1. TIO VS VRB FACTS: Valentin Tio assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987.

It alleged among other things that the tax imposed is 1. harsh, 2. confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade 3. in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is the Decree which imposes 30% tax on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing valid? DECISION: Yes. 1. A tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 2. The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. 3. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. 2. CITY OF BAGUIO VS DE LEON FACTS: Futonato de Leon assailed the validity of an ordinance of the City of Baguio imposing a license fee on any person, firm, entity or corporation doing business in the City of Baguio on the following grounds: 1. There is no law which could be the source of its authority. 2. Since the principal issue was the legality and constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, it is not such City Court but the Court of First Instance that has original jurisdiction. 3. It imposed double taxation. 4. There was a violation of the rule of uniformity established by the constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid. DECISION: 1. On July 15, 1948, Republic Act No. 329 was enacted amending the charter of said city and adding to its power to license the power to tax and to regulate. 2. The mere fact, however, that in the answer to such a complaint a constitutional question was raised did not suffice to oust the City Court of its jurisdiction. The suit remains one for collection, the lack of validity being only a defense to such an attempt at recovery, and that the sum sought to be recovered was clearly within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Baguio. 3. There is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. 4. A real estate dealer who leases property worth P50,000 or above must pay an annual fee of P100. If the property is worth P10,000 but not over P50,000, then he pays P50 and P24 if the value is less than P10,000. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. 3. BAGATSING VS RAMIREZ FACTS: Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors assailed the validity of Ordinance No. 7522 on the following grounds:

1.

2. 3.

The publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (before enactment and after approval) The Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the said ordinance; The market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. DECISION: 1. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. 2. The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. 3. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation. 4. PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: Petitioner WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal prayed that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920, which provides for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals, be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question, which was made after the passage of the law, be "declared unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project. The feeder road was within the Antonio Subdivision, and that it does not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. Petitioner alleged that it was not for public purpose. Respondent contended that petitioner has no legal personality to assail the validity of the Act since he has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest" in it "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury." He also has no legal standing to assail the validity of the donation because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby. ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of the subject feeder roads is for public purpose, and whether or not petitioner has the capacity to sue.

DECISION: The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. 5. COMMISSIONER VS BOAC FACTS: BOAC is a 100% British Government-owned corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United Kingdom. It had no landing rights for traffic purposes in the Philippines, except for a nine-month period, partly in 1961 and partly in 1962, when it was granted a temporary landing permit by the CAB. Consequently, it did not carry passengers and/or cargo to or from the Philippines, although during the period covered by the assessments, it maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines Wamer Barnes and Company, Ltd., and later Qantas Airways which was responsible for selling BOAC tickets covering passengers and cargoes. On 7 May 1968, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR, for brevity) assessed BOAC the aggregate amount of P2,498,358.56 for deficiency income taxes covering the years 1959 to 1963. This was protested by BOAC. Subsequent investigation resulted in the issuance of a new assessment, dated 16 January 1970 for the years 1959 to 1967 in the amount of P858,307.79. BOAC paid this new assessment under protest. On 17 November 1971, BOAC was assessed deficiency income taxes, interests, and penalty for the fiscal years 1968-1969 to 1970-1971 in the aggregate amount of P549,327.43, and the additional amounts of P1,000.00 and P1,800.00 as compromise penalties for violation of Section 46 (requiring the filing of corporation returns) penalized under Section 74 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). BOAC filed a case with the CTA. The Tax Court held that the proceeds of sales of BOAC passage tickets in the Philippines by Warner Barnes and Company, Ltd., and later by Qantas Airways, during the period in question, do not constitute BOAC income from Philippine sources "since no service of carriage of passengers or freight was performed by BOAC within the Philippines" and, therefore, said income is not subject to Philippine income tax. The place where services are rendered determines the source. ISSUE: Whether or not the revenue derived by private respondent British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) from sales of tickets in the Philippines for air transportation, while having no landing rights here, constitute income of BOAC from Philippine sources, and, accordingly, taxable. DECISION: BOAC, during the periods covered by the subject - assessments, maintained a general sales agent in the Philippines, That general sales agent, from 1959 to 1971, "was engaged in (1) selling and issuing tickets; (2) breaking down the whole trip into series of trips each trip in the series corresponding to a different airline company; (3) receiving the fare from the whole trip; and (4) consequently allocating to the various airline companies on the basis of their participation in the services rendered through the mode of interline settlement as prescribed by Article VI of the Resolution No. 850 of the IATA Agreement." For the source of income to be considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient that the income is derived from

activity within the Philippines. The flow of wealth proceeded from, and occurred within, Philippine territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the Philippine government. The BOAC claim for refund in the amount of P858,307.79 is hereby denied. Without costs. 6. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORP VS CIR FACTS: Petitioner corporation is engaged in the business of mining, production, and sale of various mineral products, such as gold, pyrite, and copper concentrates. It is a VAT-registered taxpayer. It claimed a tax refund for the raw materials it sold to Philippine Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) and Philippine Phosphate, Inc. (PHILPHOS), both of which are registered not only with the BOI, but also with the then Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). The CIR denied the claim because it was not able to prove that 70% of the goods manufactured by PHILPHOS and EPZA were actually exported. ISSUE: Is there a need to prove that 70% of the goods manufactured by PHILPHOS and EPZA were actually exported? DECISION: NO. Petitioner corporation does not claim that its sales to PASAR and PHILPHOS are zero-rated on the basis that said sales were made to export-oriented BOI-registered corporations, but rather, on the basis that the sales were made to EPZA-registered enterprises operating within export processing zones. Distinction must be made between these two types of sales because each may have different substantiation requirements. Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 states: xxx Provided, further, That without actual exportation the following shall be considered constructively exported for purposes of this provision: xxx (2) sales to export processing zones xxx. According to the Destination Principle,22 goods and services are taxed only in the country where these are consumed. Hence, actual export of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country must be free of VAT, while those destined for use or consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed with 10% VAT.24 Export processing zones25 are to be managed as a separate customs territory from the rest of the Philippines and, thus, for tax purposes, are effectively considered as foreign territory. For this reason, sales by persons from the Philippine customs territory to those inside the export processing zones are already taxed as exports. Hence, although this Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted from the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales to EPZA-registered enterprises operating within economic processing zones were effectively zero-rated and were not covered by Revenue Regulations No. 2-88, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for refund of its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and effectively zero-rated sales during the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1992, for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and sufficient evidence. 7. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA VS CTA FACTS: In the year 1956 the Provincial Assessor of Laguna assessed, for purposes of real estate taxes, the property comprising the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Binan Waterworks System and described in Tax Declaration No. 5987 (Exh. "A-l") which, as stated in Paragraph 2 hereof, herein petitioner NWSA had taken over. Petitioner NWSA protested, claiming that the property described under Tax Declaration No. 5987 (Exh. "A-l") are exempted from the payment of real estate taxes in view of the nature and kind of said property and functions and activities of petitioner, as provided in Republic Act No. 1383. Petitioner contended that since the respondent holds the properties in their proprietary capacity, the same are not exempted from taxes. The CTA reversed the decision of the petitioner, thus, this instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are exempted from tax.

DICISION: Yes. In exempting from taxation "property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality or municipal district . . .," said section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470 makes no distinction between property held in a sovereign, governmental or political capacity and those possessed in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character; and where the law does not distinguish neither may we, unless there are facts and circumstances clearly showing that the lawmaker intended the contrary, but no such facts and circumstances have been brought to our attention. A tax on property of the Government, whether national or local, would merely have the effect of taking money from one pocket to put it in another pocket. Hence, it would not serve, in the final analysis, the main purpose of taxation. What is more, it would tend to defeat it, on account of the paper work, time and consequently, expenses it would entail. Section 1 of the Republic Act No. 101, upon which petitioner relies is inapplicable to the case at bar for it refers only to duties, taxes, fees and other charges upon "transaction, business, industry, sale or income" and does not include taxes on property like real estate tax. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. 8. PEPSI-COLA BOTLING CO. OF THE PHIL. VS CITY OF BUTUAN FACTS: Plaintiff seeks to recover the sums paid by it to the City of Butuan pursuant to its Municipal Ordinance No. 110, as amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 122, both series of 1960, which plaintiff assails as null and void, and to prevent the enforcement thereof. Petitioner contended among other things that the ordinance: (a) partakes of the nature of an import tax, (b) is highly unjust and discriminatory, and (c) section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, upon the authority of which it was enacted, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. DECISION: a) As amended by Ordinance No. 122, the tax is, however, imposed only upon "any agent and/or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or corporation engaged in selling ... soft drinks or carbonated drinks." As a consequence, merchants engaged in the sale of soft drink or carbonated drinks, are not subject to the tax, unless they are agents and/or consignees of another dealer, who, in the very nature of things, must be one engaged in business outside the City. Besides, the tax would not be applicable to such agent and/or consignee, if less than 1,000 cases of soft drinks are consigned or shipped to him every month. The intention to limit the application of the ordinance to soft drinks and carbonated drinks brought into the City from outside thereof becomes apparent. Viewed from this angle, the tax partakes of the nature of an import duty, which is beyond defendant's authority to impose. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales, and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt from the disputed tax. b) It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate the authority to classify the objects of taxation.5 The classification made in the exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable6 and this requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally all those who belong to the same class. These conditions are not fully met by the ordinance in question.8 Indeed, if its purpose were merely to levy a burden upon the sale of soft drinks or carbonated beverages, there is no reason why sales thereof by sealers other than agents or

c)

consignees of producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan should be exempt from the tax. The general principle against delegation of legislative powers, in consequence of the theory of separation of powers2 is subject to one well-established exception, namely: legislative powers may be delegated to local governments to which said theory does not apply3 in respect of matters of local concern.

9. PEPSI-COLA BOTLING CO VS MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN LEYTE FACTS: The plaintiff sought to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264. 1 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void. Municipal Ordinance No. 23, of Tanauan, Leyte, which was approved on September 25, 1962, levies and collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked. On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance No. 27, which was approved on October 28, 1962, levies and collects "on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon. ISSUE: 1. Is Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive? 2. Do Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes? 3. Are Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair? DECISION: 1. No. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. 6 It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." The plenary nature of the taxing power thus delegated, contrary to plaintiff-appellant's pretense, would not suffice to invalidate the said law as confiscatory and oppressive. In delegating the authority, the State is not limited to the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself. When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there may be delegated such measure of power to impose and collect taxes as the legislature may deem expedient. 2. No. The intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was intended as a plain substitute for the prior Ordinance No. 23, and operates as a repeal of the latter, even without words to that effect. 3. No. Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable 10. JOHN H. OSMENA VS OSCAR ORBOS FACTS: It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Petitioner assailed the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by

Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . . to the Energy Regulatory Board. ISSUE: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of the power of taxation. DECISION: It appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. The OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as under recovery of, costs of crude importation. Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. The Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on how much to tax. However, what is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform. The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of power may be justified. 11. VILLEGAS VS HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO FACTS: Section 1 of Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondent assailed its validity on the following grounds: a) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; b) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers; c) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid. DECISION: The Ordinance is invalid

a)

b)

c)

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

12. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC VS ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS FACTS: Claim for the refund of P722.84 paid in 1956 as special import tax on pump parts imported by petitioner. Petitioner's ground: The imported articles "consist of equipment and spare parts for its own exclusive use and therefore were exempt from special import tax", by the terms of Section 6, Republic Act 1394. Petitioner is engaged in the industry of processing gasoline, and manufacturing lubricating oil, grease and tin containers. Petitioner owns gasoline stations with pumps, which are leased to and operated by gasoline dealers. It sells gasoline to these dealers. The pump parts imported by petitioner in 1956 were intended, installed and actually used by gasoline dealers in pumping gasoline from under around tanks into customers' motor vehicles. ISSUE: Are the imported pump parts exempt from the payment of special import tax? DECISION: These pump parts, in other words, are used in the sale at retail of gasoline not by petitioner but by lessees of gasoline stations. In this factual environment, it is quite evident that the pump parts are not used in petitioner's industry of processing gasoline, or manufacturing lubricating oil, grease and tin containers. The drive of petitioner's argument is that marketing of its gasoline product "is corollary to or incidental to its industrial operations." Since the law states that, to be tax exempt, equipment and spare parts should be "for the use of industries", the coverage herein should not be enlarged to include equipment and spare parts for use in dispensing gasoline at retail.