St Maximus on IIci90<; and KivTJO"t<; in Ambiguum 7

Vladimir CVETKOVIC, St Andrews

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate St Maximus' doctrine of movement.
It is well known that the doctrine of movement in Ambiguum 7 was developed
in the course of Maximus' refutation of Origenism. However, this doctrine is
not something produced ad hoc for this purpose; rather, it represents the core
of his theological and philosophical insight. Almost every student of St Maxi-
mus knows his reversal of the Origen's triad 0'1"6.0'1.<; - K1VTJcnc; - yEvEcnc; into
the triad rEvEalS - KivllmC; - IT-ra.cnc;. By this reversal, the concept of movement
from the cause of the Fall in Origenism becomes an intrinsic characteristic of
the created being. Therefore, exploring this concept in a broader perspective
will certainly show that movement occupies the supreme place in the cosmo-
logical and ontological framework of St Maximus. The scope of our research
will be mainly focused on Ambiguum 7, but for a better understanding of this
concept we will extend our analysis to the whole Ambigua and St Maximus'
opera. The aim is to show how the concept of movement employed in St Maxi-
mus teleology, cosmology and psychology gathers all the parts of his diverse
teaching in one inseparable unity.
St Maximus' concept of movement can be divided into three aspects. The
first is according to the goal or the end of movement; the second is the nature
of moved being; and the third is the simplicity of movement and a geometrical
mode or type of movement.
1. Movement according to goal
Before we begin explaining the goal-related aspect it is necessary to show that
the ontological distinction between God and creation is made on the basis of
movement. The movement is driven by desire to attain the object of desire and
to find rest in it. St Maximus introduces the Aristotelian view of movement as
something incomplete. Thus, movement refers to imperfection and a being gains
fulfillment and perfection only by achieving the cessation of movement.}
A desire, and consequently also movement, should be directed toward some-
thing that is perfect. The perfect being which satisfies the desires of others
, Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).
Studia Patristica XLVIII. 95-lO4.
The full reference: Cvetkovic, Vladimir,St Maximus on Pathos and
Kinesis in Ambiguum 7, Studia Patristica 48 (2010), 95-104,
ISBN: 978-90-429-2374-4
96
V. CVETKOVIC
8t Maximus on TIueoS and KivTjcrlS in Ambiguum 7 97
should not desire something else than itself. The being that is perfect by nature,
according to Maximus,2 is uncaused. The perfect being possesses its caUse and
presumably its end in itself and has no desire for anything else. Only God is
without desire for anything because He fills all the things
3
and consequently
He is unmoved. God is one, infinite and uncircumscribed.
4
Therefore, God is
for St Maximus 'unmoved and complete and impassible'.s
A created being is endowed with movement and movement is therefore intrin-
sic to the nature of being. However, every is directed toward an end
and we can define every movement in accordance with the goal of movement.
St Maximus teaches that from God 'come both our moving in whatever way
from a beginning and our moving in a certain way toward him as an end'.6
Therefore, the rational being by its faculty of reason can choose in general two
ways to move. The first way has the end of movement in God, the
second way has the end of its movement in everything else, namely creatiOn.
In both cases the movement of rational beings is driven by desire to reach
an end, but every end does not bring the movement to rest, because the desire
is not always satisfied. St Maximus claims that what is intrinsically good and
lovable draws all movement toward itself and it satisfies 'the desire of those
who find delight in i('7
The divine being is simultaneously the cause of everything because it is
uncaused, and the goal of everything because it is the fountain of perfection
for caused beings. Therefore, St Maximus claims that 'God is the beginning
and the end'.s The goal of our movement is then identical with the cause of our
beginning, which precedes our movement.
9
God, as our creator, has already
determined that the proper end of our being is toward Him as the end in which
our movement will be completed. Thus, God, as the ultimate end of movement
causes the energy of the being which is driven to find rest in its cause.
JO
This
energy, which St Maximus calls passion or passibility causes the
movement toward its proper end. Passion or desire directed toward being's first
and only cause or toward the ultimately desirable.
ll
St Maximus defines passion
2 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lOnC).
3 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).
4 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lOnC).
5 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073B).
6 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073B). See the English translation in: 5t Maximus the Confessor, On the
Cosmic Mystery of Christ, translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (Crestwood,
NY, 2003), 50,
7 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069BC); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 46.
8 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073C).
9 5t Maximus claims this also in Amb. 23 (PG 91, 1257C): 'Everything that by nature is
moving, necessary moves for the reason of a cause; and everything that moves from the reason
of a cause, necessarily also exists because of a cause'.
10 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1069B).
II Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO72B).
as a 'natural power or movement passing from one thing to another and having
impassibility as its end' or 'irrepressible activity that has as its end perfect
fulfillment'.12 Thus, passion or passibility does not represent a corruption of the
faculties of created beings, but a constitutive or essential characteristic of the
created order. Therefore, aspects of passion can be distinguished in accordance
with the object of desire and consequently the aim of movement. Passibility by
itself is a natural capacity or faculty to execute the operation of movement
toward something in which being finds a source of its fulfillment. Thus, the
goal toward which we direct our desires determines the nature of our passions.
Not every passion leads toward the proper end and not every movement is
essential movement.
St Maximus warns John of Cyzicus (and indirectly warns us as well) not to
misunderstand passibility as a corruption of one's power,u This leads us to the
question: How can passion be corrupted if it is an inherent power that directs
being toward its end? Passion is a natural or inherent power produced not by
us, but by God in us for all movement. It is in our power to choose the means
and direction of movement and our choice is either movement toward its proper
end, namely God, or toward the creatures or objects of our desire.
Rational beings, after coming into existence through creation, continue
(continue because they were already in a transition from non-being to being)
to move not only in accordance with their natural passion from the beginning
toward end, but also in accordance with their free will, which determines the
direction of the movement. We see that Maximus makes a clear distinction
between movement according to nature (KUTll q>6crlV) and movement according
to will (Kena rvroJ.lllV),
The constitutive and distinctive feature of every rational creature is the faculty
of reason. Reason is a source of self-determination or self-governed movement.
Therefore, if reason is a constitutive faculty of rational nature then self-deter-
mination, or will to move or govern one's own being, is also a faculty of nature.
The will or freedom of rational beings to move in whatever way they choose
is in their nature ab initio. If they exercise their freedom to move voluntary
toward good or well-being, they are moving toward God as an end. By moving
steadfastly toward well-being, rational beings gain eternal well-being as some-
thing naturally endowed to them by God. Our beginning in being and end in
eternal well-being are given to our nature, and we naturally move from the
beginning in being toward the end in well-being. Nevertheless, the capacity for
natural movement is only a potential and the choice of the direction towards the
end in eternal well being depends on our wilI.
14
It is necessary to pass through
12 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1072B); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 48.
13 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073B).
14 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1073C).
98
V. CVETKOVIC
St Maximus on and KivT]crtC; in Ambiguum 7 99
mere well-being in order to reach the divine eternity. Therefore, being in which
we were brought from non-being is our natural beginning and eternity or eternal
well-being in God is the purpose of our creation and the natural end of our
being. The proper end as good or well-being is within the powers of our natural
will and our nature. Reason. according to St Maximus, directs free will to choose
movement in accordance with nature. Movement toward God is thus both in
accordance with our nature and in with our free will.
In contrast, movement toward the creatures or objects of desire is likewise
the choice of our free will, but it is not natural because it is movement toward
something which is less stable than we are. Therefore, the willingness to move
not toward God but toward something else corrupts our powers. Hoping to gain
its stability, the rational being searches for fulfillment among created objects
that neither satisfy its desire nor bring the movement to rest.
2. Movement according to the nature of being
The second type of movement in Ambiguum 7 is that of intellectual or sensible
movement. It depends on the realm of created order to which being belongs.
This division is basic to creation. Every created thing has its goal out of itself
and moves in harmony with nature toward its goal. Thus, the movement of
intellectual things is intellectual and the movement of sensible things is sensi-
ble.15 St Maximus does not further elaborate on the movement of sensible things
here, but he does not spare ink to describe the movement of intellectual or
reasonable beings.
Let us examine the way in which intellectual beings move. Intellectual move-
ment can be divided into two kinds. The first kind can be called ecstatic movement
or the movement of love; and the second kind can be called the gnostic move-
ment or the movement of knowledge.
Movement requires initially the appropriate movement of intellectual beings
_ that is, movement in accordance with their nature. If intellectual beings move
according to their nature, then their thoughts are naturally directed toward the
goal of their movement. Having an implanted desire or passion toward the goal
of their movement in them, they love what they think. Therefore, movement
toward the goal is a natural consequence of this desire or passion. Thus, love
caUses ecstasy or ecstatic movement of being toward its goal. Ecstasy means
that the centre of the being is moved from it and placed in that towards which
it strives. It is a kind of departure from oneself. Ecstatic movement can be
described by two concepts introduced by St Maximus. The first concept is that
of delimitation or the perigraphic; the second concept is that of voluntary
15 Amb. 7 (PO 91, lO72A).
emigration. 5t Maximus describes the first concept in the following words: 'It
not longer wants anything from itself, for it knows itself to be wholly embraced,
and intentionally and by choice it wholly receives the life-giving delimitation'.l6
Union with the divine being supersedes the boundaries of intellectual being
not only by centering being in the divine, but also by expanding the limits of
intellectual being through the divine embrace. Having been embraced by the
divine, the intellectual being changes its self-perception as defined by its limits
and circumscription, to being defined by what it is embraced by. Therefore, the
rational being no longer experiences limits because in union with the unlimited
and the uncircumscribed, the limits of its being are abolished. Therefore, the
rational being can participate in God without being restricted to its natural
definition (opOC;) and it therefore becomes 'uncontainably contained' (&xwpTj-
TWS XCOPOUIlEVOU).J7 The union of intellectual being with the divine does not
suppose a mixture or confusion of the two natures. On the contrary, it fully
preserves the natural distinctions inherent in nature.
The concept important for the understanding of ecstatic movement
is that of voluntary emigration. Change in the intellectual being takes place not
only on the level of definition but also on the level of will. Thus, the intellectual
being does not only will to know and to unite itself with God, but also wills to
be known, to be embraced and circumscribed by God. Therefore, Maximus warns
that this firm and steadfast disposition to fix our will in the divine wiII is not
giving up of our free will (Ull'tsOUcrlOV), but rather EKxmpllcnc; YV(QjltKyt,18 a
'willing surrender'19 (as Blowers and Wilken translate it) or a 'voluntary outpas-
sing'20 and 'a complete handing-over of our self-determination' (as Sherwood
suggests
21
). It means that our will is completely subject to the divine will, as in
the Lord's Prayer where we ask of God that His will be done. Therefore, our
reliance on God is based on the fact that He gave us being and the capacity for
movement toward Him.
The concept of voluntary surrender is central to understanding the differ-
ence between the Neoplatonic notion of return or conversion (E1ttOTPO<pyt),
and St Maximus' idea of &vu<popa. Sherwood
22
suggests that
St Maximus employs the Neoplatonic idea of the cycle of progress from a cause
and return thereto, evident in PreeIus' 12
th
proposition.
23
There is without doubt
16 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1073D); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, 01'1 the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 51.
17 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1076D).
18 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1076B).
19 See P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, Oil the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 52.
20 Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua ofSaillt Maximas the Confessor (Romae, 1955),
129.
21 Polycarp Sherwood, St Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries of
Charity, ACW 21 (New York, 1955), 59
22 P. Sherwood, Earlier Ambigua (1955), 129, n. 7
23 Proclus, Elements in Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1933), 14, 198.
100 V. CVETKOVIC
St Maximus on ITa8o<; and Kivllcrt<; in Ambiguum 7
101
a degree of this Neoplatonic idea in St Maximus, but the main difference in
St Maximus' is that an intellectual being does not want to attain the divine
being by its own power. The intellectual being voluntarily surrenders itself to
God expecting God to act further in order to achieve union. Therefore, having
unconditional trust or faith in God, the intellectual being expects to be embraced
by the divine being and not to actively seize Him. However, theoretically speak-
ing, God is not obliged to move one step to.JYard the intellectual being and the
union might therefore never take place.
St Maximus describes the nature of the future union between God and the
intellectual beings by the metaphors of air and light and iron and fire, fre-
quently used in Christology. This would be a union where the distinctiveness
of the natures is preserved. Thus, the illuminated air is still air, just as red-hot
iron is still iron. Therefore, the divine being penetrates the intellectual being
just as the soul penetrates the body; yet the penetration takes place the other
way around; the intellectual being penetrates the divine being to a certain
extent. However, the nature of this interpenetration is asymmetrical. As we can
see in the light-air and fire-iron examples, the light and fire play an active role
of illuminating and heating while the air and the fire receive the light and the
heat passively. Likewise, the intellectual nature of angels and humans also
experience passivity after the submission of their being to the divine being.
St Maximus clearly describes the achieved state by the oxymoron ever-moving
rest or ever-resting movement around the divine. The reason why rational being
continues to move even attaining God is due to the fact that the divine infinity
causes the desire not to perish but 'to become more intense and to have no
limit'.24
The second type of movement of intellectual and rational creatures is the
gnostic movement. The provisional division between ecstatic and gnostic move-
ment requires a corresponding distinction between certain faculties of the intel-
lectual and rational creature. The ecstatic movement is a natural movement of
the intellectual faculty of angels and humans, and the gnostic movement is
governed by their faculty of reason.
However, YVcOcr1C; or knowledge of created things is attainable by reason,
wisdom
25
and appropriate movement. The appropriate movement is actually
'naturally wise and reasonable movement' (cbC; Ka-rCt q>ucrtv croq>mc; n: Kai
ABAOytcrJ..l,6VroC; 01' dm:pB1tOUC; KtvT]crBCOC;)26 toward the object of knowledge.
Thus, the soul's faculty of reasoning is naturally oriented toward beings, in
order to learn the essential nature of beings. Knowing the essential nature of
beings means to know their causes and distinctive principles (AOyot) of their
beings according to which every being is 'unmistakably unique in itself' and
24 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1089B); P.M, Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 65,
25 Amb.7 (PO 91, lO77C).
26 Amh 7 (PO 91, 108DC).
distinct from others.
27
The striving for knowledge about created beings leads
reason to acknowledge that the distinctive principles of beings (MyOl) are one
Logos. Therefore, St Maximus maintains that if SOmeone is 'moved by
deSIre and wants to attain nothing else than its own beginning, he does not flow
away from God'.28
Consequently, not only the intellectual but also the rational faculty leads to
knowledge of God, who is the source of all life and knowledge. Rational beings
gain perfect knowledge of the created world through knowledge of God,
because A,6ym of beings preexisted in the Logos as divine wills. Therefore,
the ecstatIc movement, which is directly oriented toward God, apart from the
knowledge of divine brings is the perfect knowledge of creation. The gnostic
movement or the movement of reason, which is oriented toward any object of
knowledge, leads us toward the principle of every created being and through it
to the sum of all principles (A6yot) of beings, the divine Logos.
3, Movement according to simplicity or geometrical lype
The third type of movement, the geometrical type, shows once more the distinc-
tion between ecstatic and gnostic movement or the movement of mind and the
movement of reason. Following Dionysius the Areopagite, St Maximus teaches
about three types of movement: linear, circular and spiral. These types of move-
ment can also be delineated on the basis of their complexity; whereas the linear
movement is presumably simple, and the other two are complex. 29 Andrew
Louth
30
suggests that these three types of movement can be identified with three
of movement in the soul exposed in Ambiguum 10, namely the movement
of mInd, reason and senses. St Maximus obviously follows his great teacher
Dionysius the Areopagite who has a similar division of the soul's faculties.31
As we can see from the above, mind causes the ecstatic movement that is
simple and oriented directly toward the object of its ultimate desire, the divine.
St Maximus repeats this in Ambiguum 10, claiming that the movement of
is a 'simple and explicable motion, according to which the soul, moved
III unknowable way close to God, knows Him in a transcendent way that has
nothing to do with any of the things that exist'.32 It is easy to conclude from
this that the mind moves in a straight line or linearly.
27 Amb.7 (PO 91, 1077C).
:8 Amb. 7 (PO 91, 1080C); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003). 56.
29 Amb. 7 (PO 91, lO72A).
Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor and New York 1996), 205.
DN 4.8-10 (PO 3, 704D-705C); PSfudo-DlonyslUs: The Complete Works, trans. C. Luibheid
(New York, 1987),
32 Amb. 10 (PO 91, 1112D-1l13A); A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor (1996),100.
102
v. CVETKOVIC St Maxirnus on f16.eoS and KivWnS in Ambiguum 7 103
The second movement is the movement of reason and it is directed toward
the object of knowledge or 'in accordance with the defining cause of something
unknown',33 If the movement of mind is linear, which of other two types of
movements, circular and spiral should be applied to the movement of reason?
Could this movement be described as circular? In this case, reason begins its
movement from the object of knowledge, whose natural logos investigates and
naturally moves toward the cause of it. The.refore, movement of reason can be
described as movement along the Porphyrian tree; first from the particular
object to its universal nature, and then back from universal nature or generic
genus, over intermediate genera, species and the most specific species to the
distinctive accidental feature of particular object. This movement looks as cir-
cular, but in Dionysius
34
the movement of reason is not explained as circular
but as a spiral movement. It is hard to believe that St Maximus corrects Dionysius
on this point. How then does the movement of reason gets its vertical dimension
to become spiral? As we can see from Ambiguum 7, Maximus claims that even
the being wants to learn its beginning or cause or the causes of other beings.
It does not flow away from God
35
because many AOyOt of created being
inevitably lead to one divine Logos.
36
Consequently, the movement of reason
_ which is not like the movement of mind directed toward God, but horizon-
tally toward created beings and their causes ~ gets its vertical dimension in the
process of learning the ultimate cause of all beings. Therefore, the reason on
its way toward universals does not stop on most generic genus but ascends
further to the ultimate cause or Logos. Thus, St Maximus claims that 'if we
know God our knowledge of each and everything will be brought to perfection'.3?
However, we cannot know God because of his infmite nature and we constantly
direct our desire to know Him. Therefore, the spiral movement of reason is a
combination of the linear movement toward God and the circular movement
toward creatures. Finally, the last movement of the soul (presumably the move-
ment of senses) is a composite movement, 'according to which, affected by the
things outside as a certain symbols of things seen, the soul gains for itself some
impression of the meaning of things'.38 This movement could be considered
circular because the soul moves first toward the things in the sensible world,
and then moves back to itself where the impressions of the things seen are
summed up and arranged in a particular symbolic structure.
All we have noted serve to determine the particular principle ("-6'10<;) and
mode (t"p6rro<;) of every being in a broader ontological framework. The different
33 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 11l3A); A. Louth, Maximu.I' the Confessor (1996),100.
" DN 4.9 (PO 3, 705A-B).
35 Amb. 7 (PG 91, 1080C).
36 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO77C).
37 Amb. 7 (PG 91, lO77A); P.M. Blowers and R.L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery (2003), 53.
38 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 1113A); A. Louth, Maximlf5 the Confessor (1996), 100.
natural movements gather in one simple movement of rational beings. This
movement is directed toward the divine when 'the spiritual reasons of things
perceived through the senses, ascend by means of reason up to mind, and, in a
singular way, they unite reason, which possesses the meanings of beings, to
mind in accordance with one, simple and undivided sagacity'.39
We can now see that the notion of movement occupies a significant place in
5t Maximus' thought. Many different teachings such as the teaching on nature
and will, three facnlties of the soul, AoyoS and !cOyOl, creation (ytVE<JtS) and
rest (crl'Ucr1S), being, well-being and eternal well being find their explanation
through the teaching on movement. The movement of God toward man in
Christ serves as a model for the movement of man toward God that deeply
embeds the mystery of Christ in the mystery of creation.
39 Amb. 10 (PG 91, 1113AB); A. Louth, Maximas the Confessor (1996), 100.
104 V. CVETKOVIC
Table of Contents of Vols. XLIV-XLIX
VoL XLIV
II. Tools
I. Archaeologica, Arts, Iconographica
57
63
71
James A. FRANCIS, Lexington, Kentucky
Biblical not Scriptural: Perspectives on Early Christian Art from
Contemporary Classical Scholarship 3
Peter WIDDICOMBE, Hamilton, Ontario
The Drunkenness of Noah and the Patristic Legacy in Text and Art 9
Lee M. JEFFERSON, Danville, Kentucky
Superstition and the Significance of the Image of Christ Performing
Miracles in Early Christian Art.......................................................... 15
Rocco BORGOGNONI, Firenze
No Animals in the New Paradise? The 'Hall of Philia' from Antioch
and the Patristic Exegesis of Isaiah's 'Peaceable Kingdom' 21
Anne KARAHAN, Stockholm
The Issue of 1tEPlXmpllcrlS in Byzantine Hnly Images...................... 27
Istvan M. BuaAR, Debrecen
Images of Jews and Christians in the Seventh Century: The Narratio
de Imagine in Beryto and its Context 35
Vladimir BARANOV, Novosibirsk
The Doctrine of the Icon-Eucharist for the Byzantine Iconoclasts.... 41
Martin GEORGE, Bern & Katharina BRACHT, Munich
Mneme Database Church History: A Presentation 49
Ill. Histnrica
Josef RIST, Bochum
Das Orakel des Apollon in Daphne und das Christentum .
Thomas HEYNE, Oxford
Were Second-Century Christians 'Preoccupied' with Physical Healing
and the Asclepian Cult? .
Dennis Paul QUINN, Pomona, California
Roman Household Deities in the Latin Christian Writers: Tertullian,
Arnobius, and Lactantius .
The divisions and subdivisions of movement in Ambiguum 7