Conflicts of Law Outline Reviewer Conflicts of Laws - That part of municipal law of a State which directs its courts

and administrative agencies, when confronted with a legal problem involving a foreign element, whether or not they should apply a foreign law/s (Paras). (4) Elements 1. Conflict of laws is part of the municipal law of a state; 2. There is a directive to courts and admin agencies; 3. There is a legal problem involving foreign element; 4. There is either an application or a nonapplication of a foreign law or foreign laws. Distinctions between Conflicts of Law and Public International Law Bases As to nature Persons involved COL Municipal in character Private Individuals PIL International in character Sovereign states; and other entities possessed of an international personality such as the UN org Generally affected by public interest; those in general are of interest only to sovereign States -Peaceful (diplomatic negotiations, tender & exercise of good office, mediation, conciliation) -Judicial arbitration/settleme nt -Forcible (severance of diplomatic relations, retorsions, embargo, pacific

blockade, war Sources Direct: Constitutions Codifications Special Laws International Treatises and International Conventions Judicial Decisions International Customs Indirect: Natural Moral Law Work of Writers Kilberg Doctrine It is a rule to the effect that the forum is not bound by the law of the place of injury or death as to the limitations on damages for wrongful act because such rule is procedural and hence the law of the forum governs on this issue. (Northwest Airlines vs. CA) Center of Gravity Doctrine Choice of law problems in conflicts of law are resolved by the application of the law of the jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship to or contact with the event and parties to litigation and issue therein. Forum Non Conveniens A forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by law on the ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of justice would be best served by trial in another forum or the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere tried elsewhere. It may be manifested in the following ways: 1. The evidence and the witness may not be readily available; 2. The court dockets of the forum may already be clogged to permit additional cases would inevitably hamper the speedy administration of justice; 3. Evils of forum shopping; 4. Forum has no particular interest in the case; 5. The case may be better tried in other courts. The doctrine should generally apply only if the defendant is a corporation Elements: a. The forum State is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;

b. It is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and c. It has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. Jurisdiction In international law, it is often defined as the right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries, subject to certain exceptions. Jurisdiction over the Person 1. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the moment he invokes the aid of the court and voluntarily submits himself by institution of the suit through proper pleadings 2. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through: a. Voluntary appearance or b. Personal or Substituted service of summons Jurisdiction over the Property Results either from seizure of the property under a legal process or from the institution of legal proceedings wherein the courts power over the property is recognized and made effective. This kind of jurisdiction of jurisdiction is referred to as in rem jurisdiction. Another form of jurisdiction is quasi in rem which affects only the interests of particular persons in the thing. NOTE: Summons by publication is authorized in three cases: 1. If the action is in rem; 2. quasi in rem; and when 3. Involves the personal status of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Co. vs. Bohanan GR L-12105, January 30, 1960 Facts: The testator C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties were located. Notwithstanding his long stay in the Philippines, he continued to be a citizen of the US and of the state of his particular choice, Nevada and remained to be a citizen of that state until his death. He declared in his will that the same was executed in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada. On April 24, 1950, the will which the testator executed in Manila on April 23, 1944 was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. The wife Magdalena C Bohonan and her two children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions, claiming that they have been deprived of the

Transactions involved

Private transactions between private individuals Resort to municipal tribunals

Remedies and Sanctions

legitime that the laws of the Philippines, concede them. The children were only given legacies of P6,000 each, while the wife received nothing. Issues: Is the wife entitled to any share in the estate? Is the failure of the testator to give his children what they are entitled to under Philippine laws valid? Is it necessary to reintroduce the proved Nevada Law? Held: No. The laws of Nevada of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the state of Nevada and since there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C Bohanan, the latter can have no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by the testator. Yes. Art 10 para 2 of the CC (now par 2, Art 16 of NCC) provides that legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions. Shall be regularized by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Pursuant to this article, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator in this case, Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. The testamentary provisions of the will, therefore are valid. Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610 Facts: The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301

of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will. Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved. In Re: Estate of Suntay 95 Phil 500 Facts: Facts: Jose B Suntay, the testator is a Filipino Citizen and a resident of the Philippines. On May 14, 1934, he died in the City of Amoy, Fookien Province, Republic of China, leaving properties both in China and the Philippines and nine children by the first marriage and 1 child by the second marriage with Maria Natividad Billian, who survived him. On Oct 15, 1934, the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of the last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will and of insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of said will. The petition was remanded to the CFI of Bulacan after the Court overruled the decision on appeal. Subsequently, the petition was dismissed on February 7, 1938. After the war, Silvino Suntay claiming he had found among the files and documents of his father a will in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January 4, 1931 and filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy District Court a petition praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929

or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China on January 4, 1931. Issue: 1. Has the existence of the said law been proved? 2. What is the effect of the absence of proof to the existence of said law? Held: 1. The order of the Municipal District court of Amoy China does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will ans the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will. 2. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. Theories Why We Should Apply Foreign Laws Theory of Comity foreign law is applied because of its convenience & because we want to give protection to our citizens, residents, & transients in our land. >Hilton vs. Guyot Facts: Defendants Henry Hilton and William Libbey, residents of New York and trading as co-partners in Paris under the firm name of A.T. Stewart & Co. were sued in France for debts due to a French firm, Charles Fortich & Co. Gustave Guyot, liquidator of the French firm, sued Hilton and Libbey on the French judgment in the US Circuit Court for the Southern Distrtict of New York seeking an amount totaling over $195,000. The court held the judgment conclusive and entered a decree in favor of the French firm without examination anew the merits of the case. Defendants question this decree on many grounds, foremost of which that French courts gave no force and effect to the duly rendered judgments of US courts against French citizens. Summary of ruling:

No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which one nation shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon the "comity of nations." "Comity" , in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, nor of mere courtesy and good will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to int'l duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws. "The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes individuals, so and largely to to promote a justice between intercourse produce friendly

under such foreign law; an act done in another State may give rise to the existence of a right if the laws of that State crated such right. Theory of Local Law- we apply foreign law not because it is foreign, but because our laws, by applying similar rules, require us to do so; hence, it is as if the foreign law has become part & parcel of our local law. Theory of Harmony of Laws we have to apply the foreign laws so that wherever a case is decided, that is, irrespective of the forum, the solution should be approximately the same; thus, identical or similar solutions anywhere & everywhere. When the goal is realized, there will be harmony of laws Theory of Justice the purpose of all laws, including Conflict of Laws, is the dispensing of justice; if this can be attained in many cases applying the proper foreign law, we must do so. Nature and Proof of Foreign Judgment Nature of foreign judgment It is imperative that it be proved in accordance with our prescribed rules on the matter. A foreign judgment is recognized when it is given the same effect that it has in the state where it was rendered with respect to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issues involved. Where the foreign judgment is being presented as a defense to the claim of the plaintiff, what is involved is the recognition of a foreign judgment. A foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to being recognized, a party is given affirmative relief to which the judgment entitles him. When a plaintiff asks the court of one state to carry out and make effective a judgment obtained by him in another state, what is involved is the enforcement of a foreign judgment. Conditions for Recognition of Foreign Judgment 1. Foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal which had competent jurisdiction over the parties and the case in the proper judicial proceedings in which the defendant shall have be given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard; 2. It must be a judgment on civil and commercial matters; 3. The judgment must be valid according to the

court that delivered it; and, 4. Judgment must be final and executory to constitute res judicata in another action; ELEMENTS: The judgment must be: a. Final; b. Rendered by a competent court; c. On the Merits Involve the same parties, subject matter; and, cause of action. 5. Foreign judgment must not be contrary to the public policy or the good morals of the State. Querubin vs. Querubin 47 OG 316 Facts: A Filipino married an American lady with whom he subsequently had a daughter. The man later obtained a Californian divorce on account of his wifes adultery with another man. The custody of the daughter was awarded to the innocent husband. However, the court said that the child could not be brought out of California without judicial permission. A year later, the Filipino came back to the Philippines with the child. In the meantime, the wife had married her former paramour and had been able to obtain an amendment for the divorce decree, this time granting the custody of the child to her. To obtain enforcement of this amendment in the Philippines, she brought a petition for the will of habeas corpus in Ilocos Sur. Issue: May she be awarded with the custody of the child? Held: No, under the Philippine law, two important things stand out: a. Preference in parental authority is given to the father, not to the mother (Old Civil Code); b. The guilty spouse generally loses parental authority except if the child is under 7, there should be no separation from the mother unless there be compelling reasons therefore (New Civil Code).

between the sovereignty to which they belong, that courts of justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations." "It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided." Notes: Comity is a general principle of international law that US Supreme Court has a long history of acknowledging. A respect of reciprocity between jurisdictions Respect we will not demean the laws and policies of other countries, because we expect other ountries to respect ours as well Theory of Vested Rights we seek to enforce not foreign law itself but the rights that have been vested

Kinds of Conflict Rules One-sided rule when Philippine internal law will apply. Art 15, CC: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of

persons are binding upon citizens Philippines, even though living abroad.

of

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name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? Facts: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8,alleging that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27,2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on,petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. On June 4,2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with his sexual re- assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23,2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the change of petitioner s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. Held: No, RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Under the said

All-sided rule when foreign law will apply.

Art 16, CC: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Composition of Conflict Rules Factual situation - set of facts presenting a conflicts problem. Ex. Capacity to succeed Point of contract law of the country with which the factual situation is most ultimately connected. Ex. Law of the nation of the decedent Status and Capacity Silverio vs. Republic When God created man,He made him in the likeness of God;He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo.Oh North Wind!North Wind!Please let us out!, the voices said.She pecked the reed once,then twice.All of a sudden,the bamboo cracked and slit open.Out came two human beings;one was a male and the other was a female.Amihan named the man Malakas (Strong)and the woman Maganda (Beautiful).(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,drugs and counseling with regard to a person s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of

law, a petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: 1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; 3. Or the change will avoid confusion. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Republic vs. Cagandahan 565 SCRA 72 Facts: Respondent Jennifer B. Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. In her early years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was found out that her ovarian structures had minimized. Respondent Cagandahan also alleged that she has no breasts or menstrual development. Consequently, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)a condition where persons thus afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones (androgen).She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The trial court granted the petition. Hence, this instant petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent Cagandahan HELD: Petition DENIED. In deciding this case, the Court considers the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a nomans land for those individuals who are neither truly

male nor truly female.The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. The Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like Cagandahan, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Cagandahan here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like Cagandahan, is fixed. Respondent Cagandahan here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. He could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent Cagandahans development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on Cagandahan concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider Cagandahan as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Cagandahan is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent Cagandahans position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling the Court do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, the Court respects Cagandahans congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court cannot but respect how respondent Cagandahan deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case Characteristics of Status 1. Status is conferred principally by the state not by the individual. 2. Status is a matter or public or social interest. 3. Status being a concept of social order cannot easily be terminated at the mere will or desire of the parties concerned. 4. Status is generally supposed to have a universal character: when a certain status is created by law of one country, it is GENERALLY judicially recognized all over the world. Kinds of Capacity Capacity to act (active) power to do acts with legal effects. Juridical capacity (passive) fitness to be the subject of legal relations.

Domiciliary Theory - in general, the status, condition, rights, obligations, & capacity of a person should be governed by the law of his domicile. Situs Theory - law of the place where property is situated; the general rule is that real property is governed by the law of the State where it is situated. Nationality and Citizenship Nationality membership in an ethnic, social, racial and cultural group. Citizenship membership in a political society. Citizens of the Philippines IN RP: 1987 CONSTI: ARTICLE 4: WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS? 1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution (ratification on Feb 2, 1987; effective Feb 11?) 2. Fathers and mothers are Filipino citizens 3. Born before January 17, 1973 + Filipino mothers + elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching age of majority 4. Naturalized according to law *note: #s 1-3 are considered NATURAL-BORN Citizens 1. NATU RA L BORN CIT IZ EN S -those who are citizens of a particular state w/o having to perform any act to acquire or perfect citizenship Jus soli principle Jus sanguinis principle

JURIDICAL CAPACITY

CAPACITY TO ACT

fitness to be subject of Power to do acts with legal legal relations (PASSIVE) effects (ACTIVE) Inherent in every natural acquired person Lost only through death May be lost

Looks to the law of the Rule of descent or blood place of one's birth You're a citizen of the place Your citizenship depends on of your birth your parents Followed in common law Followed in the Philippines countries *most of the cases involved are with regards elections because elective public officials from the President down to Governor are required to be natural-born citizens TALAROC V. UY: JUS SOLI APPLIED BEFORE 1935 CONSTI -Uy was born of Chinese father but of Filipino mother in RP. His nationality was contested for election purposes. Court held that Uy was a Filipino citizen by virtue of being born in the Philippines, and the adoption of the Jus Sanguinis principle did not effect the exclusion of those who were already considered citizens. Besides, he

Personal Law is the law that attaches to an individual wherever he may go.

Theories of Personal Law Nationality Theory - by virtue of which the status and capacity of an individual are generally governed by the law of his nationality. This is principally adopted in the RP.

already exercised rights which are only attributable to Filipino citizens. CO V. HRET: CHILDREN OF FILIPINO MOTHERS NEED NOT ELECT FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP IF THEY HAD ALREADY ACQUIRED NATIONALITY WHEN FATHER NATURALIZED -Ongs nationality contested, his father being Chinese. Court held that since father was already naturalized before he attained age of majority, he doesnt have to elect citizenship. TECSON V. COMELEC: CONSTITUTION DOES NOT QUALIFY CHILDREN TO LEGITIMATE OR ILLEGITIMATE -FPJ alleged to have followed nationality of mom. Since he was allegedly born before parents were married, he was deemed an illegitimate child. Court held that the Constitution does not qualify children to legitimate or illegitimate, as long as the childs father is Filipino, then he acquires citizenship of father which is Filipino 2. CITIZ ENS B Y NATU RA LIZ A TION NATURALIZATION -confers to an alien a nationality after birth by any of the means provided by law (in RP: CA 473 as amended) QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPLICANTS OF NATURALIZATION 1. AGE: Not less than 21 on date of HEARING the petition (so could file while 20 y.o.) 2. RESIDENCE: resided in RP + Continuously + not less than 10 years prior to application 3. Good moral character Believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Consitution Must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in RP in his relations w/ the constituted government + community in which he is living 4. ECON: Own real estate + in RP + worth NOT LESS THAN p5K + must have some lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation 5. LANGUAGE: able to SPEAK & WRITE English/Spanish/any one of the principal Philippine languages 6. CHILDREN & SCHOOL: enrolled minor children of school age

in any PUBLIC or PRIVATE SCHOOL recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools where PHILIPPINE HISTORY GOVERNMENT\ And CIVICS are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of the residence required of him (not less than 10 years) PRIOR TO HEARING of his PETITION for naturalization as citizen MORE DISCUSSION: *On 10 yr-continuous residence requirement Ratio: enable government to *observe applicant's conduct *ensure that applicant has imbibed the principles and spirit of our Consti When reduced to 5 years: Applicant (Section 3, CA 473) 1. honorably held office under Gov't 2. Established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in RP 3. Married to a Filipino woman 4. Engaged as a teacher (public or private - but not int'l school) for 2 years (note however YEE V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 7 SCRA 832: only Filipino citizens can be public school teachers) 5. Born in RP *On CHARACTER -requires: +Good Moral character +conducted self in a PROPER + IRREPROACHABLE manner Proper and Irreproachable conduct -higher standard of morality than good moral character -moral character of the highest degree, not enough to be a law-abiding citizen (Dy Lam Go vs. Republic) -EVIDENCE: testimony of 2 character witnesses >well known in the community and enjoy such a high reputation for probity (honesty/integrity), their word may be taken on its face value >can't be employees of the petitioner >must have known applicant for the period prescribed by law >had opportunity to observe him personally >can attest to the possession of the applicant of the qualifications - e.g. proper and irreproachable conduct during the entire period of residence -on consti requirement: not merely recitation BUT BELIEF!

*ON ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT >REAL ESTATE worth P5k (min) >lucrative trade, profession, lawful occupation YU KIAN CHIE VS. REPUBLIC: PROOF OF LUCRATIVE TRADE -Chinese citizen applying for naturalization was held not qualified because he failed to sufficiently prove lucrative trade, he having only a small fixed income and the rest of the amounts he allegedly received were all depended on the profits made by the corporation. (econ requirement continued) Lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation -substantial gainful employment or the obtaining of tangible receipts -appreciable margin of income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support for himself and his family in the event of sickness, unemployment or disability to work -his financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization -regard w/ caution if family business Real estate requirement -at odds with Article XII, Section 7 of 1987 Consti: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain" GR: Aliens can't own lands X: 1. Intestate succession (Section 2, BP 185, effective 1982): allowed natural-born citizen who had lost his Filipino citizenship to be a transferee of a private land for residential purposes ...as long as it did not exceed 1,000 m2 (urban) 1 ha (rural) Why intestate: if otherwise, it would allow aliens to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land 2. In pari delicto: vendor (who knew that he was selling to an alien) cannot file suit to void sale to an alien (who cannot own land, and must have known it) 3. Foreigner later naturalized as a Filipino: purpose of prohibition is to prevent the patrimony of our nation for future generations of Filipinos; since vendee already a Filipino, end would not be frustrated *ON LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

-not enough that applicant understands *ON MINOR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS Ratio: for the children to learn and imbibe customs and traditions and ideals of Filipinos to prepare them for a life of responsible and law abiding citizenship -should be complied with and proven -insufficient finances not an excuse for failing to comply with this requirement -initial failure to comply with this requirement is a BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PETITION even if during 2nd petition, child no longer of school age (meaning, nakapag-aral na sa ibang school not under the law) -not allowed if predominantly composed of children of a specific race (e.g. Chiang Kai Shek mostly caters Chinese children) Tecson vs. COMELEC Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the

COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the

death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita Valles vs. COMELEC Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco (Filipino) and Theresa Marquez (Australian). In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Comelec en banc dismissed the petition. In the 1995 local elections, Rosalind Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein

petitioner, Cirilo Valles. the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition. The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Sec 4 of CA 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: (a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; (b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and (c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988. Issue: WON Rosalind Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to run for public office Held: Yes

Ratio: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited

private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that Rosalind Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as

in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.

As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water. Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper. Burca vs. Republic Bengzon III vs. HRET (US Marines Corps, repatriation) RE Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar (Ching) Djumantan vs. Domingo (Marriage) Mercado vs. Manzano (Edu Manzano) Labo vs. COMELEC (Australian Citizenship)

RA 9225 AASJS vs. Datumanong (Secretary of Justice) RA 9139 Common Wealth Act No 473 Legislative Naturalization Domicile is that place where a person has certain settled,fixed, legal relations because:

1. 2.

3.

it is assigned to him by law at the MOMENT OF BIRTH (domicile of origin). It is assigned to him by law AFTER BIRTH on account of legal disability caused for instance by minority, insanity or marriage in the case of a woman (constructive domicile or domicile by operation of law). he has a HOME there that to which whenever.

RA 9189 Macalintal vs. COMELEC Rules on Domicile 1. No natural person must ever be without a domicile 2. No person can have two or more domiciles at the same time, except for certain purposes, and from different legal viewpoints 3. Every sui juris may change his domicile 4. Once acquired, it remains the domicile unless a new one is obtained: a. By capacitated persons b. With freedom of choice c. With actual physical presence d. And Provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent place of abode, there should be animus manendi (intent to remain) or animus nonrevertendi (intent not to return). 5. The presumption is in favor of the continuance of domicile. The burden of Proof is on the one who alleges that a change of domicile has taken place. Romualdez, Marcos vs COMELEC Aquino vs. COMELEC Romualdez vs. RTC Tacloban Renvoi A procedure whereby a legal matter is referred by the conflict of laws rules of the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter back to the law of the forum (remission) or a third state (transmission).

Bellis vs. Bellis Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 Inter Country Adoption Law, RA 8043 Annulment, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Zamora vs. CA Santos vs. CA Republic vs. CA and Molina Garcia-Recio vs. Recio Perez vs. CA

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