Abstract The evolution of Liberia from an impoverished country ruled by a brutal dictator and ravaged by a 14 year civil war,

to an emerging democracy on the path to stability and economic growth with the first female president in Africa, offers a case study of a local womens movement that was essential to the peace process and continued stability of the country. Through analysis of the Liberian civil war, the womens movement for peace, and current policies within Liberia, this thesis will discuss the indispensible role of women in creating lasting peace and stability in conflict regions. It will also examine the role of the international community in supporting womens involvement in peace processes and reconstruction efforts, particularly in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and peace, and security. Liberias current stability and peace is the combined result of: (1) a strong internal womens movement for peace that initiated peace talks and remained active in post-conflict efforts; (2) key international institutions and countries that became directly involved in the peace process and transitional government; and (3) an international community that followed the mandates of Resolution 1325. This thesis will argue that womens leadership and an understanding of womens experiences during war became a necessary component of the peace process and transitional government. This is true because women are the majority of the adult refugee population, the caretakers of children, victims of extreme sexual violence, and even combatants. Furthermore, if any of the above components had been missing, the local womens movement, the involvement of the international community, or the overall framework of Resolution 1325, Liberia would not be experiencing the same level of success as it is today.

Introduction In Liberia, women are change makers, policy makers, and both the literal and symbolic keepers of peace. They are leaders side by side with men, and in many instances, all by themselves. Although there are still many social problems stemming from a prolonged civil war and desperate poverty, Liberia is emerging as a changed nation. Many of these changes were led by women, but not just any women women with a clear-eyed vision of lasting stability and peace; women who experienced 14 years of war and had had enough; women who realized that they were the leaders of their own country and communities, and had the knowledge and power to know what was right for their country. Indeed, there is much to be learned from the women of Liberia. This thesis will shed an academic light on the Liberian womens peace movement and their important role in the country. The movement is widely credited in popular sources for bringing peace to Liberia, but is largely absent from academic sources. By focusing on women in Liberia, I aim to stimulate the discourse within the international community about who can be responsible for and able to create and maintain peace within a country. I do this in the hopes of pointing to solutions rooted in womens involvement in peace processes and gender analysis of war, peace, and post-conflict efforts. The evolution of Liberia from an impoverished country ruled by a brutal dictator and ravaged by a 14 year civil war, to an emerging democracy on the path to stability and economic growth with the first female president in Africa, offers a compelling case study of a local womens movement that was essential to the peace process and continued stability of the country. Through analysis of the Liberian civil war, the womens movement for peace, and current policies and practices within Liberia, I will discuss the indispensible role of women in

creating lasting peace and stability in conflict regions. I will also examine the role of the international community in supporting womens involvement in peace processes and reconstruction efforts, particularly in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, and peace and security.1 Liberias current stability and peace is the combined result of: (1) a strong internal womens movement for peace that initiated peace talks and has remained very active in postconflict efforts; (2) key international institutions and countries that became directly involved in the peace process and transitional government; and (3) an international community that followed the mandates of Resolution 1325. I argue that womens leadership and an understanding of womens experiences during war became a key and necessary component of the peace process and transitional government. This is particularly true because women are the majority of the adult refugee population, the caretakers of children, the elderly, the injured, the victims of extreme sexual violence, and even combatants. Furthermore, if any of the above components had been missing, the local womens movement, the involvement of the international community, or the overall framework of Resolution 1325, Liberia would not be experiencing nearly the same level of success as it is today. In order to prove the three points mentioned above, I will first introduce Liberia as a case study and give a brief history of the conflict and the womens movement. Then I will discuss the chapter outline of the thesis and give a description of the principal sources used throughout. In the next chapter, I will discuss prominent scholars and theories dealing with women, peace, and security and offer a theoretical background to the debate. The third chapter will be a historical

1 See annex for full text of Resolution 1325.

background of Liberia, focusing on the way Liberia was founded and the causes of the civil war. This chapter will also examine the many failed peace agreements throughout the civil war, and discuss the change in international involvement and action that characterized the 17th and final peace agreement in 2003. The fourth chapter will specifically discuss why womens involvement is so crucial in peace processes and examine the womens movement for peace in Liberia as well as current UN, NGO, and government programs that use gender analysis, and/ or are focused on women. The fourth chapter will also discuss how women, particularly president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, have played a large role in maintaining peace and security. Finally, in the fifth chapter I will offer a conclusion and series of policy recommendations on the lessons learned from Liberia and how Liberias success may be strengthened and repeated in other conflict zones. Liberia as a Case Study I chose Liberia as a case study for a number of reasons, the primary one being the success of that nations womens movement and the opportunity to learn more from its success. There are other reasons that make it a compelling case study as well. Historically, Liberia has had a very different relationship to Western countries than other African nations, yet fell to many of the same internal conflicts and prolonged civil war as nations that had been colonized by Europeans. There are scholars who believe that despite being the first African Republic, and never being officially colonized by the West, Liberia still experienced an unequal and exploitative relationship with the West, primarily the United States.2 In essence, the same colonial seeds that sowed underdevelopment, ethnic tension, and inequality throughout Africa were present in Liberia as well. Liberia may have never been officially colonized by another

2 Mgbeoji, Ikechi. Collective Insecurity: the Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003.

country, but the freed black settlers, largely from the United States, were quick to enact imperialistic and racist policies against indigenous Liberians similar to European colonizers in other African territories. The world has yet to see a peace agreement and post-conflict effort that is inclusive, in every sense of the word, of womens perspectives and experiences during war. Liberia, with its incredible womens movement for peace, its female president, female police officers and peacekeepers, the strong presence of women in all aspects of government, and the inclusion of a gender perspective in policy decisions, is the closest example. As stated by Abigail Disney, the producer of Pray the Devil Back to Hell, Liberia is what [Resolution] 1325 looks like.3 Summary of Conflict In 1980, an indigenous Liberian named Samuel K. Doe led a military junta to oust then President William Tolbert. Tolbert and 13 members of his cabinet were executed and Doe assumed power. Social unrest continued after the coup, and eventually broke out into civil war. In 1989 and 1990 an armed group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, began invading from Cote d Ivoire. A different group that had broken off from NPFL eventually captured, tortured and killed Doe in September 1990. Between 1990 and 1997 the Taylor-led NPFL and various other fighting factions from different regions fought over the control of timber, rubber, mineral resources, and power within the country. There was a brief period of relative peace between 1997 and 1999, but conflict erupted again in 2000. At the same time, political unrest and civil wars were also raging in neighboring Sierra Leone and Cote d Ivoire. These respective civil wars blended together along the borders and a main actor in the

3 Abigail Disney, Question and Answer session at film screening, Nov. 12th, 2010.

Sierra Leone conflict was Charles Taylor.4 Taylor is currently being tried by the Sierra Leone Special Court for his connection to the Sierra Leone civil war and his case is located at the Hague. Because of Liberias connection to instability in the West Africa region, it has been the focus of much regional and international attention from the 1980s to today. In addition to numerous peace talks and agreements, Liberia was under sanctions from the UN Security Council for over a decade, and sanctions against illegal diamond trading are still in effect.5 The destruction of Liberian society, infrastructure, and the economy by the civil war is well documented. The conflict infected every aspect of its national life and left no single group of Liberians without scars. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) reports, Liberias various episodes of state breakdown and conflictresulted in the deaths of an estimated over 250,000 persons and forced over million to be internally-displaced and hundreds of thousands to be refugees.6 Considering Liberias population of about 3 million, these numbers are staggering. The TRC also reveals the mass use of child soldiers and the violence and abuse inflicted upon children during the conflict. This violence and abuse included the regular use of narcotics to control child soldiers.7 Women and girls were also singled out as victims of horrific sexual violence. Many Liberian women suffered gang rapes, were forced by armed soldiers to engage in sexual acts with family members, suffered from rape that included taboo objects such as rifle

4 "Prosecutor vs. Charles Taylor." Special Court for Sierra Leone. Accessed December 11, 2010. http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx. 5 "CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site ? Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 03 May 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>. 6 Liberia. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia. A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project. 2009. Pg. 43 7 Ibid. pg. 44

butts, and were kept as sex and domestic slaves by groups of soldiers.8 The TRC reports that nearly 28% of all reported violations during the conflict included sexual violence against women, even though women were largely absent from the fighting groups.9 If Liberia is a prime example of failed peace agreements, it is also a prime example of the difference womens involvement and a gendered analysis of peace can make towards peace and stability within a country. In 2003, the fighting factions of Liberia, with the help of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and other international actors, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), but the womens movement for peace is credited with bringing the fighting factions to the table in the first place. The CPA was the only peace agreement to include a gender perspective and is also the only agreement out of 17 that has successfully maintained peace and stability within the country. The womens movement for peace was started when Comfort Freeman and Leymah Gbowee organized a meeting of women in Monrovia from local churches in 2002. From that meeting the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) was created and it soon branched out to include both Christian and Muslim women.10 Although WIPNET impacted Liberia in different ways, two specific tactics used are credited for bringing international attention and eventual peace to Liberia. The first tactic was the daily protests held in the fish market attended to by up to 2,500 women at a time.11 For months, the women dressed in all white, held signs protesting

8 Ibid. pg. 45 9 Ibid. 10 Pray The Devil Back to Hell, dir. Gini Reticker, prod. Abigail Disney (Fork Films, 2008), DVD. 11 Adams, Jim. "Liberian transplant: A woman of peace." Star Tribune, October 9, 2009. http://www.startribune.com/local/north/63196632.html (accessed October 21, 2009).

the war, and sat outside all day. These protests were meant to shame President Taylor into agreeing to peace talks, and were ultimately successful.12 The second tactic was when WIPNET members held the warlords from different fighting factions, international leaders, and members of ECOWAS in the building where the peace talks were taking place by interlocking their arms in a human chain and surrounding the building until their demands were heard.13 Members of WIPNET were not allowed in the talks, but spent months outside of the building trying to influence international leaders and fighting factions to include their concerns in the talks. The tactic of holding members of the talks hostage is credited for turning the stalled peace agreement around and finally bringing about the CPA.14 The agreement and the resulting mandates for the transitional government included a gender perspective and Liberia is the first country to have a National Resolution 1325 Action Plan.15 By initiating the peace talks and then demanding a gender perspective in reconstruction efforts, the Liberian womens movement paved the way for peace and solidified a future role for Liberian women in the rebuilding of their country. Chapter Outline and Description of Main Sources The sources used in this thesis range from scholarly articles, case studies, policy papers, documentaries, and news articles. Many of the guiding theoretical sources will be discussed in the following chapter. Peace studies, peacebuilding, and contemporary post-conflict studies, will also be analyzed. The majority of case studies focus on West African countries, and many of

12 Disney and Reticker, 2008. 14 Ibid. 15 Fuest, Veronika. This is the time to get it in front: Changing Roles and Opportunities for Women in Liberia. African Affairs, 107/427: (2008). 201224. Pg. 214 13 Ibid. and TRC. 2009. Pg. 169

them include, or are focused exclusively on Liberia. Historical accounts of Liberia will also help inform an analysis of causes of the conflict. I have, wherever possible, cited the writings, interviews, statements, and speeches made by Liberians. In keeping with my beliefs, and the purpose of this thesis, I have included in every way possible Liberian womens own descriptions of their experiences of war and their involvement in the movement for peace. The following are examples of the type of sources that include interviews and statements by Liberian women. These sources, with the addition of radio interviews and news articles, will be used throughout. Mats Utas account of one womans experience of the Liberian conflict gives greater detail and insight into the everyday day life of a young woman in Liberia during the first half of the conflict.16 Utas refers to this particular young woman as Bintu. Utas describes her experiences during the war through an anthropological lens, indentifying a number of roles played by Bintu. At different and sometimes overlapping times she played a soldier, a war victim, a multiple and habitual rape victim, a criminal, a looter, the girlfriend of various powerful officers, a refugee, a mother, and a provider. Utas describes the extreme sexual violence and limited choices faced by Bintu and other Liberian women, but he is also able to capture a sense of agency and choice that is often overlooked in the analysis of women during wartime. Both the documentary film Pray the Devil Back to Hell 17 and the PBS World Focus episode "Womens Movement Transforms Post-War Liberia"18 give a face and name to the many women who participated in the womens movement for peace, and are currently working towards

16 Utas, Mats. "Victimicy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Womans Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone." WestAfrican Warscapes. Anthropological Quarterly 78.2 (2005): 403-30. Print. 17 Disney and Disney and Disney and Reticker. 2008...

18 "Womens Movement Transforms Post-War Liberia." In World Focus. PBS. April 14, 2009. Accessed August 2009. http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/04/14/womens-movement-transforms-post-war-liberia/4965/.

maintaining stability in their country. Pray the Devil Back to Hell includes footage of violence in Liberia from 2000 to 2003 and the peace talks in Ghana in 2003. World Focus offers a look at what Liberian women have been doing since Ellen Johnson Sirleafs election in 2005. Ellen Johnson Sirleafs memoir, This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa's First Woman President describes her child and young adulthood in Liberia, her education in the United States, and her career at the World Bank. It also discusses her work in the Liberian government before the civil war, her involvement in peace and development efforts throughout the war, and finally her involvement in the CPA and her current policies and challenges as president.19 Observations and statements from Sirleafs memoir will be used throughout. Chapter two, Framing the Debate: Women in War, Women in Peace, focuses on Feminist International Relations (IR), Gender Studies, and peace theories that offer an alternative view to traditional peace and security efforts within the international community. This chapter will discuss the reasons why womens experiences of war and their involvement in peace processes are crucial for lasting peace and stability. It also examines international law and current international norms that support a recent trend towards womens involvement in peace processes. The sources used in this chapter will be discussed and introduced in the chapter. Chapter three, Political History of Liberia and Background of Conflict, gives a brief history of Liberia from 1847 to 1989 and then offers a detailed account of the civil war. It sheds light on the myriad of causes and complications present in the conflict, giving some perspective on the many failed attempts at peace. Chapter three will also focus on the second half of the conflict, from 1999 to 2003. It includes an analysis of Taylors presidency and a description of

19 Johnson Sirleaf, Ellen. This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa's First Woman President. New York: Harper, 2009

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the new fighting factions that emerged to challenge Taylor in the end of the 20th century. It also examines the reactions of the international community to Taylor as president and to the reemergence of conflict. The Truth and Reconciliation report, A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project, is a comprehensive analysis of the destruction caused by Liberias civil war based on hundreds of interviews of Liberian victims, soldiers, officers, government officials, refugees, and civilians.20 It offers a detailed history of the country and insights into the causes of the conflict. The TRC report will be used throughout. Voting for Peace: Post-conflict Elections in Liberia by Terrence Lyons argues that although the election of Charles Taylor in 1997 was not a complete transition to democracy, it was an important turning point in the civil war because it was the first significant end to years of violence.21 The election effectively made Taylors power and control over the majority of the country official. Lyons also describes the international and regional political climate during the 1990s and the many different peace talks and agreements that led up to Taylors election. At the time of writing, in 1999, Lyons notes that Taylors election would not lead to a lasting peace without serious international involvement and institution building. Adekeye Adebajo, and John Peter-Pham also analyze the many peace talks and agreements in Liberia between 1989 and 2003, although from different perspectives than Lyons. Adebajo believes that much of the problems within ECOWAS stem from Nigerias desire to be a regional power and its manipulation of the Liberian conflict to gain credibility and influence within the region.22 Peter-Pham focuses on the second half of the civil war, from 1999 to 2003.
20 TRC. 2009.

21 Lyons, Terrence. Voting for Peace: Post-conflict Elections in Liberia. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. Print. 22 Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2002.

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He does not discuss the womens movement for peace, but gives a detailed account of Taylors relationship to the Sierra Leonean conflict and the tense moments leading up to the signing of the CPA in 2003.23 Chapter four, Women as Peacemakers and Peacekeepers, focuses on the Liberian womens movement for peace and the current women-focused policies found in Liberia today. It will briefly describe Liberian womens experience of war, their stories of resistance and protest throughout the civil war, and an analysis of the womens movement for peace. This chapter will examine the impact of womens involvement and gender analysis in current policies, and Ellen Johnson Sirleafs role in maintaining peace. It will also discuss other African womens movements and describe the shift in international support for womens involvement in peace processes. This section will use many of the sources already described, as well as the sources below. What Women do In Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa edited by Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya is a compilation of case studies from conflict zones in Africa.24 The chapter titled Hundreds of Victims Silently Grieving by the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) offers a detailed analysis of the violence throughout the country and the sexual violence experienced by women. Interviews with Liberian women were done in the 1990s, years before a grassroots, cohesive movement for peace was formed. Veronika Fuest analyzes womens position and changing roles in Liberian society and politics from before and after the civil war.25 She asserts that women gained a significant increase in economic and political power from the beginning of the civil war to the election of

25 Fuest. 2008.

23 Peter-Pham, John. Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State. New York: Reed Press, 2004 24 Turshen, Meredeth, and Clotilde Twagiramariya. What Women Do in Wartime Gender and Conflict in Africa. London [u.a.: Zed, 2001. Print.

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Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Fuest acknowledges the losses that many women experienced during the conflict, but focuses on the gains of Liberian women, portraying their agency and powerful organization skills. African Womens Movements: Changing Political Landscapes by Aili Marie Tripp, Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa, traces the modern history of African womens movements and the way these movements have both influenced and were influenced by international norms and laws supporting womens rights and involvement.26 Tripp et. al. identifies womens movements and an increase in womens political participation in almost every African nation in the last 15 years citing womens organizing skills, the use of quotas, and international involvement after conflicts as factors in this emergence of this increase in power and influence. Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping by Dyan E. Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L. Parpat offers a comprehensive understanding of the way gender differences inform every aspect of war, peacekeeping efforts, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.27 It not only examines gender differences within particular conflicts through case studies, but it also discusses vast gender differences on an international scale. Mazurana et.al. analyzes movements towards gender balance and gender mainstreaming on an international level and offers many ways that gender analysis can be incorporated into current peace processes and international aid organizations. Finally, the fifth and last chapter, Conclusion and Policy Recommendations, will discuss lessons learned from Liberia for peace processes in other countries. It will offer policy

26 Tripp, Aili Mari., Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa. African Women's Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

27 Mazurana, Dyan E., Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L. Parpart. 2005. Print.

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recommendations for strengthening Resolution 1325, preventing sexual violence and ending impunity, and ensuring the success of peace agreements to prevent prolonged conflict.

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Framing the Debate: Women and War, Women and Peace Although the experiences of women during war have been discussed often, their perceived role has been almost exclusively as victims. They certainly are victims, particularly of sexual violence; but they have a different experience of war and violence than men, an experience that goes beyond victimhood. Because of their low social position in many societies, women have been excluded from political participation and leadership as well as international agreements and debates concerning conflicts in their countries. Thus, half or more of the people who experience the daily violence, economic hardship, and chaos associated with civil war and the majority of people who have remained peaceful during the conflict are left out of peace talks and agreements. Liberia is a stunning example of the failures of peace agreements that do not include a gender analysis of war or include women in the peace process. Although Liberian women experienced the war on a number of levels, their voices and experiences were absent from the many failed attempts at peace between 1989 and 2003.28 In fact, there is no evidence of the involvement of local actors beyond the fighting factions, let alone a representation of Liberian women, in any of the 16 failed agreements that preceded the CPA. To the contrary, these peace agreements depended solely on brutally violent men, interested in maintaining and increasing their own power, promising to lay down their arms and work together in transitional governments.29 Nor did the 16 failed agreements provide any form of an acknowledgement,

28 Utas. 2005. 29 Adeleke, Ademola. The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas Operation in Liberia The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1995): 569-593 and TRC 2009.

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denouncement, or understanding of the particular human rights abuses experienced by women during the conflicts solely because of their gender.30 A key aim of this thesis is to locate women within war, and in doing so, argue for their place in the peace process. Using Liberia as the principal example, I will discuss what war often means for women, particularly women in modern African conflicts. Their experience of war is not only as legitimate and important as the experience of other groups, but understanding their unique experience of war is critical to the possibility of peace and stability in a conflict region. In order to do this, the existence of women in war must be made explicit. Women have lived, live and will continue to live in conflict zones. They are both aggressors (though not nearly as often as men) and victims. Women care for soldiers and the wounded. They even engage in combat. Some may support opposition groups, others the official government in their country. They spy, cross enemy lines, carry food and supplies. Women also protest wars. They write letters to the press, to their government, to friends and family in other countries. They write books, create films, sing songs, and tell stories, in an effort to understand and explain war. Women die in war. Their children and loved ones die in war. Women are injured, tortured, and imprisoned during war. Many are raped. Their possessions are stolen, their homes and villages often destroyed. Women also loot. In short, just as women exist in all other aspects of human life, women exist in war. And just as women exist in war, they should exist in peace. To understand the damage caused by the invisibility of women in war, imagine the chaos and confusion that often characterizes modern conflict zones. There are virtually no battle lines; all the land is a potential battlefield. There are no uniforms; anyone might be a soldier, friend or

30 TRC 2009. Pg. 160

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enemy. There are few, if any, definitions of what makes a soldier a soldier, a civilian a civilian, or a victim a victim. These uncertainties add to the toll among civilians, andas always civilians are predominately women and children. In a conflict where human rights and the laws of war are disregarded, where children become both victims and combatants, and where womens bodies are seen as a prize for looting soldiers and another strategic territory to conquer, the number of actors, victims, and stakeholders grow exponentially. Now, imagine all of the competing groups, interests, and agendas in any conflict: fighting factions, multiple ethnic groups, UN peacekeepers and agencies, NGOs, regional and international leaders. With all of these competing interests and potential outcomes, how then, can a legitimate and successful peace agreement be signed when half of every idea, every experience during the war, every possible solution, is often excluded from the very beginning? A puzzle cannot be solved when half of the parts are missing. This is not to automatically equate women with peace, or say that any peace agreement that includes women will be successful. Rather, it is to say that the exclusion of women, and the exclusion of their experiences during war, leads to an incomplete understanding of conflict and therefore, to incomplete solutions. There is the real possibility that many women have the same experience and perspective of war as men. Women are not a homogenous group. Some percent of women will align themselves with destructive and aggressive forces, and thus have an interest in promoting violence. The notion of including womens voices and experiences in the peace process is not an acceptance that women are the sole solution; it is merely giving women the same responsibility and authority as all the other affected groups during times of conflict. Yet without homogenizing all women and their experience of war, one cannot deny that there are specific tactics used during battle that affect women and girls more severely, and in

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different ways, than men and boys. And even though women typically experience the brutality of war on the sidelines of battle, they have observations and insights that those in the throes of battle do not. Women have both insider and outsider vantage points from which to observe and experience conflicts, potentially offering analysis very different from those of policy experts who safely observe conflict from hundreds and thousands of miles away. This vantage point has been dismissed all too often. Theories and Perspectives on Women and Peace An examination of womens efforts and opinions concerning peace throughout the world, and over a period of decades, shows a slight tendency for women to support peace more often than men, and a disproportionate amount of womens groups also focus on peace issues more consistently than mens groups.31 There has not been enough research on modern African civil wars to date, but it is clear that advocates for peace from all conflicts, are very often women. In Liberia alone, popular sentiment clearly aligns women with peace and men with war. In Africa, particularly among womens groups, women overwhelmingly support peace. Among scholars, however, the connection between women and peace is a topic of much debate. Theories of women and peace fit into a number of different categories. Many believe that women are inherently more peaceable than men, although the reasons and support vary greatly. Some propose biological reasons, testosterone levels, evolution, and most importantly, motherhood, as the reasons for a tendency towards peace. Some reject biological arguments, and instead believe that strict gender and cultural norms push women towards peace and men towards war. Some feminist theorists believe that patriarchy, with its emphasis on dominance and the supposed male attributes of logic, reason, and self-interest is at the root of a world

Pgs. 41-52 31 Goldstein, Joshua S. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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system where war is a frequent and legitimate practice. They believe that the routine undermining of supposedly feminine traits, such as compassion, altruism, communication, etc., has created an imbalance that favors war and excludes women. Following this logic, the inclusion of women in high-level political positions, and the acknowledgement of feminine traits as equal to male traits, would automatically make the world more peaceful. Others completely reject the idea that women are innately more peaceful, citing instances of women warriors, female leaders that propose war, womens popular support of past wars, and the well-documented, active support of women in the war efforts of WWI and WWII. Many agree that there is nothing innate about women that makes them support peace more often than men, but they explain the tendency towards peace as a logical reaction of women to the exclusion, discrimination, and sheer loss that women often experience during war. Proponents of this argument accept that due to different gender roles, and possibly biological reasons, women do not have nearly the same level of political and economic power and influence, and thus do not have the same investment in entering into, or continuing wars as men do. Furthermore, women often undergo extra labor and hardship while men are away at war because they must engage in both male and female roles and are often left to raise children by themselves. The women of Liberia, and many other African peace activists, all align themselves with the belief that women are inherently more peaceful. The main reason for their peacefulness and one they invoke over and over again is their responsibility and experience as mothers and nurturers. Although using motherhood as the main impetus to fight for peace makes many Western feminists uneasy, motherhood has proven to be a compelling and empowering argument. This sentiment is expressed by everyone from market women to female lawyers and politicians, all the way up to the Madame President, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

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Maria Matembe, a peace activist and former member of parliament in Uganda, echoes the sentiments of many African peace advocates on the importance of womens participation in peace talks. At the peace negotiations and peacemaking [tables], all these men are seated there, men who know how to make wars, and now they sit there and they want to make peace. Dont you see, its just a contradiction? And why they cannot see it is what I cannot understand. That is why God created women with a sixth sense to tell themif these people [men] were to allow us to sit with them at the peace negotiation tables, peace could be reached quickly because women know the languageGod gave us the responsibility of not only mothering human beings, but nurturing themWe know human life more than they do and I wish they could let us make the decisions that concern human life.32 For the purpose of this thesis, and out of respect for the many African peace activists who have made similar statements above, I agree with the belief that motherhood is an experience that gives women yet another set of unique credentials from which to analyze war and advocate for peace. However, although motherhood may be one of the main motivating factors in womens movements for peace, it is not the sole reason for the power and success behind these movements, or the strongest reason to include women in peace talks. In addition to motherhood, another compelling reality of women that makes them more aligned with peace, and necessitates their involvement in peace and post-conflict efforts, is that women cannot win with war. For the sake of clarity and argument, this conclusion is meant to apply to modern civil wars most specifically the civil wars fought in West Africa. Women have certainly won freedom and independence through wars along with men in the past. However, the civil wars in West Africa have not given women these opportunities. This view is

32 Matembe, Maria. "Women, War, and Peace: The Politics of Peacebuilding." Lecture, Joan B. Kroc. Distinguished Lecture Series, University of San Diego, San Diego, October 18, 2006. Accessed November 8, 2010. http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/documents/ipj/Programs/DLS/IPJBookWomanWarPeace.pdf.

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similar to the one discussed above that notes womens lower social position and exclusion from political and economic decisions as an influencing factor in their support of peace. Even though some women engage in combat, loot goods, and in very rare cases, may even gain a place for themselves in the surviving government, the overwhelming population of women lose in war. They lose family members, children, homes, possessions, rights, and often, their dignity. Men are absolute losers in war too, yet for some men there is much to be individually gained; power, respect, and wealth have all been attained through war. Men and boys can look to warlords as powerful examples of economic success, while women and girls can rarely look towards female soldiers in the same way. Even women combatants in both Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced high levels of sexual violence from fellow officers and enemy forces alike. Due to already existing power dynamics and gender norms that exclude women from taking advantage of war, women do not become powerful warlords. They do not enrich themselves in the illegal trade of minerals and resources, nor become ministers of these resources once a war is over. They do not become heads of state through coups. In short, because of their outsider status during war, their exclusion from the power and wealth gained during war, their experience of motherhood and the high value they place on human life, women in modern civil wars are more invested in peace than men. Contribution to International Relations This thesis will add to the field of IR by contributing to the understanding of civil wars, peace processes, and post-conflict efforts, first and foremost by deepening the understanding of who the actors are in these processes. As Feminist IR scholars, such as Elshtain, Enloe, Tickner, and Sylvester have noted, the invisibility of women in IR, and specifically, the lack of a gendered analysis of war, has led to an impoverished view of war and its consequent security

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issues.33 This impoverished, or incomplete analysis, has in turn contributed to the many failed solutions to civil conflict as seen in Africa during the 1980s to today.34 The often complete absence of women from reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts and decisions results in narrow policies that do not address some of the most severe instances of violence within countries. By concentrating on womens experiences of war and the womens movement in Liberia, I will continue the recent scholarly focus on gendered analyses of conflict and peacekeeping operations. The main effort of these studies is to: Make apparent that inattention to, and subsequent miscalculations about, womens and girls roles and experiences during particular conflicts and postconflict periods systematically undermines the efforts of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operationsto establish conditions necessary for national and regional peace, justice, and security.35 Nowhere is the failure of understanding and acknowledging women and girls experiences of war by the IR community more apparent than the whole scale dismissal of mass rape and sexual violence as relevant causes for insecurity and specific tactics of war. The international community, and the Security Council in particular, is just now coming to terms with what many warlords have known all along. Mass rape is a relatively cheap and effective way to terrorize, humiliate, dehumanize, physically injure, and oppress not just women, but entire communities. Rape is used as a strategy to clear territories, to symbolize superiority over the enemy, to spread devastating diseases, to torture, to punish, and is considered a form of genocide when the intent is to impregnate women of another ethnic group. The sheer number of rape victims in modern conflicts proves that there is nothing aberrant, accidental, or isolated about rape during war.

35 Mazurana et. al. 2005. pg. 2

33 Sylvester, Christine. Feminist International Relations: an Unfinished Journey. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. 34 Turshen, Meredeth, and Clotilde Twagiramariya.. 2001. Print.

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A staggering 50% of all women in Sierra Leone were subjected to sexual violence, including rape, torture and sexual slavery, according to a 2002 report by Physicians for Human Rights. In Liberia, an estimated 40 percent of all girls and women have fallen victim to abuse. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped.36 Current reports of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as the Rape Capital of the World show that mass rape, despite reports and admonishments by the UN, the Security Council, and many governments, is still a prevalent tool of war. Women and girls are not the only victims of rape in times of war, but they are singled out much more often than men or boys for this particular war crime precisely because of their gender. Meredith Turshen explains further why women are the overwhelming targets of rape during war, rape targets women because they keep the civilian population functioning and are essential to its social and physical continuity.37 On top of the devastating affects that rape has on civilian communities, it can also be damaging to the very combatants who are the rapists themselves. In Sierra Leone, an effective way to break family and social ties, thus ensuring that children captured during war would not try to run away, was to force male child soldiers to rape their female family members in front of other soldiers.38 The women, whether grandmothers, mothers, or sisters, were clearly victims, yet the boys turned combatants were also victims in these brutal rapes. There are reports in Liberia as well that child soldiers were initiated in the same horrific manner, though this was not as widespread as in Sierra Leone. As Margot Wallstrm, the recently appointed Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict makes clear, rape is a strategic,

36 IRIN. In-Depth: Our Bodies - Their Battle Ground: Gender-based Violence in Conflict Zones. September 2004. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=20&ReportId=62814 38 Johnson Sirleaf. 2009. Pg. 225 37 Turshen, Meredith. Womens War Stories. Turshen and Twagiramariya. 1998. Pg. 11.

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planned, predictable, and systematic threat to international security and should not be underestimated during war. She states, far from being a niche, or a womens issue, or collateral damage, [rape] is used by political and military leaders for political, economic, and military means.39 Mass rape during war is by no means something unique to Africa, nor is using rape as a form of torture and punishment against individual women. Joshua S. Goldstein reports, during the Dirty War in Argentina and Chile, female prisoners were often gang raped. In Central America, Death Squads, financed by the United States, used rape as a way to terrorize communities. Central American guerilla soldiers also engaged in sexual violence against women. During WWII Japanese soldiers committed mass rapes against Chinese and Korean women, the most infamous being the rape of Nanking. Goldstein also notes that, atrocities in World War I often included rapeperpetrated by all the armies. 40 In addition to the failure of the international community to prevent, acknowledge, and prosecute mass rape, the exclusion of women and girls experiences of conflict leads to other miscalculations for a number of reasons. The main reason is that gender is one of the primary ways societies determine roles, duties, and practices between people, and oftentimes, men and women have very different experiences of the same conflict. Skjelsbaek and Smith discuss the way cultural ideas of masculinity have convinced soldiers that war and violence are what men do, thus forcing men to reevaluate what makes them men, or rather their role as men in society, in order to put down their arms and end a conflict. They caution that, ignoring the gender

40 Goldstein. 2003. Pg. 363-367.

39 Margot Wallstrm, "Sexual Violence in Times of Conflict" (lecture, UN Mid Day Forum Series, UN, New York, November 9, 2010).

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dimension of social reality makes it impossible to address crucial elements of conflict resolution.41 Jean Bethke Elshtain argues women have just as much a role in war and violence as men do. She argues that male gender roles, as protector, aggressor, dominant, hunter, etc. are matched and complemented by female roles of nurturer, caretaker, submissive, and weak.42 The main point being that, men do not go to war without something or someone to protect. Men, and thus the violence they engage in, are directly supported by womens domestic and nurturing roles. Elshtain, Goldstein, and others argue that gender norms are both inherent in, and made more explicit by war, making gender analysis an imperative part of understanding, ending, and preventing wars. Because ones gender delineates different social and economic roles and opportunities within society, it is a crosscutting social dynamic. The absence of a gendered analysis of war, or peace and post-conflict issues leads to supposedly gender neutral policies that do not address the many security concerns of women, nor reflect many of the power dynamics and cultural norms that may have influenced the conflict to begin with. By focusing on gender, peace processes and transitional government policies are forced to analyze the various levels of inequality and subordination between different social groups, leading to more informed and holistic policies. Gender analysis and gender theory will be used throughout this thesis, albeit, with the clear intent of understanding and comparing womens experiences of war and involvement in peace processes. This thesis will not be a complete gender analysis of the Liberian conflict, as it is purposefully interested in women. As Goldstein and other scholars have shown, understanding how gender affects men during war is crucial in understanding why wars start.

41 Skjelsbk, Inger, and Dan Smith. Gender, Peace and Conflict. London: Sage Publ., 2001. Print. Pg. 2

42 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors, and Feminist Consciousness. Womens Studies International Forum 5. 1982.

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However, given the disproportionate publicity and acknowledgement that men often receive as soldiers and government officials, their role in war is more understood and readily accepted than womens. In addition to Feminist IR and Gender theorists, Constructivist IR scholars have also questioned traditional IR theories, such as Realism, that focus on states as the main, or only, actors in peace and security issues. Traditional IR theories purposefully exclude gender analysis and non-state actors, assuming their irrelevance. Because of the exclusion of women from highlevel decision-making positions in governments, women are generally viewed as outside the state, and thus irrelevant in IR. Constructivist approaches have rejected this narrow view by including the study of social movements, NGOs, and international norms as important factors in IR. Constructivist theory, particularly in terms of norm creation and international involvement on moral and human rights issues will influence this thesis. The work of Keck and Sikkink on the development of the international movement against violence against women, and the ways social movements in one country can spark international attention on an issue, and then contribute to new international norms and policies, will also inform this thesis.43 Because of the virtual invisibility of women as a whole in the IR profession and IR texts, the acknowledgment of womens contribution to peace and security issues is, for better or worse, a contribution to IR in itself. The writing down, the documenting or as Christine Sylvester coined, the citing and sighting of women in IR texts, is a permanent contribution to a woefully underdeveloped field.44 Just as peace talks lack the inclusion of women, the absence of women continues in publications. Often, in peace agreements and historical accounts of civil wars alike, women are almost never mentioned, rape does not exist, and men get all the credit.

44 Sylvester. 2002. Pg. 43 Keck, Margaret E. Activists beyond Borders Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell UP, 1998. Print.

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UNIFEM reports that, women's participation in peace negotiations remains ad hoc, not systematic it averages less than 8 percent of the 11 peace processes for which such information is availableFewer than 3 percent of signatories to peace agreements are women.45 The statistics on sexual violence are even more telling: Out of 300 peace agreements for 45 conflict situations in the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, 18 have addressed sexual violence in 10 conflict situations (Burundi, Aceh, DRC, Sudan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan/Darfur, Philippines, Nepal, Uganda, Guatemala, and Chiapas).46 Some historical accounts of the Liberian civil war and final peace agreement, for example, do not mention women at all, make vague references to looting and terrorizing rural communities yet never mention the word rape, and even exclude the fact that hundreds of women were present, albeit outside the building, at the peace talks that led to the final, and so far successful agreement, the CPA, on August 18, 2003. Evidence of Change in International Community The lack of women at peace talks and the lack of a gendered analysis of war are fast being seen as an impediment to peace and stability. This change in perspective is similar to the change in thinking about development and poverty reduction efforts first identified by Esther Boserup.47 Just as countries are beginning to realize that womens development and empowerment are necessary for economic growth, they are also realizing the importance of women in peace processes as well. In the last decade alone, many at the UN, as well as world leaders, Human Rights advocates, NGOs, scholars, and certainly communities in conflict, have all come to realize the naivety and shortsightedness in excluding women from peace processes, and thus excluding their experiences, knowledge and perspective.

46 Ibid. 47 Ester Boserup, Women's Role in Economic Development (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971).

45 "Facts & Figures - Gender Issues: Women, War & Peace - UNIFEM." UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women. Accessed November 23, 2010. http://unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/facts_figures.php.

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Powerful figures in the international community and donor countries have begun to accept the importance of gender analysis and womens participation in peacebuilding efforts, as demonstrated by, among other things, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009). [1325 Recognizes] that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security[and] Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict(italics in original).48 Resolution 1325 was the precursor to 1820, 1888, and 1889. It laid the foundation for the recognition of women as part of peace and security issues in the first place and will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. Resolution 1820 is the first Security Council resolution to recognize sexual violence during conflict as an international security concern. Resolution 1820, Demands the immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians with immediate effectDemands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence Notes that rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes(Italics in original).49 Resolutions 1888 and 1889 strengthen 1820 and 1325 respectively. 1888 calls for the creation of a Special Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in times and Conflict, currently being held by Wallstrm as noted above. It also mandates the rapid deployment of teams of experts to situations of concern, and the inclusion of sexual violence in peace negotiations. Resolution 1889 is a follow-up to 1325.

48 S/RES/1325 (2000) 49 S/RES/1820 (2008), pg, 2-3

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[1889] calls for the UN Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of SCR 1325. It also calls for the strengthening of national and international responses to the needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings.50 Perhaps the best example of the change in perspective on sexually-based violence in times of war is the new stance taken by the Security Council and the UN as a whole. Although mass rape has been considered a war crime under international law since the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it has never received the same level of attention and effort to prevent and punish it as other war crimes. In September 2010 the Security Council called for a meeting exclusively to discuss rape in the DRC. This is an unprecedented event and a clear sign that systematic rape during conflict is now considered an international issue. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been on the forefront of ending impunity for the use of systematic rape during conflict and systematic sexual violence is considered a Crime Against Humanity in its statute. Defendants from the four situations/countries before the court Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic, and Darfur, Sudan have all been indicted on charges of sexually-based violence and other Crimes Against Humanity. Official statements both against rape as a tactic of war, and for womens participation in the peace process from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and other international figures are becoming more common. Clintons official message was amplified by an Op-Ed piece published for People.com, stating, The United States condemns these attacks and all those who commit them and abet them. They are crimes against humanity. These acts don't just harm a single individual, or a single family, or village, or group. They shred the fabric that weaves us together as human beings. Such atrocities have no place in any society.

50 "Resolutions & Instruments - Gender Issues: Women, War & Peace - UNIFEM." UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women. Accessed November 23, 2010. http://unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/resolutions_instruments.php.

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This truly is humanity at its worst.51 Donor countries and human rights organizations have also begun recognizing and investing in womens involvement in peace processes and gender analysis. The Nordic countries have been at the forefront of these efforts with the U.S. and Canada not far behind. As early as 1991, Amnesty International began to consider sexually-based violence a severe human rights violation and thus, if not addressed, an undermining factor in ending conflict and maintaining stability. Human Rights Watch includes sexual-based human rights violations in its country reports and has done extensive research and reporting on such violence in times of conflict and unrest, most recently in the DRC and Haiti. In sum, women, whether its because they are naturally more peaceful, or because they have been excluded from the spoils of war, have become not only visible, but vital actors in peace and security efforts. Nowhere is this more true than in Liberia. Their unique perspective of war, and their exclusion from existing political structures is finally being acknowledged as an asset. And although there are still high levels of sexual violence in conflict areas, human rights violations against women are regularly being reported and denounced. The gender differences between men and women, and the way those differences influence conflict, are also being recognized. These changes within the international community can be attributed to women peace activists and Feminist IR, Gender Studies, and Peace scholars in the last 20 to 30 years. The international community has recognized that past peace processes that exclude women, like the many peace talks in Liberia, rarely end in success.

51 "Hillary Clinton Pledges to 'Banish Sexual Violence' - Good Deeds, Hillary Rodham Clinton : People.com." People.com : The #1 Celebrity Site for Breaking News, Celebrity Pictures and Star Style. August 21, 2009. Accessed November 23, 2010. http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20299698,00.html.

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Political History of Liberia and Background of Conflict The Liberian Civil war was very complicated and involved many different fighting factions and regional actors. The exact causes of the war are open to much debate, but many believe Liberias unique start as a nation laid the foundation for future conflict. The exacerbation and extension of the war over 14 years and 17 different peace agreements is often blamed on the lack of international involvement and the mismanagement of regional actors. This chapter will give a brief historical account of Liberia in order to give a context to the civil war and the many peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2003. It will focus on the missteps and failures of ECOWAS and international leaders between the start of the war in 1989 and the election of Charles Taylor in 1997. Then it will look at the Taylor administration between 1997 and 2003, analyzing the key mistakes made by Taylor and the change in international and regional opinion that led to his exile and subsequent arrest. Lastly, the final peace process in the summer of 2003 and the transitional government from 2003 to 2006 will be examined. Under any comparison, the level of international support and involvement during and after the CPA dwarfs any international support during the first 15 peace agreements. The missteps by ECOWAS and the international community include, failing to understand the manipulation of ethnic tension by both Samuel Doe and Taylor as a major factor in continued violence. ECOWAS failure to recognize problems in previous peace agreements and to continue using the same failed formula- poorly executed cease-fire, short-term transitional government, followed by rushed elections allowed Taylor to develop his own strategy around the anticipated weaknesses in the peace agreements. He was essentially able to agree to one cease-fire after another, wait until fighting had died down, and then strike again. The second misstep, and one that had grave international consequences, was the fact that neither ECOWAS

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nor the international community attempted to restrain the illegal economy, particularly the diamond trade, during the first part of the war. Taylor and other warlords were able to amass huge amounts of illegal arms that flooded the market after the collapse of the cold war. This availability of arms, combined with illegal diamond trading, has been cited as a serious and exacerbating factor in Liberia, as well as other African wars. Because Taylor had control of most of the country, much of the efforts of ECOWAS and government officials in Monrovia were futile. He was able to use diamonds and fire power to maintain his de facto rule and stall one peace agreement after another until he could gain enough power to officially become president. The Security Council and international community in general shares blame in the prolonged Liberian conflict as well. By allowing ECOWAS to command a peacekeeping effort, the Security Council failed to recognize the broad regional destabilization that the Liberia conflict would incite. It also failed to recognize the devastating effects of the illegal diamond trade on the region, and the international dimensions of this trade. Finally, by failing to incorporate civil society groups, gender analysis, and womens involvement in any of the 15 peace agreements, ECOWAS relied solely on warlords to advocate for peace. Peace agreements were created and agreed to by warlords and for warlords. The agreements did not include an understanding of the human toll of the conflict or the experience of women and girls. Instead, ECOWAS offered narrow, and consequently failed, agreements and solutions that did not address the many complex factors in the conflict. Liberia: A Foundation of Profound Contradictions The roots of the Liberian conflict can be traced back to the unique history of Liberia and the way it became the first African Republic. The fact that the first settlers, or colonizers, were

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all of African, not European descent, led to a complicated postcolonial and colonial narrative. This unique beginning laid the foundation for the extreme inequality and exclusion that precipitated Does bloody coup in 1979. Ikechi MgBeoji analyzes the creation of Liberia, first as a settlement community in 1820, then as a U.S, colony in 1837, and then its own republic in 1847, as a process fueled by racism and uncertainty in the U.S. and imperialistic desires on the part of the freed slaves who settled on the shores of West Africa.52 Mary H. Moran echoes much of MgBeojis analysis, The country was literally the philanthropic project of a private, white, benevolent organization founded in 1816, by the American Colonization Society.53 Moran also examines the makeup of the roughly 13,000 early settlers, tracing the different groups that later became known as AmericoLiberians. About a quarter of them had been born free in the United States, others were emancipated from slavery on the condition that they emigrate to Africa, and almost half were recaptive Africans taken from impounded slave ships before they ever crossed the Atlantic. 54 Americo-Liberians only make up about five percent of the Liberian population today. MgBeoji describes Liberia as a political pawn from its very inception between the United States and Europe. In every aspect of governance and attitude, the settlers internalized the racist and imperialistic views held by Europe and the United States about Africa, treating the native Africans in Liberia as lower than themselves. This is distinctly apparent in the constitution of the country and the power structure that was created by the settler elite. MgBeoji writes, The young state of Liberiablindly copied foreign norms, structures, and prescriptions on governance. For example, the mode of governance in the young republic was uncritically tailored after that of the US. Its Declaration of Independence read like the American Declaration of Independence. And, as in

52 MgBeoji. 2003. Pg. 4 54 Ibid. 53 Moran, Mary H. Liberia the Violence of Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. Pg. 2

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the American original, no native or indigenous Liberian was signatory to the all-important document. The republics constitution defined Liberians as originally the inhabitants of the United States of America. To complete the ludicrous acceptance of everything American, its motto reads, The love of liberty brought us here. In effect, the African natives originally inhabiting the Liberian geographical and cultural space who were not the former inhabitants of the United States were deemed not to be Liberians.55 Continuing in the colonizing mentality of their constitution, Americo-Liberians maintained one party rule under the True Whig Party from 1847 to 1979, effectively excluding Ethnic Liberians from voting, education, and economic opportunities up through the 1940s. Despite significant improvements at inclusion made by President William V.S. Tubman during his presidency from 1944 to 1971, and weak attempts by President William Tolbert between 1971 and 1979, rampant inequality still existed. Unrest within Liberia and calls for more equality between Americo and Ethnic Liberians became much stronger during the 1970s. There was growing unrest among the college-educated Ethnic Liberians for an end to one party rule and the meaningful inclusion of Ethnic Liberians in government. Groups such as The Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL) and The Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) were holding student strikes, public meetings, and marches throughout the 1970s. The severe economic crisis that started in 1975 due to a drop in international prices of chief exports, iron ore and rubber, encouraged non-educated Ethnic Liberians to join the student groups calling for reform.56 This crisis came to a head when Tolbert proposed an almost 50 percent increase in the price of rice, the food staple of the country. This proposal incited a massive demonstration deemed the Rice Riots on April 14, 1979. Police fired into the crowd of 2000 causing the crowd to start looting and rioting, ending in 40 casualties and 400 wounded.

55 MgBeoji. 2003. pg. 5 56 Adebajo. 2002. Pg. 22

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Tolbert decided against enacting the proposed price increase, but he did further enrage the public and student protesters by imprisoning 33 PAL leaders and suspending Habeas Corpus. Between the student protests and economic challenges, Tolberts party appeared weakened and out of touch. The final blow to Tolberts rule did not come from the students however; it came from an unexpected military coup led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe. There was tension within the military between Americo and Ethnic Liberians as the officers corps was almost exclusively made up of Americo-Liberians. This tension, combined with anger over unequal wage increases and political identification with PAL and MOJA, provided the backdrop for the April 12, 1980 coup. Master Sergeant Doe, then 28 years old, and 16 other soldiers of various ranks stormed the Executive Mansion in Monrovia and brutally assassinated Tolbert and 26 others. On the 22nd of April the execution of 13 more True Whig senior officials was televised. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Minister of Finance in Tolberts administration, was the only senior official spared. Doe immediately released the PAL prisoners and incorporated members of both PAL and MOJA, and even a few of Tolberts former ministers into his administration, dubbed the Peoples Redemption Council. Adekeye Adebajo explains that neither Doe, nor any of his fellow soldiers had a high school education or any political experience. He writes, The early Doe regime was a marriage of convenience that harnessed the brawn of the soldiers to the brain of the politicians.57 Unbeknownst to the Liberian public or Does early political partners, this marriage of convenience would become a marriage of force and persecution as Doe became increasingly ruthless and power hungry, quickly turning on his previous supporters and leaders in neighboring countries.

57 Ibid. pg. 25

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Causes of the Civil War: Complex, Interdependent, and Competing Although the civil war did not start until 1989, the recklessness and ruthless tactics used by Doe to remain in power are often cited as direct causes to the war. Adebajo identifies six related causes to the civil war, many of which focus on Doe: The exclusionary rule of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy; the brutal and inept rule of Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe; the deleterious effect that Does misrule had on the Armed Forces of Liberia; the ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from this rule; the subregional tensions and rivalries that resulted from Does bloody rise to power; and the destabilizing effect of the sudden withdrawal of the U.S. support for Doe, a strategic Cold War ally.58 Interestingly, Adebajos mention of ethnic tensions is only in the context of Does administration and the way these tensions were exacerbated, not as a main factor in the civil war. Instead Adebajo cites inequality, brutality, and regional and bilateral relations between the United States and Liberia as major factors in the civil war. MgBeoji describes Doe as having a penchant for bloodshed citing that no fewer than 200 persons were killed in the first three days.59 Furthermore, these killings were done without any trial or legal representation. MgBeoji describes the especially gruesome killing of the thirteen senior officials previously mentioned, The procedure adopted in their hasty trial and execution did not have any redeeming qualitiesin spite of weak and sputtering international protests, [they] were executed in a gross and sadistic manner: tied to stakes and without blindfolds, they were machine-gunned to death before a gleeful crowd.60 Within Liberia there was initial glee, even described as a carnival atmosphere immediately following Does ascendance to power, especially among the Ethnic Liberians who had suffered so long under the True Whig oligarchy. West African leaders, however, were

58 Ibid .Pg. 19 60 Ibid. 59 MgBeoji, 2005. pgs. 12 and 13.

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deeply concerned about Does brutal tactics. They rejected him as a legitimate leader and some harbored personal dislike and ill will towards him.61 This rejection was exemplified by the refusal of the Liberian delegation to both the special session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)62 Council of Ministers and the ECOWAS Summit in 1980. Although the rejection by regional actors was bruising to Doe, the internal problems within his administration and the economy of Liberia were more pronounced. The weak alliance between student activists, former ministers, and uneducated soldiers quickly fell apart. Only two of the 17 original participants of the coup were alive and in Liberia in 1991.63 Members of both PAL and MOJA had either been imprisoned, executed, exiled, and in some cases a combination of all three. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights states that Doe had already killed more than 50 different rivals by 1985.64 Instead of embracing the student activist ideals of African Socialism or more equal political representation that motivated Doe to take power, he built a regime out of repressive tactics and ethnic violence. Doe appointed members of his tribe, the Krahn, to his cabinet, and brutally repressed both the students that influenced his grab for power, and members of different ethnic tribes that he deemed to be in opposition to his administration. Although the Krahn tribe only made up five percent of the Liberian population, they constituted 31 percent of Does government officer positions. Doe also placed Krahns in leadership positions in the state military, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), thus the repression inflicted by the AFL took on a markedly ethnic tone. The most blatant ethnic violence perpetuated by Doe and the AFL was its reaction to a foiled coup plot against him, initiated by General Thomas Quiwonkpa, a member of

61 Ibid. 62NowcalledtheAfricanUnion(AU). 63 Ibid. pg. 16 64 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Promise Betrayed. 1986. Pg. 7

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the Gio tribe. Not only was Quiwonkpa brutally tortured and executed, but the AFL was purged of any Gio members, and the county where Quiwonkpa was from was horrifically punished. Adebajo writes, Does Krahn-dominated soldiers went on a rampage in Nimba County, indiscriminately killing a reported 3000 Gios and Manos and burning their villages.65 Terrence Lyons describes another telling act of ethnic violence perpetrated by Doe that was the precursor to regional involvement in Liberia. Lyons writes, Chaos in the capital- with widespread looting, ethnic killing, and in one particularly indelible incident, the murder of 600 displaced persons under Red Cross protection in a Lutheran Church by the AFL- convinced Liberias neighbors in [ECOWAS] to act.66 Liberian Civil War 1989-1997 Doe unwittingly strengthened his already numerous regional enemies by providing them with ready armies of repressed ethnic groups seeking vengeance along their borders. Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote d Ivoire all participated in Does demise by providing amnesty to exiled members of his cabinet and turning a blind eye to the stockpiling of weapons and military plotting that was happening within and along Liberian borders, especially its border with Cote d Ivoire. These regional tensions helped lay the political fault lines that characterized ECOWAS involvement and repeated failures in the 1990s. These tensions were also the breeding grounds of Charles Taylors rise to power and the further destruction and chaos within Liberia. Taylor entered Nimba County on Christmas Eve 1989 from Cote d Ivoire, leading the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The core of the NPFL included Libyan-trained soldiers, supplemented by adventurers, professional revolutionaries, and mercenaries from across

65 Adebajo. 2002. pg. 30 66 Lyons. 1999. pg. 23

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West Africa.67 These core soldiers were matched by fighters from Nimba County, still seething from the killing and damage perpetrated by Doe and the AFL. This insurgent force advanced rapidly and reached the outskirts of Monrovia by July 1990.68 In reaction to Charles Taylor and the NPFL, as well as the regional refugee crisis spawned by conflict within Liberia, ECOWAS created the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Lyons writes, African leaders insisted on handling the crisis regionally and opposed attempts to place the Liberian crisis in the United Nations Security Council agenda (much to the relief of the United States and other members of the Security Council who did not want to engage in the difficult issue).69 In an unprecedented move, ECOWAS petitioned the Security Council, to allow peacekeepers and the commencement of peace talks, in Liberia. Instead of taking account of the international security threat Liberia presented, the Security Council agreed to a regional strategy. It is widely held that Nigeria wanted to present itself as the powerhouse of the region by taking charge of peacekeeping efforts within ECOMOG. Although Nigeria was the largest and most economically viable country in the region, it was unprepared for the task. Longstanding disagreements between leaders in Liberia and Nigeria immediately cast doubt on the success of ECOMOG. Nigerias motives within ECOMOG remained an issue in each of the 15 different peace talks initiated by ECOWAS in the 1990s. Furthermore, because ECOWAS was a regional economic community, not a peacekeeping community, it misread much of the violence within Liberia and greatly discounted the power that warlords had within the region, particularly Charles Taylor.

67 Ibid. Pg. 22 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. pg. 23

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In August 1989, ECOMOG forces landed in the port of Monrovia but were attacked by NPFL forces before they could reach the center of the city. Shortly after this defeat, ECOWAS sponsored its first round of peace talks in Banjul, Gambia. These talks included many of the future mistakes that ECOWAS would repeat: Short-lived transitional governments, accelerated timelines for elections, and a lack of overall resources to ensure the safety of Liberians and the success of the agreements. The Banjul talks were a premonition of what would become a regular pattern. Taylor refused to participate, reasoning that ECOWAS was not a neutral party. The peace talks continued without Taylor and former member of MOJA, Amos Sawyer, was selected to head an interim government, with elections called for in 12 months. By September 1989, a breakaway faction of the NPFL headed by Yormie Johnson had assassinated Doe, but his removal as president did not encourage any sense of peace and stability as Taylor, Johnson, and ECOWAS-backed Sawyer all became potential candidates. In 1990, ECOMOG began a campaign that drove Taylor out of Monrovia, but left him controlling about 80 percent of the country, an unsettling and incomplete success to say the least. In November 1990, Taylor agreed to the 2nd round of peace talks, the Bamako Agreement. This agreement instituted a cease-fire and uneasy peace between the Sawyer-led Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) in Monrovia, and the Taylor-led NPFL ruling the remainder of the country. The Bamako Agreement also called for general elections in 12 months. Possibilities for negotiations and/ or additional peace talks were grim, as Neither government recognized the other. ECOMOG could not defeat the NPFL, and Taylor would not accept the ECOWAS-created IGNU as a framework for a transitional government.70 The elections never took place and the third round of unsuccessful talks were started, this time in February 1991 in Lome, Togo. These were

70 Ibid. pg. 25

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followed by a series of four talks between June and October 1991 in Yammoussoukro, Cote dIvoire, ending with the Yammoussoukro Agreement. Despite being the most developed agreement brokered by ECOWAS thus far, it too was unsuccessful. The agreement called for the disarmament and cease-fire of NPFL and AFL forces and set a date for a general election in spring 1992. ECOWAS did not take into account however, that neither forces intended to disarm. Taylor was using the peace talks and cease-fires to strategize new attacks and gain more wealth and power through the illicit trading of diamonds, rubber, and timber. Other fighting factions began to emerge, further complicating the talks. The strongest was the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). Disagreement within ECOWAS also problematized the Yammoussoukro Agreement, as Nigeria and Sierra Leone wanted to defeat the NPFL, and Cote dIvoire and Burkina Faso supported Taylor. During this time, the United States, which had been previously absent despite its longstanding diplomatic relations with Liberia, put pressure on Senegal to send a military contingent to Liberia. Meanwhile, ULIMO was gaining strength and operating out of bases in Sierra Leone. The entire region became embroiled in the civil war and hopes for the Yammoussoukro Agreement or any kind of cease-fire diminished. After an especially bloody offensive by Taylor for Monrovia in October 1992 was barely thwarted by a combination of AFL, ULIMO, and ECOMOG forces, criticism of all parties, and particularly the political alliances within ECOWAS began to be heard throughout the region and international community. The civil war and ineffective peace talks dragged on. Taylor was getting even richer and Nigeria was exerting itself as a regional power, all the while Liberians and communities along the borders were suffering.

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The UN sponsored another set of talks in Geneva, and then another in Benin in July 1993, culminating in the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. The agreement was more comprehensive and called for a collective transitional government, headed by leaders from each faction, the NPFL, ULIMO, and IGNU. Elections were to take place in seven months. The UN became involved because of doubts of Nigerian neutrality and Taylors refusal to disarm to ECOMOG because it was majority Nigerian. Under the Cotonou Agreement ECOMOG and the UN shared the supervision and monitoring of the transition and disarmament and the UN established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in September 1993. The Cotonou Agreement failed in mid-1994, as did the Akosomobo Agreement in 1994 and the first Abuja Agreement in 1995. A free for all and even more chaotic environment seemed to take over Liberia due to the many failed peace agreements and a proliferation of fighting factions. Some of the bloodiest times in the civil war occurred after the first failed Abuja Agreement, especially the infamous battle between NPFL, AFL, and ULIMO forces on April 6, 1996 that destroyed any remaining civil institution within Monrovia. The UN Secretary General at the time wrote, It can safely be stated that all humanitarian organizations, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, UNOMIL, and government offices, as well as shops and commercial establishments, were systematically looted by fighters of all factions.71 Recognizing their defeat, ECOWAS, and particularly the new Nigerian President, Sani Abacha, developed a new strategy, geared towards elections and an official end to ECOMOG. The 15th agreement, the Abuja II Accords, signed by Taylor and the leaders from the other armed factions in August 1996 called for a similar pattern of cease-fire, disarmament, and elections as the other agreements, but differed in two strategic ways: (1) It threatened sanctions

71 Ibid. pg. 35

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to any leader who violated the cease-fire; and (2) prohibited any leader that violated the agreement from later running for office. ECOMOG was able to finally secure order in the country and enforce the cease-fire. Its success is attributed to the following policies: the increase of troops to 12,000, the incorporation of Ivoirian and Burkina Faso troops as peacekeepers, the closing of borders between Sierra Leone and Cote dIvoire, thus effectively preventing some of Taylors lucrative illegal trading, and changing command in ECOMOG. The new ECOMOG leader, Major General Victor Malu, instituted respect and professionalism among troops in an effort to stem the human rights violations and looting that characterized actions of every Liberian armed faction, including ECOMOG units from 1989 to 1996. The first female African head of state, Ruth Perry, served as the chair of the Liberian Council of State, overseeing the transitional government and preparing the country for the elections in1997. All of these factors contributed to the election of Charles Taylor in 1997, finally giving him the official power he craved, and allowing ECOWAS and the international community to feel that some success had been made. Taylor was fairly elected, although it must be noted that he owned all the television stations and many of the radio stations, giving his campaign an important edge. Liberians also knew how powerful he was, as most of them had already been living under his rule for years. They also knew that he was ruthless and would do anything for power. The often cited campaign slogan, He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa; still I will vote for him reveals the grim choice faced by Liberians. Vote for change and a chance at genuine democracy at the risk of more violence, or vote for the man who will take power any way he can.72 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was the runner up against Taylor. Even though Sirleaf had popular support, Liberians knew that there was no way for her to defend the country against Taylor.

72 Moran. 2008. pg. 106

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The election of Taylor did indeed bring one of the longest stretches of peace to Liberia in almost ten years. But Taylor quickly revealed himself by persecuting old enemies and instituting authoritarian policies. The next chapter of Liberias civil war was already in the making. Taylor as President, Warlordism Prevails The Taylor administration conducted itself in much the same way as the Taylor-led NPFL. Cruel tactics, a reliance on brute force, rampant human rights abuses, and paternalism continued despite an official end to the civil war in 1997. The TRC offers a scathing assessment of Taylors presidency: Taylors rule signaled the continuation of authoritarian rule in Liberia leaving behind a legacy of poor governance, administrative malfeasance, corruption, intimidation and intolerance of opposition, threats, torture, terroristic acts against the population and summary executions reminiscence of his predecessor, President Samuel K Doe.73 Taylor made policy blunders in three key areas that evaporated international, regional, and national support for his regime, as well as fanned the fire of another civil war and regional violence. The three areas are: initiating brutal attacks, imprisonment, and censorship against anyone who opposed or criticized him; failing to integrate different tribal groups into the military and failing to disarm and demobilize members of the NPFL, a direct violation of past peace agreements; and supporting rebel groups in neighboring states and escalating regional violence. Many of the mistakes he made were a continuation of ethnic favoritism and political repression that characterized both the Doe and past True Whig administrations. Taylor also continued to treat Liberias natural resources as his personal bank account even as the Liberian economy grew weaker and weaker. Liberians were poorer in 2003 than they were in the 1990s, leading The Economist to name Liberia as the worst place to live in the world in 2003.
73 TRC. 2009. Pg. 167

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Taylor became president on July 19, 1997 and quickly moved himself into the Executive Mansion. By November 1997, he was showing his true colors. Adebajo, the TRC, and others identify the assassination of Sam Dokie and his family as the turning point in Taylors administration. Though Taylor first embarked on a policy of national reconciliation, even inviting members or rival parties into his cabinet, he soon cracked down on opposition and attempted to institutionalize his dominance. Former Taylor ally and (and later opponent) Sam Dokie and members of his family were murdered in November 1997 after being arrested by Taylors security forces. The suspects were acquitted in April 1998 as a result of an apparent lack of evidence.74 The Dokie family was captured at a checkpoint by the SSS, Taylors secret security force, and their charred remains were later found in their car.75 This assassination was a symbolic and literal show of force that opposition would not be tolerated. Despite the strong message sent by Taylor, opposition continued to emerge, forcing Taylor to enact increasingly violent and autocratic methods to suppress them. The TRC reports that, by April 1998 the political climate in Liberia became tense due to a string of extra judicial killings, and notes that Taylor began to actively go against past peace agreements and international human rights standards.76 The cruel and public assault on Roosevelt Johnson, the only warlord from an opposing faction that stayed in Liberia after Taylors election, was a catalyzing moment for both armed opposition groups against Taylor, and members of the international community who had reservations about Taylors authority. John Peter-Pham describes the organized attack, On September 18, 1998, security forces in the capital conducted a military assault, codenamed Operation Camp Johnson Road, against Johnson himself. Hundreds of SSS officers and members of the police Special Task Force, joined by scores of
74 Adebajo.2002. pg. 232
75 Johnson Sirleaf. 2009. pg. 225 76 TRC. 2009. 161

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fighters from Taylors NPFL faction opened fire on Johnsons Monrovia compound with automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and mortars. Although Johnson managed to escape Liberia, U.S. diplomats reported that as many as three hundred civilians, most of them Krahns, many of them women and children, were killed in the seventeen hour gun battle and in subsequent house to house searches and summary executions by government forces.77 The TRC description of the attack differs from Peter-Phams, reporting that 53 to 100 citizens were killed on September 18th during the attack, and an additional 1500 were killed in the aftermath of the attack.78 Despite a difference in reported numbers of people killed, it is clear that an entire neighborhood and ethnic community was terrorized by an organized, military attack. The attack was no doubt designed to capture Johnson, but also to intimidate and eradicate any of his potential supporters. The TRC reports nine other instances of ethnically and politically motivated executions between 1997 and 2003, each instance involving between one to one hundred victims, as well as a mass grave that was found in Lofa County in 1998.79 These assassinations were committed in a larger backdrop of violence and chaos, as Taylors forces continued to terrorize, loot, and rape fellow Liberians. In addition to the egregious human rights abuses against potential opponents, Taylor quickly began to crack down on journalists and human rights groups. By 2001 he had shut down or limited all independent or foreign news organizations, leaving only the government news organizations and Taylors personal radio network as the sources available to most Liberians. In March 2000 four newspapers were closed down. In 2001, several journalists were arrested and the Center for Democracy and Empowerment was vandalized by 300 armed men, forcing the directors Amos Sawyer and Commany Wesseh, into exile. 80

77 Peter-Pham. 2004. pg. 178 78 TRC. 2009 165 79 Ibid. 164-165 80 Adebajo. 2002. 233

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In 2002 there was a string of imprisonments and disappearances, and one assassination, against journalists and human rights proponents. Human rights lawyer Taiwan Gangloe and journalist Hassan Bility disappeared into custody in early 2002. Frances Johnson Morris was arrested after presenting a paper in public that criticized Taylors declaration of a state of emergency. Henry Cooper, a ranking official of the Unity Party, was taken into custody at the same time as Johnson Morris. His body was later found riddled with bullet holes.81 Taylor would go to any lengths to intimidate or remove critics and opponents. One instance mentioned above, the imprisonment of Frances Johnson Morris, keenly exhibits the underlying sexual intimidation and violence that female critics and opponents faced. The TRC reports On February 22, 2002, the Director of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Cllr. Frances Johnson Morris, was arrested at her offices and imprisoned in a criminal male cell by Police Director, Paul E. Mulbah, under the guise of mistaken identity.82 Although there are no reports by Johnson Morris of physical or sexual assault, given the high instance of rape within Liberia as a whole, and the practice of sexual violence against numerous female prisoners during the first part of the war, the message of intimidation was clear. The refusal of Taylor to follow a number of requirements from past peace accords helped fuel ethnic tension and violent crime throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. These requirements include the use of UN and ECOMOG peacekeepers to restructure and train security forces and to specifically create ethnic balance within the AFL. Taylor refused to cooperate with ECOMOG to demobilize 35,000 ex-combatants and went as far as expelling ECOMOG troops from Liberia in 1998. Taylor also forced thousands of AFL soldiers to retire and filled their vacancies with former NPFL soldiers, creating a powerful state army to do his bidding. These

81 Peter-Pham. 2004. 179 82 TRC. 2009. Pg. 167

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soldiers were never properly trained and continued to use the same tactics of violence and looting against the civilian population, leading to an increase in violent crime.83 Adebajo describes Taylors behavior as especially disturbing. He writes, Taylor has created conditions for the mobilization of ethnic groups to protect their own people against a partisan army.84 Unraveling of International Support The dismissal of many of the mandates from the Abuja II Peace Accords irritated regional and international powers, but Taylors role in the persistent regional unrest throughout West Africa would be his ultimate undoing. Throughout Liberias civil war, conflicts were brewing along its borders and instability appeared to be contagious. The Sierra Leone civil war began in 1991 with Taylor as a principal financer of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Liberian forces and/ or finances were also involved in the skirmishes in Guinea and Cote dIvoire between 1999 and 2003. Contributing factors to the regional instability included the relatively porous borders between the countries that allowed fighting factions to regroup and plan attacks while hiding out in a neighboring country; rivalries between heads of state that helped fuel and finance rebel groups; massive refugee populations along the borders, some of whom had ties to fighting factions; and the destructive yet incredibly lucrative diamond trade. Conflict and misery were spreading rapidly, causing unrest among regional powers and generating greater international attention than the first half of the Liberian civil war. The sheer brutality of RUF tactics against civilians in Sierra Leone was a major factor in the increased focus on West Africa. Pictures of children with limbs cut off and reports of conflict diamonds surfaced in the late 1990s, helping to galvanize human rights groups and NGOs throughout the world to pressure the Security Council to enforce sanctions against the illegal diamond trade.

83 Ibid 84 Adebajo. 2002. pg. 235

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These sanctions would affect all involved in the conflict, naming Charles Taylor and many of his high level officials personally. Taylors relationship to Foday Saybana Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, began before the civil wars in Liberia or Sierra Leone. They both underwent military training together in Libya and had longstanding distrust and dislike of the head of state of Sierra Leone, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh. Taylor considered Momoh an enemy because of his cooperation with ECOMOG. During the early part of both civil wars, the RUF and NPFL took advantage of the illegal diamond trade and assisted each other in trading diamonds for arms. Once Taylor achieved legitimate power in 1997, he was able to assist the RUF diamond trade more effectively by exporting illegal Sierra Leonean diamonds as if they were from Liberia. Taylor then provided the RUF with arms that had been bought or traded with diamonds. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf believes that Taylors support of the RUF was the single biggest factor in [their] ability to continue waging war85 At the same time that fighting in Sierra Leone was dissipating, new fighting factions were emerging to challenge Taylor. In 1999 dissidents based in Guinea began to launch attacks against neighboring Liberian towns. Taylors allies in the RUF started fighting these groups, further entrenching the region in conflict. Meanwhile, other dissidents against Taylor were organizing themselves in Freetown, Sierra Leone. These dissidents came from previous fighting factions, as well as members of the AFL who had served under Doe. They called themselves Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). LURD moved their operation to Guinea in 2000 due to familial connections and support from Guinean president, General Lansan Cont. LURD fighters began their offensive in July 2000. Soon after, ethnic tension between

85 Johnson Sirleaf 2009. Pg. 224.

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LURD members caused yet another fighting faction to break off. This group, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, (MODEL), was still aligned with LURD against Taylor, but based their operations out of Cote dIvoire. This cross border fighting between Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cote dIvoire, and Liberia, quickly drew attention from the Security Council. On March 7, 2001, the Security Council passed Resolution 1343 placing an arms embargo on Liberia, prohibiting the sale of Liberian diamonds, and banning travel of senior members of the Liberian government and their wives, as well as any other individual involved in the illegal diamond trade with Sierra Leone. This resolution was continuously reaffirmed at 12month increments by the Security Council through 2003, despite resistance from Taylor. Taylor openly defied these sanctions and was the subject of even stronger sanctions in May 2003. This time the Security Council once again reaffirmed Resolution 1343, but strengthened it by adding a 10-month ban on the importation of timber and timber products from Liberia. It also reminded states to cease the arms trade to non-state actors, mentioning LURD specifically. The embargo of illegal diamonds is still in effect in Liberia. Taylors forces had grown weaker and less united during the second half of the war. Because of Taylors fear of coup attempts, he purposefully created multiple, small militarized groups instead of one standing army. None of these groups were very powerful and all of them lacked military training and discipline. The state armies, including the AFL, SSS, Special Operations Division (SOD) and the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), were increasingly underfunded, or not funded at all. Meanwhile, Taylor was relying more and more on militias, often made up of former RUF fighters.86 The weak troops under Taylor, combined with increasing pressure from sanctions and worsening economic conditions within Liberia, created a favorable situation

86 International Crisis Group, "Liberia Unraveling," 2003, Pgs. 4-5.

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for LURD and MODEL forces. By May 2003, over 60% of Liberia was under either LURD or MODEL control. Taylor was facing increasing pressure from the Security Council, ECOWAS, members of the African Union, human rights advocates, and the womens movement for peace to agree to peace talks with LURD and MODEL. The peace talks started in Accra, Ghana on June 4, 2003. The indictment from the Special Court for Sierra Leone against Taylor became unsealed that same day, indicting Taylor for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international law. After the announcement, Taylor made a strange and unexpected statement, If President Taylor is seen as the problem, then I will remove myself He then immediately left Ghana and flew back to Monrovia. Sirleaf describes the reaction of all those present at the peace talks. She and many others were skeptical that Taylor would actually remove himself from power, Taylors supporters were weeping and sobbing, while the African Heads of States were openly embarrassed and displeased by the timing of the indictment. 87 The peace talks continued without Taylor and dragged on for almost three months. Even though LURD and MODEL leaders attended the peace talks, many doubted their support. Both groups recognized Taylors weaknesses and launched an all out attack on Monrovia just 72 hours after he returned from Ghana, killing thousands and exacerbating an already massive refugee situation throughout the region. Despite the 16th peace agreement, a cease-fire signed by the different factions on June 17th, violence heightened in Liberia as LURD and MODEL leaders continued to delay a complete peace agreement. Former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, John Blaney, describes the reasons behind their stalling: With almost 1 million people starving inside the city, and Taylors forces weakening, they could see military victory within reach. The rebels intent was

87 Johnson Sirleaf, 2009. Pg. 238.

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not just to see Taylor relinquish power, but also to take Monrovia, seize power, and sack the city in the best 12thcentury meaning of the word.88 Indeed, LURD and MODEL leaders would continue stalling through August, hoping for victory and an end to any need for peace talks. It wasnt until August when WIPNET locked arms around the building, bringing international attention and pressure to the talks, did the UN warn that funding for the talks would stop if an agreement was not reached soon. Sirleaf describes the talks during June and July of 2003 as haphazardly ad hoc but notes a more serious demeanor in August.89At the same time that the peace talks started gaining momentum in Accra, international pressure and action were being mobilized on the ground in Liberia. Any international or regional support for Taylor had quickly vanished. African, international, and U.S. leaders made personal appeals to Taylor to leave Liberia. In late June 2003 George W. Bush publicly stated, President Taylor needs to step down so that his country can be spared further bloodshed, and said that the U.S. was determined to help Liberia find peace.90 On August 4th the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peacekeeping force landed in Monrovia. Unlike the many ECOWAS interventions before it, this peacekeeping effort was sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 1497, and was to [establish] conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities.91 The peacekeepers were greeted on the streets of Monrovia by thousands of Liberians chanting WIPNETs message, We want peace! No more war! On August 11, 2003, Taylor accepted the offer for exile from Nigerian president, Olusengun Obansanjo, and finally stepped down as president. His vice

10. Pg. 102. 89 Johnson Sirleaf. 2009. pg. 239-240. 90 "President Bush Outlines His Agenda for U.S. - African Relations." Welcome to the White House. Accessed December 11, 2010. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-2.html. 91 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1497. 2003.

88 Blaney, John W. "Lessons from Liberias Success Thoughts on Leadership, the Process of Peace, Security, and Justice." Prism 1, no. 2, 101-

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president, Moses Blah briefly took over the presidency while the details of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and transitional government were being finalized. The CPA divided the government up between the various fighting factions, giving each faction enough resources and power to satisfy them, but not enough to have complete control. Sirleaf describes backroom politicking and a says, a great deal of money changed handsmoney that came from all quarters but especially from businesspeople92 The CPA was not perfect, but it was much stronger and more successful in many ways than the 16 agreements before it. Gyude Bryant, a civil servant that had stayed in Liberia throughout the civil war, became the interim president. Representatives from the fighting factions were represented in all parts of the government in order to ensure balance. The CPA also mandated ethnic balance in the security sector and both ethnic and gender balance throughout the transitional government. The mandate of gender balance was unprecedented in a peace agreement and transitional government of any kind. It will be discussed further in the next chapter. The United States

played an extensive role in training and restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia and the National Police. Recognizing that the security forces of Liberia had been routinely used against Liberian civilians, the CPA also mandated that the United Nations Civil Police replace the National Police during the transitional government period and until the National Police could be restructured and retrained. The CPA also called for general elections in two years, double or quadruple the timeline for elections compared to previous peace agreements, and stipulated that high level members of the transitional government could not run for election in 2005. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was asked to join the autonomous Governance Reform Commission charged with promoting support of good governance in Liberia.

92 Johnson Sirleaf 2009. Pg. 241.

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Perhaps the most meaningful change in the international community was the direct involvement of the UN. By December 2003, the UN Mission of Liberia (UNMIL) was fully deployed with a staff of over 15,000. The previous UN Observer Mission (UNOMIL) had a staff of less than 1,000.93 The UNs first focus was on the disarmament and demobilization of the many tens of thousands of combatants throughout Liberia. Considering the attitudes of LURD and MODEL leaders and the many failed peace agreement before, peace was not a guarantee. Ambassador Blaney writes that the U.S. and international community were worried that LURD and MODEL forces would start fighting each other once Taylor left the country.94 The UN Mission was a major source of stability and aid throughout the transition period and continues to be active today. Its current mandate is through September 2011 and it still maintains a staff of about 14,000. The last peace agreement was successful at ending and preventing conflict because it allowed the UN, not just ECOWAS, to run, monitor, and enforce the agreement. The international community used the resources, laws, and bodies availablesanctions, diplomacy, criminal tribunals, peacekeeping forces, etc.to remove Taylor from the region and institute a transitional government, therefore paving the way for democratic elections and reconstruction efforts. The international community is not alone though. At every step of the way the Liberian womens movement for peace has been influencing, supporting, and monitoring these efforts.

94 Blaney. Pg. 102.

93 "UNOMIL." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. Accessed December 12, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomilF.html.

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Women as Peacemakers and Peacekeepers Much of the support behind gender analysis of peace and post-conflict processes, and an emphasis on women, found in the international community is due to decades of organizing by women all over the world. This organizing directly influenced the passing of Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, and 1889. Other accomplishments of the international womens and human rights movements include the Millennium Development Goals; the conviction of rape as a war crime in the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY); the creation of the International Criminal Court and its progressive stance on sexual violence; the emerging norm of Human Security; and most recently, the creation of UN Women. Particularly evident in the last 15 years, is the acceptance that crimes against women are human rights violations, and that as human rights violations, they undermine the security of entire communities. Another concept that has been accepted and codified by the international community is that women have an important role in economic development and health issues throughout the world. The Millennium Development Goals, and statements by both former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and current Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, are a clear indication that the UN believes womens economic development and improved health conditions will dramatically improve economic and health conditions throughout the world. The concept of Human Security has influenced a change in peacekeeping and postconflict operations by focusing on individual security, particularly womens, and holistic approaches to security, including food, water, and economic security. Human Security seeks to prevent the follies of previous peacekeeping operations. By focusing solely on disarmament, peacekeeping operations were often blind to the many different security threats present in postconflict situations.

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Discussing all the normative changes within the international community in the last two decades will not be covered here. But one thing is clear, recent initiatives and steps taken by the UN, donor countries, and many NGOs, all include, or look to women as a prominent part of the solution for the worlds worst problems: poverty, war, epidemics, illiteracy, etc. Peacekeeping and post-conflict efforts are no different. Women are now seen as an integral and important part in the effort to maintain peace and stability in post-conflict situations. Yet, there is still much to be done. Although the important role of women is understood, it is rarely put into practice. Women often play a large role in influencing and promoting peace, yet they are almost completely absent in the peace talks themselves. They are also often absent from post-conflict efforts, both literally, as in absent from decision-making positions, and conceptually, as many post-conflict operations and policies exclude womens experiences and needs. Liberia is an example of what post-conflict and peacekeeping operations can look like when womens involvement, needs, and experiences are put into action. The action, however, was not always welcome, as Liberian women activists often took it upon themselves to ensure peace and stability when the international community fell short. But what is it that women, and womens organizing can contribute to peace, specifically lasting peace? Furthermore, what makes Liberian women an important part of the peace process, and a key factor in the lasting peace and stability over the last seven years? This chapter will discuss why women are so important in peace and post-conflict processes, and specifically what actions Liberian women and the international community have taken to make women indispensable in peace and development efforts. First this chapter will discuss how gender analysis has led to more comprehensive and ultimately more successful peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. Then it will analyze

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trends among African womens organizations that help explain why women have been stronger advocates for peace than men throughout the continent. It will briefly examine Liberian womens groups during the first part of the war and will also focus on Liberian womens experience of war in order to better understand the urgency and passion behind the emergence of WIPNET. It will then highlight policies within the transitional government and the Sirleaf administration that have included gender analysis and an understanding of womens experiences. Lastly, policies from donor countries as well as NGOs that have included gender analysis and womens involvement will be examined. These policies have helped maintain peace and stability, owing much of their success to the initial push for peace by the courageous women of Liberia. Gender Analysis in Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Operations Gender analysis contributes to the peace process by forcing a broader definition of peace and what it takes to reach and maintain peace. A cease-fire can no longer indicate peace when widespread violence against women continues. In fact, many women report that rapes and domestic violence increase after conflict has ended. A peace process that deems women invisible would not detect this thinly veiled violence and unrest throughout a region, yet by not detecting and addressing it, human rights abuses against female citizens will continue to undermine peace and security efforts. The view of peace as the absence of war, often referred to as negative peace, that predominated peacekeeping processes through the 1990s, and was certainly the dominant theory behind peacekeeping efforts in Liberia until 2003, failed to see persistent areas of insecurity, or potential insecurity, beyond disarmament. Gender analysis helps bring some of these pockets of insecurity into focus.

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When high levels of rape continue, entire communities are on edge, fueling fear and distrust and undermining peacekeeping efforts. The social unrest caused by rape is often further compounded by the social ostracization experienced by rape survivors and the many children born from rape during long periods of conflict. These women and children cannot easily rejoin their families and communities, just as child soldiers cannot often go back to the lives they led before war. They cannot easily go back to a way of life predicated upon cultural hierarchies and norms, especially strict gender normsnorms that were cruelly manipulated and upended during years of conflict. This struggle is most apparent among female child soldiers. Female child soldiers were recruited for combat the same way as boys were, but many also became bush wives, forced to fulfill both the domestic and sexual needs of male combatants. Some reports of child soldiers in Liberia estimate that up to 20 percent were girls and show that these young women have not been able to rejoin their families in nearly the same levels as former male child soldiers.95 Supposedly gender blind peacekeeping efforts often fail to see women and girls at all, failing to see their social marginalization or the human rights violations perpetrated against them. By failing to see, or outright ignoring the experiences of women and girls, and failing to understand the gender implications of war, peacekeeping efforts fail to understand the lasting social consequences of war. Another pocket of insecurity often overlooked is the way gender roles define men and boys relationship to war. When young men who once felt powerful and brave as soldiers, who believe that war defines their manhood, are suddenly stripped of their identity, they may look for other, often dangerous, ways to feel powerful. Without understanding the way war and violence

95 Specht, Irma. Red Shoes: Experiences of Girl-combatants in Liberia. Geneva: ILO, 2006

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have (re)defined manhood, traditional peacekeeping operations fail to understand what drives men to war. This failure leads to a tenuous and uneasy peace at best, as underlying insecurities and threats left behind from war persist. The consequences of these shortsighted operations can be seen in Liberia and throughout Africa as failed cease-fires and peace agreements stack up, one after the other. Gender analysis is necessary to understand how men and women experience conflict differently, thus informing post-conflict policy on the differing needs of men and women. But in many conflicts, particularly in Liberia, women are seen as integral to the peace process and have a direct contribution in the current stability of the country. This involvement transcends the use of gender analysis to understand womens experiences of war. Instead it implies that there is something specific about women, and womens organizations, that influence success. Gender analysis and gender balance are important tools to reduce the invisibility and silence of women, but in Liberia, these practices served to embolden an already determined coalition of women working for peace and stability. African Women as Peacemakers Tripp et. al. find that of the many womens movements studied throughout Africa, two things are evident: 1) Women are politically active throughout the continent and they form powerful groups and coalitions; and 2) Womens groups often form in conflict situations and women are often major advocates for peace. Tripp et. al. write, One characteristic of womens mobilization that has set it apart from other forms of mobilization has been the keen interest in building ties across ethnic, clan, and religious lines, especially where relations in the broader society have been in conflict around such differences. Womens movements often sought to be as broad as possible because of their shared gender-based goals, which cut across differencesIn conflict-ridden areas, women organized across so-called enemy linesto find bases for peace. There were bold efforts of this kind in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,

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Sudan, and other countriesWomen often formed coalitions and networks for peace and/or collaborated in joint, mutually beneficial activities that helped build new bases for solidarity.96 WIPNET was formed by Christian and Muslim women from different tribes and religions. Men from their communities may very well have been fighting each other, but that did not stop WIPNET organizers from recruiting all kinds of women. One simple slogan used by WIPNET exemplifies the cooperation of women from different social groups: Can a Bullet Pick and Choose? Does the bullet know a Christian from a Muslim?97 WIPNET was started in Monrovia among urban, and slightly better off, women, but quickly incorporated women from the surrounding Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps. It went on to incorporate women from refugee populations throughout West Africa, representing women from the various ethnic backgrounds in Liberia as well as women who experienced different stages of the war. These women were able to cut across differences, recognizing that war was a threat to all women, and a serious threat to all of Liberia. In addition to recognizing the important role womens peace activism played in ending conflicts throughout Africa, Tripp et.al. also discusses why womens peace activism is different, and in the case of many African countries, more effective than mens. They find that womens activism and involvement in the peace process has great potential to maintain stability after a conflict has officially ended, precisely because women are often excluded from the powerful institutions or groups responsible for the conflict. Their argument follows many of the same lines as theories on why African women advocate and invest in peace more often than men, mainly that women cannot win with war. Yet Tripp et. al. have shown that the underlying motivation for

96 Tripp et. al. 2009. Pg. 87. Leymah-Gbowee 97 AWID. "Interview with Leymah Gbowee." Accessed December 2009. http://www.awid.org/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Interview-with-

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peace activism extends beyond peace agreements. Womens activism plays a large role in postconflict efforts as well. Womens marginalization from politics and their outsider status has, on the one hand, made them attractive contenders for power as the ends of the conflicts open up new political spaces. Their shared exclusion has given them a common agenda and capacity for being remarkably broad-based, regardless of partisanship, ethnicity, religion, or other factors, and many of womens strategies in peacemaking are indeed shaped by and arise from their marginalization in society.98 Women in Liberia are viewed as attractive contenders in both politics and the economic revitalization of their country. The World Bank, the Nike Foundation, and many other international and UN programs focus on womens economic development and empowerment as part of a larger post-conflict and reconstruction strategy. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has made it a purpose to fill government minister positions with women and states that she would love to be able to fill all political appointments with women if it were politically feasible.99 Sirleaf herself is celebrated within the international community precisely because she is the first female president in Africa, and because she is viewed as a political outsider and above the power hungry politics that so many Liberian leaders have succumbed to in the past. This status has not only made her an attractive contender for power, but a very attractive contender for international aid as well. Daniel Bergner assesses her support, [Sirleaf] is seen as a figure of profound hope for Africa by many in the West and as a savior by some Liberians, partly because she is so stern, her resolve palpable and her standards high, and partly because she is a woman.100 Bergner also notes that although Sirleaf has led a privileged life compared to the vast majority of Liberians,

98 Tripp et. al. 2009. 215-216. 99 Bergner, Daniel. "An Uncompromising Woman." New York Times Magazine, October 22, 2010. doi:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/magazine/24sirleaf-t.html?emc=et 100 Ibid.

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she too has been shaped by marginalization. Some of her strength comes from surviving a physically abusive husband. Just as the collective experiences of women, often experiences of marginalization and exclusion from power, influence their ability to lead and rebuild their communities, so do the traditional female gender roles of mothers and caretakers. Erin K. Baines identifies Rwandan women as major actors in the rebuilding of their society after the genocide. She sees womens traditional roles as mothers and nurturers being extended throughout the country, particularly in the absence of social welfare institutions. Baines writes, Both traditional and new gender roles of women are sources of social and economic capital.101 Baines goes on to describe the peacekeeping efforts of Rwandan women, and the way the UN and international NGOs viewed and relied on womens groups to maintain and promote peace. Rwandan womens organizing fills social spaces torn apart by genocide. Interviews with representatives of womens groups, United Nations staff, and government representatives gave the impression that peace is a web, where actors within that web must rebuild the self, and the social relations that make up the wholePeace, then, is not defined by diplomats and official agreements, nor even by the end of armed conflict. It is a process of restoring social relations, or reweaving the torn, and women, in their traditional gender roles, are poised in positions that promote peace.102 In much the same way as Rwandan women, Liberian women have used their traditional gender roles to mend torn social relationships. They have also expanded these roles to public and economic activities, playing a large role in the web that is peace. The Gender Advisor in Liberia, Vabah Gayflor, states that womens groups mushroomed after the war, partly in order

102 Ibid. pg. 227.

101 Baines, Erin K. Les Femmes aux mille bras: Building Peace in Rwanda. Mazurana et. al. 2005. Pg. 220.

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to fill the vacuum of power created by the absence of government, and also to assist in the same social welfare roles described above.103 Nothing left to lose- Liberians Womens Experience of War The level of chaos, deprivation, and misery endured during the civil war is best told through personal accounts. Mats Utas recounts the experience of one Liberian woman during the first part of the civil war.104 Utas refers to this particular young woman as Bintu. Although this is only one womans story, when combined with the statistics on rape and other findings from the TRC, this account reflects some of the collective experiences women had during the war. Bintus descriptions of her experiences paint a bleak picture of the conditions and choices faced by women during the war, especially in regards to their personal security. Bintu was unable to survive as a woman on her own. She had to repeatedly attach herself to men in order to secure her own physical safety. The higher ranking the man was, the safer she was. Bintu was a victim in the sense that she had to have sex with men in order to gain protection, but she was also able to use her status as the girlfriend of an important man to engage in actions that victimized others. For example, she regularly looted luxury goods, cars, jewelry, etc. and even joined in battle a couple times. This distinction shows that even though women are often victims in armed conflict, they are not always powerless. Their ability to survive in the most extreme conditions is a sign of agency and endurance.105 One experience that Bintu had demonstrates the brutal way women were victimized, but also the way women manipulated their sexuality and relationships with men as a survival tool. Bintu was caught driving by herself on her way to visit her mother. The NPFL soldiers that

103 World Focus 2009. 104 Utas. 2005. 105 Ibid.

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stopped her accused her of being a spy and threw her in prison for eight months. During those eight months she was repeatedly raped, beaten, and terrorized by the guards, other soldiers, and any man that felt like it. She also witnessed her fellow female prisoners being executed one by one. During this time she befriended another young woman who was the girlfriend of a highranking official. This friend of Bintu was able to convince her boyfriend to advocate on Bintus behalf and Bintu was eventually released. On being released, Bintu found out she was pregnant and was without any resources, protection, or a home. Because Bintu was alone, she and her unborn child were without any form of security. In the sexualized context of the civil war and the way the bodies of women and girls were used as currency for mens pleasure, she had no choice but to attach herself to another man. She became the girlfriend of a civilian who accepted the baby as his. Unfortunately, because this man was a civilian he had absolutely no access to resources, showing that men who refused to follow strict gender norms in war and become combatants had similar levels of economic and food insecurity as women. The roles of men and women were so narrowly constructed that if a man did not engage in violence, he did not have access to distinctly male privileges. The Liberian economy was completely ruined during the war and looting was the only way to earn a living. Bintu was again forced to become the girlfriend of many different men in order to provide for herself, her child, and her civilian boyfriend. In order to understand the womens movement that led to eventual peace and the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as president, it is important to acknowledge the incredibly violent and gendered context in which Liberian women experienced the civil war. Bintus story helps contextualize the security issues faced by women during the civil war and adds another dimension to the human rights abuses perpetrated by every armed faction, including some

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ECOMOG forces. It also helps to fill in the complete absence of womens experiences and perspectives in modern recounts of the civil war. The fearlessness of the Liberian women can be attributed to the many years of brutality they lived through, brutality similar to that experienced by Bintu. The first official statement of intent from WIPNET captures the attitude of nothing left to lose that gave the women so much strength: "In the past we were silent, but after being killed, raped, dehumanized, and infected with diseases, and watching our children and families destroyed, war has taught us that the future lies in saying NO to violence and YES to peace! We will not relent until peace prevails (capitals in original)."106 Betty Toe, a former member of WIPNET, echoes this sentiment, "The women of Liberia were fed up, and they were tired of the killing of their children and husbands, so they decided to seek divine intervention and do something about it."107 The long awaited peace in Liberia was the work of strong women who had had enough. They laid the groundwork for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to become president and lead Liberia in a new direction. Early Womens Movement for Peace and Emergence of WIPNET Throughout the conflict in Liberia, women were protesting, surviving, fighting, and protecting their children and loved ones as best they could. During the first part of the civil war, educated, elite Liberian women were sending petitions and statements to ECOWAS leaders, the UN, and to US officials. Both Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Ruth Perry had worked in government before the war started, and tried to fight for peace and stability from both inside and outside the country throughout the conflict. Early womens groups promoting peace include the Liberian Womens Initiative, LWI, and the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL). These

107 Adams. October 1, 2009.

106 WIPNET Statement of Intent to President Taylor. 2003. "LIBERIA - Another War." Safe World for Women. Accessed December 12, 2010. http://www.asafeworldforwomen.org/stories-from-the-ground/420-liberia-another-war.html.

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groups had the power and influence to reach high level officials within the international community, yet did not have enough members to seriously influence peace. It wasnt until the emergence of WIPNET that the Liberian womens movement for peace became effective. WIPNET was made up of non-elite women, women who could not leave the region in order to escape the chaos. The women of WIPNET, combined with the educated and connected members of previous womens organizations, were a powerful force for peace. Although LWI, AFELL, and WIPNET did not necessarily work together, they shared the same overall message, We want peace. No more war. The international community has followed women in Liberias lead by recognizing that the inclusion of women in post-conflict efforts is necessary to maintain stability. Men have an important role in post-conflict efforts as well, but women have received much more recognition as peacemakers and peacekeepers in the country. This has to do with the theories of women and peace discussed earlier. Women have been empowered through their roles as mothers and caretakers, extending these roles to the nation and government. The incessant message of WIPNET for peace was a non-political message. WIPNET did not align themselves with any of the fighting factions. Instead they maintained politically neutral, yet loud and clear, message for peace. WIPNET also recognized that a cease-fire is not enough in itself, particularly because a cease-fire does not address the security issues of many women and girls, largely the threat of rape. So, as members of LURD and MODEL were busy fighting over control of scarce resources in the country and striking deals with each other, WIPNET remained committed to peace. Much of the stalling that occurred during the peace talks in 2003 can be attributed to the negotiation of resources and coveted government positions between the various warlords, not the actual negotiation of peace and post-conflict issues. Thus the members of the transitional

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government, many of them leaders of fighting groups themselves and proven believers and promoters of violence, were not viewed with complete legitimacy and trust from their country or the international community. The UN took a much greater role in the transitional government, greatly expanding the efforts of the UN Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, and focusing on gender analysis, gender mainstreaming, and the mandates of 1325 in many of its programs. WIPNET was active in Liberia before and during the peace talks, and then during the transitional government. It was instrumental in getting Taylor, LURD, and MODEL to agree to peace talks in the first place. WIPNET was first able to influence LURD and MODEL leaders because Liberian refugees based in Sierra Leone visited the leaders to discuss the possibility of peace talks with them. Due to the massive refugee population in neighboring states, WIPNET not only included Liberian women from Liberia, but refugees and IDPs in surrounding areas and countries. As discussed before, Taylor eventually acquiesced to peace talks after WIPNET protested for months and were finally invited to the Executive Mansion to present President Taylor with an official statement and request for peace. This broad reach proved extremely effective once the peace talks actually got under way in Accra, Ghana in June 2003. Hundreds of women joined the protests outside the peace talks, many of them were Liberian refugees living in Ghana. Only two elite women were allowed at the 17th and final peace talks. Mary Brownell represented the Mano River Union Womens Peace Network that had been advocating for peace throughout the West African region since the mid 1990s. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf represented the political party, Unity Party. The fact that Brownell and Sirleaf attended the peace talks is important, yet slightly ironic. The gravity of their involvement in the talks is dwarfed by the sheer number of women activists that were present outside the talks. There is no sign that either

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Brownell or Sirleaf worked directly with WIPNET activists during the talks, but they were still effective voices for peace amid the various fighting factions and international leaders. Years of organizing by different womens groups within Liberia and the Mano River Region, as well as WIPNETs vocal and dramatic tactics outside of the peace talks influenced international and regional actors to include women in the peace agreement and, albeit marginally, in the transitional government. Employing Resolution 1325 Resolution 1325 gave women in Liberia the framework and international legal justification for demanding a gender perspective in the CPA. Resolution 1325 is the first Security Council resolution to directly deal with the impact of war on women and also recognizes the contribution of women to conflict resolution and sustaining peace. Carol Cohn explains the potential impact Resolutions 1325 has on many UN operations. She writes, Resolution 1325 breaks new ground because it not only recognizes that women have been active in peace-building and conflict prevention; it also recognizes women's right to participate-as decision-makers at all levels-in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building processes. Further, it calls for all participants in peacekeeping operations and peace negotiations to adopt a gender perspective. Gender perspectives, in this context, are taken to include attention to the special needs of women and girls during disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and postconflict reconstruction, as well as measures supporting local women's peace initiatives.108 Support of the international community, however, was crucial in both the insertion of the gender perspective into the final CPA and the overall implementation of the CPA and postconflict reconstruction efforts. Examples of key international involvement include the indictment of President Charles Taylor by the Sierra Leone Special Court and his subsequent

108 Cohn, Carol. Feminist Peacemaking: In Resolution 1325, the United Nations Requires the Inclusion of Women in All Peace Planning and Negotiation. The Women's Review of Books, Vol. 21, No. 5, Women, War, and Peace (Feb., 2004), pgs. 8-9

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exile to Nigeria; the deployment of 18,000 peacekeepers by the UN109 and the stationing of over 1000 marines off the coast of Liberia by the United States; and the creation of the UN Mission in Liberia that oversaw the Transitional Government and followed the CPA and Resolution 1325. The international laws and norms codified by Resolution 1325, were not present in previous attempts at peace within Liberia. The use of Resolution 1325, and its impact on the CPA itself, and the future position of women within Liberia was unprecedented. Veronika Fuest describes the extent of womens involvement that was written into the CPA: It states that women should be included in the Governance Reform Commission and that members of the National Transitional Legislative Assembly should come inter alia from women organizations. Article XXVIII, dealing with national balance, contains a striking exception to comparable peace agreements: The parties shall reflect national and gender balance in all elective and non-elective appointments within the National Transitional Government of Liberia.110 As Fuest shows, the ability of Liberian women to legitimize a place for themselves in the transitional government was remarkable, especially because they were excluded from the peace talks themselves.111 However, the bigger impact of the CPA is one that transcends Liberia. By inserting a gender perspective of this extent into an international agreement, Liberia has created a new international precedent and norm of womens involvement in peace agreements that could potentially impact other international peace processes. Research by Kemi Ogunsanya offers evidence of the way previous international norms and womens movement in one country help legitimize womens involvement in another. She cites the impact of the Gender Unit in ECOWAS, and the acceptance of rape as a war crime as established by the ICTR and ICTY on the peace processes of Sierra Leone and other African

109 "CIA - The World Factbook." May 2010. 110 Fuest 2008. Pg. 214 111 Ibid.

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countries.112 Other evidence of this trend is the recent creation of Resolution 1325 Action Plans by all West African countries, and the creation of Resolutions 1820, 1888, and 1889 mentioned before. Womens Involvement in Transitional Government and Post-conflict Efforts The success of the peace talks cannot be attributed to the efforts of only one person or group, but WIPNETs decision to create a human chain around the building increased the sense of urgency and purpose of the talks, ultimately leading to the successful completion and signing of the CPA. After the CPA was signed, WIPNET remained very active during the transitional government. They continued to make their presence known to the warlords who now had control over Liberia, as well as the international peace keepers, UN Mission and NGO personnel. One telling scene from Pray the Devil Back to Hell depicts WIPNET members assisting disarmament activities sponsored by the UN. WIPNET members talked to the young soldiers who were standing around waiting to receive money for their weapons. Previous attempts at disarmament had been met with problems as hundreds of armed young men would stand around for hours, some of them intoxicated, waiting to turn in their weapons. Fights inevitably erupted. WIPNET decided to monitor disarmament activities in order to prevent future violence. WIPNET was also very active in the voter registration drive, recognizing that free and fair elections were necessary for lasting peace. They helped to register thousands of Liberians, especially Liberian women. Although they kept registration and campaigning activities separate, WIPNET members campaigned very hard for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. They expressed over and over again the sentiment that Liberia needed a female leader who was not involved in the war.
112 Ogunsanya,Kemi."WomenTransformingConflictsinAfrica:DescriptiveStudiesfromBurundi,Coted'Ivoire,SierraLeone,South AfricaandSudan."ACCORD(AfricanCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes)OccasionalPaperSeries2,no.3(2007):352.

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One WIPNET member, Vaiba Flomo, states, Men, whether by omission or commission, were responsible for the violence.113 WIPNET members were determined to see women in as many leadership positions as possible. Cohns observation that Resolution 1325 in itself does not actually do a lot for women in terms of involvement in peace processes, but that its power lies in the ability of womens groups to use it as a negotiating tool to legitimize their requests, is exactly what happened in Liberia. Liberian women certainly had passion, strategy, supporters, and a mission without Resolution 1325, but the legitimacy and recognition given to the womens movement because of 1325, and the insertion of gender balance and a gender perspective in the CPA, were important steps in creating an international precedent for womens involvement. Furthermore, because of the violence against women perpetrated by members of both LURD and MODEL, and their public statements belittling WIPNETs efforts, there is no indication that the transitional government would have included women or their experiences in any way without international pressure. Even though the transitional government did not welcome womens involvement and WIPNETs activism, WIPNET was able to use Resolution 1325 and the backing of the international community to keep an eye on the transitional government and keep womens issues in the spotlight. The Iron Lady Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been a powerful leader for peace in Liberia, believing in a broad based post-conflict agenda that combines education, economic development, government reform, justice system reform, and womens leadership. Sirleaf is well aware that she did not become president alone. In every interview she gives, whether to the New York Times Magazine,

113 Disney and Reticker. 2008.

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World Focus, or The Daily Show, she always gives credit to the womens movement for bringing peace to Liberia and for electing her president.114 Leymah Gbowee puts it another way, the womens movement was the cake and Ellen was the icing.115 Sirleaf has said that she is committed to giving back to the women of Liberia all that they have given to the country. She believes the best way to give back is by empowering women to control their lives and reach their own potential. Sirleaf has also put women at the head of many leadership roles. In fact, much of her administration is headed by women, including the Inspector General of Police and the Foreign Relations minister.116 The mandate of gender balance within the transitional government was groundbreaking on many levels, but its biggest impact was institutionalizing womens leadership within Liberia. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected in 2005, and with the continued help of the UN Mission and the international community, has maintained peace and stability within Liberia. She has implemented policies aimed at reducing gender disparities. As an example, she abolished all fees for primary school, even uniforms.117 This is an incredible move for the education of girls, as school and uniform fees are major impediments to education for girls. The number of girls enrolled in primary school in 2007 was almost equal to the number of boys.118 Sirleaf has also given a huge boost to local food production and markets, two industries dominated by women, by improving market facilities throughout the country.119 The World Bank is also operating a program in Liberia aimed at improving the economic potential of female

115 Disney and Reticker. 2008 116 World Focus. 2009. 117 Ibid. 118 Liberia's Progress Towards the Millenium Development Goals 2008. Report. Monrovia: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs of Liberia, 2008 119 World Focus, 2009. 114 Solomon, Deborah. Saving the Worlds Women: Questions for Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Madame President. New York Times Magazine. August 18th, 2009 :The Daily Show With John Stewart. April 17th 2009: World Focus.2009.

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farmers through its "Gender Equality as Smart Economics" plan.120 Finally, Sirleaf is slowly working towards strengthening the justice system and improving it to deal with violence against women and girls. There is still a very high prevalence of rape, especially against young girls. In an effort to change the culture of silence around rape, Sirleaf has added women to the justice system, put a woman in charge of the police department, and started a public campaign to stop rape.121 She has also created a special court to deal with gender-based violence. There is still a lot of room for improvement in Liberia, but Sirleaf and the Liberian womens movement have strengthened institutions and put Liberia on a path to success for generations to come. As mentioned before, Sirleaf has proven herself as an asset to attract international aid, but she is also a political force in the West Africa region. In March 2009, Liberia hosted the International Womens Colloquium. The Colloquium brought political and social leaders throughout Africa together, and was the largest event held in Liberia in the last 30 years.122 Attendees of the event overwhelmingly viewed Sirleafs presidency as an inspiration for all of Africa, saying that she was Africas Iron Lady and the president of us all.123 U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Linda Thomas Greenfield, sees Sirleaf, and womens leadership, as a role model for the West Africa region. She believes some of the continued unrest in West Africa could be reversed if there were more women leaders in the region.124

121 World Focus, 2009. 122 Ibid.

120 Bekoe, Dorian, and Christina Parajon. Womens Role in Liberias Reconstruction. United States Institute of Peace, 2007. Accessed December 11, 2010. http://www.usip.org/resources/women-s-role-liberia-s-reconstruction

123 "Tune In: Online Radio Show on African Women in Power | Worldfocus." April 14, 2009. Accessed November 12, 2010. http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/04/14/tune-in-online-radio-show-on-african-women-in-power/4975/. 124 "An Impatient Liberia Confronts High Expectations, Sacrifice | Worldfocus." April 13, 2009. Accessed December 12, 2010. http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/04/13/an-impatient-liberia-confronts-high-expectations-sacrifice/4920/

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International Involvement Whether intending to or not, the international community complemented the efforts of the womens movement for peace in Liberia and, sometimes knowingly, other times unwittingly, worked in tandem to bring and sustain peace in Liberia. One telling example is the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court of Sierra Leone, and his subsequent exile to Nigeria. Although the timing of the indictment is often criticized, its role in removing Taylor from the peace talks and delegitimizing his future involvement in the peace process is seen as a crucial step in reaching peace. It is widely believed that Taylor would never have fully cooperated in peace talks or a peace agreement with LURD and MODEL. Because Taylor has been removed from the region and is imprisoned in the Hague, he is not considered a threat in West Africa today. Thus, the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the ICC, the United States, Nigeria, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, all played different but important roles in removing Taylor from the region and finally bringing him to justice. It is also important to note that no matter how powerful WIPNET was, they could never have removed Taylor from Liberia, or brought him to any form of justice. This is to say that there are important international institutions that help guarantee peace and justice in countries that do not have the resources, capacity, or infrastructure to ensure it. Another very important act by the international community, and largely spearheaded by George W. Bush, was the reduction of external debt owed by Liberia. Bush recognized that much of Liberias debt was incurred during the Doe administration, which used the funds to wage war against Liberian citizens. The United States, along with the IMF, the World Bank, and other lending institutions, have reduced Liberias debt to .3 cents on the dollar, a reduction equaling millions of dollars. Liberia is struggling as it is, so the lifting of this debt burden is a crucial step in reviving the economy and building much needed infrastructure.

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Liberia is an example of how the international community can partner with local movements and leaders to ensure success in peace processes and post-conflict efforts. The recipe for success seen in Liberia includes gender analysis, womens involvement and leadership, and continued aid, monitoring, and assistance from the international community. Liberia still has many challenges ahead as Ambassador Thomas Greenfield states, There is no area where Liberia does not need help.125 But with an empowered womens movement, a strong leader, and a commitment to peace and stability, Liberia is on the right track.

125 Ibid.

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Conclusion Liberia is a case where international law and international organizations assisted a local womens movement to bring and ensure peace in their country. The womens movement was strong in itself. They were instrumental in influencing the fighting factions to agree to peace talks, and then influencing the international community to force the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to finally be taken seriously. However, they would have never been able to ensure peace and stability without key actions by the international community, and without the empowering and legitimizing effects of Resolution 1325. Liberia is often cited as an example in current discussions around womens involvement in peace and security issues. Although such a determined womens movement, or the ability to use some of the dramatic tactics that WIPNET did, is not present in every conflict area, one thing is clear, womens involvement and a gender analysis of war and post-conflict processes are necessary for lasting peace and stability. This is to say that the strength of WIPNET was not only their willingness to do whatever it took to get the fighting factions to sign an agreement, but that they forced the international community to accept that womens involvement makes a difference, and that women have a huge stake in peace processes. The womens movement for peace showed that women must be a part of peace and security efforts and that understanding womens experiences of war sheds light on deeper issues of insecurity. That the inclusion of women in government is a step towards upending the corrupt, paternalistic legacies of power that often lead to conflict and failed peace agreements. That women cannot win with war, and because they cannot win, they are more invested in peace than men are. That an investment in womens leadership is oftentimes an investment in peace. That women are frequently the change makers in their countries and they are positively influencing peace and security efforts

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throughout Africa. Liberia represents a visible, tangible example of the intent of Resolution 1325. As mentioned before, Liberia is what 1325 looks like. Would a country without a strong womens movement be experiencing the same level of success as Liberia? It is difficult to say, but what is obvious is that peace agreements and postconflict policies that do not include women or gender analysis are set up to fail. The problem is not that womens movements do not exist, its that they are generally not looked for or consulted. Tripp et al. and other scholars analyze womens movements in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, South Africa, and Uganda, among others. Because women have been effectively excluded from peace processes and discussions of peace and security, it is difficult to know exactly what effect the womens movements in other countries have had on the peace processes. WIPNET garnered international attention through direct action, but it was not until the release of Pray the Devil Back to Hell in 2008 that WIPNET became routinely cited as bringing peace to the country. Many accounts of the peace process in Liberia still do not mention the womens movement, womens experiences of war, or Resolution 1325. Some historical accounts and IR texts give the impression that women in Liberia did not exist until Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became president. The point being is that the potential for women to positively influence peace and security is not fully understood because they have not had many official opportunities to do so. By empowering local womens movements and mandating a gender perspective and womens involvement, 1325 brings oftentimes already present womens leadership into a visible and legitimate light. Resolution 1325, at the very least, influences an understanding of womens experiences of war and the way gender roles and differences can influence war, even if a womens movement is not present.

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There are many other ways that the international community helped to ensure peace and stability in Liberia, and can continue to help other conflict ridden countries. Strong sanctions against Taylor and other warlords for the illegal selling of natural resources, particularly diamonds, weakened his administration and influenced peace in neighboring Sierra Leone. The indictment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone and the subsequent exile of Taylor to Nigeria was a major factor in the creation of the transitional government in Liberia. The removal of Taylor opened up a space for small compromises and power sharing agreements between the remaining fighting factions. Taylors removal also allowed for the arrival of the largest, most international, and better funded peacekeeping force in the history of the Liberian conflict. Pressure from the United States and other powerful countries on both Nigeria and the Sirleaf administration in Liberia to arrest Taylor and hand him over to international authorities to be tried in the Hague is a clear sign that impunity will no longer be tolerated. Although not active in Liberia, the ICC has indicted many warlords and government officials in Sudan, The Central African Republic, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on crimes against humanity including the use of child soldiers and systematic sexually-based violence. Some of these men have been arrested and are either on, or awaiting trial, well others still remain at large. The indictments, arrests, and trials pursued by the ICC offer countries with weak justice systems the assurance that the power of these men is not imminent, that they will not continue killing and terrorizing with full impunity. Although it is unlikely that all of those indicted by the ICC will be brought to justice, their crimes will at least be exposed on an international stage, further symbolizing a global consensus against impunity. Another important way for the international community to assist in peace and postconflict efforts is through economic development. The international aid, investment, and

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attention received by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is considered a large part of Liberias current success and one of Sirleafs main strengths as a leader. The reduction of international debt alone is a huge step in stabilizing the economy, but Sirleaf makes clear that employment opportunities and infrastructure investments are necessary to ensure permanent peace. With an almost 80% unemployment rate persisting even today, the decimation of the Liberian economy by the civil war is insurmountable without substantial international aid. After seven years of peace and successful democratic elections in 2005, Liberia is considered a peacekeeping success by many; but always with the understanding that without continued international economic investment and assistance, the risk of a return to conflict will remain. In addition to the lessons learned from Liberia on the importance of womens involvement, gender analysis, bodies of international law and justice, and the need for economic aid and investment in conflict regions, there are specific policy recommendations that will influence peace and stability in current and future areas of conflict. Some of these policies were followed in Liberia, but Liberia is also an example of how existing international law can be strengthened even more to support womens involvement in peace and post-conflict processes. These policies fall in three categories: strengthening Resolution 1325; preventing sexual violence and ending impunity; and ensuring the success of peace agreements to prevent prolonged conflict. Strengthening Resolution 1325 Resolutions 1325 and 1820 are milestones in themselves, having already greatly influenced peace and security efforts in the last ten years. Yet the ten year report on Resolution 1325 published in September 2010 shows that despite efforts by the UN, donor countries, and an active international womens movement, women are still largely absent from peace processes

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and rape continues to be a common and effective tool of war.126 There appears to be much discussion about the importance of women in the peace process, yet not nearly enough action. The measures of strengthening 1325 and 1820 found in resolutions 1888 and 1889 have yet to be fully implemented throughout the UN system and resources for the training and enforcement of these measures remain low. Furthermore, although Liberia was the first country to implement a Resolution 1325 Action Plan, the plan was not started until 2006 and not implemented until 2008 five years after the signing of the CPA. Now that all countries in West Africa have implemented 1325 Action Plans, there is international precedent to continue their implementation. I propose that these plans be written into peace agreements, in the same way that disarmament and election plans are, so that efforts at womens involvement and gender analysis are incorporated from the very start of a peace process. The Liberian CPA, for example, called for an election commission made up of civil society, government, and UN representatives to oversee elections after a two year transitional government. In the same way that election commissions are part of peace agreements and transitional governments, a commission to develop a 1325 Action Plan should be considered an integral part of peace agreements as well. In addition to the creation of 1325 Action plans, womens involvement and gender balance must be mandated, not suggested. As stated before, women have been almost completely excluded from peace processes. In Liberia, there were only two women allowed in the final peace talks. The CPA was unprecedented in terms of gender balance, but women were not truly represented in government until the election of Sirleaf. The womens movement in Liberia was able to harness the mandate of gender balance and continue advocating for peace.

126 UN Security Council. Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General. Report. UN Security Council, 2010.

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If they had not been so determined and organized there would have been more potential for a few token and ineffectual women in the transitional government, instead of meaningful involvement and leadership. In order to prevent the continued exclusion of women from peace talks, and the potential for women to become tokens in new governments, I propose an amendment to 1325 that mandates a quota of at least 30% of women in both peace talks and transitional governments. This quota will ensure the meaningful and effective involvement of women in high-level decision making organizations, and create a group of largely peaceful outsiders that are much more likely to be invested in peace than the warlords and international actors present in peace talks. Tripp et al. and others have shown that 30-35% appears to represent a critical mass for women in legislative bodies to feel like they have power.127 Tripp has studied the use of quotas in governments throughout the world, citing that 28 African countries currently have legislative quotas mandating womens involvement.128 This international precedent towards greater representation of women in government should be followed in peace processes as well. By mandating womens involvement through the use of quotas, Resolution 1325 would greatly strengthen the positive role that womens involvement and gender analysis have already played in peace processes, and harness those positive influences from the start, instead of years later. Preventing Sexual Violence and Ending Impunity Margot Wallstrm has stated that in order to end mass rape and sexual violence during war, rape must be prosecuted and treated as the serious threat to international security that it absolutely is. But considering the devastating effects that rape has on communities, prevention is the most important. Towards this goal, UN peacekeeping forces are beginning to be trained on preventing and recognizing sexual violence. As Wallstrm points out, mass rape continues even

127 Tripp, Aili Mari., Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa. 2009. Pg. 156. 128 "Tune In: Online Radio Show on African Women in Power | Worldfocus." 2009.

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when peacekeepers are present because peacekeepers do not know where to look or what to look for.129 Moreover, women do not report these rapes to authorities because of shame, fear of social ostracization, and because the perpetrators are very rarely brought to justice, making reporting futile at best, dangerous at worst. The destabilizing factors of mass rape and the distrust that persists when rape goes unpunished have already presented themselves as security concerns, making the prevention of sexual violence and the end of impunity for rape an international concern. To this end, the training of peacekeepers on sexual violence must continue, but at an accelerated pace. The recent inclusion of female peacekeepers and female members to the security sector in post-conflict areas have shown a decrease in rape and an increase in the reporting of rapes, leading to another policy recommendation. Not only should women be included in peace talks and transitional governments, but they should also be included in peacekeeping and security efforts. There is an effort within the UN, and certainly within Liberia, to implement gender balance in the security sector. Within Liberia it is seen as a way to decrease both sexual violence and corruption while also increasing the legitimacy of the police. In order to make this effort of gender balance within peacekeeping forces more effective, the UN should actively encourage member states to provide all female, or mixed female and male peacekeeping units as well as increased financial support for gender sensitivity training and sexually-based violence training to existing peacekeeping forces. The efforts of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, national justice systems, and the ICC, must also continue to prosecute those most responsible for the use of rape as a tool of war, and all measures of impunity for human rights violations must be excluded from peace agreements. For too long the use of rape as a tool of war has been overlooked, and its lasting

129 Wallstrm. 2010.

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effects misunderstood. The security of women must be seen as important for national and regional security efforts. Disarmament and an official end to a conflict mean nothing when half the population continues to live in fear. Liberia, again, represents a case where impunity was an afterthought and human rights violations, particularly against women, were not considered in peace agreements. Full immunity for all human rights violations was granted to the warlords present at many of the failed peace agreements during the 1990s. This immunity gave the warlords the go ahead to continue using the same tactics to wage war tactics that had already proven successful. They continued using strategies aimed at terrorizing civilians and forcefully conscripting child soldiers. As stated before, the TRC finds that every single armed faction, including ECOMOG, engaged in human rights abuses during the conflict. By granting immunity from the outset, the ECOWAS sponsored peace agreements continued a cycle of violence, human rights abuses, and impunity that undermined any effort towards peace and stability. The immunity granted to warlords, allowed them to pursue legitimate power through government as Taylor did, giving the dangerous impression that the best way to gain power was through war. Ensuring the Success of Peace Agreements to Prevent Prolonged Conflict In addition to the policy recommendations mentioned above, there are other more general steps that the international community can take to ensure that the fate of Liberia and West Africa during the 1980s and 90s is never repeated. Due to mistakes made by ECOWAS, a lack of resources, and the destabilizing effects of the diamond trade, the Liberian conflict not only continued for 14 years, but it brought instability to the entire region. It was not until the Security Council started to impose sanctions on the illegal diamond trade, and Charles Taylor himself, that West Africa began to see signs of peace. The use of specific sanctions against the arms

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trade as well as the sale of natural resources for those arms, and the naming of the known leaders of all fighting factions, including members of the acting government, must be a part of international security efforts. Without these sanctions, Taylor would have been able to continue assisting the RUF and enriching himself. Sanctions are a way to weaken destabilizing factors in a country or region without armed intervention. The sanctions begun in 2000 opened the way for peace for both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Once a peace agreement has been signed, the international community must do everything possible to ensure the success of the agreement. In Liberia, international effort usually ended after an agreement was signed, or after an election took place. This allowed for Taylor and other warlords to wait a couple months until international attention left Liberia before they started their offensive again. In order to prevent prolonged conflicts, a multiple year peace process, with both regional and international involvement, and the continued presence of peacekeepers for years afterwards must become common practice. The CPA allowed for a two year transitional government before elections even took place and there are still 14,000 UN personnel in the country seven years after the agreement was signed, and five years after democratic elections. Liberia has shown that one long, drawn out peace process is more successful than 16 short-lived peace agreements ever were. More importantly, this long, drawn out agreement, was the first one to incorporate the mandates of Resolution 1325, and was both initiated and maintained by a strong womens movement for peace, and strong female leaders.

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Annex Resolution 1325 (2000) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000 The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and recalling also the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Womens Rights and International Peace (International Womens Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816), Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century (A/S23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation, Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution, Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts, Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls, Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

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Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations, Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, 1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; 2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes; 3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster; 4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; 5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites\ Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training; 7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Childrens Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

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8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local womens peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary; 9. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict; 11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions; 12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000; 13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants; 14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions; 15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international womens groups;

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16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations; 17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls; 18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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