You are on page 1of 33

SOCIETY AND AUTONOMY.

CONTENTS. I.
Introduction.
Autonomy. Rorty. The Self, Autonomy and Liberalism. 1 2

3
4

11.
Autonomy in a Liberal Society.
Is Autonomy Possible for Rorty's Liberal Citizen. Living Dangerously. 6 7 9

Ill.
Solitude.
Intellectual Isolation. Solitude. 10 11 12

Conflict.
That Difficulty Increases Desire. Suffering and Standing Unflinchingly.

19 20
22

IV.
Conclusion: Society and Autonomy.
Nietzsche's Caste System. The Promotion of Autonomy in the Caste System. 24 24 25

I INTRODUCTION.

One of the legacies of Nietzsche's philosophy since his death in 1900 has been a re-awakening of the idea that individual autonomy is the proper pursuit ?f each man. With Nietzsche's proclamation of the 'death of God' all interpretations of ourselves and the world that involve a reference to a transcendent reality as the source of meaning, value and truth are ruled out. Consequently an individual's morality has to be viewed as purely

contingent, a product of the society and time that individual is a part of. For Nietzsche then, as well as philosophers like Hiedegger and Foucault who have taken on board Nietzsche's insight's on this matter, autonomy becomes the ideal; the attempt to become 'the true helmsman of this existence and refuse to allow our existence to resemble a mindless act of chance? is paramount. Philosophers who have taken up the project of

gaining autonomy (termed variously as self-creation, self-overcoming, self-enlargement or authenticity-) have almost always, though not

necessarily explicitly, attempted to offer a picture of what society should be like given that such a project is the new ideal. It is this topic that I would like to focus my attention on in this paper. Over the course of this paper I will consider two attempts to give an account of the form a society suited to the ideal of individual autonomy would have to take. The first attempt I will consider is the attempt made
1

by Richard Rorty in his 'Contingency, Irony and Solidarity? to advance liberal democracy as the political system compatible with the pursuit of autonomy through self-creation. I have chosen to look at Rorty's

philosophy partly because it is perhaps the most recent attempt to arrive at a vision of society that takes account of the ideal of individual autonomy and partly because it is perhaps the most deeply flawed. Through the

consideration of Rorty's thoughts on autonomy and liberalism I hope to show that Rorty's philosophy fails chiefly because he is operating with a misguided or incomplete notion of what the pursuit of individual autonomy involves. I hope then to explain what I take to be a more complete picture of the pursuit of autonomy before considering Nietzsche's thoughts on the ideal society and arguing that the ideal society envisioned by Nietzsche is the best suited to the pursuit of autonomy. Before we begin by looking at Rorty's claims however, I should first make a little clearer what I mean by the term autonomy.

AUTONOMY. The notion of autonomy has thus far been described as the state of being 'the true helmsman of this existence' after the recognition that all of our values are contingent and arise through socialisation. This conception of

autonomy should first be distinguished from the conception of autonomy we find in Kant. For Kant a person's autonomy depended on their

recognition and obedience to a moral law common to all and discernable through the exercise of reason. In other words a person is autonomous

under Kant's picture when they, through the proper exercise of reason, are able to legislate laws for themselves independently experience. of an appeal to

The common feature between Kant's conception of autonomy

and the one I am employing here is the notion of self-legislation, the word autonomy itself is infact from the Greek for 'self and 'law", The

difference of course with the notion of autonomy we are concerned with here is that there is no appeal to a universal moral law; each person given complete sovereignty over their own choices of values.
2
IS

With no

appeal to an objective moral law we are left in a state where 'anything goes'. Despite this however, one is not considered to be autonomous

simply by rejecting existing moral systems and acting as one pleases; the important thing is 'giving style to one's character's. By simply acting as one pleases a person may have grasped some of the consequences of the death of God but they are not autonomous in as far as they are acting purely on impulse or else their actions are guided by their existing, accidental, character. Having recognised the contingency of all value systems however, there are no arguments as such that can be employed by philosophers like Nietzsche or Rorty as to why we should accord value to the struggle for autonomy as I have just described it. Both Nietzsche and Rorty

acknowledge this fact and characterise themselves accordingly as enticers"; offering philosophies they believe are better than the alternatives.

RORTY. Rorty envisions his ideal 'liberal utopia'? as one where each individual is free to pursue their own projects of self-creation and gaining autonomy whilst at the same time collaborating with others for the good of the society as a whole. The coexistence of the pursuit of autonomy with Liberal politics is possible, Rorty believes, if we confine the pursuit of autonomy to the private sphere whilst adopting liberal beliefs in our interactions with others, in the public sphere. Rorty's view then is that the individual will pursue his own autonomy in private ensuring that that project does not cause harm to others or encroach on their own private pursuits of autonomy. As we shall see, Rorty does not value autonomy alone; he also wishes to retain the belief that 'cruelty is the worst thing we do'8 Rorty is not then exactly claiming that liberalism is the best form of government for the achievement of autonomy of the individual. He does however believe that the search for autonomy can exist alongside the ideals of a liberal society and further, that some aspects of a liberal society do indeed aid the
3

individual in his pursuit of autonomy. We need not I think go into too much more detail in elaborating on this picture of Rorty's philosophy. Whilst Rorty does differ from other 'philosophers of autonomy' in the details of his conception of the self and in how he describes the project of achieving personal autonomy these differences are not so marked as to make it necessary to change the notion of autonomy as being 'the true helmsman of this existence' which has been introduced in the previous chapter. In the next section then I will briefly explain the important points of Rorty's position in order to lend a greater clarity to, and serve as a reference point for, the critique of Rorty's position that will follow it.

THE SELF, AUTONOMY AND LIBERALISM. Rorty, having acknowledged the consequences of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God, holds that all of our interpretations of the world and ourselves are the historically contingent products of the society and time we inhabit. In line with and as an extension of this belief Rorty maintains that there are no timeless truths about the human condition available to us, no essence common to all and discoverable by the philosopher. In

particular Rorty holds that we are mistaken in talking of a 'self as the core of each individual. For Rorty there is no steady, inalterable self at the heart of each one of us which has various contingent beliefs and desires. Rather, Rorty holds that we are nothing but these beliefs and desires. Rorty sees us as 'networks of beliefs and desires'? which are constantly 'rewoven'lOas our beliefs and desires change. The beliefs we have are initially shaped by, as we have already stated, the society in which we live. In learning the language and linguistic practices of our society we also take on board the prevalent beliefs of the time, we take on board their description of our past and our present situation, beliefs about who we are and what is worth pursuing. The

reweaving of the network of beliefs and desires of which each person is


4

constituted occurs as our convictions about who we are and what is worth pursuing change. This re-weaving takes the form of a new description of who we are being taken from the vocabulary and stock of metaphors existing in the public language of our society. The struggle for autonomy as it appears In contrast consists in giving a new and unique description of ourselves by creating new metaphors and using old words in new ways by 'producing language which, though initially unfamiliar and idiosyncratic, somehow makes tangible the blind impress all one's behavings bear."! A person capable of giving such a redescription of themselves is termed a 'strong poet"-, they recognise the contingency of all beliefs and take up the task of creating themselves as a work of art 'telling the story of their own production'13 so they might say of their past 'Thus I willed it.'14 The strong poet's redescription is not a final description however, the redescription continues as the strong poet still recognises his new vocabulary and beliefs as utterly contingent, although for the time that these beliefs hold they will be stood for unflinchingly. Liberalism in Rorty's system is supposed to guarantee the possibility for each individual to perform creative, idiosyncratic redescriptions of themselves and beyond this to avoid what Rorty calls the 'freezing-over of culture' 15 Rorty describes liberalism as the belief that 'cruelty is the worst thing we do'16, a definition he attributes to Judith Shklar. This notion of what it means to be a liberal, coupled with the idea that there are no timeless truths which can confer upon certain beliefs a privileged status over others, should, Rorty hopes, make possible a society which embraces diversity and allows each person to undertake their own idiosyncratic projects of redescription. The belief that cruelty is the worst thing we do plays its part in so far as Rorty takes it to be humiliating for people to be redescribed by others, to be forced to understand themselves in another's terms. A persons projects of redescription will be purely private whilst the public sphere is characterised by open discussion and a willingness to abide by decisions made in the interest of the whole society. A society such as
5

this where countless new ways of understanding the world are constantly arising will, Rorty believes, prevent one vocabulary and outlook on the world from dominating too long and becoming seen as the expression of objective truths. The vocabularies and metaphors that form the unique

network of beliefs and desires of some strong poets will from time to time be taken over into the public sphere, the metaphors literalised and the once idiosyncratic description of the world will become the shared background of understanding that will shape the beliefs and desires of future generations. Having grasped the most important parts of Rorty's philosophy (for this paper at least) we can turn now to consider whether Rorty's 'liberal utopia' with its separation of the private sphere of redescription from public sphere of compromise, toleration and cooperation compatible with the individuals' striving for autonomy. really is

11

AUTONOMY

IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY.

Over the course of the present chapter I hope to illustrate how the project of gaining personal autonomy is seriously hindered, if not made impossible, by the kind of society Rorty hopes will one day be realised. To my mind there are two key aspects of Rorty's position that make his philosophy inimical to, rather than conducive to, achieving personal autonomy. The first is the belief that we can make a private and public division in our vocabularies and beliefs and moreover that the private project of redescription and self-creation can be successfully pursued under such conditions and the second is Rorty's apparent views concerning suffering and conflict. I will deal with these two points separately with the focus being upon the first of the two points, the discussion of suffering and conflict serving as a further indictment of Rorty's position and an
6

introduction to the final part of this paper.

IS AUTONOMY POSSIBLE FOR RORTY'S LIBERAL CITIZEN? As we have seen Rorty restricts the project of achieving personal autonomy to a private sphere entirely apart from public discourse. The individual then will effectively operate with two vocabularies, which in turn would mean holding two sets of beliefs. On the one hand a person will have his own idiosyncratic description of himself and the world and on the other he will have the vocabulary and beliefs of the masses which he will utilise as a citizen of his society. It seems to me highly unlikely however that a person could achieve any real sense of .autonomy whilst seriously participating in the public sphere as a liberal citizen. Rorty is quite right to assert that a background of normal discourse, a shared vocabulary, is necessary both for a society to exist at all and for an individual to take up the task of becoming autonomous. The project of gaining autonomy needs such a background of normal discourse to react against and as a source of words and metaphors to put to use in new and unique ways. Such a background of normal discourse however displays a powerful levelling or normalising power over people as noted in Nietzsche's writings on what he termed 'the herd'17 or Hiedegger's examination of 'the They'!", Under Rorty's own picture this background

of normal discourse informs and preshapes all our beliefs and desires and, leaving aside the deliberate redescription of ourselves performed in the pursuit of autonomy, the network of beliefs and desires of which we are constituted reweave themselves in accordance with the shifts in beliefs and language usage of society. The problem with Rorty's picture then is that despite his evident recognition of this power he still expects those pursuing autonomy to participate in the language and beliefs of the masses (a problem that will be elaborated on in the next section). This is especially problematic if we take the model of private redescription and public liberalism to be applicable only to an intellectual elite as it sounds as if it might be when Rorty talks of his utopia as
7

arranged so as to protect the strong poet, implying that only a select few will recognise the contingency of beliefs and take up the pursuit of autonomy. However, even if Rorty's liberal utopia is one where every

citizen has relinquished the belief in absolute truths and sees even their liberal public language as a contingent means to an end, the project of gaining autonomy still looks to be in trouble. Rorty recognises that in the absence of an absolute moral law the 'private poem"? (the redescription and reweaving of ourselves) of those we would usually describe as inhuman or unnatural must be taken as 'as richly textured and "rendulant of moral memories" as our own?", In other words Rorty seems to recognise that the autonomous person can be a type we presently would refer to as inhuman or perverse and that such people are to be welcomed as part of the diversity of a society that has given up the notion of objective absolute moral laws. This recognition of the legitimacy of the 'private poem of the pervert, the sadist, or the lunatic?' illustrates most clearly the problem we are concerned with here. To take the example of the sadist it makes no sense, it seems to me, to talk of a person who is a sadist only in private, a sadist who in all of his interactions with others takes great care not to cause anyone pain and humiliation. Put another way when Rorty quotes Joseph Schumpeter in describing his ideal citizen as one who realises 'the relative validity of one's convictions and yet stands for them unflinchingly'22 we have to ask what it means to stand unflinchingly for your convictions when such convictions are restricted to a private sphere. Liberal ideals and the ideal of autonomy simply can not sit together as the ideals of a person or society one must give way to the other. If, as in Rorty, the Liberal ideals are given more emphasis the ideal of autonomy must give, in which case it is hard to see how anything other than species of Liberal can arise.

LIVING DANGEROUSLY. The position held by Rorty is I believe a failure to grasp the scope of the pursuit of autonomy symptomatic of referring to it with terms like 'redescription' and 'self-creation'. Whilst these terms adequately express

the aesthetic nature of the pursuit of autonomy they lend themselves rather too easily to the thought that such a pursuit can be viewed as just another art form or, as it appears in Rorty, almost as a mere hobby. The pursuit of autonomy is rather an attempt to give some sense of value and meaning to our own existence in the light of the 'death of God'. Rorty

rather optimistically believes that if the implications of the 'death of God' are acknowledged by the masses this will result in a renewed sense of community as everyone realises the contingency of their beliefs and identity and come together in the face of nihilism. In opposition to this picture I find myself in agreement with Guignon and Hiley who hold that a far more likely outcome of the recognition of the contingency of our beliefs is an overwhelming sense of meaninglessness, loss and alienation. Guignon and Hiley offer as proof of this the fact that in these increasingly secular times 'disorders of the self23 (such feelings of meaninglessness and alienation) have replaced the classical neuroses of Freudian psychotherapy as the most common disorders therapists of today are called upon to treat. The pursuit of autonomy then is an attempt to give value and meaning to our life and as such is more than a hobby, a private artistic endeavour, but is rather a pursuit that effect our entire life making every decision a matter of conscience, including those in our public life. For this reason I prefer Nietzsche's description of the pursuit of autonomy as 'living dangerously'>'. Whilst living dangerously lacks the explicitly

aesthetic connotations of redescription and self-creation it captures much more adequately the scope of the pursuit of autonomy. As I hope will become evident the pursuit of autonomy is not a mere private endeavour but is a way of life that does not recognise a split between the private and the public as Rorty would have it, and which is characterised by conflict and a kind of solitude rather than compromise and a sense of community.
9

It is my belief that such a life of solitude and conflict is what it means to seriously take up the pursuit of autonomy and recognise the contingency of our beliefs whilst standing for them unflinchingly. It is living

dangerously as it involves throwing away all comfortable beliefs and intellectual safety nets and standing apart from the herd leaving ourselves 'more endangered human beings'>, many of whom will perish either in the sense of slipping back into conformity with the herd or else through real conflict of the kind I will be suggesting is a part of living dangerously. Having looked at the chief problem with Rorty's advocacy of Liberalism as a political system under which individuals may gain autonomy I shall begin explaining what I take to be a fuller conception of the pursuit of autonomy (living dangerously) that I see in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche.

III SOLITUDE.

It is easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude - Emerson. Living dangerously is I believe characterised by a certain solitude that is ignored in Rorty's definition of the project of achieving autonomy as a private reweaving of our beliefs and a redescription of our past but which plays an important part in Nietzsche's thought. Solitude will primarily be considered as an intellectual distance from others but I also propose to consider the role played by actual physical solitude in resolving to live dangerously. I hope to show that living dangerously is both a solitary

pursuit and that solitude as actual physical isolation can be a useful tool for gaining autonomy.
10

INTELLECTUAL SOLITUDE. The intellectual solitude that necessarily accompanies any serious break with traditional or commonly held beliefs is increased almost unimaginably when the break is of the nature and magnitude that Nietzsche makes, and asks us to make, in acknowledging the 'death of God' and its almost endless ramifications. The philosopher who makes such a break is not merely at odds with his peers and the common man in one or two areas such as morality or epistemology but in all areas of human knowledge and belief. As has been indicated previously the rejection of the

God-hypothesis as untenable (acknowledging the 'death of God') involves the rejection of the entire Christian-moral interpretation of the world and ourselves along with all other interpretations that employ the notion of a transcendent reality as the home of meaning and value (two-worlds views of the world and ourselves). Even in Rorty's ideal society a person

seeking real autonomy will still experience this intellectual solitude as although all have given up the idea of absolute truths all contact with others will occur in a public sphere with a shared language and set of beliefs that that person is no longer a part of. Such intellectual solitude is felt most immediately then in the sphere of human relations. In breaking not only with a particular tradition but essentially with all traditions, in throwing away all the safety nets of comfortable and familiar beliefs, we also throwaway the feeling of

belonging to any existing group or society, or sharing a common goal with others. Those taking up the call to live dangerously must be able to be, or at least learn to be, 'silent, lonely, resolute, and content and constant in invisible activities'>'. Beyond this, this sense of intellectual isolation from one's contemporaries is reinforced by the fact that in rejecting all of the interpretations of the world and ourselves that have, and have had, currency in the world the possibility of meaningful communication with those who have been 'left behind' as such becomes increasingly difficult. The complete intellectual isolation of those who have become 'godless' has another dimension, hinted at already, that marks this solitude
11

out from the solitude felt by other revolutionary thinkers. As Nietzsche points out in a letter to Franz Overbeck in July of 1885 'those who somehow managed to have a god for a companion never experienced what I know as 'loneliness?". Past thinkers who have been out of step with their time have, even when they were most at odds with their contemporaries, always had a god or gods for company or at the very least had a set of values and beliefs taken to be objectively true with which to console themselves. With the 'death of God' however the philosopher is left to create his own values in the face of nihilism, a lonely task which takes great courage: 'Not courage before witnesses but the courage of the hermit and the eagle which is no longer witnessed even by a god'>. This sense of solitude is an irradicable part of living dangerously that although embraced as necessary by those seeking autonomy always seems to come with the hope that this solitude may one day be broken." There is however

another form of solitude that I believe plays an important role in the pursuit of autonomy a more literal, physical solitude.

ISOLATION. The notion of physical solitude can be seen as, and is seen as in Nietzsche's philosophy, far more favourable than the intellectual solitude just described as it can become a valuable tool for the individual to use in his attempt to achieve autonomy. Before I attempt to demonstrate this however I should perhaps make clear what it is I mean by physical solitude. By physical solitude I mean both merely a withdrawal from

public life; say by giving up any public offices one holds as well as the physical solitude of the hermit who has next to no contact with other human beings (which from here on in we might designate by the term Isolation). Physical solitude as the withdrawal from public life is essentially a consequence of the intellectual solitude brought about by an acceptance of Nietzsche's proclamation of the 'death of God'. As I noted earlier it is hard to see why one would want, or how one could have, a genuine and
12

fruitful role in the public life of a society if we have come to see the beliefs of our contemporaries, those with which the society operates, as being without ground and are committed to the creation of new values in the face of nihilism. Taking an active role in society carries with it the danger that we may be seduced back to, or unwittingly take on board, the opinions of the masses that we had previously rejected or are in the process of weeding out. If nothing else it would make the task of gaining autonomy a great deal more difficult as it would mean attempting to create new values and giving style to one's character whilst at the same time functioning as a citizen of our particular society and operating under their values. This form of solitude as a withdrawal from public life appears numerous times
III

Nietzsche's writings.

In Daybreak for instance;

Nietzsche says of the engagement of 'society's most gifted spirits' in political and economic affairs that it is a 'wasteful use of the spirit' which is 'at bottom worse than having none at all?", Also we hear that 'If one

wants to represent a hero on the stage one must not think of making one of the chorus's! which is a comment on ambitious men caught up in the life of 'the great cities of world politics' and expressed in an aphorism entitled 'Learning Solitude'. Turning to the notion of physical solitude one might associate with a hermit and which I have termed Isolation, it is a little harder to see the presence of this notion in Nietzsche's thought and perhaps even harder to show that he held it to be a genuine and useful option open to those committed to living dangerously and gaining autonomy. However, I think evidence of Nietzsche's advocacy of what I have termed Isolation can be found in his published works as well as in his notebooks and letters. Also I believe that a good case can be made for the benefits of Isolation through an examination of Nietzsche's principle of the will to power, which reveals a tendency in mankind towards conformity, and Nietzsche's thoughts on self-mastery through sublimation. It should first be made clear however that unlike intellectual
13

solitude or the withdrawing from public life which are more or less permanent features of, and necessary consequences of, living dangerously Isolation is being considered here as a possibility that an individual mayor may not actualise as they see fit. whilst others may never need it at all. Some initial evidence that Nietzsche saw the limiting of ones interactions with others to a bare minimum as a legitimate and beneficial exercise can be seen in aphorisms taken from Daybreak and The Will to Power (these are not the only books or aphorisms in which such thoughts appear but it is perhaps where they are most clear). In Daybreak, in Some may seek Isolation frequently

aphorism 566, Nietzsche states simply that the thinker has no need for company except for the company of the great men of the past and that the thinker only seeks the company of the living in order to 'embrace his solitude more tenderly'V. In this aphorism life characterised by a certain

degree of isolation is pictured as the opposite of that lifestyle that makes life 'arduous and often insupportable'. In The Will to Power we find an

aphorism devoted to identifying that which has been ruined by the church's misuse of it (though presumably such things can regain their value once we have shaken off the church's influence). heading is as follows: 3. the "monastery": temporary isolation, accompanied by strict refusal, e.g. of letters; a kind of most profound self-reflection and self-recovery that desires to avoid, not "temptations", but "duties": an escape from the daily round; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and influences that condemns us to spend our strength in nothing but reaction ...33 This aphorism I think captures some of the benefits of what I have termed Isolation quite well. Essentially the aphorism is saying that in the The third entry under this

temporary isolation of ourselves from others we escape the duties that hinder our pursuit of autonomy along with the influences that distract our attention from, and waste our strength for, the same tasks. Moving on from this initial evidence that Nietzsche did consider Isolation to be beneficial we might turn to an argument that may back up
14

this thought. Nietzsche's later philosophy rests on the assumption of one basic principle, the will to power, and everything is reduced to a manifestation of this will to power. Man's behaviour then can only be understood, it is argued, as a manifestation of this basic drive. Upon

observing the mass of men however, Nietzsche sees that the majority seem to be sacrificing their power to create their own values by conforming to public opinion in all matters. Whilst recognising that the majority of the people are in fact diminishing their power through the submition to rules made for them by others Nietzsche shows that this behaviour is still a product of the will to power. In such cases the individuals that submit to laws originating outside of themselves have simply made the mistake of judging that the path to more power is through conformity. They believe that through conformity they will gain success and influence and they fear the reduction of this perceived power through a punishment for transgressing the laws. The will to power here then seems to display something like a tendency towards conformity. This tendency would no doubt be fairly well combated by correcting the judgement that such conformity brings greater power; but in all but the strongest of characters such a tendency or desire to conform would no doubt take a lot of work to overcome and this is where the notion of sublimation comes in. This

observation need not lose its force when we consider Rorty's position where Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power is rejected as another illegitimate attempt to claim knowledge of an absolute truth." Rorty

recognises the normalising power of the masses and acknowledges that those seeking autonomy need protection from it. Further, although Rorty says little about it I would think that reweaving the network of beliefs of which we are constituted and adopting a new description of our past would take time and discipline in much the same way as the equivalent notions of self-overcoming and giving style to one's character do in Nietzsche. The notion of sublimation involves the idea that the energy of a desire or drive can be channelled in some way towards the realisation of another goal. In Daybreak, in an aphorism bearing the title 'Self mastery
15

and moderation and their ultimate motive'35Nietzsche offers six ways in which 'the vehemence of a drive' may be combated. Two of these

methods namely; giving oneself over to the unrestrained gratification of the drive in order to generate disgust with the drive and the weakening of the entire body in order to weaken an individual drive are seen as ways in which a drive may be combated but are rejected elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings as inimical to life. The four other methods identified in the

passage are; 1. avoiding the opportunities to gratify the drive, 2. imposing a strict regularity on the gratification of a drive, 3. associating the gratification of the drive with a painful thought and 4. dislocating one's 'quanta of strength' by imposing a difficult and strenuous task upon oneself or subjecting oneself to a new 'stimulus and pleasure' in order to channel one's strength and thoughts towards a new goal. It would seem to me that all of these methods may be employed in the attempt to sublimate a drive although method four would appear to be sublimation itself. Further, methods two and three would seem to help in the achievingof the goal of method one by weakening the drive in order to make it easier to avoid whilst methods one, two and three can all be seen as preparation for method four, sublimation itself. In the case of the tendency or desire to conform that will pose a problem for all but the strongest among us it should be fairly easy to see how Isolation could play its part here. Avoiding the opportunity to gratify the desire to conform would clearly be a case of avoiding those people and institutions that demand that conformity. If this turns out to be too

difficult a task it might be eventually achieved through the second method of sublimation I have identified. By imposing a regularity on the

gratification of the desire in order to enclose 'its ebb and flow' we gain intervals where the desire does not trouble us and leaves the periods of gratification easier to control and reduce. This would no doubt involve a large degree of Isolation mixed with regular intervals where the desire to conform is gratified, with these intervals being reduced in duration and frequency as time goes on. This might take the form of a gradual
16

relinquishing of the duties that commit us to the values of the masses. With these two methods and the method of associating conformity with an unpleasant thought (such a thought might be provided by the knowledge that blind conformity actually decreases our power or leaves our life without meaning) it should be possible to bring about a dislocation between the quanta of our strength found in the desire to conform and its object, conformity, and to channel that energy in to other activities such as 'self-reflection and self-recovery' and giving style to one's character. Furthermore with the desire to conform under control or eliminated the company of others can become 'a rare delicacy' rather than a potential danger. Isolation then is to be treated as a tool to be employed in the project of self-overcoming if and when it is needed. The strongest among us may not need this degree of solitude and may be able to, as the quote from Emerson which opened this chapter puts it, keep 'the independence of solitude'36even in the crowd (though still not in a compromising public role). Those not so strong can conceivablyattain this goal through either one period of Isolation/s or perhaps may seek the benefits of Isolation time and again when ever the company of others threatens our attempts to gain autonomy. A final quote from Nietzsche here that indicates his recognition of the benefits of Isolation can be taken from one of his letters to Franz Overbeck concerning a visit from Paul Lanzky. Nietzsche says of the visit that it hashelped me over a great deal. But on the other side of the account I might say that I have learned how much I still need complete solitude for a good long while (say five years!). There is much in me that still wants to grow ripe and come together; the time for "disciplesand a school" et hoc genus omne has not come yet.37 Temporary Isolation then, can be seen as a beneficial exercise
III

the

context of the pursuit of autonomy; affording us time apart from those duties and distractions which are so easy to succumb to so that we might more easily overcome them. It should be remembered however, that
17

Isolation is not being considered as some kind of miracle cure for the tendency to conform to the values of the masses but only as a tool to be employed in the individuals attempts to gain autonomy. It is not being suggested that simply by retreating from society for a period of time the desire to conform will simply dissolve but only that Isolation may aid those actively trying to overcome such a desire. We might quote Socrates here who upon hearing someone express their surprise that a man had not been improved by travel he exclaimed 'I am sure he was not, he went with
himselfl?",

What Socrates no doubt meant was that simply by moving

from place to place and seeing the sights a person is not going to suddenly become a better person. Travelling may yield experiences and

opportunities that may aid someone who is actively trying to better themselves but will not make everyone who travels a better person. The same can be said of Isolation; it is only a benefit to those who are engaged in giving style to their character and overcoming themselves. That is why it is not enough to withdraw from the mob, not enough to go to another place: we have to withdraw from such attributes of the mob as are within us. It is our own self we have to isolate and take back into possession.t? - Montaigne. Living dangerously then involves an intellectual solitude as well as a withdrawing from public life in a more or less extreme form. This fact will be very important when we come to consider the role of those pursuing autonomy in a society organised so as to promote such a pursuit. Presently however, we shall turn our attention towards the part played by conflict and suffering in an individuals pursuit of autonomy. I hope to show, once again through reference to Nietzsche, that conflict and suffering are also integral parts of living dangerously and that Rorty is mistaken in thinking that a person can achieve and maintain autonomy in a society which seeks to eliminate such phenomena. With the

consideration of conflict and suffering complete we will have grasped the fuller notion of what is involved in the pursuit of autonomy, living dangerously, and the stage will be set for the explication of the nature of
18

a society suited to the pursuit of autonomy.

CONFLICT. What will become of the man who no longer has any reasons for defending himself or for attacking? What affects does he have left if he has lost those in which lie his weapons of defence and attack? -Nietzsche Living dangerously, as the name suggests and has been indicated earlier, is a way of life. As the pursuit of autonomy and self-creation it is a continuous project without a goal as such. Beyond the recognition of the contingency of beliefs and the resolution to live dangerously the project is one of continuous self-overcominglself-reweaving, ridding ourselves of purely inherited beliefs and creating for ourselves new values and descriptions of the world and ourselves. There is then no point
III

persons life when this creative process is said to be complete, only death brings some sort of end to the project. Such a project would no doubt require a massive amount of energy sustained over the course of a person's life. This fact, coupled with the recognition that it is all to easy to slip into conformity with the masses, makes the pursuit of autonomy incredibly arduous and means vel)' few can sustain the pursuit and achieve the kind of beauty or sublimity prized by philosophers like Rorty and Nietzsche." Even the greatest of men are more than capable of moments of weakness or complete collapse and Nietzsche offers the examples of 'Napolean, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, and

Schopenhauer'42 as great men who lapsed into conformity or patriotism. The pursuit of autonomy is itself characterised by conflict, chiefly an internal conflict, the conflict between those parts of us that are our own creation and those beliefs that are inherited from the surrounding society or which are part of a previous redescription or creation of ourselves.
19

With Rorty's picture the redescription and reweaving of ourselves occurs, in the first place, as a reaction to the recognition of the contingency of beliefs. The difficulty is however that after this; further redescriptions and reweavings are motivated it seems by simply observing other peoples redescriptions of themselves and the world and taking on all or part of their redescriptions if they take them to be better in some way than their own. Such a motivation will be fine for those with overflowing energy and enthusiasm for self-creation but will not sustain a life of living dangerously of one of lesser energy. Rorty's picture of continuous redescription comes across as a kind of disinterested casting about for more useful or beautiful descriptions of the world which would not I believe stand up to the lure of safe conformity. It is my belief that the conditions under which living

dangerously is most likely to be maintained by an individual is those characterised by conflict and strife. Once again this is a belief that runs contrary to Rorty's position where his strong poet is held to be able to flourish in an environment of peaceful discussion.

THAT DIFFICULTY INCREASES DESlRE.43 Rorty wishes to ensure that no one is in danger of being redescribed by another, that each persons private pursuit of autonomy does not encroach on anyone else's. I would argue that under such circumstances many

peoples private projects of redescription would most likely lose focus or be abandoned altogether once the urgency with which it was begun has passed (through an initial redescription and creation of values or by being absorbed back into the way of life of the masses). If however, the pursuit of autonomy is understood as a way of life (incompatible with a public/private split) not only will conflict essentially be unavoidable but also each person's will may be 'sharpened by flat opposition'44from others. Firstly, a person's personal project of gaining autonomy will be more highly prized and more rigorously pursued if in order to succeed that person has to struggle to overcome obstacles either from within themselves or from outside opposition 'there is nothing so contrary to our tastes than
20

the satiety which comes from ease of access; and nothing which sharpens them more than rareness and difficulty.?" This will certainly be the case

with those who have had the courage to acknowledge the 'death of God' and take upon themselves the task of creating their own values and giving meaning to their life. I can not see that such a person would be able to

give meaning to their life through the seemingly idle and unobstructed creation of a private poem. The private poem of Rorty's strong poet can

never be more than a facade erected so as to avoid the crushing weight of an acknowledgement of the 'death of God' but not in order to deal with

the problems it raises (this is so even without the inclusion of the earlier criticism that the compromise in the public sphere of Rorty's liberal utopia makes any real sense of autonomy impossible). Rorty's private poem or re description and reweaving of ourselves will never be more than a facade as although the possibility of grounding our beliefs in an appeal to absolute truths has been lost we would still need to ground our beliefs in some way otherwise the detrimental effects of the 'death of God' will be ever present, the private poem will always essentially be set against the backdrop of nihilism and so will always itself be seen as essentially meaningless. The kind of grounding open to us in

the light of the 'death of God' is a grounding in conflict and suffering, this I think is the meaning of Zarathustra's hallows any cause'r= claim that 'it is the good war that

Those beliefs that are a product of great struggles, in

the first place the struggle to overcome or reweave ourselves, will become our truths; for which we will truly be willing to stand unflinchingly. The importance of being able to stand unflinchingly for your beliefs will be considered momentarily but we should perhaps first make clearer

what is meant by conflict here. There are essentially three types of conflict being included, first there is the conflict within us that occurs in the

process of obtaining autonomy, second is the intellectually conflict in the form of debate and third is the actual physical conflict of war. The first

form of conflict which is in a sense constituitive of the pursuit of autonomy


IS

promoted

and intensified by the second and the third.


21

Intellectual

conflict will motivate the pursuit of autonomy in as far as debate with others will reveal weaknesses in one's beliefs by, for example, bringing to one's attention areas of our thought which are still under the influence of the masses. Such debate however is only possible with those with whom you share some common ground and given the freedom to create values and beliefs that the 'death of God' affords us the opportunity to engage in such debate may not frequently arise. In an environment where diversity is really encouraged and possible and where people truly stand for their views unflinchingly actual physical conflict is certain to arise and should to some degree be welcomed. War as essentially beneficial to a society that has as its ideal individual autonomy, the production of genius or to a lesser degree the protection of the strong poet, will be dealt with in the final chapter but we can say now how such conflict is useful to the individual himself. Aside from the fact that the victor in such a conflict will have essentially established his beliefs as truths and strengthened his resolve in pursuing his own personal creative project; there is another aspect of such physical conflict which may bear fruit for those involved in the creative process of gaining autonomy.

SUFFERING AND STANDING UNFLINCHINGLY. A further thought that is found in Nietzsche but ignored, to his detriment, by Rorty is the thought that suffering can play an important and ultimately productive part in a persons life. Nietzsche believes for instance, that

great art is almost always the product of an artist who is the bearer of some physical or psychological torment, 'it is exceptional states that condition the artist - all of them profoundly related to and interlaced with morbid phenomena's". WaIter Kaufmann in his treatment of this idea

offers the examples of Keats who was consumptive, Byron who had a club foot, Homer who was blind and Beethoven who was deaf.48 It is suggested then that it is partly in order to deal with and overcome such suffering that great art is produced, whether the creation utilises canvas and paint, the written word or ourselves. In the case of the creation of values with which
22

we are concerned the project was of course the product of the acknowledgement of the 'death of God' and a response to the fear aroused in the face of the devaluation of all values followed by the fear that we may end our days defined in terms and living by values that are not our own. As Jacob Golomb notes in his book 'In Search of Authenticity'49it is in extreme conditions that 'the quest for authenticity becomes especially pronounced'?", Extreme conditions would include times of war as well as

shifts in perspective like those that accompany Nietzsche's 'death of God' doctrine. It is during periods of intense and extreme experience that a

persons beliefs are truly tested. It is easy to begin to hold a set of beliefs unquestionably and the project of constant self-overcoming or

redescription brought to a halt in times of peace and relative tranquillity. However, when we find ourselves in extreme circumstances where we are performing extreme acts, perhaps terrible acts, or experiencing great suffering we have to take a serious look at our values and description of our world and so are pushed harder than ever in order to make of ourselves a greater and more beautiful creation so as to be able to say of such periods 'thus I willed it'. Of course suffering and extreme

experiences do not only occur in war but it is in war perhaps that the most extreme situations are lived through or witnessed. The importance of standing unflinchingly for ones beliefs is simply that conflict of any type can not occur if people are unwilling,at least for a period of time, to face opposition openly and honestly with perhaps faith enough in their beliefs to kill or die for them. Rorty claims that his system allows for and thrives off of a great number of people with diverse beliefs, which are stood for unflinchingly,engaging in an intellectual conflict. This conflict fails to promote further redescriptions of ourselves and the world however; because the conflict occurs in the terms of a liberal society. In otherwords the strong poets of Rorty's philosophy do not really stand unflinchingly for the beliefs that constitute their private poem but rather water them down with liberal beliefs precisely in order to avoid conflict and enable compromise.
23

IV CONCLUSION: SOCIETY AND AUTONOMY

The highest men live beyond the rulers, freed from all bonds; and in the rulers they have their instruments>' -Nietzsche The pursuit of autonomy as living dangerously then is characterised by a certain solitude and conflict. This being the case it seems to me that no society could ever really have a place for those pursuing autonomy. Such individuals could never be citizens as such and certainly not citizens of Rorty's liberal utopia. The only roles open to those living dangerously will be as an outsider either ignored by, or engaged in combat with, society or else as a leader, outside of society in as far as he does not participate in their beliefs and practices but defines them 'They rule not because they want to but because they are, they are not free to be second rank'52. As a leader those living dangerously, as I have described it, will in turn create an environment in which autonomy will genuinely be promoted. It is this picture I see suggested by some of Nietzsche's thoughts on political systems, more specifically in his praise of the Law-Book of Manu in 'The Anti-Christ.'>'

NIETZSCHE'S CASTE SYSTEM In his praise of the Law-Book of Manu over and against the Bible Nietzsche paints a picture of a caste system which would serve autonomy and which is divided into three castes. In the first caste would be those individuals who have chosen to live dangerously and who have taken upon themselves the role of legislature. The second caste would be made up of 'noble warriors'>' and a king who would turn the ideas of those in the higher class into ideals that can be understood and adopted by the masses and laws which they would then enforce. The second caste also serves to take the burden of actually running society away from those in the first caste so that they are not distracted from their own pursuits. The third
24

caste will be the masses who do not have the strength to devote themselves to a life like those in the first caste and who are essentially moulded by the second caste to fall in line with the ideals of the first. Those occupying the third caste will also be those who perform all the practical chores that need to be performed for the society to survive. We might ask how those who have chosen a life so at odds with that of the masses could ever hope to become their leaders. Aaron Ridley in his 'Nietzsche's Conscience'55essentially argues that they could not ever really hope to do so. Ridley argues that Nietzsche was in some sense

envious of Wagner because his music had a way of stirring people that his own writings so far had not and claims that as philosophers relying on books rather than music those we have identified as engaged in the pursuit of autonomy could never stir the feelings of a nation in a way that would make them give themselves over to the philosopher's rule. This I think is essentially correct but I also think that this could be a further reason for the presence of a king in the second caste of society. The most likely way in which those living dangerously would come to have legislative power would be by an existing ruler being moved to becoming something like a disciple after observing his solitary, heroic project and being seduced by its values. The possibility of those living dangerously becoming real

legislators is however not of great importance here as we are primarily concerned with what a society that is suited to the ideal of autonomy, the production of genius would have to be like.

THE PROMOTION OF AUTONOMY IN THE CASTE SYSTEM. The problem that I have with the picture of the caste system that Nietzsche puts forward in his treatment of the Law-Book of Manu is that the idea of a higher caste of philosophers legislating for the society they have power over through a devoted king and warrior caste is that it begins to sound quite similar to Rorty's strong poets coming together for discussion and deciding a course of action. The problem is that to be a member of the highest caste you only have to be a person who has taken
25

up the life of living dangerously with some success. This would mean that either the members of the highest caste would come together in discussion which would, in order for them to legislate, result in a compromise in beliefs (the similarity with Rorty's system) or else it would mean a physical conflict over every matter with the strongest legislating from his own ideals. Neither of these two options would be viable in that one carries the problems we have seen are inherent in Rorty's system whilst the latter would be little more than constant squabbling, the product of which the second caste would have no hope of turning into law and which both the second and the third caste could never dedicate themselves to. For this reason I would argue that Nietzsche's caste of 'the most spiritual human beings'56would instead have to be, in the first instance, a single man who has won over an existing ruler. Like minded people who are also in the pursuit of autonomy might eventually gravitate to this leader and a kind of intellectual aristocracy may be formed. This would I believe provide the kind of environment where the pursuit of autonomy is best served. Those occupying the first caste would be free to pursue the more and more beautiful and greater redescriptions of the world and to legislate values to be made law, working together for a time with a more or less common vision. Inevitably from time to time there will be conflict in this upper caste as beliefs start to diverge resulting in competition between the members of the caste and the leader. Such conflict will have the benefits stated earlier and each project will become grander and each person's will will be sharpened. Over time as the competition becomes more intense

the differences in beliefs of the members of the first caste will become more and more pronounced until real conflict breaks out and a struggle for power begins. This society then is not so unstable as to never have time for a single vision to flourish and be built upon but is open to conflict in a way that prevents the freezing over of culture. A society such as this will

promote autonomy/genius as those who occupy or rise up into the first


26

caste are given enough solitude and experience enough conflict to create ever greater and more beautiful ideals and descriptions of the world, fostering higher and higher degrees of genius. Meanwhile periods of

intense conflict, as members of the second and third castes give their loyalties to different members of the first caste, would not only intensify the projects of those members of the first caste, but will also cause some of the members of the lower castes to question their beliefs and embark on their own pursuit of autonomy.
In the extreme situation of war

something like the acknowledgement of the ramifications of the 'death of God' may be felt by some>?which in turn may lead to the flowering of many new redescriptions of the world reacting against the old established one and in the hands of some taking on a still greater and more beautiful form.

27

NOTES:
* - See Bibliography for futher details. 1. "Schopenhauer as Educator" by Friedrich Nietzsche in "Untimely Meditations", page 128.* 2. Self-Overcoming in Nietzsche and Authenticity in Heidegger for example. 3. See Bibliography for edition details. 4. Autonomy entry in "The Oxford Companion to Philosophy", edited by Ted Honderich. 5. "The Gay Science" by Friedrich Nietzsche aphorism 290, page 232.* 6. See for example jacob Golomb's "In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus" especially page 73.* 7. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page xvi.* 8. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page xv.* 9. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 10.* 10. "Reading Rorty" page 346, in "Biting the Bullet" by Charles B. Guigon and David R. Hiley.* 11. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 29.* 12. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 20.* 13. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 32.* 14. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" by Friedrich Nietzsche, page 139.* 15. "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" by Richard Rorty, page 377.* 16. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page xv.* 17. See section titled "The Herd" in "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche pages 156-162.* 18. See Book Four of "Being and Time" by Martin Heidegger, pages 149-168.* 19. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 38.* 20. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 38.* 21. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 38.* 22. "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 46.* 23. "Reading Rorty" page 356, in "Biting the Bullet" by Charles B. Guigon and David R. Hiley.* 24. "The Gay Science" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 283, page 228.* 25. "The Gay Science" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 283, page 228.* 26. "The Gay Science" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 283, page 228.* 27. Taken from online resource collection of Nietzsche's letters: "Nietzsche's Letters" at zs: www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/nletters.htm. 29. Though company is not desired as such the autonomous individual, the genius, is still paramount. 30. "Daybreak" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 179, page 107.* 31. "Daybreak" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 177, page 107.* 32. "Daybreak" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 566, page 227.* 33. "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 916, page 483.* 34. "Contingence, Irony, and Solidarity" by Richard Rorty, page 33.* 35. "Daybreak" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 109, page 64.* 36. "Emerson's Prose and Poetry" page 124, edited by Joel Porte and Saundra Morris.* 37. Quoted in "Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,Antichrist"by Walter Kaufmann, page 464. 38. Michel De Montaigne quoting Socrates. "The Complete Essays" page 268.* 39. Michel De Montaigne quoting Socrates. "The Complete Essays" page 268-269.* 40. "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 924, page 488.* 41. Such beauty and sublimity are still not goals as such as there is no upper limit to beauty and sublimity, the possibility of creating ourselves in a more beautiful or sublime way is always open to us. 42. "Beyond Good and Evil" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 256, page 188.* 43. Title of a Michel De Montaigne essay. "The Complete Essays" page 694.* 44. "The Complete Essays" by Michel De Montaigne, page 694.* 45. "The Complete Essays" by Michel De Montaigne, page 695.* 28

46. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" by Friedrich Nietzsche, page 47.* 47. "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 811, page 428.* 48. "Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist" by Walter Kaufmann, page130.* 49. See Bibliography for edition details. 50. "In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus" by Jacob Golomb, page 3.* 51. "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 988, page 519.* 52. "The Anti-Christ" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 57, page 188.* 53. See Bibliography for edition details. 54. "The Anti-Christ" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 57, page 188.* 55. See Bibliography for edition details. 56. "The Anti-Christ" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 57, page 188.* 57. "The Will to Power" by Friedrich Nietzsche, aphorism 112, page 69.*

29

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
BERKOWITZ, Peter, "Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist", Harvard University Press, 1995. COPELSTON, Frederick, "Friedrich Nietzsche Philosopher of Culture", Harper and Row Publishers, 1975. EMERSON, Ralph Waldo, "Emerson's Prose and Poetry", ed. Joel Porte and Saundra Morris, Norton Critical, 2001. GOLOMB, Jacob, "In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus", Routledge, 1995. HEIDEGGER, Martin, "Being and Time", trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, 1998. HONDERICH, Ted(ed), "The Oxford Companion to Philosophy", Oxford University Press, 1995. JASPERS, Karl, "Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity", trans. Charles Wallraff and Frederick Schmitz, Gateway Edition, 1965. KAUFMANN, WaIter, "Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,Antichrist", Princeton University Press, 1974. MALACHOWSKI, Alan(ed), "Reading Rorty", Basil Blackwell, 1990. MONTAIGNE, Michel De, "The Complete Essays", trans. M.A. Screech, The Penguin Press 1991. NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, - "Beyond Good and Evil", trans. RJ. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1973. - "Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality.", trans. RJ. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1997. - "Human, all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits", trans.RJ. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1998. - "The Gay Science", trans. WaIter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1974. - "The Will to Power", trans. WaIter Kaufmann and RJ. Hollingdale, Vintage Books, 1968. - "Thus Spoke Zarathustra", trans. WaIter Kaufmann, The Modem Library, 1995. - "Twilight of the Idols/ The Anti-Christ", trans. RJ. Hollingdale, Penguin books, 1990. - "Untimely Meditations", trans. RJ. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1997. RIDLEY, Aaron, "Nietzsche's Conscience: Six Character Studies From the Genealogy", Comell University Press, 1998. RORTY, Richard, - "Contingency,Irony, and Solidarity",Cambridge University Press, 1989. - "Philosophyand the Mirror of Nature", Princeton University Press, 1980.

30

You might also like