AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ, ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BA NDA, BENITO SANTAYANA, FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO

VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY, FELIMON G UTIERREZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL RIO, respondents. Statement of the case: These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of Appeals 2 have been consolidated in this single decision, h aving arisen from one and the same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, L aguna), and presenting as they do issues which may be resolved jointly by this C ourt. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for r egistration of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the Di rector of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190. Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was no definit e commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors construct ed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to file an e jectment suit against the former in 1966. 4 Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos de l Rios application for registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismi ssed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorab le judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private opp ositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said decision. Issue: The two consolidated petitions raise substantially the same issues, to wi t : 1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and 2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the lan d. Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is eithe r of public dominion or of private ownership. 5 Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under existing legislation are no t the subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. 6 The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article 420 provides: Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to the sa me gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. 10 Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, c ould hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as obse rved four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since th e rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at whi ch the is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordina ry depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not p art of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foresh ore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate defin ition of a foreshore land, to wit:

... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 11 The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that is alte rnately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 12 The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses o ver the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a mean s of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parc el of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public in strument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he inherited said lan d. In addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by thems elves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not i ncontrovertible evidence of ownership, 15 they become strong evidence of ownersh ip acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of th e property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years, co unted from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by pur chase. 17 The record does not show any circumstance of note sufficient enough to overthrow said findings of facts which is binding upon us. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary acquis itive prescription to set in. 18 Applicant has more than satisfied this legal re quirement. The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registera ble title over the parcel of land described in his application, he is clearly en titled to the registration in his favor of said land.