Nicolas D. Aranilla Jr. Torts Cases: 3- Tests- But For 1. Bataclan vs.

Medina ( Same)

August 13, 2012

On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision by finding de los Reyes negligent. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue: WON defendants and de los Reyes are liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney? Held: Only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs. ( jeepney is liable) The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little time to react and had no options available: it could not swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep head-on). Note: The substantial factor test contains no element of fore seeability With regards to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of IAC that. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Here, we find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident. The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney. However, record shows and evidence were presented showing that Rabbit Bus was running at an allowable speed and that the driver had little time to react at the time the collision happened.
Substantial factor test under Restatement Question to ask: Was the defendants conduct a substantial factor in producing the plaintiffs injuries?

3-Tests-Substantial Error 1. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs IAC August 30, 1990 Facts: On December 24, 1966 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, to spend their Christmas at their homes, 7 people boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon, it is driven by Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga which is bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. Upon reaching a barrio at San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached, causing it to run in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney made a sudden Uturn &practically occupied or encroached the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Rabbit driven by Tomas delos Reyes. The bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while Rabbit and Spouses Mangune & Carreon filed their respective cross-claims for damages sustained by their vehicles. Trial court rendered its decision finding defendants negligent, and ordered them to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. Defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., insurer of the jeepney was ordered to pay the plaintiffs the amount stated in their favor in one of the civil cases only. Regarding the cross claim of Rabbit, court ordered the defendants, Mangune, Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, Rabbit the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.

The actors negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if :a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm b) there is no law relieving the actor of liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm. It is preferable to use the but for test in connection with the substantial factor test since the former is the adverse of the restatement formulation. The Restatement adopts the rule that if the actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.

The cause is the active aspect whereas the condition is the passive action that may produce the injury. It is difficult to distinguish between a cause and a condition because of the time element. A condition was a cause at some point in time. It cannot be cited in saying that cause and condition are no longer applicable in our jurisdiction because it only said that it is discredited. 2. Manila Electric v Remonquillo Facts: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Pealozas 3-storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. Issue: What was the cause and condition of the accident? Held: The cause was Magnos own negligence. The condition was the too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of media agua. 3. Rodrigueza v Manila Railroad

3-Test- Cause vs. Condition 1. Phoenix vs. IAC, Supra Facts: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30am, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on bright and saw the truck looming 2 meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck. Held: The distinctions between cause and condition have already been almost entirely discredited. Posser and Keeton So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

Facts: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of sparks from its smokestack. Rodriguezas house was partly within the property of the Manila Railroad. Issue: WON Manila Railroads negligence was the proximate cause of the fire? Held: Yes. The fact that Rodriguezas house was partly on the defendants property is an antecedent condition that may have made the fire possible but cannot be imputed as contributory negligence because:(1) that

condition was not created by himself; (2) his house remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus consent of the train company; (3) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. Rodriguezas house was built on the same spot before the defendant laid its tracks over the land. Note: Condition = plaintiffs house was partly within the defendants property. Cause = the sparks on the train which was the negligent act of the defendant. Rodrigueza was not guilty of contributory negligence. Even if condition was created, the company is not going to be justified in negligently destroying the house B. Efficient Intervening Cause Class Notes: The efficient intervening cause destroys the link between the negligent act and injury. It should occur after the purported proximate cause because it would then be a condition. Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by the negligence of the plaintiff. The efficient intervening cause is actually a proximate cause. Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by the Court, any violation of administrative ordinances and the like would either be seen as 1) negligence per se or 2) prima facie evidence of negligence. It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is already in existence during the happening of the proximate cause. 1. McKee v IAC Facts: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite directions. When the car was 10 meters away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the cars lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the left and entered the trucks lane. He then switched on the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.

Issue: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES. Held: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measure and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision, which was the proximate cause of the tragedy. 2. Manila Electric v Remonquillo Facts: Efren Magno repaired the media agua belowPenalozas 3-story house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. Issue: WON there was an efficient intervening cause YES. Held: Efficient intervening cause-the negligent and reckless act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire toavoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the latters length of 6 feet. 3. Teague vs. Fernandez Facts: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a stampede. Four students died. Issue: WON there was an independent intervening cause NO.

intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of death. Held: The violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent. In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation. Note: The proximate cause of the death is the overcrowding brought about by the violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation itself as the PC. Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which the statute violated tended to prevent, the violation of the statute can be considered negligence per se and is the proximate cause. But this is only of limited application and is not yet settled. Effects of violation of statute is not settled- It can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie proof of negligence, c) rebuttable proof of negligence, d) proof of negligence 4. Urbano vs. IAC Facts: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm. Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. On November 14, he died of tetanus. Issue: WON there was efficient intervening cause YES. Held: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an effacing C. Last Clear Chance Rule 1. Picart vs. Smith Provides for the classic definition of Last Clear Chance The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Facts: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against Smith. Issue: WON smith is liable?- Yes due to LCC Doctrine. Held: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an appreciable interval. Though he saw the pony when he was still far and he had control of the situation it was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to avoid the collision. It takes into consideration the NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING ACQUAINTED TO CARS. Negligence of Smith: when it exposed Picart and pony to danger. This negligence of Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a more remote factor Last clear chance rule -Important: there should be a sequence of events 2. Bustamante vs. CA 2. (Practical importance of LCCD)

 The negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact had an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident Facts: A collision between a truck and a bus when the bus tried to overtake a hand tractor. The Bus saw that the trucks wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading towards his lane. Still, bus driver did not mind and instead applied more speed. Thus, many were killed and injured. The victims heirs filed this case to claim damages from bus and truck. Issue: WON LLCD applies in this case?- NO. Held: No. The doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. The practical import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant shall be liable to negligent plaintiff. Thus, the LCCD does not arise where the passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tort feasors as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person. Last clear chance contemplates a series of negligent acts. The definition of last clear chance in the case of Bustamante is deemed to be the common definition (from the point of view of recovery of plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a rule.

The doctrine of last clear chance would apply even if the plaintiff is grossly negligent. Exceptions, however, include joint tort feasors (according to Americn Jurisprudence). Last clear chance cannot apply when there are: 1. contractual relations, 2. joint tortfeasors, 3. concurrent negligence 3. Phoenix Construction v IAC The basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179. However, the statements made on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine were merely obiter Facts: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner-meeting when he collided with the dump truckof Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against Phoenix. Phoenix invoked the Last Clear ChanceDoctrine: Dionisio had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone. Issue: WON LCCD is applicable? NO. Held: LCCD was not applied because the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction. The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff. But in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence.

Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.

Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate truck driver. It did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other party was not negligent. Note: How did the case of Glan Peoples Lumber affect the case of Phoeix? In the case of Glan, last clear chance was deemed to be a valid defense 5. Pantranco vs. Baesa

In last clear chance, timing is of the essence. In the case at hand, the truck drivers parking askew led to an increased diligence for the driver of the car. 4. Glan vs. IAC may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix. Facts: Jeep and cargo truck collided. The jeepney driver came from a beach party and the jeep was zigzagging. The cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road was wrongly painted. A case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of the collision. Held: The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply because there is no negligence of the other party. Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of each others vehicle. The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved. The Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. It was the jeeps driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve and leave him a clear path. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts.

Facts: Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepneys lane. The heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this case against Pantranco. Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in avoiding the collision. Issue: WON LCCD is applicable?- NO. Held: It did not apply LCCD because there was no opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney driver was not aware of the peril. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages. Thus, Pantranco raises the doctrine in order to escape liability. However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.

In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the impending danger because he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at the speed of the approaching bus prevented jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it. The sole and proximate cause of the accident: Pantrancos driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction. Do not apply last clear chance under the emergency rule. 6. Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA Apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or negligence is difficult to attribute. Facts: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of RMC was tasked to deposit its money. However, it turns out that the Secretary would leave blank the duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the banks teller would validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the company in the original copy retained by the bank, Secretary would write the account number of husband. Thus, RMCs funds were now in Secretarys husbands account. RMC discovered this after 7 years and then filed a case against PBC to return its money. Issue: WON PBC is liable?- Yes, due to LCCD. Held: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller, validated a blank duplicate copy of the deposit slip. PBC was also negligent in its selection and

supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank deposit slips were validated until this incident. LAST CLEAR CHANCE RULE: Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequence thereof. The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Still, court said that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Applied 2179 of CC on contributory negligence. 60-40 ratio! 40% of the damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC. 7. Ong vs. Metropolitan Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied in this case because there was no negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Water District. Facts: Kid drowned in one of the pools of Metropolitan Water District. The reason why the kid drowned is unknown. Employees of the Metropolitan Water District acted as soon as calls for help were heard and tried to revive the kid but he still died. A case was filed by parents of kid who drowned claiming damages against Metropolitan Water District. The parents of kid claim that Metropolitan Water District may still be held liable for the doctrine of Last Clear Chance because it had the last opportunity to save the kid. Issue: WON LCCD is applicable? NO. Held: There is no room in this case for the application of the doctrine. LCCD not applied because no negligence on the part of Metropolitan Water District was proven.

There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan Water District had taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patron or prevent accidents which may cause their deaths. The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: negligence of a claimant does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The Last Clear Chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. In this case, it was unknown how the kid got into the pool and whether the kid violated one of the regulations of Metropolitan Water District because he went unaccompanied. It also appears that the lifeguard responded to the call for help and immediately made all efforts to resuscitate the kid. 8. Anuran vs. Buno Facts: A passenger jeepney was parked at the side of the road since one of the passengers alighted. A motor truck, speeding, then bumped into the jeepney from behind with such violence that 3 passengers died. This case was filed by the heirs of the deceased and of the injured to recover damages from the driver and owner of the truck and the owner of the jeepney. CA: applied the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance and held that only the truck was liable because although the jeepney was guilty of antecedent negligence, the truck was guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision. Issue: WON LCCD is applicable in this case? NO. Held: The principle of Last Clear Chance would call for the application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the 2 colliding vehicles. It does NOT

arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. Disagreed with the CA and held that both the truck and jeepney were liable For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. It did not apply LCCD because there was a contractual obligation on the part of the carrier to transport its passengers safely. 9. Raynera vs. Hiceta Facts: On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the south bound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and he was rushed to the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival. Edna Raynera, widow of Reynaldo, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against respondents Hiceta and Orpilla, owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of March 23, 1989, he and his wife went to Alabang, market, on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road going south, and saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail lights. They would have bumped the truck but the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no early warning device to alert passing motorists.

Trial court: respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Rayneras death. CA: The appellate court held that Reynaldo Raynera'sbumping into the left rear portion of the truck was theproximate cause or his death, and consequently,absolved respondents from liability. Issue: 1. WON respondents were negligent, and if so,? The Victim is negligent. 2. WON such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Raynera? Held: We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50watts bulbs were on top of the steelplates, which were visible from a distance of 100meters. Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. In light of these circumstances, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise dues care and prudence demanded of him under the circumstances. 10. Canlas vs. CA Last Clear Chance Doctrine can apply in commercial transactions Facts: 2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca. Manosca issued 2 checks that bounced. Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security. The 2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas mortgage was foreclosed. Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the

mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent. Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate mortgage against ASB Issue: WON LCCD is applicable?- YES. Held: ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of the sps Canlas. The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of the impostor aside from their residence certificate. In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon. 11. Consolidated Bank vs. Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in culpa contractual Facts: LC Diaz had a savings account with Solid bank. After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he had to leave the passbook. Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz) and was able to withdraw P300, 000.00 from its account. Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money against Solid bank. CA: found that Solid bank was negligent and it had the last clear chance to avoid the injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal. Issue: WON LCCD is applicable?-NO Held: In this case, Solid bank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual. The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of

its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. However, in this case, they failed to do this. Solid bank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative, but here, Solid bank through teller gave it to someone else. Solid bank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of LC Diaz. Thus, Solid bank was negligent in not returning the passbook to messenger of LC Diaz. CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance. Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of contractual obligation to LC Diaz. This case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of Solidbank should be reduced.40-60

Information was then filed against the driver of the Isuzu pick-up charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. Issue: WON LCCP is applicable? NO. Held: The doctrine cannot be applied because there was no time or opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty! It was the Isuzu pick-up trucks negligence that was the proximate cause of the collision. Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it that the opposite lane was free from on-coming traffic and was available for safe passage. After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down. Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he swerved to the lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to avoid collision. Isuzu drivers acts had put tamaraw driver in an which forced him to act quickly. emergency situation

12. Engada vs. CA Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead applied the emergency rule. Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because there was no clear chance emergency situation. Facts: Iran was driving a tamaraw jeepney. In the other lane was an isuzu pick-up that was speeding. The right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney. Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick up but Isuzu pick-up swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was going and so they collided.

EMERGENCY RULE: an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Defense of Isuzu: invoked Last Clear Chance Doctrine SC: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/30918666/96/Philippine-Rabbit-BusLines-v-IAC