FedericoFaleschini(ID10902214) ModuleConvenor:MichaelBurgess Module:PO867(ComparativeFederalism) 7March2011 Essay2(wordlimit:2000;actualwords:2088)

NeitherSpainnorSouthAfricaareformalfederations buttheirrespectiveconstitutionsincorporatedistinct federalismsthatmakethemoperateinpracticeas federalpoliticalsystems. Examinethisstatementandexploreitsimplicationsfor thecomparativestudyoffederalismandfederations.

Introduction Thisessayisgoingtoidentifytheelementsoffederalismpresentintheconstitutionsoftwo formallyunitarycountries,SpainandSouthAfrica(henceSA).Theessaywillalsotryto assesstherelevanceofthesecasestudiesforthedisciplineofcomparativefederalismand federations.MyargumentisthatbothSpainandSouthAfricaareinterestingcasestudiesfor thescholarsofcomparativefederalismandfederations,fortworeasons: Theyuseextensivefederalistpractisesdespitebeing(formally)unitarycountries:this suggeststorefrainfromrigidandlegalisticclassificationsoffederations; Theseyoungfederations,bornduringwhatHuntingondefinedTheThirdWaveof democratization (Huntington 1991), provide unique insights of how federalism has beenusedinrecenttimestoaccommodatethedemandsofdifferentgroups.Itisalso interesting to notice the influence of the different historical backgrounds on the developmentoffederalismineachcountry. Theessayisorganisedasfollows.Thefirstpartconsiderstheimportantdistinctionbetween theconceptsof federalism and federation throughthereviewoftherelevantliterature.The secondpartdealswiththecaseofSpain:itwillbeshownhowthepresenceoflongoppressed regionalnationalitieshasinfluencedfederalismthere.InthethirdpartSA'scaseisanalysedto discoverhowthedifferenthistoricalbackgroundproducedaverydifferentkindoffederalism. Thefourthsectionconcludes.

FederalismandFederation:distinctbutrelated

The distinction between Federalism and Federation is relatively new in the long intellectual debate on Federalism, which harks back at least to the 1787 Constitutional debate in the newborn USA. Indeed the study of federalism during the XIX century and up to Wheare's Federal Government, published in 1946, Following in the [] Liberal English tradition [] was very much couched in legal and institutional terms (Burgess 2006: 27). This legalistic focus had naturally associated federalism as a concept with its constitutional and institutional expression, that is, with the fully fledged Federal state.

Inthe'50s theBehaviouralRevolutionchallengedsuchapproach.Inthefieldof federalstudies,thisurgedthepassagefromthelegalisticconceptionoffederalismasastatic pattern ofgovernment(ibidem: 34)toa muchmoredynamic andallencompassingone. Thereforeuntilthe'70smucheffortsweredevotedtoarriveataneatdefinitionoffederalism (ibidem:45)whichtriedtoencompassboththeactualpoliticalsystemoffederalstatesandthe ideologicalandphilosophicaldimensionoftheconcept. Among many notable contributions, the work of Carl Friedrich seems particularly suitable to the scope of this essay. Friedrich indeed conceptualized federalism as an open-ended process that fits into the notion of constitutionalism as a process: this conceptualization as processes allowed enough space for a variety of constitutional expressions in different political systems, as long as they presented a division of decision-making powers between a central authority and multiple regional units. However, not even Friedrich's approach was able to incorporate the sociological approach, first uphold by Livingstone in 1952 (ibidem: 28, 35-6). Thequestfortheultimatedefinitionoffederalismbroughtthedebatetoastandstill.In particular,itprovedimpossibletocombineallaspectsoffederalismhighlightedbythevarious authors.Onlyin1982King'sFederalismandFederationclearlystatedthedistinctionbetween thetwoconcepts:inshort,federalismisconceptualizedasamultidimensionaldrivingforce andfederationasthatforce'sinstitutional,structuralandsystemiccounterpart(ibidem:47). Federalism thus is operationalized as those techniques and ideas (philosophical and ideological) which aim at regulating the relations between interdependent levels of government.

TheSpanishEstadodelasAutonomas Spaniardsarecharacterizedbyadualidentity(Moreno2001:16,110123):ontheonehand, thereisthestatenationalidentity,whichreferstotheunitarykingdomofSpain,firstunified in1469;ontheotherhand,thereis astillstrong regionalethnoterritorialidentity whose intensity varies in the various regions (comunidades autnomas (CAs))1. The interplay betweenthehistoricalnationalities(i.e.theBasqueCountry,CataloniaandGalicia,oppressed duringXIXcenturyandFranco'sregime(ibidem:19,94)),andtheotherCAshasinfluenced
1 See section 2 Const., which at the same time proclaims the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation and recognizes the existence of different nationalities.

both the Constituent process and the evolution of federalism in Spain. The essay will concentrateontwoelements:thedivisionofpowersbetweentheStateandtheCAsandfiscal federalism. TheSpanishConstitutionenjoyedlargepartysupportalsobecauseitissilentover manymattersregardingtheterritorialorganizationoftheState(ibidem:60).IndeedSection VIIIoftheConstitution,whichdealswiththeterritorialorganization,presentsahighdegree of incompleteness (Beramondi et al. 2004: 134) in the definition of political powers at regionallevel: Section143.2givestheresponsibilitytodrafttheStatuteofAutonomyoftheCAto the provinces/local authorities concerned: such an approach has beyond doubt encouragedthedevelopmentofanasymmetricfederalsystem(Argullol etal. 2006: 244); Section 148.1 lists those policy areas over which the CAs are entitled to assume exclusivejurisdiction:thismeansthateveryCAisfreetodecideoverwhichpolicy area(s)assumesuchjurisdiction.Moreover,Section148.2givestheCAsthepowerof amendingtheirownStatuteeveryfiveyears; Sections150.1and150.2provideforthepossibilityofulteriordevolutionofpowers fromthecentralStatetotheCAs;howeverSection150.3alsoprovidesforthepower oftheStatetoenforceharmonizationinallpolicyareas,eventheonesoverwhichthe CAshaveexclusivejurisdiction,forthesakeofthegeneralinterest. Asaconsequenceofthisopenendedapproach,thelistofexclusivepowerspertainingtothe CentralState(Section149.1)doesnotgivethefullpictureofthelevelofdecentralizationin Spain.IndeedthesupremacyclauseoffederallawcontainedinSection149.3ishardly appliedbecauseofthedifficultyofestablishingwhatarethemattersexclusivelyattributed to the CAs: there is still no stable equilibrium regarding the division of competences (Arguilloletal.2006:24950) In respect to fiscal federalism, the Constitution is once again silent and this has encouragedstrongasymmetry(notwithstandingtheprincipleofsolidarityseesections156.1 and158).Section157.1liststhesourceofrevenuesfortheCAsbuttheirdefinitionisdeemed toanorganiclaw.Theresulthasbeenthecreationoftwofinancialregimes:ontheonehand the commonregime andontheotherhandthe charterregime,whichapplies onlytothe

BasqueCountryandNavarra(LpezLabordaetal.2007:296). The common regime is regulated by the 1980 Ley Orgnica de Financiacin de las Comunidades Autnomas (Autonomous Communities Financing Act), which has been reformedatvarioustimes.In2001animportantreformhassubstantiallyincreasedregional revenueautonomy:from2001to2005,revenuesraisedbytheCAshaveraisedfrom9.5%to 22.6% of nonfinancial national public revenues (while their share of expenditure has remainedconstant)(ibidem:307). On the other hand, the charter regime provides a much higher degree of revenue autonomy to the Basque Country and Navarra (ibidem: table 4 p. 299, 311), therefore providing another example of Spain's asymmetric federalism. Beforeconcludingthissection,itisworthnotingthatwhileSpaincanbeconsidered federal with respect to the selfrule of the CAs, the lack of an arena for territorial representationandcooperation(Beramondietal.2004:137)showsthatSpanishfederalismis stillincomplete.

SouthAfrica:MistrustandHopetowardsFederalism ThecaseofSAshowshowhistorystronglyinfluencesfederalism'sroleinthedemocratization process. Indeed while in the case of Spain decentralization and democracy were closely linked, in SA the African National Congress (ANC), the dominant political party representingtheblackAfricanmajoritysegregatedduringtheapartheidregime,considered federalismawayforthewhiteAfrikanerlitetothwartmajorityrule(Steyler2005:316)in ordertoretainasmanyprivilegesaspossibleinthenewdemocraticregime.Inaddition,the ANC associated federalism with the old system of the homelands, i.e. the territorial organizationbasedonraciallypureregionsusedbytheapartheidgovernmentinorderto promoteracialsegregation(ibidem:3134). TheConstituentprocessinSAhasbeencalledanegotiatedrevolution(ibidem:312): theapartheidgovernmentindeedresistedthecreationofanelectedConstituentassemblyand negotiated with the ANC and the other parties involved without taking into account the electoralsupportofeachparty.Thisexplainswhynotwithstandingtheelectoraldominanceof theANC(whichhaswonallelectionssince1994(BBCNews))the1996Constitutionpresents

variouselementsoffederalism.Thefocuswillagainbefirst,onthedivisionofpowerbetween federal,provincialandlocalspheresandsecond,onfiscalfederalism. Section40.1statesthatgovernmentisconstitutedasnational,provincialandlocal spheresofgovernmentwhicharedistinctive,interdependentandinterrelated:allspheresof governmentarethusconstitutionallyrecognisedand(formally)onthesamelevel.Section41 definesthePrinciplesofcooperativegovernment,revealingtheinfluenceoftheGerman federalmodel(Steyler2005:325).Boththeelevationoflocalgovernmenttotheconstitutional statusandthechoiceofacooperativemodelareduetotheinfluenceoftheANC,which wantedtoweakentheprovincialspherewhereAfrikanersandotherprivilegedminoritiesare moreabletogetadvantages.Indeedoverallthepolityiscentredominated(ibidem:320). In respect to the provincial sphere, the autonomy from the national sphere is limited. ProvincescanwriteprovincialConstitutionsbut,unliketheSpanishcase,suchConstitutions areverylimitedinscope(seeSection143).Turningtothedivisionofcompetences,schedule 4aoftheConstitutionlistsconcurrent(nationalandprovincial)policyareaswhileschedule5a liststheexclusive(provincial)policyareas:itisevidentthatthelatteraremuchmorelimited thantheformer.Moreoversection146providesforawidenationaloverrideclause. The picture is rather different when looking at the local sphere. While municipalities are subject to the control of both the provincial and the national level (Steyler2005: 324), they have greater autonomy than the provinces: for example, section 156.4 provides for the assignment to a municipality of an exclusive provincial policy area which necessarily relates to local government, if: a. that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and b. the municipality has the capacity to administer it.. In addition, schedule 4b and 5b list of exclusive municipal policy areas is rather extensive and section 151.4 protects bylaws from excessive interference by provincial and even national law. Turningtofiscalfederalism,theunbalancebetweenprovincialandlocalspheresis onceagainstriking.Ontheonehand,provinces'taxationpowerisdependentonnational legislation, but no such act has been approved by the Parliament: as a result, provinces' revenuesarevastlyinferiortothehugeexpenditurestheyhavetosustainforprovidingmost socialservices,thatis,provincessufferfromhigh verticalfiscalimbalances (i.e.thegap betweenrevenueraisingandexpenditure).Ontheotherhand,municipalities'taxationpowers aredefinedintheConstitution(Section229)andaresufficienttocoveraround90%oftheir expenditure (see Khumalo et al. 2007: 264280 for an indepth analysis of SA's

intergovernmentalfiscalrelationssystem).

Conclusion:Federalismasaflexibletoolformanagingconflict The case studies of Spain and South Africa show well how flexible federalism can be. In both countries, minorities used federalism to protect themselves against majority rule: however, in the case of Spain federalism was seen by the once oppressed minorities as the ultimate device to protect democracy, while in the case of SA the once oppressive minority used federalism to retain as many power as possible in the new democratic order. Of course the outcome of these related but opposite processes was very different. In Spain, the historical minorities has driven the federal system towards asymmetry and towards an increasingly important role of the CAs vis--vis the national and local level. In SA on the contrary the ANC has tried to curtail the independence of the provinces as much as possible vis--vis not only the national sphere but the local one too. Inconclusion,bothcaseshighlighttheimportanceoffederalismasatoolformanaging intrastaterelationsbetweendifferentnationalandracialgroups,evenatthebeginningofthe XXI century. This is by far the most important implication for the study of comparative federalismandfederations.

BIBLIOGHRAPHY(inalphabeticalorder)
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1069402.stm

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