Student:FedericoFaleschini ModuleConvenor:MaximBratersky Module:PostSovietEurasiaandtheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation Programme:JointMasterProgrammewithUniversityofKent 22December2011

WesternpartofPostSovietSpace: PoliticalvectorsofByelorussiaandUkraine SocietalrootsandColourRevolutions

Introduction Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia form the so-called Eastern Slavs group. However under such a simplistic label lay many differences and conflicting views. These conflicting views determine the politic vectors of these countries in a very strong way which Western commentators often fail to grasp. A long shared history, dating back at least from the 19 th century (with the exception of Western Ukraine), has entangled the destiny of these three (non-nation) States. The essay is going to analyse the societal underpinnings of the political vectors in Ukraine and Byelorussia, in particular with reference to the so-called Colour revolutions wave which involved (with different intensity) many Post-Soviet states. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine exposed in sharp terms the ethnic, linguistic and cultural division inside the country, while the absence of any kind of colour revolution in Byelorussia also shed light over the internal societal dynamics (or lack thereof). The essay aims to show how in these countries societal dynamics, as shaped by centuries-old cultural influences and mass transfers of people, have a sharp and strong influence on each country's political vectors. The essay is structured as follows. The first section clarifies the internal ethnic and linguistic composition of Ukraine and Byelorussia. The second section is going to present the general interaction among national identities in Ukraine and Byelorussia and the foreign policy of these countries. The third section focuses on the colour revolution wave to understand how nationalism came into play in such a crucial moment for the determination of the countries' politics. The fourth section concludes. 1. National identities in Ukraine and Byelorussia The concept of national identity in Ukraine and Byelorussia is not a straightforward one. In both countries Russia, both through its current influence and (even most important) in the form of the Soviet and Tsarist historical heritage, is a defining factor in the debate about national identity and foreign policy. The similarities among the two countries however end here and each country must be analysed separately. Ukraine The issue of nationality is most divisive in Ukraine than in almost any other post-soviet country. I

purposedly employ the term divisive, to refer to the stark division of the country in two zones, Eastern and Western as delimited by the river Dnepr (Burant 1995). In each zone, the majority of the population holds radically different views on the issue of nationhood in Ukraine. The differences between the two opposite conceptions of Ukrainian nationality are strongly related to the history of each area (Burant 1995): Western Ukraine in general is the area where Ukrainian national conscience was born. The first consciously Ukrainian intellectual first emerged around 1850 in the main universities of the region, much in the same way as in other parts of Western Europe. Although this kind of cultural activities was persecuted by the Tsarist regime in the most part of western Ukraine (included Kiev), the development of a national conscience continued in the most western region of Galizia, which was ruled by the Austro-Ungarian Empire since the end of the 18 th century. Under the relatively liberal Hapsburg rule, Ukrainian intellectuals together with the Greek Catholic Church forged a strong Ukraine national conscience, in a similar trajectory to the one followed by Balkan nationalities. Galicia fell under Soviet rule only after 1945, a short period of time which did not erase this strong national pride; the same sentiment is shared by the vast majority of the population in western Ukraine: this is reflected in a ratio of ethnic Ukrainians to Russians and a ratio of Ukrainian-speakers to Russian-speakers higher than in Eastern Ukraine; Eastern Ukraine historical evolution is completely different, because of the deep and long Russian rule over these territories: indeed Tsarist Russia annexed Eastern Ukraine and Kiev after the Pereyaslav agreement (1654) and immediately started to colonise these territories. The pace of Russification strongly accelerated at the end of the 19th century as the region became an industrial powerhouse. Again, the extent of this Russification policy and its consequences are more intense the more you go eastward1. The main consequence of this historical path is that inhabitants of eastern Ukraine have adopted the so called Little Russianism identity which basically denies the very existence of Ukraine as a separate Slavic nationhood. This is reflected in a ratio of ethnic Ukrainians to Russians and a ratio of Ukrainian-speakers to Russian-speakers lower than in Eastern Ukraine. Byelorussia The situation is completely different in Byelorussia (ibidem). The historical process is similar: as in
1 The division in two zones is a bit a simplification: there is indeed evidence of three zones (west, centre and east), with the central oblasti having a ratio of ethnic Ukrainians to Russians and a ratio of Ukrainian-speakers to Russianspeakers higher than the eastern oblasti but lower than the western ones. Nonetheless, in terms of political allegiances, the West-East distinction holds and it is widely employed in the literature.

Ukraine, Tsarist and then Soviet rule imposed a strong policy of Russification, coupled with sheer repression and absence of economical development. The major difference however, is that the whole country was under Tsarist/Soviet rule so no nationalist hotbed could prosper. The glorious past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania headed by the Byelorussian nobility was too distant an heritage to maintain the nationalist flame alive. This meant that after 1945 the Soviet rulers were able to repress Byelorusian culture and language and create a very strong and persistent Soviet identity, which was also fostered by the comparatively good performance of the Byelorussian Soviet economy (which was the industrial powerhouse of the USSR) (Eke et al. 2000) As a result, Byelorusian ethnocultural identity has been (fatally?) weakened and the majority of the population [] views the Belarusian language as a relic of a pre-industrial, rural existence (ibidem: 534). The Byelorussian identity therefore is a wildly anachronistic mix of Little Russianism (i.e. loyalty to the eastern Slavs as one russkii narod) and Soviet Belarusian patriotism (i.e. loyalty to the Soviet Belarusian SSR, the historical memory of it and its communitarian values) (ibidem: 526). Ethnic Russians in Byelorussia and Ukraine According to Kuzio(2003),RussianidentitywasshapedwithinanallRussianimperial[i.e.Tsarist andSoviet]framework,notanationstate.[]Russianidentityisthereforemoreimperialand statistthanethnocultural.[This]lackofanethnoculturalbase(ibidem:436)isfundamentalin ordertounderstandpoliticaldynamicsintheEasternSlaviccountries.Theauthorindeedmaintains that without an ethnocultural base proactive political mobilisation (i.e. aimed at changing the system)isalmostimpossibletoachieveinthecontextofpostcommunist/transitioncountries2. AnexcellentexampleoftheoverlappingofSoviet/ImperialandRussianidentityarestatisticson ethnicity.Forexample,whenconfrontingthe results of the 1989 Soviet census with the ones of the 2001 referendum, one can not fail to note that self-identifying ethnic Russians diminished by three millions: indeed Russian in 1989 probably had a supra-national territorial-civic meaning (ibidem: 436) rather than an ethnic one, which explains how such a large number of persons could have changed its self-identification. It is thus easy to see why such a self-identification immediately defuses any kind of nationalistic claim: indeed in Crimea, the only region with an ethnic Russian majority, supra-national communists [are more successful] than Russian ethnic nationalists (ibidem: 437).

2 See section 3 on this topic.

2. Interaction among national identities and policy vectors in Ukraine and Byelorussia In politics, nationality and ethnicity matter. However they are not always preponderant factors and, crucially, they do not always translate in precise political choices. The interplay among politics, nationality and ethnicity is determined above all by the political system itself. Ukraine and Byelorussia again are very different in this respect. Ukraine Makhorkina(2005)analysesthe1998and2002electionstofindoutwhetherforeignpolicy issues,andtheparties'positionsonthem,wererelevantfortheaverageUkrainianvoter.Giventhat Ukraine,apostcommunistcountry,wasconsideredatbesta delegativedemocracy (i.e.citizens onlymobiliseduringelections)suchanattitudewouldseemunlikely.Howevertheauthorfounds thatforeignpolicyissues(tobepreciseUkraine'srelationswithRussiaandtheEU)areindeedcore issuesinthepoliticalparties'electoralprogramsandareverysignificantintheUkrainianpolitical context(20%ofthecitizenswentsofarastoconsiderthemcrucial(ibidem:256)).Theimportance offoreignpolicyintheeyesofpublicopinionisreinforcedbythefactthatamajorityofUkrainians wished that the Parliament (as the organ most representative of the public opinion) had larger competencesintermsofforeignpolicy. ThemostimportantfindingisthattheEastWestdivideisastrongpredictorofvotingbehaviourin respecttoforeignpolicyissues,morethaninrespecttoeconomicissues(evenfundamentalones suchasroleofthemarketeconomy):itisforeignpolicyorientationsthatdistinguisharegionas the mostimportant factor of political preferences. (ibidem: 257). Notwithstanding these sharp regionaldifferences,partiesand/orcoalitionsaimingatthemajorityhadtowaterdownthemost extremeforeignpolicystances:thisattentiontothetopicdemonstratesitssensitiveness. How then does this sharp divisions play out in the definition of international political vectors?TheoutcomewasaptlycalledmultivectorismbypresidentKuchma,whichhowevernever clearlydefinedit:indeedKuzio(2003)judgesitamerereflectionofanamorphousandconfused nationalidentityandhenceofaninabilitytochoosebetweenEuropeandEurasia(ibidem:448). MultivectorismandLittleRussianismareclearlyincompatibleandbroughtUkraine'sforeignpolicy toacompleteparalysis(asshownbytheisolationofUkrainewhichisexcludedbothbyEuropean ledandRussianledintegrationprocesses):foreignpolicywasatbestatooltoreacttoshortterm changes(ibidem:447).

Itisinterestingtonotethecontrastwiththefirstyearsoftheindependence(Burant1995):inthat periodUkrainianlitesadoptedanunashamedlyproWesternstanceandmadeeverypossibleeffort toparticipateinregionalintegrationschemesandbeeligibleforEUmembership.EasternEuropean countrieshoweverconstantlyrejectedUkraineastheyfearedthatitwouldhavebeenmoreofan issueratherthananassetinthepreparationforenteringtheEU,givenits(asthenyet)unreformed and highly inefficient Soviet economic system. The West lost that unique opportunity to pull Ukraine on its side: the Orange Revolution ended up being adelusion interms ofdemocratic standards,asitwillbediscussedinsection3. Byelorussia Although the Pan-Slavic rhetoric and strategy is utterly unsuccessful when dealing with Ukraine, it is the best instrument for the Kremlin to draw Byelorussia towards a closer Union with Russia. Actually, however, there has never been any need to encourage such a trend. Byelorussia regretted the dissolution of the USSR right from the start: indeed it has never held a referendum to endorse its Declaration of Independence (Eke et al. 2000: 526) and in general has avoided any kind of reform to its Soviet system. Its main foreign policy goal has always been to create an Union with Russia: already on 24 September 1993 the two countries signed an agreement over the creation of a monetary Union (Burant 1995). The consequences of such a course of action are easy to grasp (Burant 1995, Eke et al. 2000, Kuzio 2003, Bolanos2010). The rule of Lukashenka is linked to an inherently unstable equilibrium in today's world: the maintenance of acceptable standards of living in a Soviet system. In order to deliver on both sides, Lukashenka desperately needs the massive subsidies provided by the cheap Russian gas. The foreign policy vector thus is one and only one, as far as Lukashenka stays in power. Even focusing only on ethnic matters, a closer integration with Russia is the best option in the eyes of the population, which is aware of the country's dependence on Russia (Korosteleva2009). As we have discussed before, the heavy Russification has cancelled almost every trace of ethnocultural Byelorussian identity and many Byelorussians do not see closer ties to Russia as a dangerous move (indeed many have found it problematic to see themselves as a community apart from Russia (ibidem: 335)), but rather an inevitable step to preserve their Soviet system, whose stability they cherish over everything else (65% of Byelorussians would choose well-being over prosperity (ibidem: 338)).

3. The colour revolution wave in Ukraine and Belarus and the influence of nationality Colour revolutions followed a similar path in all post-Soviet countries were they happened: they all followed huge election rigging and involved large numbers of protesters whose protests endured for several days (Bunce et al. 2006). The protests in Ukraine were the biggest and longest ones, while Byelorussia was insulated from any mass protest movement. This section looks into the involvement of nationalist issues into the revolutions (or lack thereof in the case of Byelorussia). Ukraine The so-called Orange revolution had an unmistakable, heavily charged nationalist component, as Kuzio (2010) demonstrates: Western and central Ukrainians played a disproportionate role in the Orange Revolution, accounting for 35.5 and 30.1 percent respectively of the protestors [] A total of 40 percent of Kyiv residents participated in the Orange Revolution (ibidem: 293-4). It is however necessary to understand why participation was so regionally skewed. The author's answer is that nationalism was a fundamental element in the mobilisation of the population3. Drawing on the work of previous scholars, Kuzio distinguishes between two competing types of nationalism in Ukraine: Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism: supportive of democratic and market reforms4; Eastern Slavic nationalism: more suspicious of such reforms.

The first important point thus is that nationalism must not be blindly and invariantly opposed to democracy. Indeed nationalism is an extraordinary source of energy which can be channelled in different directions. In the case of Western Ukraine, the statistics related to human capital, political participation, civil society's activity present consistently higher levels in respect to Eastern Ukraine. This is the fruit of a longer political and civic tradition in Western Ukraine (in the latter sphere, the overlapping between Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox believers and protesters is very high) in respect to Eastern Ukraine. To sum up, the stronger Ukrainian national identity (in comparison to 1990) has nourished a livelier, more reactive and more organised civil society, which was able to react to what amounted to blatant vote rigging on the part of the president Kuchma. At the same time Eastern Slavic nationalism stayed passive in two key historical turns of the young independent Ukraine: the 1990 independence and 2004 Orange revolution.

3 Shils (1997) identifies four pillars of successful post-Soviet transformation: Democratisation, Marketisation, Nation/Nationalism and State Building. 4 It should be noted however that among the political parties which could be grouped under the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism banner there are also far right parties not exactly familiar with democratic values!

Unfortunately for the protesters, the Orange revolution (like all other colour revolutions) turned up to be a total failure in a very short period of time (Tudoroiu2007).Theprotestersfailedtonotice thattheleaderstheysupportedwerestillpartofthesamepoliticalestablishmentasKuchmaandthe otherpoliticianstheyloathed.Civicsocietywaseffectivelyexploitedbythenewleadershiptomake theregimechangeeasierandtheeffectsonthequalityofgovernancewereevenworsethanbefore theRevolution. Thisfailurehoweverdoesnotdiscardthevalidityoftheanalysismadeinthepreviousparagraph, sincetheimportanceoftheroleofcivilsocietyandtheregionaldifferencesinsideUkraineremain valid. Byelorussia Byelorussia was mostly insulated from the colour revolutions (Korosteleva2009). After the 2006 election a protest of some 10000-35000 people took place in central Minsk for 5 days: a sizeable number for Byelorussian standards but hardly comparable to the other colour revolutions. In respect to the topic of this essay there is no observation to be made since the protest did not have any nationalistic character at all (the most prominent and common trait of protesters was their young age). It is however important to note that ethnic Russians are strongly over-represented in the middle-level bureaucratic apparatus in the regions (Eke et al.: 533), which gives them ample powers to influence government policies. As Kutio (2010) notes, soviet nationalism (the prevailing kind of nationalism in Byelorussia, which is also pushed by the regime itself) does not have potential for mass mobilisation, rather it is directed to the conservation of the Soviet system. The preference for stability (in line with the Eastern Slavic nationalism, which is also influential in Byelorussia) makes protests highly unlikely as long as the economy ticks on: as Korosteleva (2009: 335, 341) notes: there is a healthy and legitimate consensus between the people of Belarus and their leadership [] any further quest for knowledge or critical opinion becomes redundant once individual security in an autocratic society is achieved. Lukashanka thus seems to have been successful in defusing the nationalist time-bomb and is now enjoying widespread support, which is set to endure as long as Russia is willing to subsidize the inefficient Soviet-era economy. 4. Conclusion This essay has looked into the issue of nationalism and the foreign policy vectors in Ukraine and

Russia. First it has defined the question of ethnicity and nationality in each country, then it has looked into the interaction between nationalism and foreign policy determination in the Post-Soviet years. Lastly it has focused then on the experience of the colour revolutions. The main conclusions are: Both Ukraine and Byelorussia have been profoundly influenced by the process of Russification. However while Ukraine has managed to develop a national conscience resilient enough to survive the Soviet era, Byelorussia has almost completely lost its own ethnocultural national conscience; Ukraine and Byelorussia have chosen very different paths after the collapse of the USSR. Byelorussia has immediately looked to Russia for protection and has considered itself to be Russia's little brother, not only because it was conscious that its cherished Soviet economy can not survive without Russian help but also (and more important) because Byelorussian national conscience had been almost completely russified, making an Union with Russia popular among the public. Ukraine's foreign policy on the contrary has been much more contrasted, reflecting from time to time different political interests and, most important, the sharp internal division of the country, which prevents any long-term, strategic foreign policy. Ethnic Nationalism is determinant in the crafting of Ukraine's foreign policy; In respect to the colour revolutions the two countries have again chosen opposite paths. In Byelorussia Lukashenka effectively managed to neutralize Ethnic Nationalist political movements, therefore drastically reducing any kind of revolution as long as Russia backs him up. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution has shown the vivacity and the power of civil society in mobilising massive numbers of people, although the internal fracture of the Ukrainian society looms on every initiative. In this context Ethnic Nationalism has been at centre stage, playing an absolutely key role in the mass mobilisation.

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