Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate the premises occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected their respective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from said subject premises of plaintiff; 2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall have vacated the premises of the plaintiff; 3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this Honorable Court; and 4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.

A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993 EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Respondent. DAVIDE, JR., J.: The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer in the said case was filed and "without notice and hearing," the 1 latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitled case. library SO ORDERED. He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its 2 Order of 19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 - a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that the said decision is void upon its face because it: . . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely prays that judgment be rendered. but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a 3 new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:

SO ORDERED. According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision preparation," and that respondent's "haste to amend the same to favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and downright improper." The complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from office if only to save the integrity of the judiciary." In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, the respondent denies the imputations and alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original counsel for the defendants but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time that the parties were directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until 29 November 1991 when Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered only after a preliminary conference was held where the parties with their respective counsels discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement and after the defendants failed to comply with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to submit in writing their "respective position statements setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal from the 28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2 September 1991, which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to declare the decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for execution was granted and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of 5 Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991, he received an order from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter, he (respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25
4

January 1993 that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the dispositive portion" of its earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993 a motion to set aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the plaintiff filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by the former did not appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally contends that the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was rendered moot and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the charge of gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping conclusions show his disrespectful attitude. In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, the complainant reiterates his charge that the respondent is incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to convince this Court that the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is permissible and proper shows "gross ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision after its finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly manifests his "patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence." In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 7 1993, the respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991 Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from having the defect "timely corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact done, and that the "clarified decision" did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of competence. Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and 8 Manifestation on 28 July 1993. Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a 9 Manifestation to Reply on 9 August 1993. The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation, report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious, and made the following findings: It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing dispositive portion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof. The only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the same. If only he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be the most important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this must have been simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.
6

True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and amended decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no adequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have avoided such fractured phrases as: 1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991); 2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid); 3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid); 4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomes one of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid); 5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the property (Ibid). It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions have no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done. and recommends that: . . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions. We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadings submitted by the parties in this case. After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court Administrator. How

it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or incompetence. There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness - qualities which Judges must, among others, possess. Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge to be an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he can, through constant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect for and encourages obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court. As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an 10 industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" and that 11 he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted the motion for its execution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence. We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the counsel for the defendants - the complainant herein - merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-trial order. Obviously, the complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor, 12 fairness and good faith, both attorneys should have called the court's attention to the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision. We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could not attain finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and 13 justice. It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the

order of the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars the respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case. We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred task and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and 14 act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of 15 justice. Therefore, he must constantly be the embodiment of competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's confidence in the Judiciary. A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least this counsel was never notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate, if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, the case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the submitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice before then. The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give his complaint a strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action. Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely. Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994 ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, Respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued the following order: The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.) After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows: That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.) Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said sheriff's return.Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali. With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and recommendation: There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.

The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" - Sworn Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the respondents (Exh. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G", Exh. "I" - Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva); (4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" - Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and"V-2"). After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991].ch In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995 SALLY D. BONGALONTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, Respondents. RESOLUTION

registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin. Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
l ibra ry

However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his corespondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution) The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

MELO, J.:

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib ra ry

In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases. During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant was levied upon. It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88. Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934. After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations: Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, Petitioners, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents. CASTRO, J.:

bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counterproposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows: We recognize it is your privilege both to strike picketing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library and to conduct

cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library of your intention to do

2. Take your meals within the office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. The decision to make is yours - whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management. The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958. From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building. On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety: The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958. Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision. We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you. If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Before, the decisions was yours to make. So it is now. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases

involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees AssociationNATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them. On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint. After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965. Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred: 1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B; 2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;

3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and 4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually - by registered special delivery mail at that - without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045) Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332). Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.1 Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422). Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since

the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be. Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2 Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that antiunion conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735). Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine," ... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.) It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the

petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent - again individually and by registered special delivery mail - to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee - of which Ramon Garcia was a member - refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts.. Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia: TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MANILA Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. Plaza Moraga, Manila chanrobles virtual law library

THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP Plaza Moraga, Manila INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION Plaza Moraga, Manila . for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING... However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads: 3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.) The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.) II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions. Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement. So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.) It is noteworthy that - perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work - the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees - having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike - were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring. Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.) Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.) Of course, the respondents - through Ramon Garcia - tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor: This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958. The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company. Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES President, Insurance Life Acting President, FGU. The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed. Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal. Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them - when Olbes refused them an audience - to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage - who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions - to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court." At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work

at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court: ... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728) The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further. Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip - which the respondents never denied or tried to disprove - his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution. Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.) The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with

regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos. Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead - acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence. The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: . We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378) Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that: Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)

Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement. In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.) Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order. [W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.) Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful namecalling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) - another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice. It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice. ... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an exemployee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) . IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their

usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work upon the invitation of the respondents - they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. [W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.) [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.) And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have already been filled by replacements. [W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.) A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258;see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra). The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during

which they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]). The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities. ... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].) Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-LandAir-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]). V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: . ... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions: In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied) The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above citation read however as follows: Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management upon the

City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest. In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours) It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-2017981. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph. This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest." Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs.

Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct. Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.

EN BANC G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, Respondents. DECISION

Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

DAVIDE, JR., J.: The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 76911 has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years. The antecedents are not disputed. In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases. Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as follows: a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan. b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan. c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua only; d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada Amor only. In an Order2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as follows: [I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6) years. The two motions4 for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997,5 the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses. On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence. In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and defend him. In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. We resolved to give due course to the petition. Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows:

SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases. Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus: SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer. Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows: SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals7 that by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be. Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual Property; 8 and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,9 as amended. Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception. As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception. It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,11 to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.12 Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration13 he filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated: As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held: A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction.(Underscoring ours) Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states: 16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neitherAlberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA. Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility. No costs. SO ORDERED.

En Banc G.R. No. 100643, October 30, 1992 ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 79, MORONG, RIZAL, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, MORONG, RIZAL, REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, AND AGUEDO EUGENIO, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In Our Resolution of 14 August 1992, We directed ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo[1] thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar. In his EXPLANATION of 1 September 1992, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay humbly prostrates himself before the Honorable Court and throws himself at its mercy, and explains that x x x whenever he prepares petitions either for the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, he dictates to his secretary and if portions of the decision or order to be appealed from have to be quoted, he simply instructs his said secretary to copy the particular pages of the said decision or order. In the case at bar, he did instruct his secretary to copy the corresponding pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Somehow, however, some words were intercalated on a particular paragraph noted by the Honorable Court he regrettably is at a loss to explain. He remembers, however, that at the time he was preparing the petition at bar there were other pleadings necessitating equal if not preferential attention from him which could perhaps be the reason why his secretary committed a very grievous mistake. Such mistake though he does not condone and he feels upset at the turn of events.[2] Attached to his EXPLANATION as Annex A is an Affidavit[3] of Alicia A. Castro, purportedly his Secretary, stating among others that 3. x x x in the preparation of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, it was Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay who dictated to me the contents of said petition; 4. x x x in the preparation of the petition, he told me, as he is wont to do whenever he prepares a petition, to copy the particular pages in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 entitled Adez Realty, Inc., petitioner versus The Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 79 (not 89 as stated in the Affidavit), et al., respondents; 5. x x x when I copied the particular pages of the decision of the Court of Appeals as instructed by Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, I did as instructed, but it was only after our office received the copy of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 100643 x x x that Atty. Dacanay confronted me and asked me where I got that portion which was added to the particular paragraph noted by the Supreme Court; that it was only then that I realized the mistake I committed; xxxx 7. x x x I surmise that the error could have been due to the fact that ADEZ REALTY, Inc. has so many cases being handled by the law office that I presume I could have copied or my intention was distracted by other pleadings atop my table at the time. Upon receipt of the EXPLANATION of counsel, the First Division referred his case en consulta to the Court En Banc which accepted and took cognizance of it in view of the possible sanction that may be imposed on a member of the Bar.

After due deliberation, the Court En Banc brushed off as simply unsatisfactory and incredible counsels explanation that it was his secretary who committed the mistake. This passing-thebuck stance of counsel was already aptly treated in Adaza v. Barinaga,[4] where the Court observed thus Making the law office secretary, clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and for the lawyers dereliction of duty is a common alibi of practising lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal cases, counsels shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude. The case of petitioner is no better; it can be worse. For, how could the secretary have divined the phrase without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, without counsel dictating it word for word? Could it have been a providential mistake of the secretary as it was very material, and on which could have hinged the fate of a litigants cause? Whatever be the truth in this regard, counsel cannot elude administrative responsibility which borders on falsification of a judicial record to which, by his inveigling, he unfortunately drags his secretary. Indeed, by no means can he evade responsibility for the vicious intercalation as he admittedly dictated and signed the petition. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegations in their pleadings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by them, typed or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound by the acts of his secretary who merely follows his orders.[5] The instant case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title over a parcel of land. Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 of the same statute, on which petitioner bases one of his causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in possession of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a petition for reconstitution of title. The inserted phrase without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property when in fact it did not make such a finding is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litigations. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court.[6] The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only because it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of ones oath as a Member of the Bar, Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that [a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved (underscoring supplied). Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyers solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never venture to mislead the court by false statements or quotations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista v. Gonzales,[7] We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. In Chavez

v. Viola,[8] We suspended respondent counsel for five (5) months after he filed an Amended Application for Original Registration of Title which contained false statements. The case at bar, although akin to the aforementioned cases, has more serious and far-reaching repercussions. Those who attempt to misguide this Court, the last forum for appeal, should be dealt with more severely lest We be made unwilling instruments of inequity and injustice. Indeed, counsel has demonstrated his wanton disregard for truth and fairplay even before the Highest Court of the land. Worse, he compounded his unprofessional mischief by laying the blame on his hapless secretary whose duty it was simply to obey him. It is well to repeat, perhaps to the point of satiety, what We have already said x x x that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice x x x x A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer x x x x It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all x x x sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.[9] WHEREFORE, We find ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, counsel for petitioner, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a judicial Decision elevated to Us on certiorari, thereby altering its factual findings with the apparent purpose, and no other, of misleading the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus miserably failing to live up to the standards expected of him as a member of the Philippine Bar. Consequently, ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is hereby DISBARRED effective immediately from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be served personally on Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay at his given address at Mezzanine Floor, WIL-VIC Building, 125 Kamias Road, Quezon City, entered upon his personal records, and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC VICENTE SOTTO January 21, 1949

the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration. Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows: The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.) In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, this Court, in In reKelly, held the following: The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the upon court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.) Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court. Vicente Sotto in his own behalf. FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows: As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision. In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in

intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act. But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says: In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press

and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ." It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594). In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court. In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 82238-42 November 13, 1989 ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and GEORGE D. CARLOS, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, Respondent. FERNAN, C.J.: Consequent to the dismissal on February 18,1987 of Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989, N-0990, N0991, N-0992, and N-0993 for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval by respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Sub-province of Biliran, Leyte, the offended party, herein petitioner George D. Carlos, thru his lawyer and herein copetitioner Antonio T. Guerrero filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXI of Cebu City an action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6478, against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases. The complaint and summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 were served on respondent judge on December 10, 1987. On the following day, he issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against herein petitioners, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of five (5) days and a fine of P500.00 for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court. The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading: 12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias...; xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but appalling-giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behavior ... 15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should also visit upon him ... for, reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. 1 To stop the coercive force of the Order of Contempt issued by respondent judge, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or restraining order. On March 22,

1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor from enforcing his order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to N0993. 2 Petitioner submits two issues for resolution in this petition: first, whether or not respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. N-09890993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Biliran, Leyte by reason of the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 for damages against respondent filed in Cebu; and secondly, whether or not the language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. 6478 against respondent judge in another court before another judge is contemptuous and whether the same is absolutely privileged being made in a judicial proceeding. 3 Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against respondent judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. In his Comment dated April 14, 1988, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. This, according to respondent judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability, so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully the court's prestige. Determinative of the first issue is the distinction we made in the case of Delima vs. Gallardo: 4 Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the same 5 and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of the courts. 6 It is an act done in a distance which tends to be little, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarass the court and justice. 7 As the terms connote, the word direct" would relate to an act stemming immediately from a source, cause or reason and thus, the rule under the law that it be done in the presence of or so near a court or judge while "indirect" would signify an act done not straight to the point and thus, legally speaking would pertain to acts done out or not in the presence of the court. Based on the foregoing distinctions and the facts prevailing in the case at bar, this Court sustains petitioners' contention that the alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 did not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said, petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge and involving a separate action, the civil case for damages against respondent judge, Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of respondent judge's act of dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993, such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in connection with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms

as direct contempt of court. As categorically stated Ang vs. Castro: 8 "(T)he use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice." (Emphasis supplied) Petitioners' alleged disrespectful language falling, if at all, under the classification of indirect contempt, petitioners may be adjudged guilty thereof and punished therefor only after charge and hearing as provided under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, thus: Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: xxx xxx xxx Not only was the Order of District Contempt dated December 11, 1987 issued without charge and hearing, it was likewise irregularly issued as an incident in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to N-0993, which had long been terminated. Said Order must therefore be, as it is hereby set aside for being null and void. The second issue raised by petitioners has been resolved in Lubiano vs. Gordolla, 9 in this wise: Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used as basis for any action, however false and malicious the statements may be. We find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the statements in question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate delivered ill the Batasan or in any committee thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession. While technically, to rule on whether or not the statements under consideration are contemptuous would be premature in the absence of any contempt proceedings against petitioners, we deem it wise to do so to avoid circuity of action in view of our finding that the statements complained of are not contemptuous. We agree with petitioners that the same are merely descriptive therein plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by therein defendant judge. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal cases to justify the award of damages being sought. We have consistently held that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal the power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. 10 Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be curtailed and corrected. Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and ...(to) insist on similar conduct by others." 11 This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme

importance." 12 And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers ... 13 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order of Direct Contempt of Court dated December 11, 1987 is declared NULL and VOID. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on March 22, 1988 is hereby made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Second Division G.R. No. L-42032, January 9, 1976 IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, MAKATI, RIZAL; THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN, PROVINCIAL JAIL, PASIG, RIZAL; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXV, PASIG, RIZAL; AND MARCIANO P. STA. ANA, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL, PASIG, RIZAL, RESPONDENTS. DECISION FERNANDO, J.: It is settled law that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for release from confinement of a person who has served his sentence.[1] It is on such a doctrine that reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this application for the issuance of such a writ. It is undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him with the commission of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to one of serious physical injuries. It is to such lesser offense that on September 10, 1975, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by November 19, 1975, considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975.[2] This notwithstanding, the petition alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison term imposed upon him, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner) alleging as a ground that the father of the victim, Gilberto Valenzuela, informed the movant (respondent Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason the undersigned will file an amended information.[3] Then came this paragraph in the petition: That on the following day, November 20, 1975, the respondent Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no jurisdiction to act on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his decision therein had already been executed, and, further, even assuming that the respondent Judge could still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the Fiscals motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose very liberty was being sought to be deprived, still [he] persisted in acting upon the Fiscals motion and granted the same in the interest of justice, not at all minding that your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent Judge, is still entitled to due process of law and to some justice; * * *.[4] There was a motion for reconsideration, but it was fruitless. [5]Hence this petition.On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following resolution: The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on Friday, December 12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ not later than the aforesaid date. The Court further Resolved: (a) to set this case for hearing on Monday, December 15, 1975 at 10:30 a.m.; and (b) to [grant] the motion of petitioner to litigate as pauper in this case.[6] On the date set for hearing, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado filed this return, worded as follows: 1. That the petitioner Manuel de Gracia has already been ordered released by this court per order dated December 11, 1975, in view of the fact that Trial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. has not as of this time filed the amended information for Homicide after the death of Florante Valenzuela, the offended party in this case, notwithstanding his motion entitled Motion to Order the Warden to hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia dated November 19, 1975, * * *; 2. That in view of the release from custody of Manuel de Gracia, the present petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic. * * *[7] Respondent Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr., the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, did likewise. The return stated: 1. That the petitioner is not in his custody or power although, as alleged in the petition, it was upon his motion that the respondent Judge issued the Order * * * ordering the warden to hold the release of the accused (herein petitioner). 2. That the reason for his said motion * * * is, as stated therein, that he was informed of the death of the victim and he was going to file an amended information. 3. That because of the necessity for immediate action so as to avoid the accused being released so that he could be

held to answer for a crime of homicide, and in the honest belief at that time that the proper remedy was the filing of an amended information for homicide, the undersigned filed the motion on said ground. The information concerning the death of the victim was given to the undersigned by the victims father only on November 19, 1975, the last day of confinement of the accused. However, after being able to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned concluded that the proper remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had already been rendered on the first information, but the filing of a new information for homicide upon the authority of this Honorable Courts ruling in People vs. Manolong, * * * and prior similar cases.[8] As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of the following tenor was adopted by this Court: When this case was called for hearing this morning, Atty. Salvador N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Major Edgardo Maristela appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the Court resolved (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a [return] of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time.[9] It should be stated likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela assured the Court that petitioner had been released. What was declared orally by him was thereafter set forth in writing in accordance with his return dated December 16, 1975: * * * III. That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the Provincial Warden received a commitment order issued by Judge Reynaldo Honrado, dated 16 September 1975, * * *; IV. That by virtue of that commitment order which the petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to Makati Municipal Jail, on Sept. 18, 1975, to serve his prison term thereat pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 29 as said prisoner is classified as Municipal prisoner; V. That the petitioner was brought back and confined again to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla, Executive Judge CFI Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, * * *; VI. That on December 12, 1975, the Office of the Provincial Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of First Istance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge Reynaldo Honrado, directing him to release Manuel de Gracia, the petitioner in this case; VII. That by virtue of said order * * * and the Order of Release, * * * the undersigned respondent released on said date the petitioner as evidenced by certificate of discharge from prison * * * and that is the reason why he cannot produce the body of said person before this Honorable Court; VIII. That he was not able to make the return of the writ immediately on the ground that he was at that time confined in the hospital, and he was discharged only on December 13, 1975.[10] There was likewise a return of the writ on such a date on behalf of respondent Cresencio T. Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was therein declared: 1. That the petitioner was not in his custody when he received copy of the petition as the petitioner was transferred to the Rizal Provincial Jail on December 3, 1975, as he was going to be charged with the crime of homicide and therefore, his confinement has to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of said transfer, respondent Municipal Warden could not produce the body of the petitioner before this Honorable Court.[11] On the morning of December 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There was this manifestation though: [Petitioner], thru counsel, respectfully manifests that he has already been released from confinement, for which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic * * *.[12] It would appear, therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar. Wherefore, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed for being moot and academic.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14277 April 30, 1960

MANUEL L. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent. Manuel L. Fernandez in his own behalf. Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent. LABRADOR, J.: Petition for certiorari with injunction filed by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to annul two orders dated June 16 and July 29, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Hon. Eloy B. Bello, presiding. The first order reprimands petitioner for his improper conduct as counsel in Special Proceedings No. 3931, entitled "Guardianship of the Minors Federico and Pedro both surnamed Perreyras, Timotea Perreyras, petitioner-guardian," orders him to return to the guardian within 15 days the sum of P200.00 collected by him, and causes a copy of the order to be sent to the Supreme Court for corresponding disciplinary action on the petitioner (Annex J). The second order denies petitioner's motion for reconsideration and warns him not to use improper terms in his pleadings. (Annex L.) The circumstances leading to the issuance of the above orders may be briefly stated as follows: Timotea Perreyras, through Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings No. 3931, for her appointment as guardian over the persons and properties of her brothers, the minors Federico and Pedro Perreyras. Upon her appointment and upon her qualifying as such, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common with the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to Maximiano Umagay. The request was granted by Judge Villamor, and on August 24, 1951, a deed of sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, was executed by the guardian in favor of Maximiano Umagay for the sum of P1,000. This sale was approved by Judge Pasicolan on December 17, 1952 (Annex C). The nipa land sold by the guardian had previously been sold with right to repurchase to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay by Florentino Perreyras, father (now deceased) of the guardian and the wards. The interest in the land of Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay were, in turn, sold for P200.00 to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Of the purchase price of P1,000, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, redemption price of the nipa land and as assignee of the credit in favor of Maximiano Umagay and Ricardo Perreyras. The other P200.00 was given to said attorney, in payment of his legal fees for services rendered by him as counsel of the father of the wards in a civil case. However, the record does not show that these payments were authorized by the court. On January 21, 1958, Judge Eloy Bello, who took over the court from Judge Pasicolan, issued an order requiring Timotea Perreyras to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt for failing to account for the property and money of the wards. After hearing the guardian Timotea Perreyras, the court issued another order date January 20, 1958, exonerating her of the contempt charges, disapproving all payments made by her, including that made to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez, and requiring Attys. Manuel L. Fernandez and Braulio Fernandez to

show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt of court. In the same order, the court charged said attorneys of having abused their relationship with the guardian and having taken money from her without previous approval of the court (Annex D). Atty. Braulio Fernandez submitted a written explanation, and the court, considering it satisfactory, exonerated him of the preferred charges. On January 30, 1958, the court again issued another order directing Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez to submit in ten days a written answer to the charges stated in the order of January 27, 1958 (Annex G). On February 1, 1958, he submitted an explanation (Annex H.), admitting receipt of the sum of P400.00 from the guardian, but alleging that when he received the amount he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as their relation had terminated when the guardian secured the services of Atty. Braulio Fernandez; that he acted in good faith and the guardianship proceedings were instituted by him only to help the minors the action being less expensive than an intestate proceeding, and that he was paid only P50.00 for his services to the guardian. So he asked that the charges be dismissed and that the guardian be warned not to make unjustifiable complaints against him. On February 10, 1953, Timotea Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay were summoned to appear for further examination on the proceeds of the sale of the nipa land. After hearing their testimonies, the court on June 16, 1958, found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt of court because he had taken the amount of P400.00 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court. The court also found the conduct of counsel to be anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him from the father of the wards (Annex J). This is the first order sought to be annulled in this appeal. The second order is that denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent attorney. It is claimed by petitioner in this appeal that the proceedings conducted in the court below are irregular because no formal charge was filed against him. There is no merit in this contention. The court motu proprio preferred the charges in its order dated January 20, 1958, and in another order dated January 27, 1958, the petitioner was duly advised thereof and was given an opportunity to file a written answer thereto. It has been held in the following case that there has been sufficient compliance with the requirements of law: The institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold person guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. The above requirements were complied with by the filing of the order on September 30, and the giving of full opportunity to the respondent to appear and defendant himself. The contention that a formal information filed by a prosecuting officer is necessary to begin proceedings must be overruled. (People vs. B. M. Venturanza, et al., defendants, Jose Y. Torres, appellant, 98 Phil., 211; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 769.). The court below found petitioner guilty of contempt court on two grounds, the first is that he instituted the guardianship proceedings for the sole purpose of facilitating payment to him of the debts of the wards. The facts do not, however, bear out this finding. Before the guardianship proceedings were instituted, the wards were indebted in the sum of P200.00 to Ricardo Perreyras and Maximiano Umagay, and as the wards had no money with which to pay the debt, the only way to settle it is by selling the nipa land. But the land could not have been sold by the minors without intervention of a guardian. So the petitioner must have believed that guardianship proceedings was the proper remedy. The judges of the court below, from whom Judge Bello took over, must have been satisfied that the procedure taken by the petitioner was more beneficial to the wards when they appointed a guardian and approved the sale of the land. As there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of petitioner, the finding on this point of the court below should be reversed.

However, the finding of the court that the purchase price of the land is P1,000 was in custodia legis and could not be taken and used in payment of debts without its previous authority is correct. As a lawyer the petitioner is charged with the knowledge that the property and effects of the wards are under the control and supervision of the court, and that they could not be and expended without the latter's permission, more especially so when the money taken was to pay the debt of the father of the wards. The reprimand is, therefore, fully justified. But the order for the refund of the P200.00 and the closing of the guardianship proceedings after such return, would deprive petitioner of the fees that he was entitled to receive from the father of the guardian and the wards, for services rendered in a civil case, which services are admitted to have been due from their father. While the reprimand is in order for petitioner's mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned and which his client could not pay before his death. The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly the court can not deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so. In his answer before this Court respondent judge justifies his order for the return of the P200.00 on the ground that petitioner is "below average standard of a lawyer." The opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyer's fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered. Petitioner claims that he won a civil case for his client, the deceased father of the guardian and the wards. That P200.00 is the amount of the fee of petitioner is admitted by the guardian. We find that the court's order directing petitioner to return the P200.00, and in effect denying him the right to collect the same, is not justified, to say the least. This portion of the final order is hereby modified in the sense that the return of the P200.00 is without prejudice to petitioner's right to demand payment for the services rendered the deceased out of the proceeds of the property left by him (deceased). In this Court the judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration be stricken out for employing strong language. We believe the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge below in characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming" and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner." If any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm. Wherefore, the orders are modified as above indicated. Without costs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989 ... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do but did not even contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. 5

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA GONZALEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989

[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. 6 To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ... 7 ... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8 disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession." 9 We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10 And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo. That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking in the Decision, 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ Respondents. G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, Respondents. G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. RESOLUTION

SARMIENTO, J.: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.) On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation. The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:

This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for Ayala ... 2 ... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary ... 3

The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court ... 4

motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language. Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke. In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.01... Rule 11.02... Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Rule 11.05... Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice. WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages. It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines." The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice. The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance. We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974 JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar,respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit. Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar. As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs. Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Taada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New. This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction. To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court. Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar

again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800. Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation. At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements. The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review oncertiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision. On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed. To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied). This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R. Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies."

Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong. When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision. In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases." It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote: The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may

decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this Court may decide to do in this case. With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595). As We stated before: We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility. ... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445) Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7). We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150). As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals. It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances. For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed. Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. Nos. RTJ-89-331, 355, 361, 362, 438, 439 September 28, 1990 PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL HIDALGO, respondent. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: Complainant Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge Rafael B. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac, Tarlac. In the resolution dated June 20, 1989 dismissing RTJ-89-294, the Court admonished the complainant "to exercise more care and decorum in filing unfounded and unsubstantiated charges against officers of the court in order to maintain and uphold the dignity of the same of which he is a part" (also dismissed was RTJ-88213 in a Resolution dated July 18, 1989.) Complainant did not heed this admonition. In his Comment in RTJ-89-361, and his Compliance by way of comment in RTJ-89-355, the respondent judge asked that the other administrative cases by the same complainant be consolidated. Complainant, in his Reply in RTJ-89-355, made a similar request. The Court directed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to gather all charges filed by the complainant against the respondent judge and thereafter consolidated six (6) administrative complaints: RTJ-89-331 (which recites ten [10] causes of action), RTJ-89-355, RTJ-89-361, RTJ-89-362, RTJ-89-439, and RTJ-89-438. Subsequent to the June 20, 1989 admonition, complainant continued to file charges against respondent. He also threatened to bang more cases, as evidenced by the following: (1) a Manifestation dated March 1, 1990 (submitted to respondent judge in relation to two civil cases), which reads: Counsel will make it appear on record that if the motion and joint motion will not be acted (upon) on March 21, 1990 as scheduled he will be forced much to his regret to file the following administrative and criminal complaints, against the presiding judge, namely: 1. violation of his oath; 2. falsification under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code; 3. knowingly rendering an unlawful order; 4. maliciously delaying the administration of justice;

5. grave misconduct. . . . (2) his Reply to RTJ-89-361 dated May 18, 1990: It is respectfully submitted, that the respondent has made Branch 68 as his personal court thus making it as a court for his friends, the rich, powerful and influential and against his foes, the poor and powerless.This claim will be discussed lengthily in the next administrative charge which complainant will file against the respondent [Emphasis supplied]. (3) his letter to the Court dated August 8, 1990, opposing respondent's application for disability benefits because of the "pendency of administrative cases against him filed by me and some more will follow as soon as I consolidate my evidences" [Emphasis supplied]. In a memorandum dated July 13, 1990, the OCA, after enumerating some of the charges, noted that complainant's persistent filing of administrative cases against respondent "signif(ies) a desire to unjustifiably bring respondent to public disdain and ridicule." Also brought to the attention of the Court was complainant's letter dated June 7, 1990, which contains accusations that respondent has a "conspirator" in the Office of the Clerk of Court. The conspirator allegedly inserted inconsistent words in a final Court resolution, and supplied lies in respondent's comment. From the foregoing, the OCA recommended that complainant be strongly reprimanded, if not suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months. A careful study of the charges in these complaints, the Comment in RTJ-89-361, the Compliance filed by respondent in RTJ-89-355, the records of the consolidated cases, and the memorandum of the OCA dated July 13, 1990, clearly reveals that all but three cases ** can be dismissed outright because: (1) the complainant failed to establish prima faciecases: (2) the complainant filed administrative cases as substitute for the appropriate remedy in rulings adverse to him; and (3) the complaints involve the appropriate exercise of respondent's discretionary authority. First, no prima facie cases have been established in: (1) the Seventh Cause of Action in RTJ-89331, since the same grounds have already been found to be without merit by the Court in Prudencio Penticostes, Sr. v. DBP, et al. [G.R. No. 89620, July 13, 1990]; (2) RTJ-89-361, which charges respondent with falsification of three separate orders in three different cases, since no indication of such falsification can be gleaned from the record; and (3) RTJ-89-438, which takes issue with the order to archive Civil Case No. 280, "pending resolution of the matters raised by complainant in the Supreme Court," there being nothing irregular in such order. Second, in the First, Second and Fifth Causes of Action in RTJ-89-331 (which arose from respondent's dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 198, 234, and 205, respectively), the complainant resorted to the filing of administrative complaints against respondent judge instead of availing of the appropriate legal remedies from the adverse rulings, i.e., by motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition for review or for certiorari. Third, the complainant challenges the due exercise by respondent judge of his discretion in the following instances: (1) RTJ-89-331, the Third Cause of Action, the order denying a motion to declare defendants in contempt, and the order deferring action on a motion for an accounting of harvests; the Fourth Cause of Action, the denial of a motion to dismiss; the Sixth Cause of Action, the denial of a motion for inhibition and two motions for reconsideration; the Eighth Cause of Action, the order setting aside an order of dismissal; the Ninth Cause of Action, the order granting a motion for reconsideration; the Tenth Cause of Action, the denial of a motion for inhibition; (2) RTJ-89-362, separate orders setting aside the amended complaints in Civil Case

Nos. 228, 253, 255, which complaints were amended to implead respondent as co-defendant for his alleged use of his judicial powers to prejudice complainant during the proceedings of the aforestated cases; (3) RTJ-89-355, direct contempt orders, and (4) RTJ-89-439, the failure of respondent judge to strike out the answer in two civil cases. Considering the nature, frequency and indiscriminate filing of groundless charges and despite the admonition previously given by resolution of the Court dated June 20, 1989, which the complainant willfully ignored and disobeyed by manifesting the intent to file more of the same, the complainant imposed upon the time, resources and forbearance of the Court and diverted the energies of the respondent judge who has been called upon to comment and defend his every action. This is not to say that a judge may not be answerable for violation of the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, but not every order or ruling adverse to a party can be made the basis for an administrative charge. As a member of the bar, the complainant has responsibilities to the judiciary. The Code of Professional Responsibility and the rules thereunder impose obligations on the lawyer in relation to the court: Canon 10 states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Canon 11 provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court and to judicial officers, while Canon 12 mandates that a lawyer shall exert very effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Through his imprudent filing of administrative cases against respondent judge, complainant has transgressed the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and miserably failed to observe conduct expected of a member of the bar under the Code and in accordance with his lawyer's oath. WHEREFORE, having found the charges above-mentioned to be absolutely without basis, the Court Resolved to: (1) DISMISS outright the following complaints: RTJ-89-331; RTJ-89-362; RTJ-89-438; and RTJ89-355. RTJ-89-361 and RTJ 89-439 are likewise dismissed, except as to charges for which comment has been required; and (2) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, or IMPRISONMENT of ten (10) days in the local jail in case of failure to pay the fine within the time appointed; and (3) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year for his willful disregard and disobedience of the admonition made by the Court in RTJ-89-294, and his violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. The suspension shall take effect from the date of receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of this country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Penticostes. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996 KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, Petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, Respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. The antecedent facts are as follows: Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. 1 The motion alleged in pertinent part: 1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented; 2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present; 3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief; 4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle; 5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.

The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker. Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous," respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court." 2 In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man possibly employed by the Court" had advised him to have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who "the judge may be and when he would appear." Wickers sense of disquiet increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present. 3Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five(5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7, 1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.In their petition 4 before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue that "when a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt." In his comment, 5 respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as petitioners alleged, he was "personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to "avail themselves of all possible remedies"; that after holding petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just "lawyering" and acting as "the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable because his (Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their "profuse apologies" in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had a "full grasp of the case."In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case. What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of

or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt. 6 It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only "[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable. 7Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct contempt.We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. 8The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court. 9Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangels finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof: 2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were present; 3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make room for such transfer. These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely "in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution." 10 This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he "deliberated" for two months whether or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a "mouthpiece." He was just "lawyering" and "he cannot be gagged," even if the allegations in the motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same.To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been "personally recruited" by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been "eased out" were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.

Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. 11 Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" 12 and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." 13After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners "profuse apologies" and indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence" first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel: 14Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of court. It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law. In Ceniza v. Sebastian, 15 which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge "corrupt," the Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court for the reason that Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.The same justification also holds true in this case. WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? DECISION

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993. NOCON, J p: BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf. Public Attorney's Office for private respondent. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court. Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by

the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4 The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question? In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-28056, August 31, 1970] ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. UY REALTY COMPANY, HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VI, AND THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS. DECISION FERNANDO, J.: In this special proceeding for prohibition, petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc. would impute a grave jurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel granting a motion of the other respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of execution against petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas bond "covering rentals rightfully due" the other respondent as plaintiff in anejectment case. By its stress on the claim that the above order of August 26, 1967 was issued notwithstanding the finality of a previous order of dismissal of the case by respondent Judge, it was enabled not only to have this Court give due course to such petition, but also to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting a bond of P1,000.00. The answer filed by respondents, however, altered the picture thus sedulously sought to be created by petitioner. It was apparent therein that previous to such order of dismissal, there was a motion by respondent Uy Realty Company for the dismissal of the case and for the payment of the back rentals secured by the supersedeas bond filed by petitioner. Respondent Judge, however, limited his first order to ordering the dismissal, apparently overlooking the prayer for the payment of the back rentals guaranteed by the supersedeas bond. Thereafter, within the thirty-day period, respondent sought for an amendment of the above order to include execution on the bond filed to cover the past rentals due. The order now challenged was the result thereof. It was issued at a time when the matter was still subject to cognizance by respondent Judge. It would thus appear that this petition lacks merit. We find for respondents. The order granting the writ of execution by respondent Judge is sustained. As shown by the petition itself, there was a complaint for ejectmentdated August 12, 1966 filed by now respondent Uy Realty Company against a certain Co Hing.[1] There was an answer by defendant onAugust 27, 1966, seeking dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaim for reimbursement in the amount of P15,000.00 for alleged improvements made on the leased premises and for damages in the amount of P5, 000.00 for alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor.[2]The decision of the City Court of Manila of October 20, 1966 ordered the defendant and those claiming under him to vacate the premises as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00 representing rents in arrears plus the sum of P1,500.00 a month beginning September, 1966 for the use and occupation of such premises. [3] Upon an appeal being taken, which fell to the sala of respondent Judge, a supersedeas bond was executed by such defendant as well as by the petitioner, the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. [4] During the pendency of such appeal, under date of July 31, 1967, a motion for dismissal of the case and for payment of the supersedeasbond was filed by the plaintiff, respondent Uy Realty Co. It was alleged therein: "1. That on June 23, 1967, upon failure of the defendant to make the required rental deposits to comply with the provisions of Sec. 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Honorable Court, upon motion of undersigned counsel, issued a Writ of Ejectment Execution against the defendant; 2. That counsel for the defendant did not raise any objection to the enforcement of said writ of execution by the Sheriff of Manila whereupon

said Officer placed the plaintiff in possession of the leased premises subject of this appeal; 3. That defendant having vacated the leased premises and possession thereof having been surrendered to the plaintiff, the legal issues subject of this appeal have therefore become moot and the continuation of the trial set for August 2, 1967 will not serve any purpose; 4. That defendant, upon surrender of the premises to the plaintiff, manifested that he has no longer any interest in the further prosecution of this case and would have no objection to the dismissal thereof; 5. That on November 23, 1966, defendant filedSupersedeas Bond No. 567 for P8,800.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. to enter the action into this Honorable Court, said bond having for its purpose to guarantee the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals up to the time of judgment in the City Court of Manila, including damages, attorney's fees and costs; 6. That plaintiff is, as of right, entitled to the withdrawal of the amount covered by the aforementioned supersedeas bond in view of the dismissal of this appealed case."[5] It sought in the prayer that "(a) this appealed case be dismissed; and (b) that the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. be ordered to pay to herein plaintiff the amount of P8, 800.00 guaranteed by theSupersedeas Bond No. 567 filed in this case representing rentals, damages and costs as adjudged by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 151874 in favor of plaintiff." [6] Then came this order of respondent Judge of August 2, 1967: "Upon motion of the plaintiff in view of the fact that the possession of the property, subject matter of this litigation, has been restored to the plaintiff, the defendants having vacated the same, this case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs."[7] It was noted in the answer that on August 22, 1967, the aforesaid order of dismissal of respondent Judge being received by respondent Uy Realty Company only on August 15, 1967, there was a manifestation and motion to execute bond to this effect: "1. That on August 1, 1967, the undersigned counsel filed with this Honorable Court their 'Motion for Dismissal and For Payment ofSupersedeas Bond'; 2. That on August 2, 1967, this Honorable Court issued an Order dismissing the instant case as prayed for by undersigned counsel but did not resolve the prayer for the payment of the amount represented by the Supersede as Bond in this case; 3. That the records of this case will show that on November 23, 1966, defendant filed with this Honorable Court through the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. Supersedeas Bond No. 567 for the amount of P8,800.00 which represents accrued rentals due the herein plaintiff up to the time of judgment in the ejectment case rendered by the City Court of Manila; 4. That considering the dismissal of this case, plaintiff is entitled as right to the payment of the amount represented by the aforementionedSupersedeas Bond as rentals due and owing to the plaintiff before this case was elevated to this Honorable Court on appeal; 5. That the Economic Insurance Co., Inc. has teen duly notified of plaintiff's Motion for the payment of the Supersedeas Bond as of August 1, 1967 and the undersigned counsel has not been served with any opposition thereto."[8]The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against now petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedeas bond covering rentals rightfully due respondent Uy Realty Company. That was the basis. The result thereof was the challenged order of August 26, 1967, granting the prayer for a writ of execution against petitioner "for the amount represented by its Supersedeas Bond covering rentals rightfully due to the plaintiff."[9] Petitioner does not deny, possibly because it could not deny, its liability on the supersedeas bond. It did not even oppose the motion for its execution. Its objection is that the order of August 26, 1967 was issued at a time when the matter was outside the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, the case having been dismissed. It is on that legalproposition, and that proposition alone, that it seeks to make out a case for prohibition. If the motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. sought merely the dismissal of the case, the premises having been vacated, thenperhaps the case for petitioner, such as it is, would have been bolstered. As clearly pointed out, however, the motion precisely sought that petitioner be ordered to pay the

amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by the supersedeas bond. Unfortunately, through haste or inadvertence, respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely ordered that the appealed case be dismissed. Within the period, however, before such order attained the stage of finality, a modification thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. to execute on the bond filed by petitioner. Under the circumstances, what respondent Judge did was clearly within his authority, and the challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny. Hence, this petition should fail. One last observation. It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor,[10] we have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate language of JusticeMakalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." [11] WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us by virtue of our resolution of September 25, 1967 is set aside, and this petition for prohibition is denied. With costs against petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

plaintiffs, in order that such a decision in their favor be not rendered nugatory by the above technicality, had no choice but to ask the court in a motion of April 7, 1965 to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo, defendants Cecilio, Anastasia, Simplicio and Domingo, all bearing the surname of Aguinaldo being the legitimate children, and one Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter, substituted as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, this time presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the aforesaid motion and substituted defendants in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. Hence this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which in turn by resolution of February 17, 1969 certified the matter to this Court, the question involved being one of law. As noted at the outset, we find for appellees. 1. It would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court precisely for embodying in the order complained of what is set forth in the Rules of Court. Thus: "Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative." 2Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his death there could be compliance with the above provision. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved reflection on the law. It is equally vital to remember that the judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. Defendants cannot be heard to allege that it is much too late now to apply the above rule. That would be to set at naught the principle consistently adhered to by this Court. It was succinctly put in Amor v. Jugo 3in these words: "And with more compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court." 4What was said by us in Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez 5 is worth recalling: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 6 An excerpt from Villaflor v. Reyes 7 is equally relevant: "There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable." 8 2. This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, 9 a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. WHEREFORE, the order of October 5, 1965 is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-30362 November 26, 1970 VICTORIA AGUINALDO and SIMEONA AGUINALDO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. SEGUNDO AGUINALDO (deceased), PRIMO AGUINALDO and RUFINA AGUINALDO, defendants, CECILIO AGUINALDO, ANASTACIA AGUINALDO, SIMPLICIO AGUINALDO, DOMINGO AGUINALDO, and FELICITAS BAGAWISAN, defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.: Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any court for that matter. Yet, in effect, that is what the move taken by the defendants in his case amounted to. The lower court as was but proper did not lend its approval. Still undeterred, they would appeal. They ought to have known better. There is no reason to refuse affirmance to the order of the lower court complained of, appointing appellants as legal representatives of the deceased defendant and substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in order that the execution that ought that have taken place long since could at long last be effected. There is no dispute as to the antecedents. On January 14, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II through its clerk issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958, it rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, 1 now appellees, requiring one of the defendants therein, Segundo Aguinaldo, to reconvey one-fourth ()pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to appellees, and to pay the latter the amount of P300.00 yearly beginning with the year 1955. There was an appeal. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on May 23, 1965. It was further set forth therein that on January 5, 1965, a motion for its execution was granted. Hence the writ of execution. On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash such writ of execution based primarily on the allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such appeal. There was an opposition to such motion on February 25, 1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a party to a pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and alleging that there was a failure on the part of the counsel to comply with the above provision. The prayer was for the denial of the motion of Cecilio Aguinaldo and for an order requiring counsel for the defendants to furnish the court the names as well as the residences of the heirs or the legal representatives of the deceased in order that they could be substituted in his stead so as not to render nugatory a decision, final and executory in character. On March 4, 1965, the lower court, then presided by the Hon. Ricardo C. Puno gave counsel of record up to March 22, 1965 within which to submit the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. The aforesaid counsel in turn merely manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be such as of May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid order. Considering the turn of events,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law. The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows: 1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993. CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent. SYLLABUS 1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM, p: In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco. On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property. In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping. 2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different. 3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal. On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal. 4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied. 5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo. In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal. On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the

decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990. 6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991. 7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992. 8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar. Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-93-873 December 14, 1994 LILY MOCLES, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MABINI M. MARAVILLA, Respondent. DAVIDE, JR., J.: In a sworn letter-complaint dated 11 September 1993, the complainant, who was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2833-III of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos City, charged the respondent, the presiding judge of Branch 3 thereof, with ignorance of law and bribery in that the respondent (a) issued a writ of execution with respect to the restoration of possession in the said case despite the fact that it was already on appeal with Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, and (b) was rumored to have received P20,000.00 in connection with such execution. In his comment, the respondent admits that although he issued the writ of execution after his court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal, he did so only in compliance with the order of the RTC directing his court to cause the execution of the judgment with respect to the restoration of possession. He states that there is no truth whatsoever to the unsubstantiated rumor that he received P20,000. He avers that since he assumed office in April 1972, he has not asked, demanded, or received any amount from any party in a case before his court. He further alleges that Lily Mocles "is the complainant only in name," and that she is merely "the stooge of her counsel" who is the real complainant and who has an axe to grind against him. He contends that the complainant's counsel is guilty of forum shopping for also filing with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a complaint against him for the violation of Articles 206 and 210 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with the issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent then concludes that this complaint is a "wicked farcical and malicious imputation which pained him gravely, physically and mentally," and prays not only for its outright dismissal but also for appropriate action against the complainant and her counsel. In her Reply-Affidavit, the complainant asserts that the respondent's admission of the issuance of the writ suggests "not only clear ignorance of law but deliberate and wanton misapplication of the law"; that her counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Taasan, a young practitioner from Davao City, is noted for his integrity in the legal profession; and that the charge that she is merely a stooge of her counsel is imaginary and gratuitous. On 17 June 1994, this Court received from the respondent a copy of the resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao which dismissed the complaint filed by the complainant on the ground that the questioned writ of execution was regularly issued by the respondent pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and that the alleged receipt by the respondent of P20,000.00 was based on rumor and unsubstantiated by evidence. After the issues had been joined, the Court required the parties to inform it if they were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed. They expressed their willingness to do so in their separate manifestations. The uncontroverted facts as disclosed by the pleadings are as follows:

Civil Case No. 2833-III was decided by the MTCC of General Santos City (per respondent Judge) on 6 April 1993. The respondent judge rendered a decision ordering the defendants to, inter alia, "vacate and surrender their respective possession and occupation in the area in question to plaintiff including their respective improvements therein within 10 days from notice," and to each pay the amounts indicated therein as rentals in arrears as of 3 August 1992, and thereafter, from date of demand on 3 September 1992, the amount of P75.00 a month as rental until they vacate the premises. 1A copy thereof was received by the complainant's counsel on 16 April 1993 and on 19 April 1993, the complainant filed a notice of appeal. 2 chanrobles virtual law libraryIn view of the appeal, the respondent issued on 30 April 1993 an order directing the branch clerk of court to transmit to the clerk of court of the RTC of General Santos City "a certified copy of the docket entries together with all the original papers and processes in the case."3This order was complied with and the appealed case was docketed in the RTC as Special Civil Case No. 364 and was assigned to Branch 36 thereof, presided over by Judge Apolinario F. Estoque. On 17 May 1993, the plaintiff in Special Civil Case No. 364 filed with the RTC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution 4on the ground that the defendants had failed to file the supersedeas bond and to pay the adjudged monthly rentals and that, hence, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the judgment had become executory. The defendants opposed the motion 5contending that only decisions of the RTC may be immediately executed pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure of 1991 and that the motion did not comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. In his order of 11 August 1993 6in Special Civil Case No. 364, Judge Estoque found that the complainant and her co-defendants did not file any supersedeas bond and did not pay the adjudged monthly rentals and held that pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70, immediate execution of the judgment appealed from should have been ordered by the trial court before the appeal was perfected. He then decreed: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and this being an appealed judgment, the MTCC, Branch 3, General Santos City that rendered said judgment is ordered to cause the execution thereof with respect to the restoration of possession only, without prejudice however to whatever will be the result of the pending appeal. SO ORDERED. In compliance with the order of Judge Estoque, the respondent judge issued the writ of execution on 23 August 1993. 7 On 25 August 1993, a day after the receipt of a copy of the order of Judge Estoque dated 11 August 1993, the complainant and her co-defendants filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof. 8Judge Estoque then issued an order 9directing the plaintiffappellee to comment on the motion for reconsideration. On 26 August 1993, Judge Estoque issued an order 10directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from notice, after which the appeal would be deemed submitted for decision.On 17 September 1993, Felizardo Requillos, Sheriff III of the MTCC of General Santos City, filed a "Sheriff's Return of Service" 11on the writ of execution stating therein the steps he took to implement the writ and informing the court of the "total failure of the implementation" because some of the defendants he approached refused to vacate their respective houses. On 21 September 1993, Judge Estoque issued an order 12in Special Civil Case No. 364 suspending in the meantime, upon agreement of the parties, the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the respondent judge and giving the defendants three days from the said date within which to deposit the supersedeas bond as well as to deposit the rentals in arrears

from the time of the judgment appealed from "up to the present"; otherwise, upon their failure to do so, the court "shall cause the full implementation of the order of execution issued by this court." Judge Estoque also declared as moot and academic the motion for reconsideration of the order of 11 August 1993 and the motion for preliminary injunction and restraining order. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which this case was referred for evaluation and report, found that the respondent erred in issuing the writ of execution because his court had lost its jurisdiction over the case. It states that it should have been the RTC which should issue such writ pursuant to City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals 13and Sy vs. Romero. 14Nevertheless, it is of the opinion that the respondent should not be blamed solely since it was Judge Estoque who ordered the MTCC to issue the writ. Since Judge Estoque is not a respondent in this complaint, the OCA concludes that it would be "unfair" if it recommends that the respondent judge "be penalized without Judge Estoque being likewise penalized." It also found that there is no evidence to support the charge of bribery. It then recommends that: (a) Judge Mabini M. Maravilla be ADVISED not to repeat his mistake of issuing a writ of execution in a case which is pending appeal, even if erroneously ordered by the RTC judge acting as an appellate judge in such a case, as a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely; (b) Judge Apolinario F. Estoque be FURNISHED a copy of the Court's Resolution in this case and be likewise ADVISED not to order the municipal trial court to issue a writ of execution in a case which is pending appeal and to issue the writ himself, if the circumstances warrant its issuance; and (c) the charge that Judge Maravilla received P20,000.00 from issuing that writ be DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support such a charge. We agree with the OCA that there is no evidence of the alleged bribery. The complainant herself states in her complaint that her charge is based on a rumor. She did not even disclose the source of the rumor and the occasion, place, and time when she heard it. Instead of subsequently establishing the truth of the rumor by volunteering to offer some evidence, the complainant agreed to submit this case on the basis of the pleadings. Rumors are not evidence and the complainant was grossly irresponsible when she imputed upon the respondent, under her solemn oath, the commission of a grave offense solely on the basis of a rumor with the full awareness that she could not prove it. The lawyer who assisted her in the preparation of the complaint should have, under his oath as a lawyer, prevented her from making the wild accusation. However, the respondent judge must be administratively sanctioned for issuing the writ of execution. His court had lost its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2833-III after the appeal to the RTC had been perfected. He knew that on 30 April 1993 he had directed his clerk of court to transmit the records of the case to the RTC, which was duly complied with. The plaintiff did not file in his court a motion for execution for failure of the defendants to file a supersedeas bond. That motion was filed only with the RTC. Since, indeed, no supersedeas bond was filed and, furthermore, the defendant did not deposit the adjudged monthly rentals, execution of the judgment with respect to the restoration of possession was in order pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It is the RTC which should issue the writ of execution. Section 8 of Rule 70 is a reproduction of Section 8 of Rule 72 of the old Rules of Court, which was taken from Section 88 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2588. 15In 1918 yet, this Court, applying Act No. 2588, 16already held that upon failure of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case to make the payments prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal in the Court of First Instance, the latter, upon motion, shall order the execution of the judgment of the court a quo relative to the possession of the property in litigation and that such order for execution shall not be a bar to the appeal in the Court of First Instance until final decision thereof on its merits. In the 1991 case of City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 17this Court ruled:

The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial court and the decision of the latter itself is elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the regional trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule. Accordingly, the RTC was the proper court which could issue the writ of execution in its Special Civil Case No. 364 - the appealed case. Said court, per Judge Estoque, should not have issued the 11 August 1993 order directing the MTCC to issue the writ of execution with respect to the restoration of possession. Obedience to or "faithful compliance with" the said 11 August 1993 order of Judge Estoque cannot be pleaded as a justification to the respondent's issuance of the writ of execution. He knew that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case and, moreover, he ought to have known that pursuant to the clear language of Section 8 of Rule 70 and the pronouncements of this Court, it was beyond his court's authority to issue the writ. He should have informed the RTC, through appropriate means, of this constraint. It appears, however, that no damage was done to the defendants because the writ was returned unsatisfied and in the meantime, during the pendency of the defendant's motion to reconsider the RTC order of 11 August 1993, the RTC had issued on 21 September 1993, upon agreement by the parties, an order suspending the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the respondent; giving the defendants-appellants three days from 21 September 1993 within which to deposit the supersedeas bond and to deposit the rentals in arrears from the date of the judgment of the MTCC up "to the present"; ordering them to pay their corresponding monthly rentals of P75.00 each which should be deposited within the first ten days of the month during the pendency of the appeal; and declaring as moot and academic the motion to reconsider the 11 August 1993 order and the motion for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Nevertheless, the absence of any damage to the complainant does not totally absolve the respondent from any administrative liability for having wrongfully issued the writ of execution, which amounted to grave abuse of authority if not ignorance of the rule on execution in ejectment cases. A mere advice to the respondent not to repeat the act is not enough. A fine of P1,000.00 and a warning would be in order. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. DISMISSING, for utter lack of merit, the charge of bribery against the respondent; and chanrobles virtual law library 2. IMPOSING upon respondent Judge Mabini M. Maravilla a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for grave abuse of authority, with a warning that a subsequent commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila The Facts EN BANC

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2

Because the parties 3 agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence, the case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their documentary evidence. As found by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, the facts are as follows: A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998 BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES, respondent. . . . On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City, issued a Writ of Execution (. . .) in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84 to enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1992 in G.R. No. 89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55). The Writ of Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO for short) to collect the amount of P344,000.00 which it paid to Peter Cosalan during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, on the basis of its decision ordering the respondent board members "to reimburse petitioner BENECO any amount that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen." After issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent, as new counsel for the losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of Directors, filed a Motion for Clarification with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070, the minute resolution to wit: "to note without action the aforesaid motion". Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. 2738-R (. . .) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City, seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of execution. That case, however, was dismissed by the Presiding Judge Clarence Villanueva in his Order dated March 18, 1993 (. . .). Accordingly, the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, Baguio City, through Sheriff III Wilfredo Mendez, proceeded to levy on the properties of the losing board members of BENECO. Thus, a sale at public auction was set on June 1, 1993, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning in front of the Baguio City Hall, per Sheriff's Notice of Sale dated May 4, 1993 (. . .), of the properties of Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping[,] two of the losing members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the aforementioned case. Respondent claims in his comment (. . .) that Branch 7, motu proprio, dismissed Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on March 18, 1993, which dismissal was [sic] became final due to respondent's failure to perfect an appeal therefrom which claim according to the complainant, constitute[s] deliberate misrepresentation, if not falsehood, because the respondent indeed interposed an appeal such that on May 11, 1993, the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 2738-8 to the Court of Appeals per certified machine copy of the letter transmittal of same date (. . .). While respondent "never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the NLRC of the Writ of Execution . . . nor sought to undo it" (. . .) the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk of Court andExOfficio City Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing the execution and levy of the writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action in

PANGANIBAN, J.: The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no violation of its code of conduct. Accordingly, a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes, engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned. The Case This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) before this Court on July 5, 1993, seeking his removal or suspension from the bar for forum shopping, which amounted to "grave misconduct, . . . unduly delaying the administration of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of office and applicable laws and jurisprudence." 1 After the respondent submitted his Comment, dated August 21, 1993, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 27, 1993 for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 15, 1997, we received a resolution from the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, viz: RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-149 Adm. Case NO. 4058 Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Atty. Ernesto B. Flores RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, hereinmande [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Ernesto Flores is hereby

said court (. . .) which complainant likewise claims as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070 in complete disregard of settled jurisprudence that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders and awards rendered in labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs. CA, 199 SCRA 677, a display of gross ignorance of the law. On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet, separate complaints for Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus Exempt from Levy and Execution the subject properties with Damages, etc. docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 93-F-0414 (. . .) and 93-F-0415 (. . .), which are essentially similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-031384. He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-parte (. . .) praying for temporary restraining order in these two (2) cases. The complainant further alleges that respondent's claim for damages against the defendant Sheriff is another improper and unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a violation of respondent's oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said Sheriff was merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job. Recommendation of the IBP As noted earlier, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the IBP Board of Governors concurred, that respondent be suspended from the bar for six months for: 1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R was not appealed on time 2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping Commissioner Jose ratiocinated:

This Court's Ruling We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from the bar, but we increase the period from six (6) months to one (1) year and six (6) months. Forum Shopping Circular No. 28-91, 5 dated September 4, 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before this Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994. The IBP found that the respondent had violated it, because the complaint he filed before the RTC of Baguio City "lack[ed] the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91." 6 We distinguish. Respondent's failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a violation of the aforementioned circular, because the said requirement applied only to petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals. 7Likewise inapplicable is Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 which extended the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals. Circular No. 04-94 became effective only on April 1, 1994, but the assailed complaint for injunction was filed on March 18, 1993, and the petition for the constitution of a family home was instituted on May 26, 1993. Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of forum shopping. In Chemphil Export and Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 8 this Court declared that "(t)he rule against forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars 9 of this Court merely formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors." The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule 16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provide: Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx

A cursory glance of (sic) . . . the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No. 2738-R before the RTC of Baguio City, which complaint was signed and verified under oath by the respondent, reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 which took effect on January 1, 1992 to the effect that "to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency. If there is any other action pending, he must state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency[,] he should notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice." Among the other penalties, the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance thereof. In sum, it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under which the lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 4

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; xxx xxx xxx 10 Sec. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1(e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others. 11 The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. 28-91. This circular did not only require that a certification of non-forum shopping be attached to the petitions filed before this Court or the Court of Appeals; it also decreed that forum shopping constituted direct contempt of court and could subject the offending lawyer to disciplinary action. The third paragraph thereof reads: 3. Penalties.

(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. (b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of multiple petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court. (c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 28-91 12 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94.13 In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, 14 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 15 The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs." 16 After this Court rendered its Decision 17 in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 18 and upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution 19ordering the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real property of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO. On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) "to preserve the status quo as now obtaining between the parties," as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to "cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised in court." 20 When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch of the RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled "Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.," docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. 21 The said complaints were supplemented by an "Urgent Motion Ex Parte" 22 which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs' property "to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases, until further determined by the court." Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Modequillo vs. Breva, 23 reiterated in Manacop vs.Court of Appeals, 24 shows the frivolity of these proceedings: Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the

creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. xxx xxx xxx The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Adhering to the Court's declaration in said cases, the subject properties are deemed constituted as family homes by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary; they were clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by another branch of the RTC, i.e, to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor arbiter. That they were filed ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke screen; in essence, their real objective was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in two different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a "friendly" forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby trifling with the judicial process. 25 We remind the respondent that, under the Code of Professional Responsibility, 26 he had a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 27 The Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. 28 In consonance with Millare vs. Montero 29 and Garcia vs. Francisco, 30 respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Millare, the respondent filed with different courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions which frustrated and delayed the execution of a final judgment. Holding that "respondent 'made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered [and], thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice,'" 31 this Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for one year. In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for violating the proscription against forum shopping. This Court held that "he deserve[d] to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example." 32 Falsehood The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood because, in this administrative case, he stated in his comment that he had not "perfected an appeal on the dismissal" of his petition for injunction. In his said comment, the respondent stated: Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on March 18, 1993. Not having perfected an appeal on the dismissal, the order of dismissal became final under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on record, or before April 6, 1993. So that today this case is no longer pending. xxx xxx xxx

It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family homes and damages were filed in the court below on May 26, 1993, Civil Case NO. 2378-R which seems to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated, there being no appeal formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules. xxx xxx xxx And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any further anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the court below in Civil Case No. 2738, and let it be deemed final by the Rules and jurisprudence. 33 (Emphasis supplied.) The indelible fact, however, is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected later on. The original records of the injunction suit had been transmitted to the appellate court. 34 Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the appeal. 35 Thus, in denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC, respondent was making a false statement. Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of Rule 50 36 read: Sec. 2. Effect of dismissal. Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been dismissed. Upon the receipt of such certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 4. Withdrawal of appeal. An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appellee's brief. . . . The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule. Respondent's explanation misses the point. True, he withdrew his appeal. But it is likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal, and that this was perfected. False then is his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit. Worse, he made the statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself, though in vain, from the charge of forum shopping. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. 37 He shall neither do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to be misled by any artifice. 38 For this offense, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another year. True, in Ordonio vs. Eduarte,39 Porac Trucking, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals 40 and Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 41 we imposed a suspension of only six months for a similar malfeasance. But in Flores' case, his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness, for it was committed in an attempt, vain as it was, to cover up his forum shopping.

Before we close, we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September 27, 1993. It was deemed submitted for resolution per the investigating commissioner's order dated May 10, 1995. However, the investigating commissioner submitted his report only on May 5, 1997. Moreover, the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the Court only through a letter dated July 31, 1997, which was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 15, 1997. Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its investigation of the case and over two years from the date the parties filed their last pleadings to resolve it escapes us. After all, the case did not require any trial-type investigation, and the parties submitted only documentary evidence to prove or rebut their respective cases. Thus, we find it opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the disposition of administrative cases and to remind it that this Court gives it only ninety days to finish its investigation, report and recommendation. Should it require more time, it should file with the Court a request for extension, giving the reason for such request. WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his oath and the Canon of Professional Responsibility to do no falsehood, he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1) YEAR, resulting in a total period of TWO (2) YEARS, effective upon finality of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932

discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said property. 7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the appellant bank. 8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed in the complaint with costs. On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment. Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively. On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.
1awphil.net

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee. Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant. Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

VICKERS, J.: This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs. The appellant makes the following assignments of error: The trial court erred: 1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila. 2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao. 3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328. 4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation. 5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said judgment. 6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land. The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930. In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint. In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows: P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor. Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos

intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted intereses?"
P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto. P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson. Entonces hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado. Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta. Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion. JUZGADO. Que la termine. TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas. P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que bienes se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco. P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos. P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece que Paco. P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo. P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional. P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No recuerdo mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos. P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria? Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo. JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta. P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1? SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos. Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos. JUZGADO. Puede contestar. Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.

R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar. P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada, absolutamente.

When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not remember. One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it. The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the time of the trial. With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows: When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale. Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem. For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987 NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents. No. 78791 September 30, 1987 KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers. These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with. On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the abovedescribed acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court

that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly 2 Independent Labor Union. Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution. To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987. We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3 The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4 Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members. WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

xxx

xxx

xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to him. xxx xxx xxx

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent. PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of 1 Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas. Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly 2 allowance. It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to 3 eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular 4 judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default. In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows: Butuan City 23 April 1974 Atty. Ireneo Bunye 928 Rizal Avenue Santa Cruz, Manila

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development. My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.

Very truly yours, (SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA Major Inf PC (ret) Executive Director 5

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise: June 1, 1974 Dear Major Lantoria, At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs. Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there. Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold. xxx xxx xxx

Dear Atty. Bunye:

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success. Brotherly yours, (SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI 6 Counsel

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of which read as follows: 928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila March 4, 1974

Dear Major Lantoria, This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City. Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.

b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974) c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid); d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.) In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor 9 General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part, respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove his 10 charges. (emphasis supplied)

Truly yours, (SGD.) L. BUNYI 7 Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him. By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows: xxx xxx xxx

In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters. Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which 11 he is counsel. The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent. In his answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics. On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a 13 manifestation alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up. On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In 14 said memorandum, respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to 15 influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer. With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
12

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the practice of law. The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court. Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows: 3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A selfrespecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and bar. In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read: CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges. Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to 17 influence the court where he had pending civil case. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension. SO ORDERED.
16

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION July 25, 1959 G.R. No. L-12871 TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent. Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner. City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf. , J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated. Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court. It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy. Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants. Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder. On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva. The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy. The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation. Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latters oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him. Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation. As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista. In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556) With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to do so. Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity. However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in respondents office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the

stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours. Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us. But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent. Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable. Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient. In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioners objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case. xxx xxx xxx There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. xxx xxx xxx He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. RESOLUTION

Atty. Almacen's statement that ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words: Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal)

CASTRO, J.: Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, theManila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows: Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.

does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citingRepublic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal. Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case. There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue. Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act." In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus: At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: "Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes." "Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." xxx xxx xxx Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without

justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law. xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... . xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ... xxx xxx xxx To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case. xxx xxx xxx Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith. Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines." xxx xxx xxx We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech. xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name." xxx xxx xxx We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses. xxx xxx xxx The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more. xxx xxx xxx As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances. He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical

scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566: A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... . Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable. Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon: In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed". We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision. Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra: The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition. If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide

latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down. Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8"are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion." The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties. Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11 Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) . Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641: No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665). Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." As Mr. Justice Field puts it: ... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652) The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all

times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967) In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents. 1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that: It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise. 2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do. The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public. 3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court: We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations

against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance: "It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author." Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220. 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began: Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants. Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared: ... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public. 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ... Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725. 6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said: We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct. 7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement: I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here. The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client. The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court. 8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that: The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ... The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court. 9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. 10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph: You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a

fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto. The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex

parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions." That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute." The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481. Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ... 11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case. 13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. 14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar. The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices. A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment. 1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation, found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed ... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its

power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... . 2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared: But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... . To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.) 3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed: As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court hasrepeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
18

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed. Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23 This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that

which, in the interest of

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24 Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25 Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions. The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Courtmotu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity. Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent. Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained. That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of

candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990 KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents. Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2 On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4 Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8 In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they

are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11 Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as follows: VI That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for beingmaliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.) VII That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.) VIII That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accusedcomplainant, so to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14 IX . . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocentaccused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person

in our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.) xxx xxx xxx 5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16 xxx xxx xxx D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17 scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the poor went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates. It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo." 22 To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that: CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. xxx xxx xxx RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or behavior before the courts. RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case. xxx xxx xxx We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty.

Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law. WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION September 6, 1918 G.R. No. 14576 In Re VICENTE SOTTO. Vicente Sotto in Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.

his

own

behalf.

STREET, J.: Complaints having heretofore been laid before this court charging the respondent, Vicente Sotto, an attorney practicing before this bar, with unprofessional conduct, said complaints were by resolution of the court referred to the Attorney-General for investigation. Upon November 30, 1917, the Attorney-General, after inquiring into said charges, reported that the charges were in his opinion well-founded and recommended the institution of disbarment proceedings under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent was thereupon notified of said report; and, after he had put in his reply, evidence was taken, pursuant to our resolution of December 14, 1917, before the clerk of the this court. The matter is now before us for consideration upon the evidence so taken and the arguments submitted in the form of memoranda by the AttorneyGeneral for the Government, and by Sotto, as respondent. The charges involved in the report of the Attorney-General were primarily four in number, to which the Attorney-General has added a fifth, based upon matters connected with the present proceeding itself. The four original charges are based upon four distinct transactions; and, in order that their nature may be fully understood, we herewith set forth in detail the facts connected with three of these transactions, namely, the first, third, and fourth. The other two charges will be dealt with more summarily at the end of our detailed statement. On June 16, 1917, Natalia Enriquez of Paombong, Bulacan, sold to Santiago V. SyJuco of Malabon, Rizal, two parcels of land. The contract of sale was embodied in a document duly acknowledged before a notary public. For some reason or other, the vendor, on or about the first day of August, 1917, instituted an action against the vendee for the purpose of securing the rescission of said contract. The plaintiffs attorney of record in this proceeding was one Jose Galan. While the action was pending the respondent, Attorney Vicente Sotto, intervened in representation of the plaintiff. On August 10, 1917, he went to the house of SyJuco in Malabon and attempted to procure his consent to the rescission of the contract above-mentioned and endeavored to induce him to sign for that purpose a document already prepared rescinding said contract. As SyJuco was reluctant to rescind the contract, the respondent, Vicente Sotto, intimidated and threatened him, telling him that unless he signed such document the respondent would procure his discharge from the office of notary public which he then hold, would file charges of estafa against him, as a result of which, he would enter Bilibid prison, and further that the respondent would publish in all the newspapers an article to the effect that SyJuco was an impostor. These threats, especially that relating to the publication in the newspapers that SyJuco was an impostor, had the desired effect; and on August 11, 1917, SyJuco, although aware that the charges imputed to him were false, and in order to prevent the respondent from carrying his threats into execution, acceded to the respondents demand and executed document rescinding the contract in question. Sotto seems not to have been fully satisfied with this; and a short time after the occurrence of the events above narrated, he wrote to SyJuco a letter dated August 13, 1917, in which he asked the latter to pay him the sum of P2,500 as supposed losses and damages to his client Natalia Enriquez, and giving him two days time within which to settle the claim extra-judicially. To make his demand more effective and probably to impress upon SyJucos mind the fact that

the respondent would surely execute his threats he caused to be published in the issue of August 13, 1917, of the newspapers El Comercio and La Nacion, an article prepared by himself and entitled Grave Charges Against a Notary. The same article was by him caused to be published in the issue for August 16, 1917, of the newspaper El Ideal where it appeared under the heading of The Mother of Dr. Valencia Victim of an Imposter. The difference in the headline of the article as it appeared in El Ideal and as it appeared in the other two papers, and the slight difference which may be found in their context, is the result of changes made by the corresponding editors of said papers for the purpose of evading any responsibility. These articles refer to SyJuco and in substance impute to his acts constituting fraud and deceit in securing the execution of the contract first above mentioned, and further informs the public an information for estafa will be filed against the impostor (referring to SyJuco) with Attorney Vicente Sotto acting as private prosecutor, unless SyJuco should pay all losses and damages. Four or five days passed. The respondent, meanwhile not having received any answer from SyJuco, wrote him a registered letter, in which he reproduced the contents of the first letter and when concluded with this remark: No answer having been received from you, you are advised that I will present the complaint with its consequences. In this letter were inclosed two pictures, one of Atanasia Enriquez, and another of Natalia Enriquez, the latter bearing a note in the handwriting of the respondent and saying To be published on the 25th. This note, together with the demand for the payment of P2,500, was a veiled threat to the effect that unless this sum of money was forthcoming the publication of scandalous charges against SyJuco would continue; and this was probably one of the fatal consequences which the respondent had in mind. Such action on the part of the respondent finds it a cause in SyJucos not paying any attention to his first letter, and had the object of impressing all the more upon the mind of his intended victim that he, the respondent, had all the means of exposing him to public ridicule and contempt. Still no answer was received from SyJuco; and the respondent caused to be published in The Independent for August 25, 1917, together with the pictures above described and the affidavits of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez, detailing the acts alleged to constitute the supposed fraud and deceit, the article he had already caused to be published in the newspapers above mentioned. As it appeared in The Independent the article was entitled An Aged Lady of Seventy Years denounces under oath the Adventures of a notary public of Malabon (referring to SyJuco); and, to make it appear that he had taken or copied it from La Nacion, he placed upon said article an epigraph which reads, What La Nacion says. However, the truth is, as has been said, that it was he who provided La Nacion and the other newspapers with said article. In spite of these publications SyJuco maintained his silence; and the respondent, in pursuance of his threats and of his intention to make SyJuco come to terms, committed the following acts: He asked SyJucos mother for a picture of her son and for a copy of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a case between SyJuco and his parents, without telling her the purpose for which he wanted them. Then he caused both the picture and the judgment to be published in the issue of The Independent for September 1, 1917, under the heading printed in big type of Son Sued by His Parents. Santiago V. SyJuco is sentenced by Judge McMahon. Just below the picture is printed the name Santiago V. SyJuco and above it is the satirical phrase Men of the day. This publication had an introductory paragraph which states that SyJuco, the notary public of Malabon, Rizal, who recently, according to the daily papers, attempted to defraud an aged lady of seventy years, making her sign a fraudulent document of sale of a fisher worth fifteen thousand pesos, had just lost the suit pending between him, and his father the Chinese Vicente SyJuco and his mother Cipriana Viardo. This woman ages more than fifty years, has appeared at the office of The Independent in order to ask for the publication of the judgment. But the truth, as already stated, was that it was the respondent who published it without the permission or knowledge of the old lady. The respondent denies having made any threats against SyJuco but we think that the proofs tend to show that such threats were made. The testimony of the witnesses for the AttorneyGeneral to the effect that the respondent stated that information for estafa would be filed against SyJuco, that he would surely enter Bilibid prison, etc., agrees with the respondents attempt, as shown by Exhibits 4-A and 7-A of the Attorney-General, to make and that he committed a crime and that he admitted its commission.

Denial is also made of the truth of the charge that the respondent had sent to SyJuco the picture of Natalia Enriquez, which bears the note To be published on the 25th. There are numerous circumstances, not necessary to be here detailed, which in our opinion conclusively show that the charge is true. We now pass to a consideration of the third charge, with respect to which the fact are as follows: On June 29, 1917, Jose Tortajada, a resident of Manila, executed a document by which he appointed the respondent as his attorney for the purpose of settling, judicially or extra-judicially, certain differences which he had with his wife, Amada Mestres. In said document Tortajada promised to pay the said respondent the sum of P2,000 for his services. For the purpose of acquainting the respondent with all the details of the case, Tortajada sent him on June 30, 1917, a letter in which he described in detailed the proud, haughty, stingy, and despotic character of his wife and the insults, humiliation, maltreatment, and remorse that he had suffered at her hand all of which, if published, would surely injure the reputation of both spouses and expose them to public ridicule. The respondent, in pursuance of the contract of employment, began work on the case and had some interviews with Tortajadas wife. Whether as a result of the respondents services or not, all differences between Tortajada and his wife were soon afterwards settled extra-judicially; and the respondent, not long after, made a demand for the payment of his fees of P2,000, which Tortajada refused to pay. Later on, Tortajada received in the mail the following documents: (1) a photographic copy of a letter which purported to be signed by Tortajada and addressed to the respondent; (2) a typewritten anonymous letter addressed to Tortajada; and (3) an envelope addressed to the same person bearing the name of the respondent on the upper left hand corner and in all the respects of the same class as that admitted to have been used by him. The photographic copy above mentioned is a copy of a letter which Tortajada had previously written to the respondent and in which the latter was urged to expedite the case. The anonymous letter reads: Attorney Sotto says that as you are looking for trouble, he had decided this morning to present a complaint against you, in which are reproduced all absolutely all of your letters, and, if you compel him, he will cause the complaint together with the photographic facsimiles of all the letters to be published in The Independnet and in all the local papers so that the public may know you and your motives. Believing that these things came from the respondent, Tortajada sent him a letter in which he stated that he was not afraid of the respondents threats and that the latter could do anything he wanted to do and yet the former would not pay him a cent. To this reply no answer was received from the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila a complaint against Tortajada for the purpose of recovering the sum of P2,000, the amount of fees agreed upon. In paragraph 6 of this complaint there is an exact copy of the letter of June 30, 1917, which Tortajada sent to the respondent and in which details are given of the domestic troubles of Tortajada. There can be no doubt that, supposing the anonymous letter had been sent by the respondent, its language considered with the relation of the parties at the time, especially with the persistent refusal of Tortajada to pay the respondents fee, would constitute a threat against Tortajada of a type similar to that employed by the respondent against SyJuco. But the respondent denies the authorship of the anonymous letter and that it was he who sent it. The Attorney-General, however, contends that he (the respondent) is the author thereof and that it was he who sent it. This contention is based upon the following grounds: (1) The fact that the anonymous letter was received; (2) the similarity of the envelope in which it was contained to the envelopes used by the respondent; (3) the fact that Tortajada answered it addressing a letter to the respondent, and yet the latter never made any reply denying that he sent it; (4) the fact that only the respondent could have taken the photograph of the letter delivered by Tortajada to Amando Calleja and addressed to the respondent; and (5) the fact that, as was stated in the anonymous letter, all the letters sent by Tortajada were reproduced in the complaint. This combination of circumstances in our opinion shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent sent the anonymous letter as charged.

The respondent as a second defense to the third charge contends that it was not he but his clerk, Amando Calleja, who prepared the complaint filed against Tortajada and that the respondent signed it without first reading its contents. We are, however, of the opinion that, taking all the circumstances into consideration, it was the respondent himself who prepared the complaint, or at least, if somebody else prepared it, the respondent ordered or approved the insertion of the letter in the complaint. But the respondent further contends that, even admitting that the letter in question was inserted by him or by his order, he was under no obligation to keep its contents as secret. In this view we can by no means concur. The letter was written confidentially by a client to the respondent in his capacity as attorney. Hence the respondent was under obligation to keep the contents of the letter inviolate; and as it is wholly immaterial in the cause of action stated in the complaint against Tortajada, its insertion therein constitutes a gross violation of professional conduct and of the oath taken by the respondent that he would always conduct himself with entire fidelity to his clients. The facts material to the fourth charge are these: Sometime in the month of September, 1917, Natalia Enriquez was looking for someone who would buy certain parcels of land belonging to her. Atanasia Enriquez, a niece of Natalia, was aiding her in this work, probably in the capacity of broker. It appears that the respondent was also acquainted with this fact and was also probably looking for a purchaser for one of two reasons, to wit: (1) Either because prior to that time Natalia Enriquez was indebted to him in the sum of P2,000, which he wanted to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale, or (2) because he wished that the document of conveyance should be executed with his aid so that he could earn his fees. It also appears to be probable that there was an understanding between Natalia, Atanasia, and the respondent, that when a purchaser should appear, the document would be executed with the intervention of the respondent. On one of the last days of September, 1917, a person named Bernardo Dagala, or rather his wife, Enrica de Guzman, was found who was willing to purchase the property. When the sale had already been verbally agreed upon, Atanasia Enriquez accompanied by Dagala went to the office of the respondent to notify him that a purchaser had been found and probably with a view to the execution of the proper document. But in order that they could easily withdraw and find another notary who would draw the document for a less sum, in a case the respondent should charge them too high, they withheld the name of the purchaser and Dagala was presented merely as a person who aided in looking for a purchaser. But the respondent, more resourceful that they were and with the intention of securing information from them as to who the purchaser was, met them with the statement that he too had found a purchaser who would pay more and who had ready money in the bank and that the sale to this person should not be delayed. Thereupon, Dagala, anxious that the sale should be made to him only, declared that he himself was the purchaser. Thus seeing that Dagala was so intent to purchase the property and believing that he would be willing to pay any sum for the drafting of the document, the respondent told him that the other purchaser was willing to pay him P500 for that work, and that Dagala has to pay this sum if he wanted to purchase the property. After some more discussion as to the proper fees for drafting the document they parted with the understanding that they would again meet the next day at the respondents office. However, believing that the fee demanded by the respondent was too high, Natalia Enriquez, her son Juan Valencia, Dagala, and his wife De Guzman went the next day, September 30, 1917, to another notary public in Manila, Miguel de Leon, who drafted the document of conveyance for a sum much less than the exorbitant fee which the respondent proposed to charge. The next day the respondent was informed that the document had been prepared at the office of Miguel de Leon and on the afternoon of that day the former went to the latters office and representing that he was the attorney of Natalia Enriquez demanded that the document be shown to him alleging that his client had told him that she signed it without knowing its contents. Miguel de Leon showed him the document and explained to him in detail the circumstances under which it was executed, and which leave no room for doubt that there was nothing illegal about, nothing that could invalidate it. The object of the respondent in going to the office of Miguel de Leon was of course to verify the information which he had received and which he found out was true. Irritated at the fact that he had thus lost the sum of P500 which he expected

to get as a fee for drafting the document of sale, the respondent, on October 2, 1917, sent two letters to Bernardo Dagala and two other letters to Natalia Enriquez. In this first letter to Dagala, he states that, according to his clients, Dagala had made them sign a document which they did not understand, that Dagalas conduct was improper, and requested that the latter should see him at once. In his second letter he reproduces in effect the substance of the first letter and adds: Come immediately to my office if you want to avoid the fatal consequences of what you have just done. In his first letter to Natalia Enriquez, he ordered her to come to his office in order to talk about the document she had signed. In the second letter he advised her that the fault was hers and again asked her to see him. On October 3, 1917, Dagala went to the office of the respondent, afraid of the fatal consequences which the latter covertly threatened in his letter. Here the respondent told Dagala that he had acted improperly in not coming to the formers office on the day agreed upon, that the former had lost the sum of P500 which the other purchaser promised to pay for drafting the document, that he needed money, and that he would cause trouble unless Dagala should pay him the P500 he had lost, and guarantee with the property acquired by his wife the debt of P2,000 which Natalia Enriquez owed the respondent. Somehow or other, instead of a mere guaranty, Dagala on October 3 was caused by the respondent to sign a document by which, beside guaranteeing Natalias debt of P2,000 with the property sold to his wife, he assumed the payment of the same. This done, the respondent, who knew beforehand that the property purchased by Dagalas wife was subject to a lease and right of option in favor of one Marcelo Estrella, then requested that Dagala should convince his wife to appoint him as their attorney to secure the delivery of the property from Estrella. Dagala promised to come back with his wife the following day, October 4, 1917, which they did, to inform the respondent of their answer. On this occasion Dagala paid the respondent P500 upon the account of Natalias debt for which a receipt was given. The Dagala spouses then executed a document by which they appointed the respondent their attorney to secure from Marcelo Estrella the delivery of the property, and by which they promised to pay him the sum of P500 as attorneys fees. Acting under this appointment and in representation of the Dagala spouses the respondent had an interview with Estrella at his own office. Estrella manifested his willingness to deliver the property provided that he be indemnified for damages and improvements he had made upon it. Several days later, that is, on or about October 16, 1917, the respondent appeared at the office of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila and acting as attorney for Natalia Enriquez asked that an information for estafa be filed against the Dagala spouses upon the ground that these persons had defrauded Natalia Enriquez in the sale of the property heretofore referred to. It will be noted that at this time the respondent was attorney for the Dagala spouses with respect to the same property and knew all the details of the transaction which led to the sale thereof. An investigation was held the result that the prosecuting attorney, seeing no good ground for filing the information for estafa, refused to do so. But the respondent insisted and stated that he desired criminal proceedings to be instituted against Dagala and his wife because he was sure that as soon as they or at least Dagala should be arrested, they would immediately consent to a settlement in order to avoid the scandal which the respondent intended to create with the filing of the information and which he would publish in his weekly, The Independent. In spite of this insistence, however, no information was filed; and the respondent on October 25, 1917, wrote a letter to the Attorney-General in which, after relating the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to file the information, he says, for this reason my client comes to you in demand of justice. Thereafter in the month of November a civil action against Dagala and his wife was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila in which the plaintiff Natalia Enriquez sought to secure the annulment of the contract of sale, upon the ground that it was executed through fraud, deceit, and duress. The complaint was signed by Attorney Jose Poblete, who at that time was a salaried assistant in the law office of the respondent. Upon the facts above stated it is evident that the respondent in violation of his professional duty, improperly represented conflicting interests, inasmuch as, while obligated to act for the Dagala spouses in securing the delivery of the property, he opposed their interest, by attempting to have the sale set aside.

The reply of the respondent is: (1) That it was not he who asked for the investigation held by the prosecuting attorney but Natalia Enriquez and that he was with her during the investigation not as her attorney but merely as her companion; (2) that it was not he but Jose Poblete who was the attorney for Natalia Enriquez in the civil action brought by her against Dagala and his wife; (3) that he had from the beginning acted in good faith. These assertions are not established. The evidence shows that it was he who personally asked for an investigation, chose the prosecuting attorney who conducted it, and delivered the papers upon which the fiscal acted; and that he took an active part in directing the investigation, asking now and then questions of the witnesses. It is also clear that in the course of the investigation he acted as attorney for Natalia Enriquez. When the prosecuting attorney, finding no good ground for it, refused to file an information charging estafa, the respondent wrote to the Attorney-General a letter in which he admits that Natalia Enriquez was his client. He there says: For this reason my client comes to you in demand of justice. The evidence shows that Jose Poblete was previous to and at the time of the filing of the complaint an assistant in the law office of the respondent receiving a salary from the latter but with the privilege of handling his own cases. Prior to the investigation of the professional conduct of the respondent this person was called to the office of the AttorneyGeneral and there he declared under oath, after reading the complaint signed by him in the case between Natalia Enriquez and Bernardo Dagala and his wife, that the case was a case of the respondent, who gave it to him in his capacity of assistant in the respondents law office, because the respondent desired to appear as a witness but had the mistaken opinion that if he should sign as attorney for Natalia Enriquez he could not appear as a witness. The said Jose Poblete was presented as a witness in the subsequent investigation but there he turned out to be a hostile witness, and testified, contrary to his statement at the Attorney-Generals office, that he was surprised when he made those declarations, that he was nervous at the time, and that he was referring not to the case of Natalia Enriquez against Dagala but to the case of Sotto against Alcala and Sotto against Desierto. The testimony of this witness is important in determining (1) the capacity in which he signed the complaint against Dagala and his wife, and (2) the propriety of the respondents professional conduct. Special care therefore has been taken in perusing his testimony at the investigation, as a result of which we come to the conclusion that his conduct during the investigation is censurable, that his testimony thereat can not be safely relied upon and that what he had declared at the office of the Attorney-General was the truth. As to the third defense, the evidence conclusively shows that from the beginning the respondent was acting in bad faith. In writing the two letters to Dagala in which he made the latter understand that he had committed something wrong and that fatal consequences would follow unless he should come to the respondents office, the respondent was not authorized by Natalia Enriquez. This lady had not had any conversation or correspondence with him about the document of sale which she had signed; and this is apparent from his letter in which he asked her to come so that they could talk about that document. As the Attorney-General well says, there was no ground for Sotto to believe that Dagala and his wife had committed any crime. If he acted in good faith and believed that the sale to Dagala and his wife was illegal and fastened upon them grave criminal responsibilities, it would be impossible to explain why he made them sign a document guaranteeing Natalias debt to him with the property acquired by the Dagala spouses as a result of the sale. Certainly, this conduct of the respondent is tantamount to an acknowledgment of the validity of the sale. The terms of the contract and the circumstances under which the document was executed were fully known to him as they had been explained by Miguel de Leon. In fact, in his letter to Natalia Enriquez he even told her that she was to blame for what had happened, from which statement it may safely be inferred that Dagala and his wife were not censurable. The respondents purpose in trying to secure the filing of an information against Dagala and his wife for the crime of estafa was, as by him stated, merely to make them settle the matter with him extra-judicially, in the hope that he could get more money out of them. The simple narrative of the facts connected with charges 1, 3, and 4, given above, suffices to show that the respondent has been decidedly lacking in fidelity to his clients and from motives of private gain has grossly abused the honorable profession of which he is a member. In each of these transactions his conduct was reprehensible and unprofessional in a high degree and evinces a moral obtuseness incompatible with the office of attorney. For purposes of extortion

and blackmail he availed himself of his de facto power as the responsible director of a newspaper to blacken the reputation of his refractory clients or others who refused to submit to his demands. In this he proved himself not only unworthy of membership in the legal profession but unfit even for the responsible position of editor of a newspaper. Charge No. 2, in the Attorney-Generals report relates to certain malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the judicial integrity of the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, a judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which appeared in articles published under the heading Sin Malicia in the issues of The Independent dated respectively October 13, 20 and 27, 1917. The occasion which called forth these libelous effusions from Sottos pen was that Judge Del Rosario had lately imposed upon him as fine of P500 in a prosecution for criminal libel. The publication of this matter was a manifest violation of the oath which the respondent had taken to conduct himself with fidelity to the courts. Thornton, in his work on Attorneys-at-Law, speaking of offenses of this character, says: PAR. 788. An attorney who is guilty of writing and publishing a libelous charge against the court or any member thereof, in respect to his official conduct, or who procures the writing or publication of such a charge, may and should be, disbarred from further practice. . . . PAR. 789. Nor can an attorney-at-law shield himself as against a charge of having libeled the court or a judge thereof, by pleading that he is also the editor of the newspaper wherein the charges were published. His position at the bar enables him, in such case, to inflict the greater wound, and he may be deprived of the privileges and character which it gives him, by suspension or expulsion, without infringing on the freedom of press. Charge No. 5 in the final report of the Attorney-General sets forth that in the course of the present proceedings the respondent deliberately deviated from the truth by testifying falsely in regard to certain important details of the matters under investigation, namely, in denying, under oath, (1) having enclosed the photographs of Natalia and Atanasia Enriquez in the letter that he sent to SyJuco, and having written the note found on one of them, saying: To be published on the 25th; (2) having sent to Tortajada the photograph of one of the latters letters addressed to Sotto with the anonymous typewritten note; and (3) having acted as attorney for Natalia Enriquez in the proceedings for the institution of criminal charge against Dagala. We agree with the Attorney-General that these denials are shown to be false beyond reasonable doubt; and the fact that the respondent made them shows not only the weakness of his defense but furnishes additional proof of his unworthiness to remain a member of the legal profession. In deciding the several charges made against the herein respondent, we examined each and every one of them separately upon its own merits, independently from the others. However, it must be observed that the act alleged in said charges taken together show a systematic tendency on the part of the respondent, and reveals the existence of a deliberate plan to foster his own interests, by means of an illicit use of his two-fold capacity as attorney-at-law and newspaperman. The existence of the good faith on the part of the respondent has thus been belied by the aforementioned acts. One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interest of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. In view of the repeated acts of gross misconduct above specified, on the part of the respondent Vicente Sotto, and by virtue of the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said Vicente Sotto is hereby removed from the office of attorney and incapacitated from hereafter exercising the legal profession. The certificate heretofore issued to him authorizing him to exercise said profession is accordingly annulled, and let the surrender thereof to the clerk of

this court be required within five days after this decision becomes effective. The costs will be taxed in accordance with section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Torres, Johnson, Avancea and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied. In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order: When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution. Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's abovementioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners. Isidro T. Almeda for respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.". The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent. After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue. Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CAG.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More

dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled. 2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration. The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid. The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) . And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having been instituted for delay. The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned." A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.