and Balance Now the question becomes even greater; who will stop criminal and out-of-control government from killing, abusing, violating, robbing, and destroying its own people? Yes, believe it or not, there is an answer to this one. The duty to stop such criminality lies with the county sheriff. The question needs to be posed to each and every sheriff of these United States; will you stand against tyranny? The office of sheriff has a long and noble history. It dates back over a thousand years and originated in England. The sheriff is the only elected law enforcement official in America. He is the last line of defense for his citizens. He is the people's protector. He is the keeper of the peace, he is the guardian of liberty and the protector of rights. A vast majority of sheriffs will agree with all of this until they are asked to apply these principles of protection to federal criminals. Their backpeddling and excuses will be more plentiful than radar tickets and louder than sirens at doughnut time. Most of the unbelievers, who themselves have taken a solemn oath to "uphold and defend" the U S Constitution, will passionately and even apologetically exclaim that they have no authority or jurisdiction to tell federal agents to do anything, let alone stop them from victimizing local citizens. The truth and stark reality is that it's just the opposite; the sheriff has ultimate authority and law enforcement power within his jurisdiction. He is to protect and defend his citizens from all enemies, both "foreign and domestic." -Vigilantism undermines constitutional rights Daniel Nina (2000) African Security Review Vol.9 No. 1 Dirty Harry is back: Vigilantism in South Africa- The reemergence of good and bad community Almost by definition, the state should not tolerate people who take the law into their own hands. While external assistance should be provided to assist in the self-regulation of the organs of popular justice, legislation should be enacted to regulate the emergence of popular forms of justice and policing. Legislation should also be put in place to address the complaints of communities about high levels of crime and related social problems, while education on human and constitutional rights should be provided to all. -Vigilantism can be used for violent control of groups Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 The fervor that evoked this fierce repression suggests that violence used to ensure black sub- ordination would endure in one form or another. But the unacceptability of vigilantism, particularly after the violent efforts to repress the Civil Rights movement that awakened the national conscience and destroyed Jim Crow, meant that this repression would have to take a different, more acceptable form. This fierce passion for violent control in the past nevertheless enhances the plausibility of claims that the harsh methods used to maintain the dominance of whites over blacks persist in sufficient strength to influence recent legal decisions about death sentences. "What distinguishes the saga of lynchings in the United States from other examples of mob violence in Western history are the volume of killings, the length of the period lynching was practiced ..., and its linkage to racial repression.... It is the lynching tradition as a historical institution that seems to have a lasting influence on capital punishment" (Zimring 2003:90). It follows that acts based on such passions and notions of racial impurity are likely to persist over long periods in contrast to behavior not based on such primordial sentiments
-Vigilantism can become blurred with counterrevolutionary violence

H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Another problem concerns the identification of the establishment and the status quo. When the metamorphosis of a society is prolonged, dual establishments coexist uncomfortably. The old establishment tries to protect its remaining value capabilities, while the new establishment attempts to consolidate and improve its position. When societal change occurs unevenly, it becomes nearly impossible to determine just which establishment represents the national status quo. During the Salvador Allende years (1970-73), for instance, the Chilean economic and political systems were transformed at different rates. Mapuche Indians and other peasants seized farms and workers took control of private industries. The traditional establishment used violent means to protect or regain possession of properties. Seizures often occurred with the tacit consent or support of the Allende administration, and the government refused to allow the police or soldiers to dislodge the workers and peasants. Allende did not favor the seizures, however, and the courts frequently ordered the return of the properties to their former owners. It was difficult, therefore, to ascertain just who were the vigilantes. Were the workers and peasants vigilantes or revolutionaries? Or was the old establishment engaged in counterrevolutionary violence or vigilantism?

-Vigilantism can be used by groups to check political minorities and to buy time to place new oppressive systems in governments H. Jon Rosenbaum & Peter C. Sederburg Comparative Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Jul., 1974), pp. 541-570 Rapid social change is often characterized by increasing demands for participation and services. These demands may exceed the desire and capacity of the formal system either to meet or to suppress them. Group control vigilantism, insofar as it retards these demands, may buy time to build new institutions to channel or repress them. A partial redistribution of values, which would satisfy at least some of the rising sectors while not seriously alienating established groups, requires time to effect. When a regime implicitly adopts a program of official group control vigilantism (e.g., certain forms of terror), additional short-term benefits may accrue. Insofar as the violence is controlled, the regime may gain a useful complement to its formal coercive powers, while nor completely abandoning the pretense of legitimacy given by a defined system of due process. The element of control in this subtype means that a regime can more easily manipulate this form of vigilantism, perhaps utilizing is as an aid in the realization of more complex, modernized goals. -Vigilantism is often used not due to failed enforcement but only a perception of failed enforcement Scott Johnson Vigilante Justice; Angry citizens are taking the law into their own hands, creating what could become a crisis of democracy. Newsweek International Dec 2004 Experts generally agree that vigilantes are not merely filling a law-and-order gap created by poor or nonexistent police work. The phenomenon is more complex. The western highlands of Guatemala, where many incidents of lynching occur, is not an area with an otherwise high rate of official crime. Rather, vigilantism is most prevalent in places where people have lost faith in their civic institutions. They no longer trust the police or judicial officials to care about their duties or the people they've been entrusted to protect. Indeed, corrupt police are part and parcel of the problem. A neighborhood protection group in Honduras recently told Ungar that they pulled people out of their houses frequently "and beat the hell out of them"--often while the local police were watching. Says Ungar: "The local officers allowed it to happen."
Empirics of vigilantism
-Latin America has problems stopping vigilantism Scott Johnson Vigilante Justice; Angry citizens are taking the law into their own hands, creating what could become a crisis of democracy. Newsweek International Dec 2004 Dramatic as it was, the cop killings were not an isolated incident. Vigilantism has taken root in Latin America over the past decade, lending credence to the notion that the region is in the throes of a democratic crisis. From Venezuela and Guatemala to Bolivia and Peru, angry crowds are increasingly taking the law into their own hands, meting out physical punishment for crimes real and imagined. Vigilantes often "lynch" common criminals who, in their view, have escaped justice. More recently they've started attacking public officials suspected of malfeasance. Last May a mob in the Peruvian town of Ilave beat their mayor after accusing him of embezzlement, then dragged him into a public square and left him to die. "Lynching has grown totally out of control," says Mark Ungar, an expert on Latin American police reform at the Woodrow Wilson International School for Scholars in Washington. "It's spreading in the sense that vigilantes are going after criminals, officials, even governments--and once it starts it's hard to stop." -Vigilante groups are sometimes employed for outside operations David Kowalewski Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 127-144 Powerful sectors in the Philippines have utilized the cultist vigilantes for many purposes. Local political bosses held over from the Marcos era have employed them as personal bodyguards against insurgent attacks. Large landowners and logging corporations have used them as security guards and protection against NPA "taxation." An especially close link has been forged by the military. Through counterinsurgency operations in isolated rural provinces during the Marcos regime, military officers and soldiers struck up close relationships with cultists. In the absence of churches in many areas of the countryside, some converted to the cults (Fajardo, 1986:6). The most notorious vigilante cult, Tadtad, was founded by a retired military man. Some cultist vigilantes have been used as the personal paramilitary forces of some officers, to include deployment by insurrectionist generals during military coups against Aquino (Justice and Peace Review, 1986a, 1986f, 1986h)

-Illegal immigrants help the economy Slobodan Djaji International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-117 On the other hand, those who advocate legalization of the status of illegal immigrants argue that low-skilled foreign workers are needed and that their presence benefits the economy. In the U.S.A., inflows of illegal foreign workers often meet labor market shortages that even the Labor Department considers genuine (Abrams and Abrams 1975). If the domestic labor market is sufficiently segmented, native workers are largely insulated from the direct employment effects of illegal immigration (Piore 1979, Greenwood and McDowell 1986, and Ichino 1992). Moreover, foreign workers, in the role of consumers, contribute to an expansion of the market, stimulate investment spending, and further the process of employment creation (Bernard 1953). For some sectors of the economyagriculture in the south of California and of Texas or the garment industry in large cities such as New York and Los Angeles-the availability of cheap, clandestine foreign labor is essential to the survival of a large number of enterprises. Finally, goods and services produced by the migrants are likely to cost less, benefiting the nation's consumers. -US government obligations come from the people William C. Culberson Vigilantism Political history of private power in America Greenwod publishing group 1990 The first American Concept of government by compact endured through colonial times and was stated in the Declaration of Independence. The rights to secure were life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. The three rights were not derived but inherent. Freedom and order were not the creations of governments; they were the creations of people. Law and officials were mere instruments to fulfill the necessities of a sovereign state. - Vigilantes create social disorder David Kowalewski Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 3, International Studies in the Sociology of Religion (Autumn, 1991), pp. 241-253 When cults are employed as active counterinsurgent vigilantes, the consequences may be especially bloody and politically counterproductive. Not only do vigilantes seem to cause more disorder than they alleviate, thereby generating an adverse public reaction, but the addition of cultist fervor and intolerance to vigilantism should also result in violent behavior and political blacklash. The reaction against cultist vigilantism should be especially prevalent among the nonhierarchical church sector, whose religious values are manipulated and violated by church and state authorities in the name of religion. The following sections illustrate the dynamics of these relationships in the present-day Philippines -Vigilantes can have religious affiliations David Kowalewski Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 3, International Studies in the Sociology of Religion (Autumn, 1991), pp. 241-253 Most vigilantes were mobilized from a wide range of established groups, including Lions clubs, retired military and police, Chinese businesses, and the like. Yet many have been recruited from religious cults, although the exact numbers and proportion are unknown (van der Kroef, 1988:642). Socially, these vigilante cultists can best be classified as manipulationist and thaumaturgical, both types taking a relatively benign stance toward secular society and stressing the means of overcoming problems in the world rather than eliminating or compensating for them

-White mobs have taken laws into their own hands in the past to try and stop social movements Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 The White League was soon a major force with which black activists and their allies had to contend. A White League mob forced the resignation of local Republican officials in Natchitoches parish in July 1874; one month later, the Republican sheriff of adjacent Red River parish worried because the local White League was "red hot and on the war path" (Tunnell 1984, p. 197). He informed key federal officials that while blacks were more than willing to put up an armed fight against the White League, it was useless without ample ammunition and the promise that the federal government would send backup troops when necessary. Otherwise, they were simply courting another Colfax massacre. The increased insurgency of the white supremacist countermovement was by no means restricted to Louisiana. Throughout the South, Republicans and their allies in the black community were threatened with death unless they withdrew from politics. There was a sufficient number of murders of white Republicans and black activists to lend a high level of credibility to these threats. Black voters were also increasingly intimidated. Those who cast their ballots for the Republican party faced economic threats, as well as threats of bodily harm. Consequently, the political field was increasingly abandoned to the Democratic party's nominees. Where intimidation and violent tactics were unsuccessful in cowering Republicans candidates and their supporters, another tactic reigned supreme: electoral fraud. The violence on the part of white supremacists and the accompanying electoral fraud played a major role in bringing about the Compromise of 1877, which brought an end to Reconstruction. As a result, the issue of civil and political rights for blacks was, to a large extent, denationalized, with blacks left to the mercy of southern whites who were wedded to the principle of white supremacy. -Vigilantes are often especially violent David Kowalewski Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 3, International Studies in the Sociology of Religion (Autumn, 1991), pp. 241-253 Logically one might expect the behavior of such groups to be especially violent when compared with that of noncultist vigilantes. They should prove enthusiastic counterinsurgents in order to obtain their long-denied social status from establishment actors. The combination of vigilante authoritarianism (Kowalewski, 1982; Kreml, 1976; Marx and Archer, 1976) with religiously deviant "totalitarianism" (Wilson, 1961:4) should produce virulent behaviors. As social unconventionals prior to recruitment, and as participants in unconventional vigilante politics, they should display little respect for the accepted constitutional rights of citizens (Stark and Bainbridge, 1979). Supported by both church and state, they should expect to face little official punishment in return. The Philippine cults appear to fit the common characterization of religious deviants as irrational, absolutist, and authoritarian. Several believe in anting-anting (amulets), which are expected to make them impervious to bullets and blades. Members of some groups are given rings which allegedly become hot when enemies are in the vicinity. Such objects, which foster a sense of omnipotence, give cultist vigilantes the perception that they can violate human rights with little fear of citizen retaliation. Some of the cults believe that eating their victims gives them superhuman powers.

-Federal courts are a better avenue to deal with legal flaws Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 The federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, played a crucial role in mediating the federal response to the escalating violence of southern white supremacists. To understand the importance of the Supreme Court, it is relevant to review the actions of Congress during Reconstruction (Table 1). The U.S. Congress had laid the groundwork for a significant expansion of federal authority by enacting three constitutional amendments and several important legislative acts. The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) formally eradicated slavery and granted Congress the power to pass legislation deemed necessary for enforcement purposes. This amendment was regarded as insufficient in the wake of the "Black Codes" passed by many southern state legislatures. Consequently, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which declared that all persons born in the United States were citizens and should share in equal benefits of the laws, such as those rights relating to security of person or property and rights to make and enforce contracts and to purchase, lease, sell, or hold property. District and circuit courts were given jurisdiction over cases affecting individuals who were unable to enforce the act through state courts, and the president was given the power to commit U.S. troops if needed to enforce the act (Commager 1963). Concerns about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 led Congress to pass the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) wherein the rights secured under the act were given a more solid constitutional footing. Federal powers were expanded yet further by the Fifteenth Amendment (1870), which asserted that a citizen's right to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The amendment also granted Congress enforcement powers through passage of appropriate legislation - Vigilantism used against freed black slaves Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley Crime and Justice, Vol. 10, (1988), pp. 1-37 We therefore suggest that the vigilantism largely intended to ensure that newly freed blacks reverted to their prior subordinate status had enduring effects on another lethal punishment. Assertions about the historical force of such lengthy causal chains based on the power of tradition are hardly novel. Durkheim "lamented that many social facts 'continue to exist merely through force of habit' among them anti-quated penal ... institutions ... 'that time has fixed and organized in us"' (Camic 1986:1051-52 quoting Durkheim [1895]. 1982; see also Ogburn 1937 for additional discussions of cultural lag). -Vigilantism can lead to rights violations during counterrevolutionary actions David Kowalewski Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, No. 3, International Studies in the Sociology of Religion (Autumn, 1991), pp. 241-253 In their public support of vigilantism, neither Aquino, Sin, the military, the DLG, nor the United States government distinguish between cultist and noncultist vigilantes. Whether this reflects a desire to avoid introducing divisions into vigilante ranks, or to avoid a close and overt association with social deviants, is impossible to determine here. Privately, however, some Filipino officials express reservations about the fanaticism of cultist vigilantes and admit the consequent problems of control over their activities (Interviews, 1987-1988). Numerous social sectors in the Philippines (labor unions, peasant organizations, human rights groups, etc.) have criticized cultist vigilantism. They charge that the cultists allow the military to commit human rights abuses during counterinsurgent operations while blaming "illiterate religious fanatics." For the insurgents, the sponsorship of "feudal remnant" cultists by the "clerico-fascist" church hierarchy and "U.S.-Aquino dictatorship" state simply illustrates the bankruptcy of the established order and represents a tacit acknowledgement of their growing strength. Armed clashes between guerrillas and vigilante cultists have been common.

-Vigilantism hurts ability for groups to change laws because the public blocks groups abilities to go through the political process Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy during Donna A. Barnes and Catherine Connolly The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2, (Spring, 1999), pp. 327-345 During 1867-1868, Radical Republicans and their black civil rights allies secured a number of victories. Foremost among these victories were new federal voting mandates that enfranchised the ex-slaves. Thus, when a constitutional convention was finally convened in Louisiana in 1868, the position of white supremacists had been weakened because of the voting strength of the black population. The constitutional convention convened with an approximately equal number of white and black delegates. The New Orleans Tribune, a black-owned newspaper, urged the black delegates to this convention and black voters to use their new constitutional suffrage rights to advance their race: "We compose a majority in the State, and with the help of our Radical white friends, we compose a majority in the Convention. . . . The colored masses are the masters of the field. Everything depends upon the colored vote" (October 30, 1868. quoted in Warmoth 1930, p. 52). At the convention of the Louisiana Republican party in 1868, a similar activist stance existed among the black delegates. The black candidate for the Republican gubernatorial nomination, F. E. Dumas, narrowly lost by a 45:43 vote. Oscar Dunn, a black civil rights activist, successfully ran for lieutenant governor. Also noteworthy was a party resolution, which passed, that called for "equal rights for all men, irrespective of race, color or previous condition" (Warmoth 1930, p. 55). White supremacy, a leading principle of the Democratic party, was under attack. By the election campaign of 1868, a counterattack was fully underway. This election would prove to be a major battleground in the struggle over civil rights issues and political power in Louisiana. In September 1868, Emerson Bentley, the editor of the St. Landry Progress (a Republican paper supportive of the civil rights of blacks), was attacked, and his printing press was destroyed. When a large multiracial group convened in town to protest on Bentley's behalf, it was attacked by a group of white supremacists; approximately two hundred Bentley supporters were wounded, some of them fatally. Less than a month later, five white supremacists in the town of Franklin murdered two local leaders in the Republican party who had taken a public stand supportive of the political rights of blacks. New Orleans also saw its share of violence: sixteen Republicans were killed there in the week prior to election day (Warmoth 1930).
Community policing flaws

-Community values and police values can conflict leading to problematic interactions David Thacher Law & Society Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2001), pp. 765-798 On one hand, some scholars draw pessimistic conclusions from the idea that police and community values may conflict. Most radically, Peter Manning has suggested that community policing is fundamentally flawed partly because police and community values are incompatible (Manning 1988, 1993). More moderately, a few researchers imply that although some community organizations may be viable police partners, others are unlikely to develop strong relationships with police because their goals are incompatible with the police mission (Lovig & Skogan 1995; Podolefsky 1984). Whatever their explicit conclusions, none of these studies directly investigate how police might cope with value conflict, and for that reason they tend to suggest that the problem is intractable. -Vigilante groups create community problems Newstalk (7/7/2008) Police Slam vigilante Plan Auckland police are slamming suggestions that vigilante groups are needed to protect the public. Asian Anti-Crime Group organizer Peter Low has suggested the move, as well as speculated on the use of triads to protect local communities. Counties Manukau Area Commander Inspector Andrew Coster says Mr. Low's views are not representative of the wider community, and more people want to work with the police than against them. He does not believe anyone would seriously suggest using vigilante groups, over the police. Mr Coster says police already work very closely with many community groups to deal with crime. He says using vigilante groups to deal with crime would not work and would end up creating more problems for society. Community policing distracts from more important problems. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 99 Recently, much fuss has been made about "problem-solving policing" and "community policing." Proponents herald them as important new concepts that bid to replace "professional law enforcement" as the dominant paradigm of modern policing. Critics are more skeptical. To some, the ideas are nothing but empty slogans-the most recent public relations gimmicks in policing, devoid of substantive content, and lacking in operational utility. Others find attractive content to the ideas but judge them utopian-their popularity rooted in nostalgia. Still others see these new conceptions as distractions from the most urgent challenges now facing policing; against the urgent need to control a rising tide of violence, the interest in problem solving and community relations seems a dangerous avoidance of the real business at hand. The demise of public policing leads to problems. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 121 But the decline of public policing can also be viewed from the vantage point of citizens who are interested in the overall quality of justice delivered by the society. Viewed from that perspective, the demise of public policing and the growth in private security portends several significant problems: a more unequal distribution of security; less respect for the rights of defendants; less professional competence overall to be drawn on in times of trouble (Reiss 1988). Thus the decline of public policing is a problem for society at large, not just for those who make careers in public policing. Community and police objectives may differ. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 121 Although Americans seem to like public police forces, they apparently find them increasingly irrelevant to their security concerns. Insofar as one of the important tests of a corporate strategy is its ability to maintain a competitive advantage for an enterprise, professional law enforcement has not performed well. The eroding position of public policing can be evaluated from two quite different perspectives. Viewed from the perspective of those in public policing, the loss of competitive position is unfortunate because it means less money, status, and opportunity for them and their col- leagues. That may be important to police, but it is less important to the general citizenry, particularly if citizens are benefiting from lower taxes and the opportunity to buy security more neatly tailored to their individual desires.

Community policing turns peoples fears into victimization. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 125The fundamental idea behind community policing, by contrast, is that effective working partnerships between the police and the community can play an important role in reducing crime and promoting security (Skolnick and Bayley 1986; Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). Community policing emphasizes that the citizens themselves are the first line of defense in the fight against crime. Consequently, much thought must be given to how those efforts might best be mobilized. One important technique is for the police to open themselves up to community-nominated problems. Opening the department to communitynominated problems often affects the police understanding of their ends as well as their purposes, for the communities do not always nominate serious crime problems as their most important concerns. In expressing their concerns, citizens' fears become as important as their actual victimization. The factors that trigger fears often turn out to be things other than serious crime (Skogan 1986). Thus community policing changes one's vision of the ends of policing as well as its means. Community policing must balance the demands of the citizens and justice. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 125 None of this is intended to make the police entirely subservient to communities and their desires. The police must continue to stand for a set of values that communities will not always honor. For example, the police must defend the importance of fairness in the treatment of offenders and the protection of their constitutional rights against the vengeance of an angry community. The police must stand for and seek to produce fairness in the allocation of publicly financed protective services across the population of a city rather than cater to the most powerful neighborhoods. And police executives must retain control over such things as the assignment of particular personnel and the establishment of department-wide policies and procedures, lest the enterprise cease to operate as a citywide institution and become instead a mere compilation of several independent departments. Under a strategy of community policing, police departments should become more responsive and accountable to the demands of citizens. Problem-solving and community policing overlap but are very different. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 128To a great extent, problem-solving and community policing are overlapping concepts (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988). A commitment to problem solving leads quite naturally to the invention of solutions that involve the broader community. Moreover, while problem solving often begins with police-nominated problems, many of the departments that have committed themselves to problem solving have also developed mechanisms to consult with local communities to discover what the problems are. If both occur as a routine matter, then problem- solving policing becomes virtually indistinguishable from community policing. Community policing is designed to let the community nominate problems and focuses on what the police can do in partnership with the community to deal with the nominated problems. That generally requires thought and imagination and is therefore often indistinguishable from problem-solving policing. Community policing implies that the police can use the community as a resource. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 134 To others, adding the word "community" to policing serves to remind the police that the community is an important resource to tap in pursuing the goals of crime reduction and that the cultivation of community support must be an operational goal of policing, influencing decisions about the priority given to certain kinds of activities and about the overall structure of the organization. Community policing prioritizes the opinions of the community. Mark Harrison Moore, CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1992), p. 134 To still others, adding the word "community" to policing redefines the ends as well as the means of policing. In this view, the goal of policing is not just to reduce crime but also to reduce fears, restore civility in public spaces, and guarantee the rights of democratic citizens; in short, it is to create secure and tolerant democratic communities. In both these latter cases, advocates of community policing think it is important to add the word to the enterprise of policing because it focuses the attention of police departments on their relationship to the communities they police, and that is an important corrective to the style of policing that had emerged under the professional model of policing.

-No viable strategy for community policing David Thacher Law & Society Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2001), pp. 765-798 Finally, although the literature described previously has suggested a few ways in which police may cope with value conflict, it has not systematically analyzed the strategies that police have developed to deal with this problem. As a result, our understanding of those strategies is likely to be too thin and incomplete to offer usable advice for practice. In particular, the idea that police simply "choose" tactics that promote both their own aims and their partners' probably reflects an overly simple view of organizational dynamics. For example, in the Boston case, the idea of fighting crime within the bounds of fairness and respect is a complicated notion. Most simply, it raises a number of unanswered organizational questions. What organizational routines did the Boston Police Department modify in order to ensure that officers committed to aggressive crime control would act within those bounds? How were such systems as organizational structure, training, and accountability used to shape officer behavior? In short, how does a police agency institutionalize a commitment to fairness and respect without undermining aggressive crime control? More subtly, the Boston story raises questions about how police could act successfully on two sets of values that many police agencies have seen as antagonistic (Wilson 1972; Skolnick 1975) and which therefore might confound efforts to sustain organizational focus. To tell officers "enforce the law, but don't enforce it too strictly" may make perfect sense to most officers. But it could also amount to a mixed message of the sort that organizations often try to avoid-a dysfunctional directive of "on the one hand this, on the other hand that" that can lead to paralysis and bad decision making (Wilson 1989:371). What type of organizational environment, personal temperament, or mode of practical reasoning supports the police who arrive at this sort of compromise?

10 Vigilantism 82

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

10 Vigilantism 82

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

WNDI 1 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

The Legality of Vigilantism............................................................19

Empirical examples of Vigilantism and its successes.......................27

Vigilantism saves system money....................................................34

WNDI 2 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Vigilantism can spur social change.................................................38

Social Contract and Vigilantism......................................................39

Vigilantism and its relation to morality...........................................39

Vigilantisms Enforcement benefits................................................40

Security failures without vigilantism..............................................50

Legal implications of vigilantism....................................................51

Vigilantism and the conception of Justice.......................................55

Punishment distributed by vigilantism...........................................59

Social movements blocked through vigilantism...............................69

Vigilantism Helps Police................................................................70

Racism and vigilantism..................................................................71

Empirics of vigilantism .................................................................77

Community policing flaws..............................................................82

WNDI 3 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 4 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 5 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 6 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 7 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 8 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 9 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 10 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 11 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 12 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 13 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 14 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 15 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 16 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 17 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 18 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 19 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

***Aff cards*** The Legality of Vigilantism

WNDI 20 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 21 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 22 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 23 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 24 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 25 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 26 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 27 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Empirical examples of Vigilantism and its successes

WNDI 28 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 29 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 30 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 31 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 32 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 33 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 34 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Vigilantism saves system money

WNDI 35 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 36 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 37 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

WNDI 38 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Vigilantism can spur social change

WNDI 39 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Social Contract and Vigilantism

Vigilantism and its relation to morality

WNDI 40 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Vigilantisms Enforcement benefits

WNDI 41 James 8/10/08 Vigilantism

Aff cards The Legality of Vigilantism

Neg Cards Legal implications of vigilantism