Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AND
ANALYSIS or
FAILURES TO BOMB
JUNE 1 ~ 4 5
JJFm STATISI'ICAL ca.:rROI. UN:::T
10 .ruly 1 ~ 4 5
F'LO'iN DtmllC JUliE, ] Cl4i
.08
.21
.39
.67
Metal in
Sl.mp
.62
.72
.70
.96
-1-
':S of Airborn Fc.iHng to Banb
P:"lDlnry ltIrget,s Ih:o To:
lIon'h
...,.,h
April
....
J. All entegorics of foilurcfl shoovd n favorable trend for the r.!onth
excapt engina fnilures "hieh incronsoo sdghtly 10. rolntion to tho nlLber
of nircraft nirborne. An unusually nu;.bor of valves cc.u:;(,d failures
to bodl primnry targets for the month. w:'il'J evidences of internal 01510.-
tegrntiCl'l of the engine (metel 10. sum" incroosed sharply.
1. D\n"ing Jme the low pcrcenu_go of abort-ive slr.t1"s gxnl"yit>ncoo
established a new reCor'd for the XXI BodJer common::!.. tc bom'l
primRry tOJ'ets for all. rensons tIIIIO\l'lted to ooly 9.4' of '.Ie:;
ngninst 10.6S for Yny and for April; _hile fnilw'c!J t') blX.lh
tOJ'get d1lrlnished to ff1, of totfol aircrnft I!.1rborne as CCJ1ltyreL with 7.ff1,
for end for April.
2. Rensms
for failures to bodJ nro
outlined by DSjor entegQ:7 in
the tcble below:
XXI BalDER C'J,.."Wrn
1" of
pL,nc8 Airborne Fcll...ng
to Bom
_ffi1MARY TARGET
_
!Ell
!!!JL
Jmc
'.
liry
Mnintenance ond Materiel
- 2 -
4. Apc'.rt from the engine, tt) principle> S"/EtCtlS ct'using fcilures
to bOClb prUmry tl'rgets were tho eloctric:.l pr"1poUer. r.htle pr:)pellcr
control tlssedllies seomed to fUlCtion llit.h 1 ;5S Clt.fflcul;;y in !un::lo tht'L 1[,
Mn)", fnilures !fere still relntiyoly biKb. c.nt: prop pove.rnor ft'.ilt:es sl::n i
eo =ked incroose.
5. In Yiewing tc bOlllb priJluu"y u-rgets by :ring, tne 73rd
tlYernge of 7.8% of its nirborne nircrr.ft fdling to bonb pril'1f'-l7
The 3ll.th Wing hnd th.;! highest percent or rirbom.e fniling to b:lClb pr-!aC::")
tnrgats mth tm nyernge of 11.5% for th.::: month. :('11
failures to bO!:lb primnry t'U'g.:::ts {'.lid folilures to 1:000 ('fly tf'TCet ('.!'O 1--
dicated by wing in the tr.bles fWJ.arlng.
Eneinu railures
29 47 46 45
67 49 42 47 33
51
7'
3
128 167 2
34
Mechanioal Failures
17 22 18
3
2 15
28 3
6 30 18 21 25 1 64
106
93
Maintenel ce PersOIUlel Fa.ilures
17 7
16 15
16 2l 2
3
15
8 10 18
..
45 65 56
63 76 80 92 98 98 101 92 59
82 113 4
237 33
8
3
8
3
1.1;.'
\
r; -Tl""1' :::1 <J '
10 2
3 4 4 5
15. 11 2 1
10 10
-
3
8
35
40
- . " , -
..
-
1
.,
- -
..
- -
..
-
1
"
\J,. - __ "
t'1'.,:r-, ...
-
1
.. 2 1 16 2
-
3
.. 1
"
19 4 3
D'':!' .. --" .-:
-
1 6 1
.. 1 8
-
.. 11 1
7
20 2
K..,,';'\:>> , .....
1
..
-
..
- - 1" -
5 3
1 5
17 1
HaO'-l__rla'lio Operator
1 2
- -
1
-
1 >
-
1
"
3 5
Gunna,"s
-
-
.. .. .. ..
2 1
.. ..
"
. 2 1
Total
12 27
lO 8 7
32 37 5 27 25 12 1 Iii
82 52
Weather
1 7
67 1 1 46 5
20 13 14
11
126 2l
39
En!'!!!!.
4
1 2 2
"
8 1
3 4
1 9
"
14
8 13
&na11 Fol'tlJ:ltion - - -
1 2 22
. 2
5
.
-
-
27
1
5
.pitched Enroote
-
. 1, 1
-
1 .
-
.
-
"
2 1 .
Circled Survivcrs
2 2 2 1 1 1
-
.
"
. 1 1 3 3 5
Uokno=
2 4
2 2
"
27 8 8
4 4
2
-
33
16
14
Total 4
6 5, 5 3 51 8 D 9 4 :>
1 65 21
23
TOTAL 84
117 164 108 109 235 152 130 112 126 148 6
5ll 470 510
-.3 -'
June
-"""
Aprillm
April lune
.t..oril
!l!>:
June
Failures
Eng;lne Fdilures
3.2 3.
6
35 39
4.8 4.4 3.
6 3.5 35 4.3 5.4 42 3.8 38 4.3
Mechanical Failures
19
1.7 14
2.8 1.1 2.5 31
2.2 19
1.8 1.9 1.4 1.9 24 1.7
Personnel Failures
109 0.5
1.2 103
101 1.9 2.0 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.4
.,
13 1.0
I'otal
6.9 5.8 6.2 8.0 7.0 8.9 8.7 6.8 6.3 6.9 8.8 506 7.1 7.7 7.1
!J.r ere" Failures
A/':, CY."lIflIlder
1.1 1.7 03 03 04
1.4 0.9 0.1 2.0 0.8 0.8
13
0.8 0.7
Co
-
0.1
. .,
.
0"'"
En8).neeJ
0.1
., 0.2 0.1 1-4 0.2
03
0.1
., 0.6 0.1 0.1
Bom":lanUer -
0.1 005
0.1
-
0.1 0.1
09
0.1
.,
0.2 0.5 0,,4
Nartgator
0.1
.,
... 1.1
.,
0.5 03
lo4
0.1 004 0 .:>2
Rad8l."'"Radio Operatcr
0.1 0.2
0.1
_,0.1 0.1
0.1
., .,
0.1 001
-
., .: .:
0.2 0.1
- -
0.04 0.02
Total
1.3 2.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 2.9 3.2 004 209 201 0.9 lo4
201 109 100
Weath'S
0.1 0.5 502
0.1 0.1 4.2 0.4 1.5 ,'-
1.2 0.9 -, 308 0.5 0.7
small FOI'IIIltion
0.1 0.1 0
-
0.1 0.5
-
.,
0.8 0.02 0.1
Ditched Enroute
0.1 0.1
0.1
.
-
.
0.1 0.02
-
Circled
0.2 002 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
.
-
0.1 104
0.1 0.1 0.1
UnknO'll'n
0.2 03
0.2 0.2 -:
2.4 0.7 O.G 004 0.3 o.a
-
1.0 0.4 0.3
Total
04 0.5 004 004
0.2 4.6 0.7
0,;; '.0 03
0.2 104 109 0.5 004
GRIlNDTarAL
92 90
12.7 9.J, 708 21.3 13.1 97 119 1007 U.s. s.s 1503 >0.6 9.J,
... 4 ..
.,i.e.I....,':',:,;.1 la.-J. :res 1.1 1.2 0,9 2.2 09 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.1 1.6
13
1.3 1.8 1.1
:Pez'sonnel Failures 1.7 05 1.1 13 1.1 14 17 0.9 0.8 Q...a 1.2
0.3
.... t
.. 0.1
-
.
- - -
- -
0.02
.l:X'Ol"ee:..-
-
0.2 0.1
- 002
.
03
.
0.1
-
0.1 0.1 0.04
Bo':lt>'lrdj.tH' -
0.1
0,1
0.1 0.2
-
0,9
-
-
0,,03 0-.3 0.,",
Nuv.i.{. ':;'c'
-
.
-
..
0.1
-
03
0.1
0.1
. .
0.1 0.1
. ( -
-
0.1 0.1
-
- -
0.02 0.02
T..,tdl 05
0_.5,
03 0.5 05 05
0.8
04 1.2 1.2 0.6 14 0.6 0.8 0.5
'!leath'3r
0.1
0.1
04 0.1 . 0.1
-
0.1 0.1 0,,02
l'n....:!!!'L.$.ttl!!.
03
0.2 0.1 0.1
0.1
-
. .
- -
0.05 0.02
Circled Survivors 0.2 0.1
0.1
0.1
- - -
14 0.03 0.1
0.4
Unknown
05 0.2 03 0.1
03 0.1
------
Cyl1rders
3 7 15 11 18 12 12 10
13 20 22 1 40 1.20 46 1.04
58 1.07
Valves
3 9 11 12 16 6
5
12
5
11 15
- 24 0.72 31 .70
52 0.96
Carbureter
3 3 1
-
1 1 1
-
1
3 3
-
3 09 7 0.16
1 0,-13
Oil Leake
-
-
3
-
-
1
-
-
- - -
-
4
0.12
-
-
-
Metal in SUmp
1 6 2
5 11
5 7 9 - 4
10
-
7 0.21 17 039 36 0.67
liagna'.o & Spark FlUBs 1
4 2
3
1 2
5
- 3
1 2
-
7 0>21 10
O ~ 2 3
7 O ~ 1 3
Pll'lt'.X\S 15< RU18S 2 1
""
2
4 -
- - -
2 1 1
4
0.12 6 O.:L4
7 0013 Push ROO3
2 1 2
-
1 1 2 2 1
-
3
- 4
O.. lP.
4 0,9 7 0,13
Crank: Cwe Section
- -
> 2
-.
1 1
- - -
-
-
2 0..06
3 0.. 07
Accessory Drives
-
-
1
- - -
1
-
-
- - -
1 0.03 1 0.02
011 Pw:iIp '" SUmp 4
1
-
2 2 2
-
1
- -
2
-
2 0.06 6
014 6 0.... .:.
Rocker Lrmi&
_.
2
-. -
1
-
-:
-
-
1
-
- -. -.
1 0.02
3 0.06
Cam Ii Cam Dri. ve
- - - - - - -
-
- - -
- - - - -
-
-
Crankshaft
- - - --
1 1
-
2
-
-
1
-
1
03
- -
4 0.07
. Air Detlectcr8
- - -
- 1
- -
- -
-
-
- - - - -
1 0.02
Miscellaneous, Unknown
10 13
"
6 10 15 8 11 10
9 11 1
29 0,87
35 0.79
46 0..65
TOl'LL
29 47 46
45 67
49 42 47 33 51 70
3
126 167
234
;( OF JillIDOR.'E
32 3.6 3.5 39
4.6
44
3.6
35. 3.5 4.3 504 4.2 3.63 3.78
4.34
. .<I'd.
, ,.
. .:.rI.T;;;'tJKCTiom CI.IJS::J:l Fl,nmm TO BOUB PRJ?,;!,.:!
-.2
8
...1llJL'L
1,by
__
J.l.Pril June
Jl.5.
t
.!J._P'.6-
JUr.3
Total
April
1l!!l!
2 2
4
2
5
2
4 9
0.21 0.34 0.70
,.
,
4 3
- -
- ,
4 3
0.12 0.34 0.23
,
-
,
2
4 2
3 4 3
0.32 0.34 0.23
> >
,
2 >
0.16 1-41
,
2
-
>3 22
'5
,
5 l2
'5
2')
27
0.45 0.66 0.50
8
'5
>4
1
-
3
9 15 17
0.27 0.34 0.31
1
3 2
11 6 2
'"
9 4
0.36 0,.20 0"",
2 2 6
-
3
1 2 2
1 1
4 5 l2
0.J.2 O.U 0.22
2
5 1
4 2 2
6
7 3
0.J.8 0.16 0.06
2 2
2 1
l2
14
14
5 23
"
61,>06
9'
1.91 2.40
'-72
-
'.Ill
3
5
25
1.95
2
>
2
0.21 ...
2 2
>
3 2
0.32 0.17
4
3 6
lB 21
1.
9
-.r
78
3 3
3
3
6
0.33 0.46
5
6
- -
5
6
0 .55 0..46
>
-
, ,
>
,
-
- -
2
2 2
4
2
> 4 >0 8
4 4
2 6
>
.
7 3
>7 22 ,8
32 >5 28
3
6
3
1.86 1.69
.9 2.n 1.08 2.54 30J.0 2.22
... 8_:
Propeller
Prop Control J"Ssemb ly
Prop Govt!rnor
Total
:c of Airborne
Aldl .E;;',Jt.x:
Fuel Pvlnp
T'Jtal
%'of .t.irborne
ED1l.1l1st Ring &: Stacks
Turbo Slpereharge.r
Total
% of Airborne
Bcmb Racks
Banb Bay Doors
Total
% of Airborne,
Electrical SystEm. General
Electric Motors
.Flap .Actuator
Land ing Light5
Total
%of J.1rborne
Landina Geara ,
Ne.vlgation Instt"ulQf:ot,s
"""or
other Meohanical
.<YrlJ.
0,.,.
.
E!:!RIQ!Q
HE.tJ>QU .HTERS
UNITED ST"TES ..Jr.,y It.IR FORCES
Office of the "C of 5, ,,-2
hPO 234
19 h.ugtlst 1945
SUBJECT: Foreic;n Rudio Reports.
THE FOLWdING REPORTS ,lfiE VERB"TTIi TRnNSL.-ITIONS
OF J-Jltl.HESE BIiO,J)C:.STS FOR AWE CQi;SIJ1.iPTION IJ'ID CON-
TtiIN NO r:!:GLISH-LJKtU"GE PROP..GiJID....
&.. OF THE lCl'IRE (l'okyo 17 nU;;).
"In facing this :;rave and unprececented of the a-rtpire
l
Fi.na.nce Un-
lster Hirose made the followinc
lOur has corne face to with the nost cifficult era
in its histor}-. The road which our national should toke is the one
leading to the os.intl:ll'lllnCe of order, to u pL:l.Oning for the stablliz.:I.tion of
nc.tional life and to the speedy recovery of our econooy. The 30verru!nt,
.in order to do this, is deternined to do possible to stabilize
currenc;r. Therefore, the ut::x>st sibil1ties \ull be t=.ken to guarantee
the security of sav1n3s and deposits anc. l!lCasures such the oorntoriun
definitely 1'lill not be taken. t :Oreover, concrete adjustnents \lill be rede
in the handlin6 necessar}" for the increased production of food, for
the and stability of life, for the receneration of
war Victims, and forth.
I:ext, as for the conversion of i=lportont industries, concentraticln of
necessary capital will be guaranteed ..!l.d at the sane tine ap?ropriate adjust-
uents and the establishment of leans und (word) for will be pl.:;.nned.
Furtheroore, in order to cal.ntain the sto1.bilityof currency, strict
censures to prevent inflation will be planned and redlizeG.
I strongly request you people of the nation actually to erasp the sit-
uation, to ha,e un understandinc of the measures which the
nation undertakes, anG to face the difficult tusks of the reticn (word)
self esteen, cOr.JPosure and cc.1m.'1ess."
C..BlliET, or: COtlFROiITn:G F.:EfCD;CY SITUATION. (Os=.ka 16 AU3).
Itln last nieht 1 s broadcast address Prinier Suzuki said that the way
for the people to his is to eXbrt thQir efforts in prog-
ress in science and techniC:Lue and in building up a culture wnich will con-
tribute to 'World civilization and this can be cJ.O!l.6 by our forf!,;ettine
U... ..inc) (word) of the post and witt: an eilterness to foro a n'K Japan.
President of the Oai Uip?On st&ted
that we (people of Jc.pun-tr,;ms) l"IUst not lead astr_y OUi' sulerm c.ttitude
and (word) but strive for (word) courr.[;e and exert our efforts for safe guid-
ance. ....t this ti.r.m we should. actually exercise the rescript on
educc.tion and abide by it. Thus our descendents will certuinl.;. welcor.te the
[).OriOU8 which will (word) in histor/.
In this my: "the cabinet's 0('<"5 instruction, Pre.!nier Suzuki and
President of the oat Nippon Society expressed clearly the
path we should take in confrontir-'3 this situation.
FIRST C,Jnt!ET ;1EE:rUlG. (Tokyo 17 ...US).
ttHis Imperial HiGhness Prince Higashikuni had this to say at the first
cabinet meetine held today; 'Yesterdcy I pruceeced to the palace
after bein3: su::noned b) his !I:l.per ial I--D.jesty !hperor MU YIIlS .Jrtiored to
f'Jm 8 new cabinet. Today the investiture cereoony was held. :'/hen I received.
the i.q:Jeriel COI:lllla."'ld, I was especilllly honored with the ::''1'.l.ci.Jus ir.lperial
wurds. His !r.:perial state(: that I should respect the constitutiun,
exert efforts to reUJ.lll.te the arEled forces, lll/iintain order nnd recoverine from
th.. proA"''''n+, "'H.nAt.ion. In connection with this, sinc" the situ::ltLm will
be f",ced with further difficulties, I hope to exert I:\Y efforts to recover !rOI!l
the present situation in COLlplying with the wishes expressed in t..,ese words. U
IlEnDQU.J<!'ERS
U!'JTIED ST"TES ..Ir..Y STIU..TmlC ..IR FOiiCE3
Office of the "C of S. ....-2
"pO 234
19 hUo-ust 1945
SUBJECT: FOl'eisn Radio Reports.
THE FOu.c>fIING REPORTS .fiE VERB"T!L TfL..NSL.\TIONS
OF J..F'.u{SE DfiO.DCkSTS FOR HOW!: Cm:SutiPTION n.ND CON-
Tn.IN NO ;:;r;CUSH-WK;U.GE PROP.-GiJIDh.
mwRt:CEDu-1I'ED ER,.. OF THE E.:PL'lE (Tokyo 17 nug).
tlln facing this 3l"<lve and unpreced.enteG er3 of the cn,ireJ Finance lln-
ister Hirose cade the followinE stateuent:
lOur e:::pi;'e has c:ctually cone roce to io.ce with the nost difficult era
in its historj". The road which our economy should is the one
leading to the oaintenanco of order, to for the stabilization of
notional life and to tho speedy recovery of our The aoverruilent,
in order to do this, is deternined to do everything possiole to stabilize
currenc:r. Therefore, the ut:JOst responsibilitiE:s \7111 be tu..1ten to guarantee
the security of savinJs and deposits <me neasures such as the lXlr3.toriuo
definitely will not be taken. LoreoverI concrete adjustnents '.i.ll be oade
in the production food
l
for
the establish!:lent and stability of national life, for 'the re.:ener3tion of
tleI' victins, and so forth.
Next, as for the conversion of of
necessary capital ,till be guaranteed and at the sane odjust-
uents and the establishment of loans and (word) for conversiCl:l will be pl.:m.'1.ed.
in order to the st.:lbility of currency. strict
oeasures to prevent inflation will be a.nd realized.
I strongly request you people of the nation actually to erasp the sit-
uation
l
to ha-/e an ao;>le uncierstandinc of the vnriDus Dell.sures which the
nation Wluertakes, <lnl::. to face the difficult tolsks of re tion >lith (word)
self esteem
l
cOLlpOsure and caln.,ess. II
cnaINET. 0:; CONFRo.'ITL\'G EiEGFl:CY SITU"TION. (Osc.ka 16 ...u.:;).
"In last nieht I S brOlldc.:lst address Prinier Suzuki said that the way
for the peoplt:l to repay his 1:v.jcsty is to eXurt thuir efforts in r..o..1{ing prog-
ress in science and techniclue and in building up 0. cultu:ce which will con- .
tribute to world civilizotion and this can bEl done bj" our forlSettine evory-
thinS (word) of the past and 'hi.til an eQeerness to forn e. new JUp.3n.
nlso President :.u..nam of the oc.i Nip?On Jl.ssociatbn stlited
that we (people of J<l.plln--trll.ns) tDJ.st lead .:lstr_y our solettn nttitudo
and (word) but strive for (word) cow-r."e an.! exert our efforts for sare e;u1d-
ance. "t this tine \1e sh;)uU. actually exercise the rescript on
education and abide it. Thus our descendents 1,i.ll 1'I'elcDna the
t.!ori.)us dny which will (Hord) in
In this way: "the cabinetls official instruction, Premier Suzuki and
President Linaci of the Oai Nippon Political Society clearly the
path we should take in coni"rontine this situation.
FIRST C"BH!ET liE1"TING. (Tokyo 17 hUB).
Ill-Us lI::perial Hic,hness Prince Hi "ashikuni had this to say at the first
cabinet meeting held today: 'Yesterday I pNceec!ed to tho L4'Cria1 palace
after bein6 sw:r:lOned b) his ial Io1l.jesty the f..bperor nnd wus orci.cred to
f?:n:1 a new cabinet. Today tho investiture cerer.L:ll\Y" was held. ilhen I received
the ioperial clJml8..'1d
J
I was honored nth the itJperial
words. His Ir.:perial :!.8jesty state( thdt I shDuld respect the c.:mstitutiun
l
exert efforts to ref,ul..ote the armed forces, oaintain order end recoverin.::; frol!l
the present situation. In connection with this, since the will
be with further difficulties, I hope to exert cy efforts to recover froo
thfl present situation in cOll!p),yin;;: with the wishes expressed in these words. II
SUBJ2CT: Foreli;n Ri.u.o Reports.
the in front of the
'l'her :)led:;ec. to beEU" the un-
::l.1rnin..:; LlD.i',J" peo;Jlc ho.vc filled
th6ir resptlcts the
defend the
nYesterdt,y we heard His i..ajtlsty bro<1dcast. His ":'jtlstr us
the way. .ie C<ln not ima.:!;in& how h..re. it wifl. be in the futUT6 but WE:
fi2ht hard to open the .Iay. Our roc.d is to follm/ his .ajcstJ" s instruct::'ons:
lie J:IUst defend our nc.tioool structure. Yesterd.lY's C!:.bi:'\....t dl:.clc.ration t&lls
us we not f411 behinL rest of the world. LLst 3uzuki told us
to stuct,;- science herd. ,..inl;u said to carry out the I:..;:oeriel rescript on
Eiduco.tion.
Since this
and
beaN.ble and to
Kusunoto, is stationed in issue2 a
terdol] unc.er the title uTo You J(,poJnese Residents (in un t..'1e
prepar.:tions in rLind for the Jup.lnese n.sidents t;) cope with the nt!l'j sit:L:..tion
followin.:; the ...tion of the L:.Jt)EIri.... l Rescri<Jt.
It m:.s finulJ..,y decided th1.lt uros be lLid c.:m so th..t nutione.l
policy of three thous<mc. ye.:.rs frod the dawn of history ane so th.J.t the rt.ce
und the culturE: of ..nnkinc e<m be preserved. ".le UlSt .Jvercooe the c.'.ifficulties
which lie before us in th6 future by havin.; cor.:rudes hoI? each ot.."er, \:)r
further stren heni.'1<, ties of friendsh!? wit." the c.'1inese and b;r COf..;Jl,yi.rl.:.
with the Ioperi<1l will. rois is the essence o')f the Japonese spirit. I <:.sk ._t
Y0U (tWJ words) 8djestic.:.Uv', (words) ;Julntain of the Jcpcnese
people, be Cll!:.' lnd conscientious take sUtelJ actions."
HnPPY TEl, THOUS,J:U TL1S (Shcn2.hai in i..a.ndarin ....usust 16 to Interior China)
lISince the nows of the official en.:: of this wlIr re..:ched Shon,:.hoi tot n')on
of ....UE;Ust 15, all tht; i:uwbit&nts in ..unici::::>ality were happy ten
t.!.l.!tl tJ
" a,:>TiqcTED
um:Till ST.. ..R..Y Srrtr.'I'XIC ..IR PORC:..s
Office of the ne of S, ",-2
,J>() 234
lIOur tried to brit1& about pe6.ce 'tilth ...nerica o.nd Brit.:l.in, throu.:::,h
Soviet Russi... "'Ihich was a neutrc.l nation at th""t tLle. On July 26, the tl'.reo
nations, n...eric,-, 3ritain dnd the Chunl:Xin5 Goverru.>cnt, suc1dcntly wde ;.uJ;.lic
the Potsdi.;.!.\ Joint Dec1..:lr<.tiun ... ncl ..:ada it thclt this Lecl<lration ;:;dS the
finnl notific..tion to Jd;')ll.n. The three llutions I joint QlIclc.rl1tion \.<'5 i,sTIONC:
first by the uJPcror. Lut the diplonutic interpretation this
word "i!porell becaue the recl.son for the Soviet declaration 0;: wC.r, unci this
us a little. That is, in the 30viot
issued on 9, the Soviet stated because had rejected tho
joint de-claration, the Japanese pro;:>osal which was sent to the Soviet Union
conce:-nin,:; the redistion of the Greo..l.ter &ost. hsia h.... s lost its entire (f;.")rd)
she entered the war. In this it is clear tiklt the
tried to (word) ir. shEJrin.:; honds nith ...oeric<:. a..'1d Jritl:.in titrougl: Soviet
(mrd). These ceaseless effort:;; cc.e:!e by the circles of the 2:Jpiro
ended in fnilure, due to the Sovit:it declar;,tion of l'l.:!r. ..ne:! cue to the s!'?f!<:r-
LOce of the nerciless since then, it becaUe to trir.
about the end of war in t e u.sual nan.!1er. Thus, the not-
ification of of tpe joint was
four nati..:>ns of ..nerica, Britain, Chin.. and Soviet Russia on ..u::ust 10."
13 "u3Ust 1,45
i. ..Il.T..I .. DIGNITY OF J . P'::OPl,i. (Osal<a 16)
JOINT D.L.11.nTIO:l IGm:n:;u .,T FIRST (Tokyo 15 hu;;ust)
THE FOUiJ ;r;'G kEPORTS '.ilL V".i;-"E....TL TR..t-.3L..T:i:O:\S
OF EkO..!lC..sTS HO...!.. COr.;aU.P'lIO; . .::u
T.IE 1;0 ....GE FItOP...G"iiC....
DISTRIBUTION:
R S T RIC TED
Pace - 2 _
RE,STRtlCTED
,
CnIDIT TO SCIENTIFIC SUPERIORITY (Tokyo in Enslish 16 u",ust)
However, all places were well in order ond. everyone was l:J.lch better be-
haved thnn they first heard the news on 11.
TodayJ every single house and every buildin.... hoisted the "Blue Sky.
I,bite SWl" National flag_ ill the stores are openin,3 for business <loS usual
and the Japanese soldiers are teoporarilJ' helpinG to keop peace and order.
No incidents broke out within the City. II
HhPPY TEN THOUS,JID TL.i:S (Cont.)
G-2, UShf'.L1DP"C 1
Hq. US"ST..F
cis 2
Dir of Co!;:ln 2
Dir ,jf Intel! 13
Dir of Opns 2
Dir of Pums 1
Dir of ;i!::.:l 1
Stat Control 1
PRO 1
G-2, ISCOJjl 1
,.-2, 20th t>.F. 120
...-2, VII Ftr Com 65
G-2, hGF, nPO 86 1
nTC J
Foreign Redic Reports, 18 45. Cont1d.
nSince the Cabinet system Ylas established, t.l-tis is the first tine th<lt
a Prince of the Blood has been given I!:lper1al t::l a C<:.b:ir.et.
Especic.l.ly. the fact tho.t his lLrperi.:ll LiJ,jest'l O'dciousl orG.l:N"d hi!; I!. ;.o;::-i..l!
Highness Prince I-ii.;asr-.ikun.i. to form a c<:.cinet without c.
r..eetL"'lg of the llder St.::.tes!.l<l.n sponsored by thp. :L.ord of tht: r::,
t;'e s'!e:ction of the 1e'"-der for the forcution of the succeecir"... u::, tj
the tine, is truly an unpreceeented t!linr,_ r.re truly f:.:1(;..1 1'Ii'Lh
F... E. trepidation by, the gracious concern of His . .o.jesty ner t!:e
situation. II
PiUNCE CQ;,.......,JIDtD TO GitBIUET (Oscl<a 16 r.UOJ.st)
liThe ''Yomuri Hoci'.i", in a speci.:.:!. coluon, ur[:eu the ?Cople to cast <::.!:ile
e.ll feel.ing of anguish over the factorc; thdt led to Japan's defe"t rathf>r
accuse those who used the fateful It be much
according to Bushido (Soldiers' cJ<l.u) to &1"'" ..:1I:e credit to the sch:nti:ic
superiority of those Ylho ere capable of pr'ldu'::inJ such a. weap:m. It ;>;:ml':'. 1:::
rdUch to our eood if we can accuse cf so the
"Yociuri" ar+,icle s&.id.
The Japanese !:!Ust now learn to look at a ph<lse .;Jf There is a
reeson for victorjr just ,).s i.nlch as tiero art; for t:.ofeat. !::l.VG
fililed t.:> gauGe our linitati":)ns GOO ;mew n"thins of our adversary. 'i:1at
the articlt; which in the newspaper uY.miuri
ri
nCES
u. s. AEM'l STAAT3GIC
rlADqIlMT&<S, Guam
QUE NO.2.
ase: Immediately
1. In the Superfortress strike asainst Japan in the early hours of
2 (Guam Time). 820 Narianas-based attacked the Of
-'\.M. L-i4... <..C' .,.u 4._ ..............
this number 778 bombers struck at the cities of Hachioji. Toyama, Nagaoka
,...
and Mito and at oil storage and refinery tarsets in the petroleum complex at
Ka.\'1ase.ki. The other 42 bombers mined enemy waters aro"tIQ the
"Since the beginr'inr; of thE> war thl.: of officers D.nd men sacri-
ficed has be"n I7but. HowE;ver, the of the war coulri not be ochie'/ud.
The Sovibt Union on liU;ust nine decw'eri war on the J.-:.panese nation.
Thus, the r.esso.E5e vms grantee:.. The of J<tpun h.$ CO,l::'le to
face further difficulty.
It is our duty to defend the national policy'. The ITi,6J:'l1:Jers of thl;;
bereaved families ,..-ill be given all possible aid. Govorr,,''iE>nt offici<:\ls, as
h""rocs of thv &1peror, are asked to ,further exert their f.lfforts.
1l
J.u=JJ7.SE HOtili S}iJtVICE (Tokyo II hUg).
It;ill importat1t annour.cenent will be made at noon tomo;,cro",v. IncidentallyJ
at th<'l.t hour tOf.J.orrow, electric current vlill OC fed to .,.,.:nere daJrtir.:18
distribution of electric current would not otherwise be- mace. II
THE FOLIDiiING REPORTS ,,HE VEf'w.n.Tn.; T&J'JSLn.TIONS
OF J.n1?'a"IJESE BROnDC"...STS FOR HOllS CO:NSv;.,p7IOlj hiJD CON-
'I'.,n; NO PR0P"G,.NDJ
IIEnemy hfficr'ica cllrried out an attack on the citj'" of Hrn.a."mnfJ. with a new
type bomb. The results of investigation of the power of this bomb by
our scientific circles have. proved conclusive).:; th.t this an ator:lic bomb.
\Vhat is the This bomb utilizes the enersr released when
the nucleus of an atoLl. of uraniwn, an element, is complekly desl,royed. In
the past scienco h<:.s utilized t.he r<:le,:::sE:d in t:,8 chl;;lnical reaction of
(two words), which is outside the nucleus of an atom. The of th8
atomic bomb is funda.ment<.llly different from the science of the past in this
respect. This energy is from GENeral thousand times to several (tens of
thousands) of tiJnes ffiO!'e powerful than radiant ener({Y.
Separate the nucleus of an (nrone), which is of the weicht
as the (hydrvgen) ator.l and which has absolutely no \ word), is mude to colliee
with thE: (h;;rdrogen) a'com. Hhen the nucleus of an .:.tom is thus separat6d, two
or three neutral (SUbstances) are and these neutral
aGain collide ,..ith other atomc nuclei and cause thef.l to separate. The
tior. occurs time aftf:lr time in this :"l.annt:'r (s0ve:.-al words) so t.hat even though
a ninir.llm of is used, the released from it is so powerful uS
to ""qUi:.l twenty thvusand tons of ordinary explosives. II
rtTOltIC BO!ili INVF.BTIG.!lTED BY SCHNrIF!C CIRClES. 14 "uG).
SU'.JJECT: Foreign Radio Reports.
llRegarding tnt... use of the ne'll type bow by QnE::!i\y" nrn.erica, the authorita-
tiVE> circle on international law in TCKYO tod&y pointed to the fiffierican way
of doin/), disregarding the principll:l of hUJ:1anity, as fonows:
In the first place
l
it is a fund8.ffiE:ntlll pri."lciple recognized by inter-
national law a belligerent does not possess unlir.uted right in regard
to choice of measures to hurt the enemy. For this reason the action
such as killing or woundin[; a large nwrher of the general populaco bj' dropping
particularly such a bOfim is not fron the standpoint of
"r.lt'<'Y'; 11 nnt. fnrect. t.he thdt. at one repeat-
edly protested. the mattur of th<; extrtohtely sr.u:.ll-scalb' bombing in the
course of action in China at the time of the China incident, clair.l-
ins th...t the protest "JaS made from the vievlpoint of humc.nity.
The h::lerican action nt, this time is cOMph,tely contrD..r"J to the principlu
l.. ......... ........... \....."'..,. ,' .... ... II
SUBJECT: Foreign Radio Reports.
JAPf<NESE R&CTION TO LEr\FLETS \itUillING CITIES OF IMPENDIHG DESTRUCTION (Osaka 2 .
RES T RIC TED
RES T RIC TED
.li . __
. l'The Japnnese residents of the (lroHAN) District (severul words) have had '"
determined wish for the destruction of the enemy since the great bombing of thi
district by the eneqy. hS n result of the outcome of situation in OKINAifA
and in line with the establishment of the People's Volunteer Corps in the home-
lend, the residents hn.ve initiated an IArm;? Comrade Volunteer Drive. 1 &J.1Jlo,P
above fourteen will be given combat training and (several words) will take up
arms. Ordt:rs wi.ll also be gi.ven to women in the near future. It
"Just before dawn on July thirty-one, our ldr Force attacked the enelIW
bases on OKINhWA the enemw war vessels in the surrounding waters of
and set on fire several places on the airfields and sank one unidentified
worship and one transport."
"Between last night and this dawn, about six hundred B-tweflty-nines carrie(
out scattered raids against Eastern Army Jurisdictionnl Area. Amoung these ob-
jectives, considerable d<.Ui1lge w<-s sustained at TSURm.I, Kn.";nSj..KI, Nn.GAOKh, MI'l'O,
HACHOIJI, T",CHIKA.,ih and TOYA1JJl.. But places other than those mentioned above
sustained light d3Jll8ge. II
OKINAHi1. ATTACKED (Tokyo 2 Aug)
EuPIHE ATTJ..CKS (Osaka 2 Aug)
THE FOlJ.,QHING REPORTS ARE VERBi'lTILi TfWISkTIONS
OF JAPnNESE BROADCASTS FOR HOklE CONSUlFrION "ND CON-
TAIN HD ENGUSH-LnNGUAGE FROPnGiJIDA.
Ji>PANESE RE",CTION TO INCENDlNiY riTT",CKS (Tokyo 2 Aug)
3 hUgust 1945.
rr,lith political and strategical intentions, the enemy is carr;ying out bomb-
ing attacks against. the various cities of our Recently the enelny has'
been taking an extremely elaborate propaganda lnethod of naming the cities in
varidus of the homeland by giving advance notice of the bombing attacks ar
warniqg the residents to take refuge. ..t the present time the number of cities
which have the appearance of cities without being harmed has become extremely
small. Therefore, the enemy lists the names of remaining cities and it is nat-
ural that any of these cities will suffer bor.bing attacks.
hS an excuse for making the indiscriminate bombing, the is attempt-
ing to hoodwink us such expressions as lAmerica does not want to hurt the
innocent people. However, since bombs don1t have eyes, we cannot tell where
they will falL'
It is needless to say here that the recent bombing attacks which the
who advocates of humanity, is carrying out in actuality are
different fran he is saying and what he is actually carrying out. In the
bombing second class cities the enemy is taking the method of
first of surrounding areas the cities arc
after blockine u the way from which the residents can escape, the center of tr.
cities are bombed. Examples of attacking schools and hospitals are truly
erable. For instance, in the liCASSnR and HONGKONG homes for women and children.
camps for the British are being bombed or strafed persistently.
\
However, there is no doubt that such beastly attacks by eneqy America wiL
be carried out fiercely, further toward wiping out we Japanese people
without place and time being the question. II
HEill<U,;JtTERS
maTED ST"TES nRllY STRATEDIC Am FORCES
Office of the AC of S, A-2
APO 234
l
App.,.;ze4el, 70 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses dropped heavy
10 August, 1945.
FOR rtELBaSE: 1330
ca.
by late fternoon of 9
the smoke
Communique No. g that a co
J
lr--
Scattered fires were visible au
1. Damage now availaolc
mission
COMliUNI qlJE NO.9.
u. S .AiOO' STi\.b.TEGIC .ill\. FOnC3S.
Guam
,
demolition bombs on the Tokyo arsenal area in the late of 10 August.
The bombers were escorted by p-47 Thunderbolts and P-51 Mustangs from Iwo Jima.
I
'ITI_'et of 90 13-29 Superfortresses dropped heavy demoli tion bombs on
the Nippon Oil Refinery Company at Amagasaki in the hours of 10
Enemy interception was fire ranged from meager to
intense.
Reconnaissance photographs show the_t the Ube Coal Liquefaction Company
was left completely inoperative by the 3-29 mission reported in Communique No.4.
All of the refinery units were destroyed or damaged and a seawall protecting
the plant was broken in several places, flooding the plant site.
ChI.L SPAATZ I
General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.
,
,.... f ,,",
." I v
.:. . .
lllOl'OS!:D Jl'IlfAt COlll41lJlIQ
.....,-;c.-"---.,,...--.....,
)
On.
rIP'
G,ilIE1ut SrAATZ V
,
the tIM ot the Pl'es1dent's Pl'Ocla t10n, Il9 a1 -..ft
.... land'.... tar-I a.. af"te!' l't')'1na out a napt
..'ut Japul. lUI' a pel'1Od or 26 boU1'a 01" to aeeeat1aB
.t bD8UUU... a toIli or 9M we ot .0.. st!'6te 0
AU PoPe... oorapoe.11 ot 888 B-Iil9'1 d 11'1 he- sed exeort f'1gh PI
..
avau au1 11 ..USta17 obJ.ctivea thl'ougbOut onahu. OW!' l'
tou or tle ..N Uftel1 dUl'1na thie ope tion, Jet no b
Nl..M4 aullleqaat to JlI'OCI t10n. 29 a1re ...
NtuPDi4 .. lIWr f'1sbte!' abo tt _ 10 .' NI f'1Jla1
.,tack, 1ImlttDi '1'4 .bbol'll8 bat ONlf pe a0lllle1 1'1ted tbe
.1 or ,,"tocSo aU opnatlOIl8 .ptnat hi all
. opeatS... -1ot1T. tho ttlllo b1abl1!ltl are polJlt04
,---
Da tbob oJlOreUo.. ap1Dlt JaJlU, '. tltollI India ant
. '
II&Ps- n....... 100,000.000 anA ... 4Joo po4
IIe.I21 ot 110 All &lIN to ot 2,111 t11 t 1n41Y14la1
......,. C...u.) ... b ".lItot 'lI8t ob3ocU.... 1lh.tob PO
e.lIlS.-lI'Ul' 1M .. tbo 1lO1JIt ot ---.rr
'4f1
718
24 ,119!1
'4
791
'4
92S
42,711
1-1- '4
986
21,:584
torAL TO G 169,421
-4.
For Release:
17 August
2100,
1945.
NO. 12.
1. From the operations against Japen on 14 August end in the early hours
of 15 AUo=ust all of our bombers returned. Four fighters are missing. Strike
photographs indicate excellent results.
2. Summarizing strategic operations against Japan: B-298 from India
end Marianas bases have flown over 100,000,000 miles and have dropped 169,421
tons of bombs. An aggregate of 32,612 flights by individual aircraft (Sorties)
have been executed against objectives which were ordinarily 1,SOO miles or more
from the point of take-off.
Losses incident to combat operations were 437 B-29 eircraft. A total of
297 B-29 crews were lost. A total of over Goo combat crew personnel was rescued
by naval rescue agencies.
Final and accurate evaluation of results of B-29 operations must await
completion of reconnaissance and ground survey. Available intel-
ligence confirms the following damage:
The oajor portion of the productive capacity of 59 Japanese
cities has been destroyed. Of additional cities, the industrial product-
ive capacity he,s been partially destroyed. Damage to two urban industrial
arees has not been assessed. A total of 581 important factories engaged in
production of war materials has been either totally destroyed or severely
damaged. Included in this number are 23 major factories of Japan's aircraft
industry, destruction of which has been resulted in an estimated 60% reduction
in her combat aircraft productive capacity. Also included are six of
major Also included are two plants producing tetra ethyl lead. In
addition to the above two major steel plants were to extent
resulting in a reduction in capacity to produce steel. In addition.
eight principal oil storage ana refinery installations was destroyed
severely damaged, resulting in the destruction of Japan's major oil refining
Included in the above figures are the two urban industrial areas of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were destroyed or severely damaged by one atomic
bomb dropped by a on each of these targets.
Since 28 Mo.rch 1945. 1.435 flights heve laid 12.049 mines in enemy
waters.
In their operations against B-29s have destroyed or damaged 1,935
enemy aircraft in the air and over 350 on the ground.
During the period 17 April to 11 May 1945. n total of 7.850 tons of bombs
was by B-29s against airfields and airfield installations in Kyushu for
the purpose of these fields in coordination with the invnsion of
Oki!Ul.\<ra.
Long strategic escort fighters based at two Jima have made 8,012
flights to Japan, totaling over 38,000 hours. tn addition to providing escort
protection to B-29 units operating over Japan, fighters have carried out attacks
against enemy airfields and lines of corounication. As the result of two-based
fighter operations, 1,047 enemy aircreft have been destroyed or dRmaged at a
cost of 106 of our fighters.
CA.'lL S?AATZ.
General, U. S. Army,
COlI1Illan(Ung.
2 -
S. ARI!! STRATEGIC
!!E+DQ.UARTERS. Guam.
,
COMkUNIQ.UE NO. 11.
Alrt FORCES,
For Release: Immediately
15 August 19
4
5
?
1. Over a thousand aircraft of the United States Army strategic Air
Forces operated against Japan in the last 24 hours. More than 800
Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses dropped approximately 6,000 tons of
demolition and incendiary bombs on Japan during daylight on 14 AUoPllst and
in the early hours of 15 August. Targets hit were the Hikeri Naval Arsenal,
Oseka Army Arsenal, Marifu railroad yards, the Nippon 011 ReflDery at
Akita And the industrial areas of Kumagaya and Nearly 200 fighter
airplanes from Iwo Jima escorted the bombers over and struck airfields
in the Nagoya area on the afternoon of 14 August.
SPAATZ,
General. U. S. Army.'
COmmP..nding.
L __'
IC AIl! J'OllCJ:S,
Gwlm.
COllljUNIq,UE 110. 10.
For Release: l330
11 .August I
---:..---.-
1. Reconnaissance photographs made on 10 August after the atomic
reported in Communique No. g show that at least .98 square mile of
built-up area of 3.3 square miles was destroyed.
2. A force of 102 P-51 from Iwo Jima was over the Tokyo area on
the morning of 10 August as escort for the B-29 Superfortress mission reported in
Communique No.9. OUr pilots 18 Japanese fie;htcr airplanes in combat.
destroying six. probably destroying one and dama;;inp' 11. All of our Mustangs
returned.
3. Mining of enemy waters by 3-29 Superfortresses continued on 10 Aur,ust.
CARL SPil.ATZ.
General. U. S. Army,
Commanding.
lIlM'l STRATEGIC AIR FORCES,
Q.UAlITERS, ""Am
COMtMlIQ.UE NO.9.
10 August, 1945.
FOR RELEASE: 1330
1. Seventy B-29 Superfortresses dropped demolition
bombs on the Tokyo in the late morning of 10 August. The bombers
were escorted by p-47 Thunderbolts P-51 from lwo
2. Ninety B-29 Superfortresses dropped demolition bombs on the
Nippon Oil Refinery Comp.ny qt "'''''&I\s,.kl in the e-.Tly hours of 10 August. Enemy
interception slight and fire rAnged from to intense.
3. ReconnaissRnce photographs show the Dba Coal
left completely by the ]-29 mission reported in Communique No.
4. All of the units were destroyed or qnd protecting
the plant was broken in flooding the site.
C.A1lL SPAATZ.
GenerJ\l t U. S. Army t
Commanding.
fi.JI " ( t
TEGIC
For Release: 1130, .Atlguat
10, 1945.
UNITSD STATES ATt]JfY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES. Guam, AUf1:Ust 10 _
General Carl Spaetz announced this that d.e.ma.<!e assessment photographs
made and one-helf hours after the atomic jombing of showed that
the city completely covered with smoke rising to 29,000 feet.
Scattered fires were visible out Bide the smoke area.
No further reports on results of the bombing arc available at this time.
ECHa-81045
11092
t J ? ~
For ease: 9 August 1945.
1. The second use of the atomic bomb occurred at noon of 9 August at
Nagasaki. Crew members reported good results. No further details will be
available until the mission returns.
C,UiL SPAATZ.
General, U. S. Armyt
Commandi ng.
COMMUNIQ.UE NO.7.
For Release: 9 Augu.t
1330.
1. In the first hour of 9 August, 92 B-29 Suparfortresses
dropped upwards of 500 tons of incendiary bombs in the industrial areas of
Returning crews reported excellent results, with general conflagra-
tions observed. No enemy interception was encountered and anti-aircraft fire
was meager. All of our bombers returned.
2. A force of 67 Superfortresses struck at industrial tar-
gets in the Tokyo in the afternoon of 8 August, dropping 400 tons of
demolition bombs on the aircroft plant and the Tokyo arsenal area.
Good to excellent results were reported. No enemlf were encountered
but one of our bombers lost to intense fire.
3. In the mission reported in Communique No.6, 233 Superfortresses
dropped 1,400 tons of demolition bombs. Returning crews reported excellent re-
sults, with several large fires Observed. Enemy interception slight and
fire moderate. Two of ourbombers failed to return.
4. A force of 78 P-5l Mustangs and p-47 Thunderbolts from Iwo Jima struck
four airfields and of opportunity in the Osaka on the morning of 8
August. Pilots reported that they destroyed a bridge, a locomotive and
ten set a factory afire, various shops, har.gars,
racks, and shipping. No enemy were
in the air. fire from to intense. Six of aur
to return but throo of the pilotR were rescued.
CARr SPAATZ
1. Reconnaissance made over Hiroshima on the mornins of 6
show that 4.1 square miles or 601 of the City;'s built-up area of 6.9
se: S 1945
1330.
square miles were completely destroyed hy the Atomic bombing mission, Five
major industrial within this area were destroyed. Additional
was shown outside the completely destroyed area.
2. df 225 Marianas-based ?-29 Superfortressds .truck the industr-
J
ial areas of Yawata with heavy demolition in the late morfiing of 8 Aug-
ust. The bombers were escorted by p-47 Thunderbolts from Okinawa.
3. On the 3-29 mission asainst Toyokewa Naval Arsenal on 7 Ausust, 121
bombers dropped 750 tons-of high explosives on the with reported
by crews to be generally excollent. No enomy interception was en-
counterod and anti-aircraft fire was OnG bomber was abandoned
on the return trip. The crew was rescued.
4. ],29 mission Toyokawa, 97 P-51 were over
JapaJl. Half of the force escorted the bombers. The othor half strafed targets
in the erea, exploding a 20D-foot freishter, setting two oil tanks
afire and three locomotives, 25 cars, two railroad stations,
radio stations, power lines end transformers and 19 small vessels. No enemy
interceptors were encountered. fire from mCaf,or to intense.
One of our airplanes was lost on the way to the but the pilot was rescued.
-
5. Mining missions by 3-29s were conducted on the nir,ht of 7-S Ausust
in enomy waters.
6. Small forceD of D-29o droppcd 92 tons of explosivcs on MArcu8
Island and S8 tons on the Dublon basin at Truk on the afternoon of 7
FORCES,
For Release: 7 August 1945,
1330.
1. Approximately 125 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses struck the
To.rokawa Naval Arsenal with high explosive bombs around noon of 7 August. The
bombers were escorted by fighters from :Iwo Jim...
2. P-51 Mustangs from lwo Jima attacked rJ.ne airfields in the Tokyo area
on the morning of 6 August, destroying one enemy aircraft, probably destroying
three and damaging 21. Targets of opportunity damaged Oil the mission were air-
field installations, hangars, factories, railroad yards and a 200-foot vessel
which was set afire. No enemy interceptors were encountered.
fire ranged from meager to intense. Of the 97 airplanes which participated in
the mission, six failed to return. Three of the pilots were rescued.
3. Final reports on the B-29 mission of the night of 5-6 August show
that 572 bombers struck the primary targets, 28 dropped mines and nine bombed
targets of opportunity. The crew of the B-29 which failed to return has been
rescued.
,
CiJU, SPAATZ,
General, U.S. Army,
Comrranding
RCES,
For Release, 1330,
6 August 1945.
UE NO.4.
the
1. At least 580 Marianas-based B 29 f
- Super ortresses struck at Japan during
night of 5-6 August, dropping approximately 3,850 tons of incendiary and
rial
high
explosive bombs on the Ube Coal Liquefaction Company and on the indust-
MAEGAslI1
areas of/Nishinomiya.-Mikage, Imabari and Saga, and mining the waters
around Geijitsu, Tsuruga, Hagi-0ura and Rashin. Returning crews reported good
to excellent results, with large fires observed in several of the target areas.
Enemy fighter opposition was light and anti-aircraft fire was meager to moder-
ate. One of our bombers failed to return.
2. A small force of B-29s dropped 45 tons of bombs on Moen Airfield No. 1
at Truk on the afternoon of 5 August. No opposition was encountered.
3. A force of 98 P-5l Mustangs from Ivro Jima strafed and launched rockets
against airfields and targets of opportunity in the Tokyo area shortly after
noon of 5 August. Returning pilots reported that they destroyed two enemy air-
craft and six locomotives, probably destroyed one aircraft, set tv/o oil tanks
afire, and damaged one aircraft, several factory buildings, four locomotives,
railroad stations and cars, seven small boats and various miscellaneous targets.
Our force encountered one enemy interceptor, which fled, and anti-aircraft fire
ranging from meager to intense. Two of our airplane s were damaged and three
failed to return. One pilot has been rescued.
4. Around noon of 3 August, P-5l Mustangs from lwo Jima struck the TokyO
area with the following results, Destroyed, two enemy aircraft in the air and
eight on the ground, 14 locomotives, several trucks, gun emplacements and a
transformer. Damaged, seven aircraft, six locomotives, 50 railroad cars,
interceptors and anti-aircra fire ranging from
intense. Of the 97 Mustangs which participated in the mission,
five were damaged and six failed to return. One pilot is known to have been
rescued.
5. A small force of P-51 Mustangs from Iwo Jima made a neutralization
,
strike against air installations on Chichi Jima the afternoon of 3 August,
strafing the target and dropping four tons of bombs. All of our airplanes
,
returned.
6. The first photographs available on the results of the B-29 strike in
the early hours of 2 August show thAt the industrial area of Toyama was totally
destroyed.
,
CARL SPAATZ,
General, U.S. Army,
CQI!llIBnding
STnATEGIC FO-CBS.
-TEAS Guam
, .
COMMUNIQUE NO, 3.
For 1330,
3 August 1945,
I, A force of 139 P-51 !.!ustanss from Iwo Jima struck Jap..j'l around noon
of 2 August (Guam iime). strafin3 and launchi" rocket, against five airfielc
and of opportunity in the lTagoya-Kob(, are... Our force one
airborne enemy aircraft, which fled, and enemy aircraft on
the ground. pilots reported the.t they destroyed one enemy fifihter
on Kiyosu airfield and seven locomotives in t1e yards, and
damaged two aircraft, airfield hangers and four factories, one
refinery, natural gas tanks, power lines, sevet locomotives, railroad cars an
st tions, and 14 small vessels. Anti-aircraft lOire renging from meager to
moderate caused minor d.ama.ge to 11 of our S. All of our airplC'.nes
returned.
2. Mission for the B-29 Superfortrllss strike in the e..rly hou
of 2 (Guam Time) show the.t our forces 20 enemy fi&hter
attacks which resulted in damage to two of our Four bombers were
damaged by anti-aircraft fire. No additional reports on the results on our
bombing ere available at this time.
CA,:iL A. SPAATZ.
Ge1.eral, U. S. Army.
COO\ lll'.ndinit. United
St", 'es Army Strategic
Air Forces.
'.
NO.2.
I;;' FQ;;'CES
,Y
Fe 1elease: Immedi
1. In the Superfortress strike against Japan in the early hours of
2 A = t (Guam Tine), 820 !!arianas-baseci 13-29s attackeci the tar;;ets. Of
this number 778 bombers struck at the cities of Hachioji, Toyama, Nagaoka
anci Mito anci atoil storage anci refinery targets in the petroleum complex at
Kawasaki. The other 42 bombers mineci enemy waters arounci the Shimonoseki
Straits anci off the cities of Seishin anci Rashin on the northernmost coast
of Korea. A of 6632 tons of bombs anci mines was dropped. Returning
crews reported to excellent bombing results, with Reneral conflagrations
observed in the target cities. Enemy fighter opposition over the target
cities ranged from none to slight, and anti-aircraft fire from none to mode-
rate. Over the Kawasaki petroleum opposition from
none to moderate and anti-aircraft fire was moderate. One of our airplanes
is mi ssine;.
2. The p-47 Thunderbolts recently adcied to our on
Iwo Jima made their first attack on Japan on Ausust 1st (Guam Time), joining
P-51 Mustangs in a small mission against the Nagoye_Kobe area. The
strafed and launched rockets against locomotives and cars in the
Fukide yards and and factories at the Itami Nagoya
East airfields. The operation was carried out under adverse weather con-
ditions. No enemy opposition was encountered. Four of our air-
planes failed to return.
... -
.........
('IAi:T A ,.. ...... .......
u. s. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, Guam
COMMUNIQUE NO. I
UD.4.1' ..RKS TO
iii
rot-PlItt r :'!jllM I
1114 Mat A-2 I CG Attached heretc five sheets ccvering
I 1945 I I recent Japanese broadcast. reproduced
" , I , according to your instructions. This
I
I t sheet was made a regular part of the
I
I I weekly "Air Intelligence Report". In,
I
addition, 500 extra sheets were made up
I I. and were disseminated with the Report tc
I;,' : 6MA I I units of this Command so that they might
r _ I I be made available tc all personnel.
:'., :, 1 I (7- 4
" I ri. GARCIA
I '. I Colonel, G. S. c.
1 I, IL -!Ai,:-:=2 _
I : r
I I I ;1
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1 I I , I
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I I I I
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I I I
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XlI iIJ Q. , ---'=--=-.::.;.. ........J
IIFORANDUII TO: GENERAL KISNER
26 June 1945
HEADQUARTERS XXI roMBER COIIMAND
APO 234
1. In a Weekly Review of the war situation over the Toky"o
Radio the evening of 2) June, the following interesting reference to
our Coman:ling General liaS made:
~ ~ 4 ~
CHARLES T. KINOSTON, Jr.,
Major, MIS,
Special Security Officer,
XXI Bomber Command.
SUBJECT: Japanese Home Service Broadcast.
"LeMay, who boasted that he would crush every city in
Germa.ny with a population of 100,000 or more, is now trying to carry
out the same strategy against our homeland. furthermore, we can perceive
in this LeMa{ts tactics against our homelarxl that his objectives are
not-,:unted 0cities with a population of lOO,OOOor more blt fV
tn medium ani small city there is, because such are the tactics 0 s
LeMay. II
2. It should be noted that this was a broadcast in Japanese
for home consumption not a propaganda broadcast for Allied consumption.
It is a rather ominous pronouncement to make to the citizenry.
..
'.
r::---------------,w
.
C. s. Dl'fn.,
C o l ~ . llr Corpa.
Chiar. W D1Y1ai.... IIllr _.
arn-. Il'./IJJ\azUl aarn-.
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"Ill" "- .
t1II&I. "- 1artaaa8
o
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"v bn
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III .ad ! .
' T.B
rmm, "1'"_nt.o, Calltorn1a ..
U"llt ..
,
n
YII
nu
II
I
......................
0.""., C&lUOftia 1QIIll.
...tm JlR(.Il :BiIJBi8....
ucrIOII 0.
!M tolloriDc ftClc U wl-UOIUI ""' .... with rete...".,. to
hl1"'.tac .utMwrteel. TftDllpartatlOD, htll1DC,
"W1JI& aDd TftIDtng jrobl.eu ot tI>e UI BoMber C_ncI.
1. !lat a .... lmDdred o.ncI \weot;}' (120) da,. nook leftl
01 YJa and to '" euppUee be _thar1.Md tar the Ur Depot at
Qou and thet the Air Depot at _ be autharisM to requ1a1Uon
t.brooIP PlIMC 4u..t to cOD\rol and apeoLall .... depot. tar both
e' s or 1.... and ,m """pliea.
2. !lat one luMlriid aDd aUt,. toot Il7 t.o IsiailIre4 too\
(160' " 200') ..0 ..... be IZ'<'Y1decI tar the Air Depot at OUU.
). !lat the requ1re_ ot the Ur Depot at OUU
_ .-1-.1 with a n.. _ tI>e author1aaUOD ot ausb add'_
tl_' tar euPF17 and .-tawu_ lUll! ..
..wit'_, ,.._1 sa are required to _ tllDcU ot a
CIlIsOitLl Air Depot and AfttT Air 1Is_.
4. !lat eul't1olnt air tzoaDeport be placed UDder the control
at tile Air Depot and _ III .._ C_ ... to ""..-it a piD'
of t.o (2) da1l;r __ the Ur Depot and a"l'J>17 act1T1t.1M
., TtaiM .. SalJIID.
5. !lIst...rn.s-t _t tzoaDepartat.1<m be pis ... UDdar tbe
_tnl at _ Air Depo\ and the nx _ e. .... to pers1t
taUT betalls Qou and anwlT aet1Y1t.1ea on naiaD and Saipan.
.. !Mt air pr1ar1t;}' _trol tor air ah1_t ot euppllAe
fw u.. m Cu Del be d1reou,. UDdar tile au_
91". of Depat;r Chiet ot statt tor SuwlT lUll! ..1Dw,,_.
III ..... Cam p',
.. fta\'" Deplt,. Chiet or S\att t", SuwlT and ..
01 .... m I _r C. 1M! _ au\horbed to \rEo-U ... .- atoot
_1.-
J
,
..
._,. ..part ot Col....l C. S. !:r'I1De
Secrt.1oa o I.,ow ndatl0D8
I.ftl aDd C....-pUOII data """"lIb tile 41r De and
ehanDela or com_nd tbe Com'ndlng ael>8raJ., 41r
fM}m1al s.m. Co net tar }Ot"OO. , plenn'nc_
9. tile tull faoiUt1e. ot tile 32Dd Control
....ta wUh UI ''*-r Co ad tor ool.T ta
cou..,u"g aDd pre_nUng data 00 1 1. end ooos\l8PUoa,
_ &1.. JlNJ8ft al.rcrst't eag1De and accessory operaUnc u.s
and .. oparaUoaal and pl.rm1ng data.
10. tile stau.tl.aal ..-quill nnu ot tile 41r llt
_ be _lad br per'lOOllMi and tr.. ""not. aDd tile
111I1_ Mau tile ....1stan.,. ot tile 32Dd S.C.D. tor peU:
loads ool.T.
U. tbe Serriee centera ot tbe III _r Co nd be
aut.llor18d aiDta1D _II: l...u at euppl1e. aDd obta1a
and _bUsh tile
ot 0 .1a'aac tor MOh 1I1ag 011 saeh Islanll.
12. a eriU.&1 ..n.. be _ ot the 1....10.
-tate_ and rsjalr aow outhorlMd
tor tbe Sernos _pe or tile III 'Cllber C.......d in the Ught or
tbe _i._ that .... _ pined in tile ..tabU._at ot the
."... 1I!IIct aDd tllet tile Table. ot ot tbe serrtce aroupe
or _ ....lor lIlnp be' ...n.d in 00_ the torarning.
1). !!Iat .tepe be _0 0_. tile 1nell18iOll in tile
1a1ti&1 Tabl.. ot tor _ aroupe and QI'oupe
or aU _ it_ t'arn1ehe4 in the put br _r Ares and Soft'1c...
SIll! tat \los aDd deli.....,. ot _h _teriel be _ 41r
....... Coataool.
14. !!Iat \los requ1s1U tor both 1_e pecuUar to the 1-29
SIll! &1.. oue .. U... be wor and _ b7 ool.T __7.
!!Iat ...147 be fbill.ar1_ and equ1pped with _
-s*s.. "ta. prOOID. I"t data aDd _raJ. operaUoaal requirsoanta
tor YI& a1rsI&ft.
15. !!Iat tbe 1.-- ot part.s U.U, technical orders and
_!w,..1 I.a8WMUzss 0111-29 a1.rcratt be thoroDcN7 _
SIll! _, and O4Ioq..te b-.... or lIUCh ..to tbe UI
.,.... CI .... orit1cal1T reno_ b7 42lIC oach -'h.
. ., ...
, of -e.-
landingJI
at this fle1l1 .Nt ent.irely *CJequate tor clay
day or -1gbt
b. .a result ot dltt'1cultlaa exporlencod with the llndine ot
six (6) 8-29 airplanes during bad at night, the tollow1nC
c<*Mnta were "at tohe underelgned 1.n comeetlan with the dlapatch-
inn ot VHB a1..rcr&tt !ra'"l .at.her into t.tl.1a field tor night. ",rM..al.
(1) In addition belng a stranee field, 1. the
added hareI ot oultltudo or 11ght.e on and around
the rleld. For 8':UO;1U" the eeapl&nol} land1nt ar...
h epprox1!'Mtely )00 yard. to tho right or and parallel
to the runwuye tho very hoavy aircraft will
uee tor To th., lett ana 000
(l) alle ."1' 1. ml al'108t parallel run...y on IUokam
Yield. Further to t.he lett 1. an eddltlonal parallel
runway on Yord Island. In add'ltl?n to th. conrualon
rOlulting fro. nWDerOWl parallel run_ytI aro t,.h,
lll-htl ot the city ot Honolulu lind t.he "1:1.11 tary 1n-
lurround1ng t.nt, luatlon.
(2)
OJ
(4)
(S)
The landing f1.eld at th1e stat10n 1a ItUl undftr con-
Itruction, not yet hay!n!:: been cOIIpl.t.N. Conl.Qulnt-
ly, there 1. consider.hle holvy on Nod
arourn:t the rtftld .h1ch conlt1tuwI oonelduralJlft
beaard, lhould an airplane Poll. off the run.y.
Since the t1eld 11 devoloped frc. cor"l up
out of the ocean, tl'Wtre are onl,. certain ar.ahich
Ire prwpared to hold .1rcr.tt at tnl1 If.ht. Con-
IttqUentlr, it' a very h'fY aircraft Eet. on toO I
porUon ot the field not properly prwpllret1, t,oore i.e
gr... dane:er that it .111 11nk 1nt.o t.ne F)'ound.
It an airplane lurrer- accident on landinK at
nlght, there 1a no avallalll, tor
the runway Cor t.he reaa1nlnc airplane. in the
or tor other 11rplan". Irrlv1ne atter .uch .n accident.
It would there tore become neclary for any later
arrlvaa to change their n1ght plAn to 1I0Wt altern"te
a1rrort, "lch aight or .ifht not be equlPI...d to re-
eeiYe and ..nlce
th.1.a pr.rtlcular tLAe of tho )'tujr, the ru,1.n1' GUuon
18 b1iinninK_ Conaequentl,. J t.Jie M,JLri t)' or night
n1ghta tor t.be nut r aontha would arrive 1.n In-
etru-ent weather.
,
Subjl Report or Colonel C. S. Irvine
Section V. John Rodgers, T
It should be noted that the six (6) airplane15
arriving the night ut 8 No\'ember 194h encountered
instruaent weather at and in the vicinity of the
field and it required approx1Jultely three (J) hours
to land. It e:hould .further be taken into considera-
tion that alter a crew has flown the entire trip and
arrive in a fatigued condition, they are not in top
shape tor doing an estiaate letdown or for nying
three () additional hours attempting to locate the
fiold or awa1ting tl:eir tum to land.
(6) I-.ediately adjacer.t 'to John Rodgers Yield is a cha::ln
of mountains which, at nigh t are very black since
are usually covered with a claud cap and more frequent-
than not, with rain showers. This constitutes an
added hazard fer newly arrived pilot. unfaa11iar with
the surrounding terrain.
(7) lI'hen aircraft arrive durin!: midday, the maintenance
crews are enabled. to locate any troublee: existing
and plan the ClB.1ntenance work for the time the air-
planes are scheduled to rellA1n. This Ta.ul ta in an
appreciable increase in the tiae available for aa1n-
tenance work. It i. estiJated that this increase i.
equivalent to 12 to 24 hours of time. In case of air-
craft arriving after dark, it 18 alc08t apo.sible to
8stiJute all defecta on the aitcraft during the hours
of rlarknc8s with the 11m1tell facilitiel' available.
It can, tnAre!oTe, easily cost an extra day in the
dispatching of uny aircraft, if they continue t.o arrive
during the hOUTS of darkness. I
(8) There i8 not ono 8ingle advantAge to be gained in n&T-
10& very heaT)" aircraft arrive at this station during
the hour. ot darkne
c. CCl'Ulider1og cU,_tic conditione, facilities for houaine; and.
M1Iltenance appear reasonably adequate.
2. SUPPLY
a. TbR spar. parte kit. furnished were inca-plete and inadequate
in .ca. "apecta. In genoral, the p.1Tts ordored tor grounded aircraft
_n being recel...ed in approx:1utely olle (1) ek. However, t.he parts
0I'dlIred t.1l replace at.ock., or t.hat previoua coneWlpt.ion dat.a indicated &8
neoe-r'J', we,.. not. beini: handled ... _11. SQIUI ite.. "l"8 ob.erved
loh had not been THcuivl,d within a .anth'. tao artar havine been
O"'ncI. Tho l1at or delayud lte.. 1nelud,.ed Type B-3 Undine laape,
Villrat.on, Propeller .heeaabliee. Thant appeared t.o
S\lbJI JoIeport ot Colonel C. S. Irv1ne
Sect1.OC'I V. Jotm Rodgers, T.B.
be rloua lack of normal 8-29 .paree tor 50 1.aport..allt a st.opp1.f1G
point.
J. klINT ANCF..
a. Entinu toole and handling oquiP'lont arc lnndequate. Con-
eiderable u1n.enanca and raplaciiC.snt. i6 required on 1.nstrw:l.enta,
teaperat.ure puee- and pre. sure gauee.. ost invariably, automatic
pUot.a are aa.l-runcUoning. Maintonance problolilB ou'e aggravated by the
dela7 in receiY1ng 8lllerl!8ncy TCqucsts tor stock replacenent.s.
b. kn exces.ive aaount of fuel pUDp trouble was 1'e-
portAd. Both puape were replaced on oac 0:" three () airplanes.
18 beiCV' expcriEmced wi the failure of on rudder
near trailing odsto on several s ips. Exhaust and intake valves were
round burned 1n one eng.1na due t.o the lack of cloara.nce. 'two (2)
ql.1ndor t...s railure. occurrod. A. bunled platen due to detonation
... found em one (1) engin.. T.0.8 and 1.nIItbuctions wore found to
be ob.oJlL,e ar.d out or date.
4. BRIF7ING
a. At 1)00 on the day Arter arrival all crew IBSIlbers -eat.
At t1ao an ope.ratlofl8 officer 1..Mtructe crows on route to be
follc.wd and preparation ror light including further uriering schedule
and peraonal .trairs. After this lecture, the P'light Surgeon ifl8tructa
crew 1D t.ropical preT8ntative Ded1cine point.ing out the diaeues li.1cely
toO b. M\cowatared. All crew temperatures taken. Short lecture
on Flrst .lid. All but.. the pilot. co-pilot, navigator and radio operator
then eT...cueed. The radio operator Coes to a radio briefing to be
1Datr'Ucted in uae of cod... schedul lJf calis trom air to ground and
_thoda or calle peculiar to UJ. Paeific area.
b. Pilot, co-pilot and navigator are then instructed in the use
or the John lodgers to Salpan route guide arxt ita cC*ponent parts, after
wh1cn the pneral route briefing is held. in detail covering approachea
to check p....1.D";,a. ten-inal and altarnate airport8. briefing is
t.Mn bald. COftr1n
6
condiUcoa uaually encountered en route. but not
t1nal _t.ber to be expected. At this time a lIot1C111 pictuN of the
.ntint rout.e troc. John Rodgere to 5a1pan 18 8 hawn with diagrUllJ am
actual pictu.rea cOftrinc approach to -.ll terlRinalJl and alternates, with
c. antary or field ccniitlona and warnings or how all airporta must be
appI"OKhed to .yo1d ene.;r action. After thil the route briefing 1s
cc.p14It..
c. At 0600 the .omine ot departure. & final briefing is held
t. pllot.. co-pUot. nangator and radio operator. Clearance and weight
... heJanc:e to.... are prMented by tllpt control orricer tor pilot's
et,san. Ixpect..d _ route .ather 1.8 t.hen reTi"'" with instruction.
SECRET
lubJ. "port ot Colo..l C. S.Irrt-
seaUoD ,_ John Rod&:en, T.8.
QI1 uae ot ..ather folder b,.. wu.ther officer. Br1.et1n& Officer gi...
t.bI final rout. brl.t1n& with recapitulation ot oheck pointa, alter-
ate and. tAra1..l alrporU, . ~ held territory and. approe.oh to
dutiDatlon, bajal.ein. Oper.: tiona officer then aiT take-orr and
_1 u.truot10oe.
.. Crwn an then ready tor a 0730 departure unlohan:1-.l.
or laat cau.te ..ather cUtttftl:t.7 pn..nt. the take-ott.
The br1.t1Jlc procedure at JOM Rod&.ra 1. the boat tOUDd
alGIIII the entire telT7 route.
,
.... -----------..,'-"""7--
g
ua
8ICTIO. VI. ILl..IUII.lIR DEPCIf - AAFPOJ.
(10 November and 23-24 fJovember, 1944)
1. SOP loY
a. ..a. IUd. the t a cOllplete eet of B-29
cowl1n&. plua yarioumall items luch .1 doors, etc., together
with B-O!9 Urcraft clrawinp bhipped to the Ha..ilon Air Dopot.
Th1.. recea-.ndaticn wao 1n part inspired. by t.he aerlou8 delay en-
oou.utered 10 ,lttll\& t ot cowling to the ground.ed a1rplarw
.t. lwa.jaleln. Pereonnel at HAD had not heard of thia particular
cl1.Itloult1. or aa.a ot the athere being encountered. Appaftnt1,
Ate had not drawn on the t.cilitie.ot thi. lore. depot.
b. While it 18 not C0J181dered nBcaary or de.1rable to -
te
b1
!ah lar&1 rlpUc...nt .toco at HAD, it doe..... Titally 1.-
portant to ak. certain that. varied ueort_nt of lpare parte in
:u.l.t.cI quantitiu be ..... ilobl tOfl.ther with cc.plote airplane
10 that r.a1Ilti of the Dlpot may bl ut1l1d tar
100al anuraoture or perU whereTlr po.aibla.
o. It .. UJlderatood that ATC 1rU planninc to t up aub-
_pot, tor "29 tarry route lparel. Thi..... urmeoe...ry and un-
dNirabl. wh.n the per.onnel and warehoUll1rt& of the Ha_iian .ur
n.pot .... on1,y ..._It mI wo,y.
d. eont.renere h.ld with the St&tl.tical Control ott1.
&lid pononnel or the SupplT .nd Tr&llaport&tion Divioi<>nll ot llFPQl
aDd KlD OIl .a, nt or ..teriel, handline of forward Area requi.l-
Uorw and aupp17 and torarwportation prooedU1"'e in i ...rali. Copl
or n.ld dota1led and itemaed reporta COftrine the
ltelU at equl.-nt for .ach v:m W.1ng: and IIlOYement ot _ tert.l, _re
diaVibat.ed.
The prent plan tabu..hls the retilu1ll1tlonit1i trOlj Ouaa
dinet to tho stetea tOl' pocu11or B-O!9 it.eu, and thrD"ih IWl on
a CD 1teM. th1. prooecture u excellent ln the017. Howner, it
10 _dbla that MEl .... delO1l ..,. be .nc"'!"tered 011 c-.on i t.eu
tor the Fonard A.... which IWl doe. not ha....
t. It appea..n ..ch .ore cleeirabl. to t.l'aDllt.r in bulk .h1p_nte
t .... HAD to Ouaa, thc. it. of oOlllDOn 1ue whlch are requind.
1D .p1te ot "he obrtoua de.ire ot HAD personnel t.o be cooperatl,"
&lid &1'" b1&h prioritT to B-O!9 ite_. it i. obvious that DO ite_
wIli....... at all oritioal. the .......rr unloadi"i .nd trana-ehiP_nt
_ ilwritabl,r __ dol'T. If the it_ ore th.,.. on which there
U 7 5'1. app1, thea then 1. no l"'8"OD tor not -kine 1&1"&. lb.1J-nte.
SECRET
(4)
Subj I bport or Colo..l C. S. Irvine
lleot.1on VI. - fW) - .uFPaA
&_ Some discussion .... had on the subject of iett1ni all &-29
IUPPly into normal channel.. The undersigned airee. that thl1 1.
highly dirable. Hover, the definition of "normal channel." &0-
oordil'l{; to the Irvine p8YcholoGYJ meana direct requi.ltlonine, .
acreen:l.nc once by tho qualified to do '0, coupled lf1th COtlt'"
plllte and iC"CUrate cOnlUllptlon data. It normal channels _an
prooe.,1nc a requiaitlon from IXI Bomber COllmllnd throuih the Quam Air
c-pot then throua:h HAD and throU6h FOASC to Patterson Field, thence to
4ontrol depots and .peel.li.ad depot8, with Icreening by personnel
unr111ar W1 th the &-29 airplane and 1ta: require_nt. in all the
varloua ,tap., then we ...y be very certein the. t the .o-oalled norwal
.upply c.'>anno1o will fon co",!,let.oly and a1rplanea will be kept in
ca.m1allon by -&ir 11ft - AGP type".
h. Atter thorouih oonaideratlon of this entire problem, it U
conaluded that the proper and normal handling of .U 1t..er- of luppl;r
tor the IXI Bomber Cc:.maDd. Ihould be fallon I
(1) Prior to initiation or a roquie1tlon t.o t.ho Guaa.Air
Depot by a Service Center on one of the thr.. Ialanda
d, other lir Forc. activitie. on the Ia1&D:l
will be contacted to deterra:1.ne avail.bility or
uteri.l required.
(2) Th. requial t10n will then be procd throuah t.ho Gua.
Air Dopot. 1C the QuaIIl Air 'lopot ho. info..... tion that.
the ateriel required'" at H.waU and can bhipped
exptditioualy, it should then be ordered direct
lIna11.
(3) Quaa Air Depot .hould be .uthon.ed too roqu1.1t.1on
direct POASC tor all required _ter1.1 ot
whatever nature to the lpec1&lised arxl control depOY.
with 1ntolWlit.ion copl on comaon iteu to the HAD.
TM .c....n111& ord/or l1a1taUon or roquia1Uono rro.
Ouaa _t not, and cannot, b. lla1ted in tt. or quaD-
qy POASC, _ith the present organization.
1. TbII queet.ion of air prlorltif. and utilisation ot the Air Wt
of 100 t.- per -onth allocot4d to th. nl Bollbor C.. lid 1r1np WU
-. ,....0111I01 or the UfPaA r ..l thot th.T .hould bandl.o tha
.u_U... of thia air pr1or1ti... It 1. difficult to ... how &rI)'
iIId1YUMl at _11 will be 01>10 to d.t.ora1.. tho 1_ that are of
........t. pr1..-1t. .nd Uportanc. to tho nI _ber eo-and ._
It i. the poeltive op1n1on of the undenl.&ned that ttw
I
I
,
Report of Colonel
Section VI. - HAD - lAFPOA
tactical and operational req re .. eut.8 or Mch individual Wina
.-1th1.n e Bomber Co-mand sha.ld ut.&hlish the order of 1.a-
j)orta.lce of 1.\. a at sup!"!ly tor air tranaport.a.t.ion. The
eponaibili t) rMi t.8 upon tne Veputy Chief of St.&.tf for Supply
and "'aint..enanCl!l of ths OC):'Iber So--.nd (to.ether with hi.
t.ransnorUi.t1.on aud supply personnel) to work wi t.h the Oeputy
Cr.1e! at Start tor Operat.ions on all air priorities probl ..e.
J. Durlna 1nveatleatlon of raciliU.. at Saipan, it was
apparent that a large ot C1gine. would have to b. chanied
dur1nC ..t.her conditions where absolut8lr 00 protecUoo ....
a.&11&ole to the man doing the work. IntornatioD ns received
tre. Nary persoMel at O\l&l1 the Navy IlI1ght pOlslbly have
lome nose banlera available at Hawaii. Upon arrival at Hawaii,
Kavy per.onnel ..re contacted. and t.he aoet delight.t'ul and.
magn1.ticent oooperation obtained. I-.cl1at. water ehlpmct
... arran&e<1 tor tllO banCers for uae at Supan. In add.! ticD,
instructlona Hr. i8sued for tile ehipment ot tour hanaen to be
uaed at Quam and T1n1.an.
k. An investiga.tion \'Iill be made of the possibility of
ob lnin:; staooard 160' x 230
'
haneers for the Air Depot at
Guam s1..nce the present n ers are too 5"!18.11 t) properly handle
fourth echelon work )n 8-29 aircraft.
,
~
i
1
an"
cI. S1M. u.o IU -.. co-.TV! uporl_ bao a.h-ea4r
ob_ tbf,\ Darlp\oro bow DOt. boon odoquatol,y _'nod 10 _
roCCD'a;r _rtpUOll. U 10 aporoU.. \1>0\ .\ 1_.\ """ long doo4
root&1ac fi1cb\ 1>0 ado b,. _cb _rtp\or \1>0 I01porvll11on
ot on a.truo\or ..... O&D _ 011 \be t "1'0"-" 111 \D1a
t;rpo of
tb&\ """ &\O_reI route _,.,.1 1>0 poe_ntoCl \0 \1>0
,...lbltooar,.. of t.bo ..... .\ \1>0 o\oc1Dc ...... u\1110'. .. buill \be
.....reI 11. S. bdl.o hoiU\ilI. boolt. 1>1 u.o .ucs ro4io
boot t'or \1>0 1'ooU'10 ......
t. tlIa\ lr1ot1llc 12'-""" .\ \1>0 hrr;r 0\01'0 _to be
__ 011 tIIo .\ondarcI _od..... ial..laUT .- .\ tho at.og1IIc ......
aDd _in P'1lIor1lT of roriow ot u.o 1.IIf'orDaU..
ct- ....... ._1og u.o _\bar. lADd1.Dc tio14 aDd
P'ob1_ 1Jm>lftd 10 tho non
.. QIalU'1od tl1&b\ and ong1Door _ be _U....
a\ _ &\oct-c &roO tor \b& jlW _ ot oboolth, p11a\. oopl.1o\ """
-r! .. 111 _ ...."11 0_\1og __.. and 111 to _ .......
with """.10 011 tlIo1 oporoUOll and _ (111 VII
.. *dNd ........) ttttr laar roDp t1T1IIc-
5. 1\ 10 1oporaUw t.bo\ tl.ialI\ ur... DOt. be roloa_ it -
10 __oUOD &bou\ \hair oooplote _&\0..... of tJlol.r por\1.-
alar Joll 111 t.bo &1rpa.. It _ ill UIT _ abaa\ \be quo1J..
t1oaUoao of &DT tIIo C. !!due ottia.r or tho &\or!1II
fto14 .....ld bow tharU,. \0 return \ha\ ..... _bar tor
"_, _,as.c. or lauiftMUOIl.
IICTIlW L - xu.rv,. or TeapararT IlntT bT ColoDol C. S.
IrrlDoo, 1 _ to )0 ._1944.
,
COIltoronco at 0Ir'"_ CIty OIl 1.nIotallatiOll or dotl-oot1"C
It1tlo and c-6 boob boht IOOd1fiaatloD Ir1t JrOdw>t1OIl.
cancellea by
lllCl!lll'!ber ooD DIRECTIVE No. 5200.9. effective l1fJ _
Dep.rtecl Bolllng neld, D. C
.lrr1.ftd II>'1ght neld, Ohio
COIl1'eNlDCe. with .tatt per.onnel ot .ur Teclml.eol Senioe
C.,...ncl on 11-29 production, lIOdlll.eaUon, .-1nt&nanoe and
ouPPlT probl.,...
-1-
COIlt_ at Colorado S!Z'ing., Colorado with c. aMlII1C
....nl. lleaODd Air """"0 and tho DeputT Chiet or Starr
tfllt .1JIteno_ OIl .-1nt__ prabu. in tho SeaODd .ur
r_.
Co1A:wwla S!Z'1.np, ColAlndo
1Irr1...... 0"10_ CitT, lJ<la_
Deputed II>'1ght neld, Cilio
.lrr1.ftd .1._CitT, otle_
ConhNlnco. with Co Dding ott1oer and Chiat at
no_ ot CitT .ur Teobnlce.l s.rrtae C_d OIl
tho otripp1ng ot 11-29 ai.....n tor _'ning and on tho
lOOd1t1eaUoo ot a1rc'af't tor tho 58th, 7)rd and ....Md-
1Dc wingo.
Deported <a:lah.- CitT, lJ<'"_
irr1n4 Ber1.Dgton, Jan-.
eont......... with tho C_
nd
ing Officer and Ilng1JOMr1DI
orn-r ot -.r1DgtaI1 ArwtT .ur _ OIl teaha1aol W1Ier
a.-pllann, t10ld 1.JUtallaUOIl ot It1tlo and ll"..raJ.
otae1DIt probr-.
J Imab
2 1!0,...
,.....
"'J. '.pw\ or Co1oDe1 C. S. rrn-
lent.. I. - ft1Mreq.
'''' '=
(ltle_ CiV. Qlr;le_
&n1._ ..t.l>er n.ld ceutOll'llla
ccmt...o..s the C,..ncunc otttoer, o,.raUoae
....s Rr1at1ac ort1..... Inp....uc and Suppq otnooro.
41r C. n4.
Coato...._ 1f1'" t.I>e Co neI'", OUi.or. one! nart or
....1t1o Of.. 41r -.. C. ad.
7h,,,,
1"'7>'
DeparW ""'or no1d. cel1tWD1a
&n1._ lolln n.ld. T.L
C.,.I with C adhac otn.o.r, 3a.pp1.T QttloR,
Opo....,"- and Brt.otac ort1..... 41r rnn.par\ C_.
wltA the C...nding Qf't1oer, Ide DeJU\7 aDIl
t.I>e Cb10t ot IIL1Dt...- tor t.I>e _"on 41r DopD\.
e.t'C .11 wlt.b Qllwral kle, CleMral ......
...... ODd _ nart __1 .. AArPlll lIoodq_ro.
J In ,=
J4l-' '.
DeparW lolln ......... nold. T.'.
___Jol.1a ....-u
C-r.lUl t.M c "1JIc ott1oer, otfl...
UIII apa.,,,- Air _pw\ C, ad ODd t.I>e
C ed,,,, OU1oc ot t.I>e S.... III"",.
.....j. ---' ot Col_l C. S.
...u. %. - 1UIleftr7.
Ji .,p.r
U h, >r
Des-ted 5&1_
----
C_witll tbe C. nelS. Qtt1o....
Oft1oer aDd om.... ot .ur Depo' aDd o1t1l
tIloo C r ""'", ottiov &Il4 OJ*'aU'" ottiov. Ikwl
.u.r _.
14., ,. to 21 hi p'"
.11&1_.
Coafere....lUli
CIIaDIlNl -nee
1
1, CO, III ..-.r C DII
ea.-r.l 0'Dcnw1
1
CO. 73ft fiIIC
II ..&1 1a..7
7
", CO, S&1pu bland C. eel
o.e a&1 AAJ'PQl 1"Wps.Wt&U...
O. III 1It.1e. Opwra,t-l C' neI-. IIA .. _ (CIIClQl)
_. CO. A&nQl
C+7 nelS. Qtt1oen. '""nOr 1DI aDd S"IlP17 om-
497UIo 49ftho 499Ua. aDd '00Ul __PW.
aDd 9Jn. .3Qbod and .3.30Ua Sen10w (ft_
C pc"", ott1cer. &a ".1. Sai_
DeI"RT C....S"P!':b" aDd 1k1J>Oew_. 73ft W1"I'
C' nelS", llttl.c:..... __aDd om-
lIftn.oe c...'vw irA" .......
18
'
'''' C ..... fln
feD
C ""''II Ott1oera or tour SerY1_ -..
.3l.3t1l wtac. fI D'
.... Do _ """"" ... toll_ GO tbe zoe""'" t.r1p ..
W" tIlII od .. bwaM t1J&b' aDd 1D tIlII _ pw.... "
..... , tw ta. ....... t4 Up fa t.IIIl OGDt'lI.
"U tIlII t!J&b'. III adtiu... _tna)nlll
_ Un aDd VauportaU. or tIloo JU ......
C. neI .. tIlII .u.r De"" n ........ 00_" 1D dMaU.
atlla.. ftelil
-.,.rw atllal' ftelil
.Irrl_ Okle" CUT, CJrle"
i1Jt"sbR
laltj ...~ of Col.-I C. S.Irr1De
a..u.. l. - l's.-rr
i2 lu t=
16
i
p=
Mi ..
11-"
iI ....
~ (IIr1e" Clt;r
Afti_ ~ ftelil, CIdo
it.Im8E
_ ~ fteli\
~
.......... ~ f t e l i \
.Irrl_ Ie""'II ftel.to D. C.