1

XXI BOMBER COMMAND

MONTHLY
ACTIVITY REPORT
1 MARCH 1945

This is an attempt to sm' ;arize some of the more

the Command as disclosed Qy the
statistical data maintained Qy this Unit, a;d to indicate
the trends that may affect the future activity of the
Command
XXI BOMBER COMMAMl
MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1 March

Part I.
Part II.
Part III.
Part IV.
Part V.
Part YI.
Part VII
Strength of the Connnarrl
Use of Aircraft and Crews
As It Affects Usc of Aircraft
Effectiveness of Aircraft On
Resu:l.t.s
Cost .)f '11551005
Other Activity
Preper,d
By
33rd Statistical Control Unit
-1-
SCIlEDIJLED FLOW OF VIR AIRCRAFT AND CRE,1S TO THEATF1t
Based on Information Received Up To and Including 1 March 1945
Before Enroute
Jan 31 Feb 1 March March April May June July
AtC Cws Ale cws A/c Cws A/c Cws A/c C:!'s. A/c Cws Alc Cws A/c Cwo ,....
180 240
Unit
73rd Wing
313 Wg 504 Gp
505 Gp
6 Gp
9 Gp
Wg T/R
TOTAL
20 20
30 30
'27 27
27 27
33
104 137
3 3
3 3
2l
6 27
1
1
10 10
38 5
48 15
22
22
90 90
30 30
30 30
30 30 30 30
30 30
30 30
90 90
30 30
30 30
25 55
85115
25 55
65 115
30 30
30 30
1 1
30 30
29 29 ,
30 .30
30 30

314 Wg 19 Gp
29 Gp
39 Gp
330 Gp
Wg T/R
TOTAL
::58 Wg 40 Gp
444 Gp
462 Gp
468 Gp
Wg T/R
TOTAL
315 Wg 16 Gp
501 Gp
331 Gp
502 G'p
Wg T/R
TOTAL
;.-.l1Photo
UIE & T/R
Replacement
TOTAL
12 18
8
20 18
4 1
4 1
2
2
2
2
1
1
5
5
6 2 4
2 4
2
2
4 2
4 2
4
4
XXI BCiIB COMD
REPLACI'loIOOS 65 21 55 50 14 3 7!U.!,2 60 149 79 130 82 213 90 127
GRAND TOTAL J69 416 124 161 17 13 223348 150270 219 239226 307122JGl
._
Scheduled deliveries are based on l:lformation from 20 AF. However, replacements
beginning in May are based on rate of 16% UIE per month for aircraft and 15% for
crews during 1st five months of operations and 30% per month thereufter.
Aircraft and crews of the 5C9th Composite Group are not included in the above.
P.\i\T 1. STREll;T;l OF THE COWlAND
All units assigned or attached to Headquarters XXI Bomber
Command, and all units of the 73rd Bomb Wing are now in place.
313th Bomb Wing units have all arrived with the exceptions of the
592nd AAF Band and the 680th Bomb Squadron, due to reach Tinian
in April'and May, respectively, and the 509th'Composite Group,
which is scheduled to arr:"re during May and June. The last unit
of the 314th Bomb Wing is scheduled to reach Gtmm in March. Move-
ment of the 58th Bomb Wing into this theater is scheduled to take
place during Ap":.l, May and June. Arrivai of the 315th Bomb Wing
will be approxll cOfl.current with arrJ.val of the 58th Boob
Wing, and will be completed 'lith arrival of the flight and air
echelons of the 331st a!Xl 502nd Bomb Group" in early July.
.. During February the strength in "the theater of
units assigned or attached to the AXI Bomber Cr)nrrnarrl increased
over January to a total of }4.00' officers and enlisted men.
The ultimate strength of the Command on a five-wing basis is over
63,000.
It should be noted that the lower loss rates (see Part VI)
coupled with the flow of replacement aircraft at a rate greater.
than losses has made possible a speedier build-up to authorized.
strength than was antic':' mted. Replacements in FebrlE.rY were 17
aircraft over losses, to date are 25 aircraft over losses.
Crew replacements to date, hOTIever, are )0 crews less than losses
suffered. The aircraft and 145 scheduled to arrive in
March as replacements are further indication that the COmmnd may
accelerate the builu-up to present authorizeo strength .

The estimated growth of the strength of this Command in

the theater is shown below:
Estimates
28 FEB (ON HAND) 31 MAR -30 APR 31 30 JUNE 31 JUL
OFF EX TOTPL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL
Hq XXI Be & Hq Units 487 2054 2541 2550 2650 2750 2800 2800
73rd Bomb Wing 1887 10028 11915 11915 11915 11915 11915 11915
313th Bomb Wing
11;48 9232 10680 10900 11400 13000 13400 13400
314th Bomb Wing
leoo 7867 8867 11100 11700 11700 11700 11700
315th Bomb Wing
3'100 7300 9500 11700
58th Bomb lUng
6900 8500 11600 11600
TOTAL 4822 29181 34003 36465 48265 55165 60915 63115
-3-
_______
Ave. HOURS Ave. HOURS
NO. PER NO. PER
TOT!!.. COMBAT TRNe OTHER
WL
Alc CREWS CREI'1
NOVEmlER
73rd Wing nnd Command Tote.1
1524 3239 128 157 93.2 37.8 124.6 28.3
nEl:JEMBER
73rd Bomb Wing 7403 6742 165 496 133.1 55.4 197.6
37.4 ......
313th Bomb Wing
58 58 1.7 1.9 38.5 1.5
Command Total 7461 6742 223 496 134.8 55.3 236.1 31.6
JANUARY
73rd Bomb Wing
8484 7464 598 422 136.5 62.2 212 40
313th Bomb fling 3930 415 1529 1986 77.6 50.6 80.1 49.1
Comm!Uld Total 12414 7879 2127 2408 214.1 58 292.142.5
FEBRUARY
73rd Bomb Wing 10249 7878 1943 428 158.3 64.7 214.3 47.8
313th Bomb Wing 6585 4669 1212 704 129.4 50.9 152.2 43.3
314th Bomb Wing 1821 353
1053
415
25.5 71.4 28.3 64.5
COIlllllE'.nd Total 18655 12900 4208 1547 313.2 59.6 394.8 47.3
SORTIES FLOVIN
SORTIES SORTIES
BO!IBIM:l I< \'lEATHER
pm
PER
TOTAL SHAKEDOWN STRIKE OTHm* Alc
CREf;
N01rnolBm
73rd lill and Command Total 303 303 3.3 2.4
DECJi1,!Brn
73rd 1Vg and Command Total 595 526 69 4.5 3
JANUARY
73m Bomb Wing 543 469 74 4
2.6
31Jth Bomb Wing 219 94 125 2.8 2.7
COlllJllBlld Total 762 563 74 125 3.6 2.6
fEIlRUARI
73rd Bomb rling 558 466 83 9 3.5
2.6
313th Bomb Wing 424 363 61 3.3
2.7
314th Bomb Wing
22 22 .9 .8
Command Total 1004 851 83 70 3.3 25
* Includes Training,
Sea Cearch and Photo Sorties.
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. " :. ~ . ~ ~ . :
. . . ,\.;'-"', .
. . '.' ~ . ' '.
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-4-
r-----------'

PART II. USE OF B-29 AND CP.E1IS

An average of 60 hours per aircraft and 47 hours per crew
was flown by the Commarrl during February, the best record to date.
As shown in the following table, the 73rd Wing attained 65 hours
per aircraft for the :1(' '1 despite a substantial increase in the
number of aircraft assigned end fewer days in the month. In
addition, with this increase of aircraft on hand, the Command was
still able to fly over 60% of aseigned aircraft on combat missions.
65% were ready for combat on mission days during February, the
additional aircraft being utilized chiefly for training flights
and weather strike missions.
Both the 73rd and 3l3th Wings showed increases ill combst
hours, and the 73rd Wing also tripled its flying training time.
The 4,208 hours used for tralning time, or 13.4 training hours
per aircraft was the chief factor in the slight of total
sorties per aircraft. (See table on preceding page)
These factors for February highlight two things: First, the
increasing training time, am second, the ability of the Commend
to absorb more aircraft and still fly each aircraft n greater
n\lilber of hours.
-5-
PART III. MAINI'ENAtllE AS IT AFFECTS USE OF AIRCRAFT
The mere fact of greater hours flown per despite
an increased number of aircraft on hand is indication of
increased mainttnance efficiency <:.s He:l as grer.tBr utiJ.ization
of operation.'ll airer" ft. In addition, only 12% of airborne
aircraft failed to the primary target because of mechanical
reasons in Febrt:rl"'Y compared to 22% in January and 23% in December.
This February r ...:o.:.'d compares favorably with the December-Jenuary
figure of 14% and November figure of 20% for the XX Bomber cormnand.
It must be pointed out, h0\7cver, that these trems took place
durIng a period when battle damage substantially decreased (See
Part v9 and bombing altitude was lowered.
Aircraft grounded for parts during February were 4.5%
of assigned aircraft compared to 4.6% in Jantm"Y_ Although the
figure for the 73rd Wing was 2.4% for February, the 313th Wing
had 6.9% and the 314th Wing, 5.6%. The number of aircraft reedy
for combat on mission day varied from 73% of for the
73rd Wing to 58% for the 313th.
Performance of R-3350 engines still remained the largest
maintenance problem, 53% of mechanical failures to bomb the primary
target caused by this reason. As of 28 Feb these engines averaged
162 hours before removal ("laS required. The nl'rf"'ber of hours
required before removal has steadily and the ultimate figure
can not yet be deteIT.lined.
Engines were also the chief cause for Unsatisfactory Reports,
270 of the 491 submitted to date being for thi.. reason. Cylinders
and valve mechanisms were the largest categories in this class
of URe.
In connection uith ""1fn1uating the effect of mainten:.nce on
use of aircraft, it be noted that production control report-
ing now being uill enable a more complete analysis
on this factor, especially as concerns hOUTS used in various classes
of mD.intenance, ani effect of battle damage.
-6- .
,

PART IV. EFFEC1'IVEllESS OF AIRCRAF'i' Oli ',:I58IONS

During FoorUD.I'Y 49% of airborne on Honshu missions
bombed the plima.;-:.r target, \':cather bel%. the c: .Lei' cause of
to bomb thu. prinary. Only 19% of tht: c.irborne l1.ircre.ft
bomaed the tcrget visually. Hieher for suc-
cessive month, in FEib:." . l"y 8?j-J of' airoorne aircraft bombed c.ll
turgets.
Thus it is that is steacily
ing both the nunber and of t:ircra.ft bombing the. Jllpcn-
ese r.m.inland, br.Ci has permitted <;>nly a J-crcent to
borno The follouine tnbles shan the effoctiveness of
November .
NOV DEC .rAN
73RD '/3:lD
'73RD 7.:aD 3l3'fH 31iSH TOTAL
%llirborne Bombing Primary <1.3 67.7 43.7 47.0 51.0 8L8 49.4
%Airborne Bombing 45.3
,0.1 18.4 0 18.9
%Airborne Bombing All Targets
79 .,
82.9 81.9 6&.8 83.7 95.5 87.3

%Airbor"" Foiling
to Becc.use Of:
UGchanical 19.5 22.7 21.7 13.8 10.2 0 12.2
Pcrsonpel Error 14
2.9 6.2 5.9 5.7 4.5 5.8
h'en.ther
56'.1 0.7 23.7 29.3 29.8 9.0 28.9
.
Other aM Unkno\fn 1.8 6.,0
47 3.9 3.3 4.5 3.7
"
,-7-
pART V RES U L T S
1. Bombing AccursX
Bombing accuracy information was available on only one of the five
Japanese mainland missi,,:,.-!'J conducted during the month. No figures were avail-
able on the first tno missions in uhich 89 aircraft bombed the primary target
visually, nor on the 2.ast t'",e missions in which none of the aircraft bombed
the primary target visually. On 15 February, hmlever, 17% of the bombs released
on the Engine plant in Nagoya fell uithin 3000 feet of the aimjng
point, and 18 hits uere identified in the target area. Photo coverage HaS also
incanplete for this It should be noted that these figures are based
on photo coverage during the mission and do not reflect later damage assessment
studies, which are not available in this office. In vie17 of the fact, as stated
in a recent Operations Analysis report on bombing, that probably less than four
days a month 'iTill be suitable for visual bombing during the next eight months,
it seems evident that even less bombing accuracy inforn:etion \iill be available
in the future, especially as to \Ting and group comparisons.
2. Bomb, and FUel Data
As of 28 February. 6793 tons of bombs have been dropped by "the c""""nd
OIl J'ailanc.ae targ0ttb 30% of these tons ,\Gre incendiariss. 1494 tons have been
released on five major aircraft and engine factoies. Of the urban areas, Tokyo
received the greatest tonnage, 1016 tans being dropped on this city to date.
Greater tonnaga has been made possible by measures increasing the bomb
load. In February the 7Jrd \"ling carried an average of 6739 pounds cCl:!J98red
to 5646 in January. At tho same time average graBS ,r;-e:.ght decreased to 133,600
pounds from 135.700 in January, and the average fuel 1'3tnrned decreased to
923' gallons from 987. Even the ;'ebruary averages tiere not indica tive of the
actual progress in substantiB'..2y the bomb load on missions to the ,
Japanese mainland. Individual aircraft carried about 7500 pounds of banbs in \.
scme cases and returned 1-::ss fuel. Increased experience and the emphasis on t
this problem point to c. 5 i.eady upoard trend in bomb tannago carried during March.
3. Deatroyed
During the month, 71 Japanese aircraft nerc destroyed, 59 probably des-
troyed, ond 126 damaged. To date, 267 enemy aircraft have been destroyed.
This is eqUivalent to a ratio of 6i Japenese aircraft destroyed per each B-29
lost to enemy action in combat missions I or on aVC3rage of 14 Japaneso aircraft
destroyed per 100 B-29 sorties. B3.sod on information from 20th Air Force, this
rate of destruction is by far the greatest averago achieved by eitncr
t1&htcrs or bombers in the U.S. Jirmy Air Force.
.._--------
....- ......
'!be number of enemy attacks per B-29 over t!1o targot dropped in February
to 2.1 from tho January figure of 7.6 and December figure of 4.4. Hon much
or 'tills ClocJ.1ne is clue to bacl tnrget ond Japanese base \7cother ond to Navy
strikes is Dot yet dotcrminoblo.
,
,

---
PART VI. COST OF MISSIONS
1. Losses
... 8-29 aircrrrI t, losses in February were only 12% of tmit equip-
ment compared to 22% in December em January. At the same .time
B-29 crew lossE.';o in February r.tere only ll% ~ o f unit equipment compar-
ed to 15% in December am 23% in January. On bombing missions,
3.2% of 'airborne aircraft -and 3.0% of airborne crews were lost
during the month. 3.8% of airborne aircraft were lost in December
am 5.5% in January. It should be stated that February figures
do not yet form sound lx>.sis for prediction of trems because of
the T",kyo mission ot 25 FobiuC.ry :7bon 229 aircraft were
,u...1'oorne with.only two losses ..Further stu::ly must be made to deter-
mine the effect of radar bombing days as relates to enemy fighter
reaction and aircraft losses. It may be thnt the bad \leather for
Japanese missions will substantially decrease previous sortie loss
.. rates.
As shOtln in the table belo'il; enemy action continues to be
the major cause of losses and enemy fighters have been the biggest
single factor . It must be noted here that TIhilc actual cost of
missions can effectively be a68esued in relation to number of losses
per bomb tonnage dropped uithin the target area, this type of
assessment awaits more detailed bombing accuracy figures.

2. !ia.ttle Damage
21% of aircraft airborne on Japanese mainland missions incurred batUe
damage during February. Th:is decrease from the 31% figure of January ""s in
great part due to the last mdssion of the end hence is not yet sound
eVidence of a reversal of tho previously increasing trend. The effect of
radar bombing days must be studied in this connection, too. The percent of
aircraft uhich required over 6 days to repair has slightly
decreased each month, the February figure being 14% as compared to 16,% far
January and 21% for December. The causes and effect of battle damage uill
be the subject of more detailed analysis uhen the nan reporting and analysis
procedures nou in process of being formulated, became effective. A brief
I swm:oary of the general ceuses of aircraft lost and bettIe dmne.ged fo11005:
CAUSES OF J,lRCRJJT LOST J.ND Bt.TTLE-DJJ,MlED
\ Percon"- of TotoJ. Loat and DamElged
Decem.b':lr Janttary February
EnCII\Y .li.ircraft 27.&10 5l.6r. 34->%
En6II\Y Flak 40.1% 12./% '42.6%
.En6II\Y Ale ClDd Flak 15.2% 159%
8,1%
Accidents &Malfunctions
7.&10 25% 4-8%
self lllflicted
5itZ
7.1% 43%
Other ond un.knOTlIl
38%
10.2%
5&10
3. Air-Sea. Rescue
ODly 22% of thoso failing to return from combat missions or .50.% of
thOse knoon to have ditched TIare rescued during February." This represents
Q. substantial incroase over Jonuary figures of 71% and 9%, ond \o-d.o.te
figures of 19% and 33%. 258 crei'1 members failed to return from missions
during the month. Of those, 113 uere kno"" to have ditched ClDd 56 uere
rescued.
.1C-

PfJ'T VII, OTHER ACTIVITY

1. Weather Strike
During FebrU<.l.rY, 83 eircraft were airborne on '7eather strike
missions compared to 74 in January. 90% of the February missions
were effective as against only 93% in January, und two aircraft
were lost during the month compared to none in Ja.nnary. 184 tons
of bombs were dropped j n to make a total of 514 tons to
date. In addition. the 655th Bomb Squadron (Weather Reconnaissance)
began flying at the last'of the month.
:2. :'.noto Reconnaissance Missions
A total of 42 aircraft, 33 from the 3rd Photo Reconnaissance
Squadron and 9 from the Wing, were airborneI on photo recon-
naissance missions during the month. 71% of these sorties were
effective as compared with 61% in January. However, only 38% of
airborne aircraft obtained good to excellerrt photo results: F-13
aircraft averaged only 28 hours per c.ircrllft during the month, or
2.2 sorties per aircrsft

-11-

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-
1 MAY 1945

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16.382 TQ:\IS RELEASED ON ALL TARGETS
93 -I_ OF AIRBORNE Ale BOMBED ALL TARGETS
42 -I. OF APRIL EFFORT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST
AIRF!ElDS IN KYUSHU AND SHIKOKU
82 HOIJRS FLOWN PER ASSIGNED CREW
6.8 :"ONG RANGE SORTIES PER AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
i.6 -k OF AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT LOST
lOB rlOURS FLOWN PER ASSIGNED AIRCRAfT
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XXI BOMBER COMMt.N::'
HIGHLIGHTS FOR APRIL
*:
*:
*:
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STRIKE.

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-
..._-
XXI CONM.\ND
t
M0 NT B ACT 1 V1 T Y REP 0 R T
P,ooI STllENGTE OF 'rHE
PAll!rll trsE OF AI:aCRAJ'T AND Cm::\TS
PdT III
MAINTElW1'CE AS iT ....CTS ti'SE DE .H.UCBAFT

P":.'RT IV EFF!CTIVEUESS OF AIRCRAJ"II ON MISSionS

..SOLTS
PART VI COST or MISSIONS
pm VII APPENDIX

Prepared i3y
33
rd
Statistical Control Unit

PJ.mI 1 - STUNGTR CD' T".cil: emil-LillI)

1. Movement of units
All units Assigned or attachod to iieal.quartore XXI !lomber
Co..rOla.!l.d and the Brd, 313th and 314.th iJombardoent tTings have now arriv-
ed in the Theater. with the exception of the 6a:Oth JOBb Squadron sche-
duled to reach Tinian in June and the 509th Cooposito Group in July,
and the 627th M.d G90th Chenlcnl. Co;;rooniee schoduled to roaah Guam in
Mq And June. All flight echelons of the 58th \:Ii!lG arc now in the
theater or B::lrOutO. ';Jut the tlovenont of f:,Tound personnol ulll not "us
eocploted until June. Ground of t .... o boob and tvo Bonice
groupe and t111l6 Hoadquarters of the }15th ViOlg arc nolr in placo, with
l:lOTltD8nt of personnel scheduled for coopletion 1)y 30 June. llbe 347th
Ssntee Group h now at Iva Jloe.. "'1th tba J48th So.n1oa Group .achD-
duled to arrive ai:lout 18 May.
2. Personnel Strenph
.1; the end of the oonth the litreugth of the Cor::JI.'lllnd in the
theater vaa 6915 officers and 35407 enlisted cent or a total of 43322
oompared to an ultioate strength of about 65,000. .
3. Aircraft a."1d Crev Strangth
M of 1 MaT. the Comoa.nd had 616 aircro.tt ar.d 770 crevs,
coapared to 482 and 619 crews es of I April and a projected
.treDgth of 10....4 very heavy aircraft and 1070 creve on 1 ll'evaDbor.
It 8hoUld be notad that this projectod atrello">th, which ia based on "
latast availao'e flow dP.te. actually indicatea a number of
cr0V8 than air.;raft. This is considerably different fron the two creve
per a.. a::rcraft ratio requostad. This ratio for 1 May was onl}'
1.2 to 1. .ac'tuel a.ircraft o.nd crOll strongth for 1 \<I.q vsa about lOP
1.'. thnn tbet anticipated froD in!orsatlon received at 1 April.
1 Mny expresBod 1n tereB of potential Borties
(baaed on a 35 misSion and fl Z;; 1055 rc,.t_&ae tba Ilt'!.:d;y "7o:l:.a:"_
Ual Sorties and Cro"yt Rotation.' dnted 5 Ma;r 1945) waS 13.792 compared
to 12.724 for the prdvious Donth. However, this waa an average of 19.5
potential aortiee per crow coonander co:npared to 21.3 for 1 April.
Potential Bortie still gcvo indica.tion of dropping 'barply
upon the begln!'l.1ng of rotation. The 73:od ll1Ub at 1 Nay 8howed a dill-
proportionately large percantaga of its crews 'lith 16-21 credit Bortles.
fh. 3l3th l/lng sl.:.ovcl! an even Ir..r6Qr percente.ge of ita orevs in the
10-15 credit sortie class. In part due to their short time in the
theater, the 314th Wing ea yet has sbo'lm no lavel1t'.b' out in it_
ezper1ence. Leveling, of course, is necessary to prevent large out-
flow- 1n short period. with coneequent lnvantory decrease.. abdou.lf
the presant un.eTen nov of rep1acamenh tUl!;other with crew shortage.
and aaz1cum effort conditions Q&ke difficult the use of discretion
1b .electiD6 vhich crews vill fly particular mi.,ions. It 1s clear,
bovner that; the. present rate ot operations cennot be Ill&.intained for
.. 10116 tgrm period unless the ratio of crm/s to e.illero.tt ill raised and
the erc,.." cr"Cit sorUe 103'.-(>100. to JlI'6T8n\ cUBp:aportionat.-w
q lU'6Il wt.!lawta of c.O\I8 for rotation.
,
-2. .
100 ,-
TOL'AL
28.J1
37.1.3
-4.(:50
47.!JJ
86.27
".71
80.0
88.
- 0-
NOV
lliC
JAIi
PD
YAII
JPII
nK'_II. USE OF 5:29 AIRCRAFT AND CP.E.WS
Hours flown per UIri in
frca the March recorO.,t. As ahO"lfn in the tablc! at th'J bot.tom
of the page} hours nere
flown per assignbJ. c.lrcrri't
durilli the .:.lonth cocparvi. tl')
1l.4.9 haUl's l:urlng March. The
plump-d figure 1m3 110. D:-
clU".41ng .ircraft au::! i.ime of
the 58th Bomb which
not scheduled for operations
hut fieri" it:J oun aircraft the
last fe" oay:; 01 tl':r.e zwnth,
the April fil:.ure \'16.E ..t..08.5.
10% of flying time was
utlli:Kd fo1' training purposes
compared to 9% in 21%
in Fao:'uarj nd I7/. in Jan-
U3J'y.
A cC:i'lpnrison of
i11ngs tLo J1.4th Wing
ulth 115.2 hours per aircraft,
the 731'11 ting ,dth U',..l azr
the Jl.>th with 100.1. 't'he
la.."l.l' utiliz;btlon rate of thG
31::th \Iing is confiroed by 11
lower Eorth rate (8{Je below) .
Thin \lUS cuur,atl in part b' the
fact thnt the 313th Wing hact un average of 641= of itl:! aircrdt of .
ccmllssion during the I:lontoh CO::l.pared b for t.he 73:r<: .ilug urrl 38%
for the 3li.tb Ring. llJ.i;:: tm5 largely in greater t.i.!:l.e out
for engine chc.ngc & maim.!1Ilnce eni fer insl-ection. Th... 31Jth pulled
248 engioos ciurir..g :D.ol:i.th ClXlpared to a:. for the 7J:.'"d fang ani
93 fo'" "hf:l 3l4th fling. '!'he cHsproporti(.Jr.o.tc ntmilic.r of pu.1h for
tho lfif'gely"d,Ui.'l to fJu:.JpeetCO,: !'blol'f-byt;q. "":
ElIIim Chntlge;, li: Malnternnce
P.....
Battle
Other Maintenance
Inspection
1. I:ours2o::n :E."r B-29 Ait'Craft an::.. Crews
60
so
t

o.
J
4
?tAReH APRIL
5
SORTIES PER CREri
6,...-.:..:.:..:.:....:.-=7:.,r.:=----,
-4-
n
fect.1'n ae: cc:.pnred to and 92% in March. With the arrival of the
1st Photo Reconnaiasnnce Sq at the ero of April, it was expectEd that the
m.ber of pIloto 8Ort1eS would be increased for the next Cew 1Il0ntha.
Other uses of aircraft for April showed 39 B-29 aircraft es-
90 B-29 aircraft were airborne on strike missitms dur-
J. Other Uses of Aircraft
March. This decrease was caused by less radar scope missions. of
the rccoonaisaance flights ani 100% of the radar scope fligh('8 WeT! at-
cortiIIJ ttpter plarx:s for mvige.tional rom rescue aid, alii five sea
of 7.4 and 5.5.
inc April cOlDpared to 89 in March am n tOval of 405 to datE;. 91% were
errective compared to 94% for the previous month. Mechanical failure
was the sole renson for failure to complete these missions.
utilization of aircraft and expressed in terms of sorties
2. sorties Per Aircraft ani Crew
2
4
IlARCH APRIL
6
SORTIES PEil Ale

78 B-29 ani F-IJ aircraft were airborne during the month OD
e photo reoonnniasance and :tadnr scope missionq compared to 100 sorties for
also showed 0. slight deCrea;3. The Commam avenged 6.8 sorties per (lS--
I e1gned aircraf't in April compe.Tl.'<! t.o 7.0 in March, ani 5.3 sortios per
assigned cre" both months. The 73rd Wing achieved a record. high of 7.9
sorties p>l" aircraft s.J:ld 5.7 sorties pEr cre... compared to the Uarcb highs
5956
8463
8990
-199
of each month.
1376
1785 1937
1452
1555 1662
1093 1225 99,
1247
917
1508
5
o
Al'lOther factor which every cvidl"lflC<:; of crHically hime:;--
1,. the coabat effort of the CCIlIlIlllro Wl:.S t.ho gro\ling IllO.1ntenarce backlog
at the Guam Air Ik:pot. During tht:} month t.his backlog grW frOID .il B-n
aircraft to 18 6-29 tho t:OlllmIlOO began operations 1:.11:t.
OCtober, the output of thE: depot r.as only been 18 B-29 aircrnft, nul :3
or those 1fUre roturrx:d to the Uoit....'<i Stntes ani J wer.... salvaged. At
the eld ot t.he month, the tlvernge.l-29 aircrclt on han:! at. tho r.:o:;..ot hn:
been thery for 11
-5-
R-PSO SPARh E.Jr.lNE REQUIREMEllI'S Mill SH!FtffiNt SCHEDULES
wq JULY AUG SEPT OCT
--
WI III, w.lllI'EtiAWE AS IT AFTlr.'I'S USC OF AIRC!V\FI
20
Spo.r& Engines
Oil Iblld*
Est1ll&tcd
Pulls
Engines Scheduled
for Delivel7** 6S6 1200 1500 1300
KIwlac Sh1paent
ReqIl1re..nts- 750 lU>9 1452 1408 1376 1431 1404
plus or Minus -94 -252 -76
* Eetilllated spare Scrvic&:1b1e .t.nginc. on Hand as of 1st
** Actual Sbipaa6DtS cCllllllitt,cd to this cO!lllllCm.
*** ftequirE:lD.onts based on lAO nying hours per average assignad aircraft
OD hnoo per month.
15
10
The continuation of the high utilization of aircro.ft
April, discussed, is itself evidence of J:Wintemnco effici-
eocy. In addition, the a1rcra.ft abort rata did not imronse but rema1D-
ed lfQbetontial1y unchanged {See port IV}. Still another factor liaS that
thia utilization wes maintained despite nn increase in the aircraft
duage rate to 17.1% of t'.1rcraft bcmbing compa..red to 8.9%, for March.
Am further, tho percE:int of airborne ah'C>:"L.ft which aborted for mechaD-
ieel reasons continued its stoEl.d;y decline. As shown in the chart belOW',
this per...:entage wns now otll.1 4.6%. a decrease of 14.4% since the begin-
nir.g of I38.jor operations to the Japanese mnlnJanL
The percent of nasignbd aircraft non-oporntional Q"aiting ports
roached tl record low of 1.3'; in April ccmparod to 4.2% in March and 4.5J
% in Fobruary. Despite this, how-
ever, an anlysis of stock levels
(sea wSix Months Projection of
Combat Effort and Loglsticnl Re-
quirements," dated 15 April) re-
veals that operations may be
seriously in the near
future unless required stock
levols are iomediately estnblish-
...-0 t.o tnke cor; of tho increased
combat effort.
The supply of angines,
how,Jver, Inll be sufficient to
ClOt. t our inc1"nscd operatioml
tempo at. 1cnot through the Donth
of 1945. The engine
J[)V IJE.r: J f. N FeD idAR APR re:quirroatlnts have boe n followed
Qonthly and this proj action of
engine pulls is based upon the
past expericncl of this Coomand. sbipl!lonts or those engines are
set up to pro'/';..d"l a tlC.X"'....m\ID bvel of 60 d.a.ys OpnrBS on bani am a mini-
mlD of llpproximat&ly 45 da.ys spares on lmn:L As of 30 April the average
hours on pulled cntines was 256, c...l:lpnru.. t, \.Xl-'t:ct.e:cl lif!> of 300-320 brs.

ilARCH APRIL
40
60
80
100
March
A2tl!
....D1ca1 FUlur.. - EIciae
).0$
).1$
..cbaD1oal raUurea - other
1.611
1.611
rault'7 ar IMdtlq1aW 1Ia1Dt.eIll:ace
1.2$ 1.0$
I.-peoUon to' Groure Crews
"'IDnael Fail"... of Air Crews
0.7$
0.611
U....n &lid Other .'kAi
9...0!
Total
6.9%
7.0$
2. eauae' tor
grapba.
percentages ani the 313th Wing the lowost, as shown in the above
The percent of airborne aircraft bombing primary aM UST
bNak dwu u toUon:
pm IV. IlI7ECT1VENESS OF liIlCRAFT ON M1551016
Cauael tor abort.s were also substaDtially the 1n AprU
.. in March. 7.fY1. of airborne aircraft were non-E:ffective cOlDpared
too for MaJ.'ch .txt 12.5% for February. ilarch am April abort.
tarpt. was approx1m&tel,. the 88JDe for the Commard fur April as March.
84.6% boal.bed the primary in April compared to 84.5% in Karch, am
93.1% bcabed &lI7 tari\:et in both :nonths. The 13rd Wing had the b1&hos't.
o
1) 73 J1J J14
MARCH APRIL
60
80
1. Percent of A1rborDa Aircraft Bombigg
100 r __::.$...:llOIlB:;::;::;;IIIl=-.:Pc::
R1IlARI
==_-,
9".2
82.8 8).2
a
1. D9,truction cf
During the the c.: .:.
da7l1ght ngainst lnU.i ..... .. four ni"t.t and seven
t
ta k 1 t Vl..lutl.! .,,OJ J.. t '" tar t thr
a C 8 o.ga fIB urbnn (l'rec.s t'tu f1 . - ..1....... g: 3, t10 rt ght
tUODJ tho:.: CCGIIUBi conducted 63" ,-,.: t missions. !n :-.dd-
or A2$ of thE' total sortte /:u;",l...:".a,;,ks, toUline s....rties
t1&lds in Kyushu ani tihikoku 1 0 .... 1nth ll.goihBt vo.rlc'.b Illr-
was the firat moDth in the of tactical operations. This
proportion of the CCtlbat effort Y di c Commard in which SUf'b a lnree
to tho of tactical verted i'r(lll straugic
As dE:ltaUed on tha "Hlghli ..... t n
r&port., over 20 G" S page at the btiglrm1ng of
DeatruetiOIl. to c miles of urOOn areAS were burned out.
.. targets YlnS sa follOfls:
6. Mltsubishi C,nglne Plant, Nagoya _ 6,2% d8maed for a
total of to do.to.
b. Itorlyuma Plnnt - 73% of roof nt'e;}&
c. Hodacaya l,,;hl::lmical IndUHtry - 59% damaget:i.
d. Shizuokn Engioo PJant - 49% damaged.
e. Rlknjimtl. :.fusllshino Alc Flar..t - 44% damuged for a tutal
of 48% to date.
f. Tachilulri. Aircraft Co. --.....3ii dc..mngcd ..
g. Hakajima Kouumi .I01.rcruft. t:
o
. _ 10% damaged.
h. Tachiarni Unchine Works - ]00% dl!1llD.ged.
. The deetruction llccaDplished by the 57 aircraft rrh"'.t.h }-8.!'t-
iClp&tcd in night mining operations is :"lore properly
liKht or the mining ussions which folluwc.."C1. during the eo.rJy "'l"_"'t of
IIa.y when the CC!OQ.l'.d dirt:ctcd 195 aircraft to mining operat,t....rs. ':'he
results of thi.!l lnrger affort in lotay ':"e DOt within tb6 scope ':)1' t.u!.s
_.
The 1m sorties, or 42 per of the Canmn.nc{ls P"'I"'Tt,
wh1eb were directed 11"'. support of thl 1....ctica.1 oF-eru'tions .. bed
abo'n carmot be asf,iossec!. in terms Cocp"_CL'Jle to thE; detitrlXtion accom-
plished ill the Dight am day attack:: C,):..t :'.00d noove.
An analysis by A-2 of thin Coo:nun::l. of the onem;y sccie or
effort I!neQ the beginning of B-29 stril':es on Kyushu airfields reveals (1)
thut the Jupc.nese havf.t been unable te pl:educe II large, well coord1qa-
ted att.ock upon OJdMtro. since 16 J'prilj (2) that the: 1s now able
to tl,. n daily eortie avernge of ll:Js than 10% of the nircra.l't com-
mittad to the Okimwll oper:ltion bocL'.\ls.:l of d:.:structiun of air 1nstalla-
t1oDS; (J) that tho enetlY Cl'.n no loneer risk. nssembliDi aircrnft in
Sout.h Kyuahu except to refuel and att.:1ckj end (4) that thu eraw cun
oall' Ill!lke short re.mce plans am diapo.tch srooll fOl'lllllti<lns becouac h6
ona DOt be eertain today .hut sta.g1:'lg fields will be service.abl", to-
_.
2. W1. Acc\1l"CY
According to e. recent stu:,y by the Dpcratons A.mtlys18 ('. +-ion
of Ud.. .ceurnc
J
' figures nrc ll.veU.l'.ble for 1) t-:...
nltitu:le do.ylight missions ageinst precisicn tnrgtlts aM 2) the o..".:ugbt
ap.inst drfie-1d
Frc..c an of 8 lOcdiw altitU::c missil)ns(15)OOO it
waa t.bD.t o.n eatilantcd J.(.'% of tbl. releas6d full r.tt.,il! lC)l,i1 of
tile A.'., ov&r t1dCQ the bombing acc.C"';;,cy of nine previous high
1lil11ons (29,000 feet). In thu purccntagf. ot r.1rbo:-m ! irct" _.....,
boabtDg ttle: primnry ta.!'gct MS :mbtr. :.....t.ly 1ncrco:;od so that l.CCl.a'lley in
t.eme at lQIlba nirbcrno 10 mort:) th;::.n t:.hraE> ti.muR thc.t for tho high nltitu::l.e
aillsloDl. '!hese figurt>B iulvo !Jt,eo obtr.1uE:d froIil thl. nunbor of bursts id-
lD bomb plots llM increased. by 11 corrocti:-o factor based on the
l. t.ho.\ t.A.. maber or oc.b bw'1St." ,i.dont:i.i'icd ic thnn whit!h
cotuall;y bit the particular or6n:
ID the atreeks on tho Kyuehu drficlds, the. bolD1;I pllttcrn wt!.& de-
__________
wi tbiD 1000 fl'Jet of un A l' - t
.. . no nppU hl
..s made of .tJr:1etion1u plot tocu o. CONlequently, an nnnlysll
actual lIPI from. the ill'sirn...Vl :.tP!. It wtl.S ll.5certo.ln the detiation 0';' the
the IlMUI.D range c't"ror ras "'JO '". "1 !Ourrl. that for 38 ft,-,t<"n,
,,. ongn "'lil - ,... -... ,
an:rn.t dlstb.ncc. IIshort" or ITler: I''''''' .. e the absolute ..", (the
1
d fl t' . .aOIll the assi d
The abso ut.e c (,(; :ton l.... "l 373 feet. toe UPI) wa..l >S n::'3t.
At the present time
ct.lllpP.riscn of bombi;;& .:re on- dc't..:l does not p""r:l1t &D1' re-
thnt the reCE:DUy DdOftL-c stllooc.ro. the It is hoped, hO'll'ovor,
in t.!le nl;U" futuro. otting procedure. will allow eu::h
.3. Bomb erxl ruel Dnte
Due to higher bunbing C'ltitud
tanclil, the a.verage OC1l10 lred for the C . n:i 65 am slightly lODger dll-
pourds f'rUr:1 tho March roce.rd of 12 295 in deere&.6ed to 11,522
the 3l3tb WIllg 12,088 pounds, cn::1 the 31.4tr. l:,,,i
3rd
"tt'lg nVl;rngt:d 12,880 pourds,
pounds for dbtc.rv::e diffcrentlcl) c.verc."'oo 12" ,th, r.n adjustaent ol JOOO
1) 057 12 IV\L ni 11 LL .., /'. arch fl{;wes had been
, , ,7VV n ,1,JQ5, rOl'lf>ectivt.>ly. Hence lobe. 3l.!.th IVi hod
too incrtKL6<: its lor..d dl;;Spi ttl th'-'l fnctors of higt:.l:Ir
d18taDeQ. For tho Kyuahu strikes alone th 7'rd '1 . .. 8819
8 6 ' .... "ll6 r."I.:ro,B:.:u poUDd.
ccmpc.red to 10, J for the 313tt. 0.00 8,325 (not cdj'IEtcd) for the J14th.
The Corr.oerd c.Vi:lr::'.gL-d 901 gD..!h.llz NtlJrnod per nircl':!.ft during April
ctJlllpnrecl tu 959 in Morch d(::,spite tho f::.ct th-.:.t weather probnb11it1es florCtd
aircrc.tt tl.. carry & 1000 go.lltn s(;vc.rD..! msslcns. AJ:lrU liguret
were 782 cnUcns tor the 7]rd wIng, 955 for thE )13th fling o.m 1004 for the
.314th cOllpnrcd tti Uc..rch ...r 914, 996 and 10)2.
4. lm?'!.Jl!s Aireraf't Dostr yc.d
202 Jllpo.JKlse n1.rerll.rt WE1rc coo 104 prcbnbly dti8trc,yed
in AprU.. tb.. h1lhut ti&ure!l to d.a.te. A toto.l of 484 urcr:.:.f't bun been
QEratrll1'8d and 305 probably destroyed us of 30 April. [)[mage asses5r.!.eDi:;
IDf'OI'attl.n WB8 nc.t yet til llXl1.catf: the n\.llbcl" vf Brem)"
deaUQ1ed on the: crowd dw1r:w the nirtluld strikes.,
The porcont of eMllll WcraJ.'t ,!hieh JJCr<:s dtistre.yed or
probnblT destrc)'Od rEocahod ita hlUhtlst lovel in i.pril, thtJ 73rd Wing em
)l,'ltll 1Ii111 each oloicing and thu J14th \ling 8.as cumporod t, 2.6l'. 1.as
ud. 11.1$ 1D Utu'cb. Tlw DlElOOr of owID,y Ilireruft a.tt:.eks ptll' 8--29 OftI' the
tarpt 1'08t1 alighUr in April tA 0.8 frla tJm 0.2 low of March, but tbl
... ,Ull below the 2.1 figure tor rebrUll7 nm tht:t 1.6 record c.f Jan\l!ol'7.
'ftll) Ck.oIlbat Ilbox scoreIt expressed as the nmber (".f el'J[lllQ' aiJ'cJ"tL!t
deatroTBd per u1rcrdt lost to c.nelIlY C.Ctioll shc.wod the beat t1gur'e .
11_ Je:lrWJZ'7, rc.t1o swnding :lot 4.6 to 1 cc.mpurcd te. 0.7 in r&arch, 4.1-
in Februll.ry tutI 6.1 in Jnnwry.
LOSS.:.:3
-9-
I YYh'r ut MISSIPNS.
Enemy Action JO
Mcchnn1cl.l.1 ?
Accident 5
War ;1enry 3
UnX.IlO1Jn M
Total 59
CAUSES FllR !l=29 Ale
_l1rcr&ft
FlaJc
Flu and alrerutt
Aoo1dent It: lIech
Own Gulls
Othbr UakllDWl1
WCrIli't ,E ern Lo.S4Ii
A1rcrcJ't and ..crew 10G8 in April ani tor the
tu.t ua-, caoro craws were lost during a month thc.n airer&ft. The air-
cratt lo.s Ttlte was 17.J%- of U.E. cOUlpared to 14.l% l.aet JDonth an::\. an
AA1 planD1ng fnctor ot 16%. Tho loss rate "as 19.)% of U.E. CIS-
pared to last month am an AAF pl..anntng fnctor of 15):. The
stamiaJ. increase in crew losses was due in large: pnrt to rcelnssiflea_
tion and. reoreanization at lm1v1due.l crw ClOlQOOrs, hospltalblltlotl,
aDi transfers to stntr positions.
on a baail:l, 1.6% of nirborne j.ircratt 1JOt9
_.-pored to 1m !lArch ...zrI 5.5l:'tn"Jii\!hcry."
1085 rate was 1.4% in .Il.prh CClmp41't.'C! t.o 1.O,J In Marchi 2.5$ In :et1Zl.l"y
cni In Jc.nutlry. The prbbnbillt)i' 6r-'dcpletlon of cr'\7 lnvet:torbs
with' the has already been discussed. With e. tr....
more losses of crews rclassi!ic&tioD .
etc., it 16 c..pparent that thEi prest:nt ruto of effort oot bo ulnta1rr
eci for the long tel'll urxier AAF attrition plannirlg factors. The mere
tact of thes.:.: irr:reascd losses to such reasons, of COt1rs." wtl.S iteelf
cvid81lC8 of the tenderry to be expect-ad frOtl tho high utilization or
combat crews caused. by the low crew to 'i:-crnft retio.
Enemy action r.aa the chi!:!f cause for :.:.lrcruf't losses during
AprU. Ali sh;"'n in Appetxiix: A, urban areu strikes in the larg-
t losses to our aircraft. A breakdown of causes for ill 10ti8e6 dmrc
the month follows:
':J,. ,J.l-Bea 'lu:cue
ucd from eircrc...rt rlQ'fm at seu
The po::roeot.. of orew C1c.mbers high J,iJlrcb Cigure .of
de01"e&Md. duriac April to froznf t c.irerr..ft \16re.. lost ovor
7'5%. Slnce aD ll:rtlllScd percont 0 to return substuntlilly
t.ara:et, the ra.tio ot erav 1ll.ember3 from mlGsionB during
oreaaed. 516 ere" 1'lltmlbtJrs failed 0 t Svll ani 57 IT.. ru known
801M ot 158 wera known to be to be ditch..d \lero
cl1tchecl. Eleven of the crow me.&1l \..t;TP. rescued during Apr ,
bat 0. tot.a.l. or S5 crfilW I:WIIb&rs in ..
I.uc u.- panchutinc.
- .

C(lMP.-AISOli OJ STaTISTICS ?OR APRIL ACCORDING TO TYPJ: or MISSIon

Average Number
'l'n>e of :"
".
lfumber of llumber :tfumber
Bombing Altitude
il.ircratt of Airborne
-
Enomy .i..ttacks Fe
Mission. '_ lUsslons Airborne
;QQt:>J.!.in.K Lost Aircraft_Lost Dropped &.29 Bor.I'olng
BIGlI'l 0ItUll ........
3
692 641 8250 to 9050 20 4070 0.3
D.l.1LIGll'l PBlOlllft ut.am
7
838 759 7975 t. 20500 13 33
4
2 1.7
1IlCH1' PitOUTl 4
3
66
333 6450 t. 7940 8 2.2j!\ 2510 0.1
JIUUQ 1'"lGB71
5 57 45
5600 to 6980
0 257 0
but 1 ra.ld 26.].00
'UC"lIe..t.:. BUfi'OI:r (IUJ)
63 1390 1267 13500 to 18125 12 6051 .7
TO"'''
82 33
4
3 3045 53 162
3
0 .8
-.10-

'IX ilj"W-
BtMoaJ(f OJ' JlA.DS J'ROM WISSIOJllS TO J.AP.A::J.
TO
HOV DEC JAJI FED !WI APR DMZ
- -
-
- -
Ale BOlllbinc Primary Targe' to Ale Airborne- 21% 1l4% 50%
Ale Bombing All Targats to A/e Airborne- 19% 82% 93%
;"/C to Ale Airborne 19%
Ale for Canasa to A/e Airborne lr,S 9%
;,.fc 1ioDo-ltNocthil tor Mochnnieal Reason. tl? 4:/0 airborne 19.0% 4.1% 4.6% 6,Jll
I./e Lo.t or JatU. Damaged to A/e Over Target 8.6% 39.1% 26.0% 18.9% 18.0l>
Ale Lo.t to Ale Airborne 4."; 5.1% 1.6',:
Bow. nOVll. per Ale on Hand
58th V1nc
19.8 6.4 10.2
(Adju.ted to ba.ia) 73rd \ltIll; 31.8 54.0 60.1
10.1 115.2 111.0 80.5
31ath 23. 0 49.0 54.0 105.0 100.1 82.8
31 th Wing

121.4 115.2

nI :Oomber Co-.nd
37.8 53.6 5G.1
3
f.iW"
105.7 8 .9
C..bat Sortles per Ale On Hand
"58th lling
(.A4Jullbd to (l 3O-dq baa!")
73rd 3.25 4.34 3.88 3.85
7.85

'ling 1.
1
7 '.21

6.,,? .87
31 th \ling
.


6.
77

H!
XXI CoIllZll&.nd
3.
2
5 4:92 2.90 3.35 .81
Ie lKlll.b1nc prlaar7 td,., and all tarph are compue4 to alrbcrM A/C. uclud...1n hOlllnc and 41vonlonat}" A/c. lIu::>erduabo_. etc.
1fblch vere DOt upected to boab.

AlO ....inc laI'pU on Japanese bOltS hlazau 1& taken u ,he near._' ...-ur. aTallaUe r4 J.#J Oftf' ,i:arcet
-11-

."
'r
. I

.,
1
,
..

XXI
BOMBER COMMAND
MQNTULY
ACTIVlT-Y REPORT
.

" ..., .
1 JUNE 1'115
"RD scu
'''"Yo:> 1111""'''' R,f,O'
23-15 .....
IOU' J)"f 7-'"...- s.o ..
"_""10"'11 V/lIlR" "",A
t.., ......
U'l> 1"".'1 144 <obl'E s.o "'''h
10
SEA SEARe H
SORTIES
,,"' .... " .. '5/1 "",
" "AY
Nt'_ 41 "'Ad 'liLeS
Aj'TSIIIJ'SJ<' ,0/& ",ni>.S
14-'. M.Y
4" ; % ....t .. D....... lilJ>
421 MINING SORTIES

t. t,jo ..... '
.o1J2 "Ii ..111(1
28
FIGHTER ESCORT
SORTIES
,

82
PHOTO
SORTIES
"'''II. FOjG
5 M""
,rl ,o>JJ
II):' PUh/,.
" A'",.
.:"" '1''' ..... 5 ""..
,.."., <1'1 11
) (; .. Ifr ro H-24- :n ..... ,.
t .. "" r.,.,
!<.:IUIoT
93
WEATHER STRIKE
SORTIES
* 102 HOURS FLOWN PER ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT
* 86 HOURS FLOWN PER ASSIGNEO CREW IN THEATER
* 6.4 LONG RANGE SORTIES PER AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
* 2.0% OF AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT LOST
* 93". OF AIRBORNE AIC BOMBED ALL TARGETS
* 24594 TONS RELEASED ON ALL TARGETS
* 6.4 TONS CARRIED PER AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT
oIL
" "."
S-..,4 45% D.ol. ED
XXI BOMBER COMMAND
HIGHLIGHTS FOR MAY
3995 BOMBING SORTIES
"IH ....,. l/IWRl. "', :>1DIM"'
,,, .... ""
31:3 To." n..... I.fltJ
To><" ..,. ..... "'''WI' ... ,
i /J""IlJ'Trf p", ,..,,,.
'0 A, ... "
21$ '0.15 DII ...." f'D
''''0:'.........11 ""'- srAfrDo/.
/O"'A,..
$.%11. 11
A
INITIALS: /10.
DATE: 5 June 145
XXI oottBER cn,;:tJ;.ND
,
MONTHLY ACT.IVITY RE?ORT
5 Ju.:'!e 1945
PART I S':'RE:j.TH OF THE CQ'.::aAND
Pf... ~ II USE CF AIRCRAFT AUD CRU!S
P;.R1' III atAIlli'ENANCE AND OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING
USi!. OF AIRCRAFT AIID CRE.llS
PART IV EF?..GTIVENESS OF AHl.CAAFT ON MISSIOR3
PART V RESTJLTS
PAItT VI COST OF !.lISSIONS
rART VII APPENDIX
Prepared By
J3:d ~ ~ a t i s t 1 c a l Control Unit
-1-
-,
PART I -- STRE.IIIGTH OF THE COMiMND
1. Hovoment of Units
Rith only a few exceptions, all units or attached to
Hel'dqual'ter:>, XXI Bomber Command and its five llings he-va non arrived in the
Ulcnter. 'rho rernaining one-third of the 58th Wing ground echelon ,;ill
arri'le in June ,.13 \li11 the 827th Chamiclli Company. All ground echelons of
thu 315th Wing are in rl1ace, but flight echelons are arriving slowly due
to fnilure to complete Northwest Field on schedule, and this movement
not be completed untU July. All units of the 509th Composite Group are
no's .in place or enroute (lXClpt for the 1st Ordnnnce Squadron, scheduled to
arrivL: in June and July. The 41st Photo Reconnnissance Squadron is due to
aniV<:l in t.)."e theater in June. All units of the Cotlbut Staging Center are
in at Iwo.
2, Personnol Rtrength
At the Gnd of the nonth th.s strength of the COlTlll'Umd in the theater
8,888 officers e.nd 46,192 enlisted nen, or u tot&l of 57,080 compared
to [tn ultimate strC'ngth of about 79,500 personnel.
3. AircrLft and Cl'a,,' Stronglh
As of 1 June, I:.ho COtllnand had 709 sod 8'12 crews in the
thc'.tcr compl',red to 616 drcraf't <.nd 770 C1''::178 uS of 1 (-lnd a proj ected
Iluthorized :;trcngth of 993 ,p.Jr:r heuvy nircr:."ft llnd 1639 very heLvy creVis on
I 1945. Th" inc1'0[<.50 in strength for tho month w.::;.s lorgly dUel to
thE: of 58t.h i'!ing aircraft, thc other Wings remc.ining at &bout the
same strength. The to ratio for 1 June only 1,2
to 1, tho sllme ratio /1:; the previous J:lonth, The projected strength, ho;.:ever,
\'"ill bt::: 1.65 to 1.
on l,ltcst cru\" informution Hnd also on estimatBs from
the 58th r:.nd 7,3rd V:ings O!l the crews QxpectC'd to complete their tour of
duty in June, losses nill exceed repl: cElmcnts by u.bout 41 crews io June.
Approxir.:r-tl":J1y lOS crmls are expected to complete their tour of duty and
7$ crcv:s (4871.. plnnoed sorties }: 1.6% loss rute) ,Lrc expectr.:d to be lost
through attrition. This totl..l of 183 crew::: i" cOI,lpnred to the 142 crmls
expectL;d to arriv., during the month. The In.rge outflow of crem:; during
these first felf months of cretlS complHting their tours will not be as
serious as previously nnticiplitod b,"cl..us", of thu I"ddi tional crer,'s to be
Bent to the COmJn::nd beginning in July. HO'i11:1ver, until'these crews arrive
tho Conunll.nd does fnce t. dll':'linution of its effort and (tn apparent decretlse
in its cre\,: oxperiuoce. lovC'l. Til: pruBent 101'1 CrGY1S to uircrllft rntio
and l!IC.."(lmu,ll effort conditiQns plus thE. fllilurr: to meet immotw-c theuter
requiremEJilts b;'r buildint ur. un eXClLf, of Cre1':8 ovur the required hr..ve
Ittreely prc'vcnted bomb V-0UPI; from ",quf,lizing their era\,: experi"ncE. c..t
dosired l<:vels. Hence, ClIO of 1 June th(, ?3rd lling found i tscH .;0'1 th 1..1%
of its pilots ond cOII\l1t:l1dvrG hu.ving in excess of 21 crew credit
sorties, nnd tho 58th ring MYI,. The 313th Wing hrd 35% of its pilot credit
:,ortiu bunched in the 16-?O flortio cluss. It no" oxpectud thnt enough
-.ddit.iOlV.l cTtmS will arrive in timo to preclude these lurga blocks of
from completing their 1:.0\'1' short periods
of' time.
- 2 -
PARr I -- STRENGTH OI" THE Cm,tMND
L Movement of Uuits
';i1th only a fe.. exceptions, nIl unlts or attached to
X.1l'.:I Bomber Command and its five l/ln&5 he.vc now arrived in the
theater. 'fhe recaining one-third of the 58th \'ling ground echelon uill
arrht.. in June r.s will the 827th Chemical Company. All ground echelons of
the J15th Wing nrc in plnca, but flight eeh:lons are arriving slowly due
to feilure to CQ;!lr1ctc iJorthr:est Field on schedule. and this DQvecent '" ill
nt.ot bE" cOi.lpleted until July. All units of the Cocposite Group are
lr. place or enroute except for the 1st QrCnnnee Squadron. scheduled to
oniv.,; in June IUld July. The 41st Photo Rcconnnissanee Squadron is due to
in t.'le thent.er in JunE'. All unito of the Coahut Stltging Center ore
now in p:i!l.CU at 1\10.
. 2. Forsoonol 8t.renrt,h
At t'le Gnd of tile r:onth th strcugt.h of the COllllll.l1d in the theater
..as 8,MS officf'rs e.nd L.b,192 enlisted oen, 0'; l.1 totd of 57,080 compared
to t'n ultim.:.lte strength of about 79,500 personnel.
J. A.ircr, ft and ere" Strength
As of 1 June, the COl:'.llWld had 709 :.:.lrcr<lft s.ud 8'12 crews in the
thccter comp'.r'ld to 616 Hircr(:.ft uld 770 cr.:..;g (.I.S of I Hay t!nd a projectd
DuthOT:ized strcncth of 993 vcry vnd 1639 very hev.vy crews on
1 [)t;cl.:r\bc.r ll)45. Thl: in :;trength for the month was lllrgcly du to
Ule lllTivLl of 58th l":inf aircrcft, the ot.her Wings remuining at .,bout the
5amc strenE'th. The cssi;tncd cre,', to rircrnft ratio for 1 June til:s only 1.2
to 1, UI{' snmc ratio 11S the previous conth. The projoctt::d strength, ho;:ever,
i"il1 ultimc:tcly be 1.65 to 1.
Unfed on l.J.test crt::\ flo'\", information "nd also on cst1lll1ltcs from
tho 58th and 73rd Y::!.ngs 0' the cxpcctC'd to complete their tour of
duty ill June, nill exceed repl: Cf,;monts by u.bout 41 crews in June.
Approximnkly 105 crmls urc c:-.pccted to complCJte their tour of duty and
78 crcv:s (4871.. pLumed sartiN: 1.6% 10fJS l:utO) tirE. expoctc,d to be lost
tbrough attri tion. Thi::; tot!..l of 183 crows j,n to tho 142 crcllS
to urriw durint the month. The outflow of cre,ls during
t1HHiC fIrst fm.. l:lontils of cre.ls completing their tours will not be CIS
serious as previously rmticipatod bcc.. 1)1' t.hu !,dditionnl C'r=';:S to be
Gent to thu bt:!Einning in July. HO'i7ucr, until theso crews arrive
tJl(, COll\lM.nd docs fnce L.. diminution of its effort llJld fin oppnront decreuse
in its crc,: 'lxperluncc levl'L Th: pr.... r;ellt 10.1 cru\"IZ to aircraft rntio
Bnd effort conditions plus to meet theater
rccluircJIl'lts by bl:ildinl: <J1 exccfI:'> of crc-:J3 over tho required h&ve
InrBCIJ prlv.. :lted bomb f!"oups from oo.quf.l1:-.ing tlluir crc..... cxperi"nce.. tot
doaired l"v&ls. Hence, itS of 1 June thi: 7Jrd mng found itsolf r;ith 41%
of it:'> pilots and comrll..nd..... rs h..ving in excess of 21 crew credit
-nd thr; 58th ling 1."1-. The J13th J1ng hrd 35J; of its pilot credit
sorti;: s hUlChcd in the 16-20 clll.ss. It no.. o:xpcckd thnt enough
... ddition. I crCl" s Tiill nrri'le in tilllO to preclude these 1n.rgc. blocks of
cre,'s from comr-l("ting their to\'l' \':ithin dlsproportlonl'ltt'ly short periods
of time.
- 2 -
\
Per Cre,\;, AsgC. - Tot.al 86 84 8J SO 87 9J 59 84 86
f1Vi'f.: COI'l:IDrd totnl ir.cl"Ud.. s J15th \;ing M;:.y figures.
Tho Cor.unand again fleil an number of hours per assigned
creu in the theater in Mey, attaining 86.2 hours compared to 83.8 hours in
April, 86.4 in an:! the 60 hours planning figure prescribed for long
torm utilization of crens. As indicated in Part I of this report, the
continuation of the ratio of assigned crews to aircraft at only 1.2 to 1
makes it difficult to reduce the excessive nunbcr of hours flOI'm per crew.
2.98 86.27
93 83.75
1.44 86.24
1.16 28.31
250 37.43
8.25 42.50
4.05 47.60
7.83
TRtli OTHER TarAL
7.35
8.62
B-29
HOURS FLOWN pm CP..EW
74.20
),3.40 10.15
75-94
26.02 1.03
)).91 1.02
26.97 7.28
76.97

").97 114.85
1.20 107.81
1. 71 102.21
B-29
HOURS FLaI'lN PER A/c
TRl'li OTHER TOTAL
50.20 1.51 310 55.41
91.22 9.28
36.80 9.93 11.25 57.98
42.09 12.79 5.11 5999
34.75 1.37 1.69 37.81
95.51 11.10
COMBAT
101.10 9.78
APR
FEB
KAY
JAN
lIAR
ks shown in the above table, 102.2 houre per assigned &ircraft were
flo\m Quring May compared to 107.8 hours i!l April arrl the planned figure
in April of 100 hours. 1'oi" decrease "as f>.xpected because of the arrival
of 58th an:! J15th fling aircraft, mich flen 94.1 hours am 37.,3 hours per
aircraft, respectivel;,., em because the planned flying time for the ?3rd,
.313th, arrl ,31.4th Wings called for approximately the DUClber of hours am
sorties per aircraft that 17ere performad. The 58th lacks one-third of its
maintel'llll'.ce personrnl, and the :3l5th will not become fully operational. un-
til July.
An exacination 01 each Wing's performance in terms of hours and sor-
ties flown per aircraft and crew on hand, discloses that the 7,3rd Wing,
l1ith an increase of 13 aircraft during t.he month arrl a decrease of 14 crews,
fle>'l fm"l'er sortie!> am hoUTs tum the previous The 313th Wing, with
a slight increase in aircraft and slight decrease in crews, bettered their
April rocord. The Wing, I1'ith un increase of about 40 aircraft an:!
Cre17$, flew le;1$ flying hoUTs than the month before arrl about the same
number of sorties.
PART II.
USE OF AIRCRAFr AND cnE'i1S
l.
li2.
ur
!J
. Sorties
Flown Per 8-29 Aircraft am Crew
SuMM/,RY OF HOURS & SORTIES
58TH
73RD 313TH 314TH XXI Be
MAY APR MAY APR MAY APR l'tAY APR MAY
Aver A/c Asgd
154 179 192 173 177 146 186 512 710
fl.(.tcr B-29 Crews A,gd
168
249 235 217 213 180 223 659 841
Total Coobti. t Sorties
923 1409 1269 1112 1167 966 1191 3487 4558
Sorties Per A Ic Asgd 6.0 7.9
6.6 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.8 6.4
Sorties Pe.r GreH Asgd 5.5 5.7 5.4 5.1
55 54 54
5.3 5.4
8-29 Hours F'lo..-m -
Per Ale Asgd - Conbat 85 108 91 88 92 98 96 96 91
Per Ale Asgd - Total 94 117 102 100 105 115 107 lOS 102
-.
Per Cre;: tsgd - Gocbat 78 78 74 70 77 79
80 74 77
3. UtlH'l,nt1on of f;ircrhft on Mnx1mum Effort Mi3sion nt,yS
8L,.1% of tLircr,.,ft on hi.md or 74.1% of aircnft ll.lioignEld :.-ere
utilized on Il::'xill'lUm effort oission days durin6 Muy. There ,;erc fhe lll:lXi-
tlUI:1 effort missions during the month, two to NRgOYC., trIO to Tok}'o, nnd one
to YolcollllMa. OJ' tho 84.1% utilized, 80.6% airborne on combnt rn1s:>ioos
Emu 3.5% 0n other The '73rd Wing utilized 89.2% of its nircr,d't
on bf'lId compl.lrGd to 84.7% for t.he 58th Wing, 83.0% for the 3l4th rling und
77.rJ1, for tho 313th Wing.
4. other of Aircraft
Itl f'ddition to the 3,ens bombing sorties conducted by very heavy
during bff:y, theN :'ere l.21 cdning r.orties, 93 o:e3.th:r
82 photo nnd scope 28 fi[hter
na\'i.gntione.l rnd escort sorties, ::'nd 10 se:' scnrch sorties.
98% of the \:eather strikes \It:re !ffective durine th.. month
compare-d to 92% in April. Mechnnicnl \:"as the :Jole reason for the
2%
Photo roconnllissnnce pcrforr.mnce Iins at thr.! lowest ebb in thr'ee
montha, 34% 01' "irbornl.l aircraft "barting compnred to 16.7% in April and
17% in and only 56% of the airborne getting GOod to exel1ent
J:iloto r..;::;ults elXlparl!u to 63% in ldr'.rch end 78.2% in lIpril. The chief
reuson for the riGe in the non-offcctivo rate \:"QS bed t:eather. 1ergely
duc to the rC<lssigrummt of s.vernl F-IJ'G to eech HillE in a.ddition to tho
Jrd Photo Rccon.ml.L>sr..nco Squt".dron, tho::;c nircrnft Ilvcrc.go:::d 52.6 hours in
'.tay compnrad to 41 hours hI April Lnd 28 in Morch. The 3rd ihoto Squadron
e.veraged hours on tho nircrc..ft :l.n its posscssion. F-13 oircrc:ft,
hOt..::lvel', 'O..ere used for other purposes thr-.n reconn.:lissancc during the conth,
.md ant. UP::; lost on c botlbing mission.
Principle u:::c of the )0 8-24' 5 in the Cor.unnnd durin,s n1':S for
.-rc:\th.,r rccolma1.ssnnce by tho 655th Her thcr Reeonnc.i:ssunco 5qlUidron. They
fl(,:\" 3'J.5 hours pnd 3.7 sordas IJel' drcr[tft, c:.nd 39.2 hours and 3.6 sorties
xx-r ere;" These sorties I,-ere 1()()'".' effcctivC,l.
5. Tnininr:
Trnining timo rcmnined fdrly constant for tk-y, 9% of totel
flying hours belll& used for tro.1ning purposes cornpl'rt.d to 10, in April
t.nd C1/. in Yarch. t1inf; fif;UI"es r:cri; 313th fiing - 12%, 31L,th - 9%,
56th 'Ring - 8%. nnd 73rd lUng - 7%. The trnining rr0bl'CC cn.lling for
proficiency courses shor'od as of 2 Jum.. the '73rd fling f1il..h Co 2.2% llVert ge
proficiency rc.tlni:, tho 31Jt.h 'lith 18%, the 31L,th Wing dth 15%
fOnd the 58th Wing IIi th 6%.
Tho JIJth Wing h..::.d the most lea-d crOH flying- training time in
the thc['.ter for tho triO tteck period ended 2 June '.;1th 475 hours cOlllp&re:d
to 219 hOUTS for the 314th 132 hours for the 58th Wing and lOB hours
for the 73rd Wine.
- 4 -
1. Maintenance
33
MAY
32
APR
TOTAL
9
56 146 170
77 108 141-
39 44 80
32 38 61
MAR
314TH
APR i.'<AY
2 27 21
3
313TH
APR MAY
3
2 7
61 96 104 138 139 70 115 195 304 419
68 98 107 141 141 97 136 204 336 452
18 40 )0 5'1 56 49 66
2.4 32 37 46 39 )0 41
10 12 25 22 26 10 19
16 14 15 16 20 8 10
58Tf!. 73RD
},1J..Y APR !lAY
4767 5.383 5939 5192 5480 4372 5753 12424 15364 21960
936 1)42 1189 1155 1098 1238 2023 3595 4545
24.9 20.0'22.3 21.5 25.1 21.5 16.) 2)4 20.7
FAILUf..E TO BO?m ANY TARGE.'t
PART III. MAINTEUiiJiCE AIID OTH1:!.R FACTORS AFFECTH'G liSt OF AIRCRAFT AND CR.-lOWS
D. OF SPARE Ale SUBSTITUTED
V GRomID & AIR ABOHTS DUE
TO
Highlighting the maintene.nce picture of the month VlCS the performance
of the. 58th Wir..g, ,,.hieh flew within 6% of the COlllmand Rverage hours and
sorties per as:>igned although it 25% less maintenance: personnel
per Ale on ham. In addition. this Wing consistently imicated the highest
percentage of aircnft in COLll!u.asion daily am the lowest non-effectiv6 air-
craft ciue to mccLle.nical 0)' ln1l:.ntenfmce personr.el reasons.
For the past three r...onths, the percent of aircraft on hand which were
in cOIll.'D.ission da:"ly !".a.s shown 8. :.:;tenciy increase, the figures boitJg 47% for
.tarch, 52% I'm' hpril, am for May. This increase should have per-
:uitted a higher pGrcent of aircraft on ham scheduleci for missions during
LiuY, altt.ough the of scheduled &ctu.').lly cecreased from 24% of plane
days avaih.blc in April to n';t in May. These increases in the percent of
in the 1011 ratio of crews to aircraft,
it increasingly difficult to cren all available planes.
Of NEr ABORTS TO SCHUiULED 6.5 7.2 8.7 1.L.9 6.4 '7.6 0.' '-}.2
. Including all failures resulting in failure to bomb any target .
.. IncluUng only those failures attributablo to maintenance or lIUlterieL
l.tq Tot: 1 pbn... D:.ys en ;i!111d to::- April incluci.e:-; 58th and for in:::l'-ides 3l5th.
-5-
In relation to the nu.iber of aircraft st:hGti.uled for nissior.s, the total
mcinteru::nce failures, both air am grou."1d., prc:::;cnt some importar.t relation-
ships \1hic:'l r.;;flect not only on the degree of ;:Jainter.ance, but also on the
differer.ces in the scheduling policy bet',;een the \'lings.
As further shown in Parts IV and VI of this roport, both the number l
of ail'ct'aft aborb and aircraft losses due to maintenance increased slightly \
during Linj'. 6.4% of airborne aircraft aborted in May beCI.l.U$e of maintenar.ce \
and materiel f!:lilurlJll compared to 5.7f., in April and 5.8% in !.'iarch. (see \
tc.ble on 9). lit the same eime of aircraft losses 17erc due to r:J.e- \
chunic:::U. :roeasons in May cor.rpared to 11% in April. A large portion of these \
Vlere caused by failures on teJ:e-offb. It should be noted failures of both
equipment and m.:tir.tcnance personnel contributed to this abort increase,
while the por..:ent of 61,ine fnilurG8 remained cotlste.nt.
OF MAnIT FAILUR.ES TO seHED 7.3 7.) 9.012.211.9 8.911.0 10.1 9.) 9.9
TOTAL
MECE FAIL!JHF.B
rOT PLANE DAY3 on HJ
tt/l.INT PEESQilNEL FAILURES
%OF PLAnE 1I,:(S seiIED
TuT
.. F.rI.ILIJP,hS TO TAKE CfF**
.Ir:-..BO:.!IE. :".lmre FAILURES
- 6 -
. .,. :-'. -

r
Ave O....YS PLlJffi5
ON H;,ND AT EtlO
OF PERIOD HAD
BEEll AT Ii'."O
:.5
6.8
4.6
99
115
436
NO. OF DAYS LVER.\GE 'rIME
EIJ,PSED BET"Ull PER COUPLETED
ARRIV/IL & DEPARTURE PLANE
25
44
NO. OF
COMPLETED
PLANE'S
The principle rOIlSO:lS thct aircr.::tft vert. grounded at 11'10 Cl'.n be
seen in thd t.r,blo bElloti, in Hhich the plnno d"..,ys &rounded arc shol'm for ench
week of tl:o period froe J Iby 1945 to 30 t.hy 1945 .
PERIOD
Th!.:l I'vc:rr.gc tlIilC it took to rcpnir rdrcrttft nt 1\/0 during the
month of if! indicuted by 'the follor:ing tf'blc. Included in the elapsed
til.1t1 is sue:: as ,mEl sp.nt by the reptlired drcraft lI\"mi ting pick up
for rctu..'"tl to its be.se, nn interv.::tl ..'verrging about 1-1/2 de.ys JXlr drplo.ne.
1 Ul;t - 15
16 !.lay - :31
Ll\NDINGS AT mo JIrAJ,
\
REFUELInG M.AINTElI/lNCE
TOTAL
'lEEK TotAL %"OF it OF
%OF
ENDING SORTISS NU!1BEil SORTIES NW.BER SORTIF.S NUMBER SORTIES
9 695 105 15.1 23 3.3 128 18.4
16 1o\.1.Y 1730 64 4.9 26 1.5 110 6.4
23 May 1018 26 2.6
9 .9 35 35
30 M-"1Y 1141 .--2J,
-.2-'--'-
41
-1.&
102
---.M
TCYrLL 4584 276 6.0
99 2.2 J?5 8.2
2. \klL,tcnt'.Ilc", nt 11,0
During tho month of Muy, u stendily incrcnsing bncldo[; of grounded \
nircrr'.i't f't 1\,0 .11m.."I. highlighted t.he of 1'. growing mointennnce
probleM. of cctivity nt INo for tho month is indicated by
tc.ble belo_ J cov.::ring t."te four-i:Cck period from 3 tk:ly to 30 Lt<>.y, 1945.

STATUS OF PLMiES AT Fro

( Pl:-.nc IlE'.ys Lost)
arllER
BATTLE
;.\'I.\1T ENGINE ENGINE
OI'HER
DI','!AGE J\OCP E!m
CH.\<ICE HAIfl!
msp
!V!INT TUfAL
4J 32
0 19 23
0 ? 124
46
47
24 35 44
2 10 208
35 3
10 103
33
0
14
198
..J -l!
10"<
..M .J< ..li 221
213 91 34 259 142 2 46 ?8?
83.2%
13.7%
3.1$
90.4%
8.1$
1.5$
- 7 -
1-2 days
')-4 dnys
5-7 dnys
DAYS PLhUES
CRammED
..... DA!LY .aAClWN
M.QNTHLY HOURS USED
TY'iL: OF OF %OF
PIJIN1

Ut\NijOURS
:Mill<
8-<:9 & F-l3 1.4,900 75.6 39,902 77.4
otM-r Aircrn.ft 4,600 24.4 11,662 22.6
,
!
Tota.l 19,700 100.0
'1,564
100.0
The !.Ocr s:l.tutltion in the COI:'ll'.nnd during tho mont.1 of t!ny sholVcd
continuJd itrip!"ovcment ovor previous months. Phno dnj's lost clue to f,OCP
was only O.9fJf, of total pl"rw d.'lys t!.vl'ilPble. Tho Guam Air Depot .fas
still continuing to fill 75% of pll AOCP the oonth of
This is 1'. Eubstantial incrcnsL over the Feb. figure of '..nel figure of
68%. There nes n slight jn the of in the %
of grounded for 3-4 and 5-7 dnys as shown beloN;
4. Aircrnft. Out of COr.ll".1ssion for Perls
:,;".:.:.' . '.'. '.",';
...,',' .... '"
The alightl:,. grc=.tcr proportion of rvnil:cble l:R.nhours beL,g spent on
8-29 the ratio of the two bncklog is consistent
.lith the, prcsencp. of nircrl:ft in the "Othcr
ll
category being 1Ci'1er iJI'iority
than B-29
1
s rnd F-1J
1
s.
According: to informntion submitted by the depot, in the sections
of the depot performing inspection, cero repr:ir, mctd, nnd flibht
testing cctivities, tho distribution of oocklog and llr'n hours consumed
nppc:r...'>d as follor.s:
'l'hc bF.cklog of B-29 und F-IJ nircraft on hcmd in the depot in-
crc;>sed ddl;,' nvcrc.ge of 12.8 plnnes on h.s..'1d in April to 13.4 plr.nes
on This is not believed to be excessive, since
the nvcI"':.gt> Of>cklog in teres of W'on hours durin& iMy sccr>.ed consistent f7ith
ilori< normc.lly for efficient operntions .
DurinC the of May, GlIam Air Depot showed tl. 5ubstl'ntial 1m-
provomC'nt over I nd April in tho time ('cnsumod in tho of 8-29
and F-13 ::-ircrclt, ns indlco.ted in the tp.ble belcm:
NO.
OF "Ie 1;,VffiAGE Oi. 'is ELAPSED
RETUP.NED TO
Ale \lE1lE
DAYS IlEFOOE
r'lOlrrH
TACTICAL UNITS TIl DEPar
liORK STARTED
2
:J6 5
".pril 8
52 8.5
Uny 12 23 3.7
J. .I.binten ncc of COl:!!lt'.nd Aircr:'1ft ,t the GUt'!D Air Depot
..

This incrcnse in days grounded CIllj-" be due to f'. possible increl".sc in c-u-go
backlog f't the De!oOt int',slII'.lCh as 1"'0 has grently incre:1l500 tho dccends being
!:C'.de Upo!l tI'Pm;port nirerllft of the Depot.
DJr.lng the nonth of 39 J\OCP requests received freI:! Iko.
Thv GUf'I:! Air filled 82% of these requisitions. or the 39 requests of
'Iblch Ulera fJ. record, 26 were for R-3350 engines Clnd 8 requosts ,;erc for
aD C001C'rs. The nvurnge olapsed time bctl"le,m reC(uieition and receipt of
p:ll'k [rounding &-29 nircraft at 1..0 'f1e.S 6.3 dr>.ys.
5. Supn:;'y F".ctoro
supply flow of cnginee 85 presently projected UTe sufflc-
i,"l!t to I:'eet the reqti.irements of the thrt."l.1gil the month of September
operations. Shipments nrc set up
to provide (' mtudI:'iUll\ 60 dny stock l0vel of spt!.res t".nd tl minimum of 45 days
.-;tock level. .\s of 31 the r-verq,:c ho'Urs on cUJ:ltl.1ntive pulled engines
1''.5 ?5L9 This ,/[\5 I'n increfl.se of 2:1. hours over the )0 figure
of 233.3 The hours on plulcd engines for the period 1-15
tlr'y ;:95.1 tours. The highest poriod :{et recorded on engine pulls
.m.5 I'D ller:'fe of 320.9 ho'-lrS for the 73rd \7i!lf for the 154 engines pullerl
in the t.'r.'0 '.. poried ending 31 iAey 1945. This figure exceeds the 319
hour of tlle life ex?!cta...'1CY of R-3350 engines Lt1 the
Tho;:. supply of chaclct'..l (B-46 , E-4B, Arf-I,f17f.l, AlHf7'6,
;.R-r.471.2 (NPj), pves p.vidence of filling considen'b1y below
stock levels. Inver-to!"1 ('s of J1 tiny wes 19,027 tons representing
2537 sorties. Tho estimct.cd inventory for 30 June including
th... cxr:; ded .' :l"rh"td of JO,149 tons ilo 10,026 tons 01" OI:.1y 1336 sorties.
This fr.lle 105,82'-: tor:s short of the 60 n..:y stoclt lovel desired bJ.- the
COlllm:md.
D'..rrL"'r the p.rst rr.onth the Cor.uurnd set up requisition objectives
on follrn-inr cle3ses of supply:
8. Aircraft Pnrts
b. Slgn=..l Parts (Ground)
c. Slgnnl Pnrts (Air)
d. Ordnance Parts (Ground)
c. Qrd.:1nnce Parts (Air)
ThE:sa books Tfere set up to IJhOfl projected JO days con,!;umptlorl on thesG
perts 60 levels npplicnblc. Although not the scope
of this orpcr. future reports stock levels objectives
pnd supply items which give evidence of hindering opera-
tions
- 8 -
6. Ilon-t.vdla.bili tv of Cornbn.t Crews All A Factor Effecting Utilization
averLga of 16.2% of creps not for
cOlilb..,t during the t\.o week period ending J1 With tho extrEIJCly 1011
to rntio under which the Commend is this pcrcen-
t increasingly significpnt. As shown in the tnblc the
chief recsons for nan-rvailcbility crcwz not fully D.S. rt
in the United end sickne&s.
CO:.!Ei.r CR,&",' mtBER I1VJ.ILABILITY
BASED ON il.Vffi;\GE FOR. ALL CREr! POSITIONS
16-J1 w.y
58th Wing 13rd lUng 313t.t. Wing
314th 'I1ing nIB;
OF %OF
%OF %OF %OF
!.SGD .SGD ASGD
ASGD ASGD
ri.ssigncd
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
AVIlllrblo 87.8
84.7 76.4 86.4 8).8
Not Avail-:b1e
12.2
15.3 23.6 13.6 16.2
'r
Combct. Injuries
.8 .5
.9 .3 .6
I
2.2
1.5 1.9 2.6 2.0
,
Pnss, Leave, Furlough .1 .1 .1 .1
At Rest C".mp 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.6
Grounded For &:st .1 6.7
.4 1.8
DS (other TD Id
2.2
2.5 .4 1.3
CI"t1 sch in US) .1
DS to ld cru uch in US 1.9 1+.9 4.J 3.3 3.7
Not Fully 6.3 1.1
54
4.1 4.1
j

.8 .1 .3 .2 tion
Othor 2.3 .4 .8
,
- 9 -
4
).2
1.8
1.4
TOTAL
92.6
/
MAll. APR rMY
91.9
- 0.1 - 0.1
- 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
/
/
/
92.2
.
,
/
/
/
/
%BOHElI} ALL TARGETS - r.tAy
934
60
so
100
/
S9.4

/
- 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.2 - 0.9 0.2 0.03 0.3
- 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.05
- o. - 0.1 - 0.10.;2 0.05
- 0.1 - 0.1 - - 0.04 - 0.02
- 0.1 - 0.4 0.1
0:3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -
2.6 2. 3.2 2.8 4.2 .1.2.1 3.2 .5 J.O J.2
5.516.0 4.5 6.7 5.6 7.6 7.3 52 51 59 5.S 5.7
- 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - 0.1 0.0
0 .2 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
- 0.1 0.2 0.2 O. 0.' 0.2 - 0.1 O. 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.2 9.2 O.J 0., O. 0.2 - 0.1 0.) 0.3 0.3 o.
6.6 6.S 5.2 7.717.7 9.2Is.) 5.7.6.9.7.46.9 7.0 7.6
58TH 7:,RD J13TH JUTH
-1.1 1.0 O. 2.2 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.6 1.1 1. 15 1.3
1.7 1.5 1.1 I.] 1.2 1.41.70.5 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.1
M...4.Y MAR APR Imy i.1AR APR
t
MAY iAf.R APn l.'iAY
FJ.ILUID: TO BO.',ffi AN'l TARGET
As A Percent Of Airborne
I 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.8 O. 0.8
D.) 0.) 0.2 0.) 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 O.J 0.4 0.2
- 0.1 - O.
- 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 - 0.3 - 0.1 0.1 0.1
/
90.6 SO 0
..
1

/
/
9O.S
/J
1. of Airborne Aircrnft Bombing
;, OO:olBING Hn:MF.Y TP.llG:i1.T - tiAY
I
o f-L",:-"-,--,LLL---,-L/A.-r-lL..'L
58th 'l3rd ;'13t.h j14th
40 r
20 -
so
100
z _.
Drn.. to an incTercs", in maintenance arxl mechanical failures, the abort
rate 17ent up for the s:com modh in suecGssion. The /.tay I1Dort rate vias
7.6% airborne aircraft compared to 7.0% in April and 6.9% in March. These
are det&i1ed in the table:
Th of tirborllO aircraft bombing the primary target rose
in i.';c.y to 89.4% comp<.red to 81,.6'/> in April and 84.5% in tJIc.rch. The per-
cent of uil'borrle aircraft bombing all targets waS slightly lower in t.l.o.y
tl:o.n the: pri:'viou..:; two mont.hs, 92.4% bombing all ngnip.st 9J.1% in
both March arrl April. The 58th l'lil1g had the highest percentages and the
3lJth Wing the lowest.
fota1
2. Cause3 for Non-Effectiveness
!E'Jl.THEF
.1m:n:
1'T1lR FAIlum:s
small Formation
D1teiled Enroutc
Survivoro
Unknot7n & Oth"l'
4Alh'1' & :/';"TEJUE.L FAILURES:-
Engine FnillU"es
:"ie:chanicH1 FnillU"S
Faulty & Insp
Total
Total
PART IV. EFFiiCTIVENi:S3 OF AIRCRAFT ON MISSIONS
.... CHE\'! FAILURF..-
Alc COmI:lll.nder
Co-Pilot
Engineer
Bomoc.rdier
Navigator
Radio Operator
Gunners

-
PART V. RESULTS
1. of Targets
AS sho":in in Appetrli.>: At during i.:ay the Comman::l perforned three
nif;ht an::. thrc(,. d"l.y urban Ill'en missions totaling 1950 sortie:>, 36 daylight
tl!.ctice.l missions 768 sortios, 10 night. mining missions totaling
421 sorties, am: tr.o daylight o1ss1ons against irxiividual strategic tar-
gets totaling 277 "orties. In these missions, 15,934 tons of irrerrliar::
les, &,255 tons of bi&h (;xplosives, nn:l 2,LJJ6 tons of cines for n total
of 24,595 tons ;icre dropped on Japanese targets. Th", greatest tonnege in
one raid in MY histOF! ..e.s <lchicvc-d in the Nagoy& rll.id of 16 when
468 aircraft dropped 3696 tons out of /J. force of 522 aircrnft airborne.
This is to thG 8th AF record of 2923 tons by l2.48 aircraft. ngeinst
Cologne, 0. distance of c.bout )25 miles, on 17 October 1944.
As dctnil"ci on the I1highligh't.s" pug> at the beginning of this report,
)8.8 zqU!l.re :::l.ilcs r.umerous AJ\F' nuobcred targets \dthin tht.6
Ilrt.a:.;Itl:.rL. burl}(;Q out. in M:::Y to bring the total to date to 92.7 square miles
of urbv.n ar,las. Destruction to indust.rirJ. pri..r:lll.ry targets for
May wus us
C'.. KmmtUshi Ale Pla.nt, Kobe - 39% dumo.ged
b. Hiro Unvo.l i,jC Foctory, Kurc - 71.5% Clllmagcd
c. OshL'tIa Na..-c.l Oil Storage, Osh.iIDa - 90% d8.lllC.ged
d. OtE'..k!:; Oil Rcfin"ry, Dt3ko - 45% cic.zr.agcd
o. 1'oklVrn<.Ill. Cod Yarda am Naval Fuel Station - 49.ffI, damaged
f. Mitsubishi Ale r'forks, I'b.goyn - 46.5% dC'.mllgod for 0. total
of 68.5% to date-. May &.!:l.::::.ge ,fas II result of urban area
strikes .
Not only ho.;:: the dB.l:lllgo to precision tc.rgets increased, tim.
this f;l"eetcr destructiC!n :me been llchieved Ilt a. less cost. For
in tCrr:lS of sqiZ'.r... fuct of d.a:mge per c.ircrnft lost, there
ona. r:lid !.lct..oen Novegbcr nnd FcbrUE.rY in ...mch over 300,000 sq. ft.
of roof areo :;c.s dn;;w.god per nireraft lost. Hor-ever, in Unreh there -;res
OlK: .:::uch raid, follow<o:d by 5 In April 11m 3 in tdey. Moreover, during
these recent 13onths, h:lvc been an DUIlbcr of raids in
which no 8ircraft uere lost.
llissiol1S against. airfields on Kyushu o.m Shikoku continued until
11 Mo.y in support of Dkinmffi 0f0ratiolW. Tho need for this assistnnco
l1as obvintud by thli< incno.sd utilizc.tion of carrier-borm aircraft in
those opl.rations, noc. the Com;naoo oree nora wns able to concentrate on
bombing. Darnago nsseaemont comparable to the above
ure not for this type of turbet, but bombing accuracy datu
for atrikGS is includE;d in a !luccooding paragraph.
Acccrding to the A-3 scction, strategic mining operations
thuir hoight in llOO up to 27 Mas the had placed
4,765 mines in JapnlXlse inlnrrl ....ators. The significance of the Imam
Sea to Jap:.nese shipVing cannot be ovor-emphadzod e.s it contoins the
ports of Kur.... , Hiroehi!:lll, Kobe, Ose.kn, Tokuyama am others of lesser size.
In adcition to this it offers a flrotected 'l'l"stcrifay to shipping, a pril:mry
need cue to th( penetration which our submarines and aircraft t.heir
inndc;ucte le.t'.L h::.va effected. Finally, thru the Sh.iJ:lono-
scki Stt"tdt.s I,; the shortest route to Northern waters. For these reasons,
.:rU.r.1ng the Inlnm Sen r.as received high prIority, nrd cach day that Jllp8.n-
c:se shipr ing move:t:cnts are cut i:3 u drain on the effectiveross of Japan as
a fighting mtion. Tbest; mining operaticns have been dirocted primnrily
egeinst three typc:s of t.:trg6ta, as follows:
a. Eo.st<.:rn nn1 Western ontrancos to Sbinonoseki Straits - 80% of
JL.pt'.ru;.sc shiPIJing in the inner zone normo.lly goes through thesc wnters.
Closure of these Str.:l.its has forcca diversion of the enemy
l
5 shipping to
routes south of Kyushu whero it hus beon subject to vigorous c.ttccks by
our submarines and aircraft.
b. Me.jor Port.o - The 1arsout vert or m(;.rchnnt ghippine in t.h(J
El:1p1re:: is in thE:! Kooo-Osaka o.r&a, and blockade mine fidds laid eround the
SIlI&.1l island of Awaji have VfJry ofi'l::ctive toward reducing merchant
2. Bombing Accuracy
\
15
22
8
45
2
4*
o
6
2
60
o
8
4
6
7
17
7
6
1
11.
BQ;.1Blm ACCURACY ON PREtISIQIi TARGl"TS
lIny 1945
NU'JDER OF roRliATIOt6 \:ITH CIRCtll..I\R ERROR OF
0-1000
1
1000-2000
1
Over 3DODI Total
OCM.BING ACCURACY ON KYUSHU MISSIONS
I.iay 1945
OF FCRHATIOIiS CIRCULAR ERROR OF
0_10001 1000-2000' 2000-3000
1
Over J(X)OI Tetd
6 1 1 0 8
5 4
0 J
12
II 5
1 J
20
D3to. fol' 12 r:rl.ssions oot included bccuusv of insufficient photos.
-
-12-
58th
7,3rd
Jll.th
2lBC
Ring
.>13th
Jll.th
2l1lC
-II' Incluies a total of c:1ght formatioru; which did not bomb on briefed
e.iming because of smoko (Mission li.6).
!mE: Dlltn fer 6 formations not includtld becnuse of insufficient. photos.
For thes", missions, lI.CCYr3CY i"igurcs ho.ve oocn obtained from the
Oprat1or.s AI'llllysis Sectiol!, giving the circular error for as l!l8.IV for-
cations e.s sufficient pcetogn.phy wt..s c.vcl1L.ble, f1herc j>Ossible, ccl-
cul:l.tiens of the circular Error ';7crc bc.sed on actml bursts observed,
but if this .,'es iLpcsiblc, calculatior..s were r:w.de utilizing bo!r.bs-in-
air photogrnpb.y. Tl:is latter lethoo, clthough net completely rolilible,
docs p<;rmit accurnte cclculatiCin.> nthln approx.imntely 1000 feet. The
following tabulation su:::ce.rizes tho da.ta for t.he mission.:. against pl"ll-
elaion tcrgcts.
E:{arnlnntiCiIl of this table indicatG2 that on the wholc the Comrnandls
c.ccurncy llr.s bcell gooo. Of 1.5 mmings, only six rusulted in gross errors,
including foU!:" of th& 7Jrd Wing in which the briefl:id e.iming point was not
used. It sheuld be nott.d th:.lt t.h"'<Ic missi<.:ns \'lore: ccm:iucted against com-
purntiv..ly lightly dcf,,;ooc.:d tar15cts in the KtutJ tux!. Kobe regions. This
contributed to the snccessful results. Cocparison
'.'Iings in::ice.tes that ill of them attained approxiJ:uttcly the same
dcgree cf proficiency. The abovc'tubln includos visual
Inforcution is avuilable for fivc l'tid!l.r 3ightiIlBs on Mission 172 against
the Ka.;;... nl..hi Ale Plant, Kob". For these fCrr.ultions, the circular error
r1O.S 12,000
1
, 1'1,250
1
, 18,)00' and 24,400
1

/.ll strikE.S cgclnst the Kyushu airfield insto.lle.tions u(;re flown by

the ;13th ani J14th arrl frow. data. derived rOD llvailable aerial
phOt.Lgrc.phs
J
comparisons between the bombing accuracy of tilcec lUngs t:JtJ.y
m.t.de ns foll0l7S:
Bombing f'.ccUTacy ds.t.r. for teo !:1onth is rO'Ughly divisible into two
sections; strikes agci.nst precision targets am strikes e.gninst Kyushu
airfiuld targets.
' UIlS:: IF;: j
sr.ipping tlctivitlcs. Also, attrition mine fiddl:l planted in tho Imters
nrouni Kcbu nm Osakll hnve had this 8ll1ll0 effect becnuse mine suceping
close to CnL in confined wnters is a slow of the
ports of ftlgoyn, Tokyo, arrl tile SOilS of 1.11ynzu nr..d Tsurugu in Northern
Honshu hns lLIso beer. ;'Iith success.
c. Nc.1:nl 3e.scs - The main nuvnl bnso is at Kure am the majority
of navo.l ships have been sUltioncd in the Kurc-!lirosh1m.D. aren. The waters
hnvc boen mined to reduce the flc,xibility of Joptloose nuvnl operations by
the threat mine fields prosent to shipping movement. This
hilS been chiefly n tncticru operation in support of tho OY.1nc.na CIJ.Clpn.i.gn.

-13-
Av:rt.g_ fUl,l r...,Cm'n;"d. ,'{.<.:r.f..%c1 furthor in [.1l'_y tc 750 gollollS,
eompurui to 901 in April and in Eierch. The 7jrd i"!ine nvo.n.gr,d 699
gc.llcl"'.s, th.. 58th ';li:!g 7';:.1 gdlor.... , tho. 34th ml'lf:: 782 eD.11Clns, v.rrl the
313ti1 j,ing 793 go-Hum,
Th", Corunr:.lX, Clvcn:.g<:<u th(' le.rgc:.>t bor.'lb 10nd on rEcord during May,
nch pIn!!; carr;yir..g nn average cf 12,705 pounds cQ:npured co 11,522 in
April in Mc.rch, Tho 73rd r.ing <,,,Vi:::raged 13,673 puun1s, tho
313th :,inG 13,065 pourrls, t..lu_ 58th pound!'>, e.rrl th" 311,.th
"ing ::tJ ,-1-65 pou.."rls. Lpril figurer; were 12,880 for th 73rd Wing, 12,088
fur tilt.. 313tli ?ling Ql1l..- 9,074 ftlr the JUth i!ing. To put the, 34th fling
on (. bush; of thl::! gl'C:1tt..r distunce the:.' must fly,
3000 pounh. shuuld b0 tu t.he-ir figures,
5, Bunb ani Fuel rata
, ....'iug 11::..y, in conjun::tion wit!'! the Psychf'logic:.>.l ;;arfo.ru Branch
of CIilCP;.C c.ne. o',n, th" ir..itinted & prcg:'ru:\ of leaflet drop-
ping ove,r p'illCipu1 In.pun-..sl;> tnrge-ts, Orner this prClgr:..rn, pr:nphllJt3
b;y" r:::<.-fr..rio. (;xperts D,.l"o;.. londr::d in specio.lJ.y design-
c-d C2sec r..rKl thGn I',;h.o.s"d UV6r J:l.fXll1 by 1l1rcl"!.ft of the 7.3ro. \line flying
$trlkl Qission$. Although tons dropped
in ti!'!.1'ch, t:-J.b- .<)ctUDJ. progrurll die. not COL1.";lCnCl: until Uny,
Jl.mong tht! turge<ts upon \ihich 1ccflcts l1ere C:I'opped during the month nrc
TckY0, Ynr;ata, HC',m.rJlIut:.U, KebB, Naf',{yll, Yokohor:w., A tot(l].
of 418 propugnooz. bunbs containing npproxL-;.at<lly 9,069,000 end
48,000 n,,";fspc.pG:rs hau been droppeci by the tlnc. of month,
l.,. Ps;\'C:'010Eicc.l .:o.rf".r0
1]1 J:::.punt;.E'(' drerl.lft 17rC dtJstroyoo nnd 82 probc.bly de strayed in
':.C/ bring the totw to d!Lte: to 614 a:rcraft dostroyed am 387 probably
oe::rlroy..d. In ,.QQition, ]00 Jc.p::t:l8se aircraft have ooGn destrcyed or
dOJ!lt..6""d on thE' growii in strik",s I;'_enin.st airrigId:; on Kyu;;hu am ,shikoku.
3. Ah'cruft Destroyed
lo'rct'l the. ir..fo:L'!:l:.ltion Ilvllilttble, 3!Jth fling "ould seem to have
till' high3!' bO'llbine accuracy for thG::;';' mi:::sionz. tiiffer....,nce may
possibly e;.pl.ciP.l::d by th{:. i:lethodg of briGfing used, tho f!ing
du::igroting tin Point rather than the nssig'l:ad ff,PI.
p:.:rcent of cr:eny t:.ircrr-ft ott.'.lckil".g I'1hich wt:re clfJstroycd or
probl,bly rvucheci its highost level in ll!ay Do Conmand cver-
of COllI:a!'(;.d 'te, 1.7% in Apcil, tht;: pr(;Vi0lli; Th<. 313th I:ing
c1(d"ln>,'d :<:1.8i" tht 34th ';iing i.6.9%, tho 58th ";ilng and 73rd i<ilng
11.6%. the cf attacks per B-29 over
to.;,'gr;t ".7t,,5 (.only 0.) in May cu;:1par;d to O.S in April c.m 0.2 1:1 f,!crch.
The, Eli.>rial c0moct "00}; SC0rr,lI ::'cr th"J month shc'"led 2,3 ,:,oomy aircraft
B-29 l03t uCtiOl1 unci compered to
4.6 in A!JI'il am. 0,7 in i.larch. Of COt.:ri;;G grc.llt 1.1ajority of losses
t action vlcr(. cCUl:;eo by fle.k rllth6r than ellli1.1y aircraft.

1. Aircraft und Losses

34 J8%
90 IClO% 62 100%
1.4
I
IUnknown
, ,. .."
.. , ',' '," "
During 1l.pril ani May fighter esccrt '1785 iUrnishod for fcur missions.
One of these :!lis:;;ions nea against Kyu:;hu airfields am no eoc-my fighters
wt:<re etX:t.unte-r.>d.. On threo reooining IJissivns. th<i- att.acking fo:"ce
cn:::ot;I!ten-d Ene!ily opposition. with the foiloring T(;Sul.tS. On cission
58, 6. totul of 531 at.wc:Cs resulted in thE. loss of only 1 8-29 to enel!:y
drcrcl't e..PJd flak and 2 P-51' 8. On mission 63, no 8-29' 8 wt:re lost an:!
4 ?-51'3. On mi::sion 186 to YokohOlr.a, 2 8-29
l
s c.OO :2 P-511s. On these
trJee missions, the fighters claim 57 encny aircraft destroyed nnd 27
probublcG, ruprescnting urrlatermincd enount of duplication with 8-29
claims. FrOl:l thc.:;c tllssions, it. can be stated that fighter escort hns
hdpcd to keep 8-29 losses t:.t a 10,; level, although data is roOt suffi-
cient for a final dotermination on this subject.
-14-
During April J04 B-29s lankd fit Iwu JiIna \'{hile pnrticipating on
bowhill6 3m ;::llr..i.ng oissioru: to th", .repo.nese cailllan::l. This was 9.1%
of tho sortiGs for th.:1t month, In ATc.y, 369 8-29s made landings on Iwo
while participnting on boobing & minlne; cU.ssic.ns for 8 .4% of sorties.
figure have been substantially and losse-s less uore
it not for tho l:liverse I7ctlther cc.nditiC'llS \'Ihieh pro:vailed at Il1u when
c.ircruft werE: returning frum sev6ral C1iszions. On Mission 174, lL.. May,
fcow lost nircrllft :ue c.ircctly chargea.ble; to the bad weather e.t Iwo.
On Mission 183, 2; ilay, the fog procltrlc-d lare.ings at Il70 an:! three
nircrn.ft w... ra lost as n r"emlt. Of the 78 crew Oel:loor8 aboard these
St;vcn nircrnft, 66 or 65$ p8.rt'.chutttd to
Beth e.1r-cr&ft erri Crctl loss ::,utes increased in May for tho secom
c.cnsf:.cutive conth, Tho aircraft loss rate was 18.(.% of U.E. compared
to 18.2% in April ani 14.3% in March. This was equivalent to 2% of
airborx c..ircraft in r,luy, 1.6% in April am 1.3% in MarciL The
loss rate Rn5 17.7% of V.Z., 0. slight decrease from the 18.2% April
but higher then the 11.2% rete of I.larch. HOl'evar, expressid on
l.I. sortie besia, cr",,: mtunber casuul.ties wero 1.5% of airbCJrre co::lpared
to 1.4% in Apl'i1 aoo. 1.0% in March.
3. of two Facilities
2. Effect of Figntcr Escort
PART VI, COST OF MISSIONS
8S 41. of thv 90 aircraft lost during thl: month were lost
cn TokJ,To milJ5ions, it Iil.] be that losses T:'.B..y level uff 0.3 the
chief Tokiu targets ere destroyed. An exact analysis of causes
fer aircrdt losses is difficult this conth bccaust:' of the luge per-
cc,nt.o.ge of unknown losses, HcwO;lver, 1.\5 shm;n below, the percent lost
to C1cchanica.l reasons inc.leascd 10% ovor the April Ratti,
Cd,'S&> FOR B-29 CPS; LOSSES I
/.prt w',Y I jJlR MAY I
25!.JJi, 19 1 l'nc::lY Action 32 52% 25 28% I
7 11% 11 I iAcchaniclll 7 11% 19 21% I
11. 34 -..up & Pero 5 8% 12 13% I
16 2&j, 14 17<J, I War Weary 4 6$ j
I
6 ?% I
Totc.! 62 l<JO%, 84 100% I
Rc.tO-tiol'.
Combat Opcr
Ene::lY ctic.n
_ Ul'.krown
Reclo.se & Roc,rg

PE.aCBI.."l' OF TD1J,L Lie LOST Hill DJ.?{hCED

J:.:.nucry March April

ft 51.6% ;'4.61 5.)% 14.8% 8.5%

Flak 12.7% 42.ifI, 77.8% 61.;% 72.2%
Flak end Aircraft 15.9' 8.0% 15.7% 6.5%
Acci60nt & 2.5% 4.'1% 2.0% 2.2% ).0%
..
Own Guns ','.0% 4.)% 1.7%
Other & Ur.kI'lOml 10.2% 5.6, 10.9% 4.1% 8.4%
May
77
75
8)
...1l!.
)05
4558
14.9 Pu' F'llcility
Sur ties
Sorties
J.IR-.:>EA filiSCUE F,.CI:"ITIE.S
I _ Aril
NU!lbEr of ::;ubuurioos 50
Ntt:lbcr of st1perem.boa (8-,9) 55
rhDbc=r of dmbos 48
thDbe!' r f surface: ships
198
)487
17.6

Tho.) Ll,;rC(,nt vf crcn tlCt1bE.rs rCllcued fr.,:1 thol:,c dOl'm at sec.

slighl:.lY iL to 47> the April figure. A total of
227 crc\-; m,:::bcrE ...... ro Im::t ",t Uo::l thE; D.onth, 122
kncnn tG heve ?2 b6iling cut OVer rontGr, and 33 in c!rcrcft
c.t :;;ct;. In addition, 75 of 78 crow J;l(.tlb<::'s ..r::chuted over
1;0;0 so.fely, fL(; incrci oing pt.rccnt rc:-,cusd in i,luy Wc.s t:.nlc ubtedly
partly the; result of .:lon incrElt,sing nlrnbcl' of c.ir-:3t.:c. rcscU(... fJlciliti"$.
A cc:..,:..rison of fc.cilitiLs in April (.m f",!lows:
;. nil' SOD. H,:,scuc
The J:.l;;rccnt cf cJ.rcraft 'txmbing which were bcttle-dN:1:iged de-
e:r\.. tlc(.d in tv 15% eU:l.pu.rcd tt in April 8.9% in
J14th suffered the nOEt riith c rete of The
58th ',ling imci 15.2%, the 7)rd liing 14.1% Did th(= J1)th Wir.g 1).6%.
f'fJri..l.. 1'Lt.,S h:.:.d !xol;n 18.8% for 31)th ',"ling, 15.7% for the 7)rd
,fir:g 15.5% fer 1:.1:... 314th IJing. FInk '.:a::; still tn... c..'l.USO
;'f.>!' aircr=tft lo:lt cnd dc.oagc--d, irxlicLted by the folloil'ir.g tLblu.
4. Dtu,ICE<C

COMPARISON OF MISSION
SECRET
.-

' .
ToPe .t
Mi..ions
Number of
Mission.
Numbor
Airborne
Number
Bombing
Aircraft
Loet
of AIrborne
Aircraft Lost
Bombin& Altitude
Tone
Dropped
Avero.ga Number
Enemy Attacks Per
:Bombing
10329 9415 175 1.7%
79
o
1
18
8
56
19
172
14
28
o
70
1059 105
10665 13
6613 31
2406 4
3531 61
54473 44
24496 32
6.000 t. 27.000 4933 132
6.500 t. 7,900 4093 8
6,800 t. 14.500 24335 18
19.300 to 20,000 6813 31
5,000 to 26.500 3747 5
to 20,100 10552 65
17.900 to 21,400
11,500 to 14.500
'9,300 t. 20,000
5.700 to a,bOD
13,200 to 20,100
2.0%
27.000 532
7.400 t. 7.700 1583
6.800 t. 7.200 9580
2.5% 5.000 t. 6 000 1082
.3% 16.300 t. 16,400- 970
1.1%


1.2%
1.3%
MARCH
1
5
21
5'
1
33
3
47
22
5
10
3045 55 1. 1023
0
;lAY
2357
401
3
137
4
7
759 13 APRIL 1.6% 8.000 t. 20,500 3342
333 8 2.2% 6.500 t. 7,900 2510
641 21 3.0% 8.300 t. 9,'00 4070
45 0 0.0% 5.600 t. 2b.100 257
1267 13 .9% 13.400 t. 18.100 6051
245
1463
1241
375
689
177
238
1470
181
291
4416
2570
87
MARCH - MAY
1309 1181 17 1.3%
631 571 13 2.1%
3f(P 3514 89 2.3%
13b4 1241 22
678 601 10 1.5%
224L ..R'I____ 1.0%
277
1566
'?,64
"21
766
638
366
692
57
1390
W'3
194
265
1595
200
316
54
1
2
5
2
2
82
7,
3
5
63
2
3
3
10
3
6
12
10
6
11
3
'17
101
146
nA.YLIGIiT PRIORITY TiRGEr
!lIGHT" URA:"" Ll{EA
n.\.YLIGH'l' tRBn.if AlIEA
"mIlTG (nGIlT)
TACTICAL SUPPORT (DLY)
MAY TOrALS
Dl.YLIGHT PRIORITY TJRGET
nGHT PR10RITY TARGLT
"'GIlT llR1AlT AREA
lUNING (fIGHT)
TACTICAL SUPPORT (IlI.Y)
APRIL !X)TALS
DA.YLIGHT PRI03.1'1Y Tl.RGB:r
lJIGST PRIORITY TARGLT
tnGh"T UR3AN A.r.1I'.A
DAYLIGHT UImAJJ AP.E.A
MINING (:-lIGHT)
TACTICAL SUPPORT (n,..y)
TOTi<L
i DAYLIGHT PRIORITY TJRGET
'I NIGHT PR10RITY TMlGI T
NIGHT URUlJ AREA
MINING
TACTIC.A.L SUPPORT (nl-Y)
KARCH IJOTAtS
.
. .

: .,.
TOJ.APJJJ
MAR _
TO
NOV DEC JAll FEB MAR APR
!!!!.
MAY

!fe 30mbin& Primary Target to Ale Airborne
21% 66% 44% 50%
64% 65% 69% 67%
61%
J./O :BomblJ1g All Targets to A/e Airborne 79%
62% 62% 67% 93% 93% 92% 93%
91%
;"/0 Ef'fe.Jtho to A/C Airborne 79%
63% 62% 67% 93% 93% 92% 93%
91%
!/O Non-EffEC; for All Causes to A/e Airborne
21% 17% 16% 13% 7% 7%
6% 7% 9%
!/C Non-EffEC. for Mechanical Reasons to Ale Airb': 19.0% 14.7% 12.3% 7i4f.. 4.7% 4.6% 5.2%
4.6% 5.9%
Ale Loat or Battle Damaged to A/e Over Target
6.6% }2.6% 39.1% 26.0% 10.4% 16.9% 17.2% 15.9% 17.6%
Lost to A/e Airborne
1;6% 5.7% 3.3% 1.3% 1.6% 2.0% 1.6% 2<1%
30urs Flown per Ale On Hand 58th \ling
19.8 6.4 91.0 82,2 62.2
(AdJuated tc a 30-day basis)
73rd 1Jlng 37.6 54.0 60.1 70.7 115.2 117.1 99.
1 110il 64.9
31ath 't1ing
23. 0 49;0 54,0 105.
0 100,1 101,7 102.1 67.7
31 th \ling
76.2
121.4 115.,2 10
g
.4 110..5 106.6
315th Uing
f
3 .1 34.'6 3
4

6
-
Total. 37.
S 53.
6 56.1 64.3 111..1 107.6 98.9
104;7 89.7
Combat Sortles per A/e On Hand
58th \"ling f f
5.61 5.18 5.16
(AdJustod to n 3D-day baSis) 73rd ''ling 3.25
4;34 3.86 3.65
1.. 85 6.41 7.13 5.57
3lath mng
1.17 3. 21 ;47 6.42 6.39
6,42 5.26
31 th Ving
.92 6.76 6.63 6.21 6.45
6;14
}15th Ufng
f
3.52

3.3
6
-
-- -- - - -
*
A/c h d btl I Total 3.25 4.29 2,90 3;35 6.77 6.81 6.21 6.53 5.55
on on u no Bort as and or flying time.
, A/C bomuing primary target and e.ll targets are compared to airborne A/C, excluding homing and diversionary A/C, Guperdumbos, etc
WniCh wero not expected to bomb.
.,
f" Q. bpmbl.qg tar.get.s .on 19'panese l10me islands 1s taken as the nearest measure available of A/C over target.
A/C lost in this relationship
__ ' __ -____ _'7_

. , .
.
,
,
. ,
. .
~ , "'"
~ ' '. ..~
~ " . ~
~ ~ ~ I( XXI
Bomber Command
,

1 JULY 1945
..
.w-..... ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ____J.___u_
New Records
Jj
mGELIGifl'S !Q! ~
llESULTS
COST OF MISSIONS
EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRCRAr"r ON MISSIONS
USE OF AIRCRAFT Aim CRE'IS
OTHER USES OF AIRCRAFT AND cmTI'1S
STRElIDTH OF THE COMMAlID
CONTENTS
III ROllBS FLO\1N PEa ASSIGNED AlRCRAFl'
Prepared By
33rd Statistical Control unit
-1-
MO!THLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1 July 1945
XXI :BOMBER ccrowm
PART I
PART II
PART III
PART IV
PART VI
PART VII
93 HOuas FIDrn PER ASSIGlIED CBEV
-7.1 LOliG RAJrl'rE SORTIES P::R ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT
.O.8 ~ OJ' AIiGOR.11E AIRCRAFT LOST
. 9 ~ OF AIRBORNE AI C 1KimED PRIMARY TARGET
. 9 4 ~ OF AIRBORNE AI C :BOMBrJ> ANY TARGET
*6.7 TONS CARRIED PER AIRBOImE AIRCRAFT
.32.360 TOliS RETEASED ON ALL TARGETS
1. Destruction Of Targets
No Da..mage
No Damsee
No Dam&l;e
l2}< (Prel im. )
4.3% (Prelim.)
No Dame.t;e
9%
'105%
95.7%
53.6%
13.
4
%
60.5%
(Preliminary)
one (Preliminary)
40% (Prelimlnarr)
(Prelim.)
(Prelim.)
2o,t; (Prelim. )
No Assessment
No Asse811ment
IDt lAo 11
visual
%Destroyed Or Damaged
two visual
attacks)
Target
During J'Une the XXI Bomber Command bombed Japan in force ten times. This.
plus mining and other combat missions, resulted in the largest monthly effort
to date. Urban areas accounted for 64% of the sortie effort individual stra.-
tegic targets and mine fields 7%. The results of this are
given below.
Nagoya. Arsenal, Chlgusa Factory
Nagoya Arsenal.. Atsuta Plant .
lfippon Veh1cle Mfg. Co., Nagoya(Same 3.ttack as nagoya
Arsenal, Atsuta.)
Sumitomo Duralumin Mill, Nagoya
lure Naval Arsenal.
Tachikava .1.1r De!lOt
The following table summarizes the damage assessment results on these pre-
cision targets:
Of the ten primary visual targets, seven were bombed visually, while in the
other three cnses weather conditions diverted the attacking force to the pri_
mary radar target. Of the fourteen primary radar targets, 5 were attacked
visually, 6 by radar, and 3 by a combination of the two. Of the total targets
assigned, 15 or were attacked visually by a part of the force. This per-
centage gives an indication of the variable nature of weather conditions over
the Japanese Empire and the consequent difficulty in weather prediction.
The XXI Bomber attacked precision targets on four days during the
month of June. These attacks \-lere scheduled to take place on three days, but
weather considerations forced a delay of 24 hours for six missions scheduled
for 9 June.
A total of 24 tar@ets were assigned to forces of varying sizes for these
missions. of these afforded a sufficiently Ood radar bombing run
to be assigned as both primary visual and primary radar targets. For the re-
maining ten targets, a specific primary rmlar target was assigned.
Visual Bombine;
Kauanishi Aircraft Co" Himeji Plant
Mltsublshi Aircraft Co., Mlshlma Plant, Tamashima
Aichi Aircraft Works, Atsuta Plant
Alchi Aircraft Uorks, Nagoya Plant
Kawanish1 Aircraft Co" Naruo Plant
Kawasaki Aircraft Plant, Kagamigah8.ra (Two Attacks)
M1tsubiBhi Aircraft Plant, Ka6amiga.hara (Two Attacks)
Kawasaki Aircraft Co., Akashi Plant (Two Attacks; also
radar attack)
Radar Bombing
Sum1tomo Light Metals Industry, Osaka
Alchi Aircraft Works, Eitoku Plant
Kawasaki Aircraft Co., Akash1 Plant (AlBO
JapeD. Aircraft Company. Tomioka
Hitachi Co., Chiba
()p.k& Inr:t Arsenal, Osaka
(Bote. Percent damaged includes removals).
r---
Sm.n.lARY OF MISSIOnS
%Of Total
Missions Sorties

Sorties
Strategic
Targets (Dayl1ft) 24 1412
1'61 25%
Strategic Targets (Night
2
11
43'
1%
Urban Areas (Daylight)
4
12006
31%
Urban Areas (Night)
11 1521
9914 27%
Mining (Night)
12
361 2081

Miscellaneous Sorties
-

*
-
32360
Total
562
----
Urban Arons
Dr
Destroyed Or Daoaged

(Pre11..i:lina.ry)
;'. '.' .:.., ....
The folloving gives tha daDage inflicted by target:
Osaka and .At3agasaki
8.02 sq, miles (Total to
Kobe

(Total t. dat_S.75)
HezrwJatsu
Shizuoka 2.28-
Kot;oshima 2.11
0........ 2.1)
(PreliD.inary)
royohashi
log (PreliminE\rY)
1ukuoka 1.37
Yokkaichi 1.23
(Prel imin::-ry)
.....seIJo. Moji, Omuta, &Hobeoka Less than 1 sq. ni.
ouch (Prelim.)
Targets
AasUI:l.1gaura SeaplDJle Base (Attacked by
two forces)
Sitachi E!'J6ineering Works, Kaigan Plant
Stra.tegic Tareets OUght)
Til.:! 315t.ll tUng oadG its debut this oonth in tvo night miEjsions against 011
industry ta..'gets. By utUizi..n& the A.?Qr7 equipoent of this specialized \ling,
it is hoP3d that cn.terial can be inflicted at. night on precision targets.
It will bo remembered that similar attacka launched in March by other wings of
the collll!l2.lld vere not successful.
rr
The three at.tacking forces ....hich vore forced to boob radar targets
were able t.o bomb t.hese targots visually and inflict substant1al damage. The
resul ts of those attacks are as follows:
It should be remembered that substantial. t\a'llage to important strategic tar-
gets often results from these incandiary raids against industrial and urban areas
Inforcation is not available to assess adequately the results of these two
missions. Preliminary reports indicate that 30% of one target, tho Ut.sube River
Oil Refinory, Yokkaichi, has been destroyed or daoaged, but this assessment in-
cludes dalllBgil inflicted on a previous da,ylight mission when a small force bombed
this tal'get as secondary objective.
Over 25 sqWJ.I"e miles of urban and industrial areas were burned out during
June to bring the total to date to apyroxil:l&tel;y 120 square miles. The attacks
agair.st urban areas for Ju."l.e fall into two categories: (1) four daylight large
scale attacks agcinst Osaka and Ko'ue in the early part of the month; (2) three
niE;ht attac.k9 egai.!l.st eleven secondary cities during the latter part of the
l:lonth. In these latter raids, cech city WM the target for a wing attack, except
?uh-uoka against which tvo wings vere airborne.
Mining Operations
Minir.g operations vere carried on every other night durill June beginning on
.... the seventh. Targets wera the Shimonoseki Straits, UUgata, Fushiki, Nanao,
Tsu.nl&&. Malzun.t. Fukuoka. Karatsu, Sakata, Obama. Sakai, Hagi, Sonzakl, Yuya
:Ba;r and tbB lobe-Osaka area. According to the A-2 Shipping Intelligence Section
it is csttoated that as a of these operations: (a) passage of all but
scallar veasols throuC1 'the Shimonoseki Straits vas 1I:!possible for at least
of ;.he period 8-)0 June; (b) ports on tho H\I coasts of P.on8hu end Iushu vere
blockaded for va--ying periods aft or each clsalon, the length of closure
varying, in tI.11 probability, 1I!. inverse proportion to the importance of the port
to the cncClY. In other 'lords, tho more important ports were probably opened
within tuo or three days after ,a mining, while soallcr ports very likely reoalnoi
closed for D. week or acre. To componsata for that probability the larger ports
minod at more frequent intervals; (0) baSed upon the nuober of mines laid
during the month, it 1s that at least 100 enemy vessels of ell tyECs
and 010.888S \/ore sunk or deJnaod by B-29 laid mines in June; (d) althoU8h the
etrect of minele.ylng on Japanese imperto and exports cannot be ovoluated on the
basia of avnilable information, it is estimated that the available merchant ship
vas able to oparnte during June at only about of normal efficiency
tho r"lll.\ltD of Dublll"'r:l.no. <dr IU\d m1ni"e A.t.t.a.cks. This ostimate is partially
lIUblltantlatod by photographs showing large numbi!rs of vessels immobilized for
'ID11aually long periods in harbors and anchorage areas in Japan.
J
error is as follovs:
No of lormatious
6
4
4
ANALYSIS OF CIRCULAR E.HRORS BY :F01IHATION
e 1945
i"lING APRIL MAY JUliO TOTAL
.=.---=
--
58
-


73 34%
35


-
1%
31
I
1Gf,
I
!XXI BC
32i&

Boobing Accura.cy
Missions of Hareh-27 and 31 are included with
April.
From the above table it can be seen that approxi!:mhly 30$
of the Cot!::land
1
s bombs fall within 1000 faet of the AP. Of the VingS,
the 58th, operating in Ma;y & June, has compiled the best record, with
the 73rd and 314th close behind. In analyzing this tabulation, it
must be remembered that bombing accuracy figures tend to fluctuate
substantially from month to month. For this reason, data is presented
for the three month period as a Whole, and to be valid, any comparison
by '-Ting should be confined to the three month basie.
The table sUJm;)IU"izes the accuracy in terms of
the second element, the distance of the.actual NFl from the assigned
MPI. During this period, the average circular error of the Comm.n.nd
has been calculated to be approxicately 1100 feet. The avor89 for...
mation pattern baa been in an area slLghtly 10s8 the four million
square feet
IncludeB the !Ollawi"hformations
7Jrd \ling _ NiBaion _ Shizuoka Ale Engine Plant
313th YiD8 - Mission - Target 6195
313th Ving _ Mission 126 _ Hnmaoatsu A./7
313th Wing - Mission 126 _ T01'obasbi
314th V1n _ Mi8sion lqq _ City of Tokyo
[Ii: I
The Operations Analysis Section has recently prepared a de-
tailed study of the bombiIl& accuracy of tbia Command. Although the
final report for this BtudJ' has not been the follov1n8 data
soce of the statistics it vUl contain;
The folloWing table sumoarizes the bOlllb1ng accuracy of the
Cot:!NU1d in terl!l.s of -the bOlllbs within 1000 feet of the aiming point:
To determine the accuracy against precision targets, a total
of 39 daiYl1ght missions beginning with 27 March were The
very high altitude attacku prior to this date were OI:litted as unrepre-
sentative of current operations. All available strike photography from
these missions has been exaoined in detail, and vhere possible, bomb
plot a for 6ach fcrnation were prepared. \1hen smoke or overcAst pre-
vented identification of the actual bomb burst, accuracy was determined
by calculation from photographs. Insofar as information
\rae available, forma.tions dropping by radar .... ere also included. The
tbl.-ee Illost important elecents in dehrmin,ing bombing accuracy are:
(1) Percentage of hits within a certain dlstance from the aiming point;
(2) The radial or circular error or the distance between the actual
NPl end the asaigned HPI; and (3) The size of the bocb pattern. Each
of ihese elements bas been considered in this study.
PERCENT OJ' :BOMBS REI&UiED AT TARGET :FALLnrG VITHIN 1000' OF A.P.
Prechi.m Targets Only
2.
!reakdawn of this figure by circular
Circular Error
0I:i mile
1-2 mile
Ovor 2 .il
un
Sif;hting - No
of Formations With CEA 0
Radar
I Target
_rot
110,
nBG

1000'- 2000
1
-
!
c::n.
Assess- Asses&- TOTAL
2000' '000'
000'
able able able
58
1. 10
5
4 0
7
2 2

73
33
21 8
1
18 1

4 2

5 7
10 6
3
4 0 41
,31
I 18 16
9
I

1
7
4
3
70
XXI BC I 70 54 ----L.12
I
5 33
I
1...
7
I
255
"
- .

J. Enemy Fighter Renctlon

\
Pntwrn Size
7,000,000"". >'t. II
Less Than 4,000,000
SG. Ft. !
1100 Ft.
UOCi Ft.
.;.
. '.'
J
... .

J(1,i

April
I.-\ay June
!
I
. tU:ci{s Per 8-29 Over Tho
Target 0.8
O.J O.J
AttucJi.s Per 8-29 LOJI'\
105 110 158
AtUi.c:t.s per
16 14
16
Attuc..:s ?er Lost I..nd
""""""I
lJ
12 14
Joyanesc figbters again did not constitute Q serious interference
to the comrr.nndls combat effort during too conth. however. on the Kobe mis-
sion of Y Juno, tllere i/e!'e 100 - 125 fighters which offered the stiffest op-
pasi tion to tile superforts Since the Tokyo mission of 27 January. JlOwever,
destJita the fuct twt fighter oyposition lIus yet to show u general lIlll.rk,,-d
incrcil3e, it must bu pointed out tnat with full of Okinawu. ffinny of the
Jup fighters L.nd trainers have btlen into B-29 interceptors until
sucn t:ur.e as thc;.> muy be needed to rapel /ill invasion. und good buso wt:ather
plus fuvorublc flight conditions muy resu1.t in rencwed fignter activity.
Effectiveness or Enemoc Fighter Attacks
Tao txr cent of enecy aircruft attacd.ng ;11l1cn wero destrored or pro-
tx.,bly dt:stroy.:d decrease slignt:ly in June to 1J.&;I. cocpc.red to the lb.?];
for lIit;.y. f!o",ever. 4.) eneJ:lY uircrc.ft were destroyed per 8-29 lost to
.melllJ uction or unknown COl:.rlRred to 2.2 in Ir.!c.y. Fightkr escort lI'llS given
fOl tc.ree missl.ono during the lotission& on Ulose deys S'"<1St:llned 428
attncks. losing only O::'le c.ircruft to uehon by enucy I.ircro.ft.
W.J.lo. aggressiveness of Jap fighters remained relt.tively undiminished
tlunng June (40 _ 45% of c.ttucks breaking off at 250 yurds or less). the
effectheness of their attacks uppoaro to MV(; diminished wrlen vietlod in
of 8-29 losses.
1
It 1s belJ.eved trw. t the ac<:Ur".lcy oJ: the CClCtlWld would be even grentel'
were it not for two factors L" ,x:.rticular:
(1) Tr.a V"..l.riable size of too fon:ntlons. results, from the dif-
ficult weather conditions often provniling anroute to the target, scc.ttering
the or....gint..l aircraft cr fonr.ntion und Ill!l.ld.na: reasse.::bly difficult.
(2) 'fhe mixed coo-ructer of tl.c forwcticns in wnich aircruft or two or
I!!Ol"Q groups ure cO::ilbined in one foroation. Expari&nco in the Big!lth Air
Force l'.'1.t.l cOl!lposite groups l.as definitely proved that bol:lbing is less accu-
rate W.lOn l.o.lrcr..ft freo l:lOre th:m one group comprise u formtion. Tilis 15
uSWllly caused 0)" be difficulties of as:;cobling during lX-0r flight condi-
tions.
For Co cOl:lpareb:l.e in'the history of tlle two \Ullts, the
.bS be"r, r.ole to better tile o.CC'Unlcy of the Eighth Air Force. Tills increase
is jJEll'tiCWal"l).' t:.llTked in the )leT cent of boibs fnlling 1000 feet of
tone /I..i'.
It 1s ;vortlF.lhile to compar COI.'Ui1o.nd during these
tnX'ee monti1s with tile ... ccuracy achieved b)' the Eighth Air Force during its
1'lrgt ;l0llr in Uropean tHeatre. T1.e three chief cot1ponents for judging
bombing uccurucy for the two Air Forces nre suwwarized in the following
r.i"';;;;;;: '
I
CircUlar
%or ilombs Wi thin Error
1 1000 Feet Of AP (Estin;o.te)
IEig-" Air Foroe
AX! lbuber CO:;jWJ".d

\
JUN'
12712
11477
11880
/
FED
6024
6000
2
OOO
100
12000
AlJIIRAOE BOMB trEIGlfI' PER AIRCRAFT
I ;._
- - ' .. '#
.
4. Boob and Fuel Data

lJ.OOO,------------;co=,
Average fuel returned reoaincd at approximately the May
level, the Coomand averaging 742 gallons returned in June cocpa.red to
750 The 73rd tling averaged 710 gallons, the 314th \ling 733
gallons, tho 313th Uing 748 gallons. and tho 58th tTing 750 gallons.
Potentialities of tho B-29B stripped aircraft were partially
indicated by the performance of the 315th Ving in its first tvo combat
missions on the 26th and 29th of June. Tho average bocb load per air_
craft vns 14.631 pounds and 14,647 for these missions from Guam. This
load can be expected to increase substantially inasmuch as the average
fuel returned was 1320 gallons and 1181 gallons. Average gallons con-
sumed per hour on these first two missions was only 367.2 and 379.7
compared to 416 for the Col:lll1and
The Collltl8nd averaged. the largest bOClb load on record dur_
ing June. each plano carrying an average of 13.445 pounds inchning
mining missions of the 313th Wing, or 13.506 pounds for bombing mis-
sions alone. The 73rd 1'f1ng 13,935 pounds, the 313th lUng
13.547 includitl& minitl& missions and 13.761 pounds excluding mining
:nissions. the 58th \ling 13.379 poums. and the 314th lIing 12.949
pounds. It should be rem.el!lbered that these figures include substan-
tia! loadings of the 1'-47 incendiary bombs. Aircraft carrying these
bombs are limited to a load of 184 bombs, or 12.680 pounds. If air-
craft carrying bombs ere excluled from the above compariBon, the
total for each wing is by approximately pounds.
\lings substantially exceeded their figures. the 314th
\ling achieving the largest increase with a 1500 pound raise over May.
It must be pointed out that this .tTing is at a weight disadvant8e
becaUBe of the distance difforential.

,.
..
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,
PART II COST or MISSIONS
Aircraft and crow combat 106S08 for thli month of Juno worc
extroneIy 10'11. A total of 44 aircraft vere lost on combat missions
this DOnth. '!'his represents a loss rate of O.S% on cocbat missions,
substantially below the 2.1% rate for May and lover than tho rata for
any previous moth.
The low loss rate can be attributed largoly to tho lightly
defonded targets that were attacked during thO month. Tho Tokyo and
llogoye urban aroas wore not attacked at all whilo on two missions
against Osaka, poor weathor proventad aore than a row cnelll fighters
froe airborne against tho attacking force. It should be noted
that approxloatoly 50;& of the cocbat losses oecured on tvo c.isslons early
in tho moth agninst Osaka and Kobe.
The throe night attacks against oloven socondary cities voro
carried out at oxceptionally low cost. As a rosult of woak defensos,
particulaxl:.r scorch-lights. at those torgets, only four aircraft \tore
lost or of tho sorties.
Only one aircraft vas lost on cin1D.8 cissions, a loss rate
of
E=c:,y Action
Cocbe.t Operationsl
Unknown on Missions
Roclass &:. Rcorg
Rotation
Total
-7-
. .,
.'.. .
, I" "
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