FedericoFaleschini(ID10902214) ModuleConvenor:MichaelBurgess Module:PO867(ComparativeFederalPoliticalSystem) 9May2011 Essay2(wordlimit:4000;actualwords:4150)

HowImportantDoYouThinkAsymmetrical FederalismIstotheSurvivalofFederations?

Introduction Asymmetryisafeatureofeachandeverypoliticalsystem:initsmostgeneralmeaning,it referstoallkindofdifferencesacrosssubStateunits.Asymmetricfederalisminsteadisa muchmorespecificterm,andrelatestotheinstitutionalizationofthesedifferencesinthe politicalandlegalpractisesofafederation.Asymmetricalfederalismhaslongbeenataboo topicamongscholarsofFederalismbutitspracticalrelevancehasincreasedenormouslyover thelasttwentyyearsandsohastheinterestforitintheliterature. Theessayisgoingtoanalysetheimportanceofasymmetricfederalismforthesurvival of federations. The literature provides mixed evidence in respect to short and longterm consequencesofasymmetricalfederalism.Theessaycombinesontheonehandtheoretical insightsontheoriginsandfunctioningofasymmetricaldevicesandontheotherconcrete evidence from federal political systems. The main argument is that asymmetry is an increasinglycommonfeatureofallfederalanddecentralizedsystemsbecauseitdependson changesintheinternational(e.g.Europeanintegration)andinternal(e.g.ethnopolitics)arena buttheoveralleffectonthestabilityofaspecificfederationdependsontheinteractionof variousfactors:theextentofasymmetryitself,thedemographiccompositionofthefederation andthepartydynamics. Theessayisdividedintofivesections.Thefirstonedefinestheconceptofasymmetry andexplainswhyitissorelevantnowadays:thedistinctionbetween defacto and dejure asymmetries is introduced and the concept is linked to current important international processes.Thesecondoneillustratestwotheoriesofasymmetricalfederalism,onecovering theexperienceofmultinationalfederationsandtheotherfocusingontheroleofthedemand ofpublicservices.Thethirdoneprovidesevidenceofasymmetricalpractisesincontemporary federal political systems. The fourth section concludes and assess the importance of federalismforthesurvivaloffederations.

TheConceptofAsymmetricalFederalismanditsRelevanceinContemporaryPolitics andFederalSystems InhisseminalarticleTarlton(1965)firstdefinedtheconceptofasymmetryinfederalsystems. Hisaimwaspolemicaltowardspreviousapproachestothestudyoffederalism(legal,political andsociocultural)inthattheyalltreatedfederalsystemsasawhole(ibidem:867)not allowingforvariationsamongeachconstituentunitinitsrelationtothefederalcentre.Tarlton insteaddefinedasymmetryastheconcept[which]expressestheextenttowhichcomponent statesdonotsharein[theconditionscommontothefederalsystemasawhole](ibidem:861; emphasisadded).Hethusdefinestwoidealtypes:the symmetricalmodel, whereeachof the...unitswould...beminiaturereflectionsoftheimportantaspectsofthewholefederal system(ibidem:868),andtheasymmetricalmodel,whereeachunitwouldhaveaboutita uniquesetoffeatures;federalsystemswillbesomewherebetweenthesetwoextremes. Tarlton links the concept of asymmetry to the federalstate conflict: where asymmetry betweenoneorafewoftheunitsandtherestofthefederationisacutethereisthepotential forfederalstateconflict,orevenforsecession.Hegoesasfartosaythattheworkabilityofa federalsystemforagroupofunitsisonlyafunctionofthelevelofsymmetry:iftheelements ofasymmetryprevailovertheonesofsymmetry,thesystemwon'tworkattheoptimumlevel ofharmonythenitfollowsthataunitarysystemwouldbebetter(ibidem:873).This pessimisticconclusionovertheconflictresolutionpotentialoffederalismbackthenwasa lonevoice. Inhisattacktothelegalisticapproachtofederalism,Tarltonoverlookedtheimportant distinctionbetweendefactoanddejureasymmetries1.Theformerrefertodifferencesamong units in the economic, social and political domain and are common to practically all federations, while the latter relate to asymmetry embedded in constitutional and legal processes(Watts2005:2).Itisfundamentaltokeepthesetwoconceptsseparatedbecausede factoasymmetriesdonotalwaystranslateintodejureasymmetries.Indeed,asBurgess(2005: 430)recalls,politicalscientistscanonlyworkwithsocialrealityhavingpoliticalsalience: soasymmetryisrelevantonlywhenitfindsapoliticalexpression.Inaddition,notallconflicts havethesamesalience,withculturalideologicalconflictsusuallyhardertosolvethansocio
1 Itisalsoimportantnottoconfusetheconceptofdefactoasymmetrywiththepreconditionswhichleadto suchasymmetries.ForaquickoverviewofdejureasymmetriesinfederalpoliticalsystemsseeWatts(2005); foranindepthoverviewseeMcGarry(2006).

economiconesbecausetheformerareinherentlylessbargainable(ibidem:431).Tarlton's conclusionwasindeedsimplistic:therearemanytypesofasymmetryandnotallofthemhave thesameimpactonthefederation. Notwithstandingitshighpracticalrelevance,thetopicofasymmetricalfederalismhas longbeenignoredafterTarlton'sarticle.Indeedscholarshavelongbeenconcernedonlywith classicalfederations whichabodetotheearlymoderndoctrineofsymmetricstaterights: asymmetries(asTarlton'spessimisticpitchsuggests)wereseenwithsuspicion(VonBeyme 2005: 433). In recent years, however, changes at the level of domestic and international politicshavecoincidedwiththewidespreaddiffusionofasymmetricalmechanismsinmany federal and decentralized systems and scholars' interest in the subject has been growing, especially since the publication of the important volume Accommodating Diversity: AsymmetryinFederalStates(Agranoff1999). Thereisanumberofreasonsforthissurgeofinterestinasymmetricalfederalism.Among others (see e.g.vanHouten 2007:54851),VonBeyme (2005:434)highlights fourmain factors: Therevoltofregionsandethnicgroups,moreconcernedwithidentityissuesrather thanredistributiononesandthusmoreinclinedtoacceptdifferencesinlifeconditions; Theeconomicimbalancescreatedandnourishedbytheprocessesofglobalization, Europeanintegration,migration,etc.; Theshiftfrom participatoryfederalismtoa federalismofcompetitioncausedbythe dominanceoftheneoliberalparadigmandbyeconomiccompetition; ThediffusionofPostmodernistthinking,notobsessedwithorderandrationalityas classicalmodernismwas. Beforegettingontothenextsectionaquicklookattheinfluencesoftheprocessof EuropeanIntegrationisdue.Manyscholarshavelookedattheimplicationsoftheprocessof European Integration on subnational demands for selfgovernment and a burgeoning literatureexistonthetopicofEuropeoftheRegions 2.Forexample,Dardanelli(2002)shows howScottishNationalistlitesexploitedtheadvantagesofferedbyEuropeanIntegration(i.e. access to foreign markets and the systematic bias towards small member States in the decisionmakingprocessoftheEU)tomakeindependenceamoreattractivesolutionthanit
2 Seee.g.thespecialnumbersonthistopicbyPublius(volume26/4,Fall1996)andbyRegionalandFederal Studies(volume18/5,October2008).

usedtobeandhenceboostsupportforindependenceinScotland. MoreingeneraltheprocessofEuropeanIntegrationhasopenedthenewelectoralarenas,the Europeanitselfandtheregionalone:politicalpartiesandlobbieshavetargetedtheirstrategy ontheterritorialdimension(Hepburn2008)andthisisandwillcontinuetobeanimportant factorbehindtheEuropewidepushtowardsdecentralisationandincreasingasymmetry.

TheoriesofAsymmetricalFederalism This section will expound two theories of asymmetrical federalism in order to try to understandwhatarethemostimportantdriversofasymmetricalfederalism(Brown2005: 4). Zuber (2011) focuses on multinational federations. Building on a gametheoretical foundation,shewantstounderstandwhymultinationalfederalsystems(henceMFSs)develop asymmetricalinstitutionsandwhataretheconsequencesofsuchachoiceonthestabilityof thefederationinthelongrun. FollowingKimlyca,shedefinesthemultinationalStateastheonewhichcomprisesinitsown territory one or more national minorities (i.e. cultural groups voicing claims to self determinationonaterritorialbasis(ibidem:547):thiskindofminoritiesrepresentagreat threattotheunityofthefederalStategiventheirterritorialconcentration.Theauthorframes theMFSasathreeplayersgame:NationalBasedUnits(NBUs)wherenationalminoritiesare themajorityofthepopulation, RegionalBasedUnits (RBUs)wherethethemajorityofthe populationispartofthenationalmajority,andobviouslythefederal Centre.Asymmetryis thusdefinedasthecharacteristicofMFSsthroughwhichNBUs dejure enjoymorerights than[RBUs]andmaintainadifferentiatedrelationshiptothecentre(ibidem:548). TheauthoraddressesthequestionofwhyasymmetrydevelopsinMFSsbyfocusingonthe problem of secession. She makes the following assumptions: first, that the starting point (statusquoSQ)isasymmetricMFS,andsecond,thatthe(eventual)militaryconfrontation between a national minority (hence MI) and the Centre is characterized by asymmetric warfare(ibidem:551)(whichlowersthecostofinsurrectionforMI).Secessionhencecan framedasaprisoner'sdilemmagame:eachplayercanobtainitsownmostpreferredoption (i.e.secessionforMIandmaintenanceoftheSQfortheCentre)ifitdefectsandtheother

playercooperates(e.g.iftheMIsecedesandtheCentrestickstotheSQi.e.doesn'tdo anything).HoweverthisisnottheParetoefficientoutcome:indeedthatcanbereachedonlyif both players cooperate (i.e. negotiate an institutional change). Institutional change nevertheless necessarily leads to asymmetry: indeed the Centre will give NBUs more favourableconditionsthantheaverageUnitinordertoincreasethesayoftheMIinthe decisionmakingprocess(thereforeloweringthecostofcooperationfortheMIandindirectly raisingthecostofdefection). AfterhavingdemonstratedthataccommodationofaMI'sclaims leads toasymmetry,the authorturnstothequestionoftheeffectofasymmetryoverthestabilityoftheMFS.Inthe new asymmetrical setting, the goals of NBUs and RBUs diverge: the former wants asymmetricdealstobemaintained(sinceitrepresentstheMI'sguaranteeofequalstatuswith theNationalMajorityhenceMA),whilethelatterengagestheCentreinanUpgradeGame (i.e.asksforanupgradeofitspowerstothelevelofNBUs'ones).FollowingTsebelis,the authormodelsthesituationasa Nestedgame:theasymmetricaldealsweakentherelative statusofRBUsandthuschangestheruleofthefederalgamenotonlyinrespecttoCentre NBUsrelationsbutalsoinrespecttoCentreRBUsrelations.Thefinaloutcomedependson theCentre'spreferenceordering(whetheritvaluesmoretheUpgradeDealwiththeRBUor the SQ) and on what player makes the first move3. The most important conclusions to underlinearethefollowing: The Upgrade Game pushes the system towards symmetry again and makes it inherentlyunstable,nomatterwhatstrategytheCentrechooses; Asymmetry is not a selfenforcing institution since it prevents an alliance of the subordinatedunitsagainstanoppressivecentre;indeedtheCentreisabletoexploitits positionofpotentialcoalitionpartnertoincreaseitsauthority. Anarrativeofthefirst8yearsoftheRussianFederation(19901998)corroboratesthistheory. Thefactthatfrom1999PresidentPutinstartedtorollbackasymmetricdeals(Watts2005:4) proves that the Centre's political lite thought asymmetry had gone too far: such a developmentisnotincontrastwithZuber'stheory. Thetheorytowhichweturnnowismoregeneralinscopebutadoptsthesamerational framework(morespecificallypublicchoicetheory).Congletonetal.(2003)analysehowand
3 TheCentrecouldforexamplebetemptedtobreakbackonlythestrongestRBUsbyproposingtoeachonead hocupgradedeals,likesofollowingtheclassicdivideetimperastrategyamongRBUs.

whypolicymakingauthorityistransferredfromoneleveltotheother.Theyconceptualizethe demandofdevolvedpolicymakingpowersbyregionalauthoritiesastheanswertoademand of public services by the population of the region concerned. The authors look at three scenarios: Decentralisation from an overcentralized State: a revenuemaximizing over centralizedcentralgovernmentisakintoamonopolyprovider(inthiscase,ofservices andpolicymakingpowers)andisunlikelytoprovidetheadequatelevelofpublicservices foreachregion.Regionalgovernmentswhicharepressedbytheirelectoratetoprovidea specific level4 of public service(s) must purchase policymaking power at a price5. Assumingthatthecentralgovernmentdoesnotapplypricediscrimination(i.e.requires thesamepricetoallregions),asymmetryislikelytoemergewhentherearesubstantial regional differences in the demand for local autonomy (ibidem: 173), which in turn depends on the demand for the public service(s) concerned. The historical example providedreferstocitystatesinMedievalEurope,whichwerefarricherthantherestofthe country and thus asked for higher levels of public services than could be centrally provided:thereforetheyfrequentlyobtainedstrongerthanaveragepolicymakingpowers (e.g.specialcharters); Centralisation from an overdecentralized State (or group of States in the case of internationalorganizations):suchascenarioreferstothecreationofanewcentralor supranational functional authority/organisation, which is conceptualized as a club which provides excludable public services [and whose membership is voluntary]. Outsiders(regionsandStatesstilloutoftheneworganisation)usetwocriteriatoassess theexpectednetbenefitofenteringtheorganisation:first,aneconomicone(anticipated advantagefromtheincreasedscaleorscopeofcentralizedproductionorregulation),and, second,apoliticalone(expectationsaboutthemannerinwhichthosenetbenefitsareto be distributed among member[s]) (ibidem: 177). To reduce the political risk of centralisationrunbyweakermembersundersymmetricalmembership(i.e.theyfacean allornothingoffer)theorganisationcanuseinstitutionaldevicessuchassupermajority votingrulesandgeneralityruleintheprovisionofservices.Asymmetryisanothersuch instrument:byallowingheterogeneouslevelsofservice(bothamongmemberstatesand
4 Suchalevelwouldofcoursebehigherthanthecentrallyprovidedone. 5 Suchapricewouldbeapoliticalone:forexample,centralgovernmentcouldasktheregionalgovernmentto forcethroughapolicyviewedunfavourablybytheregion'spopulation.

across different services) it potentially expands both membership and the range of centralizedservicesprovided(ibidem:179).Theexampleprovidedis,notsurprisingly, the European Union, which ticks all the boxes (supermajority and generality rule, asymmetryinthelevelandextensionofservicese.g.optoutagreements). Thethirdscenario(Constitutionalconvention)basicallyfollowsthesamelogic. Tosumup,Congletonetal.makethetransferofpolicymakingauthoritydependon,first,the potential gains which could be realised out of further decentralisation/centralisation, and, second,thedisparityinpublicservicesdemandamongregions/States.Thebiggestdifference betweenCongletonetal.'stheoryandZuber'soneisthattheformerignoressecurityissues (ibidem:188,note12)andthereforefailstoaccountfortheincreasedriskfortheCentreposed byNationalMinorities.Inaddition,Congletonetal.'sdonotmakeanyclaimontheeffectsof asymmetryonthestabilityofthefederation.However,theirmodelisdynamic(becausetakes intoaccounthistorybydevisingthethreedifferentscenariosandaccountsalsoforchangein thenumberofcomponentunits)andcanbetterexplainprocessesbasedabovealloneconomic cooperation,e.g.theprocessofEuropeanintegration.

AsymmetricalFederalismontheJob:EvidencefromEUCountries Thetheoriespresentedintheprevioussectiondonotrelatetoindepthcasestudiesandare missingcomparativeevidenceandquantitativeanalysis.Theessaynowlookspreciselyatthis category. InhiscomparativeanalysisofregionaldemandsforautonomyinsixEUcountries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), van Houten (2007) verifies eight hypothesesdrawnfromtheliteratureonregionaldemandsforautonomy.Inrespecttotheaim ofthisessay,themostinterestingresultsarethat,onaverage,culturallydistinctandrelatively richandeconomicallypowerfulregionsaremostlikelyto[demandautonomy](ibidem:561); however these structural factors do not explain alone variations in demand for autonomy amongsimilarregions(e.g.similarlyculturallydistinctandrelativelyrich).Sucharoleis insteadperformedbythevariablerelatedtothedynamicsofpartycompetitionattheregional level:theanalysisindeedshowsthat,allthingsbeingequal,regionswherecompetitionis largelyamongregionalbasedparties(andnotagainstnationalbasedones)aremorelikelyto

voicesubstantialdemandsforautonomybecauseinsuchanelectoralarenaallormostissues willbeframedinterritorialterms. TherelevanceofpartydynamicsareconfirmedalsobySwenden(2002)inhisarticle onBelgium.Hefocusesonthewaypartydynamicshinderandsoftenmanyofthenumerous asymmetriestypicaloftheBelgianfederation.Indeeddefactoasymmetriesencompass: Theconcurrenceofthreeterritoriallydefinedregions(Flemishregion,Walloonregion andBrusselscapitalregion)andofthreelinguisticallydefinedcommunities(Dutch speaking,FrenchspeakingandGermanspeaking6); Disparities in economical performance among the three regions (with the Flemish havingbackin1996thehighestGDPpercapita,thebiggestpopulationandthelowest unemployment); Asymmetriesinthepartysystemintworespects:variationofsupportofeachbig partyfamilyacrossregionsasusualand,moreimportantly(anduniquetoBelgium),a dualpartysystem(onefortheFrenchspeakingandonefortheDutchspeaking). Dejure asymmetriesinthestrictsensearerelativelylimited,themostrelevantbeingthe slightlylowerstatusofBrusselscapitalregion visvis WalloonandFlemishonesandthe inconsistenciesincommunitypolicyduetotheimperfectcongruencebetweenregionaland communityborders(ibidem:74). Thecombinationofthedoublepartysystem,thepervasiveconsociationalpractises,theparity rule (whichprescribesforanevennumberofDutchandFrenchspeakingministriesinthe Brussels capitalregionandfederalgovernmentsthatis,forsymmetrybetweenthetwo communities)andthepracticeofcongruentgovernmentcoalitions(i.e.tobuildgovernments outofthesamecoalitionatalllevelsofgovernment,bothinWallonia'sorFlanders'sonesand intheBrusselscapitalregion'sandfederalones).Theendresultisthatsuchpartydynamics almost always form symmetric and congruent governments, therefore making the Belgian systemmuchlessasymmetricthanitcouldappearatfirstglance. TheEuropeancountrywhichhastakendejureasymmetryfarthestisSpain.As Cangletonetal.(2003:185)predictinthescenarioofbargaininaconstitutionalconvention, theoutcomehasbeenanhighlyasymmetricalone(Agranoff2005;Moreno2004).
6 TheGermanspeakingcommunityissosmallonly70000peoplethatitwillbenolongertakeninto considerationintherestoftheparagraph.

AsymmetrybuildsonthehistoryofSpain:thehistoricalheritageandpreviousexperiencesof selfrulebytheBasque,Catalan,Galician,NavarranMinorityNationsallowedthemtoclaim extensivepolicymakingpowers(i.e.NBUs'powers)rightduringthe'76'79transitionto democracyandtoobtainthosepowersmuchfasterthantheothersregions.Intheseregions theregionalethnoterritorialidentityisstrongerthanintherestofSpainandthismakesthem morewillingtopaythepriceforautonomy.Eventoday,32yearslater,althoughthecentral governmenthasrelentlesslypursuedsymmetryofpowersfortheComunidadesAutnomas (CAsi.e.theregions)andallregionsnowenjoysubstantialpolicymakingauthority,there arestillhugedifferencesamongNBUsandRBUs,especiallyinrespecttotheBasqueand NavarreCAsvisvistheotherCAs. TheprocessoffederalizationofSpainhasdevelopedinaninductivemanner,stepbystep (Moreno2004:3).IndeedboththecentralgovernmentandMinorityNations'liteshave favouredcentreperipherybilateralrelations,theformertokeepspreadofpowertothe(other) CAsasnarrowaspossible(Zuber'stheoryhereishelpfulinexplainingsuchabehaviour),the lattertobettercontrolthepaceofdecentralisation.Thereforenooverallframeworkof federalizationhasemergedyetandthesecondChamberhasyettobecomeatrueterritorial chamber:suchadevelopmentwouldnodoubtencouragetheinvolvementoftheCAsinstate widedecisionmaking(ibidem:12)butforthemomentthestrugglebetweenNBUs,RBUs andtheCentrecontinuesinapurelypoliticalform. AnexampleofhowfarreachingarethepowersgrantedtoBasqueCountryandCataluniais theirintenseparadiplomaticactivity(seeAgranoff2005:5;ontheBasqueCountrysee Lecoursetal.2001;forageneraloverviewofparadiplomacyi.e.diplomacybysubstate unitsseeLecours2002). Ontheother(symmetric)sideofthespectrum,thecaseofGermanyshowsthat culturalideologicalandpoliticalvariablescanseriouslycurbtheriseofasymmetry(Jung 2005).Germanyhastwonotabledejureasymmetries:ontheonehanddifferentvoting weightsofLnderintheSenateandontheotherstrongfiscalrevenuebasedequalization, withthepoorestLndergettingupto77,5%ofthegapbetweentheirrevenuecapacityand thenationalaverage[backin2005,whilein2004suchapercentagewasupto90%!](ibidem: 4). OverallneverthelessGermanyischaracterizedbyadejuresymmetricfederalism:Lnder havethesamerights,thereisnooptoutfromredistributivepolicies,etc.Inaddition,thanksto

linguistichomogeneity,relativelysmallterritorynoseriousmarginalisationoftheperiphery ,nationwidepoliticalpartiesandNGOs,therearenostrongstructuraldifferingpressures forautonomyandtherestillisastrongcommitmenttothe(in)famousequality[was uniformitybefore1993]ofconditionsoflife(ibidem:23).Howeverpressuresforasymmetry areincreasingeventhere.

Conclusion Theessayhasexpoundedtheconceptofasymmetricalfederalismandhaslinkeditto significantcontemporarydevelopmentsintheinternationalarenaandinthedomesticone.In respecttotheformerithasbeensaidthatglobalisationandtheprocessofEuropean Integrationincreasecompetitivepressureinadifferentwayforeachsubstateunit(eveninside thesamecountry)andprovideopportunitiestoexploiteconomyofscaleand/orscopeforthe mostentrepreneurialsubstateunits.Insteadinthedomesticarenatheriseofethnopoliticshas increasedthesignificanceoftheregionalarenainthepoliticalcompetition.Asymmetrical federalismisheretostayandisanincreasinglyimportantfeatureinalmostallfederations. Howevertheanalysishasshowedthatitsimportanceandextentvarywidelyindifferentkind offederations.Theimpactofasymmetryonthestabilityandultimatelyonthesurvivalofa federationisdependentuponmanyvariables. Thetheoreticalanalysishasshownthatdemographicpatterns(bothintermsof distributionintheterritoryandacrossethnicgroups)mattermorethaneverythingelse.The presenceofnationalminoritiesincreasesboththescopeandtheriskfromhavingrecourseto asymmetricalfederalismtocurbsecessionistclaims.Zuber'stheoryprovestohavegood explanatorypowerbothinrespecttoRussiaandwithregardstoSpain.Theyoungageofthese federations,however,doesnotallowtodrawadefinitiveconclusiononthestabilityofsucha system.Whatcanalreadybesaid,however,isthat,inthecaseofmultinationalfederal systems,asymmetricalfederalismcanbeaquitesuccessfulmeanstopreventthebreakingup oftheStatebutdoesnotsecureperseastableinstitutionalequilibrium. ThecaseoftheEuropeanUnion,conceptualisedasaprocessofcentralisationfroma statusquoofexcessivedecentralisation,showsthatinsteadinsuchacase,withvoluntary subscription,asymmetricfederalismcanbeanefficiencyandstabilityenhancinginstrument.

ThecaseofBelgiuminsteaddemonstratesthattoassesstherealinfluenceof asymmetricconstitutionsitismandatorytolookatthewiderpictureofthewholepolitical process.IndeedtheincrediblycomplexinnerworkingsofBelgianpartypolitics,characterized overallbyallpermeatingconsociationalpractises,risktolimitthegainstoberealizedthrough asymmetry.ItcouldbesaidthatthefactthatBelgiumisstillaunitedStatespeaksupforthe effectivenessofasymmetricalfederalisminmakingfederationssurvive:howeverthecurrent governmentcrisis(329dayswithoutacentralgovernmentonthe8May2011andstillgoing strong(Falter2011))doesnothintatahappyending.Theresponsibilityofasymmetrical federalisminsuchacrisishoweverisnotclearnorlinear. Finally,thecaseofGermanyshowsthatwhenthefederalsystemisnotputthrough excessivecentrifugalpressuresandstickstoastrongegalitariancommitment,asymmetrycan belimited.HowevernotevenGermanycancompletelyavoidthepressuretoasymmetry wieldedbytheoppositemovementsofglobalisationandregionalisation. Asymmetricalfederalismisimportantforthesurvivaloffederationsbecauseisoneof themostcommonanswerstorisksandopportunitiesofthecontemporary globalised/regionalisedworld.Itishoweveradoubleedgedswordanditsimpactonlongterm stabilityshouldbecarefullyvaluedforeachfederationinthelightofitsspecificdemographic, politicalandhistoricalpatterns.

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