The Darfur Conflict [ 14 ] [ 15 ] was a guerrilla conflict or civil war centered on the Darfur region of Sudan .

It began in February 2003 when theSudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) groups in Darfur took up arms, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non- Arab Sudanese in favor of Sudanese Arabs . One side of the conflict was composed mainly of the official Sudanese military and police, and the Janjaweed , a Sudanese militia group recruited mostly from the Arab Abbala tribes of the northern Rizeigat region in Sudan; these tribes are mainly camel-herding nomads . The other combatants are made up of rebel groups, notably the SLM/A and the JEM, recruited primarily from the non-Arab Muslim Fur , Zaghawa , andMasalit ethnic groups. Although the Sudanese government publicly denies that it supports the Janjaweed, it has been providing financial assistance and weapons to the militia and has been organizing joint attacks targeting civilians. [ 16 ] [ 17 ] The Sudanese government uses oil revenues to fund a military capacity that is in turn, used to conduct war in Darfur. Oil revenues collected from companies around the world fund the civil war as well as violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Sudan's oil wealth has played a major part in enabling an otherwise poor government to fund the expensive bombers, helicopters and arms supplies which have allowed the Sudanese government to launch aerial attacks on towns and villages and fund militias to fight its proxy war in Darfur.
[ 18 ]

There are various estimates on the number of human casualties , ranging from under twenty thousand to several hundred thousand dead, from either direct combat or starvation and disease inflicted by the conflict. There have also been mass displacements and coercive migrations, forcing millions into refugee camps or over the border and creating a large humanitarian crisis and is regarded by many as a genocide . The Sudanese government and the JEM signed a ceasefire agreement in February, 2010, with a tentative agreement to pursue further peace.The JEM has the most to gain from the talks, and could see semi-autonomy much like South Sudan. [ 19 ] However, talks have been disrupted by accusations that the Sudanese army launched raids and air strikes against a village, violating the February agreement. The JEM, the largest rebel group in Darfur, has said they will boycott further negotiations. [ 20 ] In Darfur, over 5 million people have been affected by the conflict. [ clarification needed ]

[ edit ]Timeline [ edit ]Origins of the conflict The conflict's origin goes back to land disputes between semi-nomadic livestock herders and those who practice sedentary agriculture. [ 21 ] The usage of the terms "Arab" and "Black" has been opposed, because all parties involved in the Darfur conflictwhether they are referred to as 'Arab' or as 'African,' are equally indigenous and equally Black.
[ 22 ] [ 23 ]

Since the population of Darfur is predominantly Muslim, conflict is not about race or religion, but about resources as the nomadic tribes facing drought are going after the territory of sedentary farmers. [ 24 ] [ edit ]Arab Apartheid Beginning in 1991 elders of the Zaghawa people of Sudan complained that they were victims of an intensifying Arab apartheid campaign. [ 25 ] Sudanese Arabs, who control the government, are widely referred to as practising apartheid against Sudan's nonArab citizens. [ 26 ] The government is accused of "deftly manipulat(ing) Arab solidarity" to carry out policies of apartheid and ethnic cleansing against non-Arabs in Darfur. [ 26 ] American University economist George Ayittey accuses the Arab government of Sudan of practicing apartheid against black citizens. [ 27 ] According to Ayittey, "In Sudan... the Arabs monopolized power and excluded blacks - Arab apartheid." [ 28 ] Many African commentators join Ayittey in accusing Sudan of practising Arab apartheid. [ 29 ] [ 30 ] [ 31 ] [ 32 ] [ 33 ] Boston Globe columnist Fred Jacoby has accused Sudan of practising apartheid against Christians in what is now South Sudan "where tens of thousands of black Africans in the country's southern region, most of them Christians or animists, have been abducted and sold into slavery by Arab militias backed by the Islamist regime in Khartoum." [ 34 ] [ 35 ] Alan Dershowitz has pointed to Sudan as an example of a government that "actually deserve(s)" the appellation "apartheid." [ 36 ] Other distinguished people who have accused the regime in Sudan of practising "apartheid" against non-Arabs include former Canadian Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler . [ 37 ]

[ edit ]Beginning of the conflict The beginning point of the conflict in the Darfur region is typically said to be 26 February 2003, when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) publicly claimed credit for an attack on Golo , the headquarters of Jebel Marra District. Even prior to this attack, however, a conflict had erupted in Darfur, as rebels had already attacked police stations, army outposts and military convoys, and the government had engaged in a massive air and land assault on the rebel stronghold in the Marrah Mountains . The rebels' first military action was a successful attack on an army garrison on the mountain on 25 February 2002 and the Sudanese government had been aware of a unified rebel movement since an attack on the Golo police station in June 2002. Chroniclers Julie Flint and Alex de Waal state that the beginning of the rebellion is better dated to 21 July 2001, when a group of Zaghawa and Fur met in Abu Gamra and swore oaths on the Qur'an to work together to defend against governmentsponsored attacks on their villages. [ 38 ] It should be noted that nearly all of the residents of Darfur are Muslim , including the Janjaweed , as well as the government leaders in Khartoum . [ 39 ] On 25 March 2003, the rebels seized the garrison town of Tine along the Chadian border, seizing large quantities of supplies and arms. Despite a threat by President Omar al-Bashir to "unleash" the army, the military had little in reserve. The army was already deployed both to the south, where the Second Sudanese Civil War was drawing to an end, and to the east, where rebels sponsored byEritrea were threatening a newly constructed pipeline from the central oilfields to Port Sudan . The rebel tactic of hit-and-run raids to speed across the semi-desert region proved almost impossible for the army, untrained in desert operations, to counter. However, its aerial bombardment of rebel positions on the mountain was devastating. [ 40 ] At 5:30 am on 25 April 2003, a joint Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) force in 33 Land Cruisers entered al-Fashir and attacked the sleeping garrison. In the next four hours, four Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships (according to the government; seven according to the rebels) were destroyed on the ground, 75 soldiers, pilots and technicians were killed and 32 were captured, including the commander of the air base, a Major General . The success of the raid was unprecedented in Sudan; in the 20 years of the war in the south, the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had never carried out such an operation. [ 41 ] [ edit ]The Janjaweed enter the conflict (2003) The al-Faioyioshir raid was a turning point both militarily and psychologically. The armed forces had been humiliated by the alFashir raid and the government was faced with a difficult strategic situation. The armed forces would clearly need to be retrained and redeployed to fight this new kind of war and there were well-founded concerns about the loyalty of the many Darfurian noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the army. Responsibility for prosecuting the war was given to Sudanese military intelligence. Nevertheless, in the middle months of 2003, the rebels won 34 of 38 engagements. In May, the SLA destroyed a battalion at Kutum , killing 500 and taking 300 prisoners; and in mid-July, 250 were killed in a second attack on Tine. The SLA began to infiltrate farther east, threatening to extend the war into Kordofan . However, at this point the government changed its strategy. Given that the army was being consistently defeated, the war effort depended on three elements: military intelligence, the air force, and the Janjaweed , armed Baggara herders whom the government had begun directing in suppression of a Masalit uprising in 1986-1999. The Janjaweed were put at the center of the new counter-insurgency strategy. Though the government consistently denied supporting the Janjaweed, military resources were poured into Darfur and the Janjaweed were outfitted as a paramilitary force, complete with communication equipment and some artillery. The military planners were doubtlessly aware of the probable consequences of such a strategy: similar methods undertaken in the Nuba Mountains and around the southern oil fields during the 1990s had resulted in massive human rights violations and forced displacements . [ 42 ] The better-armed Janjaweed quickly gained the upper hand. By the spring of 2004, several thousand people mostly from the non-Arab population had been killed and as many as a million more had been driven from their homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The crisis took on an international dimension when over 100,000 refugees poured into neighbouring Chad , pursued by Janjaweed militiamen, who clashed with Chadian government forces along the border. More than 70 militiamen and 10 Chadian soldiers were killed in one gun battle in April. A United Nationsobserver team reported that non-Arab villages were singled out while Arab villages were left untouched The 23 Fur villages in the Shattaya Administrative Unit have been completely depopulated, looted and burnt to the ground (the team observed several such sites driving through the area for two days). Meanwhile, dotted alongside these charred locations are

unharmed, populated and functioning Arab settlements. In some locations, the distance between a destroyed Fur village and an Arab village is less than 500 meters. [ 43 ] A 2011 study in the British Journal of Sociology , The Displaced and Dispossessed of Darfur: Explaining the Sources of a Continuing State-Led Genocide, examined 1,000 interviews with Black African participants who fled from 22 village clusters in Darfur to various refugee camps in 2003 and 2004. The study found that: 1) The frequency of hearing racial epithets during an attack was 70% higher when it was led by the Janjaweed alone compared to official police forces; it was 80% higher when the Janjaweed and the Sudanese Government attacked together; 2) Risk of displacement was nearly 110% higher during a joint attack compared to when the police or Janjaweed acted alone, and 85% higher when Janjaweed forces attacked alone compared to when the attack was only perpetrated by the Sudanese Government forces; 3) Attacks on food and water supplies made it 129% more likely to be displaced compared to attacks that involved house burnings or killing of persons; 4) Perpetrators knew and took special advantage of the susceptibility of Darfur residents to attacks focused on basic resources. This vulnerability came against the backdrop of increased regional desertification. [ 44 ] [ edit ]2004-2005 In 2004, Chad brokered negotiations in N'Djamena , leading to the April 8 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government, the JEM, and the SLA. One group which did not participate in the April cease-fire talks or agreement the National Movement for Reform and Development splintered from the JEM in April. Janjaweed and rebel attacks continued despite the ceasefire, and the African Union (AU) formed a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor its observance. In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors. It, however, soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150Nigerian troops. On September 18, 2004 United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1564 declaring that the government of Sudan had not met its commitments, expressing concern at helicopter attacks and assaults by the Janjaweed militia against villages in Darfur. It welcomed the intention of the African Union to enhance its monitoring mission in Darfur and urged all member states to support such efforts. During April 2005, after the government of Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement with Sudan People's Liberation Army which led to the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War , the African Union Mission in Sudan force was increased by 600 troops and 80 military observers. In July 2005, the force was increased by about 3,300 (with a budget of 220 million dollars). In April 2005, AMIS was increased to about 7,000. The scale of the crisis led to warnings of an imminent disaster, with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan warning that the risk of genocide was frighteningly real in Darfur. The scale of the Janjaweed campaign led to comparisons with the Rwandan Genocide , a parallel hotly denied by the Sudanese government. Independent observers noted that the tactics, which included dismemberment and killing of noncombatants and even young children and babies, were more akin to the ethnic cleansing used in the Yugoslav wars , but warned that the region's remoteness meant that hundreds of thousands of people were effectively cut off from aid. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group reported in May 2004 that over 350,000 people could potentially die as a result ofstarvation and disease. [ 45 ] AMIS soldiers from Rwanda preparing to depart to Darfur in 2005. On 10 July 2005, Ex-SPLA leader John Garang was sworn in as Sudan's vice-president. [ 46 ] However, on 30 July, Garang died in a helicopter crash. [ 47 ]His death had long-term implications and, despite improved security, talks between the various rebels in the Darfur region went slowly. An attack on the Chadian town of Adr near the Sudanese border led to the deaths of three hundred rebels in December 2005. Sudan was blamed for the attack, which was the second in the region in three days. [ 48 ] The escalating tensions in the region led to the government of Chad declaring its hostility toward Sudan and calling for Chadian citizens to mobilise themselves against the "common enemy". [ 49 ] (See Chad-Sudan conflict ) [ edit ]May Agreement (2006) Minni Minnawi was granted a press opportunity with US President George W. Bush after signing the May agreement.

On 5 May 2006, the government of Sudan signed an accord with the faction of the SLA led by Minni Minnawi .However, the agreement was rejected by two other, smaller groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and a rival faction of the SLA.
[ 50 ]

The

accord was orchestrated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick , Salim Ahmed Salim (working on behalf of the African Union ), AU representatives, and other foreign officials operating in Abuja , Nigeria . It called for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army. [ 51 ] [ 52 ] [ edit ]JulyAugust 2006 July and August 2006 saw renewed fighting, with international aid organizations considering leaving due to attacks against their personnel. Kofi Annan called for the deployment of 18,000 international peacekeepers in Darfur to replace the African Union force of 7,000 ( AMIS ). [ 53 ] [ 54 ] In one incident at Kalma , seven women, who ventured out of a refugee camp to gather firewood, were gang-raped, beaten and robbed by the Janjaweed. When they had finished, the attackers stripped them naked and jeered at them as they fled. [ 55 ] [ 56 ] [ 57 ] In a private meeting on 18 August, Hdi Annabi , Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations , warned that Sudan appeared to be preparing for a major military offensive in Darfur. [ 58 ]The warning came a day after UN Commission on Human Rights special investigator Sima Samar stated that Sudan's efforts in the region remained poor despite the May Agreement. [ 59 ] On 19 August, Sudan reiterated its opposition to replacing the 7,000 AU force with a 17,000 UN one, [ 60 ] resulting in the US issuing a "threat" to Sudan over the "potential consequences" of this position.
[ 61]

On 24 August, Sudan rejected attending a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting to explain its plan of sending 10,000 Sudanese soldiers to Darfur instead of the proposed 20,000 UN peacekeeping force. [ 62 ] The UNSC announced it would hold the meeting despite Sudan's non-attendance. [ 63 ] Also on August 24, the International Rescue Committee reported that hundreds of women were raped and sexually assaulted around the Kalma refugee camp during the last several weeks, [ 64 ] a practice that the Janjaweed were reportedly using rape to cause women's humiliation and ostracism. [ 65 ] On 25 August, the head of the US State Department's Bureau of African Affairs , Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer , warned that the region faces a security crisis unless the proposed UN peacekeeping force is allowed to deploy. [ 66 ] On 26 August, two days before the UNSC meeting, and on the day Frazer was due to arrive in Khartoum , Paul Salopek, a US National Geographic Magazine journalist, appeared in court in Darfur facing charges of espionage; he had crossed into the country illegally from Chad, circumventing the Sudanese government's official restrictions on foreign journalists. He was later released after direct negotiation with President al-Bashir. [ 67 ] This came a month after Tomo Krinar , a Slovenian presidential envoy, was sentenced to two years in prison for spying. [ 68 ] [ edit ]New proposed UN peacekeeping force See also: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 On 31 August 2006, the UNSC approved a resolution to send a new peacekeeping force of 17,300 to the region. [ 69 ] Sudan expressed strong opposition to the resolution. [ 70 ] On 1 September, African Union officials reported that Sudan had launched a major offensive in Darfur, killing more than 20 people and displacing over 1,000. [ 71 ] On 5 September, Sudan asked the AU force in Darfur to leave the region by the end of the month, adding that "they have no right to transfer this assignment to the United Nations or any other party. This right rests with the government of Sudan." [ 72 ] On 4 September, in a move not viewed as surprising, Chad's president Idriss Dby voiced support for the new UN peacekeeping force. [ 73 ] The AU, whose peacekeeping force mandate expired on 30 September 2006, confirmed that its troops would leave the region. [ 74 ] The next day, however, a senior US State Department official told reporters that the AU force might remain past the deadline. [ 75 ] [ edit ]Implementation (September 2006) On 8 September, Antnio Guterres , head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees , said Darfur faced a "humanitarian catastrophe". [ 76 ] On 12 September, Sudan's European Unionenvoy Pekka Haavisto claimed that the Sudanese army was "bombing civilians in Darfur". [ 77 ] A World Food Programme official reported that food aid had been cut off from at least 355,000 people in the region. [ 78 ] Kofi Annan told the UNSC that "the tragedy in Darfur has reached a critical moment. It merits this council's closest attention and urgent action." [ 79 ] On 14 September, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, Minni Minnawi , stated that he did not object to the UN peacekeeping force, in opposition to the Sudanese government's view that such a deployment would be an act of Western

invasion. Minnawi claimed that the AU force "can do nothing because the AU mandate is very limited". [ 80 ] Khartoum remained sternly against the UN's involvement, with Sudanese president Al-Bashir depicting it as a colonial plan and stating that "we do not want Sudan to turn into another Iraq ." [ 81 ] [ edit ]Deterioration (OctoberNovember 2006) On 2 October, with the UN force plan suspended indefinitely because of Sudanese opposition, the AU announced that it would extend its presence in the region until 31 December 2006. [ 82 ] [ 83 ] Two hundred UN troops were sent to reinforce the AU force. [ 84 ] On 6 October, the UNSC voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan until 30 April 2007. [ 85 ] On 9 October, theFood and Agriculture Organization listed Darfur as the most pressing food emergency out of the forty countries listed on its Crop Prospects and Food Situation report. [ 86 ] On 10 October, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour , claimed that the Sudanese government had prior knowledge of attacks by Janjaweed militias in Buram, South Darfur the month before, an attack which saw hundreds of civilians killed. [ 87 ]

Children in the camps are encouraged to confront their psychological scars. The clay figures depict an attack by Janjaweed . On 12 October, Nigerian Foreign Minister Joy Ogwu arrived in Darfur for a two-day visit. She urged the Sudanese government to accept a UN formula.Speaking in Ethiopia , Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo spoke against "stand[ing] by and see[ing] genocide being developed in Darfur." [ 88 ] On 13 October, US President George W. Bush imposed further sanctions against those deemed complicit in the Darfur atrocities under the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 . The measures were said to strengthen existing sanctions by prohibiting US citizens from engaging in oil-related transactions with Sudan (although US companies had been prohibited from doing any business with Sudan since 1997), freezing the assets of complicit parties and denying them entry to the US. [ 89 ] The AU mission's lack of funding and equipment meant that aid workers' work in Darfur was severely limited by fighting. Some warned that the humanitarian situation could deteriorate to levels seen in 2003 and 2004, when UN officials called Darfur the world's worst humanitarian crisis. [ 82 ] On 22 October, the Sudanese government told UN envoy Jan Pronk to leave the country within three days. Pronk, the senior UN official in the country, had been heavily criticized by the army after he posted a description of several recent military defeats in Darfur to his personal blog . [ 90 ] On 1 November, the US announced that it would formulate an international plan which it hoped the Sudanese government would find more palatable. [ 91 ] On 9 November, senior Sudanese presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie told reporters that his government was prepared to start unconditional talks with the National Redemption Front(NRF) rebel alliance, but noted he saw little use for a new peace agreement. The NRF, which had rejected the May Agreement and sought a new peace agreement, did not issue a comment. [ 92 ] In late 2006, Darfur Arabs started their own rebel group, the Popular Forces Troops, and announced on December 6 that they had repulsed an assault by the Sudanese army at Kas-Zallingi the previous day. In a statement, they called the Janjaweed mercenaries who did not represent Darfur's Arabs. They were the latest of numerous Darfur Arab groups to have announced their opposition to the government's war since 2003, some of which had signed political accords with rebel movements. The same period saw an example of a tribe-based split within the Arab forces, when relations between the farming Terjem and nomadic, camel-herding Mahriatribes became tense. Terjem leaders accused the Mahria of kidnapping a Terjem boy, and Mahria leaders said the Terjem had been stealing their animals. Ali Mahamoud Mohammed, the wali, or governor, of South Darfur, said the fighting began in December when the Mahria drove their camels south in a seasonal migration, trampling through Terjem territory near the Bulbul River . Fighting would resume in July 2007. [ 93 ] [ edit ]Proposed compromise UN force and Sudanese offensive On 17 November, reports of a potential deal to place a "compromise peacekeeping force" in Darfur were announced, would later appear to have been rejected by Sudan.
[ 95 ] [ 94 ]

but

The UN, nonetheless, claimed on 18 November that Sudan had agreed to

the deployment of UN peacekeepers. [ 96 ] Sudan's Foreign Minister Lam Akol stated that "there should be no talk about a mixed force" and that the UN's role should be restricted to technical support. Also on November 18, the AU reported that Sudanese military and Sudanese-backed militias had launched a ground and air operation in the region which resulted in about 70 civilian deaths. The AU stated that this "was a flagrant violation of security agreements". [ 97 ]

On 25 November, a spokesperson for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accused the Sudanese government of having committed "a deliberate and unprovoked attack" against civilians in the town of Sirba on 11 November, which claimed the lives of at least 30 people. The Commissioner's statement maintained that "contrary to the government's claim, it appears that the Sudanese Armed Forces launched a deliberate and unprovoked attack on civilians and their property in Sirba," and that this also involved "extensive and wanton destruction and looting of civilian property". [ 98 ] [ edit ]January - April 2007 cease-fire agreement and its rapid dissolution According to the Save Darfur Coalition , New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and President al-Bashir have agreed to a ceasefire whereby the Sudanese "government and rebel groups will cease hostilities for a period of 60 days while they work towards a lasting peace." [ 99 ] In addition, the Save Darfur press release stated that the agreement "included a number of concessions to improve humanitarian aid and media access to Darfur." Despite the formality of a ceasefire there have been further media reports of killings and other violence. [ 100 ] [ 101 ] On Sunday 15 April 2007, African Union peacekeepers were targeted and killed. [ 102 ] The New York Times reported that "a confidential United Nations report says the government of Sudan is flying arms and heavy military equipment into Darfur in violation of Security Council resolutions and painting Sudanese military planes white to disguise them as United Nations or African Union aircraft." [ 103 ] The violence has spread over the border to Chad . On 31 March 2007 Janjaweed militiamen killed up to 400 people in the volatile eastern border region of Chad near Sudan. The attack took place in the border villages of Tiero and Marena. The villages were encircled and then fired upon. Fleeing villagers were later subsequently chased. The women were robbed and the men shot according to theUNHCR . There were many who, despite surviving the initial attack, ended up dying due to exhaustion and dehydration, often while fleeing. [ 104 ] On 14 April 2007, more attacks within Chad were reported by the UNHCR to have occurred again in the border villages of Tiero and Marena. [ 105 ] On April 18 President Bush gave a speech at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum criticizing the Sudanese government and threatened the use of sanctions if the situation does not improve. Sanctions would involve restriction of trade and dollar transactions with the Sudanese government and 29 Sudanese businesses. [ 106 ] [ edit ]International Criminal Court charges Sudan's humanitarian affairs minister, Ahmed Haroun , and a Janjaweed militia leader, known as Ali Kushayb , have been charged by the International Criminal Court with 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Ahmed Haroun said he "did not feel guilty," his conscience was clear, and that he was ready to defend himself. [ 107 ] [ edit ]May 2007 Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Chad president Idriss Deby signed a peace agreement on 3 May 2007 aimed at reducing tension between their countries. [ 108 ] [ 109 ] The accord was brokered by Saudi Arabia. It sought to guarantee that each country would not be used to harbor, train or fund armed movements opposed to the government of the other. The Reuters News Service reported that "Deby's fears that Nouri 's UFDD may have been receiving Saudi as well as Sudanese support could have pushed him to sign the Saudi-mediated pact with Bashir on Thursday". Colin Thomas-Jensen, an expert on Chad and Darfur who works International Crisis Group think-tank has grave doubts as to whether "this new deal will lead to any genuine thaw in relations or improvement in the security situation". Additionally The Chadian rebel Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) which has fought a hit-and-run war against Chad President Deby's forces in east Chad since 2006 stated that the Saudi-backed peace deal would not stop its military campaign. Thus the agreement may end up hurting the Sudanese rebels the most, leaving the Sudanese government with a freer hand. [ 110 ] Also in May, locations related to the conflict were added in Google Earth . [ 111 ] [ edit ]June 2007 Oxfam announced on June 17 that it is permanently pulling out of Gereida, the largest camp in Darfur, where more than 130,000 have sought refuge. The agency cited inaction by local authorities from the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), which controls the region, in addressing security concerns and violence against aid workers. An employee of the NGO Action by Churches Together was murdered in June in West Darfur. There have been ongoing hijackings of vehicles belonging to the UN and other international organizationssomething that is also making them think twice about staying in the region. [ 112 ] [ edit ]July 2007

BBC News reported that a huge underground lake has been found in the Darfur region. It is suggested that this find could help end the war as it could eliminate the existing competition for precious water resources. [ 113 ] France and Britain announced they would push for a UN resolution to dispatch African Union and United Nations peacekeepers to Darfur and would push for an immediate cease-fire in Darfur and are prepared to provide "substantial" economic aid "as soon as a cease-fire makes it possible." [ 114 ] A 14 July 2007 article notes that in the past two months up to 75,000 Arabs from Chad and Niger crossed the border into Darfur. Most have been relocated by Sudanese government to former villages of displaced non-Arab people. [ 115 ] The hybrid UN/AU force was finally approved on 31 July 2007 with the unanimously approved United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 . UNAMID will take over from AMIS by 31 December 2007 at the latest, and has an initial mandate up to 31 July 2008. [ 116 ] On 31 July, the ongoing conflict between the Terjem and the Mahria tribes (former partners in the Janjaweed) heated up, with Mahria gunmen surrounding mourners at the funeral of an important Terjem sheik and killing 60 with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and belt-fed machine guns . [ 93 ] [ edit ]August 2007 From 3 August 2007 until 5 August 2007, a conference was held in Arusha , Tanzania , to unite the different existing rebel groups to make the subsequent peace negotiations with the government of Sudan more streamlined. Most senior rebel leaders attended, with the notable exception of Abdul Wahid al Nur, who while not in command of large forces, but a rather small splinter group of the SLA/M he initially founded in 2003 [ 117 ] is considered to be the representatives of a large part of the displaced Fur people , and there have been concerns that his absence would be damaging to the peace talks. [ 118 ] International officials have stated that the difficulty lies in the fact that there is "no John Garang in Darfur", referring to the leader of the negotiating team of South Sudan , who was universally accepted by all the various South Sudanese splinter groups. [ 119 ] The leaders who arrived on Friday were Gamali Galaleiddine, [ 120 ] Khalil Abdalla Adam, Salah Abu Surra, Khamis Abdallah Abakar, Ahmed Abdelshafi, Abdalla Yahya, Khalil Ibrahim (of the Justice and Equality Movement ) and Ahmed Ibrahim Ali Diraige. The schedule for Saturday consists of closed-door meetings between the AU-UN and rebel leaders, as well as between rebel leaders alone. [121 ] In addition to those eight, eight more arrived there late on 4 August (including Jar el-Neby, Salah Adam Isaac and Suleiman Marajan [ 122 ] ), whereas the SLM Unity faction also boycotted the talks as the Sudanese government had threatened to arrest Suleiman Jamous if he left the hospital. [ 123 ] The rebel leaders aimed to unify their positions and demands, which included compensation for the victims and autonomy for Darfur. [ 120 ] They eventually reached agreement on joined demands, including power and wealth sharing, security, land and humanitarian issues. [ 124 ] In the several months up through August, Arab tribes that had worked together in the Janjaweed militia began falling out among themselves, and even further splintered into factions. Terjem fought Mahria as thousands of gunmen from each side traveled hundreds of miles to fight in the strategic Bulbul river valley. Farther south, Habanniya and Salamat tribes clashed. The fighting did not result in as much killing as in 2003 and 2004, the height of the violence. United Nations officials said the groups might be trying to seize land before UN and African Union peacekeepers arrived. [ 93 ] [ edit ]September 2007 On 6 September 2007, the next round of peace talks was set to begin on 27 October 2007. [ 125 ] On 18 September 2007, JEM stated that if the peace talks with Khartoum should fail, they would step up their demands from self-determination to independence for the Darfur region. [ 126 ] On 30 September 2007, the rebels overran an AMIS base, killing at least 12 peacekeepers in "the heaviest loss of life and biggest attack on the African Mission" during a raid at the end of Ramadanseason. [ 127 ] [ edit ]October 2007 Peace talks started on 27 October 2007 in Sirte , Libya . The following groups attended the talks: [ 128 ]

Justice and Equality Movement splinters:

Justice and Equality MovementCollective Leadership, led by Bahr Idriss Abu Garda

Justice and Equality MovementAzraq, led by Idriss Ibrahim Azraq National Movement for Reform and Development , led by Khalil Abdullah

Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front, led by Salah Abu Surrah United Revolutionary Force Front, led by Alhadi Agabeldour Sudan Liberation MovementG19, led by Khamees Abdullah Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, led by Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige

The following groups didn't attend:

Justice and Equality Movement , led by Khalil Ibrahim; they object to the presence of rebel groups they say had no constituency and no place at the table. Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdel Wahed), led by Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur; the group has few forces, but its leader is highly respected; refused to attend until a force was deployed to stem the Darfur violence. Sudan Liberation MovementUnity, originally led by Abdallah Yehya, includes many other prominent figures (Sherif Harir, Abu Bakr Kadu, Ahmed Kubur); the group with the largest number of rebel fighters; object for the same reason as JEM. Ahmed Abdel Shafi, a notable rebel enjoying strong support from the Fur tribe .

Faced with a boycott from the most important rebel factions, the talks were rebranded as an "advanced consultation phase", with actual talks likely to start in November or December. [ 129 ] [ edit ]November 2007 On 2007-11-15, nine rebel groups six SLM factions, the Democratic Popular Front, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the Justice and Equality MovementField Revolutionary Command signed a Charter of Unification and agreed to operate under the name of SLM/A henceforth. [ 130 ] On 2007-11-30 it was announced that Darfur's rebel movements had united into two large groups and were now ready to negotiate in an orderly structure with the government. [ 131 ] [ edit ]February 2008 A fresh Sudanese offensive by government soldiers and Arab militiamen against Darfur rebels has trapped thousands of refugees along the Chadian border, the rebels and humanitarian workers said 20 February 2008. [ 132 ] As of February 21, the total dead in Darfur stands at 450,000 and displaced totals somewhere around 3,245,000 [ edit ]May 2008 Main article: 2008 invasion of Khartoum and Omdurman On May 10, 2008 Sudanese government soldiers and Darfur rebels clashed in the city of Omdurman , opposite the capital of Khartoum , over the control of a military headquarters. [ 133 ] They also raided a police base from which they stole police vehicles. A Sudanese police spokesperson said that the leader of the assailants was Mohamed Saleh Garbo and his intelligence chief Mohamed Nur Al-Deen were killed in the clash. Witnesses said that heavy gunfire could be heard in the west of Sudan's capital. Sudanese troops backed by tanks, artillery, and helicopter gunships were immediately deployed to Omdurman, and fighting raged for several hours.After seizing the strategic military airbase at Wadi-Sayedna, the Sudanese soldiers eventually defeated the rebels. A JEM force headed to the Al-Ingaz bridge to cross the White Nile into Khartoum, but was repulsed by Sudanese forces. By late afternoon, Sudanese TV claimed that the rebels had been "completely repulsed", while showing live images of burnt vehicles and corpses on the streets.
[ 134 ]

The government imposed a curfew in Khartoum from 5 pm to 6 am, and aid agencies told their workers living in the capital to stay indoors. Some 93 soldiers and 13 policemen were killed along with 30 civilians in the attack on Khartoum and Omdurman. Sudanese forces confirmed that they found the bodies of 90 rebels and to have spotted dozens more strewn outside the city limits. While Sudanese authorities claimed that up to 400 rebels could have been killed, the rebels stated that they lost 45 fighters dead or wounded. Sudanese authorities also claimed to have destroyed 40 rebel vehicles and captured 17. [ edit ]August 2009

General Martin Agwai, head of the joint African Union-United Nations mission in Darfur, says the war is over in the region, though low-level disputes remain. "Banditry, localised issues, people trying to resolve issues over water and land at a local level. But real war as such, I think we are over that," he said. [ 135 ] [ edit ]Doha peace forum (December 2010 to Present) In December 2010, representatives of the Liberation and Justice Movement , an umbrella organisation of ten rebel groups formed in February 2010, [ 136 ] started a fresh round of talks with the Sudanese Government in Doha , Qatar . A new rebel group, the Sudanese Alliance Resistance Forces in Darfur, has also been formed and the Justice and Equality Movement is planning further talks. [ 137 ] The talks ended on December 19 without a new peace agreement but basic principles were agreed, these included a regional authority and a referendum on autonomy for Darfur. A Darfuri Vice-President was also discussed. [ 138 ] [ 139 ] In January 2011, the leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement, Dr Tijani Sese , stated that the movement had accepted the core proposals of the Darfur peace document proposed by the joint-mediators in Doha. The proposals include a $300,000,000 compensation package for victims of atrocities in Darfur and special courts to conduct trials of persons accused of human rights violations.Proposals for a new Darfur Regional Authority were also included, this authority would have an executive council of 18 ministers and would remain in place for five years. The current three Darfur states and state governments would also continue to exist during this period. [ 140 ] [ 141 ] In February 2011, the Sudanese Government rejected the idea of a single region headed by a vice-president from the region. [ 142 ] On 29 January 2011, the leaders of the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement issued a joint statement stating their commitment to the Doha negotiations and agreed to attend the Doha forum on 5 February 2011. The Sudanese government initially withheld decision whether to attend the forum on that date due to beliefs an internal peace process without involvement of rebel groups might be possible. [ 143 ] Later in February 2011, the Sudanese Government agreed to return to the Doha peace forum with a view to complete a new peace agreement by the end of that month. [ 144 ] On 25 February 2011, both the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement announced that they have now rejected the peace document proposed by the mediators in Doha. The main sticking points were the issue of a darfuri vice-president and compensation for victims. The Sudanese government has not commented on the peace document. [ 145 ] On 9 March 2011, it was announced that two more states would be established in Darfur: Central Darfur around Zalingei and Eastern Darfur around Ed Daein . The presidential decree making this official has not yet been released. The rebel groups protested and stated that this was a bid to further divide Darfur's influence. [ 146 ] Advising both the LJM and JEM during the Doha peace negotiations is the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG). Lead by Dr. Paul Williams and Matthew T. Simpson , PILPG's team has provided on the ground legal support with regard to the substantive issues in the peace process. In June 2011, a new Darfur Peace Agreement (2011) was proposed by the Joint Mediators at the Doha Peace Forum. This agreement will supersede the Abuja Agreement of 2005 and if signed, preparations for a Darfur status referendum will be stopped. [ 147 ] The proposed document included provisions for a Darfuri Vice-President and an administrative structure that includes both three statesand a strategic regional authority, the Darfur Regional Authority , to oversee Darfur as a whole. [ 148 ] The agreement was signed by the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement on 14 July 2011. [ 149 ] [ edit ]Mortality figures

A mother with her sick baby at Abu Shouk IDP camp in North Darfur Sudanese authorities claim a death toll of roughly 19,500 civilians [ 150 ] while certain non-governmental organizations , such as the Coalition for International Justice , claim that over 400,000 people have been killed. [ 151 ] In September 2004, the World Health Organization estimated there had been 50,000 deaths in Darfur since the beginning of the conflict, an 18-month period, mostly due to starvation . An updated estimate the following month put the number of deaths for the 6-month period from March to October 2004 due to starvation and disease at 70,000; These figures were criticized, because

they only considered short periods and did not include deaths from violence. [ 152 ] A more recent British Parliamentary Report has estimated that over 300,000 people have died, [ 153 ] and others have estimated even more. In March 2005, the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland estimated that 10,000 were dying each month excluding deaths due to ethnic violence. [ 154 ] An estimated 2.7 million people had at that time been displaced from their homes, mostly seeking refuge in camps in Darfur's major towns. [ 155 ] Two hundred thousand had fled to neighboring Chad. Reports of violent deaths compiled by the UN indicate between 6,000 and 7,000 fatalities from 2004 to 2007. [ 156 ] In May 2005, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) of the School of Public Health of the Universit catholique de Louvain in Brussels ,Belgium published an analysis of mortality in Darfur. Their estimate stated that from September 2003 to January 2005, between 98,000 and 181,000 persons had died in Darfur, including from 63,000 to 146,000 excess deaths. [ 157 ] On 28 April 2006, Dr. Eric Reeves argued that "extant data, in aggregate, strongly suggest that total excess mortality in Darfur, over the course of more than three years of deadly conflict, now significantly exceeds 450,000," but this has not been independently verified. [ 158 ] The UN disclosed on 22 April 2008 that it might have underestimated the Darfur death toll by nearly 50%. [ 9 ] In July 2009, the Christian Science Monitor published an op-ed stating that many of the published mortality rates have been misleading because they include a large number of people who have died of disease and malnutrition, as well as those who have died from direct violence. Therefore, when activist groups make statements indicating that "four hundred thousand people have been killed ," they are misleading the public. [ 159 ] In January 2010, The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters published an article in a special issue of The Lancet . The article, entitled Patterns of mortality rates in Darfur Conflict , [ 160 ]estimated, with 95% confidence, that the excess number of deaths is between 178,258 and 461,520 (the mean being 298,271), with 80% of these due to diseases. peacekeepers have been killed in Darfur. [ citation needed ] [ edit ]International response Main article: International response to the Darfur conflict International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by the advocacy organizations Amnesty International in July 2003 and the International Crisis Group in December 2003. However, widespread media coverage did not start until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila , called Darfur the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis" in March 2004. [ 162 ] Organizations such as STAND: A Student Anti-Genocide Coalition , later under the umbrella of Genocide Intervention Network , and the Save Darfur Coalition emerged and became particularly active in the areas of engaging the United States Congress and President on the issue and pushing for divestment nationwide, initially launched by Adam Sterling under the auspice of the Sudan Divestment Task Force. Particularly strong advocates have additionally included: New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof , Sudan scholar Eric Reeves , Enough Project founder John Prendergast , Pulitzer Prize -winning author Samantha Power , photographers Ryan Spencer Reed , former Marine Brian Steidle , actress Mia Farrow and her son Ronan Farrow , Olympian Joey Cheek, actress Angelina Jolie , actors George Clooney , and Don Cheadle , actor Jonah Hill , actress Salma Hayek , Save Darfur Coalition 's David Rubenstein, Slovenian humanitarian Tomo Kriznar, and all of those involved with the Genocide Intervention Network . A movement advocating for humanitarian intervention has emerged in several countries. [ edit ]International Criminal Court In March 2005, the Security Council formally referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1564 of 2004, but without mentioning any specific crimes. [ 163 ] Two permanent members of the Security Council, the United States and China, abstained from the vote on the referral resolution. [ 164 ] In April 2007, the Judges of the ICC issued arrest warrants against the former Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmed Haroun , and a Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb , for crimes against humanity and war crimes. [ 165 ] The Sudan Government said that the ICC had no jurisdiction to try Sudanese citizens and that it would not hand the two men over to authorities in the Hague.
[ 166 ] [ 161 ]

51 International

On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor filed ten charges of war crimes against Sudan's incumbent President Omar al-Bashir , three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. The Prosecutor has claimed that Mr. al-Bashir "masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part" three tribal groups in Darfur because of their ethnicity. Leaders from three Darfur tribes are suing ICC prosecutor Luis-Moreno Ocampo for libel, defamation, and igniting hatred and tribalism. [ 167 ] After an arrest warrant was issued for the Sudanese president in March 2009, the Prosecutor appealed to have the genocide charges added. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that there was no reasonable ground to support the contention that he had a specific intent to commit genocide ( dolus specialis ), which is an intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. The definition adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber is the definition of the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute, and some ICTY cases. On February 3, 2010 the Appeals Chamber of the ICC found that the Pre-Trial Chamber had applied "an erroneous standard of proof when evaluating the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor" and that the Prosecutor's application for a warrant of arrest on the genocide charges should be sent back to the Pre-Trial Chamber to review based on the correct legal standard. [ 168 ] In July, 2010, Sudan 's president Omar al-Bashir was finally charged by Hague for orchestrating Darfur genocide, three counts of genocide in Darfur by the International Criminal Court . [ 169 ] Mr. al-Bashir is now the first incumbent head of state charged with crimes in the Rome Statute. [ 170 ] Bashir has rejected the charges and said, "Whoever has visited Darfur, met officials and discovered their ethnicities and tribes ... will know that all of these things are lies." [ 171 ] It is expected that al-Bashir will not face trial in The Hague until he is apprehended in a nation which accepts the ICC's jurisdiction, as Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute which it signed but didn't ratify.
[ 172 ]

Payam Akhavan, a professor

of international law at McGill University in Montreal and a former war crimes prosecutor, says although he may not go to trial, "He will effectively be in prison within the Sudan itself...Al-Bashir now is not going to be able to leave the Sudan without facing arrest." [ 173 ] The Prosecutor has publicly warned that authorities could arrest the President if he enters international airspace. The Sudanese government has announced the Presidential plane will be accompanied by jet fighters. [ 174 ] However, the Arab League has announced its solidarity with al-Bashir. Since the warrant, he has visited Qatar and Egypt . Both countries have refused to arrest him. The African Union also condemned the arrest warrant. Some analysts think that the ICC indictment is counterproductive and harms the peace process. Only days after the ICC indictment, al-Bashir expelled 13 international aid organizations from Darfur and disbanded three domestic aid organizations. [ 175 ] In the aftermath of the expulsions, conditions in the displaced camps deteriorated, [ 176 ] and women were particularly affected. [ 177 ] Previous ICC indictments, such as the arrest warrants of the LRA leadership in the ongoing war at northern Uganda, were also accused of harming peace processes by criminalizing one side of a war. Some believe that the arrest warrant against al-Bashir will hinder the efforts to establish peace in Darfur, and will undermine any effort to boost stability in Sudan. [ 178 ] [ edit ]Russian and Chinese undermining of sanctions Amnesty International issued a report [ 179 ] [ 180 ] [ 181 ] accusing Russia and the People's Republic of China of supplying arms, ammunition and related equipment to Sudan. This hardware has been transferred to Darfur for use by the government and the Janjaweed militias and thus violating a UN arms embargo against Darfur. In its report it showed a photo of Chinese-made Fantan fighters that have been seen at Nyala , Darfur and a Ukrainian Antonov-26 aircraft (painted white). The report provided evidence (including eyewitness testimony) that the Sudan Air Force has been conducting a pattern of indiscriminate aerial bombings of villages in Darfur and eastern Chad using ground attack jet fighters and Antonov planes. The report contained an image of a Russian made Mi-24 attack helicopter (reg. n 928) at Nyala airport in Darfur in March 2007. For several years the Sudan Air Force has used this type of attack helicopter for operations during Janjaweed attacks on villages in Darfur. The report also showed evidence that the government has been camouflaging military aircraft and helicopters by painting them white and in doing so, tried to cover up their military use by claiming that they were civilian in nature. The white Antonov-26 aircraft was reported to have been used in Darfur in bombing missions. Recently it has been confirmed by Airforces Monthly Magazine for June 2007, that China and Iran have financed and delivered "newer" aircraft for Sudan. The most recent additions have been 1520 A-5 Fantan ground attack aircraft. Also confirmed by Airforces Monthly is the use of Mil Mi-24 Hind gunships and Mil Mi171 Assault Helicopters. They have been photographed painted in UN markings and white color for disguised use in illegal attack missions into the Darfur Region. The base in which they have been seen is at Nyala Airport in the Darfur Region. 8 Hinds

have been confirmed operating in the Darfur region. One An-26 transport has been also confirmed delivered from a Russian civil aviation corporation. This aircraft is modified with bomb racks, and painted in UN white for illegal bombing missions into Darfur. The aircraft serial 7705 is used, but actually confirmed as 26563. Training for Sudanese crew has recently been confirmed to have been conducted and ongoing at Dezful-Ardestani Air Base in southern Iran. China and Russia denied they had broken UN sanctions. China has a close relationship with Sudan and increased its military co-operation with the government in early 2007. Because of Sudan's plentiful supply of oil, China considers good relations with Sudan to be a strategic necessity that is needed to fuel its booming economy. [ 182 ] [ 183 ] [ 184 ] China also has direct commercial interests in Sudan's oil. China's stateowned company CNPC controls between 60 and 70 percent of Sudan's total oil production. Additionally, it owns the largest single share (40 percent) of Sudan's national oil company, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. [ 185 ] [186 ] [ 187 ] China has also consistently opposed economic and non-military sanctions on Sudan. [ 188 ] [ 189 ] [ 190 ] [ 191 ] Recently, however, a 2007 Small Arms Survey research paper suggested that China may be changing its stance on Darfur due to international pressure. [ 192 ] [ edit ]Criticism of international response

The Save Darfur Coalitionadvocacy group coordinated a large rally in New York in April 2006 Omar Al Bashir has sought the assistance of numerous non western countries after the West, led by America, imposed sanctions against him, he said- "From the first day, our policy was clear: To look eastward, toward China, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and even Korea and Japan, even if the Western influence upon some [of these] countries is strong. We believe that the Chinese expansion was natural because it filled the space left by Western governments, the United States, and international funding agencies. The success of the Sudanese experiment in dealing with China without political conditions or pressures encouraged other African countries to look toward China." [ 193 ] Grard Prunier , a scholar specializing in African conflicts, argued that the world's most powerful countries have largely limited themselves in expressing concerns and demand for the United Nations to take action in solving the genocide in Darfur. The UN, lacking both the funding and military support of the wealthy countries, has left the African Union to deploy a token force (AMIS) without a mandate to protect civilians. In the lack of foreign political will to address the political and economic structures that underlie the conflict, the international community has defined the Darfur conflict in humanitarian assistance terms and debated the label of "genocide."[ 162 ] On 16 October 2006, Minority Rights Group (MRG) published a critical report, challenging that the UN and the great powers could have prevented the deepening crisis in Darfur and that few lessons appear to have been drawn from their ineptitude during the Rwandan Genocide . MRG's executive director, Mark Lattimer, stated that: "this level of crisis, the killings, rape and displacement could have been foreseen and avoided ... Darfur would just not be in this situation had the UN systems got its act together after Rwanda: their action was too little too late." [ 194 ] On 20 October, 120 genocide survivors of The Holocaust , and the Cambodian and Rwandan Genocides, backed by six aid agencies, submitted an open letter to the European Union, calling on them to do more to end the atrocities in Darfur, with a UN peacekeeping force as "the only viable option." Aegis Trust director, James Smith, stated that while "the African Union has worked very well in Darfur and done what it could, the rest of the world hasn't supported those efforts the way it should have done with sufficient funds and sufficient equipment." [ 195 ] Human Rights First claimed that over 90% of the light weapons currently being imported by Sudan and used in the conflict are from China; [ 196 ] however, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s "Arms Transfers Data for 2007", in 20032007, Sudan received 87 per cent of its major conventional weapons from Russia and 8 per cent from China. [ 197 ] Human rights advocates and opponents of the Sudanese government portray China's role in providing weapons and aircraft as a cynical attempt to obtain oil just as colonial powers once supplied African chieftains with the military means to maintain control as they extracted natural resources. [ 198 ] [ 199 ] [ 200 ] According to China's critics, China has offered Sudan support threatening to use its veto on the UN Security Council to protect Khartoum from sanctions and has been able to water down every resolution on Darfur in order to protect its interests in Sudan. [ 201 ] Accusations of the supply of weapons from China, violating the UN arms embargo , continue to arise. [ 202 ]

Amnesty International slammed Russia for breaking the UN arms embargo on Darfur, Russians sold weapons like Mi-24 helicopters, Anntonov 26 planes, Russian weapons sales to Sudan totaled 21 million dollars. It was reported these weapons were used to slaughter Darfur civilians. The report said Russia "cannot have been unaware of reports of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law by the Sudanese security forces, But they have nevertheless continued to allow military equipment to be sent to Sudan." Russia was reported to "have been or should have been aware, several types of military equipment, including aircraft, have been deployed by the Sudanese armed forces for direct attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks in Darfur". The Russian planes were disguised as UN Planes which violate the Geneva Conventions. The Janjaweed also used Russian small arms to murder and loot, these Russian weapons spread into neighboring Chad. In 2005 helicopters from Russia were sold to Sudan for 7 million pounds sterling. Photos show Russian helicopters in Darfur. [ 203 ] [ 204 ] [ 205 ] The US-funded Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, which investigates attacks in southern Sudan concluded that "as the Government of Sudan sought to clear the way for oil exploration and to create a cordon sanitaire around the oil fields, vast tracts of the Western Upper Nile Region in southern Sudan became the focus of extensive military operations." [ 206 ] However, experts say the Darfur region is unlikely to hold significant oil reserves. [ 207 ] Sarah Wykes , a senior campaigner at Global Witness , an NGO that campaigns for better natural resource governance, says: "Sudan has purchased about $100m in arms from China and has used these weapons against civilians in Darfur." [ 199 ] In March 2007, threats of boycotting the Olympic games came from French presidential candidate Franois Bayrou , in an effort to stop China's support to the Sudanese government in the war. [ 208 ]There were also calls for boycotts from actor and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Mia Farrow , Genocide Intervention Network Representative Ronan Farrow , [ 209 ] author and Sudan scholar Eric Reeves[ 210 ] and the Washington Post editorial board. [ 211 ] [ 212 ] Sudan divestment efforts have also concentrated on PetroChina , the national petroleum company with extensive investments in Sudan. [ 213 ] In May 2009 the Mandate Darfur was canceled because the "Sudanese government is obstructing the safe passage of Darfurian delegates from Sudan." [ 214 ] The Mandate was a conference that would have brought together 300 representatives from different regions of the civil society of Darfur. [ 214 ] The conference planned was to be held in Addis Ababa sometime in early May.

PIRATES Somali pirates have been making headline news lately, and they've even begun to affect the tourism industry along Kenya's coast with a couple of frightening cases of kidnapping from beach resorts. Find out who these modern day pirates are, where and how they operate, and why they've turned from fishing to piracy.

The Current Status of Somali Piracy

According to a recent BBC report, Somali pirates seized a record 1,181 hostages in 2010, and were paid many millions of dollars in ransom.

In the Fall of 2011, more than 300 hundred people were being held hostage by various pirate groups based in Somalia.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) considers the Somali coast to be the most dangerous stretch of water in the world. At any given time pirates are holding at least a dozen ships hostage including the occasional oil supertanker for which they can demand up to $25 million in ransom. A typical piracy attempt reads like this:

11.04.2009: 1240 UTC: Posn: 00:18.2N - 051:44.3E, About 285 nm east of Mogadishu, Somalia.

Eight pirates armed with guns and RPG in two skiffs, launched by a pirate mother vessel, attacked a container ship underway. Master increased speed to 22.8 knots and the skiffs followed at 23.5 knots. They approach very close and fired upon the ship. Master made evasive manoeuvers and prevented the boarding.

These live piracy reports come in several times a day.

Where do Somali Pirates Operate?

Somalia has a huge coastline (see map), wrapped around the Horn of Africa. In 2008 many pirate attacks were launched in the narrow channel known as the The Gulf of Aden. In response to these attacks and the economic effect they were having on this popular shipping channel, a fleet of international warships are now on daily patrol. Pirates are now known to be using "mother ships" so they can launch attacks further out at sea. Have a look at thisinternational piracy map for a graphic overview of all the latest piracy attempts.

Who are These Pirates?

Somali pirates don't wear eye patches, and instead of swords they have RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). They use small, fast speedboats to get around and work in crews of 10 or so. Once they find a good target, they launch hooks and rope ladders up to board the ship and overwhelm the crew. They often attack at night. In 2008, 40 ships were successfully captured and ransoms were paid ranging from $500,000 to $2 million. In 2010, 49 ships were hijacked off the coast of Somalia (out of a total of 53 worldwide). Quite the incentive for poor fishermen living in a war torn African country. Successful pirates live well, they marry beautiful women, drive big cars, build big houses, and buy increasingly sophisticated weapons. Somali pirates have accountants, lend money to businessmen, and are basically running the economy of the autonomous region ofPuntland. A BBC report in January 2012 claims that pirates have boosted the Somali economy significantly, but not all of it has trickled down to the coastal communities. Just feeding and housing the hijacked crews helps sustain the economy in Puntland. A BBC report filed in September 2008 talks about life in a Somali pirate town: "Eyl has become a town tailor-made for pirates - and their hostages. Special restaurants have even been set up to prepare food for the crews of the hijacked ships. As the pirates want ransom payments, they try to look after their hostages."

Sea Bandits or Coastguards?

In a recent report, BBC Somalia analyst Mohamed Mohamed says pirates are a combination of ex-fisherman, ex-militia, and computer geeks. There's no use hijacking a huge ship if you don't know how the radio works and therefore can't demand your ransom. Pirates also have to know how to use GPS. Somali pirates don't see themselves as the bad guys. A pirate interviewed by the New York Times said: "We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas. We are simply patrolling our seas. Think of us like a coast guard." The article continues -- "Somalia's central government imploded in 1991, casting the country into chaos. With no patrols along the shoreline, Somalia's tuna-rich waters were soon plundered by commercial fishing fleets from around the world. Somali fishermen armed themselves and turned into vigilantes by confronting illegal fishing boats and demanding that they pay a tax". Also, check out this video by rap artist K'Naan for a very articulate Somali opinion about piracy.

Why Doesn't Somalia's Government Act?

Somalia doesn't take action against these pirates, nor can they register complaints from ships that are attacked, since it has a barely functioning government. A few years ago, there wasno government at all. The current Somali government would like to help but in reality, they're not even in complete control of the capital Mogadishu, let alone a region like Puntland.

Any Hope of Stopping The Pirates?

In response to an upsurge of attacks in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008, international forces have been patrolling the area. It seemed to work in 2009, with hijackings down to around 41 for the first 4 months of the year. However in 2010 a reported 1,181 hostages were seized by pirates with millions of dollars paid in ransom as a result.

By 2012, international naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden were making it difficult for Somali pirates to launch attacks. But, at least 40 vessels and more than 400 hostages are still being held in or just off Somalia, according to the Ecoterra International group which monitors piracy in the region.

For ships further out at sea, it's up to the captains to try and out maneuver these pirates in speedboats, hose them down with fire houses, and even fire back. Insurance premiums on ships in this area are running at an all-time high. And there are still lots of pesky international laws that don't allow any navy ships to just come in and shoot at a non-military vessel. The area where most of pirates operate is about four times the size of Texas, so logistically it's difficult to ensure a safe passage for every ship in these waters. There's also the issue of the crew and keeping them safe. It's difficult to shoot at the pirates without harming the captured crew. The Indian army shot at what they thought was a pirate vessel in November 2008, it turned out to belong to the Thais and several crew members were injured in the attack. See the whole story. Since 2011 some pirates have been captured and six stood trial in Paris in November 2011.

And more pirate attacks are being repelled simply because they are so common now. An "everyday" report from January 2012 reads like this:

MOGADISHU Jan 12 (Reuters) - Somali pirates tried to board a Spanish navy ship off the Horn of Africa nation but it repulsed the attack and arrested six pirates, the European Union Naval Force for Somalia said on Thursday.

A Stable Somalia is the Long-Term Solution

Obviously a safer and more stable Somalia is the real solution and would make much of this go away. Getting an effective government in place should be the first step. News About Somali Pirates

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the early 21st century.[1] Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy.[2] [3] Piracy has impeded the delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an estimated 10 billion a year in global trade. [4] According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable industry of profiteers has also risen around the piracy. Insurance companies, in particular, have profited from the pirate attacks, as insurance premiums have increased significantly. [5] A United Nations report and several news sources have suggested that piracy off the coast of Somalia is caused in part by illegal fishing.[6][7]According to the DIW and the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign vessels has also severely constrained the ability of local fishermen to earn a living and forced many to turn to piracy instead.[5][8] Other articles allege that 70 percent of the local coastal communities "strongly support the piracy as a form of national defense of the country's territorial waters", and that the pirates believe they are protecting their fishing grounds and exacting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen.[9][10][11]Some reports have suggested that, in the absence of an effective national coast guard following the outbreak of the civil war and the subsequent disintegration of the Armed Forces, local fishermen formed organized groups in order to protect their waters. This motivation is reflected in the names taken on by some of the pirate networks, such as the National Volunteer Coast Guard.[12] However, as piracy has become substantially more lucrative in recent years, other reports have suggested that financial gain is now the primary motive for the pirates. [13][14][15] Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, took on the role of fighting Somali piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden.[16] The increasing threat posed by piracy has also caused concern in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by deploying a warship in the region on 23 October 2008. In September 2008, Russia announced that it too would join international efforts to combat piracy.[17] Some reports have also accused certain government officials in Somalia of complicity

with the pirates,[18] with authorities from the Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district reportedly attempting

to use pirate gangs as a bulwark against Islamist insurgents from the nation's southern conflict zones.[19] However, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, both the former and current administrations of the autonomous Puntlandregion in northeastern Somalia appear to be more actively involved in combating piracy.[18] The latter measures include on-land raids on pirate hideouts,[20] and the construction of a new naval base in conjunction with Saracen International, a UK-based security company.[21] By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land and international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean. [20][22][23] As of 21 February 2012, the pirates were holding around 7 large ships with an estimated 191 hostages.[24] By the end of 2011, pirates also managed to seize only four ships off of the coast of Somalia; 18 fewer than the 26 they had captured in each of the two previous years. They also attempted unsuccessful attacks on 52 other vessels, 16 fewer than the year prior. [25] [edit]History During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia received aid from Denmark, Great Britain, Iraq, Japan, Sweden, USSR and West Germany to develop its fishing industry. Prior to this Somali fishing was very limited and close to shore. Fishermen were looked down on by herders and urban workers. Cooperatives had fixed prices for their catch, which was often exported due to the low demand for seafood in Somalia. Aid money improved the ships and supported the construction of maintenance facilities.[26] After the fall of the Barre regime, the income from fishing decreased due to the Somali Civil War. With the collapse of the central government, the Somali Navy ceased to exist as a fighting force. With Somali waters undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fishing in Somali waters, and ships from big companies began dumping waste off Somalia, killing fish. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local fishermen started to band together to protect their resources.[27] Although most of these early defensive forays went unreported, the first recorded incident of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia occurred on May 10, 1991 near Mombasa, when Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) militiamen hijacked a vessel belonging to the Somali Police Force that was transporting refugees to safer shores.[28] Armed pirates in the Indian Ocean nearSomalia. After the picture was taken, the vessel's crew members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the ship's crew members returned fire. One suspected pirate was killed and 12 were taken into custody. Seeengaged pirate vessels Some pirates are former fishermen, whose livelihoods were hurt by foreign ships illegally fishing in Somali waters. [29] After seeing the profitability of piracy, since ransoms are usually paid, warlords and terrorist groups have begun to facilitate pirate activities, splitting the profits with the pirates.[30] In most of the hijackings, the pirates have not harmed their prisoners.[31] Pirates have even attacked World Food Program ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia. As a result, international warships began escorting aid shipments into port.[32] The Transitional Federal Government has made some efforts to combat piracy, occasionally allowing foreign naval vessels into Somali territorial waters.[33]However, many foreign naval vessels chasing pirates have been forced to break off when the pirates entered Somali territorial waters.[34][35] To counter this, in 2008 (and renewed each year since then) the UN passed a resolution allowing international warships to pursue pirates into Somali territorial waters.[36] On the advice of lawyers, the Royal Navy and other international naval forces have often released suspected pirates that they have captured because, although the men are frequently armed, they have not been caught engaging in acts of piracy and have thus not technically committed a crime.[37] The government ofPuntland has made more progress in combating piracy, evident in recent interventions.[38] Due to improved anti-piracy measures the success of piracy acts on sea decreased dramatically by the end of 2011 with onlyfour vessels hijacked in the last quarter versus 17 in the last quarter of the preceeding year.[39] In response, pirates resorted to increased hostage taking on land.[39] [edit]Summary of recent events Main article: List of ships attacked by Somali pirates

Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region, though most attacks do not result in a successful hijacking. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. [40] However, this is only a fraction of the up to 30,000 merchant vessels which pass through that area. [41] The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and "there have been almost daily attacks in March", [40] with 79 attacks,[42] 21 successful, by mid April. Most of these attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden but the Somali pirates have been increasing their range and have started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean. [43][44] Below are some notable pirate events which have garnered significant media coverage since 2007. On 28 May 2007, a Chinese sailor was killed by the pirates because the ship's owners failed to meet their ransom demand. [45] On 5 October 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1838[46] calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to repress the acts of piracy.[47] At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India called for a United Nationspeacekeeping force under unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia.[48] (There has been a general and complete arms embargo against Somalia since 1992.) In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa,Kenya.[49] The frequency and sophistication of the attacks also increased around this time, as did the size of vessels being targeted. Large cargo ships, oil and chemical tankers on international voyages became the new targets of choice for the Somali hijackers. This is in stark contrast to the pirate attacks which were once frequent in the Strait of Malacca, another strategically important waterway for international trade, which were according to maritime security expert Catherine Zara Raymond, generally directed against "smaller, more vulnerable vessels carrying trade across the Straits or employed in the coastal trade on either side of the Straits."[50] On 19 November 2008, the Indian Navy warship INS Tabar sank a suspected pirate mothership.[51] Later, it was claimed to be a Thai trawler being hijacked by pirates.[52] The Indian Navy later defended its actions by stating that they were fired upon first.[53] On 21 November 2008, BBC News reported that the Indian Navy had received United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to combat piracy.[54] On 8 April 2009, four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical miles (440 km; 280 mi) southeast of the Somalia port city of Eyl.[55] The ship was carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons were relief supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya.[56][57] On 12 April 2009, United States Navy SEAL snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after determining that Captain Phillips' life was in immediate danger.[58][59][60] A fourth pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody.[61][62] On May 18, a federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count indictment against him.[63] On 20 April 2009, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch Naval forces who were on a NATO mission.[64] After an attack on the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum tanker, the Dutch frigate De Zeven Provincin tracked the pirates back to a pirate "mother ship" and captured them. [64][65] They confiscated the pirates' weapons and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen whom the pirates had kidnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate "mother ship".[64][65] Since the Dutch Naval Forces were part of a NATO exercise, but not on an EU mission, they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep the pirates so they released them.[64] Clinton stated that this action "sends the wrong signal" and that additional coordination was needed among nations.[64] On 23 April 2009, international donors pledged over $250 million for Somalia, including $134 million to increase the African Union peacekeeping mission from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $34 million for Somali security forces. [66][67] SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a donors' conference sponsored by the U.N. that "Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on the ground", and that "More security on the ground will make less piracy on the seas."[66][67] Somali President Sharif Ahmed pledged at the conference that he would fight piracy and to loud applause said that "It is our duty to pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra firma".[66][67] The Somali government has not gone after pirates because pirate leaders currently have more power than the government. [66][67] It has been estimated by piracy experts that in 2008 the pirates gained about $80 million through ransom payments. [66][67] On 2 May 2009, Somali pirates captured the MV Ariana with its 24 Ukrainian crew.[68] The ship was released on 10 December 2009 after a ransom of almost $3,000,000 was paid.[69]

Suspected pirates keep their hands in the air as directed by the guided-missile cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) as the visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) team prepares to apprehend them. On 8 November 2009, Somali pirates threatened that a kidnapped British couple, the Chandlers, would be "punished" if a German warship did not release seven pirates.[70] Omer, one of the pirates holding the British couple, claimed the seven men were fishermen, but a European Union Naval Force spokesman stated they were captured as they fired AK-47 assault rifles at a French fishing vessel.[70] The Chandlers were released on 14 November 2010 after 388 days of captivity. [71] At least two ransom payments, reportedly over GBP 500 000, had been made.[72] In April 2010, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alluded to possible covert and overt action against the pirates. CIA officials had been publicly warning of this potential threat for months. In a Harpers Magazine article, a CIA official said, "We need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean side, but we don't have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia." [73] On 11 May 2010 Somali pirates seized a Bulgarian-flagged ship in the Gulf of Aden. The Panega, with 15 Bulgarian crew members aboard, was en route from the Red Sea to India or Pakistan. This was the first such hijacking of a Bulgarian-flagged ship. On 12 May 2010, Athens announced that Somali pirates have seized a Greek vessel in the Gulf of Aden with at least 24 people on board, including two Greek citizens and some Filipinos. The vessel, sailing under the Liberian flag, was transporting iron from Ukraine to China. On 14 January 2011, while speaking to reporters, Commodore Michiel Hijmans of the Royal Netherlands Navy stated that the use of hijacked vessels in more recent hijackings had led to increased range of pirating activities, as well as difficulty to actively thwart future events due to the use of kidnapped sailors ashuman shields.[74] On 15 January 2011 thirteen Somali pirates seized the Samho Jewelry, a Maltese-flagged chemical carrier operated by Samho Shipping, 650 km southeast of Muscat. The Republic of Korea Navydestroyer Choi Young shadowed the Samho Jewlry for several days. In the early morning of 21 January 2011, 25 ROK Navy SEALs on small boats launched from the Choi Young boarded the Samho Jewelry while the Choi Youngs Westland Super Lynx provided covering fire. Eight pirates were killed and five captured in the operation; the crew of 21 was freed with the Captain suffering a gunshot wound to the stomach. [75] On 28 January 2011, an Indian Coast Guard aircraft while responding to a distress call from the CMA CGM Verdi, located two skiffs attempting a piracy attack near Lakshadweep. Seeing the aircraft, the skiffs immediately aborted their piracy attempt and dashed towards the mother vessel, MV Prantalay 14 a hijacked Thai trawler, which hurriedly hoisted the two skiffs on board and moved westward. The Indian Navy deployed the INS Cankarso which located and engaged the mothership 100 nautical miles north of the Minicoy island. 10 pirates were killed while 15 were apprehended and 20 Thai and Myanmarese fishermen being held aboard the ship as hostages were rescued.[76] Within a week of its previous success, the Indian Navy captured another hijacked Thai trawler, MV Prantalay 11 and captured 28 pirates aboard in an operation undertaken by the INS Tir purusuant to receiving information that a Greek merchant ship had been attacked by pirates on board high-speed boats, although it had managed to avoid capture. When INS Tir ordered the pirate ship to stop and be boarded for inspection, it was fired upon. The INS Tir returned fire in which 3 pirates were injured and caused the pirates to raise a white flag indicating their surrender. The INS Tir subsequently joined by CGS Samar of the Indian Coast Guard. Officials from the Indian Navy reported that a total of 52 men were apprehended, but that 24 are suspected to be Thai fishermen who were hostages of the 28 African pirates.[77] In late February 2011, piracy targeting smaller yachts and collecting ransom made headlines when four Americans were killed aboard their vessel, the Quest, by their captors, while a military ship shadowed them. [78] A federal court in Norfolk, Virginia, sentenced three members of the gang that seized the yacht to life imprisonment. [79] On 24 February 2011 a Danish family on a yacht were captured by pirates.[80] In March 2011, the Indian Navy intercepted a pirate mother vessel 600 nautical miles west of the Indian coast in the Arabian Sea on Monday and rescued 13 hostages. Sixty-one pirates have also been caught in the operation carried out by Navy's INS Kalpeni.[81]

In late March 2011, Indian Navy seized 16 Somali pirates after a three-hour-long battle in the Arabian Sea, The navy also rescued 16 crew members of a hijacked Iranian ship west of the Lakshadweep Islands. The crew included 12 Iranians and four Pakistanis.[82] On Jan. 5 2012, an SH-60S Seahawk from the guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd, part of the USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group, detected a suspected pirate skiff alongside the Iranian-flagged fishing boat, Al Molai. The master of the Al Molai sent a distress call about the same time reporting pirates were holding him captive. A visit, board, search and seizure team from the Kidd boarded the dhow, a traditional Arabian sailing vessel, and detained 15 suspected pirates who had been holding a 13member Iranian crew hostage for several weeks. The Al Molai had been pirated and used as a "mother ship" for pirate operations throughout the Persian Gulf, members of the Iranian vessel's crew reported. [83] In early May 2010, Russian special forces retook a Russian oil tanker that had been hijacked by 11 pirates. One died in the assault, and a week later Russian military officials reported that the remainder were freed due to weaknesses in international law but died before reaching the Somali coast. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had announced the day the ship was retaken that "We'll have to do what our forefathers did when they met the pirates" until a suitable way of prosecuting them was availab A collage of pirates armed with AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers and semi-automatic pistols. Many pirates are 2035 years old and come from the region of Puntland, in northeastern Somalia. The East African Seafarers' Association estimates that there are at least five pirate gangs and a total of 1,000 armed men.[85] According to a BBC report, the pirates can be divided into three main categories:

Local Somali fishermen, considered the brains of the pirates' operations due to their skill and knowledge of the sea. Many think that foreign boats have no right to cruise next to the shore and destroy their boats. Ex-militiamen, who previously fought for the local clan warlords, or ex-military from the former Barre government used as the muscle. Technical experts, who operate equipment such as GPS devices.[86]

Many of the Puntland group of pirates received sophisticated training on weapons, engines and navigation from three separate mainly Western "security" companies, such as Som Can, that were contracted by the Puntland government. They trained locals to protect inshore fishermen initially, and were also authorised by the government to sell fishing licences to foreign fishermen on a share basis. All of the companies either collapsed or were forced out leaving a large pool of highly trained seamen who form the nucleus of the pirates. According to Globalsecurity.org, there are four main groups operating off the Somali coast. The National Volunteer Coast Guard, commanded by Garaad Mohamed, is said to specialize in intercepting small boats and fishing vessels around Kismayo on the southern coast. The Marka group, under the command of Yusuf Mohammed Siad Inda'ade, is made up of several scattered and less organized groups operating around the town of Marka. The third significant pirate group is composed of traditional Somali fishermen operating around Puntland and referred to as the Puntland Group. The last set are the Somali Marines, reputed to be the most powerful and sophisticated of the pirate groups with a military structure, a fleet admiral, admiral, vice-admiral and a head of financial operations.[87] The conduct of a typical pirate attack has been analyzed[88] and shows that while attacks can be expected at any time, most occur during the day, often in the early hours. They may involve two or more skiffs that can reach speeds of up to 25 knots. With the help of motherships that include captured fishing and merchant vessels the operating range of the skiffs has been increased far into the Indian Ocean. An attacked vessel is approached from quarter or stern; RPGs and small arms are used to intimidate the operator to slow down and allow boarding. Light ladders are brought along to climb aboard. Pirates then will try and get control of the bridge to take operational control of the vessel. [88] The closest Somali term for 'pirate' is burcad badeed, which means "ocean robber". But the pirates themselves prefer to be called badaadinta badah, or "saviours of the sea", or in the English "coastguard",[89] as they claimed that their action was for "protection of his sea, the native [Somali] waters". [edit]Effects and perceptions

There have been both positive and negative effects of the pirates' economic success. Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed men makes them feel insecure, and that their free spending ways cause wild fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Others fault them for excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages and khat.[86] On the other hand, many other residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their impoverished towns, a presence which has often provided jobs and opportunity when there were none. Entire hamlets have in the process been transformed into veritable boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- "allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury."[90] Local fishermen in the Malindi area of Kenya to the south have reported their largest catches in forty years, catching hundreds of kilos of fish and earning fifty times the average daily wage as a result. They attribute the recent abundance of marine stock to the pirates scaring away the foreign fishing trawlers, which it is claimed have for decades deprived local dhows of a livelihood. Marine biologists agree, saying that the indicators are that the local fishery is recovering because of the lack of commercial scale fishing.[91] The Somali piracy appears to have a positive impact on the problem of overfishing in Somali waters by foreign vessels, as a comparison has been made with the situation in Tanzania further to the south, which suffers from the same problem, and also lacks the means to enforce the protection and regulation of its territorial waters. There, the catches have dropped to dramatic low levels, whereas in Somalia they have risen back to more acceptable levels since the beginning of the piracy. [92] [edit]Weaponry and funding The pirates get most of their weapons from Yemen, but a significant amount come from Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Weapons dealers in the capital receive a deposit from a hawala dealer on behalf of the pirates and the weapons are then driven to Puntland where the pirates pay the balance.[86] Various photographs of pirates in situ indicate that their weapons are predominantly AKMs, RPG-7s, AK47s, and semi-automatic pistols such as the TT-30.[93][94] Additionally, given the particular origin of their weaponry, they are likely to have hand grenades such as the RGD-5 or F1. The funding of piracy operations is now structured in a stock exchange, with investors buying and selling shares in upcoming attacks in a bourse in Harardhere.[95] Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew.[96] To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas.[90] Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their release.[97] In 2008, there were also allegations that the pirates received assistance from some members of the Somali diaspora. Somali expatriates, including some members of the Somali community in Canada, reputedly offered funds, equipment and information.[98] According to the head of the U.N.'s counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, the Al-Shabaab group in 2011 increasingly sought to cooperate with the pirate gangs in the face of dwindling funds and resources for their own activities.[99] Steed, however, acknowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties between the pirates and the Islamist militants. Detained pirates also indicated toUNODC officials that some measure of cooperation with Al-Shabaab militants was necessary, as they have increasingly launched maritime raids from areas in southern Somalia controlled by the insurgent outfit. Al-Shabaab members have also extorted the pirates, demanding protection money from them and forcing seized pirate gang leaders in Harardhere to hand over 20% of future ransom proceeds.[100] There have also been ties with al-Qaeda receiving funding from pirate operations. A maritime intelligence source told CBS News that it was inconceivable to Western intelligence agencies that al Qaeda would not be getting some financial reward from the successful hijackings. They go on to express concern about this funding link being able to keep the group satisfied as piracy gains more publicity and higher ransoms. [101] [edit]Economic issues [edit]General

The purpose of piracy is to get ransom money for release of the crew, ship, and cargo. Pirates' income from ransom has been estimated to be about 39 million euro (about $58 million) in 2009 [102] and $238 million in 2010.[103] The average ransom had risen to $5.4 million in 2010, up from around $150 thousand in 2005. [104] However, indirect costs of piracy are much higher and estimated to be between $7 to 12 billion as they also include insurance, naval support, legal proceedings, re-routing of slower ships, and individual protective steps taken by ship-owners.[103] Further, piracy in Somalia leads to a decrease of revenue for Egypt as fewer ships use the Suez canal (estimated loss of about $642 million), impedes trade with a number of countries such as Kenya and Yemen, and is detrimental to tourism and fishing in the Seychelles.[103][105] A 2011 report published by Geopolicity Inc, investigated the causes and consequences of international piracy, with a particular focus on piracy emanating from Somalia. The report asserts that piracy is an emerging market in its own right, valued at between US$4.9-8.3 billion in 2010 alone, and it establishes, for the first time, an economic model for assessing the costs and benefits of international piracy. This model provides a comprehensive, independent framework of trend analysis, whilst also highlighting where the greatest rates of return on international counter pirate investment and policy are to be found across what Geopolicity term the Pirate Value Chain. The report states that the number of pirates could double by 2016, increasing by 400 each year. This is being fuelled by attractive financial incentives with Somali pirates earning up to US$79,000/year; equating to almost 150 times their countrys national average wage.[106] [edit]Human cost Somali piracy operations exact significant human cost. Of the 4,185 seafarers who had been attacked and the 1,090 who were held hostage in 2010, a third were abused.[107] According to Reuters, of the 3,500 captives during a four year period, 62 died. The causes of death were murder, suicide and malnutrition.[108] Many seafarers are also left traumatized after release.[108] On the Somali side, youth is directed into a perilous life of criminal activity. [107] [edit]Profiteers According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable industry of profiteers has also risen around the piracy. Insurance companies, in particular, have profited from the pirate attacks, as insurance premiums have increased significantly. DIW claims that, in order to keep premiums high, insurance firms have not demanded that ship owners take security precautions that would make hijackings more difficult. For their part, shipping companies often do not comply with naval guidelines on how best to prevent pirate attacks in order to cut down on costs. Ship crews have also been reluctant to repel the pirates on account of their low wages and inequitable work contracts. In addition, security contractors and the German arms industry have profited from the phenomenon.[5] [edit]Sovereignty and environmental protection The former UN envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that "because there is no (effective) government, there is ... much irregular fishing from European and Asian countries,"[109] and that the UN has what he described as "reliable information" that European and Asian companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the Somali coastline.[110] However, he stresses that "no government has endorsed this act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible."[110] In addition, Ould-Abdallah told the press that he approached several international NGOs, such as Global Witness, to trace the illicit fishing and waste-dumping. He added that he believes the toxic waste dumping is "a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster (for) the Somali environment, the Somali population", and that what he terms "this illegal fishing, illegal dumping of waste" helps fuel the civil war in Somalia since the illegal foreign fishermen pay off corrupt local officials or warlords for protection or to secure counterfeit licenses.[109] Ould-Abdallah noted that piracy will not prevent waste dumping: I am convinced there is dumping of solid waste, chemicals and probably nuclear (waste).... There is no government (control) and there are few people with high moral ground[...] The intentions of these pirates are not concerned with protecting their environment. What is ultimately needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and take control of its affairs. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN envoy for Somalia[110] Somali pirates which captured MV Faina, a Ukrainian ship carrying tanks and military hardware, accused European firms of dumping toxic waste off the Somali coast and declared that the $8m ransom for the return of the ship will go towards cleaning up

the waste. The ransom demand is a means of "reacting to the toxic waste that has been continually dumped on the shores of our country for nearly 20 years", Januna Ali Jama, a spokesman for the pirates said. "The Somali coastline has been destroyed, and we believe this money is nothing compared to the devastation that we have seen on the seas." [110] These issues have generally not been reported in international media when reporting on piracy. [111][112] According to Muammar al-Gaddafi, "It is a response to greedy Western nations, who invade and exploit Somalias water resources illegally. It is not a piracy, it is self defence."[113] Pirate leader Sugule Ali said their motive was "to stop illegal fishing and dumping in our waters ... We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits [to be] those who illegally fish and dump in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas." Also, the independent Somali news-site WardherNews found that 70 percent "strongly supported the piracy as a form of national defence of the country's territorial waters".[114] [edit]Waste dumping See also: Radioactive waste dumping by the 'Ndrangheta Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, there have emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in late 1991, Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste. The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tonnes of nuclear and toxic waste that was illegally dumped in Somali waters by several European firms front companies created by the Italian mafia.[115] The European Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and theEuropean Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two European companiesthe Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian waste broker, Progresso and representatives of the warlords then in power, to accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about 60 million). According to a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assessment mission, there are far higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal hemorrhages and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the northeastern towns of Hobbio and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coastdiseases consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP continues that the current situation along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia but also in the eastern Africa sub-region.[115][116] In 1992, reports ran in the European press of "unnamed European firms" contracting with local warlords to dump toxic waste both in Somalia and off Somalia's shores. The United Nations Environment Program was called in to investigate, and the Italian parliament issued a report later in the decade. Several European "firms" really front companies created by the Italian mafia contracted with local Somali warlords to ship hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic industrial waste from Europe to Somalia. Troy S. Thomas, Warlords rising: confronting violent non-state actors[117] Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for "any transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international law".[118] According to Nick Nuttall of the United Nations Environmental Programme, "Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there", and "European companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as $2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a tonne."[110][119] [edit]Illegal fishing At the same time, foreign trawlers began illegally fishing Somalia's seas, with an estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year, depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. Through interception with speedboats, Somali fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and trawlers or levy a "tax" on them as compensation, as Segule Ali's previously mentioned quote notes. Peter Lehr, a Somalia piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews says "It's almost like a resource swap, Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somali waters."[29][120] The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) issued a report in 2005 stating that, between 2003 and 2004, Somalia lost about $100 million in revenue due to illegal tuna and shrimp fishing in the country's exclusive economic zone by foreign trawlers.[6]

According to Roger Middleton of Chatham House, "The problem of overfishing and illegal fishing in Somali waters is a very serious one, and does affect the livelihoods of people inside Somalia [...] the dumping of toxic waste on Somalia's shores is a very serious issue, which will continue to affect people in Somalia long after the war has ended, and piracy is resolved." [121] To lure fish to their traps, foreign trawlers reportedly also use fishing equipment under prohibition such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting systems.[109] Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention: "In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment". Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction: "The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured".[122] [edit]Anti-piracy measures [edit]Self-defense The third volume of the handbook: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area (known as BMP3) is the current authoritative guide for merchant ships on self-defense against pirates. The guide is issued and updated by a consortium of interested international shipping and trading organizations including the EU, NATO and the International Maritime Bureau.[88] It is distributed primarily by the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) the planning and coordination authority for EU naval forces (EUNAVFOR). BMP3 encourages vessels to register their voyages through the region with MSCHOA as this registration is a key component of the operation of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) (the navy patrolled route through the Gulf of Aden). BMP3 also contains a chapter entitled "SelfProtective Measures" which lays out a list of steps a merchant vessel can take on its own to make itself less of a target to pirates and make it better able to repel an attack if one occurs. This list includes doing thing like ringing the deck of the ship with razor wire, rigging fire-hoses to spray sea-water over the side of the ship (to hinder boardings), having a distinctive pirate alarm, hardening the bridge against gunfire and creating a "citadel" where the crew can retreat in the event pirates get on board. Other unofficial self-defense measures that can be found on merchant vessels include the setting up of mannequins posing as armed guards or firing flares at the pirates.[123] Though it varies by country, generally peacetime law in the 20th and 21st centuries has not allowed merchant vessels to carry weapons. As a response to the rise in modern piracy, however, the U.S. Government changed its rules so that it is now possible for US flagged vessels to embark a team of armed private security guards. Other countries and organisations have similarly followed suit.[124]This has given birth to a new breed of private security companies who provide training and protection for crew members and cargo and have proved effective in countering pirate attacks. [125][126] The USCG leaves it to ship owners' discretion to determine if those guards will be armed.[127][128] With safety trials complete in the late 2000s, dazer lasers have been developed for defensive purposes on super-yachts.[129] They can be effective up to 2.5 miles with the effects going from mild disorientation to flash blindness at closer range. In February 2012, Italian Marines based on the tanker Enrica Rexie fired on an Indian fishing trawler off Kerala, killing two of her eleven crew. The Marines had mistook the fishing vessel as a pirate vessel. The incident sparked a diplomatic row between India and Italy. Enrica Rexie was ordered into Kochi where her crew were questioned by officers of the Indian Police.[130] [edit]Military presence The military response to pirate attacks has brought about a rare show of unity by countries that are either openly hostile to each other, or at least wary of cooperation, military or otherwise. Currently there are three international naval task forces in the region, with numerous national vessels and task forces entering and leaving the region, engaging in counter-piracy operations for various lengths of time. The three international task forces which comprise the bulk of counter-piracy operations are Combined Task Force 150 (whose overarching mission is Operation Enduring Freedom),Combined Task Force 151 (which was set up in 2009 specifically to run counter-piracy operations)[131] and the EU naval task force operating under Operation Atalanta. All counter-

piracy operations are coordinated through a monthly planning conference called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE).[132] Originally having representatives only from NATO, the EU, and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) HQ in Bahrain, it now regularly attracts representatives from over 20 countries. As part of the international effort, Europe plays a significant role in combating piracy of the Horn of Africa. The European Union under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched EU NAVFOR Somalia Operation Atalanta (in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)). This operation is working to protect humanitarian aid and reduce the disruption to the shipping routes and the de-stabilising of the maritime environment in the region. To date, 26 countries have brought some kind of contribution to the operation. 13 EU Member States have provided an operational contribution to EU NAVFOR, either with ships, with maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, or with Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) team. This includes France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom (also hosting the EU NAVFOR Operational headquarters), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia. 9 other EU Member States have participated in the effort providing military staff to work at the EU NAVFOR Operational Headquarters (Northwood Headquarters UK) or onboard units. These are Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland and Finland. Finally, 4 non EU Member States, Norway (who has also provided an operational contribution with a warship regularly deploying), Croatia, Ukraine and Montenegro have so far also brought their contribution to EU NAVFOR. At any one time, the European force size fluctuates according to the monsoon seasons, which determine the level of piracy. It typically consists of 5 to 10 Surface Combatants (Naval ships), 1 to 2 Auxiliary ships and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft. Including land-based personnel, Operation Atalanta consists of a total of around 2,000 military personnel. EU NAVFOR operates in a zone comprising the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the western part of the Indian Ocean including the Seychelles, which represents an area of 2,000,000 square nautical miles. Additionally, there are, and have been, several naval deployments by non-multinational task forces in the past. Some notable ones include: On 29 May 2009, Australia pledged its support, re-directing Australian Warship, HMAS Warramunga from duties in the Persian Gulf to assist in the fighting of Piracy.[133] On 26 December 2008, China dispatched two warships Haikou (171), Wuhan (169) and the supply ship Weishanhu (887) to the Gulf of Aden. A team of 16 Chinese Special Forces members from its Marine Corps armed with attack helicopters were on board.[134][135] Subsequent to their initial deployment, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply ship in the Gulf of Aden by assigning ships from the South Sea Fleet and/or East Sea Fleet to the area on a three month basis.

Members of the U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement and the visit, board, search, and seizure team embarked aboard USS Princeton (CG 59) engage in a mock assault operation in the Red Sea. The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy both support the actions of the Combined Maritime Forces Task Force 151 in their antipiracy missions in the area.[136] To protect Indian ships and Indian citizens employed in sea-faring duties, Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from 23 Oct 08. A total of 21[137] IN ships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since Oct 08. In addition to escorting Indian flagged ships, ships of other countries have also been escorted. Merchant ships are currently being escorted along the entire length of the (490 nm long and 20 nm wide) Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) that has been promulgated for use by all merchant vessels. A total of 1181 ships (144 Indian flagged and 1037 foreign flagged from different countries) have been escorted by IN ships in the Gulf of Aden since Oct 08. During its deployments for anti-piracy operations, the Indian Naval ships have prevented 15 piracy attempts on merchant vessels. In response to the increased activity of the INS Tabar, India sought to augment its naval force in the Gulf of Aden by deploying the larger INS Mysore to patrol the area. Somalia also added India to its list of states, including the U.S. and France, who are permitted to enter its territorial waters, extending up to 12nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) from the coastline, in an effort to check piracy.[138] An Indian naval official confirmed receipt of a letter acceding to India's prerogative to check such piracy. "We had put up a request before the Somali government to play a greater role in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden in view of the United Nations resolution. The TFG government gave its nod recently."[139] India also expressed consideration to deploy up to four

more warshipsin the region.[140][141] On 14 March 2011, the Indian navy reportedly had seized 61 pirates and rescued 13 crew from the vessel, which had been used as a mother ship from where pirates launched attacks around the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, a Bangladeshi ship hijacked by pirates last year was freed after a ransom was paid. [142] Norway announced on 27 February 2009, that it would send the frigate HNoMS Fridtjof Nansen to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy. Royal Norwegian NavyFridtjof Nansen joined EU NAVFOR's international naval force in August.[143] Russia also chose to send more warships to combat piracy near Somalia following the announcement from the International Maritime Bureau terming the menace as having gone "out of control."[144] Due to their proximity to Somalia, the coast guard of Seychelles has become increasingly involved in counter-piracy in the region. On 30 March 2010, aSeychelles Coast Guard Trinkat class patrol vessel rescued 27 hostages and sank two pirate vessels. Other non-NATO and non-EU countries have, at one time or another, contributed to counter-piracy operations. Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Iran have all sent ships to the region, sometimes joining with the existing CTFs, sometimes operating independently.[145] A maritime conference was also held in Mombasa to discuss the rising concern of regional piracy with a view to give regional and world governments recommendations to deal with the menace. TheInternational Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) organised the regional African maritime unions conference, the first of its kind in Africa. Godfrey Matata Onyango, executive secretary of the Northern Corridor Transit Coordination Authority said that "We cannot ignore to discuss the piracy menace because it poses a huge challenge to the maritime industry and if not controlled, it threats to chop off the regional internal trade. The cost of shipping will definitely rise as a result of the increased war insurance premium due to the high risk off the Gulf of Aden."[citation needed][146][dead link] In 2008 Pakistan offered the services of the Pakistan Navy to the United Nations in order to help combat the piracy in Somalia "provided a clear mandate was given."[